Volume 5 — CONTENTS (continued 5)

It was with this persuasion, and in a reliance on public faith, that they received paper money in exchange for their merchandise, and kept that paper with a view to employ it in new speculations of commerce. The unexpected reduction of this paper overturns all their calculations at the same time that it ruins their fortune. I ask, Sir, if these consequences can induce you to believe, that this act of Congress is proper to advance the credit of the United States, to inspire a confidence in their promises, to invite the European nations to run the same risks, to which the subjects of his Majesty have exposed themselves?

These, Sir, are the principal reflections occasioned by the resolution of Congress of the 18th of March. I thought it my duty to communicate them to you with an entire confidence, because you are too enlightened not to feel their force and justice, and too much attached to your country, not to use all your endeavors to engage it to take steps to do justice to the subjects of the King.

I will not conceal from you, that the Chevalier de la Luzerne has received orders to make the strongest representations on this subject, and that the King is firmly persuaded, that the United States will be forward to give to him, on this occasion, a mark of their attachment by granting to his subjects the just satisfaction, which they solicit and expect, from the wisdom and justice of the United States.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, June 22d, 1780.

Sir,

I received this day the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to write me on the 21st of this month.

I thank your Excellency for the confidence, which induced you to communicate this letter to me, and the continuance of which I shall ever study to deserve.

When your Excellency says, that his Majesty's Minister at Congress has already received orders to make representations against the resolutions of Congress of the 18th of March, as far as they effect his subjects, I am at a loss to know with certainty, whether your Excellency means only, that such orders have lately passed, and are sent off to go to America, or whether you mean, that such orders were sent so long ago as to have reached the hand of the Chevalier de la Luzerne.

If the latter is your Excellency's meaning, there is no remedy; if the former, I would submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether those orders may not be stopped and delayed a little time, until his Excellency Mr Franklin may have opportunity to make his representations to his Majesty's Ministers, to the end, that if it should appear, that those orders were issued in consequence of misinformation, they may be revoked, otherwise sent on.

I will do myself the honor to write fully to your Excellency upon this subject without loss of time, and although it is a subject on which I pretend not to an accurate knowledge in the detail, yet I flatter myself I am so far master of the principles as to demonstrate, that the plan of Congress is not only wise, but just.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, June 22d, 1780.

Sir,

I this day acknowledge the receipt of the letter, which you did me the honor to write to me on the 21st.

I have the honor to agree with your Excellency in opinion, that it is the intention of Congress to redeem all their paper bills which are extant, at an exchange of forty for one, by which means, the two hundred millions of dollars, which are out, will be reduced to about five millions.

I apprehend, with your Excellency, that it was necessary for the Congress to put themselves in a condition to defray the public expenses. They found their currency to be so depreciated, and so rapidly depreciating, that a further emission sufficient to discharge the public expenses another year, would have, probably, depreciated it to two hundred for one; perhaps, would have so totally discredited it, that nobody would have taken it at any rate. It was absolutely necessary, then, to stop emitting. Yet it was absolutely necessary to have an army to save their cities from the fire, and their citizens from the sword. That army must be fed, clothed, paid, and armed, and other expenses must be defrayed. It had become necessary, therefore, at this time, to call in their paper; for there is no nation that is able to carry on war by the taxes, which can be raised within the year. But I am far from thinking, that this necessity was the cause of their calling it in at a depreciated value, because I am well convinced that they would have called it in at a depreciated value, if the British fleet and army had been withdrawn from the United States, and a general peace had been concluded. My reason for this belief is, the evident injustice of calling it in at its nominal value, a silver dollar for a paper one. The public has its rights as well as individuals; and every individual has a share in the rights of the public. Justice is due to the body politic, as well as to the possessor of the bills; and to have paid off the bills at their nominal value, would have wronged the body politic of thirtynine dollars in every forty, as really as if forty dollars had been paid for one, at the first emission in 1775, when each paper dollar was worth, and would fetch a silver one.

I beg leave to ask your Excellency, whether you judge that the Congress ought to pay two hundred millions of silver dollars, for the two hundred millions of paper dollars which are abroad? I presume your Excellency will not think that they ought; because I have never met with any man in America or in Europe, that was of that opinion. All agree, that Congress ought to redeem it at a depreciated value. The only question then, is, at what depreciation? Shall it be at seventyfive, forty, thirty, twenty, ten, or five, for one? After it is once admitted, that it ought to be redeemed at a less value than the nominal, the question arises, at what value? What rule? I answer, there is no other rule of justice than the current value, the value at which it generally passes from man to man. The Congress have set it at forty for one; and they are the best judges of this, as they represent all parts of the continent where the paper circulates.

I think there can be little need of illustration; but two or three examples may make my meaning more obvious. A farmer has now four thousand dollars for a pair of oxen, which he sells to a commissary to subsist the army. When the money was issued in 1775, he would have been glad to have taken one hundred. A laborer has now twenty dollars a day for his work; five years ago, he would have been rejoiced to have received half a dollar. The same with the artisan, merchant, and all others, but those who have fixed salaries, or money at interest. Most of these persons would be willing to take hard money for his work and his produce, at the rate he did six years ago. Where is the reason, then, that Congress should pay them forty times as much as they take of their neighbors in private life?

The amount of an ordinary commerce, external and internal, of a society, may be computed at a fixed sum. A certain sum of money is necessary to circulate among the society, in order to carry on their business. This precise sum is discoverable by calculation, and reducible to certainty. You may emit paper, or any other currency for this purpose, until you reach this rule, and it will not depreciate. After you exceed this rule, it will depreciate; and no power, or act of legislation hitherto invented, will prevent it. In the case of paper, if you go on emitting forever, the whole mass will be worth no more than that was, which was emitted within the rule. When the paper, therefore, comes to be redeemed, this is the only rule of justice for the redemption of it. The Congress have fixed five millions for this rule. Whether this is mathematically exact, I am not able to say; whether it is a million too little, or too much, I know not. But they are the best judges; and by the accounts of the money being at seventy for one, and bills of exchange at fiftyfive for one, it looks as if five millions was too high a sum, rather than too small.

It will be said, that the faith of society ought to be sacred, and that the Congress have pledged the public faith for the redemption of the bills, at the value on the face of them. I agree that the public faith ought to be sacred. But who is it that has violated this faith? Is it not every man, who has demanded more paper money for his labor or his goods than they were worth in silver? The public faith, in the sense these words are here used, would require that Congress should make up to every man, who for five years past has paid more in paper money for anything he has purchased, than he could have had it for in silver. The public faith is no more pledged to the present possessor of the bills, than it is to every man, through whose hands they may have passed, at a less value than the nominal value. So that according to this doctrine, Congress would have two hundred millions of dollars to pay to the present possessors of the bills, and to make up to every man, through whose hands they may have passed, the difference at which they passed between them and silver.

It should be considered, that every man, whether native or foreigner, who receives or pays this money at a less value than the nominal value, breaks this faith. For the social compact being between the whole and every individual, and between every individual and the whole, every individual, native or foreigner, who uses this paper, is as much bound by the public faith to use it according to the terms of its emission as the Congress is. And Congress have as good a right to reproach every individual, who now demands more paper for his goods than silver, with a breach of the public faith, as he has to reproach the public or their representatives.

I must beg your Excellency's excuse for calling your attention a little longer to this head of public faith, because I cannot rest easy, while my country is supposed to be guilty of a breach of their faith, and in a case where I am clear they have not been so, especially by your Excellency, whose good opinion they and I value so much. This public faith is in the nature of a mutual covenant, and he who would claim a benefit under it, ought to be careful in first fulfilling his part of it. When Congress issued their bills, declaring them, in effect, to be equal to silver, they unquestionably intended that they should be so considered, and that they should be received accordingly. The people, or individuals covenanted, in effect, to receive them at their nominal value; and Congress, in such case, agreed on their part to redeem them at the same rate. This seems to be a fair and plain construction of this covenant, or public faith; and none other I think can be made, that will not degenerate into an unconscionable contract, and so destroy itself.

Can it be supposed, that Congress ever intended, that if the time should come when the individual refused to accept and receive their bills at their nominal value, and demanded, and actually received them at a less value, that, in that case, the individual should be entitled to demand, and receive of the public, for those very bills, silver equal to their nominal value? The consideration is, in fact, made by the public at the very instant the individual receives the bills at a discount; and there is a tacit and implied agreement springing from the principles of natural justice or equity, between the public and the individual; that as the latter has not given to the former a consideration equal to the nominal value of the bills, so in fact, the public shall not be held to pay the nominal value in silver to the individual. Suppose it otherwise, and how will the matter stand? The public offers to an individual a bill, whose nominal value is, for example, forty dollars, in lieu of forty silver dollars; the individual says, I esteem it of no more value than one silver dollar, and the public pays it to him at that value; yet he comes the next day, when the bill may be payable, and demands of the public forty silver dollars in exchange for it. And why? Because the bill purports on the face of it, to be equal to forty silver dollars. The answer is equally obvious with the injustice of the demand. Upon the whole, as the depreciation crept in gradually, and was unavoidable, all reproaches of a breach of public faith ought to be laid aside; and the only proper inquiry now really is, what is paper honestly worth? What will it fetch at market? And this is the only just rule of redemption.

It becomes me to express myself with deference, when I am obliged to differ in opinion from your Excellency; but this being a subject peculiar to America, no example entirely similar to it, that I know of, having been in Europe, I may be excused, therefore, in explaining my sentiments upon it.

I have the misfortune to differ from your Excellency, so far as to think, that no general distinction can be made between natives and foreigners. For, not to mention that this would open a door to numberless frauds, I think, that foreigners when they come to trade with a nation, make themselves temporary citizens, and tacitly consent to be bound by the same laws. And it will be found, that foreigners have had quite as much to do, in depreciating this money, in proportion, as natives, and that they have been in proportion much less sufferers by it. I might go further and say, that they have been in proportion greater gainers by it, without suffering any considerable share of the loss.

The paper bills out of America, are next to nothing. I have no reason to think, that there are ten thousand dollars in all Europe; indeed, I do not know of one thousand. The agents in America of merchants in Europe, have laid out their paper bills in lands, or in indigo, rice, tobacco, wheat, flour, &c.; in short, in the produce of the country. This produce they have shipped to Europe, sold to the King's ships, and received bills of exchange, or shipped to the West India Islands, where they have procured cash, or bills of exchange. The surplus they have put into the loan offices from time to time, for loan offices have been open all along, from 1776, I believe, to this time. Whenever any person lent paper bills to the public, and took loan office certificates, he would have been glad to have taken silver in exchange for the bills, at their then depreciated value. Why should he not be willing now? Those who lent paper, when two paper dollars were worth one in silver, will have one for two; those who lent, when forty were worth one, will have one for forty; and those who lent, when paper was as good as silver, will have dollar for dollar.

Your Excellency thinks it would be hard, that those who have escaped the perils of the seas and of enemies, should be spoiled by their friends. But Congress have not spoiled any; they have only prevented themselves and the public from being spoiled. No agent of any European merchant, in making his calculations of profit and loss, ever estimated the depreciated bills at the nominal value; they all put a profit upon their goods sufficient to defray all expenses of insurance, freight, and everything else, and had a great profit besides, receiving the bills at the current, not the nominal value.

It may not be amiss to state a few prices current at Boston the last and the present year, in order to show the profits which have been made. Bohea tea, forty sous a pound at L'Orient and Nantes, fortyfive dollars; salt, which costs very little in Europe, and used to be sold for a shilling a bushel, forty dollars a bushel, and in some of the other States, two hundred dollars, at times; linens, which cost two livres a yard in France, forty dollars a yard; broadcloths, a louis d'or a yard here, two hundred dollars a yard; ironmongery of all sorts, one hundred and twenty for one; millinary of all sorts, at an advance far exceeding. These were the prices at Boston. At Philadelphia, and in all the other States, they were much higher. These prices, I think, must convince your Excellency that allowing one half, or even two thirds of the vessels to be taken, there is room enough for a handsome profit, deducting all charges, and computing the value of bills at the rate of silver at the time.

There are two other sources from which foreigners have made great profits. The difference between bills of exchange and silver. During the whole of our history, when a man could readily get twentyfive paper dollars for one in silver, he could not get more than twelve paper dollars for one, in a bill of exchange. Nearly this proportion was observed all along, as I have been informed. The Agent of a foreign merchant had only to sell his goods for paper, or buy paper with silver at twentyfive for one, and immediately go and buy bills at twelve for one. So that he doubled his money in a moment.

Another source was this; the paper money was not alike depreciated in all places at the same time. It was forty for one at Philadelphia, sometimes, when it was only twenty at Boston. The agent of a foreign merchant had only to sell his goods, or send silver to Philadelphia, and exchange it for paper, which he could lay out at Boston for twice what it cost him, and in this way again double his property.

This depreciating paper currency being, therefore, such a fruitful source for men of penetration to make large profits, it is not to be wondered that some have written alarming letters to their correspondents.

No man is more ready than I am to acknowledge the obligations we are under to France; but the flourishing state of her marine and commerce, and the decisive influence of her councils and negotiations in Europe, which all the world will allow to be owing in a great measure to the separation of America from her inveterate enemy, and to her new connexions with the United States, show that the obligations are mutual. And no foreign merchant ought to expect to be treated in America better than her native merchants, who have hazarded their property through the same perils of the seas and of enemies.

In the late Province of the Massachusetts Bay, from the years 1745 to 1750, we had full experience of the operation of paper money. The Province engaged in expensive expeditions against Louisburg and Canada, which occasioned a too plentiful emission of paper money, in consequence of which, it depreciated to seven and a half for one. In 1750, the British Parliament granted a sum of money to the Province to reimburse it, for what it had expended more than its proportion in the general expense of the empire. This sum was brought over to Boston in silver and gold, and the Legislature determined to redeem all their paper with it at the depreciated value. There was a similar alarm at first, and before the matter was understood, but after the people had time to think upon it, all were satisfied to receive silver at fifty shillings an ounce, although the face of the bills promised an ounce of silver for every six shillings and eight pence. At that time, the British merchants were more interested in our paper money, in proportion, than any Europeans now are; yet they did not charge the Province with a breach of faith, or stigmatise this as an act of bankruptcy. On the contrary, they were satisfied with it.

I beg leave to remind your Excellency, that at that time, the laws of Massachusetts were subject not only to the negative of the King's Governor, but to a revision by the King in Council, and were there liable to be affirmed or annulled. And from the partial preference, which your Excellency well knows, was uniformly given to the subjects of the King, within the realm, when they came in competition with those of the subjects of the Colonies, there is no reason to doubt, that if that measure, when thoroughly considered, had been unjust in itself, but the merchants in England would have taken an alarm, and procured the act to be disallowed by the King in Council. Yet the merchants in England, who well understood their own interests, were quite silent upon this occasion, and the law was confirmed in the Council; nor can it be supposed to have been confirmed there in a manner unnoticed. It had met with too much opposition among a certain set of interested speculators in the then Province, for that supposition to be made. And the case of the British merchants, at that time, differed in no respect from the present case of the French, or other foreign merchants, except that the credits of the former were vastly greater, and they must have, consequently, been more deeply interested in that measure of government, than the latter are in the present one. Their acquiescence in the measure, and the confirmation of that act, must have rested upon the full conviction of the British administration and of the merchants, of the justice of it. Your Excellency will agree, in the difficulty of making any distinction between the French merchant and the Spanish or Dutch merchant, by any general rule; for all these are interested in this business.

Your Excellency is pleased to ask, whether I think these proceedings of Congress proper to give credit to the United States; to inspire confidence in their promises, and to invite the European nations to partake of the same risks, to which the subjects of his Majesty have exposed themselves?

I have the honor to answer your Excellency, directly and candidly, that I do think them proper for these ends, and I do further think them to be the only measures that ever could acquire credit and confidence to the United States. I know of no other just foundation of confidence in men, or bodies of men, than their understanding and integrity; and Congress have manifested to all the world by this plan, that they understand the nature of their paper currency, that its fluctuation has been the grand obstacle to their credit; and that it was necessary to draw it to a conclusion, in order to introduce a more steady standard of commerce; that, to this end, the repeal of their laws, which made the paper a tender, and giving a free circulation to silver and gold, were necessary. They have further manifested by these resolutions, that they are fully possessed of the only principle there is in the nature of things for doing justice in this business, to the public and to individuals, to natives and foreigners, and that they are sufficiently possessed of the confidence of the people; and there is sufficient vigor in their government to carry it into execution.

Notwithstanding all, if any European merchant can show any good reason for excepting his particular case from the general rule, upon a representation of it to Congress, I have no doubt they will do him justice.

Moreover, if his Excellency the Chevalier de la Luzerne can show, that the sum of five millions of dollars is not the real worth of all the paper money that is abroad, and that ten millions of dollars is the true sum, I doubt not Congress would alter their rule, and redeem it at twenty for one. But I doubt very much whether this can be shown. But I cannot see that any distinction could be made between French merchants and those of other nations, but what would be very invidious and founded upon no principle. I cannot see that any distinction can be made between natives and foreigners, but what would have a most unhappy effect upon the minds of the people in America, and be a partiality quite unwarrantable; and, therefore, your Excellency will see, that it is impossible for me to take any steps to persuade Congress to retract, because it would be acting in direct repugnance to the clearest dictates of my understanding and judgment, of what is right and fit.

I cannot excuse myself from adding, that most of the arms, ammunition, and clothing for the army, have been contracted for here, by the Ministers of Congress, and paid for, or agreed to be paid for here, in silver and gold. Very little of these articles have been shipped by private adventurers. They have much more commonly shipped articles of luxury, of which the country did not stand in need, and upon which they must have made vast profits.

Thus have I communicated to your Excellency my sentiments, with that freedom, which becomes a citizen of the United States, intrusted by the public with some of its interests. I intreat your Excellency to consider them as springing from no other motive, than a strong attachment to the union of the States, and a desire to prevent all unnecessary causes of parties and disputes; and from a desire not only to preserve the alliance in all its vigor, but to prevent everything, which may unnecessarily oppose itself to the affection and confidence between the two nations, which I wish to see increased every day; as every day convinces me more and more of the necessity, that France and America will be under, of cherishing their mutual connexions.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO B. FRANKLIN.

Paris, June 22d, 1780.

Sir,

I have this day the honor of a letter from his Excellency the Count de Vergennes, on the subject of the resolutions of Congress, of the 18th of March, concerning the paper bills, in which his Excellency informs me, that the Chevalier de la Luzerne has orders to make the strongest representations upon the subject. I am not certain whether his Excellency means, that such orders were sent so long ago as to have reached the hand of the Minister at Congress, or whether they have been lately expected. If the latter, I submit to your Excellency, whether it would not be expedient to request, that those orders may be stopped until proper representations can be made at Court, to the end, that if it can be made to appear, as I firmly believe that it may, that those orders were given upon misinformation, they may be revoked, otherwise sent on.

Your Excellency will excuse this, because it appears to me a matter of very great importance. The affair of our paper is sufficiently dangerous and critical, and if a representation from his Majesty should be made, advantages will not fail to be taken of it by the tories, and by interested and disappointed speculators, who may spread an alarm among many uninformed people, so as to endanger the public peace.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, June 26th, 1780.

Sir,

The resolutions of Congress, of the 18th of March, respecting the paper bills, appeared first in Europe, as recited in the act of the Assembly of Pennsylvania; they were next published in the English newspapers, as taken from a Boston paper published by the Council; at last the resolutions appeared in the Journals of Congress.

A great clamor was raised, and spread, that the United States had violated their faith, and had declared themselves bankrupts, unable to pay more than two and a half per cent. A gentleman soon after called on me, and told me, that the Court was alarmed, and that the Count de Vergennes would be glad to consult me upon the subject. I then received a letter from Boston, acquainting me, that the Legislature of Massachusetts had adopted the plan. Of this letter I sent an extract immediately to the Count, and waited on him at Versailles, where I had the honor of a long conversation with his Excellency on the subject. He desired me to converse with his first Secretary, which I did particularly.

His Excellency told me he had written to me on the subject, and that I should receive the letter the next day. On my return from Versailles, I received a letter from Mr Gerry, informing me of the resolutions to pay the Loan Office certificates, at the value of money at the time when they were issued. I had before told the Count, that I was persuaded this was a part of the plan. I sent an extract of this letter also to the Count, without loss of time. The next day I received the letter from his Excellency, the copy of which, and of my answer, are enclosed. Yesterday, Mr Trumbull of Connecticut, favored me with a law of the State, respecting this matter, and an estimate of the gradual progress of depreciation. These papers I forthwith transmitted to his Excellency. I am determined to give my sentiments to his Majesty's Ministers whenever they shall see cause to ask them, although it is not within my department, until I shall be forbidden by Congress; and to this end I shall go to Court often enough to give them an opportunity to ask them, if they wish to know them.

The clamor that has been raised, has been so industriously spread, that I cannot but suspect, that the motive at bottom has either been a wish to have an opportunity of continuing the profitable speculations, which artful men are able to make in a depreciating currency, or else by spreading a diffidence in American credit, to discourage many from engaging in American trade, that the profits of it may still continue to be confined to a few.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, June 29th, 1780.

Sir,

The disputes about the Alliance, have been so critical and disagreeable, that Congress will pardon me for making a few observations upon our arrangements here.

I apprehend, that many of the disputes, delays, and other inconveniences, that have attended our affairs in this kingdom, have arisen from blending the offices of political Minister, Board of Admiralty, Chamber of Commerce, and Commercial Agent together. The business of the Minister is to negotiate with the Court, to propose and consult upon plans for the conduct of the war, to collect and transmit intelligence from other parts, especially concerning the designs and the forces of the enemy. This is business enough for the wisest and most industrious man the United States have in their service, aided by an active, intelligent, and laborious secretary. But added to all this, our Ministers at the Court of Versailles, have ever been overloaded with commercial and Admiralty business, complicated and perplexed in its nature, and endless in its details. But for this, I am persuaded much more might have been done in the conduct of the war, and the United States might have had more effectual assistance, and France and Spain too fewer misfortunes to bewail.

I would, therefore, beg leave to propose, to appoint a consul without loss of time to reside at Nantes, and to him consign all vessels from the United States. I think it should be an American, some merchant of known character, abilities, and industry, who would consent to serve his country for moderate emoluments. Such persons are to be found in great numbers in the United States. There are many applications from French gentlemen. But I think that a want of knowledge of our language, our laws, customs, and even the humors of our people, for even these must be considered, would prevent them from giving satisfaction, or doing justice. Besides, if it is an honor, a profit, or only an opportunity to travel and see the world for improvement, I think the native Americans have a right to expect it; and further, that the public have a right to expect that whatever advantages are honestly to be made in this way, should return sometime or other to America; together with the knowledge and experience gained at the same time.

These consuls, as well as the foreign Ministers, should all be instructed to transmit to Congress, written accounts of the civil and military constitutions of the places where they are, as well as all the advantages for commerce with the whole world, especially with the United States. These letters preserved, will be a repository of political and commercial knowledge, that in future times may be a rich treasure to the United States. To these consuls, the commercial concerns of the public should be committed, and the vessels of war. It will be necessary sometimes to send a frigate to Europe to bring intelligence, to bring passengers, even, perhaps, to bring commodities, or fetch stores. But I hope no frigate will ever again be sent to cruise, or be put under the command of anybody in Europe, consul or Minister. They may receive their orders from the Navy Board in America, and be obliged to obey them. I have had a great deal of experience in the government of these frigates, when I had the honor to be one of the Ministers Plenipotentiary at the Court of Versailles, and afterwards at Nantes, L'Orient, and Brest, when I was seeking a passage home. Disputes were perpetually arising between officers and their crews, between captains and their officers, and between the officers of one ship and another. There were never officers enough to compose a court martial, and nobody had authority to remove or suspend officers without their consent; so that in short, there was little order, discipline, subordination, or decency.

Another thing, when frigates are under the direction of an authority at a distance of three or four hundred miles, so much time is lost in writing and sending letters and waiting for answers, it has been found an intolerable embarrassment to the service. It is now two years since consuls were expected, and a secretary to this mission. It is a great misfortune to the United States that they have not arrived. Every man can see that it has been a great misfortune, but none can tell how great. There is much reason to believe, that if our establishments here had been upon a well digested plan and completed, and if our affairs had been urged with as much skill and industry as they might in that case have been, that we should at this moment have been blessed with peace, or at least with tranquillity and security, which would have resulted from a total expulsion of the English from the United States and the West India Islands.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO B. FRANKLIN.

Paris, June 29th, 1780.

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter of the Count de Vergennes to me, of the 21st of this month, and a copy of my answer to his Excellency, of the 22d.

This correspondence is upon a subject that has lain much out of the way of my particular pursuits, and, therefore, I may be inaccurate in some things; but, in the principles, I am well persuaded I am right. I hope that things are explained so as to be intelligible, and that there is nothing inconsistent with that decency, which ought in such a case to be observed.

If your Excellency thinks me materially wrong in anything, I should be much obliged to you to point it out to me, for I am open to conviction.

This affair, in America, is a very tender and dangerous business, and requires all the address, as well as all the firmness of Congress, to extricate the country out of the embarrassment arising from it; and there is no possible system, I believe, that could give universal satisfaction to all; but this appears to me, to promise to give more general satisfaction, than any other that I have ever heard suggested. I have added copies of the whole correspondence.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

Versailles, June 30th, 1780.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which you did me the honor to write me on the 22d inst. on the subject of the resolution of Congress of the 18th of March last. I have already informed you, that it was by no means my intention to analyse this resolution, as it respects the citizens of the United States, nor examine whether circumstances authorise the arrangement or not. I had but one object in writing to you with the confidence I thought due to your knowledge and your attachment to the alliance, which was to convince you that the French ought not to be confounded with the Americans, and that there would be a manifest injustice in making them sustain the loss with which they are threatened.

The details into which you have thought proper to enter have not changed my sentiments; but I think that all further discussion on this subject will be needless, and I shall only observe, that if the King's Council considers, as you pretend, the resolution of Congress in a wrong point of view, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, who is on the spot, will not fail to elucidate the matter; and if Congress on their part shall not adopt the representations, which that Minister is charged to make to them, they will undoubtedly communicate to us their reasons to justify their refusal.

Should they be well founded the King will take them into consideration, his Majesty demanding nothing but the most exact justice. But should they be otherwise, he will renew his instances to the United States, and will confidently expect from their penetration and wisdom a decision conformable to his demand. His Majesty is the more persuaded that Congress will give their whole attention to this business, as this Assembly, which has frequently renewed the assurance, values, as well as yourself, Sir, the union which subsists between France and the United States, and that they will assuredly perceive that the French deserve a preference before other nations, who have no treaty with America, and who even have not, as yet, acknowledged her Independence.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 1st, 1780.

Sir,

I had this morning the honor of your letter of the 30th of June.

It is very certain, that the representations from his Majesty, which may be made by his Minister, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, will be attended to by Congress with all possible respect; and its due weight will be given to every fact and argument, that he may adduce; and I am well persuaded, that Congress will be able to give such reasons for their final result, as will give entire satisfaction to his Majesty, and remove every color of just complaint from his subjects.

As in my letter of the 22d of last month, I urged such reasons as appeared to me incontestible, to show that the resolution of Congress of the 18th of March, connected with the other resolution, to pay the loan office certificates, according to the value of money at the time they were emitted, being a determination to pay the full value of all the bills and certificates, which were out; and the depreciation of both being more the act and fault of their possessors than of government, was neither a violation of the public faith, nor an act of bankruptcy. I have the honor to agree with your Excellency in opinion, that any further discussion of these questions is unnecessary.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 6th, 1780.

Sir,

In the public papers of the latter end of June, are lists of the vessels of war and privateers taken and destroyed by the powers at war.

VESSELS TAKEN FROM FRANCE.

Vessels.Guns.

Protée,64Taken by Admiral Digby,

Fortune,42Taken by Admiral Rowley,

Blanche,36Taken by Admiral Rowley,

Prudente,36Ruby, Everett,

Danaë,34Experiment, Wallace,

Sartine,32Admiral Vernon,

Licorne,32Admiral Vernon,

Alcmène,30Proserpine, Sutton,

Oiseau,26Apollo, Pownal,

Adventure,26Admiral Arbuthnot,

Pilote,14Commodore Reynolds,

Mutin,14Commodore Reynolds,

Coureur,14Admiral Keppel.

Destroyed.

Valeur,26Experiment, Wallace,

Recluse,24Experiment, Wallace.

VESSELS TAKEN BY FRANCE.

Ardent,64D'Orvilliers,

Experiment,50D'Estaing,

Minerva,32

Montreal,32Le Bourgoyne,

Fox,28La Junon,

Active,28

Ariel,20D'Estaing,

Lively,20D'Orvilliers,

Ceres,18D'Estaing,

Weazel,16

Senegal,16

Zephyr,14

Alert,10D'Orvilliers,

Thunder Bomb,8D'Estaing.

Destroyed.

Juno,32At Rhode Island,

Flora,32

Lark,32

Orpheus,32

Quebec,32By the Surveillante,

Cerberus,28At Rhode Island,

Rose,20At Savannah,

Falcon,18At Rhode Island,

King Fisher,16At Rhode Island.

PRIVATEERS TAKEN FROM FRANCE.

Lion,40

Monsieur,40

Duc de Cogny,36

Belhune,30

Ménagère,30

Hercule,30

Comte d'Artois,28

Lis,28

Sphinx,20Retaken by the French,

Helena,16Retaken by the French,

Jackall,10Retaken by the French.

VESSELS TAKEN FROM SPAIN.

Phœnix,80By Admiral Rodney,

Monarca,70

Princessa,70

Ammonica,32Pearl, Montagu,

Margarita,28Johnstone.

Destroyed.

S. Domingo,70By Admiral Rodney,

S. Eugenio,70

S. Julian,70

PRIVATEERS TAKEN FROM THE SPANIARDS.

Guipuscoa,64Sta Teresa,28

San Carlos,52Sta Bruna,26

San Carlos,32Solidad,26

San Rafael,30

VESSELS OF WAR TAKEN FROM CONGRESS.

Hancock,32Rainbow, Sir George Collier,

Raleigh,32Experiment, Wallace,

Providence,32Admiral Arbuthnot,

Boston,32Admiral Arbuthnot,

Delaware,30Lord Howe,

Virginia,30St Albans, Onslow,

Oliver Cromwell,24Beaver Sloop, Jones,

Hampden,20Sir George Collier,

Trumbull,20Venus, Ferguson,

Cumberland,20Pomona, Waldgrove,

Ranger,20Admiral Arbuthnot,

Alfred,20Ariadne, Pringle,

Hunter,18Sir George Collier,

Cabot,18Hope, Dawson,

Lexington,16Alert, Bazeley.

Destroyed.

Bricole, pierced for

60, mounting40Admiral Arbuthnot,

Bon Homme Richard,44Serapis, Pearson,

Randolph,36Yarmouth, Vincent,

Warren,32Sir George Collier,

Washington,32Captain Henry,

Effingham,28Captain Henry,

Queen of France,28Admiral Arbuthnot,

Fruit,26Admiral Arbuthnot,

General Moultrie,20Admiral Arbuthnot,

Notre Dame,16Admiral Arbuthnot.

N. B. Seventeen armed ships, from fourteen to twentyfour guns, destroyed by Sir George Collier, at Penobscot; three frigates, and two sloops destroyed by the same, upon the stocks at Portsmouth, the gallies destroyed upon Lake Champlain, in Georgia, &c., the ships destroyed in Egg Harbor, at Bedford, &c.

VESSELS OF WAR TAKEN BY CONGRESS.

Vessels.Guns.

Serapis,44Paul Jones,

Drake,18Ranger, Paul Jones,

Thorn,16Boston, Tucker,

Countess of Scarborough,22Paul Jones.

Destroyed.

Augusta,64At Mud Fort,

Acteon,28At Fort Sullivan,

Mermaid,21Off Cape Henlopen,

Merlin,18At Mud Fort.

VESSELS OF WAR DESTROYED BY ACCIDENT.

English.

VesselsGunsVesselsGuns

Somerset,64Cruiser,16

Repulse,32Otter,16

Arethusa,32Pomona,16

Liverpool,28Zebra,16

Syren,28Cupid,16

Leviathan,26Savage,16

Grampus,26Pegasus,14

Tortoise,26Spy,14

Glasgow,24Swallow,14

Vestal,20Viper,14

Mercury,20

French.

Roland,64Monarque,64

Zephyr,32Fox,28

Spanish.

Pondersoso,70Rosa,30

Notre Dame, Congres,

St Joseph,70Carmes,36

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 6th, 1780.

Sir,

In looking over the long list of vessels belonging to the United States, taken and destroyed, and recollecting the whole history of the rise and progress of our navy, it is very difficult to avoid tears. Nevertheless, what we have done and lost, shows what we can do. Our resources of materials, artists, and seamen, are not exhausted. But it is impossible not to inquire, whether we have not committed errors in the destination of our vessels? Whether our navy is equal to the attack or defence of places? Whether our articles of war for the government of the marine, are adequate to the introduction of that obedience and discipline that are necessary? Whether cruising for the protection of our own trade, against the depredations of privateers and smaller vessels of war of our enemies, and for the purpose of making prizes of transports and merchant ships, is not the object fittest in the present stage of our naval history, to encourage seamen to engage in our service, to form officers, to supply the United States with many things, and to weaken and distress our foes? Officers who have a thirst for glory, and wish to distinguish themselves by brilliant battles, ought not to be discouraged, but I cannot but think, that at this period they would do more essential service to their country, by a line of conduct leading to fewer laurels, but more wealth.

In all events, however, it is to be hoped and presumed, that Congress will give great attention to their navy, to the augmentation of ships, the multiplication of seamen, the improvement of discipline, and the formation of officers. Americans, I see, must cherish their own navy. I fear that no other nation would grieve very much at the total destruction of it, before the conclusion of a peace. I am sorry to say this; but I have heard such hints as convince me, that it is my duty to put Congress on their guard, and to entreat them to leave nothing unattempted to put their marine upon the best footing in their power.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 7th, 1780.

Sir,

On the 27th of June Mr Hartley, after a speech of an hour long, moved, that the House would give him leave to bring in a bill, to the end to empower the Court, to adopt the most proper means to make peace with America. After a short debate, the question being put, the majority was for the negative. This motion is said to have had the less success, because it is founded on a principle absolutely false and derogatory to the royal prerogative. The King of England, to make peace, wants nothing but the will. It is in this case only that he is absolute. The American war was commenced without the participation of Parliament. Why should they give the King new powers to bring it to a conclusion? There is but one means of forcing him to it, and that is by refusing him the necessary subsidies; and they are now further from this than ever. But it is ridiculous to labor to clothe the King with powers, which are inherent in his title. It is, in other words, to permit him to be a King.

The bill is of the following tenor. "Whereas for some years there have arisen unfortunate disputes between Great Britain and several Provinces of North America, which have occasioned the calamities of war; to the end to prevent a greater effusion of blood, and to re-establish peace, be it enacted, that his Majesty be permitted by virtue of letters patent, to nominate Commissioners with power to treat, consult, and agree upon the means of restoring peace, in concert with persons authorised for this purpose by the said Provinces of North America. That, to facilitate the good intentions of this bill, be it enacted, that the King give power to the said Commissioners, to cause to be suspended all hostilities by land and by sea, for so long a time and under such conditions and restrictions as they shall judge proper. That, to the end to establish upon a good foundation, a cordial reconciliation and a durable peace between Great Britain and the said Provinces, by reinstating them in their ancient friendship, his Majesty may legally permit his said Commissioners to grant and to ratify, from time to time, any article of pacification, which thus granted and ratified, shall have its full and entire effect for ten years, to be dated from the 1st of August of the present year. That, for removing every obstacle, which may oppose itself, to the full execution of any article of pacification, his Majesty shall be at liberty, by any order in writing, signed with his hand and countersigned by one or more Secretaries of State, to authorise the said Commissioners to suspend, during ten years, to be dated from the 1st of August of the present year, the execution of any act of Parliament, which concerns the said Provinces, so far as the said acts, their clauses or conditions, may put any obstacle to the full effect, and to the execution of any article of pacification between Great Britain and the said Provinces. That, to the end to establish a durable reconciliation, and a perpetual peace between Great Britain and the said Provinces, be it enacted, that all and every article of pacification, resolved and ratified for ten years as aforesaid, shall be from time to time communicated to both Houses of Parliament, to be by them examined, as forming the base of a sincere and durable union; and that every one of the said articles having been once approved in Parliament, shall have forever its full and entire effect. That the present act shall remain in force until the 31st of December."

Having been disappointed, by another accident, of my English papers, I have been obliged to translate this bill from the Courier de l'Europe, I hope to transmit the original in a few days. It is however of so little consequence, that it is scarce worth transcribing. Other grounds must be taken than that of General Conway, Governor Pownal, or Mr Hartley, before anything will be done in earnest towards peace. The history of Charleston, and the numberless fictions with which the stockjobbers have decorated it, have raised the stocks three and a half per cent, and have given such a temporary intoxication to the people, that scarce anything is talked of but unconditional submission.

The affair of Mobile, the dispersion of both the outward and homeward bound Quebec fleet, the indecisive battles between de Guichen and Rodney, and the anxiety for Walsingham's fleet, and twenty other fears, begin now to sink their spirits again.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

N. B. Sir George Saville moved on the same day a resolution, that the American war was unconstitutional, expensive, and ruinous, but this motion was rejected by nearly the same majority.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 7th, 1780.

Sir,

On the 21st of last month, the merchants of the city of Amsterdam arrived at the Hague, and presented to their High Mightinesses a petition, conceived in these terms.

"To their High Mightinesses, our Lords, the States-General of the United Provinces.

"The subscribers, all merchants, trading to the West Indies, and established under the jurisdiction of this State, give respectfully to understand, that, to their great regret, the petitioners have learned, by the way of a ship, lately arrived from Curaçoa, the unheard of ill treatment exercised by the English in taking the barques belonging to the subjects of their High Mightinesses, which trade with the French possessions in the said countries, and which, loaded with the productions of the said countries, purchased or consigned, make sail to return to the islands or places which belong to the dominions of their High Mightinesses, without having even to this time, that your petitioners know of, returned either the barques or cargoes; but so far from it, that the cargoes of some of them have been already condemned, and the barques restored empty; a fate which the petitioners fear to see others undergo likewise. And as by these vexations and unparalleled ill treatment, the subjects of your High Mightinesses, contrary to all kinds of right, are deprived of their property and effects embarked, as well as of the liberty which is assured to them by the treaties subsisting between the Crown of England and this State, and by these means see themselves reduced to an impossibility of being able to procure for the ships sent from home to the West Indies, the cargoes necessary for their return, all expeditions and adventures of merchandises from our countries to these places must absolutely cease, and draw after it the inevitable ruin of this branch of commerce, so important as well as that of many of the subjects of your High Mightinesses, both in this country and in the West Indies."

"For these causes, the petitioners pray, in all humility, that your High Mightinesses would be pleased to take this navigation and commerce, forming an object so considerable, under your effectual protection, in the first place, by granting the necessary convoy to ships which go to the West Indies, or which return from thence, and in the next place, to order to cruise in those seas a sufficient number of vessels of war, or even to order them to escort the barques in question, and other trading ships, loaded with productions and effects permitted by the treaties, and making sail for the French Colonies, or returning from them, to the end to secure them from all further insult; which will preserve at the same time the petitioners, as well as many other subjects of the Republic from total ruin. That it may, moreover, please your High Mightinesses to charge the Count de Welderen, your Envoy Extraordinary to the British Court, to make the necessary representations touching the seizure of these barques, to seek to obtain of the English Ministry, that the requisite orders may be sent to the Colonies of his Britannic Majesty, for releasing the aforesaid barques with their cargoes, paying, at the same time, the expenses occasioned by their seizure; in fine, that by the good and efficacious offices of his Excellency, things may be directed in such a manner, that on the part of the Court of St James, they may write to Jamaica and elsewhere, and not interrupt for the future, the subjects of their High Mightinesses in the exercise of this lawful commerce, but to permit them to enjoy a free navigation and commerce, such as have been solemnly accorded and guaranteed to them by the treaty of 1674."

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

B. FRANKLIN TO COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Passy, July 10th, 1780.

Sir,

I received the letter your Excellency did me the honor of writing to me, dated June 30th, together with the papers accompanying it, containing the correspondence of Mr Adams.[6] I have taken some pains to understand the subject, and obtain information of facts from persons recently arrived, having received no letters myself that explain it. I cannot say, that I yet perfectly understand it, but in this I am clear, that if the operation directed by Congress in their resolution of March the 18th occasions, from the necessity of the case, some inequality of justice, that inconvenience ought to fall wholly on the inhabitants of the States, who reap with it the advantages obtained by the measure; and that the greatest care should be taken that foreign merchants, particularly the French, who are our creditors, do not suffer by it. This I am so confident the Congress will do, that I do not think any representations of mine necessary to persuade them to it.

I shall not fail, however, to lay the whole before them; and I beg that the King may be assured that their sentiments, and those of the Americans in general, with regard to the alliance, as far as I have been able to learn them, not only from private letters but from authentic public facts, differ widely from those that seem to be expressed by Mr Adams in his letter to your Excellency, and are filled with the strongest impressions of the friendship of France, of the generous manner in which his Majesty was pleased to enter into an equal treaty with us, and of the great obligations our country is under for the important aids he has since afforded us.

I have the honor to be, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 13th, 1780.

Sir,

By the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, his Majesty and the United States agreed, in case of war, to join their councils and efforts against the enterprises of the common enemy; to make it a common cause, and aid each other mutually with their good offices, their councils, and their forces, according to the exigencies of conjunctures; and each of the contracting parties, in the manner it may judge most proper, is to make all the efforts in its power against the common enemy.

I have cited these clauses from the treaty, not as foundations of any demand that I have to make, because they are neither proper to support any demand, nor have I authority to make any if they were, but as an apology for the liberty I take of requesting your Excellency's attention to a few observations upon the present conjuncture of affairs.

It is certain, from the best intelligence from London, as well as from the debates in Parliament, on the several motions which have been made for a pacification, that the British Ministry are inflexibly determined to pursue the war another campaign in America, to send more troops and ships there, if they possibly can obtain them, and to put to the hazard not only the national credit, but their maritime power, and even their political existence, rather than give up their designs of domination over America; and indeed this is not at all to be wondered at, that the Ministers and the nation, who have so far lost their justice, their humanity, and policy, as to deliberately form and pursue the plan of changing the foundations of the laws and governments of thirteen Colonies, and reducing them to slavery, and who have pursued this object with such sanguinary fury for so many years, should persist so as to bury themselves in the ruins of their empire, rather than to fail of their purpose, when it is plain they consider, and that not without reason, the same ruin in the independence of America, and her connexion with France.

The conduct of Count de Guichen, on the 17th of April, and the 15th and 19th of May, in the West Indies, does great honor to the national bravery, as well as to their science in naval tactics, and shows that there is no cause to fear that the enemy will obtain any advantage there. Yet nothing has yet been done on either side that seems decisive.

The advantages, which Spain has gained in West Florida, and particularly of late at Mobile, and the probability that she will succeed in gaining both the Floridas, show that the English are on the losing hand in that quarter; but it is not the loss of both the Floridas, nor of all the West India Islands, in my opinion, that will induce them to make peace, and acknowledge the independence of America in alliance with France. They will see every possession they have beyond the island lopped off, one after another, before they will do this.

I pretend not to know, to what part of America M. de Ternay and M. de Rochambeau are destined, but to whatever part it is, whether Canada, Nova Scotia, New York, Carolina, or Georgia, I have no hopes of anything decisive from their operations, although they should be instructed to co-operate with General Washington. If they should be destined against Canada or Nova Scotia, they may succeed; but this success will not be decisive. If they are intended against New York, I have no hopes of their success. The naval force is not sufficient to command the seas. Admiral Graves, added to the ships before at New York, will be superior; and I shall venture to give my opinion, that without a superiority of naval force, clear and indisputable, New York will never be taken. It is so situated, so fortified, it is garrisoned with troops so accustomed to war, and so embittered and inflamed by cruel passions, carefully nursed up in their breasts by their King and their Generals, and it is universally regarded by them a port of such essential importance, that I confess I should despair of success against it, with an army twice as numerous as that of the Generals Washington and Rochambeau united, while the English are masters of the seas, or even while they have there an equality of naval power.

Most people in Europe have wondered at the inactivity of the American army, for these two years past; but it is merely from want of knowledge and attention. The true cause of it is, the English have confined themselves to their strong holds in seaport towns, and have been sheltered from all attacks and insults by the guns of their men-of-war, and forever will be so, while they have the superiority at sea. If our army had been three times as numerous as it was, it must have remained inactive, without a fleet to co-operate with it; for an attack upon New York without a fleet, would have been only sacrificing the lives of thousands of brave men, without a possibility of succeeding.

Had the English two years ago marched into the country from Philadelphia, instead of retreating back with precipitation to New York, Europe would have heard more of the exertions of the American army, so much more, that in my serious opinion, you would have heard of their total destruction. As it was, they were closely pursued, attacked, and if not beaten, they had much the worst of the action, for besides their loss in killed and wounded, and in those who perished under the fatigue and heat of the day, not less than five hundred deserted from them, and their desertions would have been multiplied in every unsuccessful engagement within the country.

If in the last year the British army had marched out into the country, instead of remaining under cover of their men-of-war, I am equally clear, that they would have been ruined. The English, ever since the alliance, have been fearfully apprehensive of an attack upon their strong holds upon the coast by the French. This it was that induced them to retreat from Philadelphia to New York, and this has kept them almost wholly confined to that garrison the last year. I mention this, merely to wipe off the imputations said to result from the inactivity of our army, since the alliance, by showing the true cause of it, that it proceeds not from any change of sentiments in the Americans, but from the change of the mode of prosecuting the war on the part of our enemies.

I am, however, clearly of opinion, and I know it to be the general sense of America, that the English, both in North America and in the West India Islands, have been for these two years past absolutely in the power of their enemies; and that they are so now, and will continue to be so, in such a degree, that nothing will be wanting but attention to their situation, and a judicious application of the forces of the allies to accomplish the entire reduction of their power in America. In order to show this, let me beg your Excellency's attention to a few remarks upon the situation of the English, and upon the method of applying the force of the allies so as to reduce them.

The English are in possession of Canada, a province vastly extensive, and in which there is a great number of ports, at a great distance from each other, necessary to be maintained among a people too, who are by no means attached to them, but who would readily afford all the assistance in their power to the united forces of France and the United States, and who would join them in considerable numbers. In this whole province, the English have not, comprehending the garrisons of all their ports, more than four thousand men.

The English are in possession of Nova Scotia; they have in Halifax and the other parts of the province, and at Penobscot, about three thousand men. But the people of this province being descendants and emigrants from New England, chiefly, are discontented with the British government, and desirous of joining the United States. They are in possession of New York Island, Staten Island, and Long Island, where they have in all of regular British troops, —— thousand men. The militia, volunteers, &c. of whom they make such an ostentatious display in the despatches of their Generals, and in the gazette of St James, are of very little consideration; their numbers are much exaggerated; it is force, fear, and policy, that enrol the greater part of them; there are perhaps fifteen thousand inhabitants of the city. These, together with the army and navy, are fed and supplied with provisions, and stores, and fuel, and their cattle and horses with forage, brought by sea from Quebec, Halifax, Ireland, and the West Indies, except the small quantity, which they draw from Long Island and Staten Island.

They are now in possession of Charleston, in South Carolina, and Savannah, in Georgia. Their armies and navies in these places, as well as the inhabitants, must be chiefly supplied by sea in the same manner. They are still perhaps in possession of St Augustine, in East Florida, and Pensacola, in the west. From these places, they have drawn of late years great supplies of lumber and provisions for their West India Islands. The number of troops in Georgia and Carolina may amount to —— thousands. They are in possession of Jamaica, Barbadoes, Antigua, St Christophers, and St Lucia, and other islands. These draw supplies of provisions and lumber, &c. from Quebec, Halifax, Pensacola, and Augustine, that is from the Floridas. The number of troops they have in each island, I am not able to ascertain; but certainly they are not strong in any of them; and the climate in the West Indies, and in Georgia and Carolina, is making a rapid consumption of their men.

From this sketch, it will be easily seen, what a great number of posts they have to sustain; how these are mutually connected with, and dependent on each other, and that their existence in all of them depends upon their superiority at sea, and that to carry on the intercourse and communication between these various places, a vast number of transports, provision vessels and merchant ships are necessary. This is so much the fact, that the English nation has now little navigation left, but what is employed in maintaining the communication of these places with one another and with Europe. Here then it is, that the English commerce and navy is vulnerable; and this it is, which clearly points out to their enemies the only sure and certain way of reducing their power in that quarter of the world; and if it is reduced there, it is brought into a narrow compass everywhere.

The policy and necessity of keeping always a superior fleet both in the West India Islands and on the coast of the continent of North America, is from all this very obvious. The English are so sensible of this, that they dread it as the greatest evil that can befall them. The appearance of the Count d'Estaing upon the coast of North America, never failed to throw the English into the utmost terror and consternation.

The appearance of a French fleet upon our coasts has repeatedly compelled, and ever must compel, the English to call off from their cruises all their frigates and other ships, and to assemble them at New York, for their security and the defence of that place. These are among the happy effects of such a measure, the communication of the United States not only with each other but with the West Indies, with France, and all other parts of Europe, with which they have any concern, is immediately opened, and they are thereby easily furnished, in all parts, with everything fitting and necessary to carry on the war with the greatest vigor. His Majesty's fleets and armies will be amply and much more cheaply supplied, and his subjects will reap, in common with the inhabitants of the United States, the benefits of this free commerce. It will give free sea-room to the few frigates belonging to Congress and the several States to cruise for the merchant ships, provision vessels, and transports of the enemy. It gives opportunity also to the privateers to do the same. There are at this day, notwithstanding the dreadful sacrifices made at Charleston and Penobscot, sacrifices, the necessity of which would have been entirely prevented by a few ships of the line, the Continental frigates, the Confederacy, which is arrived at Philadelphia, the Alliance which will soon be there, the Trumbull, the Deane, the Bourbon, and also a ship of fiftysix guns which is nearly ready for sea. The State of Massachusetts has two frigates and smaller vessels. There are besides these, now in being, belonging to Newburyport, Beverly, Salem, Marblehead, Portsmouth, Boston and Rhode Island, about forty privateers. There are several belonging to Philadelphia.

If a French fleet should constantly remain upon that coast, the number of these privateers would be doubled in a very few months. What havoc then must these armed vessels make, especially if a few French frigates should be also ordered to cruise for prizes among the provision vessels, merchant ships, and transports, passing and repassing to and from America and the West India Islands to Europe, and to and from America and the West Indies, and to and from Quebec, Nova Scotia, New York, Charleston, Savannah, and the Floridas. Such depredations have several times been made by our cruisers alone, as to reduce the English at New York to very great distress, and it would be very easy in this way to reduce them to such misery as to oblige them to surrender at discretion.

I therefore beg leave to submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether there is any possible way that a marine force can be employed against the English, so much to the advantage of France and the disadvantage of England, as in this way, and whether upon the principles of French interest and policy alone, even without taking into consideration that of the United States, a fleet ought not to be constantly kept in North America. The advantages they will there have in artists, supplies, accommodations, &c. above the English, are obvious.

But the question will arise, where shall they winter? I answer, they can winter with perfect security and advantage, either at Boston, Rhode Island, Delaware, or Chesapeake Bays.

Another question will arise, whether they should all winter together in one port, or be separated to several ports? I apprehend, however, that it would be most prudent to leave it to the discretion of the commander-in-chief of the squadron, to keep the squadron together, or to detach parts of it, according to the exigencies of the service, advising with Congress, or with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, from time to time.

Two ships of the line, with three frigates, stationed at Boston, with orders to cruise occasionally for the protection of French and American trade, and the annoyance of the enemy, the same number at Rhode Island with the same orders, the same number at Delaware river, with similar orders, and a like number in Chesapeake bay, with like orders, which would make eight ships of the line and twelve frigates, I have a moral certainty would, in one year, reduce the power of the English in North America, to absolute annihilation, without striking a blow on land. These ships would make a diversion of an equal force of the English, from the West India Islands, so that they would be in that respect as usefully employed for his Majesty there as anywhere. Eight ships of the line, and twelve frigates, stationed together at Rhode Island, with orders to cruise for the same purposes, would do the same thing.

Which plan would do best, I dare not undertake to say, but until further informed and instructed by Congress I should think however that the best plan would be to station the fleet for the winter, either in Delaware or Chesapeake Bay; and as the war has lately turned to the southward, I am inclined to think that Chesapeake Bay would be the most proper.

But in all events, I beg leave to entreat in the most earnest manner, that a powerful fleet may be ordered to winter somewhere in North America. By this means I think there is a moral certainty, the English will be ruined there, whereas if dependence is had upon the assault and attack of their strong holds, without the most absolute command of the sea, I fear it will end in disappointment and disgrace.

There is the more urgent reasons for laying these considerations before your Excellency, because there is a portion of the people in America who wish to return to the domination of Great Britain, many of whom are artful and sensible men. They take notice of every circumstance of the conduct of France, and represent it in such a light as they think will throw a prejudice against the alliance into the minds of the people. They represent the affair of Rhode Island and of Savannah, and of some other things, as proofs that the Court of France do not mean to give any effectual aid to America, but only to play off her strength against that of Britain, and thus exhaust both. The refugees in England concur with them in these representations, and the Ministry and the members of Parliament in their public speeches represent the same thing.

Even Mr Hartley, who is more for peace than any man in that kingdom, in a printed letter to the inhabitants of the county of York, says, "It is our duty to unravel by negotiation, the combination of powers now acting against us;" and he says further, in express words, that "It is apparent to all the world, that France might long ago have put an end to that part of the war, which has been most distressing to America, if they had chosen so to do." He must mean here the war of their frigates and privateers upon our trade. "Let the whole system of France be considered," says he, "from the beginning down to the late retreat from Savannah, and I think it is impossible to put any other construction upon it but this, viz. that it has always been the deliberate intention and object of France, for purposes of their own, to encourage the continuation of the war in America, in hopes of exhausting the strength and resources of this country, and of depressing the rising power of America." This is not only the language of Mr Hartley, but the general language of newspapers and pamphlets, and, I am well informed, of conversation in England. These are very industriously sent to America, through various channels, which cannot be stopped by laws, art, or power.

The body of the people have great confidence in the sincerity of France; but if these contrary opinions should be suffered to gain ground, as they most assuredly will if something is not done to prevent it, when all the world sees and declares as they do, that it is the best policy of France, if she considered her own interest alone in the conduct of the war, to keep a superior naval force upon the coast of the continent of North America, I leave your Excellency to judge what a melancholy effect it will have upon our affairs. There is no event, in my opinion, which would have so direct a tendency to give force and extent to opinions so dangerous to both nations, as the calling off from the continent your naval force, during the winter, and not keeping a superiority there through the year. I scruple not to give it as my opinion, that it will disunite, weaken, and distress us more than we should have been, disunited, weakened, or distressed, if the alliance had never been made.

The United States of America are a great and powerful people, whatever European statesmen may think of them. If we take into our estimate the numbers and the characters of her people, the extent, variety, and fertility of her soil, her commerce, and her skill, and materials for shipbuilding, and her seamen, excepting France, Spain, England, Germany, and Russia, there is not a state in Europe so powerful. Breaking off such a nation as this from the English so suddenly, and uniting it so closely with France, is one of the most extraordinary events that ever happened among mankind. The prejudices of nations in favor of themselves, and against all other nations, which spring from self-love, and are often nurtured by policy for unworthy purposes, and which have been ever certainly cultivated by the English with the utmost care in the minds of the Americans, as well as of the people of every other part of their dominions, certainly deserve the attention of the wisest statesmen, and as they are not to be eradicated in a moment, they require to be managed with some delicacy.

It is too often said in France, where the prejudice against the English has not been fostered into so much rancor, because France never had so much to fear from England, as England has from France, "That the Americans and the English are the same thing," not to make it appear, that there are some remnants of prejudices against the Americans among the French, and it must be confessed there are some in America against France. It is really astonishing, however, that there are so few, and it is the interest and duty of both to lessen them as fast as possible, and to avoid with the nicest care, every colorable cause of reviving any part of them.

I beg your Excellency to excuse this trouble, because the state of things in North America has really become alarming, and this merely for the want of a few French men-of-war upon that coast.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 14th, 1780.

Sir,

The advices from the Hague of the 9th of this month are, that the talk had been of a Congress to be held in that place; but as her Majesty, the Empress of Russia, had given to understand, that she desired that the conferences should be held at Petersburg, the States-General have consequently named, upon the proposition of his Serene Highness, the Prince Stadtholder, the Baron de Waassenaar Starrenburg, and the Baron Van Heckeren de Brantzenburg, Deputies to the Assembly of their High Mightinesses, on the part of the Provinces of Holland, West Friesland, and Utrecht, Ministers Plenipotentiaries to go to Petersburg, to the end to assist there at the conferences, which are to be held for the protection of the commerce of neutrals.

And that the Chevalier Llano, now Minister Plenipotentiary of his Catholic Majesty to their High Mightinesses, had arrived at that residence.

The English continue to fill all the newspapers of Europe with the despatches of Clinton, Cornwallis, Tarleton, &c. of their triumphant progress in Carolina, and we are unable to obtain a syllable from any part of America to contradict it, or explain it. It is devoutly to be wished, that Congress would appoint some active and intelligent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and make it his duty to transmit the journals, newspapers, and other intelligence, and duplicates and triplicates of them, to their servants abroad. Vessel after vessel arrives, even directly from Philadelphia, and we cannot get the journals, papers, and scarcely a private letter by them. Surely, the department of foreign affairs is of some importance to the United States, and their most important officers abroad ought not to be less informed, than every private merchant. The successes of the English in Carolina have filled them with the most ridiculous exultations. They have thrown off the mask entirely, and talk now almost universally of nothing but unconditional submission; not an idea of peace is entertained. They are perfectly confident the Congress will not maintain their authority three months. They have filled the world with histories of insurrections at Philadelphia, which drove the Congress to Lancaster, killed the French Minister, &c. &c. &c. The stocks rose three and threefourths per cent. This is the wise nation, that is to govern America, as they think, at their pleasure.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 15th, 1780.

Sir,

The news from Petersburg of the 13th of June is, that the last advices received from Mohilew have confirmed the news, that the Empress would return sooner than was at first expected, and that the Emperor, under the name of the Count de Falckenstein, would arrive at the same time, at Petersburg. That the fleet of Cronstadt had been eight or ten days in the road, waiting only for their final instructions to put to sea. It will be separated into three divisions, each of five ships of the line, under the command of the Rear Admirals Barisson, Cruse, and Polibin. Since the departure of a courier, which Mr Harris, the British Envoy, has expedited to his Court, the 26th of last month, a report has been spread, that he has demanded his recall.

The ordinance, which the Empress has passed at Czarsko-Zelo, on the 19th of May, to the end to ascertain the rights and duties of her subjects relative to the neutrality, is too remarkable, in the present conjuncture, not to be given entire to the public. The following is the preamble.

"The maritime war, subsisting for some time between Great Britain, on the one part, and France and Spain on the other, has begun lately to do equal injury to the commerce and the navigation of our faithful subjects. We have not in consequence failed to employ for their protection and indemnification from all the losses, which have been occasioned to them, our most efficacious intercession; in consequence of which several merchants have already obtained, in proportion to their demands, a considerable indemnification. Nevertheless, although we doubt not, that all the others will be equally indemnified by the belligerent powers, yet we cannot regard the particular compensation of individuals, as a sufficient pledge of the safety upon which neutral nations may hereafter depend. From this motive, we have resolved not only to take measures the most effectual for the maintenance of the maritime commerce of our subjects, but to put them in execution, in case of need. They have already been announced to all Europe, by a declaration delivered in the same terms to the three belligerent powers, by which we fix expressly and with precision, the rights and prerogatives of a commercial neutral flag. The one and the other are founded either upon the proper terms of our Treaty of Commerce with the Crown of Great Britain, or upon the evident and immutable principles of the law of nature and nations. But while we require of other nations, for our proper utility the entire and unlimited accomplishment of their duties, we are not less fixed in the intention on our part to observe inviolably, in regard to them, the obligations of the strictest neutrality. Thus it is necessary, that all our subjects should conform themselves vigorously in their maritime commerce, and in the enterprises relative to it, to this our will. In default of which, they will render themselves unworthy of our protection and of our succor. But to the end, that no man may fall into error by ignorance, we order our College of Commerce to notify the Russian merchants trading in our ports, that while they enjoy an entire liberty of trading and sending their vessels to all parts of Europe, they are bound to observe, conformably to our treaties with different powers, and to the ordinances of each place, that which follows."

This is the preamble; the purview shall be sent to Congress as soon as it appears.

It seems that the Empress, as well as the Ottoman Porte, has not a little resented the indecent and groundless assertions, with which England has filled Europe and America, that the Empress would take part with them, and that there were misunderstandings subsisting between Petersburg and Constantinople. I think it can be no longer doubted, that Russia will never take part with England, and that while she is determined upon a neutrality, every other maritime power of Europe must do the same, or join against England. It is equally plain, that England must come into the system of rights preparing for neutrals, or go to war with all the maritime powers of the world. This is too decisively and obviously advantageous to North America, to need any comments.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 15th, 1780.

Sir,

The news from Constantinople is, "that upon the advice, that a fleet of French merchant-men from Marseilles, was blocked up by the English cruisers in the port of Milo, the Count de St Priest, Ambassador of France, presented a Memoir to the Porte, complaining of this last violation of the last agreement made between the Ottoman government and the Ambassadors of the belligerent powers, for the maintenance of the neutrality. In consequence, the Reis Effendi requested Mr Ainslie, the British Ambassador, to give orders conformably to the said agreement, to the cruisers of his nation, to respect the coasts, forts, and havens of the Ottoman Empire, and not to commit hostilities but in open sea. The Ambassador answered, "that he approved the requisitions of the Porte too much, not to contribute all that lay in his power, to make the English cruisers observe the orders which had been before given them." Nevertheless, the Count de St Priest judged proper, by way of further precaution, to send the consul of his nation, who resides at the Dardanelles, to the Capitan Pacha, who is now in the Archipelago with his fleet, to desire him to have a care that the French fleet should suffer no insult. The Ottoman Admiral immediately complied with this requisition; and we learn by the French consul, who is returned here, that having found this commandant at Metelin, he had no sooner learned the object of his commission, than he detached some to go to the succor of the fleet blocked at Milo. But his assistance will not have been necessary, because, according to letters from Smyrna, the six English cruisers, which held the French fleet shut up, having had the audacity to attack this convoy even in the port, the Chevalier d'Entrecasteux, who commanded it, had shattered them, after an engagement of several hours, in such a manner, that he had put them out of a condition to keep the sea, and that they must have retired to Paros."

Stockholm, 27th of June. "The King having judged proper to name an Admiral General of his fleet, has chosen for this eminent post, the Major-General and Commander of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Sword, Henry de Trolle. M. de Moussin Puschkin, Envoy from Russia, is arrived here from Petersburg."

Hague, 10th of July. "The Admiralty of Amsterdam has put in commission, with the advice of the Prince Stadtholder, the vessels, the Admiral de Reister, of sixtyeight guns, and the Hereditary Prince, of fiftysix."

Hamburg, 23d of June. The Mars, a Danish man-of-war of fifty guns, commanded by Captain Luken, and three frigates, with seventyeight merchant ships of different nations, under convoy, sailed from the Sound the 18th of this month."

It thus appears, that Russia, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark, are proceeding in earnest to convoy their trade, and increase their naval force, to protect the confederacy in favor of the rights of neutrality.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 15th, 1780.

Sir,

It is worth while to lay before Congress the following statement, which is lately published in the papers.

English Ships of the Line.

Now under Rodney, including the Triumph of seventyfour guns, arrived from Cork, the beginning of May,22

N. B. The Fame, of seventyfour guns, was taken to pieces last winter, to repair the other vessels of Jamaica. The Sultan from St Lucia, and the Hector from Europe joined, in March, the two sixtyfours which were at that station. Jamaica,4

They say that Arbuthnot has sent to Jamaica the Russell and Robust,2

The 15th of May, sailed with Graves,7

The 3d of June, sailed with Walsingham,4

—

39

French and Spaniards.

With De Guichen,23

Left at Martinique, the Dauphin Royal, of seventyfour guns, to protect the port,1

At the Havana, under D. Bonnet,8

At St Domingo, under De la Motte Piquet,5

Sailed from Cadiz, the 28th of April, under D. Solano,12

M. de Ternay, the 3d of May,7

—

56

A superiority, against which, all the events of the war evidently show that it is impossible to resist. But the ministerial people have made Rodney take Don Solano with his twelve ships, which shifts the balance to—English, fiftyone, French and Spaniards, fortyfour.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 17th, 1780.

Sir,

In your Excellency's letter to me of the 24th of February last, I was honored with your opinion in the following words.

"With regard to the full powers, which authorise you to negotiate a treaty of commerce with the Court of London, I think it will be prudent not to communicate them to any body whatever, and to take every necessary precaution, that the British Ministry may not have a premature knowledge of them. You will no doubt readily feel the motives, which induce me to advise you to take this precaution, and it would be needless to explain them."

1. I should have been very happy if your Excellency had hinted at the reasons, which were then in your mind, because after reflecting upon this subject, as maturely as I can, I am not able to collect any reasons, which appear to me sufficient for concealing the nature of my powers in their full extent, from the Court of London. On the contrary, many arguments have occurred to me, which seem to show it to be both the policy of the United States, and my particular duty, to communicate them.

2. Your Excellency will recollect that my commissions empower me to join with the Ministers of the belligerent powers in making peace; to make a treaty of commerce with the Ministers of his Britannic Majesty, and to represent the Congress as their Minister Plenipotentiary, at the Court of London. It seems to me then, inconsistent with the design and nature of my appointments, to conceal them from the Court of London.

3. I think also, that announcing my powers to the Court of London, would have a tendency to draw out from them some proofs of their present designs, and it is always important to discover early the intentions of the enemy, that the people may be prepared, both with councils and forces, to resist them if hostile.

4. The English nation would expect of the Ministers, that some answer should be given to me. If it should be an insolent one, as there is too much cause to expect, it will prepare the minds of the Americans, and of the other belligerent powers, for what they are to expect, and it will alarm and arouse, if anything can, the people of England.

5. At this particular time, when an election approaches, it would throw the Ministry into some embarrassment, for the people of England sigh for peace.

6. Another consideration has weight with me; a great part of Europe, as well as the people of England, are amused by the English Ministers and their emissaries, with reports that there is some secret treaty between France and the United States, by which the former has secured to themselves exclusive privileges in some branches of the American commerce, which misrepresentations, as they are at present an obstruction to peace, would be cleared up by the communication of my powers.

7. There are at present many persons of consideration in England, who have long followed the Ministry in the war against America, who begin to see the impracticability of succeeding, and now vote for peace, and will lay hold of every occurrence that favors its accomplishment.

8. At this moment, under the wild impression, that the surrender of Charleston has made, it might be improper to make the communication, but upon the news coming of M. de Ternay's arrival, of Don Solano's, or both, or upon the receipt of some intelligence, which may take off a part of this impression, I submit it to your Excellency's consideration, whether it would not be proper to communicate my appointments to Lord George Germain. It seems to be most proper that it should be done, so that the nation may consider them before the meeting of Parliament, and that those who are for peace may digest their plans accordingly.

9. Notwithstanding the suppression of the late riots, and the consequent temporary relaxation of the committees and associations, the nation is in a most critical situation. Those disturbances were not simply the effect of fanaticism and bigotry, but of deep and general discontent and distress among the people; and although the Ministry may at present be confident they have suppressed them forever, they will surely find themselves mistaken if they pursue this war. I know of no measure, that will be more likely to increase the opposition against Administration than communicating my powers. It will at least show all the world, that the continuance of the war and the consequent ruin of England is their own fault, not that of the Americans, who are ready to make peace upon terms honorable and advantageous to Great Britain.

10. I am the more confirmed in those opinions, by the communication your Excellency made to me yesterday of the message sent by the Court of London to the Court of Madrid. I am convinced in my own mind, that that message is insidious in the last degree, and that it is intended to answer two ends only; first, to spy out what they can of the political and military plans of Spain; secondly, and principally, to amuse France, Spain, and America too, with false ideas of pacific inclinations, simply in order to slacken and enervate their preparations for the next campaign.

11. Sincere intentions of making peace upon any terms, which France or America can agree to, consistent with subsisting treaties, I am as sure they have not, as I am of their existence. Now I think there is no way of counteracting this insidious policy so honorably and so effectually, as by a frank and decent communication of my full powers. This will necessitate them to come to an explanation of their real intentions concerning America; for there, Sir, lies the obstacle to peace; all other questions would be soon arranged if that was settled.

I hope your Excellency will pardon the long letters I write you, because it is really a voluminous subject we have in contemplation, and mankind in general are little less interested in it, than our particular countries. I shall hope for the honor of your Excellency's answer upon these subjects.