Volume 1 — CHAP. XVII. CRUISE OF THE IMPÉRIEUSE CONTINUED.

CAPTURE A SETTEE.—GET UNDER SAIL.—FIGHT BETWEEN THE PATRIOTS AND FRENCH.—MAKE SAIL FOR ROSAS.—FORT TRINIDAD.—GALLANTRY OF CAPTAIN WEST.—BRAVERY OF THE CATALAN.—REPULSE OF THE FRENCH.—ATTACK OF THE IMPÉRIEUSE.—THE FRENCH REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS.—OCCUPATION OF CATALONIA.—THE CASTLE OF TRINIDAD.—NATURE OF OUR POSITION.—NATURE OF OUR OPERATIONS.—MANUFACTURE OF A MAN-TRAP.—LOSE MY NOSE.—THE FRENCH ASSAULT ROSAS.—PRACTICE OF THE FRENCH.—PRESENTIMENT.—THE FRENCH ATTACK.—THE ATTACK REPULSED.—BRAVERY OF A FRENCH SOLDIER.—HEAVY GALE OF WIND.—UNFORTUNATE ACCIDENT.—EVACUATE THE FORTRESS.—STAND TOWARDS LA ESCALA.—LETTER FROM LORD COLLINGWOOD.—DESPATCH TO LORD COLLINGWOOD.—LETTER TO THE ADMIRALTY.—TESTIMONY OF THE SPANIARDS.—SIR WALTER SCOTT.—OFFICIAL GRATITUDE.

On the 19th of October we again quitted Gibraltar for the eastward, having learned that the French frigates which had succeeded in getting out of Toulon were at anchor in St. Fiorenzo bay, in the island of Corsica. After leaving Gibraltar, we stood over towards the Spanish possessions on the Barbary coast, and finding everything right there, passed on to the Zaffarine Islands, inside of which we anchored for the purpose of painting and refitting the ship, which stood much in need of renovation.

This being accomplished, we again sailed on the 29th, and on the 31st arrived in the harbour of Carthagena, 291where we found the Russian ambassador to Austria on his way to Trieste. No English man-of-war having been here since our former visit, we were received with great hospitality and attention by the authorities and inhabitants, who unanimously expressed their delight at being at peace with England; though, as a Spanish fleet lay dismantled in the harbour, it struck me that they might aid England to better purpose by looking after the enemy. Even their convoys had to be protected by English ships, for whilst we lay at Carthagena, the Myrtle arrived from Tarragona, with twelve sail of transports which she had convoyed thither with Spanish troops from Lisbon, and again returned for more.

The Impérieuse left Carthagena on the 10th of November, and rounding Cape Palos, passed between Majorca and the mainland, where, on the 11th, we captured a settee. On the 12th we anchored off Barcelona, which place was still in possession of the French. The Cambrian was at anchor in the roads.

At night we sent the boats of the Impérieuse to throw rockets into the fort, and at daylight on the following morning got under weigh, but perceiving two boats full of men in chase of some Spanish settees, we lowered ours, and pulled for the boats, which on seeing our intention, abandoned their prey, and ran in under the forts for protection.

On our arrival at Barcelona the Cambrian went out for a run, leaving the Impérieuse to watch the enemy. On her return we again out boats, and proceeded to blow up a fort close to the entrance of Llogrebat 292river, and succeeded in so far shattering its foundations, as to render it useless.useless. On the 14th the Impérieuse anchored near the mouth of this river for the purpose of watering, sending at the same time a boat to throw rockets into the barracks, in order to divert the attention of the Barcelona garrison.

Having completed watering on the 15th, we again got under sail, and resumed our position before the town, shortly after which we observed about 2000 of the French army march out and ascend the hills, where they soon became engaged with a large body of Spanish peasantry. The ships followed, keeping as far as practicable in shore; but still at too great a distance to render any material assistance to the patriots, who were at last forced from their position. As soon as this action was over, the batteries commenced firing shells at us. In place of replying to this, both ships opened a heavy fire on the portion of the town occupied by French troops, amongst whom, as we afterwards learned from the Spaniards, our shot told with great effect.

Irritated by this unexpected movement, the whole of the batteries ashore began to ply us with shot and shell, the latter of which were thrown with excellent precision as regarded their direction, but fell either over or short of us, two only bursting near the Impérieuse, but without doing us any harm. The Cambrian, lying a little farther out, escaped with similar impunity. With round shot the batteries were in our case more lucky, one of these passing through the barge and galley, and another striking the muzzle of a 293brass 32-pounder on the forecastle, in such a way as to render it useless, though without injury to the men who were at the time working the guns.

The circumstances under which the destruction of this gun was effected, are too curious to be passed over.

By an extraordinary coincidence the enemy’s shot entered the muzzle at the moment our men were firing it, so that the two shots met in the bore! The consequence was, that the gun was blown up nearly in the middle, the exterior being forced into a globular form—to our great annoyance, for this gun was one of our most useful weapons.

On the 17th another action took place between the mountaineers and a French force on the hills, the object of the patriots being to get possession of the heights, where the French had established a battery, but which on every side annoyed the cordon of irregular troops employed in intercepting provisions, from which the Spaniards could not dislodge them, though they appeared to make their attacks with so much judgment and vigour as to compel the enemy to remain on the defensive. In the present case the attack was unsuccessful, the patriots being compelled to retire without accomplishing their object.

After this affair was concluded, several Spanish officers came on board the Impérieuse, and spoke confidently of being able to drive in the French advanced force as soon as General Reding’s force joined. They informed me that the presence of the Impérieuse and Cambrian had been of great use, by compelling the 294French to keep a considerable portion of their troops in the town, and to employ others in manning the coast batteries, so that few were available for operations elsewhere; but beyond this we had no opportunity of assisting the patriots, as the heights to which the enemy clung so tenaciously were beyond the reach of shot or shell from the ships.

On the 19th I received information of the French having invested Rosas, and knowing that Lord Collingwood attached considerable importance to this place, I considered it my duty, in accordance with his lordship’s instructions, to proceed in that direction, hoping that the Impérieuse might there render substantial service; we therefore left the Cambrian before Barcelona, and made sail for Rosas, where we arrived on the following day. As it fell calm, the ship was compelled to anchor ten miles from the fortress.

On our arrival a heavy cannonade was going on between the ships and a French battery thrown up on the cliff above Fort Trinidad. The Impérieuse, as has been said, being out of range, I took the gig and landed in the town, to ascertain how we might best employ ourselves. Having satisfied myself on this point, I sent back the gig with orders for the frigate to make every effort to get within range of the French troops surrounding the town, so as to enfilade them. As the calm continued, she was, however, unable to approach till the following day, I meanwhile remaining in Rosas, to encourage the Spanish troops, whose spirit was beginning to give way.

Previous to our arrival the marines of the Excellent, 295together with some Spanish troops, had occupied the citadel. Many of these having been wounded, the Excellent took upwards of forty on board and sailed, leaving the Fame to watch the place, and her commander withdrew some thirty marines, who, with sixty or seventy Spaniards, occupied Fort Trinidad. The departure of the Excellent in the first place, and the withdrawal of the marines in the second, greatly dispirited the Spaniards, who on the evening of the 21st began to quit the town in boats.

A brief outline of what had occurred previous to my arrival in the Impérieuse, will here be requisite, in order to comprehend the events which followed. On the 6th of November a body of 6000 French, or rather Italians, coming from Figueras, had taken possession of the town and the heights commanding the roads. The inhabitants forthwith fled; but the Excellent and Meteor, then lying in the harbour, speedily drove out the invaders.

On the assault of the town some of the inhabitants had fled to the citadel, which was in a wretched condition, one of its bastions having been blown down during the last war; and such had been the negligence of the Spanish military authorities, that it had received no better repair than a few planks and loose stones; whilst the stores were even in a more wretched condition than the works. It was, however, necessary to put it, as far as possible, in a defensible condition, and to this Captain West, of the Excellent, energetically applied himself.

To the eastward of the town, on an eminence commanding 296the harbour, stood Fort Trinidad, of which a description will presently be given. In this fortress Captain West placed five-and-twenty of the Excellent’s marines, in addition to the Spaniards who manned the fort; and, at the same time, sent fifty seamen into the citadel to support the garrison.

The Spanish governor, O’Daly, now sent a request to the Junta of Gerona for reinforcements; but the French, managing to intercept his despatches, caused it to be reported to the Junta that the English had taken forcible possession of the fortress, and deposed the governor; whereupon, in place of sending reinforcements, the Junta wrote to Captain West, demanding an explanation of conduct so extraordinary, and, till this explanation revealed the trick, it remained undiscovered.

On the 9th the citadel was attacked by General Reille, and a breach effected; but Captain West, placing the Meteor in a position to flank the breach, and sending some boats to enfilade the shore, prevented the assault, and despatching more seamen to the citadel, the next day it was again in a tolerably defensive state, so much so that Captain West had sallied out with the seamen and effected the rescue of a party of Catalonian militia.

The French commander, thus foiled by the gallantry and judgment of Captain West, now deemed it necessary to proceed against Rosas by regular siege, but first made an attempt to storm Fort Trinidad, in which he was repulsed with considerable loss; but the fort was so much in danger that, in order to prevent surprise, Captain West reinforced it with thirty additional marines, who entered by means of rope ladders.

297The French now, despite opposition from the ships, began to erect batteries on the heights for the demolition of Fort Trinidad, and threw up an entrenchment 300 yards from the citadel, for the purpose of breaching that also. A 3-gun battery opened against the town walls, and the joint effect of these being occasionally directed against the ships compelled them to retire out of range.

Captain West was now superseded by Captain Bennett of the Fame, and, as a breach had nearly been effected in the lower bomb proof of Fort Trinidad, Captain Bennett withdrew the marines. At this juncture I arrived at Rosas in the Impérieuse, having, indeed, come there to render what assistance I could to the Spaniards, and, knowing the endurance, as well as indomitable bravery of the Catalan or Michelet^[41] character; feeling, moreover, assured that the Junta of Gerona would supply early assistance, I determined to replace the marines which Captain Bennett had withdrawn, with others from my own frigate. As it was generally known amongst vessels on the Mediterranean station that I was acting under discretionary orders from Lord Collingwood, Captain Bennett, though he had withdrawn his own men, and notwithstanding that he was my senior officer, did not attempt to thwart my resolution, 298probably because he considered that by so doing he might be interfering with the instructions given me by Lord Collingwood.

On the 22nd, after having given further instructions on board the Impérieuse for annoying the enemy during my absence, I again went on shore to the citadel, into which the French were incessantly throwing shells, but without much effect; for although every shell fell within the place, the shelter was excellent, and no great damage was done.

Having ascertained the position of the enemy’s entrenchments, I returned on board, and despatched a party from the frigate to fire upon them at the distance of about 600 yards, as well as to harass the batteries in course of construction. The work was so well performed by our men as to embarrass the troops in the batteries, and thus lessen their fire on the citadel, the preservation of which, till further assistance should arrive, was my principal object. A battery of 24-pounders on the top of a cliff, and therefore inaccessible to our fire, kept up, however, an unremitting fire on Fort Trinidad, every shot striking; but the fort being bomb-proof, without injury to the little garrison, which, like that of the citadel, was well sheltered, but had no means of returning the fire except occasionally by musketry.

After pounding away at the fort for several days, the French made up their minds to storm, but on coming within range of musket-shot, they got such a reception from the garrison as to render a hasty retreat imperative. As their discomfiture was visible from the 299ship, we fired a salute of twenty-one guns by way of sarcastic compliment, but the enemy had not the politeness to return the courtesy.

The Impérieuse now got under weigh, and cleared for action, taking up a position to the left of the citadel, and within musket-shot of the French lines, into which we poured such a storm of shot as to drive out the enemy. Satisfied with the success, I went on shore at Rosas, and got 700 Spaniards to embark in the boats, afterwards putting them on board a light vessel, with the intention of landing them at the back of Fort Trinidad, so as to dislodge the troops from the battery on the cliff, and throw the guns over. The movement was, however, detected by the French commander, and a force which had just been engaged at a distance was hastily recalled, and rushed on, driving the Spaniards and some Germans before them. Manning the batteries, the French instantly turned their attention to the Impérieuse, against which they directed such a well-aimed shower of shells as rendered it imperative to get under sail and anchor out of range.

The firing between the batteries and the citadel was kept up during the night without intermission, and at daylight the Spaniards we had landed for the attack on the cliff battery appeared in such confusion, that it became necessary to despatch the boats to bring off a party of marines, who had been put on shore with them. Our men reported that the Spaniards had unaccountably refused to follow them to the attack, and, as is usual in such cases, had suffered far more severely than they would have done had they persevered 300in the attempt to capture the battery. On sending boats to bring off the Spaniards we only got 300 out of the 700, the remainder being either killed or made prisoners.

On the 23rd we again ran in under Fort Trinidad, but this time on the opposite side to the battery on the cliff, where we could effect considerable mischief, without receiving much in return. It now fell dead calm, so that it was lucky we had not taken up our former position, where we might have been terribly annoyed.

The French, without paying much attention to us, now appeared to redouble their efforts against both castle and citadel, whilst their troops mustered strongly on the hills, with the evident intention of an attack on both, the moment a breach became practicable.

Finding this to be the case, the Fame withdrew her marines from Fort Trinidad, upon which I went ashore, and after careful inspection of the breach in course of formation, considering it still capable of prolonged defence, begged the commandant to hold out till next day, when he should be reinforced with marines from the Impérieuse, promising at the same time to remain myself in the fortress with the men. With some difficulty he was induced to consent to this arrangement, after telling me that it had been his intention to capitulate on the same evening.

Nor was the Spanish governor at all to blame for his intention to surrender the fortress. Captain Bennett had withdrawn his men, thinking, no doubt, that it was untenable, and that therefore nothing was to be 301gained by their exposure; so that the Spanish governor might fairly plead that further resistance had been deemed unavailing by the English themselves.

Lord Collingwood had, however, entrusted me with discretionary orders to assist the Spaniards, and it appeared to me that the present was an instance where those orders might be carried into effect, for I had no doubt, if assistance arrived promptly, that the French would be compelled to raise the siege of Rosas, as they had done that of Gerona. In which case they would find themselves isolated at Barcelona; and being cut off, as they already were by land, and exposed to bombardment by sea, must surrender. The occupation of Catalonia, in short, turned on two points; 1st, whether the Junta of Gerona supplied an adequate reinforcement; and, 2ndly, whether I could hold Fort Trinidad till it arrived. Neither do I blame Captain Bennett for withdrawing his men. It was simply matter of opinion, his being that neither fort nor citadel would long hold out—mine, formed on actual inspection of the fort, that it was still in a condition to maintain itself, and being so, that its retention was essential for the preservation of the town and citadel. And had there been a little more alacrity on the part of the Gerona Junta in supplying reinforcements, that opinion would have been justified. Captain Bennett perhaps knew the dilatory habits of the Spaniards better than I did; but although my senior officer, he was disinterested enough not in any way to interfere with my plans.

Before daylight on the 24th we landed fifty men, 302ordering all the marines to follow after sunset. Our first object was to effect such repairs as would put the fort in a better state of defence, and this was accomplished without any great difficulty, as the French were confining their attention to one particular spot, where, by a constant succession of quick firing, they hoped to make a practicable breach. This we could not prevent, having no artillery to reply to theirs.

My principal ground for a belief in the practicability of holding the fort arose from the peculiar form and thickness of the walls, to penetrate which was no easy matter, if resolutely defended. Even if eventually successful, it would not be difficult to evacuate the fort by the lower portion, before the enemy could establish themselves in the upper, whilst a well constructed mine would involve both them and the castle in one common ruin.

The Castle of Trinidad stood on the side of a hill, having by no means a difficult descent to the sea, but this hill was again commanded by a higher and more precipitous cliff, which would have enabled an enemy to drive out the occupants with ease, but for the peculiar construction of the fortress.

Next to the sea was a fort constructed with strong walls some 50 feet high. Behind this and joined to it, rose another fort to the height of 30 or 40 feet more, and behind this again was a tower rising some 20 or 30 feet still higher, the whole presenting the appearance of a large church with a tower 110 feet high, a nave 90 feet high, and a chancel 50 feet. The tower, having its back to the cliff, as a matter of course sheltered 303the middle and lower portions of the fortress from a fire of the battery above it. Nothing, in short, for a fortress commanded by adjacent heights could have been better adapted for holding out against offensive operations, or worse adapted for replying to them; this on our part being out of the question, as the French battery was too much elevated on the cliff for artillery to reach, whilst the tower which prevented their shot from annoying us, would also have prevented our firing at them, even had we possessed artillery.

It was to this tower therefore that the French chiefly directed their attention, as a practicable breach therein, followed by a successful assault, would in their estimation place the fortress at their mercy, so that we must either be driven out or forced to surrender. In consequence of the elevated position of the enemy’s battery on the cliff, they could however only breach the central portion of the tower, the lowest part of the breach being nearly sixty feet above its base, so that when practicable, it could only be reached by long scaling ladders.

A pretty correct idea of our relative positions may be formed if the unnautical reader will imagine our small force to be placed in the nave of Westminster Abbey, with the enemy attacking the great western tower from the summit of a cliff 100 feet higher than the tower, so that the breach in course of formation nearly corresponded to the great west window of the abbey. It will hence be clear that, in the face of a determined opposition, it would be no easy matter to scale the external wall of the tower up to the great 304west window, and more difficult still to overcome impediments presently to be mentioned, so as to get down into the body of the church. These were the points I had to provide against, for we could neither prevent the French from breaching nor storming.

It so happened, that just at the spot where the breach was in process of formation, there was a lofty bomb proof interior arch, upwards of fifty feet in height. This arch, reaching from the lower part of the breach to the interior base of the tower, was without much difficulty converted into an obstacle, of which the French little dreamed; viz. into a chasm, down which they must have plunged headlong had they attempted to penetrate an inch beyond the outer wall, even after they had gained it.

The only operation necessary was to break in the crown of the arch, so that all who on an assault ventured on penetrating farther than the outer wall of the breach, must of necessity be hurled to the bottom. But as the fall of a portion of the enemy might not deter the rest from holding possession of the outer wall till they were provided with the means of overcoming the obstacle, I got together all the timber at hand, and constructed a huge wooden case, exactly resembling the hopper of a mill—the upper part being kept well greased with cooks’ slush from the Impérieuse, so that to retain a hold upon it was impossible. Down this, with the slightest pressure from behind, the storming party must have fallen to a depth of fifty feet, and all they could have done, if not killed, would have been to remain prisoners at the bottom of the bomb proof.

305The mantrap being thus completed,—and to do the Spaniards justice, they entered with ardour into the work,—the next object was to prepare trains for the explosion of the magazines, in case evacuation of the fort became compulsory. This was done in two places; the first deposit of powder being placed underneath the breach, with the portfire so arranged, as to go off in about ten minutes; the other beneath the remaining part of the fortress, with a portfire calculated to burn until we ourselves were safe on board the frigate.

The French were highly exasperated on finding that the castle had been reinforced from the Impérieuse, of which ship they had by this time not a few unpleasant reminiscences; they therefore adopted additional measures to put a stop to our co-operation.

In addition to the previously mentioned battery, another was erected on the cliff commanding the fortress; and on the 25th, upwards of 300 shots were directed at the tower, the result being a hole, which speedily widened into a tolerable breach. Our men were now engaged in blocking it up as fast as it was made, and working as they did under cover, no loss was sustained, though every shot brought down large masses of stone within the fortress; the French thus supplying us with materials for repair, though rendering a sharp look-out against splinters necessary.

On this day I received a wound, which caused me intolerable agony. Being anxious, during an ominous pause, to see what the enemy were about, I incautiously looked round an angle of the tower towards the battery 306overhead, and was struck by a stone splinter in the face; the splinter flattening my nose and then penetrating my mouth. By the skill of our excellent doctor, Mr. Guthrie, my nose was after a time rendered serviceable.

Whilst the enemy were breaching the tower, the boats of the Impérieuse inflicted on them such severe chastisement, that detachments of infantry were stationed on the hills to drive off the boats with musketry; but our people managed to keep out of harm’s way, whilst directing a destructive fire upon the nearer portion of our opponents.

On the 26th the French renewed their fire; but as during the previous night we had filled up the breach with loose rubble, their progress was by no means rapid, the rubble forming almost as great an obstacle as did the wall itself. It was, however, evident that the breach must sooner or later become practicable, so that we turned our attention to the erection of interior barricades, in case of a sudden attempt to storm. In addition to these barricades festoons of top chains were brought from the ship, and suspended over the hopper and elsewhere; the chains being moreover armed with large fishhooks, so securely fastened, that there was little danger of those who were caught, getting away before they were shot.

The barricades constituted what may be termed a rampart within the breach, constructed of palisades, barrels, bags of earth, &c., these supplying the place of walls, whilst the descent from the crown of the bombproof 307to the bottom, constituted a formidable substitute for a ditch.

We got to-day a trifling though welcome reinforcement of sixty regular Spanish, or rather Irish troops in the Spanish service, and sent an equal number of peasants to Rosas; for though these men were brave, as are all Catalans, and ready enough, yet their want of military skill rendered them ill adapted to the work in hand. As soon as the Irish comprehended our means of defence, and the reception prepared for the enemy, their delight at the prospective mischief was highly characteristic, and could not have been exceeded had they been preparing for a “scrimmage” in their native country.

At midnight the French made a general assault on the town of Rosas, and after several hours’ hard fighting obtained possession. The Impérieuse and Fame now approached, and commenced a fire which must have caused great loss to the besiegers, but which failed to dispossess them. Towards morning—when too late—a detachment of 2000 Spanish troops arrived from Gerona! Six hours earlier would have saved the town, the preservation of which was the only object in retaining the fortress.

The practice of the French when breaching the walls of Rosas, was beautiful. So skilfully was their artillery conducted, that, to use a schoolboy similitude, every discharge “ruled a straight line” along the lower part of the walls; this being repeated till the upper portion was without support, as a matter of course, the whole fell in the ditch, forming a breach of easy ascent. 308This operation constituted an object of great interest to us in the fortress, from which the whole proceedings were clearly visible.

Having secured the town, the French redoubled their efforts against the castle, and had they continued with the same vigour, we must have been driven out. Two of our marines were killed by shot, as was a third by a stone splinter, so that with all my desire to hold out, I began to doubt the propriety of sacrificing men to the preservation of a place which could not be long tenable.

The French being also heartily tired of the loss they were sustaining from the fire of the ships and boats, sent us a flag of truce, with the offer of honourable capitulation. This being declined on our part, the firing recommenced more heavily than before.

On the 28th the fire of the enemy slackened, their troops being engaged in throwing up intrenchments and constructing batteries in the town, a second detachment of Spanish troops being on its way now that the place had fallen. Soon after midday they sent a small party with another flag of truce. As it was, however, evident that their object was this time to spy out the state of our defences, we threw some hand grenades towards them, to show that we would not hold any parley, on which they retired, and the firing was again renewed.

On the 29th the French opened upon the castle from five different batteries on the hills, but without damage to life, as our men were now kept close. The ships and bombs, however, directed upon them a destructive 309fire with shot and shell, which considerably damped their ardour. To-day all access to the citadel was cut off, the French having succeeded in erecting batteries on both sides the sea gates, so that all communication with the boats was rendered impossible.

The dawn of the 30th might have been our last, but from the interposition of what some persons may call presentiment. Long before daylight I was awoke with an impression that the enemy were in possession of the castle, though the stillness which prevailed showed this to be a delusion. Still I could not recompose myself to sleep, and after lying for some time tossing about, I left my couch, and hastily went on the esplanade of the fortress. All was perfectly still, and I felt half ashamed of having given way to such fancies.

A loaded mortar, however, stood before me, pointed, during the day, in such a direction that the shell should fall on the path over the hill which the French must necessarily take whenever they might make an attempt to storm. Without other object than that of diverting my mind from the unpleasant feeling which had taken possession of it, I fired the mortar. Before the echo had died away, a volley of musketry from the advancing column of the enemy showed that the shell had fallen amongst them, just as they were on the point of storming.

Rushing on, their bullets pattered like hail on the walls of the fort. To man these was the work of a moment; for, as may be supposed, our fellows did not wait for another summons, and the first things barely discernible amidst the darkness were the French scaling 310ladders ready to be placed at the foot of the breach, with an attendant body of troops waiting to ascend, but hesitating, as though the unexpected shell from our mortar rendered them uncertain as to our preparations for defence. To the purposeless discharge of that piece of ordnance we owed our safety, for otherwise they would have been upon us before we even suspected their presence; and so exasperated were they at our obstinate defence, that very little attention would have been paid to any demand for quarter. The French deserved great credit for a silence in their movements which had not even attracted the attention of the sentries on the tower.

Whilst the enemy were hesitating, we became better prepared, our men being ready at every point which commanded the breach. It was not in the nature of the French to slink off on being detected. In a few minutes on they came up the ladders, to the certainty of getting either into the mantrap, or of being hurled from the walls as fast as they came up, retreat being for a short time impossible, on account of the pressure from behind. There was now just light enough for them to see the chasm before them, and the wall was crowded with hesitating men. About forty had gained the summit of the breach, all of whom were swept off with our fire; whilst a crowd was waiting below for the chance of sharing the same fate. Giving them no time for deliberation, several shells which had been suspended by ropes half-way down the wall, were ignited, our hand grenades were got to work, and these, together with the musketry, told 311fearfully on the mass—which wavered for a few moments, and then retreated amidst the loud huzzas of our fellows. The French, however, gallantly carried off their wounded, though they were compelled to leave the dead, who, till the following morning, lay in a heap close to the foot of the tower.

Scarcely had we got rid of our assailants, when a numerous body of troops came down from the hills with muskets firing and drums beating, nothing doubting that their comrades were in possession of the fortress. Our lads, having their hands now free, returned their fire with excellent effect, dropping some at every discharge; when at length, finding that the assault had failed, and that we were able to offer effectual resistance, the detachment retreated up the hills as fast as they could, amidst the derisive cheering of our men.

The force which formed the storming party, consisted, as we afterwards learned from our prisoners, of one company of grenadiers, two of carabineers, and four of the voltigeurs of the 1st Light Regiment of Italy, in all about 1200 men. They were gallantly led, two of the officers attracting my especial attention. The first was dropped by a shot, which precipitated him from the walls, but whether he was killed or only wounded, I do not know, probably wounded only, as his body was not seen by us amongst the dead. The other was the last man to quit the walls, and before he could do so, I had covered him with my musket. Finding escape impossible, he stood like a hero to receive the bullet, without condescending to lower his sword in 312token of surrender. I never saw a braver or a prouder man. Lowering my musket, I paid him the compliment of remarking, that so fine a fellow was not born to be shot down like a dog, and that, so far as I was concerned, he was at liberty to make the best of his way down the ladder; upon which intimation he bowed as politely as though on parade, and retired just as leisurely.

In this affair we had only three men killed—one of the marines and two Spaniards, another Spaniard being shot through the thigh and the Spanish governor of the fortress through the hand; there were, however, a few minor casualties. The total loss of the enemy, judging from the dead left behind—upwards of fifty—must have been severe. My determination not to quit the fortress was therefore increased, as there was every reason to be satisfied with the efficacy of my hopper trap and fish-hook chains. In short, it was impossible for any one to get over the one or through the other. Not a Frenchman had advanced beyond the outer wall.

After this the enemy did not molest us much, except with musketry, which did no damage, as our men were well under cover. They, however, turned their attention to the citadel, the Spanish garrison replying smartly to their fire. The Spaniards with us in the castle likewise behaved with great gallantry, as did the soldiers of the Irish brigades in the Spanish service, by whom the peasants before mentioned had been supplanted. Had the latter remained, the repulse of our assailants might have been more difficult, though equally certain.

313On the 1st of December we passed a tolerably quiet day, the French being engaged in erecting a new battery, to annoy our boats when coming on shore, with which they appeared to content themselves.

The 2nd passed over in the same quiet way.

On the 3rd the troops in the citadel made a sortie, apparently in the hope of dislodging the French from their intrenchments, and an obstinate engagement ensued, with considerable loss on both sides. By the time this was over, our friends on the hill had nearly completed another new battery, and were trying its effect on us somewhat unpleasantly, every shot knocking down great quantities of stone. A still more unpleasant circumstance was, that a heavy gale of wind had arisen, before which the Impérieuse was visibly dragging her anchors, and might be compelled to go to sea, leaving us to defend ourselves till her return.

On the 4th, the French opened all their batteries on the citadel, eleven of their guns being brought to bear upon the old breach elsewhere mentioned as never having been properly repaired. At this point an immense number of shot and shell were directed, and towards night a breach was nearly practicable. This operation against the citadel seeming decisive, the new battery on the hill began upon us in the castle with redoubled vengeance, and every shot told with effect; the object no doubt being to storm both fortresses simultaneously on the following day.

An unfortunate accident occurred in the castle to-day. Five of our men were loading a gun, intended for employment against a body of French troops, who 314were throwing up an intrenchment below us, with the evident object of cutting us off from retreat or communication with the frigate; by some mischance the gun exploded, blowing off the arms of a marine, who died soon after, and knocking a seaman over the castle wall, a depth of fifty feet. The poor fellow was taken up by the boat’s crew, and carried on board in a dreadfully shattered condition.

At daylight on the 5th, the French again opened their batteries on the citadel, and by 8 A.M. the breach was quite practicable. A large body of troops had assembled for the assault, but the firing suddenly ceased on both sides, and from the number of men lounging about the breach, it was clear that a capitulation was in progress. Under these circumstances it became my duty not to sacrifice our marines and seamen to the mere excitement of fighting a whole army which could now pay us undivided attention. We therefore began to think of taking our departure, and getting our baggage collected, we made signals to the Impérieuse for all boats to be in readiness to take us off, if the garrison in the citadel should capitulate. The battery, however, continued firing upon us as usual, and with decisive effect on the tower. Without taking any notice of this, we laid trains ready for blowing up the fort.

Soon after our signals were made, the Fame and Magnificent—the latter of which had recently come into the anchorage—got under weigh and beat towards the landing-place. Our signals having been also understood by the French, the batteries overhead ceased firing, and a number of troops approached to take possession. 315At 11 A.M. we made the signal for the boats—the Impérieuse attending them close in shore.

We now commenced evacuating the fortress, sending down the troops of the Bourbon regiment first; the Irish brigade next, and our marines and seamen last. On the boats pulling in, the ships opened fire with shot and shell upon the French. We did not, however, receive any molestation from the latter, whilst our men went down the rope ladders out of the fort, and by one o’clock all were out of the castle except the gunner and myself, we having remained to light the portfires attached to the trains.

After this we got into the boats also unopposed, but the moment they pulled off from the shore the French opened upon us with musketry and round shot, fortunately without injury to any one. A stiff breeze now blowing, enabled the Impérieuse to get close in, so that we were soon on board.

The French having become practically acquainted with some of our devices were on their guard, and did not take possession of the castle immediately on our quitting it, and it was lucky for them that they did not, for shortly after we got on board the first explosion took place, blowing up the portion of the fortress which they had been breaching; but the second train failed, owing, no doubt, to the first shock disarranging the portfire. Had not this been the case, scarcely one stone of the castle would have remained on another.

In the evening I directed the Impérieuse to get under weigh and stand towards La Escala, where we landed the Spanish troops. On the following morning the 316Fame parted company for Lord Collingwood’s fleet; and leaving the Magnificent at anchor with the bombs, we stood towards San Felin, having the mortification of seeing the French flag flying over what remained of the Castle of Trinidad, which we had so pertinaciously endeavoured to defend, and failing in this, should have wholly destroyed but for the accident of the second portfire becoming out of order.

In the defence of this fortress, we lost only three killed and seven wounded; the loss of the Spaniards amounting to two killed and five wounded. Next to the thorough accomplishment of the work in hand my care was for the lives of the men. Indeed, it is matter of congratulation to me that no commander having gone through such service ever had fewer men killed. Lord St. Vincent on a former occasion gave this as a reason for not promoting my officers, but even a rebuff so unworthy failed to induce me to depart from my system of taking care of the men, the death of one of whom would have affected me more than the death of a hundred enemies, because it would, in my estimation, have been attributable to my own want of foresight.

The destruction of the French must have been very great. We who were cooped up in the fortress had only one collision with them, but in that they suffered fearfully, whilst we escaped scot free. But the fire of the ships must have told upon them to a great extent.

The subjoined letters from Lord Collingwood to the Secretary of the Admiralty constitute the only commendations 317I received for the services detailed in the preceding chapters.

Extract of a letter from Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood to the Hon. W. W. Pole, dated on board the Ocean, Dec. 14, 1808.

“My letter of the 1st instant would inform you of the enemy having laid siege to the castle of Rosas, and of the measures taken by the British ships in that bay in aid of the Spaniards for its defence. The Scout joined the squadron off Toulon on the 7th, and by her I received further accounts from Captain Bennett, of the Fame, of the progress the enemy was making against that important fortress.

“Captain Lord Cochrane has maintained himself in the possession of Trinity castle with great ability and heroism. Although the fort is laid open by the breach in its works, he has sustained and repelled several assaults, having formed a sort of rampart within the breach with his ship’s hammock cloths, awnings, &c., filled with sand and rubbish. The zeal and energy with which he has maintained that fortress excites the highest admiration. His resources for every exigency have no end. The Spanish governor of the castle is wounded and on board the Meteor.

“Collingwood.”

This expression of opinion on the part of Lord Collingwood should have procured me some commendation from the Naval authorities at home; the more so as it was spontaneous on his lordship’s part, no official despatch from me on the subject having at that time reached him. I was, however, a black sheep at the Admiralty, and, had it been my good fortune to have been instrumental in raising the siege of Rosas, the only care taken by the Tory Government at home would, in all probability, have been how to conceal a knowledge 318of the fact from the public. After the evacuation and destruction of the fortress I addressed to Lord Collingwood the subjoined despatch.

“H. M. Ship Impérieuse, Bay of Rosas,

5th Dec. 1808.

“My Lord,—The fortress of Rosas being attacked by an army of Italians in the service of France (in pursuance of discretionary orders which your lordship gave me, to assist the Spaniards whenever it could be done with most effect), I hastened here. The citadel on the 22nd instant was already half invested, and the enemy was making his approaches towards the south-west bastion, which your lordship knows was blown down last war by the explosion of a magazine and tumbled into the ditch; a few thin planks and dry stones had been put up by the Spanish engineers, perhaps to hide the defect; all things were in the most deplorable state without and within; even measures for their powder and saws for their fuses were not to be had, and mats and axes supplied their place. The castle of Trinity, situated on an eminence, but commanded by heights, was also invested. Three 24-pounders battered in breach, to which a fourth was afterwards added, and a passage through the wall to the lower bomb-proof being nearly effected on the 23rd, the marines of the Fame were withdrawn. I went to examine the state of the castle, and, as the senior officer in the bay had not officially altered the orders I received from your lordship, I thought this a good opportunity, by occupying a post on which the acknowledged safety of the citadel depended, to render them an effectual service. The remaining garrison consisted of about eighty Spaniards, who were on the point of surrendering; accordingly, I threw myself into the fort with fifty seamen and thirty marines of the Impérieuse. The arrangements I made need not be detailed to your lordship; suffice it to say, that about a thousand bags (made of old sails), besides barrels and palisades, supplied the place of walls and ditches, and 319that the enemy, who assaulted the castle on the 30th with full 1000 picked men, were repulsed with the loss of their commanding officer, storming equipage, and all who had attempted to mount the breach. The Spanish garrison having been changed, gave good assistance. As to the officers, seamen, and marines of this ship, the fatigues they underwent, and the gallant manner in which they behaved, deserve every praise. I must, however, particularly mention Lieutenant Johnson, of the navy, Lieutenant Hoare, of the marines, Mr. Burney, the gunner, Mr. Lodowick, the carpenter, and Messrs. Stewart, Sloven, and Marryat, midshipmen.

“Captain Hall, of the Lucifer, at all times and in every way gave his zealous assistance. I feel also indebted to Captain Collens, of the Meteor, for his aid.

“The citadel of Rosas capitulated at twelve o’clock this day. Seeing, my lord, farther resistance in the castle of Trinity useless, and impracticable against the whole army, the attention of which had naturally turned to its reduction; after firing the trains for exploding the magazines, we embarked in the boats of the Magnificent, Impérieuse, and Fame.

“I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) “Cochrane.

“The Right Hon. Lord Collingwood.”

Lord Collingwood’s Letter to the Admiralty.

“H.M. Ship Ocean, Jan. 7. 1809.

“Sir,—The Impérieuse having with other ships been employed in the Bay of Rosas, to assist the Spaniards in defending that fortress, and Captain Lord Cochrane having taken on himself the defence of Trinity Castle, an outwork of that garrison, I have received from him a letter, dated the 5th of December, a copy of which is enclosed, stating the surrender of Rosas by the Spaniards on that day, and of his having embarked the garrison of Trinity Castle on board his ship from the castle destroyed.

320“The heroic spirit and ability which have been evinced by Lord Cochrane in defending this castle, although so shattered in its works, against the repeated attacks of the enemy, is an admirable instance of his lordship’s zeal; and the distinguished conduct of Lieutenants Johnson and Hoare, of the Royal Marines, and the officers and men employed in this affair under his lordship, will, doubtless, be very gratifying to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

(Signed, &c.) “Collingwood.

“To the Secretary of the Admiralty.”

To these despatches I may be pardoned for appending the following extract from the Gerona Gazette, as it appeared in the Naval Chronicle of 1809.

Lord Cochrane.

The Spanish Gerona Gazette, when inserting a letter from Lord Cochrane, January 1, 1809, subjoins the following liberal testimony to his noble conduct:—

“This gallant Englishman has been entitled to the admiration and gratitude of this country from the first moment of its political resurrection. His generosity in co-operating with our earliest efforts, the encouragement we received from the interest he took with the commanders of the Balearic islands, to induce them to succour us with troops and ammunition, can never be erased from our recollection. The extraordinary services which we owe to his indefatigable activity, particularly this city and the adjacent coast, in protecting us from the attempts of the enemy, are too well known to be repeated here. It is a sufficient eulogium upon his character to mention, that in the defence of the castle of Trinidad, when the Spanish flag, hoisted on the wall, fell into the ditch, under a most dreadful fire from the enemy, his lordship was the only person who, regardless of the shower of balls flying about him, descended into the ditch, returned 321with the flag, and happily succeeded in placing it where it was.”

Without any degree of egotism, I may—considering that no praise beyond Lord Collingwood’s was ever awarded to me for my defence of Trinidad—be excused from adducing the following remarks, known to be from the pen of Sir Walter Scott.

“Thus, in consequence of our cooperation, were the French detained a whole month before a neglected and ill-provided fortress, which, without that cooperation, could not have resisted the first attack. The event might have been different had there been a floating army off the coast—the whole of the besieging force might then have been cut off. Of the errors which the English Government committed in the conduct of the Spanish war, the neglect of this obvious and most important means of annoying the enemy, and advantaging our allies, is the most extraordinary. Five thousand men, at the disposal of Lord Cochrane or Sir Sidney Smith, or any of those numerous officers in the British Navy who have given undoubted proofs of their genius as well as courage, would have rendered more service to the common cause than five times that number on shore, because they could at all times choose their points of attack, and the enemy, never knowing where to expect them, would everywhere be in fear, and everywhere in reach of the shore in danger.

“Lord Cochrane, during the month of September 1808, with his single ship the Impérieuse, kept the whole coast of Languedoc in alarm,—destroyed the numerous semaphoric telegraphs, which were of the utmost consequence to the numerous coasting convoys of the French, and not only prevented any troops from being sent from that province into Spain, but even excited such dismay that 2000 men were withdrawn from Figueras to oppose him, when they would otherwise have been marching farther into the peninsula. The coasting trade was entirely suspended during this alarm; 322yet with such consummate prudence were all Lord Cochrane’s enterprises planned and executed, that not one of his men were either killed or hurt, except one, who was singed in blowing up a battery.”

For none of the services detailed in the last two chapters did I ever receive praise or reward from the Admiralty authorities! though from the nature of the services they were necessarily accompanied by the deprivation of all chance of prize-money, either to myself, officers, or crew. The check opposed to the advance of the French in Catalonia—as testified by Lord Collingwood—was therefore made at my expense, without costing a farthing to the nation beyond the expenditure of ammunition; a strange contrast to some of the costly expeditions of the period for less results, and one which ought to have secured for me anything but the political animosity with which all my services were regarded.

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