Front matter (continued 7)

The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low-temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another place and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau.

I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation.

I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with

Heil Hitler! Always yours [Signed] E. Milch Mr. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff Berlin SW 11

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 347-PS

Copy of a Copy

I Ju 3 D 9 Tgb No 783/449 18 April 44 [in pencil] To the Reich Youth Leader Artur Axmann Berlin-Charlottenburg 9 Kaiserdamm 45/46 Dear Party Member Axmann:

My chief of the department youth, Obergebietsfuehrer Lueer has proposed to me the plan to let the youth of the Latvian and Estonian peoples participate in complete age groups in the military education camps of the Hitler Youth.

I thank you, party member Axmann, for the generous invitation of the Hitler Youth to the Youth organization of the Baltic districts [General Bezirken]. I agree with you in the expectations, which we connect with the enlargements of the camps, begun with such success in East-Prussia.

The experience of Germany is best able to liberate the youth from thinking about small states and to explain to them the understanding for the European obligation. Furthermore, I expect especially through the conscription of entire age groups, that the military education will make itself felt in the military aspect. Only the education of an entire age group has influence on the reserve situation. The reserve situation of the Estonian and Latvian Legion is marked especially by the lack of noncommissioned officers and instructors. If we can eliminate this lack by the universal military education of the growing age groups, that will mean for the future a considerable inner strengthening of not small parts of our Northern front.

The first General directors as well as state directors in Estonia and Latvia in the meantime have been instructed, to create the legal basis, which are necessary for the execution of required military education. Obergebietsfuehrer Lueer could assure me that the inner readiness exists on the part of the youth. Also the organization and leaders of the youth will never close their ears to this commitment. However, I must draw your attention to the doubts, which are in the way of the military education of the Latvian and Estonian youth on German soil; I have consciously refrained from issuing the necessary orders on my own competence, but have asked Commissioner General to cause the countries own administration to publish the appropriate orders. Because of their own orders, these agencies will also have to issue the specific orders for the individual commitments. This is according to our policy, to relieve the German authorities from all the more technical and administrative problems, which touch little on our leadership and educational mission, and to leave to the countries own administration freedom of action.

However, according to the conferences which have taken place so far, it cannot be expected that General Dankers or Dr. Mae will order their youth organizations on their own, to conduct the military education not in Latvia or Estonia, but in East-Prussia or in Warthegau. This viewpoint is partly caused by the more or less expressed fear, to be suspected by reactionary circles to favor a so called Germanization. General Dankers and Dr. Mae can also point out, that the transfer of the Latvian and Estonian pre-military education of the youth contradicts the above-mentioned principles, which we customarily observe in the realm of the remaining administration. I cannot include a camp education, which primarily is to alleviate the most dire needs of an inadequate recruit training as a matter of our basic German educational mission. In the military education camps, the young Latvians are trained under Latvian leaders in the Latvian language,—not because this is our ideal, but because absolute military necessity demands this. If General Dankers or Dr. Mae express the wish, and they have done so, to conduct such camps on Latvian or Estonian soil, I am not able to oppose them with any serious reasons.

I consider the arrangement of the most necessary suppositions for the future military service an immediate and simply practical mission of the countries own youth activity. The permission, that the countries own youth organizations, even if only in part and under German leadership, can carry out the military education in the country, gives them a considerable power toward those circles, still opposing, and is also able to increase the enthusiasm, especially of the youth. Our policy must adapt itself in the necessary extent toward this immediate goal, to rouse the Baltic peoples to the highest war effort of all forces. I am sure that the adaptability and educational capacity of the youth demand other measures from us, than those which can be advocated by us in our policies toward the adult parts of the population. However, politics and the education of the youth must perform in common according to the necessities of war, which gives us the problem to mobilize all available forces for victory. Even under these conditions, there are enough possibilities for Germany to exercise influence. The universal execution of the military education based on compulsory service with regard to the location of the camp gives us the possibility to increase the share of the German camps. Two or three camps in Estonia and Latvia therefore act as advertising for the camps within Germany; for in contrast to the Germanic peoples of the West, the military education is no longer to be carried out through voluntary enlistments, but through legal conscription. The camps in Estonia and Latvia as well, will have to be under German leadership, and as military education camps of the Hitler youth, they must be a symbol of our educational mission beyond Germany's borders.

I consider the execution of the military education of the Estonian and Latvian youth not only a military necessity, but also a war mission of the Hitler youth especially. I would be thankful to you, party member Axmann, if the Hitler youth would put itself at our disposal with the same readiness, with which they have so far supported our work in the Baltic Area.

Heil Hitler! [signed] Lohse

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 351-PS

LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE REICH CABINET SINCE 30 JANUARY 1933

Reichs Chancellor Adolf Hitler, appointed 30 January 1933

Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor since 2 August 1934

Name Appointed Reappointed Resigned

The Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor von Papen 30.1.1933 30.7.1934

1.The Deputy of the Fuehrer Hess, Reichsminister without portfolio 1.12.33

2. Reichs Minister of Foreign Affairs—Freiherr von Neurath 2.6.32 30.1.33

3. Reichs and Prussian Minister of the Interior—Dr. Frick 30.1.33

4. Reichs War Minister and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces—von Blomberg 30.1.33

5. Reichs Minister for Finance—Graf Schwerin von Krosigk 2.6.32 30.1.33

6. Reichs and Prussian Minister of Economy—Dr. Hugenberg— 30.1.33 29.6.33

Dr. Schmitt 29.6.33 [1] 30.7.34

[2] 30.1.35

Commissioned:

President of the Reichs Bank Directorate—Dr. Schacht 30.7.34 Temporary or 6 months

30.1.35 Until further notice

7. Reichs and Prussian Minister for Labor—Seldte 30.1.33

8. Reichs Minister of Justice—Dr. H.C. Guertner 2.6.32 1.2.33

9. Reichs Postmaster General and Reichs and Prussian Minister of Transportation—Freiherr von Eltz-Ruebenach 1.6.32 30.1.33

10. Reichs and Prussian Minister for Food and Agriculture— Dr. Hugenberg 30.1.33 29.6.33

—Darre 29.6.33

11. Reichs Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda—Dr. Goebbels 13.3.33

12. Reichs Minister for Aviation—Goering Reichs Minister without portfolio 30.1.33

Reichs Minister for Aviation 5.5.33

13. Reichs and Prussian Minister for Science and Education— Rust 1.5.34

14. Reichs and Prussian Minister for Church Affairs—Kerrl Reichs Minister without portfolio 16.6.34

Reichs and Prussian Minister for Church Affairs 16.7.35

15. Reichs Minister without portfolio 19.12.34

————

State Secretary of the Reichs Cabinet:

Dr. Lammers, State Secretary and Chief of the Reichs Chancellory 30.1.33

Press Chief of the Reichs Cabinet— Funk 30.1.33

Director of the Ministry

State Secretary in the Reichs Ministry for Enlightenment and Propaganda 13.3.33

Present at the First Session of the Cabinet of Adolf Hitler on 30 January 1933 at 5:00 p.m.

Present:

Reichs Chancellor Hitler

Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor and Reichs Commissar for the State of Prussia von Papen

Reichs Minister of Foreign Affairs Freiherr von Neurath

Reichs Minister of the Interior Dr. Frick

Reichs Minister of Finance Graf Schwerin von Krosigk

Reichs Minister of Economy Dr. Hugenberg

Reichs Minister of Labor Seldte

Reichs Minister of Justice

Reichs Defense Minister von Blomberg

Reichs Postmaster General and Reichs Minister for Transportation Freiherr von Eltz-Ruebenach

Reichs Minister and Reichs Commissar for Aviation Goering

Reichs Commissar for Procurement of Labor Dr. Gercke

State Secretary in the Reichs Chancellory Dr. Lammers

State Secretary in the Office of the Reichs President Dr. Meissner

Reichs Press Chief, Director in the Ministry Funk

Responsible for the Protocol Counsellor in the Ministry Wienstein

Reichs Minister for Food and Agriculture Dr. Hugenberg

Subject: The Political Situation.

The Reichs Chancellor opens the session and explains that millions of people within Germany would joyfully greet this day on which a Reich Cabinet under his leadership had been appointed by the Reich President. He asked the members of the Cabinet to give him their confidence as he himself had confidence in each member of the Cabinet.

Then the Chancellor stated that he intended to suggest to the Reich President the appointment of the Counsellor in the Ministry, Dr. Lammers, to the post of State Secretary in the Reich Chancellor in place of the retired State Secretary Planck, and the appointment of the member of the Reichstag, Walter Funk, to the post of Director in the Ministry and Director of the Press Office in place of the retired Director in the Ministry, Marcks.

The Reich Cabinet took note of this. There were no objections against his proposal.

The Reich Chancellor then opened a discussion about the political situation.

Reich Minister Goering stated that he had contacted the Center Party. The Center Party felt offended because they had not been informed about the development of the situation. As he had been informed Reich Chancellor von Papen had not contacted the representatives of the Center Party. He, Reich Minister Goering, was under the impression that the Center Party expected certain concessions from the present Reich Cabinet.

The Reich Minister for Economy and Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture stated that it would be wise to avoid any brusque actions toward the Center Party. However, the representation of the Center Party in the Reich Cabinet was to be avoided since, in his opinion, it would endanger the unity of decisions of that body.

The Reich Chancellor pointed out that adjournment of the Reichstag would be impossible without the collaboration of the Center Party. One might, however, consider suppressing the Communist Party to eliminate its votes in the Reichstag and by this measure achieve a majority in the Reichstag. Based on his experiences, however, such suppressions of parties were of no avail. He was afraid that heavy political fights and possibly a general strike might be the result of this contemplated suppression of the Communist Party of Germany. Surely the economy of the count needed settled conditions. If, however, one discussed the question of the greater danger for the national economy, the uncertainty and unrest connected with new elections or a general strike, then one had to arrive at the conclusion that a general strike would be far more dangerous for the national economy.

It appeared flatly impossible to suppress the 6,000,000 people who stood behind the Communist Party of Germany. It might be possible, however, to achieve a majority for the new Reich Cabinet after dissolving the Reichstag and the new elections which had to fall soon. The best thing, however, would be if the Reichstag should adjourn itself voluntarily.

The Reich Minister for Economy and the Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture explained that he certainly has no longing for a general strike. In his opinion, however, it was impossible to avoid the suppression of the Communist Party of Germany. If that were not done one could not achieve a majority in the Reichstag, certainly not a majority of two-thirds.

After the suppression of the KPD the passage of an enabling law through the Reichstag would be possible. He doubted that there would be a general strike after the suppression of the KPD. He preferred the suppression of the KPD to new elections.

Reich Minister Goering stated that the Communists had planned a demonstration for this evening (30 January), which he had prohibited. On the basis of his investigations the KPD would not be prepared for a general strike at the present. The social democrats were pressing for a discussion in Reichstag.

In his opinion it would be best to dissolve the Reichstag as soon as possible and to hold new elections. The Reich Chancellor had given his word that the present constellation of the Reich Cabinet would not be altered even after new elections.

The Reich Chancellor confirmed the correctness of this statement.

The Reich Minister for Labor declared that there was great joy in the ranks of the Steel Helmet [Stahlhelm] about the forming of the present Reich Cabinet. There was no more friction between the Steel Helmet and the SA.

In his opinion it would not be wise to let the first act of the present Reich Cabinet consist in the suppression of the KPD which might result in a general strike.

The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Commissar for Prussia pointed out that the German nation needed a rest. In his opinion it would be best initially to request an Enabling Law from the Reichstag. If such a law would not be passed the situation could be tackled anew. The Reich Chancellor declared that the general strike was not to be taken lightly. To suppress a possible general strike the Reichswehr should not be committed, if possible.

The Reich Minister for Defense thanked the Reich Chancellor for this attitude and emphasized that the soldier is only used to thinking of his opponent as an enemy from outside.

The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs discussed the question of whether a suppression of the KPD with the possible consequence of a general strike were to be preferred to new elections for the Reichstag under foreign political consideration. He came to the conclusion that a suppression of the KPD with the possible consequence of a general strike would be, by far, the more serious outlook.

The Reich Minister for Finance pointed out that the financial status of the Reich, the States, and the Counties could only be adjusted through a slow improvement of the economic situation. He regarded the suppression of the KPD as a last political means. State Secretary Dr. Meissner proposed for the discussion whether an Enabling Law was to be proposed which would contain provisions for measures to be taken by the Reich Cabinet in the interest of combating unemployment. Such an Enabling Law would only require a simple majority in the Reichstag.

Reich Commissar Dr. Gereke stated that the Center Party would not tolerate the Cabinet. Speedy new elections to the Reichstag would become necessary. The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Commissar for the State of Prussia suggested that the Reich Chancellor, in an interview, would state at the earliest opportunity that the rumors about the danger of inflation and the rumors about the danger of the rights of civil servants are untrue. The Reich Chancellor agreed to this. He further informed the meeting that he would contact representatives of the Center Party in the morning of 31 January.

A new meeting of the Ministers is to take place on 31 January at 4:00 p.m.

The Reich Cabinet took note of this.

Signed: Wienstein 31.1.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 352-PS

Copy

THE REICH MINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE REICH CHANCELLERY

Rk. 8008D Berlin, 14 June 1942 Fuehrer's Headquarters

To the Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration [General bevollmaechtigter die Reichs Norwaltung]

Subject: The Jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers for the Defense of the Reich [Ministerats fuer die Reichsverteidigung]

Your letter of 3 June 1942—CBV Nr. 493/42/2882—. Recently the Fuehrer announced in accord with the opinions of the Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich as shown in my letter of 20 Feb. 1940-RK. 624B- that he believes it practical to reserve certain legislative missions for the Reich Cabinet. With this he has not limited the competency of the Council of Ministers for the defense of the Reich but given a directive as to how legislation should be handled under the point of view of practicability. I have no doubt that the Fuehrer, as well as the Reich Marshal, have not changed their point of view, in particular regarding the fact that at the present there should be only legislation important in the cause of war, and that they will stress the fact that the Fuehrer himself and the Reich Cabinet should not be eliminated from the powers of legislation. It will have to be tested from time to time what measures will be reserved for the Reich Cabinet. My letter of 20 February 1940, and the opinions of the Fuehrer therein expressed may serve as a directive even if the limitations indicated by me are no longer applicable in their full meaning. I would therefore suggest not basing the discussions with the Reich Minister of Finance on the question of competency of the Reich Cabinet or the Council of Ministers for the defense of the Reich, but on the question of whether it would be practical to achieve settlement through either Reich law or a Decree from the Council of Ministers for the defense of the Reich in the sense of the opinions voiced by the Fuehrer.

Signed: Dr. Lammers

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 374-PS

Berlin Nr 234404 9.11.2355

To all state police offices and state police administrative offices. —To director or his deputy.

This teletype message is to be transmitted immediately in the most rapid way.

1. Actions against the Jews and in particular against their synagogues will occur in a short time, in all of Germany. They are not to be hindered. However, it is to be made certain, in agreement with the ordinary police, that plundering and similar law breaking will be held to a minimum.

2. Insofar as important archive material is present in the synagogues, it is to be secured by immediate measures.

3. The seizure of some 20 to 30 thousand Jews in the Reich is to be prepared. Wealthy Jews above all are to be chosen. More detailed directives will appear in the course of this night.

4. If, in the course of this action, Jews are found in possession of arms then the sharpest measures are to be employed. Special troops of the SS as well as the general SS can be drawn into the total action. In any case the direction of the actions through the State police is to be assured by proper measures.

Addenda for State Police Cologne:

In the synagogue of Cologne there is especially important material. This is to be made safe, immediately, by the quickest measures in agreement with the Security Services.

Gestapo I Mueller

This teletype is secret

SECRET

Blitz Munich 47767 10,11.38 0120 To all State police administrative offices and State police offices. To all Security Service O.A. and W.S. Subject: Tonight's measures against Jews.

On the basis of the attack upon Legation Secretary v. Rath in Paris demonstrations against the Jews are to be expected in the entire Reich tonight 9 to 10 November 38. The following orders are issued for the treatment of these incidents.

1. The directors of the administrative offices of the State police or their deputies have to take up, by long-distance phone, negotiations with the proper political directorates of their regions —Gauleitung or Kreisleitung—immediately upon the receipt of this telegram and to unify a discussion of the carrying out of the demonstrations to which the proper inspector or commander of the regular police is to be drawn. In this conference the political direction is to be informed that the German police has received from the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the Police the following orders to which the measures of the political directorate should comply.

2. Only such measures are to be taken, which do not entail a danger to German life and property (for example: burning of synagogues only if no fire hazard is present in the neighborhood).

3. As soon as the course of events tonight permits the use of the appointed officials for this purpose, as many Jews are to be seized, especially wealthy ones, in all regions as can be accommodated in the prisons at hand. Moreover, only healthy, male Jews of not too great an age are to be seized. After carrying out the seizure, negotiations are to be taken up at once with the proper concentration camps for the quickest accommodation of the Jews.

Signed: HEYDRICH SS Gruppenfuehrer

Police radio service—Radio Hannover Urgent—Secret SSD Berlin 133 10; 11 2110 To all political authorities

As soon as notices of the ending of the action arrive from the Gau administration take action that destroyed shops are so shut up with boards, etc., that the destruction is as little visible as possible. Have owners directed in certain cases to work under police orders to carry this out. Have the ruins of synagogues, etc., removed as quickly as possible.

Chief of the regular police Special command staff of the High Command g. a. Nr 224/38

Appendix

National Socialist German Workers Party

Gau Coblenz—Trier

Coblenz June 7, 1933 Propaganda Department To all Kreis directorates Subject: List M. 18, Jew baiting Nr 2

You will receive in the next few days a list of the communities of your districts in which you will find the Jewish firms and businesses of your district. You will immediately check in your whole district whether the addresses given are correct or whether some have been forgotten. The highest importance is to be placed on accuracy since the list is to be printed.

Subject: Jew baiting

The district directorate will set up a committee which has the task of directing and supervising the communities in the whole district. The strength of this committee will be determined by the district directed. You are to inform the Gau-propaganda directorate at once of the committees named. The Gau propaganda directorate will then set itself in coordinating with these committees through you.

Present tasks of the committees.

The committee will form in all the local groups and support localities such committees whose names shall be known only to the district committee. The members of the sub-committees shall report to the district committee the names of those Party members and other Germans who buy from Jews. The district committee will publish articles whose content is such that it will point out to the miscreant members of the nation the shamefulness of their deed, and will make them aware of the shame to which they would be subjected if they were proceeded against publicly. This article must be arranged so that only the addresses of those involved, the business and the time in which he made the purchase will be given. The article should bear no signature and will be posted on various posting spots. Further the committees have to secure female clerks from Jewish stores, who can then very easily name those who purchase in Jewish shops. This demands some caution and has to be done with the greatest secrecy. The names of these clerks shall in no case be mentioned. Negotiations are to be undertaken with the association for the employed middle class so that it will prepare the means for this action and will assume the responsibility of finding a new job in another shop of equal importance in case the clerk loses her job. Her name must not be given, only the number.

The district directorate will point out in all gatherings of members or in all public gatherings that the Jew in all countries is again carrying on a low attack which is greatly harmful to Germany. It must be made clear to the masses that no German may buy from a Jew. It is also to be demanded of the Party membership that it constantly bring this to the attention of its friends and acquaintances. The Party membership must go so far in the interest of the nation that it cease friendship with best acquaintances if the latter continue to purchase from Jews. It must go so far that no German will speak to a Jew if it is not absolutely necessary, and this must be particularly pointed out.

German girls who go with Jews are to be made cognizant of the shamefulness of their actions. A member of our party must, in no way, have anything to do with such a person.

Heil Hitler Signed: Bang Gau-Propagandaleiter

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 375-PS

TOP SECRET

Berlin, 25 August 1938 General Staff of the 5th Section (German Air Force) (Genstb. 5. Abteilung) No. 28/38. TOP SECRET (G-2) For Commanders only [CHEF-SACHE] THROUGH OFFICER COURIER ONLY

Subject: Extended Case Green [GRUEN—code for Czechoslovakia.] Estimate of the Situation with Special Consideration of the Enemy.

A. Initial Political Situation:

1. The basic assumption is that France will declare war during the Case Green.

It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured.

2. The Soviet Union will probably side immediately with the Western Powers.

3. It is not expected for the moment that other states will intervene against Germany.

The Dutch-Belgian area assumes in this connection much more importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe than during the World War. This mainly as an advanced base for the air war.

4. The United States of America will immediately support the fight of the Western Powers with strong ideological and economic means.

5. Italy, Nationalistic-Spain, Hungary and Japan are regarded as benevolent neutrals.

B. Initial Military Situation:

1. The French-Czechoslovakian treaty provides for military assistance only in the case of an unprovoked attack. At least an agreement of the French and British views as to the legal aspect has to be achieved. If only for political reasons we have to consider the 2nd day as the earliest possible day of war on a European scale. In cast of a 24 hour ultimatum it would be the 3rd day.

2. It is further assumed that the actual commencement of hostilities will only take place after the French armed forces have been tactically deployed. That means within the fourth to eighteenth day. This to

a. use the deployment as a means of political pressure,

b. and to be able to deploy the troops undisturbed.

3. The war aim of the Entente Powers is to be considered as the overcoming of Germany through attacking its war economy. With other words through a long war.

4. The following are possible methods of operation for the French army:

a. to man and hold the Maginot-line,

b. to march into Belgium and the Netherlands at the beginning of the war with the aim of occupying the Ruhr-territory.

All suppositions support the first alternative.

5. The French Air Force will probably attack both economic and German Air Force targets as well as military and communication objectives. Thus no concentrated effect will be achieved at any one place.

6. The French Navy will probably cooperate through operations with the British sea power to supplant the North Sea blockade. The aim will be the maintenance of naval predominance in the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean.

7. The British Air Force is assumed to be committed from English bases against the Rhine-Westphalia industrial area and the North Sea ports. Sooner or later the Belgium-Dutch neutrality will be violated.

A camouflaged aircraft reporting network in Belgium and the Netherlands has to be taken into account from the first day of the war. No transfer to France on the part of the British Air Force need be expected at the beginning of the war. Equally it is held to be out of the question for any large parts of the British armed forces to be transferred to France.

8. Provision seems to have been made for the use of North French ground organizations during the course of the war at least by part of the attacking British Air Forces.

The existence of a relatively large number of civilian airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands seem to indicate the intention of moving advanced elements of the air defenses of London (light fighters and reconnaissance aircraft) into this area after a while.

9. Thanks to the expected neutrality of Poland, the active participation of Soviet Russia will be largely restricted to the prosecution of the war in the Baltic.

Furthermore, air attacks against East Prussia and the Baltic coast are to be anticipated and occasional raids on Berlin are regarded as possible.

10. The basic assumption in respect to our own prosecution of the war is that two war plane air forces will be available in the West at the beginning of hostilities. There will be five war plane air forces in all after three to four weeks. The aim will be to bring about a decision by the defeat of the Western powers.

C. Task of the German Air Force:

The German Air Force has at present not all the forces necessary to seek a decision by attacking the enemy's war economy with the aid of the navy. The prime responsibility of the German Air Force in the present situation must be to help the armed forces immobilized opposite a fortified front to achieve operational freedom.

D. Enemy War Plane Forces:

1. The French Air Force will have on the 1st October some 640 war planes in the front line units on French home territory of which not more than 120 to 150 attain a modern standard of performance. Available reserves total about 320 obsolete war planes.

There are another 150 obsolete war planes in North Africa for use in colonial war or against Southern Italy.

It is assumed that the French home war plane units will be deployed for the most part in the known areas of Eastern France at the beginning of the war. They will be employed against various targets (air force targets, industrial and communications targets, military installations, Army targets) in the operational area as well as in depth according to the capabilities of their personnel and equipment.

Any transfer of more than insignificant forces to Czechoslovakia is regarded as outside the range of practical possibilities, as is the concentrated commitment of large formations against the armies fighting in Czechoslovakia.

2. The British war plane force will consist of some 850 war planes on October 1st of which 300 to 350 can be regarded as modern. The majority of the front line aircraft as well as some 200 to 300 reserve aircraft can be described as only conditionally serviceable in the face of modern defences.

Due to their inadequate range the present British war plane formations are not in a position to carry on a vigorous air war from their home bases only without violating sovereign Dutch or Belgian territory.

Even if Dutch and Belgian neutrality is ignored only the modern war planes need to be taken into account as a serious threat to the Ruhr.

A transfer of British Air Forces to Northern France is to be expected at the earliest, after several weeks of war.

If the French Army Command decides to march through Belgium and the Netherlands the immediate influx of British fighters into this area becomes probable.

Heavy attacks against the North Sea ports by carrier based aircraft need not be reckoned with:

a. because the equipment and training of these aircraft is designed to fit them for specific naval tasks;

b. because aircraft carriers, due to their vulnerability, will be committed in the North Sea only for very pressing reasons, which do not exist in this instance.

On the other hand occasional attacks by coastal aircraft forces against targets on the North Sea coast are feasible and probable.

E. Enemy Aircraft Industries:

1. The first aircraft put into mass production as a result of the expansion of French military aircraft industry during the years 1934 to 1938 are at present rolling off the assembly lines. At the moment the aero-engine factories are lagging behind with deliveries.

In August 1938 forty single-engined and thirty twin-engined military aircraft were delivered to the French Air Forces. It must be assumed that these figures will be increased during the coming months to 100 aircraft a month, 50 single-engined and 50 twin-engined.

A further moderate increase in production is possible and to be expected from spring 1939 on.

2. In Great Britain existing plants have been extended since 1936 with the aid of State funds and the effect on the armament situation will begin to make itself felt increasingly from 1939 on. If the present plans will be observed the program will be completely carried out by 1941.

Present production (August 1938) is estimated at some 200 aircraft of all types (commercial and military aircraft) a month. It must be noted that the import of training aircraft and long-range reconnaissance aircraft from the United States and Canada is intended.

3. North American aircraft industry (United States and Canada) is at the moment fully occupied. No notable expansion has yet taken place but is possible. A possible expansion would have no practical effects in 1939.

250 aircraft of all types (commercial and military) a month for the home and foreign market may be stated as the present production rate. Appreciably more aircraft engines are manufactured.

F. Position with regard to preparation of target data:

1. It is proposed to supply units on or before 5th October with the following target data for France:

a. Air Force (airfields, air parks and equipment depots, air force fuel dumps). About 90% of existing installations are included.

b. Fuel Supply.

100% of the refineries are included and 60% of the total storage capacity (including the above-mentioned Air Force fuel dumps).

c. Ammunition Supply.

An estimated 70% to 80% of the total productive capacity of explosive and gunpowder factories and 17 large supply dumps (main ammunition depots and ammunition depots, Army and Air Force) are included.

d. Power Supply.

All the large power plants are included.

e. Key Industries.

In particular the Paris aero-engine industry has been included.

f. Targets in the Paris area.

Further target data, particularly for essential industrial targets, are accumulating currently.

In addition, command authorities will receive maps of the tactical situation and of target groups on or before the above-mentioned date.

2. Basic target maps of British ground organization (airfields) are approximately 90% ready. They have been passed on to Air Force Group 2 for printing and for the adding of sectional excerpts of maps. They have been ordered to be ready by 15 September.

As far as essential industrial targets are concerned, work has been carried out on the food and crude oil supply systems and docks in the London and Hull areas (basic target maps, sector maps, partially covered also by aerial and ground panoramas).

These will be reproduced after the ground organization targets have been printed. They cannot be expected to be ready before 20 October.

Tactical maps and target maps of London and Hull will be issued to the command authorities prior to the end of September.

3. The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for Belgium and the Netherlands are ready for printing. Reproduction and distribution (including sector maps) will probably be possible only during October.

4. In general it must be emphasized that, unlike Czechoslovakia, there are relatively very few aerial photographs of Western European targets available.

G. Recommendations for our own Prosecution of the Air War.

1. A negative answer must be given to the question as to whether it is appropriate to postpone the massed commitment of our striking power until the spring. The balance of force would probably have altered by that time to our disadvantage due to further progress of French and British aircraft industry and imports from North America.

2. From a climatological point of view the autumn offers our forces greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our relatively good training in instrument flying.

3. As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept the figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled by concentrated blows directed against the enemy's weakest points.

For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the greatest care and must be restricted to the decisive points.

4. As long as only 2 air forces are available prosecution of the war on the basis of gaining time is advisable. This is seen in attacks against the enemy air forces in the airfields where they are deployed in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete aerial predominance by the enemy.

Attacks on Paris should only be carried out as a reprisal, especially as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. Such attacks must however be possible at all times.

Direct cooperation with the Army is only considered desirable if the enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger the Western German fortifications by a break through or out-flanking.

Support for the Army will be supplied in this case by attacks:

a. against transports, troop concentrations and movements,

b. against enemy war planes, should these cooperate with his armed forces in great numbers.

Should there be danger of a penetration of the Western fortifications, a further measure would be to concentrate fighter forces scattered in the West on the decisive ground front.

Attacks against objectives in the British Isles are to be regarded as unjustifiable in view of the small numbers of our combat forces.

Should the enemy remain on the defensive in the ground war and withdraw with his war plane forces to the West there will be no urgent reason for us to commit our own forces. In this case it would seem better to save our forces until reinforcements arrive.

5. As soon as strong forces are freed for the prosecution of the war in the West, operations in the air must be directed without delay at reaching a decision.

It would seem possible to achieve this end by attacking:

a. fuel refineries and dumps;

b. gunpowder and high explosive factories, main ammunition depots and ammunition depots;

c. the most important parks handling imports which are also centers for the transfer and reshipment of fuel and ammunition.

Thus the enemy's fuel and ammunition supply system for his ground and air forces would be paralyzed or at least curtailed to an intolerable degree.

Assuming that the individual groups of targets are one after the other successively attacked until eliminated it would appear that by the use of 5 air forces a sufficient measure of success could be achieved to enable the Army to break through the enemy's fortified front.

No large-scale operations against targets in the British Isles could be carried out in addition to this task.

Everything should however be prepared to make reprisal attacks against London possible at any time.

Considering the strength of the air defences in and around London success in such attacks is only likely if strong forces are committed.

In addition occasional harassing attacks against targets in South and Southeast England may be worthy of consideration, particularly if the weather enforces a lull in France. A secondary aim of such attacks would be to pin down strong defence forces in Great Britain.

6. Should still stronger war plane forces—at least 3 air forces—be available after the French targets had been successfully attacked, they might be committed to advantage in attacks against the food supply of Great Britain, notably of London. It must however be emphasized that it is only regarded as possible to achieve decisive successes if considerably stronger forces are committed and if the western ports are also subjected to air attacks.

H. Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy:

1. The use of the Condor Legion against the refineries in Bordeaux and possibly against those in Marseilles would valuably supplement our attacks of the French fuel supply system.

2. The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious for the enemy as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces should accompany the air attacks against the ammunition supplies with synchronized offensive thrusts. Special attention should be directed towards the ammunition supplies stored in the Maginot Line itself and accessible to air attack.

3. The Navy should hamper imports through the French Atlantic ports to as great an extent as is compatible with its other tasks and the forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at the beginning of the attack against the fuel supply of France.

4. Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take. In this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain.

Signed: For: WOLTER 1 inclosure Distribution: Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff General Staff/5th Section (Draft) 1. copy with 1 inclosure 2. copy with 1 inclosure

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 376-PS

SECRET

FUEHRER'S H.Q. 29/10/40 Major (General Staff) Freiherr von Falkenstein [Addressed to an unspecified General] "Chefsache"

In order to supplement today's telephone conversation of 10:00 A.M. I take the liberty of submitting to you a brief resume of the military questions current here for your personal information before I go on leave. Major Queisner, my deputy, is informed of the questions touched on here and can supply further information if necessary.

The exception is Gibraltar, General Warlimont having requested that all inquiries be made to him, as this territory is regarded as a particularly ticklish business.

1. At the moment no intervention in Greece is intended. Nor for the moment is anything to be undertaken with regard to Crete.

2. The question of beginning preparation in Libya in conjunction with Italy is to be examined in the light of a report by General Ritter von Thoma, which will be received during the next few days.

In the light of this report a proposal is to be submitted to the Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel with regard to strength required, date of offensive, etc. Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal Badoglio will then meet in mid-November and will settle details. Large-scale preparations should not be expected before then.

The Quartermaster-General (Colonel Langemeyer) has been informed by us of the necessity for timely disposal of special war material, equipment and clothing.

3. No orders respecting Case East [Fall Ost] have been given and no orders are to be expected at the moment.

At the moment the Russian action against Rumania is dismissed as a trifling matter.

Transports to Rumania are proceeding according to plan as ordered by the Fuehrer and are not to be speeded up.

4. No activity should be expected at present on the part of Spain. The conversation between the Fuehrer and Franco therefore covered only economic collaboration and long-term developments.

The Gibraltar affair should not however be lost to mind though it will have to be treated with extreme care.

The Army will shortly send a small reconnaissance staff [Erkundungsstab] to Spain where it will cooperate with Admiral Canaris: this has been authorized by the Fuehrer. The GAF will request permission to participate on its own account.

There will be further orders from the Armed Forces Supreme Command; the details requested in tele-printer message 00 926/40 are required for this purpose.

5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:—

a. No other operational commitment,

b. Portuguese neutrality,

c. Support of France and Spain.

A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF.

Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from Ic Kurferst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the information he desires.

6. C. in C. Armed Forces Norway has expressed fears that as a result of the Order: Armed Forces Supreme Command, Armed Forces Operations Staff/Abteilung L. No. 35 331/40 top secret and Chefsache dated 22/10/40 greater activity on the part of the British will develop against Norway, and has requested naval and air force reinforcements. The question of moving Stuka Staffeln was touched upon. I expressed my opinion that Stuka units had at present to prepare for other tasks, but would however request that the matter be further examined.

7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, especially in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft industry are being published in the German press. The matter has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. I pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own merits.

[Signed] Falkenstein.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 382-PS

WRITTEN STATEMENT BY KORVETTENKAPITAN MOEHLE DATED 19th JULY, 1945

A. Order of September, 1942

In September 1942 (I can no longer recollect the exact date), the following W/T message was given to all U-boats and operational flotillas by the Commander in Chief U-boats in officers' cypher, i.e. Top Secret:—

1. "All rescue measures such as righting of capsized life-boats, going alongside, provisioning, towing to land, etc., are absolutely forbidden and must cease.

2. Previous orders concerning the rescue and taking prisoner of masters and chief engineers remain in force since their interrogation is of the highest importance to the High Command. Boats should rescue as many as they can carry.

3. All rescue measures contradict the most primitive demands of warfare that ships and crews should be destroyed.

4. You must be hard and remember that the enemy in his bombing attacks on German towns has no consideration for women and children."

This W/T message was without any doubt sent out at the instigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e. Grand Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in which the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider it quite impossible that an order of such importance could have been given without his knowledge.

I do not know whether the order was given with the concurrence or at the instigation of the Supreme Command, i.e. the Fuehrer's headquarters, or at the instigation of the Fuehrer himself after one of his many conferences with Grand Admiral Doenitz.

As Senior Officer of the 5th U-boat Flotilla, it was my duty to pass on these instructions of Commander in Chief U-boats to Commanding Officers of U-boats which were leaving on their war patrols.

So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and in particular for those who know the manner in which Commander in Chief U-boats is wont to give his orders, that the High Command regard it as desirable that not only ships but also their crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that they should be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was continually stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant ships and the consequent difficulties. I too understood this order in that way.

Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise the order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different words. It would then only have stated that for reasons of security rescue measures were to cease and this order would have been passed as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps even the intention that this order could be interpreted in two ways and the reason may be that in the first place, it contravenes international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in commanding officers.

It was very difficult for me as senior officer of the Flotilla to ask for clarification of this order from the Commander in Chief U-boats since while I was senior officer (15.6.41-5.5.45) I could only, owing to lack of time, visit the Commander in Chief U-boats four or five times. I could not discuss this order with officers on my staff as all messages in officers' cypher might only be received by me. I was moreover of the opinion that commanding officers who were uncertain as to the meaning of this particular point always had the opportunity (an opportunity which they often took on other points) to obtain a clear understanding of this point when they went for their instructions to the staff of Commander in Chief U-boats itself; these instructions by the staff of the Commander in Chief U-boats were for the great part given by very young officers with much more recent operational experience than I had—the officers on Commander in Chief U-boats' staff changed frequently. Generally speaking, with very few exceptions, commanding officers received their instruction from the staff of Commander in Chief U-boats after I myself had given them their instructions. Commanding officers were generally speaking in much closer personal contact with these young staff officers than they were with myself as senior officer of a purely transit flotilla. There were many commanding officers whom I only saw and got to know for a few days in Kiel while they were fitting their boats out for operations.

Having given considerable thought to the whole of this matter I now remember that during one of my visits to Commander in Chief U-boats' staff in the winter of 1942/3 or the summer '43, one of the staff officers, Korvettenkapitaen Hessler or perhaps more likely Korvettenkapitaen Kuppisch, with whom because of very close ties of friendship I used to converse intimately as long as he was Commander in Chief U-boats' staff, told me of the following occurrence (whether I broached the subject or how the matter came up I can no longer remember).

A type VII boat (500-tonner) reported in her war log that when outward bound from a base in France, she met far out in the Bay of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to take them on board owing to shortage of room (she had a complement of 54 and carried full provisions for 14 weeks). The boat therefore proceeded without taking any notice of the survivors.

This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the Commander in Chief U-boats' staff. It was stated that she would have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was highly probable that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a German U-boat.

This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief U-boats clear to me.

As concerns making the order known to commanding officers: the order was always passed on during a commanding officers' conference while their boats were having their final overhaul or while they were being fitted out in Kiel for operational patrols; during these conferences I passed on to commanding officers once again all important orders about the equipping of their boats, procedure on departure, in home waters and while in convoy to Norway. Operational orders were not given by the flotilla; they were always given by the Commander in Chief U-boats himself or by Captain U-boats West on his behalf.

I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with more or less the following words:—"I have now to inform you of a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It is a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in September 1942 gave the following order in an 'officers only' signal ( ... the exact words of the order were then read out)."

Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any further discussion on this point.

Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to answer somewhat as follows:—

"I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave this order, by reference to the following event": I then mentioned the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay together with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by Commander in Chief U-boats' staff. I then went on to say, "Gentlemen, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with own consciences. The safety of your own boat must always remain your prime consideration."

Since the introduction of total underwater war ("Schnorchel"), I have in this connection in various ways further stated that commanding officers were in a much easier position in this respect since they had no occasion to surface and that the order was therefore illusory for them. They had to keep clear of everything which was not worth the firing of a torpedo.

I also remember that many commanding officers after the order of September 1942 had been read said, "That is quite clear and unequivocal however hard it may be". Had this order been given to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger my own boat by acting in this way, (i.e., by shooting at life-boats).

If therefore U-boat commanding officers state that they had received from me the order to destroy life-boats, this does not correspond with the facts, but they received from me quite insufficiently clearly expressed instructions from the High Command together with my personal views thereon.

Before the order of September 1942 was issued I never discussed this difficult question at a commanding officers' conference and the subject of conduct towards survivors was never broached.

B. Conduct Towards Neutral and Hospital Ships

On this matter, which I treated together with what has gone before, I gave commanding officers the following directions:

There was an express order of the High Command, and Commander in Chief U-boats was adamant on this point and would relentlessly pursue the breach of it by court martial (i.e., he insisted on the order being strictly obeyed), that no neutral or Red Cross ship might be molested even if the enemy misused neutral flags or the Red Cross.

The political results of sinking a neutral were much more serious than would have been the usefulness of the tonnage sunk.

I told commanding officers for their guidance in doubtful cases—in bad visibility, when neutral markings were not distinct, etc.—that it was better to allow five enemy vessels to go free than to sink one neutral.

So far as concerns the stopping and examination of neutrals, an order was made in January 1944 that in particular Spanish and Portuguese steamers in the North and Central Atlantic were to be stopped and examined for contraband and members of enemy nations of military age. I told commanding officers "Don't touch them. Stay underwater. You are endangering yourselves too much by that because you will certainly be reported by wireless and we know from experience that when such examinations are made watchfulness is liable to suffer. You are only exposing yourself to the danger of being surprised. If a ship carries neutral markings let it go by unscathed."

Objection was often made that German hospital ships had often been destroyed by the enemy, as German propaganda had stressed for years. My answer was: That does not matter, however unpleasant it may be. The order of the High Command is decisive and binding. Politics come before warfare.

C. Rendering of Reports

There was an order—I do not remember whether it was in the form of a written or verbal instruction—that no events during a war patrol which contravened established international agreements should be entered in the war log. I believe that the reason for this order was that eight copies were made of war logs and were available to many authorities; there was always the danger therefore that events of this nature would become known and it was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of propaganda that this should be so.

Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for when commanding officers made their personal reports; these were invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief U-boats or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats.

I also gave the commanding officers instructions on this point.

To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 1942 appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had however to carry out the command to pass on this order to commanding officers for their instruction.

During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that he was therefore unable to carry it out.

An order of this nature was never given by me, i.e. on my own initiative, and could not be given by me since, had I exceeded my authority in so serious a way, I would immediately and without question have been relieved.

[signed] MOEHLE Korvettenkapitaen

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 386-PS

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937 NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei on 5 Nov 37 from 1615-2030 hours

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor

The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG

The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH

The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h. c. RAEDER

The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING

The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH

Oberst HOSSBACH

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today's conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4-1/2 years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuehrer then stated:

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation, and its propagation. This is, consequently, a problem of space.

The German nation is composed of 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand, it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation [Volkstum] at its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in Austria and Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in Germany itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1-3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows:

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained:

1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats—possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30-40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand for an increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increase in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, the economic need will also drive Germany to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by Britain, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in Geneva and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favorable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times—Roman Empire, British Empire—has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe.

England is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance on England's part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. Angola. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient Rome.

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could England alone, for example, defend Canada against an attack by America or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by Japan.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect.

a. Ireland's tendency for independence.

b. Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilize the nonfulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon against Britain.

c. The weakening of the British position in the Far East by Japan.

d. The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which—by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius—expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abyssinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is endeavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Mohammedan world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favorable than that of England. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political considerations as power factors:

Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for Silesia, and Bismarck's wars against Austria and France had been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943-45. After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943-1945 no one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia has come.

Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czechoslovakia if France should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would declare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either towards the North or the West.

Once Czechoslovakia is conquered—and a mutual frontier, Germany-Hungary is obtained—then a neutral attitude by Poland in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as Germany's strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have any setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the behavior of France, Poland and Russia would probably have to be judged in the following manner:

The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability England and perhaps also France have already silently written off Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of England in a war against Germany. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on France's attitude. An attack by France without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear.

Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken into consideration at all in view of Japan's attitude.

Should Case 2 occur—paralyzation of France by a Civil War—then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuehrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (i.e. Franco's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya against North African French colonial possessions.

As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England—being at war with Italy—would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique favorable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightning" [blitzartig schnell].

Feldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications—which was pointed out particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg—the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von Blomberg draws special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuehrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fuehrer appeared to assume, the Fuehrer stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to statements by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuehrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(Signed) HOSSBACH

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS

APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY

[pencil note]

S.O. Only

"FALL GRUEN"

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

[ITEM 1] [Handwritten notes] * * * of the Fuehrer: [semi-illegible]

1. Does Mussolini regard his work as completed or not.

a. if so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia, West; then wait and see. "Return with the bag empty."

b. if not, then the "Empire" of Africa. Impossible without German help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. "Return with Czechoslovakia in the bag."

2. Mussolini, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Germany's military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of his aims with that.

3. Against France and England problem of Czechoslovakia can be settled only if still allied with Italy. France and England will not intervene. (Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping period.)

4. Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806)

5. State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor:

a. Deliveries of ores: France—600,000 tons; Germany—2 million tons.

b. Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launchings not for 2 years.

c. Out of date air force equipment.

6. No general staff conferences of the various branches of the Armed Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. Only through Supreme Command. Very important that actual intentions be kept secret.

7. Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for constituted units, but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. Range of guns.

8. Replacement of officers doubtful.

Schm [Major Schmundt's writing and initialled by him]

[ITEM 2] [Typed notes] S.O. Only Berlin, 22 April 1938

BASES OF THE DISSERTATION ON "GRUEN"

Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 21 April:

A. Political Aspect

1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As result would be: hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of the last opponent on the mainland.

2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually come to a crisis and lead to war.

3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti-German demonstration).

B. Military Conclusions

1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibilities 2 and 3. Case 2 is the undesired one since "Gruen" will have taken security measures.

2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the divisions by rail—which is unavoidable but should be cut down as far as possible—must not impede a lightning-swift blow at the time of the action.

3. "Separate thrusts" are to be carried out immediately with a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of targets, composition of the columns according to their individual tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force.

The Air Force is to support the individual columns, (e.g. dive-bombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hampering the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communications traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.)

4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the decisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a European crisis will certainly arise. Accomplished facts must prove the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize "Gruen".

Therefore: bridging the time gap between first penetration and employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pilsen, Prague],

5. If possible, separation of transport movement "Rot" from "Gruen". A simultaneous strategic concentration "Rot" can lead "Rot" to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be possible to put "Fall Rot" into operation at any time.

C. Propaganda

1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia (Gruenland).

2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs (Gruenen).

Schm [initialled by Schmundt] Written by an officer [The following are handwritten notes] 22 April

A. POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES

1. Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents.

2. Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation of the situation.

3. Action as the result of an incident. (example)

B. MILITARY NECESSITIES

Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 "security measures" will be taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into.

1. Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in a direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications must be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, roads reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by Luftwaffe, cooperation with Luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, cutting of communications.

2. "Dead Space" in first 4 days prior to actual operation must be avoided under all circumstances. Must be bridged through motorized army. Penetrating via Pilsen. Hamper mobilization.

3. Separation of transport movement "Rot" and "Gruen",

a. in order not to aggravate "Rot",

b. but also so as not to arrive late, if necessary.

Basic Principle: Create Accomplished Facts so that

a. help comes too late—other powers do not intervene

b. Allies take part (like wolves also want something out of it)

c. State collapse from within.

Propaganda: Directions to Germans. Threats to others.

Submit:

1. Fortifications (strength in detail)

2. Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht.

[ITEM 3] [Four Telegrams]

MOS 1 16/5 0925— Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ZEITZLER Most Secret—1. Which divisions on the "Gruen" frontiers ready to march within 12 hours, in the case of mobilization? 2. What is the final day of mobilization?

SCHMUNDT MOS 1 1930 MELDAU MBZ

[the same also in Schmundt's handwriting]

MOS No. 2 1115— MBZ 02 16/5 1114— Major Schmundt, Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer— Most Secret to Question 1, 12 of them—in garrisons to Question 2, Third day—Please state time of receipt. Teleprint left my room at 1110—NN. ZEITZLER Oberstleutnant on the General Staff

MOS 03 16/5 1155 OKW for Oberstleutnant Zeitzler—Most Secret 1. Teleprint received 1115 2. Please send the numbers of the divisions. Schmundt 1159 MOS 03 Wagner (?) [the same also in Schmundt's handwriting]

MBZ 04 16/5 1302—

Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer—

Most Secret to message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 28, 8, armored and mountain.

Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff.

[ITEM 4] [Telegram] MBZ 05 17/5 1505

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT, ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO THE FUEHRER—MOST SECRET

IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATIONS:

FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CONSTRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILOMETER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE POTENTIALITIES: STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST CALIBRES.

ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL STAFF

[ITEM 5] [Covering letter, with draft for Gruen attached] MOST SECRET Berlin, 20 May 1938 Tirpitzufer 72.76 Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces L Ia No. 38/38 S.O. Only S.O. Only access only through Officer Schm [initialled by Schmundt] My Fuehrer!

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself intend to make.

For the meantime, however, it is necessary that the "Gruen" section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly-suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff.

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed.

Heil, my Fuehrer [signed] Keitel

L Ia to No. 38/38 S.O. Only written by an officer MOST SECRET S.O. Only access only through officer Berlin, 20 May 1938 DRAFT for THE NEW DIRECTIVE "GRUEN" 3 Copies 1st Copy (Provisional)-[pencil note]

1. Political Prerequisites: It is not my intention to smash Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through military action. Therefore inevitable political developments within Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one which may never come again.

2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action: An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without sufficient political justification cannot be considered with reference to the possible consequences of such an action in the present situation.

Rather will the action be initiated either:

a. after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden military action on our part, which must come with all possible surprise as to time and extent, or

b. by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral justification of military action.

"b" is militarily and politically the more favorable.

3. Conclusions for the Preparations of "Fall Gruen"; which must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 a and 2 b.

a. For Armed War it is essential to create—already in the first 4 days—a military situation which plainly proves to hostile nations eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if France, due to Italy's clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention against Germany.

It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise.

b. The Propaganda War must, on one hand, intimidate Czechoslovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the other hand, give instructions to the national minorities for supporting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of thinking.

c. The Economic War has the task of employing all means at the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslovakia.

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can precede the Armed war. I myself will determine the date.

Z [initialled at end by Zeitzler]

[Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this draft are set forth with minor changes under ITEM 11.]

[ITEM 6] [Typescript] Questions on "Gruen"

1. Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

2. Strength of mobile divisions.

3. Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobilization.

4. Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit (motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust.

5. When can the field units be equipped with 15 cm. mortars?

6. What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are available for combating fortifications such as fortresses?

MOST SECRET L Ia Berlin, 23 May Questionnaire of 23 May

1. Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readiness.

Strength of a peacetime division 14,000 men Strength of a division made ready to march 14,000 men

(but composition is different from that of a peacetime division, i.e. some men are left out and others included).

2. Strength of mobile divisions.

Strength of a mobile division 17,000 men

3. Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of Mobilization. In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division is composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional troops.

The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 battalions and one motorcycle rifle battalion.

The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions.

The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motorized of 2 light Battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 1 Anti-Tank Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 Signal Battalion motorized.

Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 807 light Machine guns, 250 heavy Machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 heavy mortars, 8 light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 122 2 cm. guns, 16 37 cm. guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field howitzers.