Volume 1 — CHAP. VI. CRUISE OF THE SPEEDY CONTINUED.

THE SPEEDY SENT TO ALGIERS.—INTERVIEW WITH THE DEY.—SPEEDY RETURNS TO MINORCA.—ATTACK ON OROPESA.—ENEMY’S VESSELS DESTROYED.—LETTER OF THANKS FROM LORD KEITH.—SPEEDY SENT IN CONVOY OF A PACKET.—CAPTURED BY THREE FRENCH LINE OF BATTLE SHIPS, AND TAKEN TO ALGESIRAS.—ATTACK BY SIR J. SAUMAREZ’S SQUADRON.—LOSS OF THE HANNIBAL.—CAPTURE OF DOCKYARD ARTIFICERS.—GALLANTRY OF CAPTAIN KEATS.

Our success hitherto had procured us some prize money, notwithstanding the peculations of the Mediterranean Admiralty Courts, by which the greater portion of our captures was absorbed.

Despite this drawback, which generally disinclined officers and crews from making extraordinary exertions, my own share of the twelvemonth’s zealous endeavours in our little sloop was considerable, and even the crew were in receipt of larger sums than those constituting the ordinary pay of officers; a result chiefly owing to our nocturnal mode of warfare, together with our refraining from meddling with vessels ascertained to be loading in the Spanish ports, and then lying in wait for them as they proceeded on their voyage.

One effect of our success was no slight amount of ill concealed jealousy on the part of officers senior to myself, though there were some amongst these who, being 119in command of small squadrons instead of single vessels, might, had they adopted the same means, have effected far more than the Speedy, with an armament so insignificant, was calculated to accomplish.

After remaining some days at Port Mahon to refit, we prepared to return to our cruising ground, where, from private information, we knew that other prizes were at hand. In place of being permitted so to do, the Speedy received an order to proceed to Algiers, for the purpose of representing to the Dey the illegality of his cruisers having taken a British vessel in retaliation for an Algerine captured whilst violating the law of blockade.

The mission was a singular one to be entrusted to the captain of one of the smallest and worst armed vessels in the British service. Remonstrance, to be effectual with a piratical government, ought to have been committed to an officer armed with sufficient force at least to induce respect. There was, however, no alternative but to obey, and a short time saw us at anchor off the mole of the predatory potentate.

The request for an interview with his highness occasioned no little dissatisfaction amongst his ministers, if those who were quite as much his masters as his subordinates could be so termed. After some consultation, the interview was, however, granted, and a day was appointed to deliver my message.

The invariable Moslem preliminary of taking coffee having been gone through, I was ushered through a series of galleries lined with men, each bearing on his shoulder a formidable looking axe, and eyeing me with 120an insolent scowl, evidently meant to convey the satisfaction with which they would apply its edge to my vertebræ, should the caprice of their chief so will.

On reaching the presence of the Dey—a dignified looking and gorgeously attired person, seated cross-legged on an elevated couch in one corner of the gallery and surrounded by armed people of most unprepossessing appearance—I was marched up between two janizaries, and ordered to make three salaams to his highness.

This formality being complied with, he rudely demanded, through the medium of an interpreter, “What brought me there?” The reply was that “I was the commander of an English vessel of war in the roads, and had been deputed, on behalf of my government, respectfully to remonstrate with his highness concerning a vessel which his cruisers had taken contrary to the laws of nations.” On this being interpreted, the ferocious scowls of the bystanders were exchanged for expressions of injured innocence, but the Dey got in a great passion, and told the interpreter to inform me that “remonstrance came with an ill grace from us, the British vessels being the greatest pirates in the world, and mine one of the worst amongst them,” which complimentary statement was acknowledged by me with a formal bow.

“If I did right,” continued the Dey, through his interpreter,—“I should put you and your crew in prison, till (naming a captured Algerine vessel) she was restored; and but for my great respect for the English government, and my impression that her seizure was 121unauthorised, you should go there. However, you may go, with a demand from me that the vessel unjustly taken from us shall be immediately restored.”

This decision appeared to be anything but satisfactory to the oligarchy of which his court was composed, as savouring of a clemency to which they were little inclined. From the boisterous conversation which ensued, they were evidently desirous of prolonging my stay to an indefinite period, or perhaps of terminating it summarily through the instrumentality of the axemen who lined the galleries, as a few years afterwards they terminated the existence of the Dey himself.

To confess the truth, there was some room for self-congratulation on quitting the presence of such barbarians, to whom I was not fairly accredited for such a mission. However, the remonstrance confided to me being duly delivered, we returned to Minorca, to report progress, though not without being chased by an Algerine cruiser on our way. As the Speedy outsailed her, and as there was no beneficial object to be gained by interfering with her, we stood on without further notice.

On arriving at our former cruising ground, we encountered a Spanish privateer of six guns, which was captured. This vessel was fitted out at my own private expense, and my brother appointed to command her, as a tender to the Speedy; several enemy’s vessels having previously escaped for want of such aid.

In a few days after this, we fell in with the Kangaroo, Captain Pulling, who, being senior to me, was therefore my commanding officer. Running down the 122coast in company, we attacked the fort of Almanara, and after silencing it, brought off a Spanish privateer of seven guns.

On the 8th of June, the Speedy ran into Oropesa, where, on the 13th and 14th of April, we had the previous action with the fort and gun-boats. Perceiving several vessels at anchor under the fort, it was deemed advisable to make off shore, with the intention of running in again at midnight, and cutting some of them out.

We had not proceeded far, before we again fell in with the Kangaroo, when informing Captain Pulling of what we had seen, he declined the night attack, preferring to postpone operations till the following day. Accordingly, at noon on the 9th, we went in, and made out a twenty-gun xebec and three gun-boats, with ten sail of merchantmen under their convoy. It was determined to attack them as they lay; the Kangaroo anchoring well up to and engaging the fort, whilst the Speedy and her tender under my brother’s orders, encountered the xebec and the gun-boats—the Speedy anchoring in a line between those vessels and the Kangaroo.

For some hours an incessant cannonade was kept up on both sides, the Kangaroo’s fire flanking the fort, whilst the slackened fire of the Spanish vessels showed that our shot had told. At this juncture, a twelve-gun felucca, and two more gun-boats having arrived from Valentia to their assistance, the Spaniards took heart, and the action became nearly as brisk as before.

The felucca and the newly arrived gun-boats were, 123however, for a time beat off, and after an hour’s additional firing, the xebec, two gun-boats, and some of the convoy were sunk; the remaining gun-boats shortly afterwards sharing the same fate.

The action had now continued for upwards of nine hours; during which the Speedy had expended nearly all her ammunition, viz. 1400 shot, and the Kangaroo was much in the same predicament. As the felucca and gun-boats had again come up, it was necessary to effect something decisive. Captain Pulling, therefore, slipping his cable, shifted close to the fort, which was soon afterwards abandoned, and the Speedy closed with the felucca and her consorts, which forthwith fled. Had they remained, we had not half a dozen rounds left to continue the action.

Both vessels now hoisted our boats, and made for the merchantmen. Three of these had been sunk, and four others driven on shore; we, however, brought away the three still afloat. By this time a number of Spanish troops lined the beach for the protection of the vessels ashore, and as we had scarcely a shot left, it was impracticable to reply to the musketry, within range of which the boats must necessarily have been placed had the attempt been made. We therefore relinquished the endeavour to get off the stranded vessels.

It may be useful here to remark that on board the Kangaroo were some guns fitted on the non-recoil principle, and that during the action these broke from their breechings; one, if not more, endangering the vessel by bounding down the hatchways into the hold.

The subjoined letter of thanks for this affair was forwarded 124to Captain Pulling by Lord Keith, who was then at Alexandria, watching the movements of the French in Egypt.

“Foudroyant, Bay of Aboukir,

“10th July, 1801.

“Sir,—I have received your letter of the 10th of June, detailing the attack made by the Kangaroo and Speedy upon the fort of Oropesa and the enemy’s armed vessels at anchor under its protection, on 9th of that month; as well as upon the tower of Almanara on a former day: and while I offer my congratulations upon the successful issue of your enterprise, I cannot withhold my approbation of the persevering and determined conduct manifested by you and by Captain Lord Cochrane, as well as by the officers and companies of both the sloops on these occasions, and I request that my satisfaction may be communicated by you to his lordship, and that you and he will make the same known to the officers and companies of the Kangaroo and the Speedy.

“I am, &c. &c.

“Keith.

“Capt. Pulling, Kangaroo.”

On our return to Port Mahon with the prizes, the Gamo had not been purchased by the Government; but, to my regret, this useful cruiser had been sold for a trifle to the Algerines, whilst I was condemned to continue in the pigmy and now battered craft by which she had been taken. To have obtained command of the Gamo, even as a means of deception on the enemy’s coast, I would scarcely have changed place with an admiral.

But a more cruel thing still was in store for me. The commandant lived in the house of a Spanish merchant who had a contract for carrying the mails to 125Gibraltar. The vessel employed for this purpose was a notoriously bad sailer, and when the Speedy was ready for sea, instead of being permitted to return to our cruising ground, she was ordered to convoy this tub of a packet to Gibraltar, with further instructions to take the letter-bag on board the Speedy, protect the packet, put the mail on board her as soon as we arrived off the Rock, and return without holding any communication with the shore! the evident object of the last injunction being that the service which had been thrust upon us should not become known!

The expectation of the packet-master, doubtless, was that we should put to sea out of privateer reach. In place of this, we ran along the Spanish coast, our superior sailing enabling us, without delay, to scrutinise every creek as we passed. Nothing, however, occurred, till we were close in with a bay, or rather indentation of the shore near Alicant, where seeing some vessels at anchor, we made towards them, on which they weighed and deliberately ran ashore. To have stopped to get them off would have been in excess of our instructions. To set fire to them was not, and as one was laden with oil, and the night following very dark, the result was a blaze which illumined the sky for many miles round.

Unluckily for us, three French line-of-battle ships, which afterwards turned out to be the Indomitable, the Dessaix, and the Formidable, were in the vicinity, and being attracted by the light of the burning vessels, ran in shore to see what was the matter.

At daybreak, on the morning of July 3rd, these large ships were observed in the distance, calling up to 126our imaginations visions of Spanish galleons from South America, and accordingly the Speedy prepared for chase. It was not till day dawned that we found out our mistake, the vessels between us and the offing being clearly line-of-battle ships, forbidding all reasonable hope of escape.

It was about four o’clock in the morning when we made out the French ships, which immediately on discovering us gave chase. Being to windward, we endeavoured to escape by making all sail, and, as the wind fell light, by using our sweeps. This proving unavailing, we threw the guns overboard, and put the brig before the wind; but notwithstanding every effort, the enemy gained fast upon us, and, in order to prevent our slipping past, separated on different tacks, so as to keep us constantly within reach of one or the other; the Dessaix, being nearest, firing broadsides at us as she passed when tacking, at other times firing from her bow chasers, and cutting up our rigging.

For upwards of three hours we were thus within gunshot of the Dessaix, when finding it impossible to escape by the wind, I ordered all the stores to be thrown overboard, in the hope of being able, when thus further lightened, to run the gauntlet between the ships, which continued to gain upon us.

Watching an opportunity, when the nearest line-of-battle ship was before our beam, we bore up, set the studding sails, and attempted to run between them, the French honouring us with a broadside for this unexpected movement. The Dessaix, however, immediately tacked in pursuit, and in less than an hour got within 127musket shot. At this short distance, she let fly at us a complete broadside of round and grape, the object evidently being to sink us at a blow, in retaliation for thus attempting to slip past, though almost without hope of escape.

Fortunately for us, in yawing to bring her broadside to bear, the rapidity with which she answered her helm carried her a little too far, and her round shot plunged in the water under our bows, or the discharge must have sunk us; the scattered grape, however, took effect in the rigging, cutting up a great part of it, riddling the sails, and doing material damage to the masts and yards, though not a man was hurt. To have delayed for another broadside would have been to expose all on board to certain destruction, and as further effort to escape was impotent, the Speedy’s colours were hauled down.

On going aboard the Dessaix, and presenting my sword to the captain, Christie Pallière, he politely declined taking it, with the complimentary remark that “he would not accept the sword of an officer who had for so many hours struggled against impossibility,” at the same time paying me the further compliment of requesting that “I would continue to wear my sword, though a prisoner”—a request with which I complied; Capt. Pallière at the same time good-naturedly expressing his satisfaction at having terminated our exploits in the cruising line, they having, in fact, special instructions to look out for us. After this reception it is scarcely necessary to add that I was treated with great kindness by my captors.

Thus ended the thirteen months’ cruise of the Speedy, 128during which we had taken and retaken upwards of 50 vessels, 122 guns, and 534 prisoners.

After the capture of the Speedy, the French line-of-battle ships stood along the coast, and proceeded with her, and the unlucky packet which had been the primary cause of the disaster, to Algesiras. During this passage I had ample opportunity of observing the superior manner in which the sails of the Dessaix were cut, and the consequent flat surface exposed to the wind; this contrasting strongly with the bag reefs, bellying sails, and breadbag canvass of English ships of war at that period.

As there was no force at Gibraltar adequate to an attack of the French squadron, the authorities lost no time in transmitting intelligence of their arrival to Sir James Saumarez, then blockading the Spanish squadron in Cadiz. The French meanwhile proceeded to water and refit, evidently with the intention of passing the Straits with the first fair wind.

Quitting Cadiz, Sir James Saumarez immediately sailed for Algesiras with his squadron, consisting of the Cæsar, Venerable, Audacious, Hannibal, Superb, Pompée, Spencer, Calpe, and Thames, these reaching the bay on the 6th of July.

At the time of their first appearance I was conversing with Captain Pallière in his cabin, when a lieutenant reported a British flag over Cabritta point, and soon afterwards the top-gallant masts and pendants of a British squadron became visible. We at once adjourned to the poop, when the surprise of the French, at the sight of a more numerous squadron, became not unreasonably 129apparent; Captain Pallière asked me “if I thought an attack would be made, or whether the British force would anchor off Gibraltar?” My reply was “that an attack would certainly be made, and that before night both British and French ships would be at Gibraltar,” at the same time adding that when there, it would give me great pleasure to make him and his officers a return for the kindness I had experienced on board the Dessaix!

The French admiral, however, determined that his ships should not be carried across the bay if he could help it. Before the British squadron had rounded the point, the French out boats, with kedges and stream anchors, for the purpose of warping in shore, so as to prevent the approaching squadron from cutting them out; but the order was so hurriedly executed, that all three ships were hauled aground, with their sterns presented to the approaching British force; a position which could not have been taken by choice, for nothing could apparently be more easy than to destroy the French ships, which, lying aground stern on, could only use their stern chasers.

To employ their consequently useless hands to some purpose, the French landed a considerable portion of their crews to man the Spanish batteries on the island, as the ship’s guns could not be brought to bear. Two of the British ships anchored, and opened upon the French ships aground, but being exposed to the fire of some of the newly manned forts higher up the bay, the heavy guns of which were admirably handled by the French seamen, both the British vessels slipped 130their cables, and together with the remainder of the squadron, which did not anchor at all, backed their main-top-sails for the purpose of maintaining their position. The wind, however, blowing from the westward, with a rapid current sweeping round the bay, thwarted this intention, and the British squadron quickly drifted past the enemy, firing as they went.

Perhaps I ought previously to have mentioned an incident demonstrative of the sang froid of my captor. After having satisfied himself that an action with a superior force was inevitable, Capt. Pallière remarked, “that it should not spoil our breakfast,” in which he had invited me to join him. Before the meal was ended, a round shot crashed through the stern of the Dessaix, driving before it a shower of broken glass, the debrís of a wine bin under the sofa.

We forthwith jumped up from table, and went on the quarter-deck, but a raking shot from Sir James Saumarez’s ship sweeping a file of marines from the poop, not far from me, I considered further exposure on my part unnecessary, and went below to a position whence I could nevertheless, at times, see what wasgoing on.

The Hannibal, having with the others forged past the enemy, gallantly filled and tacked with a view to get between the French ships and the shore, being evidently unaware of their having been hauled aground. The consequence was that she ran upon a shoal, and remained fast, nearly bow on to the broadsides of the French line-of-battle ships, which with the shore batteries and several gunboats opened upon her a concentrated 131fire. This, from her position, she was unable to return. The result was that her guns were speedily dismounted, her rigging shot away, and a third of her crew killed or wounded; Captain Ferris, who commanded her, having now no alternative but to strike his colours—though not before he had displayed an amount of endurance which excited the admiration of the enemy.

A circumstance now occurred which is entitled to rank amongst the curiosities of war. On the French taking possession of the Hannibal, they had neglected to provide themselves with their national ensign, and either from necessity or bravado rehoisted the English flag upside down. This being a well-known signal of distress, was so understood by the authorities at Gibraltar, who, manning all government and other boats with dockyard artificers and seamen, sent them, as it was mistakenly considered, to the assistance of the Hannibal.

On the approach of the launches I was summoned on deck by the captain of the Dessaix, who seemed doubtful what measures to adopt as regarded the boats now approaching to board the Hannibal, and asked my opinion as to whether they would attempt to retake the ship. As there could be no doubt in my mind about the nature of their mission or its result, it was evident that if they were allowed to board, nothing could prevent the seizure of the whole. My advice, therefore, to Captain Pallière was to warn them off by a shot—hoping they would thereby be driven back and saved from capture. Captain Pallière seemed at first inclined to take the advice, but on reflection—either doubting its 132sincerity, or seeing the real state of the case—he decided to capture the whole by permitting them to board unmolested. Thus boat by boat was captured until all the artificers necessary for the repair of the British squadron, and nearly all the sailors at that time in Gibraltar, were taken prisoners!

In this action the French and Spaniards suffered severely both as regarded ships and men, their masts and hulls being much knocked about, whilst several Spanish gunboats were sunk. The wonder to me was that the British squadron did not anchor, for the French ships being aground, stern on, could have offered little resistance, and must have been destroyed. It is true that the batteries on shore were admirably served, and thus constituted a formidable obstacle; but had not the squadron drifted past the French ships, the latter might have been interposed between the batteries and the British force, when the fire of the former would have been neutralised, and the enemy’s ships aground destroyed with comparatively little loss. It is not, however, my purpose or province to criticise the action, but simply to give the details, as personally witnessed from that extraordinary place, for a British officer, the deck of a French ship!

Neither the imprisonment of the captured crews, nor my own, was of long duration. The day after the action, Sir J. Saumarez sent Capt. Brenton into Algesiras Bay with a flag of truce, to endeavour to effect an exchange of the gallant Capt. Ferris, his officers, and crew. At that time there was no regulated system of exchange between the belligerent powers, but Capt. 133Brenton succeeded in procuring the release of the crew of the Hannibal and the entrapped artificers, together with the officers and men of the Speedy. Admiral Linois would not at first give me up, but, on further consideration, allowed me to go with the other officers to Gibraltar on parole. My complete release was eventually effected for the second captain of the St. Antonio, taken shortly afterwards.

The French ships having lost no time in communicating with the Spanish admiral at Cadiz, he promptly appeared off Algesiras with a reinforcement of six ships of the line, several frigates, and gunboats. The enemy having by this time warped off their grounded ships, as well as the Hannibal, and having by the 12th got them in sea-going order, the whole sailed from Algesiras, followed by the British squadron, which, by great exertions, had been got in readiness for pursuit.

Of the action which subsequently took place I have no personal knowledge, other than that of a scene witnessed by myself from the garden of the commissioner’s house, in which I was staying.

The enemy were overtaken at dusk, soon after leaving the bay, and when it had become dark, Captain Keats, in the Superb, gallantly dashed in between the two sternmost ships, firing right and left, and passed on. Of course I do not assert myself to have been personally cognisant of the way in which the attack was made, the firing only being visible from the Rock, but that this is the correct version of the affair rests upon indisputable authority. The movement was so rapidly executed, that the Superb shot ahead before the smoke 134cleared away, and the Spanish ships, the Real Carlos, 112, and the San Hermenegildo, 112, mistaking each other for the aggressor, began a mutual attack, resulting in the Real Carlos losing her foretop-mast, the sails of which—falling over her own guns—caught fire. While in this condition the Hermenegildo—still engaging the Real Carlos as an enemy—in the confusion fell on board her and caught fire also. Both ships burned till they blew up, and nearly all on board perished; a few survivors only escaping on board the Superb as Captain Keats was taking possession of a third Spanish line-of-battle ship, the San Antonio—for whose second captain, as has been said, I was exchanged.

The remainder of the combined squadron got safely back to Cadiz after an encounter between the Formidable and Venerable. I am aware that the preceding account of the action with the French ships at Algesiras differs in some respects from that compiled by naval historians from the despatches; but this circumstance will not prevent me from giving my own version of a conflict in which it was my misfortune to be a reluctant spectator. The Real Carlos, one of the ships blown up, bore the flag of the Spanish Admiral, Moreno, who with Admiral Linois was said to be at the time on board a Spanish frigate.

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