Volume 1 — CHAP. XXII. ARRIVAL IN ENGLAND.

INTENDED VOTE OF THANKS TO LORD GAMBIER.—RESOLVE TO OPPOSE IT.—INTERVIEW WITH LORD MULGRAVE.—LORD GAMBIER DEMANDS A COURT-MARTIAL.—HE IS DIRECTED TO MAKE A FRESH REPORT OF THE ACTION IN BASQUE ROADS.—INJUSTICE OF THIS SECOND DESPATCH.—ATTEMPT TO ENTRAP ME INTO THE POSITION OF PROSECUTOR.—COMPOSITION AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT-MARTIAL.—THE ADMIRAL’S POINTS OF JUSTIFICATION.—DISPOSED OF BY CAPTAIN BROUGHTON’S EVIDENCE, AND BY THAT OF CAPTAINS MALCOLM, NEWCOMBE, AND SEYMOUR.—SIR HARRY NEALE’S EVIDENCE STOPPED BY ADMIRAL YOUNG.

On the 26th of April, His Majesty was pleased to confer on me the Knighthood of the Order of the Bath.

Soon after Lord Gambier’s arrival in England, Lord Mulgrave informed me that a vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief would be proposed in the House of Commons. Whereupon I told Lord Mulgrave that it was my duty to apprise him that in my capacity as one of the members for Westminster, I would oppose the motion, on the ground that the commander-in-chief had not only done nothing to merit a vote of thanks, but had neglected to destroy the French fleet in Aix Roads, when it was clearly in his power to do so.

Lord Mulgrave entreated me not to persist in this determination, as such a course would not only prove 404injurious to the Government, but highly detrimental to myself, by raising up against me a host of enemies. The public, said his lordship, was satisfied with what had been done, and gave me full credit for my share therein, so that as I should be included in the vote of thanks, the recognition of Lord Gambier’s services could do me no harm.

I told his lordship that, speaking as a member of the House of Commons, I did not recognise Lord Gambier’s services at all, for that none had been rendered; and as for any thanks to myself, I would rather be without them, feeling conscious that I had not been enabled satisfactorily to carry out the earnest wishes of the Admiralty by the destruction of the enemy’s fleet, as impressed on me by his lordship before accepting the command with which I had been entrusted. I nevertheless begged his lordship to consider that in my professional capacity as a naval officer, I neither did offer nor had offered, any opinion whatever on Lord Gambier’s conduct, but that my position as member of Parliament for Westminster forbade my acquiescence in a public misrepresentation.

Lord Mulgrave replied, that I was even now accusing Lord Gambier in my professional capacity; the public would not draw the distinction between my professional and parliamentary conduct. I expressed my regret for the public want of discrimination, but told his lordship that this would not alter my determination.

Soon after this conversation Lord Mulgrave sent for me, and again entreated me, for my own sake, to reconsider 405my resolution, saying that he had reported our former conversation to the Government, which was highly dissatisfied therewith. His lordship further assured me that he was anxious about the matter on my account, as the course intimated would certainly bring me under high displeasure. To this I replied, that the displeasure of the Government would not for a moment influence my Parliamentary conduct, for which I held myself answerable to my constituents.

His lordship then said, “If you are on service, you cannot be in your place in Parliament. Now, my lord, I will make you a proposal. I will put under your orders three frigates, with carte blanche to do whatever you please on the enemy’s coasts in the Mediterranean. I will further get you permission to go to Sicily, and embark on board your squadron my own regiment, which is stationed there. You know how to make use of such advantages.”

I thanked Lord Mulgrave for the offer, at the same time expressing my gratitude for his anxiety to preserve me from the evils of acting contrary to the wishes of the Government; but told his lordship that, were I to accept this offer, the country would regard my acquiescence as a bribe to hold my peace, whilst I could not regard it in any other light. Self-respect must, therefore, be my excuse for declining the proposal.

The anxiety of the then Government was, no doubt, to convert what had been effected in Aix Roads into political capital, as a victory which merited the thanks of parliament. My tacit aquiescence in the 406object of Government would have subjected me, and rightly, to a total loss of political confidence in the estimation of those with whom I acted. No man with the slightest pretensions to personal honesty or political consistency could, therefore, have decided otherwise than I did, even with the kind warning of Lord Mulgrave, that evil consequences to myself would follow—a prediction subsequently verified to the letter.

The upshot of the matter was, that on Lord Mulgrave communicating my determination to Lord Gambier, the latter demanded a court-martial.

As soon as my fixed resolution of opposing the vote of thanks became known to the Government, the Board of Admiralty directed Lord Gambier to make a fresh report of the action in Basque Roads! requiring his lordship to call upon various officers for further reports as to the part they took therein!

Accordingly, on the 10th of May, Lord Gambier forwarded a new despatch to the Admiralty, in which my services were altogether passed over!!! notwithstanding that, in Lord Gambier’s previous report, he had written as follows:—“I cannot speak in sufficient terms of admiration and applause of the vigorous and gallant attack made by Lord Cochrane upon the French line-of-battle ships which were on shore; as well as of his judicious manner of approaching them, and placing his ship in a position most advantageous to annoy the enemy and preserve his own ship, which could not be exceeded by any feat of valour hitherto achieved by the British navy.”

Still more singularly, in the second despatch, which 407is too long for insertion^[54], Lord Gambier inadvertently confirms the fact that no attack on the French fleet would have been made at all, had it not been for my having commenced an attack with the Impérieuse alone, which movement, as has been said, was executed literally by stealth, under the fear that the signal of recall would be hoisted by the commander-in-chief!

It having, for reasons described in a former chapter, become imperative on Lord Gambier to send us assistance, he, nevertheless, construed this into an intention on his part to attack the enemy. “Observing the Impérieuse to advance, and the time of flood nearly done running, the Indefatigable, &c. &c. were ordered to the attack!” It is not very probable that, had Lord Gambier intended an attack, he would have let the flood-tide go by, without taking advantage of it in a channel which was afterwards declared unsafe from want of water!

This passage alone of Lord Gambier’s second despatch ought to have decided the result of any court-martial. The Board of Admiralty would not, however, see anything inculpatory of their former colleague; but, on the 29th of May, ordered me, through their secretary, to become the accuser of the commander-in-chief; “I am commanded by their Lordships to signify their directions that you state fully to me, for their information, the grounds on which your lordship 408objects to the vote of thanks being moved to Lord Gambier, to the end that them Lordships’ objections may be of a nature to justify the suspension of the intended motion in Parliament, or to call for any further information.”—(Signed) “W. W. Pole.”

This command was manifestly intended to entrap me into the position of Lord Gambier’s prosecutor, and was, moreover, an improper interference with my Parliamentary capacity, in which alone I had declared my intention to oppose an uncalled-for vote of thanks to the commander-in-chief. I therefore wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty the subjoined reply.

“Portman Square, 30th May, 1809.

“Sir,—I have to request that you will submit to their Lordships that I shall, at all times, entertain a due sense of the honour they will confer by any directions they may be pleased to give me; that in pursuing the object of these directions, my exertions will invariably go hand in hand with my duty; and that, to satisfy their Lordships’ minds in the present instance, I beg leave to state that the log and signal log-books of the fleet in Basque Roads contain all particulars, and furnish premises whence accurate conclusions may be drawn; that, as these books are authentic public documents, and as I cannot myself refer to them, anything I could offer to their Lordships on the subject would be altogether superfluous, and would appear presumptuous interruptions to their Lordships’ judgment, which will, doubtless, always found itself upon those grounds only that cannot be disputed.

“I have, &c. &c.

“Cochrane.

“The Hon. W. W. Pole,

Secretary to the Admiralty.”

409This reply, though plain, was respectful; but, as I had afterwards good reason to know, was deemed very offensive; the result being that, after two months’ delay to enable Lord Gambier to get up his defence, a court-martial was assembled on the 26th of July, on board the Gladiator, at Portsmouth, the court being composed of the following members:—

President—Sir Roger Curtis, Port-Admiral.

Admirals—Young, Stanhope, Campbell, Douglas, Duckworth, and Sutton.

Captains—Irwin, Dickson, Hall, and Dunn.

It may perhaps be asked in what way a court-martial on Lord Gambier can so far concern me as to occupy a prominent place in this autobiography? The reply is, that, notwithstanding my repudiation, I was regarded at the court-martial as his accuser, though not permitted to be present so as to cross-examine witnesses; the whole proceeding being conducted in my absence, rather as a prosecution against me than Lord Gambier; and that the result was injurious to myself, as Lord Mulgrave had predicted, involving the punishment of not being employed with my frigate at Flushing, there to put in execution plans for the certain destruction of the French fleet in the Scheldt; so that, in order to punish me, the enemy’s fleet was suffered to remain in security, when it might easily have been destroyed.

The reader must not imagine that I am about to inflict on him the evidence of a nine days’ trial; but without some extracts therefrom, it is impossible to comprehend the matter. Let him bear in mind that 410Lord Gambier relied for justification on three points:—1st, That, had he sent in the fleet, its safety would have been endangered by the fortifications of Aix (which he had previously spoken of as being dismantled); 2nd, Want of water to navigate the fleet in safety; and 3rdly, From the fire of the enemy’s vessels driven ashore (though lightened of their guns and stores).

Captain Broughton (of the Illustrious).—“I was in Basque Roads, in the Amelia, on the 17th of March, and when within gunshot of the Isle of Aix observed the fortifications as being under repair, from the quantity of rubbish thrown up. I thought the fortifications on the island were not so strong as we supposed, and so reported to Lord Gambier. This was on the 1st of April. I did not notice any furnaces for heating red-hot shot. We were just out of gunshot,—they fired at us from both sides, but none reached us.”

In reply to the question, “whether everything was done that could be done to effect the destruction of the enemy’s ships?” Captain Broughton said:—

“It would have been more advantageous if the line-of-battle ships, frigates, and small vessels had gone in at half-flood, about 11 o’clock. There were nine sail ashore, and if the British ships had been ordered in, it would have been more advantageous. There were only two of the enemy’s ships at anchor, and the fleet, had it gone in, would have been exposed to their fire; but I conceived they were panic-struck, and on the appearance of a force might have been induced to cut their cables, and escape up the river. A ship or two might have been placed, in my opinion, against the batteries on the southern part of Isle d’Aix so as to take off their fire, and silence them. I told Sir Henry Neale, on board the Caledonia, when the signal was made for all captains 411in the mooring, that ‘they were attackable from the confused way in which the French ships were at the time;’ viz. from having run ashore in the night, in order to escape from the fire-ships, which they imagined would explode.

“As the wind was north-westerly and northerly, ships might have found safe anchorage in what is called, in my French chart, le Grand Trousse, where there is thirty or forty feet of water out of range of shot or shells in any direction. When we first came into Basque Roads, if the charts were to be believed, there appeared to be water enough in that position. I do not know anything of any shoal water. I sounded from the wreck of the Varsovie to that anchorage, and found no shoal there. Two ships of the line would have been sufficient to have silenced the batteries on Aix, and five or six of the least draught of water to attack the enemy’s ships. The discomfited French squadron would have made very little resistance. The loss would have been very little, as few of their ships were in a situation to fight their guns.”

Here a distinguished officer shows that two ships could have silenced the batteries; that, in case of damage, there was plenty of water for them to retire to out of reach; and that the French ships, being ashore, could not use their guns.

Captain Pulteney Malcolm (of the Donegal).—“I saw the enemy’s three-decker on shore. Till about noon she was heeling over considerably, and appeared to me to be heaving her guns overboard. She got off about two o’clock; all the ships got off, except those that were destroyed. Had it appeared to me that there was no other chance of destroying those ships but by such an attack, I certainly think it ought to have been made. Had they been attacked by the British ships, in my opinion they could not have been warped off from the shore, as it was necessary so to do, to lay out anchors to heave them off.”

412Question.—“Would you, had you commanded the British fleet, have sent in ships to attack the enemy’s ships on shore?”

Answer.—“The moment the two ships quitted their defensive position, the risk was then small, and of course I would have sent them in instantly.”

This evidence is pretty decisive, but its plain tendency was attempted to be neutralised by the question whether there would have been risk of damage, had the British fleet been sent in to attack the enemy’s ships when ashore! The great point of defence throughout was risk to the ships, as though the chief use of ships of war was to save them from injury.

Captain F. Newcombe (of the Beagle).—“Can you state any instance of neglect, misconduct, or inattention in the proceedings of the Commander-in-chief, between the 11th and the 18th?”

Answer.—“None; save and except, had the Commander-in-chief thought proper, from his situation, TO HAVE SENT IN VESSELS EARLIER THAN THEY WERE SENT, though there might be a great risk in so doing, there was a possibility of annoying the enemy more than they were annoyed.”

Captain George Francis Seymour (of the Pallas.)—“I saw the Impérieuse inform the Commander-in-chief, by signal, that if allowed to remain he could destroy the enemy: there was every prospect of preventing them from getting off, as it would prevent their carrying out hawsers to heave off by. From what I afterwards saw, I think the ships might have floated in sooner—they might have come in with the last half of the flood-tide.”

President.—“How much sooner would that have been than the time they actually did join?”

Answer.—“At eleven o’clock.”

Question.—“What time did the line-of-battle ships join?”

Answer.—“Within a short time after two o’clock.”

413Question.—“Is your opinion formed from information obtained since the 12th of April, or on that day?”

Answer.—“It was formed from the depth of water we found ON GOING IN.”

This evidence, coming from an officer of Captain Seymour’s character and standing, was so decisive, that it was subjected to a severe cross-examination, of which the subjoined is the substance:—

“It is impossible for me to foretell the event of such an attack, it so much depending on fortuitous circumstances. I cannot say that the line-of-battle ships should have gone in; I was not in possession of the Commander-in-chief’s information. I state the fact, and leave the Court to judge. I mean to say, there would have been water enough for the line-of-battle ships to have floated in. As to the opposition they would have met with, the Court has as much before them as I have.”

If the reader will refer to Lord Gambier’s expression, in his second despatch of the 10th of May (see page 407), it will be evident that no attack whatever was intended; “but observing the Impérieuse to advance,” it became imperative to support her, i.e. when the flood-tide “had nearly done running.” This is the true explanation of the British ships having been sent in at all. I repeat, that the advance of the Impérieuse thus forced on the little that was done. Had an attack been seriously intended, the time at which the British fleet should have gone in was that pointed out by the preceding officers, viz. when the French ships were aground, and the whole within reach of destruction; instead of when the few, which were unable to 414get off by any exertions, were assailed. To have rested a case upon the danger to the British fleet from the fire of the ships ashore, with their guns thrown overboard to lighten them, was a course of defence which, for the honour of the British navy, is elsewhere unparalleled.

There is no necessity to adduce further extracts on this head; and I have purposely refrained from introducing my own evidence; but the animus by which the Court was actuated in the case must not be lightly passed over.

One of the principal witnesses was, as a matter of course, the Captain of the Fleet, Sir Harry Neale. This officer, though thoroughly conversant with both the acts and intentions of the commander-in-chief, was directed by the President openly, not to state the opinions he had given to Lord Gambier on public services! By Admiral Young Sir Harry Neale was told to say nothing but what he was directed to detail! This would be incredible were it not printed in “Minutes of the Court-Martial, revised by Lord Gambier!”

Sir H. Neale (Captain of the Fleet).—“There were continued conversations between the Commander-in-chief and me. I have given him my opinion on different services; some of those he may have approved, and some he may not have approved.”

President.—“I apprehend these are not to be stated!”

Yet Sir H. Neale carefully marked the distinction between private conversation and the public service, by using the term “different services;” he being evidently ready to tell all he knew as regarded the public service. 415He was, however, stopped by Admiral Young in one of the strangest injunctions which ever fell from the lips of a judge.

Admiral Young.—“If you are directed to detail any circumstances, you are then to say all you know of the circumstances you are directed to detail; but if you are asked a specific question, your oath, I imagine, will only oblige you to answer SPECIFICALLY and directly, and as fully as you can, the question which is proposed to you!”

So that Sir Harry Neale was cautioned that, if he was not directed to detail circumstances, he was not to relate them, however important they might be! And if asked only a specific question, he was merely to answer specifically; though the Court could know nothing of the facts, unless they permitted the witnesses to tell the truth, and the whole truth, in the very words of the oath.

But as Sir Harry Neale was known to be a man not likely to be thus peremptorily silenced, half a dozen insignificant questions were, therefore, only put to him by the Court, with the exception of one or two leading questions from Lord Gambier.

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