Front matter (continued 9)

4 IN THE WEST—GRADUAL REVERSAL OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE WORK ON THE LIMES.

5 INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 10.15

FUEHRER'S CONSENT REQUESTED OKW [Handwritten notes] Fuehrer's decision:

1—Agreed

2—Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by Gen. Keitel. Decision will then be reached.

3—Agreed

4—Agreed

5—Agreed

NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division Relayed to Lt. Colonel Zeitzler at 2300, 10.11 SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col. [in Schmundt's writing]

[Next page contains illegible notes] [Handwritten notes]

10.10.38

What is in the Zone?

5 1 (motorized) For special duties 1 mountain

1 (light) 3 div

1 armoured 1 Truck Transport Regt.

1 mountain

1 div.

4 3 motorized div 3 4 div

1 light Germania

1 armoured

2 div

Liebstandarte

1 armoured 13 div

3 div 4 div (motorized)

3 armoured

2 mountain

2 light

———

24 divisions

[notes in Schmundt's writing]

[Telegram] Army Telegraph Network Notes of Telegraph Office Received from HOZG 11.10.10.45 Pass to Date Time R. No. by Lt. Col. 11.10 Schm. Schmundt HBZG 008 1040

TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO THE FUEHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDETEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15 AND SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HENLEIN, PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF THE C-IN-C TO THE FUEHRER HAS BEEN DISPATCHED.

OKH 6th Div. (Five) General Staff of the German Army 11.37/38

[ITEM 48] [Ink note]

1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of armies.

2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades between Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl.

[Rest of note impossible to decipher completely]

[Telegram] Army Telegraph Network Notes of the telegraph office Received from HBZC 11.10.1955. Pass to Date Time R. No. by 1)4 Mot. Lt. Col. 11.10 2030 Joe Div. Schmundt 1 B'n ready to March [?] 1 Arm'd Brig. 24 +5 — 29 [Undecipherable note] TOP SECRET HBZG 13 1930.11.10 Lt. Col. Schmundt

Question 1: WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA?

Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS:

ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing

ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm'd Brig., 2 Mob. Div.

ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing

ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division

ARMY GROUP 1: 1 Division ready to march and 1 Mobile Division

B LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMMENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RESISTANCE.

Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE REGROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES?

Answer: A Army: FOR REGROUPING: 2 days. FOR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION)

B Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY TIME

Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND RETURN MEASURES?

Answer: A Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 DAYS.—IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS.

B Luftwaffe: AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR DEMOBILIZATION—THE AA GUNS WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING LEFT AS THEY ARE—LENGTH OF TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. AFTER DEMOBILIZATION IS COMPLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE ARMY.

Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 1st?

Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 3 days at least.

Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 24 HOURS.

(signed) KEITEL

[ITEM 49] [Typewritten table] LI a Berlin, 12 October 1938 3 copies, 1st copy

REFLECTIONS

Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of Forces from the Sudeten-German Area

Present Strength

Army Group No. of Divs. Div. Nos. Earmarked for Withdrawal No. of Divs. To be Withdrawn Strength After Withdrawal

Army Group Command 5 5 1/3 1/3 44, 2 Mtn, 3 Mtn, 29th Mot, 4 light, 2nd Armoured 3 2 1/3 1 1/3

Army Group Command for Special Duties 4 1/3 plus 1 SS Regt 1/3 5th, 7th, 9th, 45th, 1st Mtn. 1 1/3 3 1

Army Group Command 4 7 (plus 1 SS Regt) 10th, 24th, 2nd (Mot), 13th (Mot), 20th (Mot), 1st Light, 1st Armd. 2 4 2

Army Group Command 3 3 (plus 1 SS Regt) 4th, 3rd, 18th 2 2 1

Army Group Command 4 8th, 28th, 30th, 3rd Arm'd. 1 3 2

TOTAL 22 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts) 8 1/3 14 2/3 (Plus 3 SS Regts)

Namely: 11 2/3 Inf. Div 3 Mtn Divs 3 Mot Divs 3 Light Divs 3 Armd Divs Namely: 3 1/3 Inf Divs 2 Mtn Divs 1 Mot Div 1 Light Div 1 Arm'd Div Namely: 8 2/3 Inf Div 1 Mtn Div 2 Mot Divs 1 Light Div 2 Arm'd Divs

7 1/3

[ITEM 50] [Telegram] REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MOST SECRET Received on 17.10 from kg at 1535 by [Indecipherable] MBZ O 61 Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525 Lt. Colonel Schmundt

OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14-1/3 Divs and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October—this is necessary for the building up of the Army—and the reassignment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved are the: 2nd Arm'd Div, 1st Mountain Div, 7th Div, 13th Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm'd Div). Fuehrer's decision requested today.

Signed Keitel

[Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:] The Fuehrer has given his consent 17 Oct. By telephone, 1905 hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel, Section L, OKW.

Schmundt, Lt. Col.

[ITEM 51] [Typescript]

The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938 Despatched 19 X 39 M

TO THE C-IN-C OF THE ARMY GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH, BERLIN

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Verfugungstruppe), the SS and SA.

Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3-1/2 millions of German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all.

The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exercise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding cooperation of all departments.

Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire German people express their gratitude to those who participated in the liberation of the Sudeten-Land.

(signed) Adolf Hitler Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938 (signed) Schmundt, Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.

The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

After Delivery:

To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces I request that publication in the press be initiated from there.

1st Draft.

To The C-in-C of the Army

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory had been completed according to plan, the operation being carried out by sections of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3-1/2 million German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces.

You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the country and the care of the population from the day when the army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten-German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938.

My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understanding and devoted readiness to help with which they have done their duty.

J.

[Handwritten note] The military SS (SS Verfuegungstruppe), the SS and SA

[ITEM 52] [Typescript]

Berlin, 18 October 1938

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET L I a 1300 hours [Stamp] 60 copies Copy

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor

Recd. 20 Oct. 1938 Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret Despatch Clerk W

MOST SECRET Directive No. 4

The Fuehrer has ordered:

1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining in Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace time bases.

2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the command of the Army be shipped back and returned to the C-in-C of the Air Force. The withdrawal of other parts of the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten Germany will be effected by the C-in-C of the Air Force.

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Keitel

Distribution: III

[ITEM 53] [Telegram] REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE MOST SECRET Received at 1040 by [Indecipherable] Initials MBZ 066 Telegram from MBZ 050 21/10 1030 LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT:

(SECRET)—OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER'S APPROVAL TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE: ON THE 20TH OF OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, & AGREEMENT WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38

Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL [Handwritten:] Consent given, 21 Oct 38. Passed to Colonel Jodl's Ante-Room at 1400 Sch 22/10

[ITEM 54] [Typescript] MOST SECRET TOP SECRET Only through officer Conference Notes L I a Berlin, 27.9.38 4 copies, 1st copy [Pencil note] Time of Attack "Gruen". (Z. v. A. Gruen)

COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR FORCES ON X DAY

As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a coordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day.

The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i.e., about 0615; it also wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, which, however, would not alarm the entire Czech front.

Air Force's time of attack depends on weather conditions. These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low ceiling in Bavaria.

If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army no tactical surprise of the enemy's air force would be achieved and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of attack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well-timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather conditions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the Air Force on X Day in part or altogether.

If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded as indispensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force,—desirable as it may be,—may possibly have to be dispensed with.

Thus it is Proposed:

Attack by the Army—independent of the attack by the air force—at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission for limited operations to take place before them, however, only to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front.

The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them.

J. [Initialled by Jodl.]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 392-PS

The Social Life of New Germany with Special Consideration of the German Labor Front [Das Sociale Leben in neuen Deutschland unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Deutschen Arbeitsfront] (Berlin, 1938) by Prof. Willy Mueller. Pages 51-54. [Prof. Mueller was Reich Indoctrination Administrator in the German Labor Front].

"The Supreme Directorate of the Political Organization—The Staff Director"

Munich, 21 April 1933 Circular Letter Nr. 6/33

On Tuesday, 2 May 1933, the coordination action [Gleichschaltungsaktion] of the free trade unions begins.

The direction of the entire action lies in the hands of the Action Committee.

The Action Committee is composed as follows:

Dr. Robert Ley, Chairman.

Rudolf Schmeer, Deputy.

Schuhmann, Commissar of the General German Trade Union Federation [ADGB].

Peppler, Commissar for the General Independent Employees Federation [AFA].

Muchow Organization.

Bank Director Muller, Commissar, Director of the Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials.

Brinckmann, Commissar Chief Cashier.

Biallas, Propaganda and Press.

All the commissar directors of the unions belong to the broader Action Committee.

The essential part of the action is to be directed against the General German Trade Union Federation [ADGB] and the General Independent Employees Federation [AFA]. Anything beyond that which is dependent upon the free trade unions is left to the discretion of the Gauleiter's judgment.

The Gauleiters are responsible for the execution of the coordination action in the individual areas. Supporters of the action should be members of the National Socialist Factory Cell Organizations [NSBO or National-Sozialistische Betriebszellen-Organisation].

SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of trade union properties and for taking into protective custody personalities concerned.

The Gauleiter is to proceed with his measures on a basis of the closest understanding with competent regional factory cells directors [Gaubetriebszellenleiter].

The action in Berlin will be conducted by the Action Committee itself.

In the Reich the following will be occupied:

The directing offices of the unions;

The trade union houses and offices of the free trade unions, The Party houses of the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany insofar as trade unions are involved there;

The branches and pay offices of the Bank for Workers, Employees and officials, Inc.

The district committees of the General German Trade Union Federation and of the General Independent Employees Federation.

The local committees of the General German Trade Union Federation and of the General Independent Employees Federation.

The following are to be taken into protective custody:

All trade union chairmen [Verbandsvorsitzende];

The district Secretaries and the branch directors of the "Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc."

The Chairmen of local committees as well as the employees of unions are not to be taken into protective custody but are to be urged to continue their work.

Exceptions are granted only with the permission of the Gauleiter.

The taking over of the independent trade unions must proceed in such a fashion that the workers and employees will not be given the feeling that this action is against them, but on the contrary, an action against a superannuated system which is not directed in conformity with the interests of the German nation.

The Provisional local direction of the General German Trade Union and of the General Independent Employees' Federations is to be taken over by a commissar of the National Socialist Factory Cells Organization [NSBO].

The dealings with the authorities and other organizations are to be handed over immediately to the newly installed commissars.

All funds and accounts of the independent trade unions are to be blocked immediately and remain thus until Thursday afternoon 1800 hours. Insofar as incumbent cashiers are permitted to remain in office they will be subject to the authority of the commissar. All payment receipts must be countersigned by a commissar.

After raising the blocking of funds the usual payments for the support of persons, etc. must be unconditionally assured in order not to create a feeling of uneasiness among the members of the trade unions.

As soon as possible mass assemblies are to be arranged for the free attendance by all trade union members. In these meetings the meaning of the action is to be set forth and it is to be explained that the rights of the workers and employees are being unequivocally guaranteed.

The following unions belong to the General German Trade Union Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 28 unions].

The following unions belong to the General Independent Employees Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 13 unions].

Up to the present time the following have been proposed for commissars: [Here follows an enumeration of 17 names as commissars for the most important arrangements of the General German Trade Union Federation].

For the rest, the newly installed commissars will be nominated by the Gauleiters in close cooperation with the Regional Factory Cells Office. [Gaubetriebszellenamt].

It is to be understood that this action is to proceed in a strongly disciplined fashion. The Gauleiters are responsible in this respect; they are to hold the direction of the action firmly in hand.

Heil Hitler! /s/ Dr. Robert Ley

The NSBO (National Socialist Factory Cells Organization) took over not only the administrative apparatus but the entire press of the "Free Trade Unions." The papers and magazines which had a pronounced party political [parteipolitisch] tendency had to stop their publication, while the other special publications continued. By all these measures Marxism was to be hit exclusively, but not the idea of trade unions as such, in which the right and defense of the German workers were embodied.

On 5 May 1933, the leader of the action committee reported to Hitler the success of the ordered action. Then, in a public mass demonstration, he reported about the events of 2 May to the workers of Berlin; at the same time, he unfolded before them his future plans which were to secure the maintenance of the financial efficiency of the trade unions in the interest of the worker.

Following the crushing of the free trade unions, the danger came, of course, that former functionaries would try to acquire money and other property items for themselves in an illegal manner. This, however, would have entailed damage to the members. To avoid these dangers on 12 May 1933, the Attorney General of the State confiscated the property of the free trade unions and of all of their affiliated unions and administrative agencies in order to secure an orderly disposition of the property of the German workers. Dr. Robert Ley was assigned as the attorney with the right to dispose of the confiscated property [vefuegungsberechtigter Pfleger der beschlagnahmten Vermoegen].

While the free trade unions were smashed [zertruemmert] in the action of 2 May, Dr. Ley granted the entire Union of the Christian Trade Unions with further full liberty of movement. For this purpose, he told it on the 6th of May 1933 that "nothing will be changed in the present situation until the return of the Saar to the Reich and that they (the Christian Trade Unions) should continue as before to represent and carry on the idea of the Christian Trade Unions and of Germandom as they see it". Therefore the Christian Trade Unions put on temporary constraint in their attitude toward the social political events of 2 May and participated in the Saar in forming the "German Trade Union Front" in order to help to secure the result of the Saar voting by achieving a unity of the people.

The former free trade union leaders behaved differently. These, with the assistance of their colleagues abroad and of the international union of the trade unions, tried to oppose the measures of the German government; this induced Dr. Ley to introduce the defense against sabotage by the legal authorities.

The hostile activities reached their peak at the International Workers Conference of Geneva which began on 8 June 1933. From the German side, Dr. Ley also took part in it; representatives of the Reich Cabinet and of the Christian Trade Unions were with him. The subjects for the meeting were labor mediation, work conditions in certain branches of industry, social insurance, provision for unemployed, and shortening of the working time. The participating states were to enter the basic rules, which were to be set up in an international agreement, into their social legislations. The Germans represented voiced the opinion that the situation of the working people could not be improved by international agreement but by providing work and bread for the workers. In spite of this opposite opinion, Germany took part at the conference; in this way the German government wanted to prove that it had no purpose whatever to smash the social achievements of the German labor but that, on the contrary, she endeavored to retain them and lead them further. However, she was not willing to approve of an international agreement by which the further development of the German social legislation could be hampered.

During the conference, a few foreign personalities opposed the German representatives in such a way that Dr. Ley was induced to reject the further participation of the German Delegation in the discussions.

The atmosphere of Geneva did not remain without influence upon the representatives of the Christian Trade Unions. As already mentioned, the Christian Trade Unions were first given opportunity to continue their social work without interference. They began to exploit this favor. Also formally they have asserted that they were subject to all governmental measures which have been already taken or were to be taken; but that they could not refrain in the course of time from striving for a special position, which was to protect them from being ideologically converted to the world of national socialistic ideas. This attitude, which was contrary to the general interests and was prone to bring again dissension in the ranks of labor, induced Dr. Ley on 24 June 1933 to order the complete incorporation of the Christian Trade Unions into the German Labor Front which had been founded in the meantime. It was again the NSBO to which this task was assigned. At the same time the leaders of the Christian Trade Unions lost their honorary positions which were granted to them by Dr. Ley in the new social order. Concerning this, Dr. Ley submitted the following statement:

I. With the formation of the German Labor Front the majority of workers' and capitalists' organizations should have an opposite orientation. Not only should the last refuge of Marxism be liquidated by this means, but also it should be possible to remove the unfortunate schism of the German laboring men. Petty and selfish persons do not wish to recognize this great and revolutionary fact and seek to weaken this work by imitations and self-help organizations. It is the will of the Fuehrer that outside of the German Labor Front no other organization (whether of worker or of employers) is to exist***

II. National Socialism is exercising the power in its strength most generously, however this proceeding is being interpreted here and there by its small opponents as weakness. This National Socialism believed that it could be generous in dealing with the Christian Trade Unions and other middle-class groups. This fact was answered by ingratitude and disloyalty. It turns out that the afore-mentioned unions have shown the greatest corruption in treasury matters and in economic affairs. Because of this knowledge I offer the following: All offices of the Christian Trade Unions and of employee unions are to be occupied by National Socialists * * *

(Signed) Dr. Robert LEY

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 404-PS

MEIN KAMPF Adolf Hitler German Edition, 1935

[Pages 456 to 457]

It is precisely our German people, that today, broken down, lies defenseless against the kicks of the rest of the world who need that suggestive force that lies in self-confidence. But this self-confidence has to be instilled into the young fellow-citizen from childhood on. His entire education and development has to be directed at giving him the conviction of being absolutely superior to others. With this physical force and skill he has again to win the belief in the invincibility of his entire nationality. For what once led the German army to victory was the sum of the confidence which the individual and all in common had in their leaders. The confidence in the possibility of regaining its freedom is what will restore the German people. But this conviction must be the final product of the same feeling of millions of individuals.

[Page 475]

The racial State will have to see to it that there will be a generation which, by a suitable education, will be ready for the final and ultimate decision on this globe. The nation which enters first on this course will be the victorious one.

MEIN KAMPF Adolf Hitler 41st Edition, 1933 Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger, GMm. b.H. Muenchen.

[Page 607, line 37 to page 608, complete]

For this reason alone, The SA of the NSDAP could have nothing in common with a military organization. It was an instrument for defense and education of the National Socialist movement and its tasks lay in an entirely different province from that of the so-called combat leagues [Wehrverbaende]. But it could also constitute no secret organization. The aim of secret organizations can only be illegal. In this way, the scope of such an organization is automatically limited. It is not possible, especially in view of the talkativeness of the German people, to build up an organization of any size and at the same time to keep it outwardly secret or even to veil its aims. Any such intention would be thwarted a thousand times. Not only that our police authorities today have a staff of pimps and similar rabble at their disposal, who will betray anything they can find for the Juda's payment of thirty pieces of silver, and even invent things to betray, but the supporters themselves can never be brought to the silence, that is necessary in such a case. Only very small groups, by years of sifting, can assume the character of real secret organizations. But the very smallness of such organizations would remove their value for the National Socialist movement. What we needed and still need were and are not a hundred or two hundred reckless conspirators, but hundreds of thousands of fanatical fighters for our philosophy of life [Weltanschauung]. We should not work in secret conventicles, but in mighty mass demonstrations, and it is not by dagger and poison or by pistol that the road can be cleared for the movement, but by the conquest of the streets. We must teach the Marxists that the future master of the streets is National Socialism, just as it will some day be the master of the state.

MEIN KAMPF Adolf Hitler Munich, 1933, 39th Edition.

[Page 675]

The trade union in national-socialist interpretation, has not the mission to gradually transform into one class, through condensation, all the various individuals among the people, thereby to take up the fight against other similarly organized structures within the nation. On the whole we cannot assign this mission to the trade union, rather it was first conferred on it at the moment in which it became the weapon of Marxism. It is not that the trade union is imbued with the spirit of the class struggle, directly, on the contrary, Marxism has made of it an instrument for its class war. It created the economic weapon which the international world Jew uses for the ruination of the economic basis of free, independent national states, for the annihilation of their national industry and of their national commerce, and thereby for the enslavement of free peoples in the service of international world finance Jewry.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 405-PS

1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 285

Law concerning Trustees of Labor of 19 May 1933

The Reich Government has decided on the following law, which is hereby promulgated.

Section 1

1. The Reich Chancellor appoints trustees of labor for the larger economic areas upon the proposal of the competent provincial governments and in agreement with them.

2. The Reich Labor Minister will assign the trustees either to the participating provincial governments, if they agree, or to the provincial authorities.

Section 2

1. Until a new revision of the social constitution, the trustees are to regulate the conditions for the conclusion of labor contracts. This practice is to be legally binding for all persons and replaces the system founded on combinations of workers, of individual employers or of combinations of employers. The regulations concerning the general application (par 2 ff of the tariff accord decree in the publication of 1 March 1928, Reichsgesetzblatt I, p 47) remain unaffected.

2. Moreover, the trustees are also to look after the maintenance of the labor peace.

3. Furthermore, they are to be convoked for their cooperation in the preparation of a new social constitution.

Section 3

The trustees are empowered to request aid of the competent Reich and provincial authorities for the execution of their regulations. They should contact the provincial government or one of their designated authorities before executing their measures, even though the danger of delay exists.

Section 4

The trustees of labor are bound by the directives and decrees of the Reich Government.

Section 5

The Reich Minister of Labor in agreement with the Reich Minister of Economics issues the necessary regulations for the implementation.

Berlin 19 May 1933. The Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler

The Reich Labor Minister Franz Seldte The Reich Economics Minister and Agriculture Hugenberg The Reich Minister of the Interior Frick The Reich Minister of Finance Count Schwerin von Krosigk

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 406-PS

Contents Memorandum by Gauleiter Party Member Julius Streicher

Enclosure 1: First memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party Member Karl Holz, with postscriptum.

Enclosure 2: Second memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party Member Karl Holz, with postscriptum.

Appendix 1: Case Sandreuter

Appendix 2: Case Ritter

Appendix 3: Case J.M. Lang

MEMORANDUM BY GAULEITER PARTY MEMBER JULIUS STREICHER Action against the Jews on 9/10 November 1938.

I was no longer present at the traditional fellowship congregation in the old town-hall in Munich on the evening of 9 November 1938 when a speaker, who claimed to have higher authority, made it known that the party was launching an action against the Jews during the night of 9/10 November 1938. I was informed of this fact by the party members Obergruppenfuehrer von Obernitz and Obergruppenfuehrer Litzmann around midnight of 9 November 1938. I declared to both these party members that I myself did not approve of an action involving arson of synagogues and destruction of goods but that I would raise no objections, of course, if this action had been sanctioned by the party. Therefore, what was done to the Jews during the night of 9/10 November 1938 happened without my direct or indirect assistance.

The consequences arising from the action against the Jews.

The action against the Jews of November 1938 was not a spontaneous one emanating from the population, and therefore was incomprehensible to many party members also as to its effects. Units of the components of the Party had been ordered to carry out the action against the Jews. If there is evidence now that in isolated cases party members with immaculate police records have appropriated goods during this action it should not be over-looked in judging such incidents that the appropriation was committed in an instant, where all goods were being destroyed in accordance with the orders given.

April 14, 1939

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-II-PS

Telegram GBA 760/43 [in ink crossed out in red] 10 March 3. To the Fuehrer Fuehrer headquarters

With the urgent request for immediate presentation to the Fuehrer in person and decision.

Subject: Difficulties in recruiting of workers [Arbeitsdienstverpflichtung] in the former Soviet territories.

My Fuehrer:

You can be assured that the Arbeitseinsatz is being carried out by me with fanatical determination, but also with care and consideration for the economical and technical, as well as human, necessities and occurrences.

The replacement for soldiers who are to be freed and the reinforcement of the armament program with newly needed workers can and will be supplied, in spite of great difficulties, which had to be overcome in the last two winter months. 258,000 foreign workers could be supplied during January and February to war industry, although the transports in the East were almost completely lacking. The commitment of German men and women is in full force.

Now that the difficulties of the winter months are disappearing more and more the transports from the East can be put into full operation again on account of preparations arranged by me. Although the report and commitment-results of German men and women is outstanding, in the heavy industrial labor the commitment of productive foreigners who are used to labor cannot be neglected.

Unfortunately, a few commanders in chief [Oberbefehlshaber] in the East mobilized the recruiting of men and women in the conquered Soviet territories, as I was told by Gauleiter Koch—for political reasons.

My Fuehrer! To fulfill my task I ask you to abolish these orders. I think it impossible that the former Soviet people should experience a better consideration than our own German people, on whom I was forced to levy drastic measures. If the obligation for labor and the forced recruiting of workers in the East is not possible anymore, then the German war industry and agriculture cannot fulfill their tasks to the full extent.

I myself have the opinion that our army leaders should not give credence under any circumstances to the atrocity and propaganda campaign of the Partisans. The generals themselves are greatly interested that the support for the troops is made possible in time.

I should like to point out that hundreds of thousands of excellent workers going into the field as soldiers now, cannot possibly be substituted by German women, not used to work even if they are trying to do their best. Therefore I have to use the people of the eastern territories.

I myself report to you, that the workers belonging to all foreign nations are treated humanely, correctly and cleanly, are fed and housed well, and are even clothed. On the basis of my own services with foreign nations, I go as far as to state, that never before in the world were foreign workers treated as correctly as is now happening in the hardest of all wars by the German people.

Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and to report to me kindly, whether the concept of the mission presented here is still right.

I would ask to talk to you personally about different important points of the Arbeitseinsatz at the beginning of next week, possibly Tuesday.

Yours, always thankful, sincere and obedient Signed: Fritz Sauckel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V AND VI-PS

District Administration Thueringen of NSDAP The Plenipotentiary for The Direction of Labour. Weimar 15 April 1943 Nr. 435/43 10:25 o'clock To the Fuehrer, Obersalzberg. 23 June 1943 [stamped] My Fuehrer,

As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers from the East for the German war economy in the coming months.

The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfillment of the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas too, will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.

Counting the manpower which comes into question from Poland and the remaining areas, and which is in the neighborhood of about 150,000, it will become possible again to place 5- to 600,000 workers at the disposal of German agriculture and 1 million workers at the disposal of the armaments industry and the rest of the war industries by the coming summer months.

I beg you to agree that the new French labor forces can also come into the Reich under conditions similar to those which applied to the last group. I have kept in touch with the High Command of the Armed Forces.

Since the largest part of the Belgian civil workers and prisoners of war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000 Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my Fuehrer.

1. After one year's activity as plenipotentiary for the direction of labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were given to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this year.

As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich presents a shining example to the methods of the capitalist and bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and blunders occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.

Besides the foreign civil workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war will be employed in the German economy.

2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches of the German war economy:

Armament 1,568,801

Mining industry 163,632

Building 218,707

Communications 199,074

Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544

Other economic branches 480,298

Besides the employment of foreign workers, 5 million German men and women workers were transferred, inside the German economic structure, to the German war economy proper by being switched from businesses unimportant to the war effort to important ones, or by retraining.

All of these efforts were necessary in order to smooth out the natural fluctuations, for example, through death, sickness, expirations or breaches of contract, but especially through drafting into the Armed Forces and the shifting of industries into other regions and to facilitate the enlargement of the armament works, the establishment of new factories and the fulfillment of new programs.

3. The result of the registration action for men and women up to the 7 April is as follows:

On the basis of the order of 27 January 1943, 3,249,743 men and women have registered. The results are not yet final.

The number of men amounts to 553,415

that of women to 2,696,328

Up till now about 52% of these registrations (that is 1,851,771) have been definitely fixed up by the Labor Bureaux.

Up till now only 32.5% of the men come into question for the direction of labor as the majority do not fit in with the requirements as a result of old age or sickness.

Employed up to the present moment are 66,008 men. Up to 7 April 732,489 women were put to work.

This result must be designated as outstanding. 44% of these women, however, work less than 48 hours per week because of their domestic circumstances. The basic armament industry has received from the women and men employed

20,670 men 341,100 women

It was possible to make some 130,000 available to agriculture and the rest to the Armed forces, postal service, railroads, etc.

4. The result of the shutting-down measures taken by the Reich Minister for Economic Affairs includes 74,644 persons, of this group, mostly over-age and consisting of 27,218 men, 47,426 women, only a third could be directed to industry, 10,108 men, 17,929 women, of these the armament industry received 5,258 men, 8,621 women.

The rest were distributed to the remaining industries of war importance and to the Armed Forces.

5. The demands of the armaments industry for men and women workers and the allocations of these from December 1942 until the end of March 1943 give the following result:

Demand Allocation

December 1942 } 250,000

January 1943 } total 335,000 172,000

February 1943 } 235,000

———

total—657,000

March 1943 225,000 450,000

replacements for those drafted from the armaments industry. 240,000

——— ———

800,000 1,107,000

In the March figures 320,000 men and women are brought into account by the registration-action.

Since I, my Fuehrer, shall be staying in the eastern provinces on the 20 April, I beg, already today, to be allowed to extend my most fervent good wishes to you, along with those of my district and my family.

You can be assured that the district of Thueringen and I will serve you and our dear people with the employment of all strength.

The warmest desire is that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete satisfaction.

Your faithful and obedient, [signed] Fritz Sauckel

Passed on: Puttig.

Received: Weismann Oberg.

Officially received: 1130 o'clock Heinstein pkz Munich for Section Roem. 3.

The above telegram was also sent in letter form. [in ink] WE 15 Apl.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-VIII-PS

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz Berlin W8, Mohrenstr 65 (Thuringenhaus) 17 May 1943 Tel: 12 65 71 To the Telegraph Office of the Party Chancellery Berlin W8

Gauleiter Sauckel requests that the following telegram be transmitted to the Fuehrer and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich.

By direction

Heil Hitler! [signature illegible]

a. To the Fuehrer, Fuehrer Headquarters

b. To the Reich Marshal for the Greater German Reich, Headquarters

to a. My Fuehrer!

to b. Most respected Reich Marshal!

In regard to the Arbeitseinsatz in connection with the Organization Todt, I request that I be permitted to submit the following figures:

In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy by the Arbeitseinsatz since I took office, the Organization Todt was supplied with new labor continually. The total number of laborers employed by the OT amounted to 270,969 at the end of March 1942 and 696,003 at the end of March 1943.

In this it is noteworthy that the Arbeitseinsatz has accelerated the OT in the West for the purpose of completing the work on the Atlantic Wall and has furnished laborers with utmost energy. This is all the more remarkable because:

1. In France, Belgium and Holland the industries work for the German war economy exclusively, and must always be supplied with labor in any case;

2. Great numbers of workers must be placed at the disposal of the German economy within the Reich itself.

In spite of the attendant difficulties the supply of the OT in the west was raised from 66,701 at the end of March 1942 to 248,200 at the end of March 1943.

Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall.

to a Heil Hitler! Your obedient and faithful Fritz Sauckel to b Your continually obliged Fritz Saukel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz Berlin W8, 3 June 1943 1751/43 [pencilled] ab 6/4/43 To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany The Fuehrer's Hq My Fuehrer!

I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943.

For the first time the following number of new foreign laborers and Prisoners of War were employed in the German war industry:

January 1943 —120,085

February 1943 —138,354

March 1943 —257,382

April 1943 —160,535

May 1943 —170,155

————

Total —846,511

I may remark that this number of 850,000 was reached only after greatest difficulties were overcome which had not existed during the previous year; all those who have worked for the Arbeitseinsatz, particularly in the occupied territories, did so with the greatest fanaticism and devotion.

Unfortunately quite a number of our officials and employees were victims of murders and attacks by partisans.

Besides those labor forces recruited for work within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were recruited in the occupied territories through the agencies for the Arbeitseinsatz as well as through the OT and the factories working in the East and the West for the German war industry. Furthermore the Wehrmacht received a large number of laborers as well as labor volunteers.

Moreover, because of the order dated 27 January 1943 requiring everybody to register, the following numbers of men and women were made available:

Men Women Total

February 14,594 163,012 177,606

March 45,606 494,931 540,537

April 19,315 269,374 288,689

May 11,405 186,683 198,168

——— ———— ————

Total 91,000 1,114,000 1,205,000

Of these approximately 800,000 are available only for less than 48 hours of work per week.

Altogether, German war industry during the first 5 months of 1943 recruited more than 2,000,000 laborers.

Furthermore, negotiations resulted in agreements and regulations on the following points: Wage control and increased production in the various European territories especially in France, which enabled us to keep wages in the occupied European territories on a reasonable level, to stabilize living conditions of foreign laborers working for Germany in spite of the difficult conditions of war, to increase production by means of wage control in these territories. These measures were carried out in agreement with industrial and farming authorities as well as with the Commissioner of the Reich for the control of prices.

Heil! Your obedient and faithful Signed: Sauckel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 437-PS

[Extract from report of Hans Frank to Hitler re situation in Poland, dated 19 June 1943—Pages 10 and 11.]

In the course of time, a series of measures or of consequences of the German rule have led to a substantial deterioration of the attitude of the entire Polish people in the General Gouvernment. These measures have affected either individual professions or the entire population and frequently also—often with crushing severity—the fate of individuals.

Among these are in particular:

1. The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, mainly of the working classes in the cities, whose majority is working for German interests.

Until the war in 1939, its food supplies, though not varied, were sufficient and generally secure, due to the agrarian surplus of the former Polish state and in spite of the negligence on the part of their former political leadership.

2. The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates and the expropriation without compensation and resettlement of Polish peasants from manoeuvre areas and from German settlements.

3. Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in commerce and trade and in the field of private property.

4. Mass arrests and mass shootings by the German police who applied the system of collective responsibility.

5. The rigorous methods of recruiting workers.

6. The extensive paralyzation of cultural life.

7. The closing of high schools, junior colleges and universities.

8. The limitation, indeed the complete elimination of Polish influence from all spheres of State administration.

9. Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church, limiting its extensive influence—an undoubtedly necessary move—and, in addition, until quite recently, the closing and confiscation of monasteries, schools and charitable institutions.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 440-PS

Berlin, 20 Nov. 1939 The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces OKW/WFA No. 213/39 g.k. Chefs. (Top Secret, Chief Matter) Department L (I) 8 Copies, Copy Chief matter By officers only TOP SECRET Directive No. 8, for the conduct of the war.

1. The state of alert, to make the continuation of the initiated concentration of troops possible at any moment, must be maintained, for the time being. Only this will make it possible to exploit favorable weather conditions immediately.

The various components of the Armed Forces will make arrangements enabling them to stop the attack even if the order for such action is received by the High Command as late as D-1 at 2300 hours. The keyword

"Rhein" (—start attack) or "Elbe" (—withhold attack)

will be passed on to the High Commands at the latest by this time.

The High Commands of the Army and the Air Forces are requested after having determined the day for attack, to notify Department L of the High Command of the Armed Forces immediately with regard to the mutually agreed hour of the commencement of the attack.

2. Contrary to previous orders, all measures intended against the Netherlands are to be carried out without special orders at the start of the general attack.

The reaction of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be foreseen. The entering of our troops will take the character of a friendly occupation wherever no opposition is encountered.

3. The Land-operations are to be carried out on the basis of the assemble directive of 29 October. The following is added to complete this directive:

a. All measures have to be taken to move the emphasis of the operation quickly from Army Group B to Army Group A if greater and quicker successes than at Army Group B should be obtained there as the present disposition of enemy's forces that would indicate.

b. The Dutch area, including the coastal West-Frisian Islands, without Texel for the time being, is to be seized as far as the Grebbe-Haas Line, until further notice.

4. The Navy is authorized to take blockage measures for submarines against the Belgian and, contrary to previous orders, also against Dutch harbors and waterways, in the night before the attack and from the time of the start of the blockade activities and the time of the land attack must also be kept as short as possible in the case of the use of submarines.

Combat actions against Dutch naval forces are only authorized, if they adopt a hostile attitude.

The Navy is charged with the coastal artillery defense of the coastal regions to be occupied, against attacks from the sea. Preparations have to be made accordingly.

5. The tasks of the Air Force remain unchanged. They have been supplemented by special orders, issued orally by the Fuehrer, concerning the landing from the air and the support of the army by the seizure of the bridges west of Maastricht.

The 7th Air-borne Division will only be committed for landing activities from the air after the seizure of bridges across the Albert Canal has been secured. The fastest means of transmission of this message between the High Command of the Army and the High Command of the Air Force must be guaranteed.

Localities, especially great open town, and the industries are not to be attacked either in the Dutch or the Belgian-Luxembourg area, without (urgent) military reasons.

6. The closing of the frontiers. a. The border and news traffic across the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers is to be kept at its present volume until the beginning of the attack in the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities are not to participate in the preparations for the closing of the border until the start of the attack.

b. The Reich-Border is to be closed towards the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg for all non-military border and news traffic at the start of the attack. The Commander-in-Chief issues the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities concerned. The Highest Reich Authorities concerned, will be informed by the OKW (High Command of the Armed Forces) at the beginning of the attack that the measures for the closing of the borders will be issued immediately by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, even for the Dutch Border outside of the operational territory.

c. At first, restrictions in the border and news traffic will not be ordered after the start of the attack on the other Reich-Borders towards the neutral countries. Further prepared measures for the surveillance of personal and news traffic will be taken, if necessary.

By order Distribution: Signed: Keitel

High Command of the Army—1st Copy.

High Command of the Navy—2nd Copy.

R. d. L. [Reichs-Ministry of the Air] and the High Command of the Air Force—3rd Copy.

attested: von Trotha [?] Captain High Command of the Armed Forces: Chief WFA—4th Copy. L—5-8th Copy. Distribution: Copies K 1st Copy IV 2nd Copy II 2nd Copy for information [in handwriting] Acknowledged 21 October [initials illegible]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 442-PS

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW/WFA/L No. 33 160/40 Top Secret The Fuehrer's hq. 16 July 1940 7 copies, 4th copy

TOP SECRET Transmit by officer courier only

General Order No. 16 on the preparation of a landing operation against England.

Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation still shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out.

The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English homeland as a basis for the carrying on of the war against Germany, and if it should become necessary to occupy it completely;

To this end I order the following:

1. The Landing must be carried out in the form of a surprise crossing on a broad front approximately from Ramsgate to the area west of the Isle of Wight, in which air force units will take the roll of artillery, and units of the navy the roll of the engineers. Whether it is practical to undertake subordinate actions, such as the occupation of the Isle of Wight or of County Cornwall, before the general landing is to be determined from the standpoint of every branch of the armed forces and the result is to be reported to me. I reserve the decision for myself. The preparations for the entire operation must be completed by mid-August.

2. To these preparations also belong the creation of those conditions which make a landing in England possible.

a. The English air-force must morally and actually be so far overcome, that it does not any longer show any considerable aggressive force against the German attack.

b. Mine-free channels must be created.

c. By means of a closely concentrated mine-barrier the straight of Dover on both Flanks as well as the western entrance to the channel in the approximate line Aldemey-Portland must be sealed off.

d. The area in front of the coast must be dominated and given artillery protection by strong coastal artillery.

e. Tying down of the English naval forces in the North Sea as well as in the Mediterranean (by the Italians) is desired, whereby it must now be attempted that the English naval forces which are in the homeland be damaged by air and torpedo attack in strength.

3. Organization of the leadership and of the preparations;

Under my command and according to my general directions the supreme commanders will lead the forces to be used from their branches of service. The command-staffs of the supreme commander of the army, the supreme commander of the Navy, and the supreme commander of the air-force must from 1 August on be located within a radius of at least 50 km. from my headquarters (Ziegenberg). Lodging the command staffs of the supreme commanders of the army and navy together at Giessen appears practical to me.

Hence for the leadership of the landing armies the supreme commander of the army will have to employ an army group hq.

The project bears the code-name "Seeloewe" [Sea-lion].

In the preparation and carrying out of the undertaking the following tasks fall to the various branches:

a. Army: will draw up the operational plan and the transport plan for all units of the 1st wave to embark. The AA artillery to be transported with the 1st wave will at the same time be attached to the army (to the individual crossing groups) until such a time as a division of tasks in support and protection of ground troops protection of the ports of debarkation and protection of the aerial strong points to be occupied can be carried out. The Army furthermore distributes the means of transport to the individual crossing groups and establishes the embarkation and landing points in agreement with the Navy.

b. Navy: will secure the means of transport and will bring them corresponding to the desires of the Army and according to the requirements of seamanship into the individual embarkation areas. Insofar as possible ships of the defeated enemy states are to be procured. For every ferrying point it will provide the necessary naval staff for advice on matters of seamanship with escort vessels and security forces. It will protect, along with the air forces employed to guard the movement, the entire crossing of the channel on both flanks. An order will follow on the regulation of the command relationship during the crossing. It is further the task of the navy to regulate, in a uniform manner, the building up of the coastal artillery, that is, all batteries which can be used for firing against sea targets of the Army as well as of the Navy, and to organize the fire control of the whole. As great an amount of very heavy artillery as possible is to be employed as quickly as possible to secure the crossing and to protect the flanks from enemy operations from the sea. For this purpose, railway artillery (supplemented by all available captured pieces) without the batteries (Ks and K12) provided for firing on targets on the English mainland, is to be brought up and emplaced by use of railway turntables.

Independent of this, the heaviest available platform batteries are to be opposite the Straits of Dover, so emplaced under concrete that they can withstand even the heaviest aerial attacks and thereby dominate the Straits of Dover under any circumstances in the long run, within their effective range.

The technical work is the responsibility of the Todt Organization.

c. Mission of the Air Force is: To hinder interference from the enemy air force. To overcome coastal defenses which could do damage to the landing positions, to break the first resistance of enemy troops and to smash reserves which may be coming up. For this mission closest cooperation of individual units of the air force with the crossing units is necessary. Furthermore, to destroy important transportation routes for the bringing up of enemy reserves, and to attack enemy naval forces, which are coming up, while they are still far away from the crossing points. I request proposals on the use of parachute and glider troops. In this regard it is to be determined if it is worth-while here to hold parachute and glider troops in readiness as a reserve to be quickly committed in case of emergency.

4. The armed forces chief of signals will carry out the necessary preparations for signal connections from France to the English mainland. The installation of the remaining 80km East Prussian cables is to be provided for in conjunction with the Navy.

5. I request the supreme commanders to submit to me as soon as possible:

a. The intentions of the Navy and Air Force for achieving the necessary conditions for the crossing of the channel (see figure 2).

b. The construction of the coastal batteries in detail (Navy).

c. A survey of the tonnage to be employed and the methods of getting it ready and fitting it out. Participation of civilian agencies? (Navy).

d. The organization of aerial protection in the assembly areas for troops about to cross and the means of crossing (Air Force).

e. The crossing and operations plan of the army, composition and equipment of the first crossing wave.

f. Organization and measures of the Navy and the Air Force for carrying out of the crossing itself, security of the crossing, and support of the landing.

g. Proposals for the committment of parachute and glider troops, as well as for the attachment and command of anti-aircraft, after an extensive gain of territory on English soil has been made (Air Force).

h. Proposal for the location of the command staffs of the supreme commanders of the Army and of the Navy.

i. The position of army, navy, and air force on the question whether and what subsidiary actions before the general landing are considered practical.

k. Proposal of army and navy on the overall command during the crossing.

A. Hitler [Initialled] J [Jodl] K [Keitel] Distribution: Supreme Cmdr of the Army—1st copy. Supreme Cmdr of the Navy—2nd copy. Supreme Cmdr of the Air Force—3rd copy. Armed Forces Command Section [?]—4th copy. (WFA) Section L—5th and 7th copy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS

TOP SECRET The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces WFSt/Abt.L(I) No 33 356/40 g.K.Chefs Only by officer Directive No. 18 Fuehrer's Headquarters 12 November 40 2F/408 10 copies, 4th copy 55

The preparatory measures of Supreme Hq for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:—

1. Relations with France. The aim of my policy towards France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the time being France will have the role of a "non-belligerent power"—she will have to tolerate German military measures on her territory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protection of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) against England and the deGaulle movement. From this initial task France's participation in the war against England can develop fully.

For the time being, the conversations with France resulting from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on—apart from the current work of the armistice commission—entirely by the foreign office [Auswartiges Amt] in cooperation with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [OKW].

More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks.

2. Spain and Portugal. Political steps to bring about an early Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of German intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this purpose:

a. Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed.

b. The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at another point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands.

The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as follows:

Section I

a. Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the Chief of Foreign Intelligence.

b. Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our preparations.

c. The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness away from the French-Spanish border and information will be withheld from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands).

With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that the railways are available for reinforcements.

Section II

a. Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, will, at a favorable moment, carry out an air attack from French soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack.

b. Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air.

Section III

a. Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops.

b. Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gibraltar.

Section IV

Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required.

As for the strength of the units to be used for operation "Felix" the following will apply:

Army. The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance.

Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readiness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominately of a mobile nature.

Air Force. Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack on Gibraltar to guarantee substantial success.

For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units are to be transferred to Spain.

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets.

Navy. Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the British-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, which they are expected to do after the air raid.

To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, preparations are to be made in cooperation with the army for the transfer of single coastal batteries.

An Italian participation is not envisaged.

As a result of operation "Gibraltar", the Atlantic Islands (in particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain increased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Canaries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be occupied.

I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disadvantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be given to me as soon as possible.

3. Italian Offensive against Egypt. If at all, the use of German forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have reached Morsa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the air bases necessary for this.

The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be carried on as follows:

Army. Holding an armored division ready for use in North Africa (composition as previously provided for).

Navy. Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa.

Air Force. Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the latter.

4. Balkans. The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus make possible the use of German air force units against targets in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area.

In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the calculations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position.

So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, preparations will be made for an early increase in the German Army mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted to me.

The Commander-in-chief of the Air Force will make preparations for the use of German Air Force units in the South East Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations.

The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased to the extent proposed to me.

Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, ammunition) are to be given favorable treatment.

5. Russia. Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued.

Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the army's operational plans has been submitted to, and approved by, me.

6. Landing in England. Due to a change in the general situation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation "Seeloewe" in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed forces must therefore earnestly endeavor to improve conditions for such an operation in every respect.

7. I shall expect the commanders-in-chief to express their opinions of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchronization of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particularly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the Atlantic Isles.

Signed: Adolf Hitler J [initialled: Jodl] Distribution: Ob.d.H (Op.Abt.)—1st Copy. Ob.d.M (l.Skl.)—2nd Copy. Ob.d.L. (LwFueSt.Ia)—3rd Copy. O.K.W. SFSt—4th Copy. Abt. L.—5th-10th Copy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 446-PS

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces

OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs. SECRET The Fuehrer's Headquarters 18 December 40 (only through officer) 9 copies, 4th copy Directive Nr. 21 Case Barbarossa

The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick campaign before the end of the war against England (case Barbarossa).

For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have to be safeguarded against surprise attacks.

For the Eastern campaign the Airforce will have to free such strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick completion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is limited by the following reservation: That the entire battle and armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently protected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break down.

Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequivocally against England also during an Eastern campaign.

If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.

Preparations requiring more time to start are—if this has not yet been done—to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.

Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.

The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the following basis:

I. General Purpose:

The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be destroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the wide spaces of Russia is to be prevented.

In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight.

Effective intervention by the Russian Airforce is to be prevented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations.

II. Probable Allies and their tasks.

[Page 4, par. II]

2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area.

[Page 8, par. IV]

IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this letter of instructions are precautionary measures, in case Russia should change her present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of their execution has not been fixed) will become known and thereby grave political and military disadvantages would result.

V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on their further plans based on this letter of instructions.

The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in regard to their time.

[signed] Hitler [initialed by: Jodl, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.] Distribution: Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.)—1. copy Ob. d. M. (Skl.)—2. copy Ob. d. L. (Lw.Fue.St.)—3. copy OKW: WFSt.—4. copy Abt.—5-9. copy

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS

TOP SECRET Top Secret Only thru officer OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff Section L (IV/Qu) 44125/41 Top Secret Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941 5 copies, 4th copy

Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) #33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940 Directives for Special Areas to Order #21 (Case Barbarossa)

I. Area of operations and executive power

1. The authorization to issue orders and the regulations regarding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has been reached.

It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General Gouvernement an area of operations. However, in accordance with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized to take all measures necessary for the execution of his military aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders issued by civilian agencies.

2. The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be divided up into individual states with governments of their own, according to special orders, as soon as military operations are concluded. From this the following is inferred:

a. The area of operations, created through the advance of the Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supreme Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Supreme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies.

b. In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on behalf of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the preparation of the political administration, tasks which result from the struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing political systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The executive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army (OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not be disturbed. Details shall be arranged directly through the OKH with the Reichsfuehrer SS.

c. As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own political administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according to its genealogic basis and to the positions of the Army Groups, into North (Baltic countries), Center (White Russia) and South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their orders from the Fuehrer.

3. For the execution of all military tasks within the areas under the political administration in the rear of the area of operations, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command.

The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the military sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Commander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Commanding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily for the following tasks:

a. Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in order to support him in his political task.

b. Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values for use by German industry (see par. 4).

c. Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops according to the needs of the OKH.

d. Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy paratroops.

e. Traffic regulations.

f. Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and for PW's inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas.

The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of the commissioners of the Reich.

Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately.

The time for the assumption of command by the commanding officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall allow a change in the command without disrupting military operations. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain in office, operating according to the principles valid for the commanding officers.

4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the administration of economy in the area of operations and in the territories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has delegated the Chief of the "Wi Rue Amt" with the execution of the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi Rue Amt.

5. The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the jurisdiction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the employment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section Defense.

6. The behavior of the troops towards the population and the tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and commanded.

II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic:

7. Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the beginning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods and communications to Russia.

8. As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-military traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer's orders. Billeting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the Reichsfuehrer SS the assignment of liaison officers.

The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the highest government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme Commander of the Army and the agencies under him shall decide on exceptions.

Except for the special regulations applying to the police organizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance-permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Army exclusively.

III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Finland.

9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and according to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case it should become necessary during the course of the operations to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be submitted to the OKW.

10. Police measures for the protection of the troops are permitted, independently from the granting of special rights. Further orders in this shall be issued later.

11. Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the territories of these countries, on the following subjects:

Procurement of food and feed. Housing and machinery. Purchase and the shipment of merchandise. Procurement of funds and wage-control. Salaries. Request for indemnity-payments. Postal and telegraph services. Traffic. Jurisdiction.

Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, are to be submitted to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941.

IV. Directives regarding Sweden.

12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, no special authority is to be granted the commander of the German troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and attacks.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces Signed: KEITEL Distribution: OKH—1st copy. OKM—2nd copy. R.d.L.u.O.K.L.—3rd copy. Armed Forces Operational Staff—4th copy. Section L—5th copy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 448-PS

Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. Chiefs F.H.Q. 11th Jan 44 TOP SECRET 13 copies, 4th copy. Order No. 22

Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation demands for strategical, political and psychological reasons German assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England against our allies.

Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the Albanian front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group Cavallero, in connection with later operations of the 12th Army, shall be enabled to start an attack also from Albania.

I order therefore, the following:

1. A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of the Army which will be in a position to render valuable services to our Allies in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will be given separately. The preparations for the transfer of the unit will be made in time to follow immediately the present transport of an Italian armored division and a motorized division to Tripoli (starting approximately 20 February).

2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. Its most important assignment will be the fight against the English Naval forces and their communications between the western and eastern Mediterranean. Besides that, provisions are also to be made, with the help of temporary landing fields, to attack the English unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of Western Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give immediate support to the Army group of Graziani.

The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory between Sicily and the North African coast a "restricted area" [Sperrgebiet] in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air corps and to avoid incidents against neutral ships.

3. For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate strength of one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and Armored forces, are to be provided and held in readiness. The transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to commence, as soon as the approval of the Italians is received by the High Command of the Armed forces. In the meantime, it must be examined and determined with the Italian High Command in Albania whether and how many more forces for operational attacks could be employed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the Italian Divisions.

The duty of the German forces will be:

a. To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an emergency case, should new crises arise there;

b. To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later attacking with the aim:

To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point for a far-reaching operation,

To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in order to support thereby the frontal attack of List's Army.

4. The directives for the questions of authority over the German troops to be employed in North Africa and Albania and the restrictions which are to be made with reference to their employment, will be settled by the High Command of the Armed Forces and the Italian Armed Forces staff.

5. The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only as far as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, to be provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For transports of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed in Foggia is to be utilized.

Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk of the German forces to Albania before the transfer of the blocking unit to Lybia starts, (See 1) and the use of all German boats becomes necessary for this purpose.

[signed] Adolf Hitler Distribution: OKH/Gen Staff of Army, operating—1st cy. OKM/Skl—2nd cy. Ob.d.L./Lw.F.St.I a—3rd cy. OKW WFST—4th cy. ————L—5th to 9th cy. WNV—10th cy. Foreign/Intelligence—11th cy. Armed Forces, Transport Chief—12th cy. German General with the Italian high command—13th cy.

F.H.Q. 29th Jan 41 High Command of the Armed Forces WFST/Abt. L(I) Nr. 44018/41 g.K. Chefs II. Anz. 13 copies, 4th copy.

Ref: The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. OKW /WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V. 11th Jan. 41

The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following code names:

Operation Tripoli: "Sonnenblume" Operation Albania: "Alpenveilchen" The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

By order (Signed) Warlimont

Distribution: OKH/general staff of Army, operations—1st cy. OKM/SKL—2nd cy. Ob. d. M./Lw Fuest—3rd cy. OKW: WFST—4th cy. Section L—5th to 9th cy. WNV—10th cy. Foreign/Intelligence—11th cy. Armed Forces, Transportation Ch.—12th cy. German General with the Italian high command—13th cy.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 498-PS

TOP SECRET The Fuehrer No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942 12 copies, 12th copy.

1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment in which they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle.

2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, wherever they may appear.

3. I therefore order:

From now on all enemies on so-called Commando missions in Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their actions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. for publication in the Report of the Military Forces.

4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some other means, through the police in occupied territories for instance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance, etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short time.

5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy soldiers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offensive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are captured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after battles.

6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, or acted against this order where it was to be executed.

[signed] Adolf Hitler

Distribution: Copy No.

O.K.H. / Genst.d.H (High Command of the Army / General Staff of the Army). 1

O.K.M. / Skl. (High Command of the Navy / Naval War Staff). 2

Ob.d.L. / Lw.Fue.St. (C in C Air Force / Air Force Operational Staff). 3

W.B. Norwegen (Armed Forces Commander, Norway) 4

W.B.Sudeost (Armed Forces Commander, Southeast) 5

Ob. West (C in C, West) 6

Geb.A.O.K. 20 (20th Mountain Army) 7

Ob. Sued (C in C, South) 8

Pz.Armee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) 9

Rf.SS u. Chef d.Dtsch.Polizei (Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police). 10

OKW /WFSt (High Command of the Armed Forces / Armed Forces Operational Staff). 11-12

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 501-PS

Field Post Office Kiev, 16 May 1942 No 32704 B Nr 40/42 TOP SECRET To: SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff [Handwritten:] Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8 pers. R/29/5 Pradel n.R b/R [Handwritten:] Sinkkel [?] b.R, p 16/6

The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (Saurer) stop completely in rainy weather. If it has rained for instance for only one half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It is only a question now whether the van can only be used standing at the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to that place, which is possible only in good weather. The place of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is difficult to access because of its location; in damp or wet weather it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed are driven or led to that place, then they realize immediately what is going on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible. There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point and to drive them to the spot.

I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house-trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each side of the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans became so well-known, that not only the authorities, but also the civilian population called the van "death van", as soon as one of these vehicles appeared. It is my opinion, the van cannot be kept secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged.

The Saurer-van which I transported from Simferopol to Taganrog suffered damage to the brakes on the way. The Security Command [SK] in Mariupol found the cuff of the combined oil-air brake broken at several points. By persuading and bribing the H.K.P. [?] we managed to have a form machined, on which the cuffs were cast. When I came to Stalino and Gorlowka a few days later, the drivers of the vans complained about the same faults. After having talked to the commandants of those commands I went once more to Mariupol to have some more cuffs made for those cars too. As agreed two cuffs will be made for each car, six cuffs will stay in Mariupol as replacements for group D and six cuffs will be sent to SS-Untersturmfuehrer Ernst in Kiev for the cars of group C. The cuffs for the groups B and A could be made available from Berlin, because transport from Mariupol to the north would be too complicated and would take too long. Smaller damages on the cars will be repaired by experts of the commands, that is of the groups in their own shops.

Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought to Berlin for repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much too expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to save those expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks soldered and if that should no longer be possible, to notify Berlin immediately by radio, that Pol. Nr.——— is out of order. Besides that I ordered that during application of gas all the men were to be kept as far away from the vans as possible, so they should not suffer damage to their health by the gas which eventually would escape. I should like to take this opportunity to bring the following to your attention: several commands have had the unloading after the application of gas done by their own men. I brought to the attention of the commanders of those S.K. concerned the immense psychological injuries and damages to their health which that work can have for those men, even if not immediately, at least later on. The men complained to me about head-aches which appeared after each unloading. Nevertheless they don't want to change the orders, because they are afraid prisoners called for that work, could use an opportune moment to flee. To protect the men from these damages, I request orders be issued accordingly.

The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by dozing off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by correct adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the prisoners fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such as could be seen before, are no longer noticed.

Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be reached with further news.

Signed: Dr. Becker SS Untersturmfuehrer

Reichs Security Main Office Message Center 1900, 15 June 1942 [Handwritten:] Riga E 2 II D 3a Maj Pradel Message No 152452 R 16/6 Wiederhausen Riga 7082—15-6-42—1855—BE To Reichs Security Main Office—Roem. 2D3A—Berlin TOP SECRET Subject: S-Vans

A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia.

The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three S-vans on hand (2 Daimond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand are leaky already.

The commandant of the Security Police and the Security Service "Ostland" Roem IT-126/42 GRS Stamp: Signed: Truehe, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer No 240/42 II D 3a 16 June 42 Procedure: [handwritten] 1. When can we count on having another S-van ready? 2. Are gas-hoses on hand, ordered or when to be delivered? 3. Request answer. R 16/6