Volume 1 — CHAP. XXIII. LORD GAMBIER’S DESPATCH.

ITS OMISSIONS AND SUPPRESSIONS.—MOTIVE FOR LORD GAMBIER’s MISSTATEMENTS.—MR. FAIRFAX REPORTS THAT THE MEDIATOR WENT IN FIFTH, NOT FIRST.—REASON OF THE CONTRARY ASSERTION.—NAPOLEON ATTRIBUTES THE ESCAPE OF HIS FLEET TO THE IMBECILITY OF LORD GAMBIER.—MISMANAGEMENT OF THE FIRESHIPS.—LORD GAMBIER’s DELAY AND MISDIRECTION.—HIS PERVERSION OF FACT.—HIS MISPLACED PRAISE.—THE DESPATCH FAILS TO SATISFY THE PUBLIC.—CRITICISED BY THE PRESS.—ADMIRAL GRAVIÈRE’s ACCOUNT OF THE TERMINATION OF THE ACTION.

The despatch brought to England by Sir Harry Neale set out with the perversion, that the fireships, “arranged according to my plan,” were “led on in the most undaunted and determined manner by Captain Wooldridge in the Mediator, preceded by some vessels filled with powder and shells, as proposed by Lord Cochrane, with a view to explosion!”

The omission of the fact that before Captain Wooldridge “led the fireships” I had myself preceded them in the explosion vessel, and that, even before the Mediator proceeded on service in obedience to the signals made by my order from the Impérieuse, the explosion vessel under my personal command was half-way towards the French fleet; the 417suppression of my name as having anything at all to do with the attack by means of the explosion vessels, notwithstanding that by going first I ran all the risk of being boarded by the French guard-boats, and myself and crew murdered, as would have been the case had we been captured, showed that the object of the commander-in-chief was to suppress all mention of me, my plans, or their execution, as entitled to any credit for the mischief done to the enemy.

The despatch leads the reader to infer that the success subsequently obtained arose from the “undaunted and determined manner in which Captain Wooldridge led the fireships,” from “Admiral Stopford’s zealous co-operation with the boats,” though not one of these ever stirred from alongside the Cæsar, anchored full four miles from the scene of action, and from the plans of the commander-in-chief himself.

That this suppression of all mention of the success of my plans in driving the whole enemy’s fleet ashore with the exception of two ships of the line, was deliberately intended by the commander-in-chief, is placed beyond question by the contemptuous manner in which he speaks of the means which really effected the mischief,—“some vessels filled with powder and shells, with a view to explosion.” That these means, conducted by myself, not Captain Wooldridge, did drive the French ships ashore, has been admitted by every French and English historian since that period; and that this was done by my personal presence and instrumentality is a historical fact which nothing can shake or pervert. The only person ignoring the fact was the commander-in-chief 418of the British force, who not only gives me no credit for what had been done, but does not even mention my name, as having, by the above means, contributed to the result!

The sole conceivable motive for such a suppression of the success of my plans must have been that, having neglected to take advantage of the helpless condition of the French ships driven ashore, it was desirable to conceal the whole of the facts from the British public, by ascribing the success gained to other, and totally different causes, and thus to convert a deep discredit into a great victory!

The despatch goes on to state that, “the Mediator, by breaking the boom!” opened the way for the fireships, “but, owing to the darkness of the night, several mistook their course and failed.”

At the conclusion of the last chapter, such reasons have, I think, been given why the Mediator could not have broken a double boom nearly a mile in extent as ought to have set the question for ever at rest. But as that statement, notwithstanding its impossibility, is endorsed by the commander-in-chief as the groundwork of his despatch, it will be necessary to refute his lordship’s statement also, and that from the evidence of an officer upon whose testimony he must necessarily rely, viz. Mr. Fairfax, the master of the fleet, who was deputed in the Lyra to observe the effect produced by the fireships, and, as a matter of course, reported to the commander-in-chief the result of his observations, which were as follows:—

“When the explosion-vessel blew up, she was about two cables’ length from the Lyra. The Lyra, as well as the other 419explosion-vessel, is marked in the chart produced by me. When she blew up, the fire vessels all seemed to steer for that point. I hailed four of them, and the Mediator, and desired the Mediator to steer south-east, or else she would miss the French fleet.”—Minutes, p. 177.

In another place Mr. Fairfax states that the night was so dark that it was difficult to make out exact positions; but the testimony of Captain Proteau, of the Indienne, that the explosion took place at the boom, “à l’estacade,” is indisputable, as the Indienne, by Captain Proteau’s testimony, was lying so close to the boom and the explosion-vessel also, as only to escape the effect of the latter by her shells going over. The spot, therefore, where the explosion took place is historically beyond doubt.

The testimony of Mr. Fairfax, then—and it must be borne in mind that I had no worse enemy in the fleet than that person—is this:—1st, The explosion took place; 2ndly, all the fireships steered for the point where it had taken place; 3rdly, Mr. Fairfax hailed four of them; 4thly, the Mediator then came up, steering in a wrong direction, so that in place of “leading the fireships in the most undaunted and determined manner,” as vouched for by the commander-in-chief, the master of the fleet, who was on the spot, vouches that she was the fifth fireship which came up, and that had he not set her right in her course she would have “missed the French fleet;” i.e. she was behind the other fireships, and steering outside the boom, which lay in front of the French fleet!

It would, I think, be superfluous to say another word 420about this extraordinary story of the boom, nor should I have condescended to notice it at all in connection with the despatch, but that the commander-in-chief makes it the groundwork of his report to the Government, for the unworthy purpose of altogether omitting my name as connected with the explosion-vessels, and for leading the public to infer that these produced no effect whatever, either on the boom or the French fleet! which is indeed the main object of the despatch.

It was, however, necessary to give some reason why the French fleet ran ashore; and as it was not considered expedient to give me the credit of causing it to do so by the terror created from the explosion, the commander-in-chief, despite his own judgment as a seaman, appears to have caught at Captain Wooldridge’s story of breaking the boom, and other subsequent exploits just as unfounded; though the master of the fleet must have reported that some time after the explosion-vessel had done its work he fell in with the Mediator, steering in a wrong direction, and set her right in her course!!!

I forbear to speak of having myself encountered the Mediator after passing several other fireships, as that would be assertion only. Of the effect produced, and by what means it was produced, the subjoined extract from the Times newspaper of May 4th, 1809, will furnish some idea, as coming from French sources:—

“Some letters have been received from the French coast, which bear testimony to the destructive result of the late attack an the enemy’s fleet in Basque Roads. ‘Your infernal machines,’ says one of the letters, ‘have not only destroyed 421several of our ships, but they have rendered almost all the remainder unfit to put to sea again. They have proved the destruction of more than 2000 of our people, (?) and petrified the rest with fear. The mouth of the Charente river is completely blocked up with wreck.’”^[55]

Yet two days after the departure of the Impérieuse, the commander-in-chief addressed another despatch to the Admiralty, from which the subjoined is an extract:—

“Caledonia, April 16, 1809.

“It has blown violently from the southward and westward ever since the departure of the Impérieuse, which has rendered it impracticable to act in any way with the small vessels or boats of the fleet against the enemy. I have the satisfaction to observe this morning, that the enemy have set fire to their frigate L’Indienne, and that the ship of the line which is aground at the entrance of the river—supposed to be the Regulus—there is every reason to believe will be wrecked.”

The Emperor Napoleon himself is, moreover, an authority on the subject, not to be passed over.

“Some conversation now took place about Lord Cochrane, and the attempt which his lordship had made to capture or destroy the ships in the Charente.

“I said it was the opinion of a very distinguished officer, whom I named, and who was well known to him (Napoleon), that if Cochrane had been properly supported, he would have destroyed the whole of the French ships.

“‘He would not only have destroyed them,’ replied Napoleon, ‘but he might and would have taken them out, had your admiral supported him as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by L’Allemand’ (I think he 422said) ‘to the ships to do the best in their power to save themselves—sauve qui peut, in fact—they became panic-struck, and cut their cables. The terror of the brûlots^[56] was so great, that they actually threw their powder overboard, so that they could have offered very little resistance.’

“‘The French admiral,’admiral,’ continued Napoleon, ‘was an imbecile, but yours was just as bad. I assure you, that if Cochrane had been supported, he would have taken every one of the ships. They ought not to have been alarmed by your brûlots, but fear deprived them of their senses, and they no longer knew how to act in their own defence.’”—O’Meara’s Napoleon, vol. ii. p. 291.

Were it worth while, numerous testimonies of the like character could be gathered from French official sources, but it is necessary to mention some other points of the despatch.

The commander-in-chief’s assertion, that, “owing to the darkness of the night, several fireships mistook their course and failed,” was true enough, but not the whole truth, which was, that, from their clumsy management—neither going in the right direction, nor being kindled at the right time or place—not one out of the twenty-three fireships took effect!

The despatch goes on to state, that at daylight Lord Cochrane signaling that seven of the enemy’s ships were on shore, and might be destroyed, the commander-in-chief “immediately”^[57] ordered the fleet to unmoor and weigh, intending to proceed with it to their destruction; but the wind blowing fresh from 423the northward^[58], and the flood-tide running^[59], rendered it too hazardous to enter Aix Roads, wherefore the fleet again anchored about three miles from the forts on Isle d’Aix.

This was, indeed, all that the fleet collectively did, or that the commander-in-chief intended it to do. Seeing, however, the “enemy warping off their ships” and that, whilst the fleet was unmooring and anchoring again, “they had succeeded in getting off all but five of the line!” the commander-in-chief “gave orders to Capt. Bligh of the Valiant, with the Revenge, frigates, bombs, &c.,”—to attack those that remained aground? Nothing of the kind, but—“to anchor near the Boyart Shoal, in readiness for an attack!!” An odd way truly of preventing the five remaining enemy’s ships, then throwing their guns overboard for the purpose of lightening themselves, from warping off!!

“At twenty minutes past two, P.M.,” continues the commander-in-chief, “Lord Cochrane advanced in the Impérieuse, with his accustomed gallantry and spirit, and opened a well-directed fire on the Calcutta, which struck her colours to the Impérieuse.” Lord Gambier afterwards denied this, though almost the only part of the action which he was near enough to see with his own eyes! Indeed, the terms of the despatch are decisive of having been detailed from his own personal observations!

But now comes the monstrous part of the assertion; viz. “The ships and vessels above-mentioned soon 424after joined in the attack on the Ville de Varsovie and Aquilon, and obliged them to strike their colours,” &c. Instead of “soon after,” the Valiant, Revenge, &c., remained at anchor near the Boyart, till my signal “In want of assistance,” had been wrongly interpreted as a signal of “distress.” But for this, it is clear that not an anchor would have been weighed. Yet the commander-in-chief made the act of sending in these ships, when it could no longer be avoided, appear part of a previous plan to attack the Ville de Varsovie and Aquilon, and that they were sent for this purpose soon after my attack on the Calcutta and them simultaneously!

This is not only a perversion of fact, but a suppression of it; for the commander-in-chief must have seen that the Impérieuse was engaged with the Aquilon and Ville de Varsovie, as well as with the Calcutta, before the Valiant, Revenge, &c., were ordered in to our assistance, as requested by my signal. And here it must be distinctly understood, that had not a portion of the fleet been compelled by this justifiable device of my signaling “In want of assistance,” to come to our supposed aid, no attack would have been made. To avert this disgrace, I resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice my ship.

Throughout the whole despatch, there is not a word to indicate that the terror caused by the explosion-vessels had anything to do with the success gained. On the contrary, the success is attributed to causes purely imaginary. Great credit is given to me “for the vigorous and gallant attack on the French line-of-battle ships ashore,” and for “my judicious manner of approaching them, and placing my ship in a position 425most advantageous to annoy the enemy, and preserve my own ship! which,” continued his Lordship, “could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy!”

The plain fact is, and it will by this time be evident to others besides nautical men, that the just quoted piece of claptrap was considered in the light of a sop to my supposed vanity, sufficient to insure my holding my peace on the subject of the fleet not having even contemplated an attack till forced into it by my signal being mistaken for being “in distress.”

Instead of being praised for what my plans really effected, I was praised for what was neither done nor intended to be done. Instead of adopting “a judicious manner of approaching the enemy, so as to preserve my ship,” I drifted the Impérieuse in like a log with the tide, and stern foremost, for fear of being recalled, and then went at the enemy with a determination, not to preserve, but to lose my ship, if the commander-in-chief did not relieve her before she was riddled with shot; this being my only hope of forcing on an attack of any kind. My motive was, no doubt, fathomed from seeing me attack three line-of-battle ships simultaneously. Not a moment was to be lost, and for the first time, since the French ran their ships ashore in terror, two British line-of-battle ships, and some frigates, approached the spot where the enemy’s vessels had been lying aground ever since the previous midnight, helpless, and, as every French authority admits, hopeless of escape, had the slightest effort been made to prevent it.

426In place, then, of attacking these with a single frigate, in such a way as to “preserve my ship,” I here avow that I rushed at the enemy in the bitterness of despair, determined that if a portion of the fleet was not sent in, the Impérieuse should never again float out; for rather than incur the stigma which would have awaited me in England, from no fault of mine, but because it was not expedient that plans which had been partially successful should be fully accomplished, she should have been destroyed.

This despatch, inexplicable as it was felt to be, naturally suggested to the public mind in England, that, despite its assumption of a great victory, the result of the victory was by no means commensurate with the tone of exultation assumed. The French fleet was not destroyed; and it was equally manifest, that if but little had been effected, it was owing to the time which had been suffered to elapse between my first signals and the tardy aid reluctantly yielded in support of them. By that kind of intuitive perception characteristic of the British press, it was agreed that there had been mismanagement somewhere, but where was not to be gathered from the commander-in-chief’s despatch, in which everything “by favour of the Almighty,”^[60] as the despatch most reprehensibly set forth, had succeeded.

It is not surprising, then, that the press began to 427criticise the despatch on its own merits. The following remarks are extracted from a Times leading article in the paper of April 25th, 1809, by way of specimen:—

“None felt more joy than ourselves at the destruction of four French vessels in Basque (Aix) Roads. We have, however, been given to understand that there are some people conversant in these things, whose satisfaction is not quite so complete as was our own on the result of the action.

* * * * * * * *

“Lord Cochrane’s first signal, as we learn from the Gazette, to the admiral of the fleet, was that ‘seven of the enemy’s ships were on shore, and might be destroyed.’ The question which hereupon naturally suggests itself to the mind is, ‘Why, then, if seven might be destroyed, were there only four?’

“The despatch proceeds. ‘I immediately made the signal for the fleet to unmoor and weigh.’ Indeed! Had Admiral Lord Gambier to unmoor at the time he received this intelligence? Did he not expect this might be the case? Or with what view was Lord Cochrane sent up the Roads? We are not much acquainted with naval matters, and therefore ask for information. To reason by analogy, if a military commander, knowing the enemy to be near, should send forward a detachment to reconnoitre and to attack, if possible, he would at least keep the rest of his troops under arms, that he 428might be ready to advance at a moment’s warning, and to sustain his own party when necessary.”

* * * * * * * *

The most honest account I have ever seen of the termination of the action, is written by the venerable and gallant Admiral Gravière, who was present at the attack. It will be found in the Revue des Deux Mondes for 1858. From this, though incorrect in stating that I commanded a division, I make the subjoined extract, which shall close the subject:—

“Un esprit de vertige semblait s’être emparé, dans cette affreuse nuit, et dans les journées qui suivirent, des plus braves capitaines. Des vaisseaux que l’ennemi n’avait pas même attaqués furent abandonnés par leurs équipages, et des hommes héroïques partagèrent la faiblesse commune.

“La mollesse de Lord Gambier, le courage et le sang froid de quelques-uns de nos officiers, préservèrent seuls l’escadre française d’une ruine totale.”

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

LONDON

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Transcriber’s Note

A simple diagram of a French defensive boom, on p. 400, seems geometrically suspect. A triangle with two ‘400 toise’ sides, cannot have an ‘800 toise’ opposing side. (A ‘toise’ is a French measure slightly less than two meters.) The French description the obstacle is on p. 381, beginning with ‘Elle étoit flanquée...’.

Footnote 41 (297.28 refers to Michelot de Prato, which appears in the text as Michelet. These are references to Micheletto Corella, a Catalan soldier who served as Cesar Borgia’s executioner.

Errors deemed most likely to be the printer’s have been corrected, and are noted here. The references are to the page and line in the original.

ix.8 I must have p[er/re]maturely sunk. Transposed.

2.8 to the grant [w]hich Dungal Restored.

21.33 [“]Your lordship’s real friend Added.

60.8 that our national[,] safety depended on Removed.

98.11 sunk [her.] Restored.

292.1 to render it useless[,/.] Replaced.

340.1 He th[a/e]n ran for Madeira Replaced.

342.6 an immense amount of mischief[,/.] Replaced.

422.6 “‘The French admiral,[”/’] Replaced.