Front matter (continued 19)
Reading edition
In emergency, erect in individual places barracks for occasional workers which are used as unloading details and similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities).
OKW/AWA is competent for transporting Russian PWs, employment through "Planning Board for Employment of all PWs." If necessary, offices of Reich Commissariats.
No employment where danger to men or their supply exists, i.e. factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no "solidarity." German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.
Food is a matter of Four Years' Plan. Supply their own food (cats, horses, etc.)
Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home where part of the people live in caverns.
Supply of shoes for Russians as a rule wooden shoes, if necessary Russian shoe repair shops.
Examination of physical fitness, in order to avoid importation of diseases.
Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians if possible by selected Russian engineers.
Employment offices for civilian workers to be kept separate from those for PWs. In this respect the wage-problem is to be considered. Furthermore families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule employment in closed groups [geschlossener Einsatz].
Some points as to general Arbeitseinsatz
Rather employ PWs than unsuitable foreign workers. Seize Poles, Dutchmen, etc., if necessary as PWs and employ them as such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong action.
General employment of all German women repudiated by the Fuehrer.
Where Russians can be employed, labor service is not to be used. Labor service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War situation to be taken into consideration.
As a matter of principle central interests precede local interests, therefore no resistance from Reich commissaries and other local authorities against Arbeitseinsatz in the homeland.
Savings in wages are to be made up by compensatory contributions of the business.
Express order by the Fuehrer. Under no circumstances may the wage level in the East be raised or assimulated to the wages in western Germany. Strong action is imperative against solicitors who offer high wages.
It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of wages for foreign workers.
Foreigners not to be treated like German workers, on the other hand do not provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters.
The welfare installations of the Labor Front [DAF] are under no circumstance to be used for PWs or Eastern workers.
All agencies are to promote maximum utilization of Russian manpower.
Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly organized in the operational area. Speed is necessary, as the mass of manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets).
Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of escaping prisoners. Especially in and around Berlin strictest guard necessary.
[illegible initials] Distribution: Chief Rue—1st Copy Sect. Ro—2nd Copy Rue II—3rd Copy Rue IIIa—4th Copy Rue VI-IIIa—5th Copy Draft (Rue IVd)—6th Copy
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1208-PS
SECRET 1938 Reich Justice Ministry [various numbers and notes] The Commissioner of the Four Year Plan [various illegible notations] Reich Justice Ministry, 14 Dec 1938 To:
The Highest Reich authorities,
The leaders and heads of branches of the party and the affiliated organizations,
The district leaders,
The Reich governors,
The state governments,
The Chief Presidents and Presidents of the governments,
The Reich commissars for the Saar territory
for the Reunion of Austria with the German Reich
for the Sudeten German districts.
To message: to the Reich leaders of the NSDAP.
In agreement with the representatives of the leader I hereby order the following:
I
1. The elimination of Jews from the German economic life is the task of the state and therefore is exclusively the duty of the authorities and agencies expressly designated for that.
2. As far as special installations have been created for this purpose, they require the approval of the Reich minister of economy or they are to be dissolved.
II
The taking over of Jewish businesses and other fortunes from Jewish possession has to be affected only on a strictly lawful basis according to the directives issued for this purpose. Transactions which were made since 1 Nov 1938 contradictory thereto, will be cancelled.
III
Only the Reich is entitled to the benefit from the elimination of the Jews from the German economic life.
Persons and agencies which have illegally benefited from the transfer of Jewish businesses or other fortunes from Jewish possession, may therefore be ordered to pay a compensation tax in favor of the Reich.
Berlin, 10 December 1938 The Commissar for the Four Year Plan Signed: GOERING General Fieldmarshall
To be circulated Dept. IV
Messrs: Read Messrs: Read
DR. VOLKMAR DR. PAETZOLD
ANZ Initialed 10/1 DR. POHLE
DR. BECKER Initialed 11/1 DR. PRITSCH
BRAUNS Initialed 14/1 REINECK Initialed 14/1
DR. BREITHAUPT Initialed REINECKE Initialed 13/1
EPPING Initialed 11/9 REXROTH Initialed 11/1
FECHNER Initialed 12/9 DR. SAAGE Initialed 11/1
DR. FICKER Initialed 14/1 SEBODE (since 9.1.39) Initialed 16/1
DR. HESSE
HENSSLER Vacation 18/1 DR. VON SPRECKELSEN Initialed 11/1
HOFFMANN Initialed 11/1
HORNIG Initialed 11/1 DR. SCHAEFFER, GAss. Initialed 11/1
DR. JONAS
DR. KOEHLER Initialed 13/1 DR. SCHULTZE Initialed 11/1
DR. KRAMER, AGR Initialed 11/1 STAUD Initialed 12/1
KUEHNEMANN Initialed 11/1 STEMMLER
LAUTERBACH DR. VOGELS Initialed 13/1
LENTZ Initialed, date illegible DR. WAITNAUER Initialed 11/1
MASSFELLER Initialed 13/1 ZIEGERT Initialed 11/1
DR. MERTEN Initialed 11/1
to V a 445/38 Secret
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1216-PS
Concentration Camp Dachau special orders (Camporganization)—Service regulations Notes on Death Penalty—Conference Re: "Important Incidents in Concentration Camp Dachau" Subject: Concentration Camp Dachau Memorandum
On 29 May 1933 p.m., Dr. Wintersberger, the chief prosecutor [Oberstaatsanwalt] of the State Court [Landgericht] Munich II, has handed me his report of 29 May 1933 with two copies of the "special regulations" concerning inmates of the concentration-camp Dachau (Camp Organization) and stated orally that several deaths have been reported from the concentration camp Dachau during the last few days showing that the report of the camp commandant and the camp physician as to the causes of death is hardly in conformity with the findings of the coroner's inquest and autopsy, so that the evidence obtained by the inquiry so far would justify the suspicion of crimes committed. The essential contents of his oral report on the single cases is incorporated in the memorandum of 30 May 1933 drafted by the prosecuting authority [Staatsanwaltschaft] of the district Court [Landgericht] Munich II, which is referred to.
The same day, on 29 May 1933, I reported on this subject to the State Minister of Justice in the presence of Amtsgerichtsdirektor Sprick. The Minister of Justice called the Prime Minister by telephone and obtained his consent that the subject "Execution of protective custody" should be made an item on the agenda of the meeting of ministers on 31 May 1933; he commissioned me to submit the matter to the State Minister of the Interior together with Amtsgerichtsdirektor Sprick and to take all further steps which might become necessary.
Accordingly, on 30 May 1933 a.m., accompanied by AGDirektor Sprick, I made my report first to Ministerialdirektor Gareis, secretary for police matters [Polizeireferent] in the Ministry of the Interior and then in the presence of the latter to the State Minister Wagner himself stating the facts as they had been reported to me by Dr. Wintersberger, the chief prosecutor [OStA]. I restated the official findings in the cases of Schloss, Hausmann, Strauss and Nefzger, pointed out that in accordance with Article 346 of the Penal Code (StGB) it is mandatory to make an inquiry which, by the way, would also serve the true interests of the state; discussed the legal aspects of the camp regulations [Lagerordnung] and duly communicated that the Prime Minister, on request by the Minister of Justice, had put the subject on the agenda of the meeting of ministers of 31 May 1933.
State Minister Wagner declared that the pacts are not yet cleared sufficiently to allow the matter to become a subject of discussion in the meeting of ministers, and that the commandant of the Bavarian political police who was sick at the time, should be heard first as well as the camp commandant.
He asked the Prime Minister by telephone to delete this item from the agenda and gave orders to Ministerialdirektor Gareis to open a discussion of the matter without delay. From the sphere of the Ministry of the Interior the following are to participate in the discussion: Ministerialdirektor Gareis, the commandant of the political police, Himmler, as well as the camp commandant and the camp physician of the concentration camp Dachau; from the sphere of the State Minister of Justice: Amtsgerichtdirektor Sprick, Chief Prosecutor [OStA], Dr. Wintersberger, Dr. Flamm, physician of the District Court (Landgerichtsarzt) and the undersigned reporter in this matter.
I have reported the result of my audience with the State Minister Wagner to Ministerialdirektor Degen and Staatsrat Spangenberger on 30 May 1933 and in the presence of the latter to the State Minister of Justice on 31 May 1933. I was requested to emphasize at the proposed meeting that Article 346 of the Penal Code (StGB) makes an inquiry by prosecution and police mandatory.
On the afternoon of 31 May 1933 I was told by Min. Dir. Gareis over the telephone that in accordance with orders from State Minister Wagner the proposed discussion would not take place, because he wished to avoid any sign of intervention in a pending matter, that the chief prosecutor [OStA] of the District Court [LG] Munich II should contact Himmler, the commandant of the political police, as had been suggested in the case of Schloss by letter of the Ministry of Justice of 29 May 1933 No. II 28923, and that the State Ministry of the Interior would take the necessary steps as far as its own sphere was concerned in this matter.
A.G.Dir. Sprick was asked to make this known to the Minister of Justice who was just participating in a meeting of ministers [interlineary note in ink:—on 31 May—] (OStA) Dr. Wintersberger was orally requested to contact Himmler, commandant of the political police, as soon as possible, and to report on the result.
Munich, 1 June 1933 (s) DOEBIG 2 June 1933 (Friday)
At 5:15 parley on the matter with Reichsstatthalter von Epp.
The papers on Schloss, Hausmann, Strauss and Nefzger were available at this parley on informal request.
Result of the parley:
The files of the prosecution Munich II on these 4 cases are submitted to the State Minister of the Interior in order to get his view first. In the camp Dachau a change of personnel shall take place.
DOEBIG.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1229-PS
TOP SECRET [Stamped] [illegible pencil mark] Supreme command of the Armed Forces
Armed forces Fuehrer Staff (WFST) /department L number 33 264/4C top secret, for general officers only.
[stamped] Fuehrer headquarters, September 6, 1940. 73 [in pencil] [illegible pencil mark] 7 copies 4th copy [in pencil]
SUBJECT: Material for the intelligence service
SUBJECT: Counter intelligence (Abw.) III number 398/40 top secret of August 26 1940. OKH General Staff of the Army (Gen. St.d.H.) operational department Ia number 150231/40 top secret of September 2, 1940.
TO: Counter intelligence service abroad (Ausl./Abw.)
The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the Status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached.
These regroupings must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East. On the other hand, Russia will realise that strong and highly trained German troops are stationed in the Gouvernement, in the Eastern provinces, and in the Protektorat; she should draw the conclusion that we can at any time protect our interests—espec. on the Balkan—with strong forces against Russian seizure.
For the work of our own intelligence service as well as for the answer to questions of the Russian intelligence service, the following directives apply:
1. The respective total strength of the German troops in the East is to be veiled as far as possible by giving news about a frequent change of the army units there. This change is to be explained by movements into training camps, regroupings.
2. The impression is to be created that the center of the massing of troops is in the Southern part of the Gouvernement, in the Protektorat and in Austria, and that the massing in the North is relatively unimportant.
3. When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, espec. of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary.
4. By suitable news the impression is to be created that the anti-aircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets.
5. Concerning improvements on railroads, roads, airdromes etc. it is to be stated that the work is kept within normal limits, is needed for the improvement of the newly won Eastern territories, and serves primarily economical traffic.
The supreme command of the Army [OKH] decides to what extent correct details, i.e., numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons etc. will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter espionage.
The chief of the supreme command of the armed forces by order of Signed: JODL A certified copy F.M. [in pencil] Captain Distribution:
Counter intelligence service abroad 1st copy (with map)
Supreme command of the Army (Operational department) 2nd copy
Supreme command of the Airforce (Fuehrer department) 3rd copy
Supreme command of the armed forces
Armed forces Fuehrer staff [WFST] 4th copy
Department L, Ref, IH, IL 5th-7th copies
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1233-PS
Secured Objects of Art in the Government-General [Poland]
Introductory page:
By reason of the decree of 16 December 1939 by the Governor General of the occupied Polish territories, the special commissioner for securing objects of art and culture was able to seize within six months almost all the art objects of the country, with one exception: A series of Flemish Gobelins of the Castle of Cracow. According to the latest information these are now in France, so that subsequent seizure will be possible.
Scientific treatment of the objects of art took place simultaneously with the salvage activities. The result is shown in the catalog with pictorial supplement, which clearly proves the penetration of the East by the German will for culture.
It is superfluous to speak of an independent Polish development of art in the historic epochs of style. There are creations of German impressions and Dutch or Flemish works which according to their spirit and character, equally do not express anything but German spirit and German culture. French and Italian works are in the minority.
The state of preservation of the secured objects of art was generally poor. The Poles' hasty salvage efforts prior to the out-break of hostilities and neglect over a considerable time have caused damage of all sorts which required immediate remedy. For this reason, our own shops for restoring purposes, were established in Cracow and Warsaw, so that these works of art could receive care corresponding to their value.
The catalog contains a qualitative selection corresponding to the standards of leading German museums. German art and everything having a rank within the entire European development of art was given preference.
Art objects excluded by this qualitative selection were also scientifically treated, catalogued, and protected against loss or damage.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1249-PS
Copy 1 June 1942 The Chief President of the Province of Upper Silesia. 1. I b 2 Subject: Police Courts-martial. Enclosure: Decree dated 1 June 1942.
In agreement with the Reichminister of the Interior and the Reichminister of Justice I am hereby establishing a police courts-martial at Kattowitz for the annexed Eastern territories of my province, effective immediately.
The administrative competence of the police courts-martial is seen from the enclosed decree.
In the sense of paragraph 1 of the decree, severe excesses of Poles and Jews as well as other criminal acts by Poles and Jews which endanger seriously the German reconstruction are:
1. High treason [Hochverrat].
2. High treason [Landesverrat].
3. Sedition.
4. Crime and Attacks against public order.
5. Forgery.
6. Sexual crimes against Germans.
7. Crimes against the life of Germans.
8. Assault and battery against Germans.
9. Crime and violation against the personal freedom of Germans.
10. Theft and embezzlement against Germans.
11. Robbery and extortion against Germans.
12. Receiving and concealing of stolen property of Germans.
13. Fraud and treachery against Germans.
14. Wilful destruction of property of Germans and the Reich.
15. Crimes and violations dangerous to the commonwealth of the Germans and the Reich.
16. Crimes and violations in the sense of the law against malice.
17. Crimes and violations in the sense of the decree of extraordinary radio measures of 1 September 1939.
18. Crimes against war economy.
19. Violations of the law for controlling venereal diseases dated 18 February 1927, as far as the violation is committed against Germans.
20. Crimes and violations in the sense of the law against criminal and publicly dangerous use of explosives.
21. Violations of the law against possession of arms.
The police courts-martial is competent for all punishable acts according to paragraph 1 of the decree dated 1 June 1942, which are committed by Poles and Jews in the annexed Eastern territories of the province of Upper Silesia. The courts-martial can also try punishable acts committed by Poles and Jews in the other Reich territory or in the occupied territories, if the perpetration live in the annexed Eastern territories of the province of Upper Silesia.
I request to instruct the county [Kreis] and local police authorities, competent for preliminary proceedings for punishable acts, and to submit those proceedings which come under the jurisdiction of the police court-martial immediately to the court-martial section of the state police administration, office Kattowitz, at Kattowitz, street of the SA No. 49.
Before submitting the case to the court-martial section, I request that the nationality of the accused be established beyond a doubt.
The report forms to the criminal police administration office at Kattowitz are not affected by this decree.
Distribution:
1. To the president of the district at Kattowitz.
2. To the president of the district at Oppeln.
3. To the secret state police—state police administration office at Kattowitz.
4. To the state police administration office at Oppeln.
5. To the criminal police administration office Kattowitz.
6. For information.
To the inspector of the security police and of the security service at Breslau.
2. I b 2 1 June 1942
To the Reich Minister of the Interior, in Berlin.
Subject: Administration of law in the annexed Eastern territories.
Ref.: My report of 30 January 1942—I b 2—and decree there Pol. S II A 2 No. 113/42—176 from 22 May 1942.
Enclosure: Decree dated 1 June 1942.
Enclosed I am forwarding to you the decree about the establishment of courts-martial in the annexed Eastern territories of the province of Upper Silesia.
The decree has been put into effect on 1 June 1942.
Forwarded for your information.
3. I b 2. 1 June 1942
To the District headquarters [Gauleitung] Upper-Silesia, at Kattowitz.
Subject: Establishment of a police courts-martial for the annexed Eastern territories at Kattowitz.
Enclosure: Decree dated 1 June 1942.
In agreement with the Reichminister of the Interior and the Reichminister of Justice, I have established, effective immediately, a courts-martial for the annexed Eastern territories of my province.
The local and administrative competence of the courts-martial is defined in the enclosed decree.
Forwarded for your information.
4. Copy of 3, with enclosure: to
a. The district leaders [Kreisleiter] of the districts Kattowitz, Jarnowitz, Warthenau, Beuthen, Bendsburg, Krenau, Pless, Rybnik, Teschen, Bielitz and Saybusch;
b. The general command VIII sector command Breslau, Gabitzstr.;
c. The public prosecutor at Kattowitz;
d. The president of the superior court at Kattowitz;
e. The leader of the security service administrative sector [SD-Leitabschnitt] Kattowitz, attention: SS battalion Podlich;
f. The Reich commissar for the strengthening of German nationalism attention: SS battalion leader Dr. Arlt, at Kattowitz.
5. To the files at I b 2.
Kattowitz, 1 June 1942 The Chief President of the Province of Upper Silesia I b 2
Decree for the establishment of courts-martial in the annexed Eastern territories of the province of Upper Silesia dated 1 June 1942
On the basis of number 13 of the decree of the cabinet council for the Reich defense, for the administration of criminal jurisdiction against Poles and Jews in the annexed Eastern territories and the district of the previous Free City of Danzig, dated 4 December 1941 (RGBl. I, p. 759), the following is decreed in agreement with the Reichminister of the Interior and the Reichminister of Justice:
Par. 1.
1. Severe violations of Poles and Jews against Germans, as well as other criminal acts by Poles and Jews which seriously endanger the German reconstruction work, can be sentenced by courts-martial, until further notice.
I reserve for myself the decision as to whether or not the criminal act is a crime in the sense of paragraph 1.
Par. 2.
The courts-martial pass sentence of death, transfer to the secret state police acquittal.
Par. 3.
1. Courts-martial will be established for the district of a state police administration office. They consist of one president and two members.
2. President is the leader of the state police administrative office or his permanent deputy. The members will be appointed by the leader of the state police administration office.
Par. 4.
1. During the trial the court must do officially everything that is necessary to discover the truth. If necessary, the accused is to be tried with the assistance of an interpreter.
2. The names of the judges and of the accused, the evidences on which the sentence is based, furthermore the crime, the sentence including a brief justification, as well as the day of the sentencing are to be recorded.
3. Otherwise the courts-martial determines its proceeding according to its dutiful judgment.
Par. 5.
1. The decisions of the courts-martial are not legally contestable.
2. The sentences of the courts-martial are subject to a reexamination which leads to confirmation or voiding.
3. The confirmation makes the sentence lawful and executable.
Par. 6.
The right of confirmation or voiding of the courts-martial sentences is mine and, on my orders, that of the higher SS and police officer.
Par. 7.
The courts-martial can, for special reasons, forego a penalty or transfer the case to another court.
Par. 8.
This decree becomes effective on the day of its publication.
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1276-PS
MOST SECRET The Chief of the Security Police and the SD IV A 2 a - Bk. No. 502/42 Most Secret
In written communications, please give this reference No., the date and subject.
Berlin SW 11, 17 June 1944 Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8 Local tel. no. 120040 Trunks 126421 Reichsbank Clearance Account: 1/146. Post Office Transfer Account: Berlin 2336. Express Letter Security Section III Recd: 20 June 1944 No. 20/44 Most Secret Annexes: Nil 94 To: Supreme Command Armed Forces Ops. Staff of the Armed Forces I C III general security
For the attention of Colonel of the General Staff Martini not represented in the department
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 74/76.
Subject: Commando operations. Fuehrer's order of 18.10.1942
Reference: Communication of Counter Intelligence Bureau Defense Section III 527/2. 44g (C 2) of 21.3.1944.
The C-in-C of the Security Police and the SD in Paris reports the arrest of isolated parachutists of French nationality in English uniform near Plumelec/Morbihan. It is evident from interrogation that members of the De Gaulle Army, after reporting voluntarily to the "Service Air Special," were taking part in a 14-days special training camp, in which were 300 Frenchmen and 300 Englishmen. Apparently only Frenchmen are used for operations in France. The parachute-jump is made in groups of ten, each consisting of:
1 Lieutenant 2 wireless operators 7 sabotage experts. Armament: each man 1 sub-machine gun 1 pistol 1 carbine 1 stabbing weapon. Equipment: Sabotage and radio apparatus, including Eureka gear i.e. D/F beacons. (therefore arrested by the SD? [marginal note in pencil])
The group which was arrested had orders to carry out railway sabotage in the district around Rennes. The acts of sabotage were obviously to be carried out by the group as a body. In addition, the group was to await further orders in some hiding-place.
Apparently they were not ordered to link up with the local resistance organisations. The arrested men had no civilian identity cards on them.
The employment of such groups is for the most part obviously planned for regions where, due to the action of the Security Police, there are no more local resistance or sabotage organisations in existence, or where the enemy knows that sabotage organisations were only counterfeited by tricks of the security police, which had meanwhile been disclosed.
* * * I consider it essential that the necessary orders should also be given from there, in order that the lesser units of the Armed Forces may not—as has often been the case recently—interpret them wrongly and turn the Commando troops over to the Security Police instead of slaughtering them in combat as they retreat. It is only a question of handing them over to the Security Police when members of Commandos of this kind are not captured in battle by the Armed Forces but by other means, e.g., by being handed over by the native police.
If a few isolated Commando troops are spared at first for interrogation purposes, I consider it necessary for the Security Police authorities to take part in the interrogation. The further treatment of members of Commandos, who are finally to be treated as killed in action [Gefallene], is, however, even in these cases, the responsibility of the Armed Forces.
I request that the measures taken from there be reported to me.
By Order
Signed: Mueller
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1279-PS
MOST SECRET WFSt/Qu (Admin. 1) No. 007893/44 Most Secret [The number is changed, in pencil, to 009074/44] One copy has been destroyed [remainder of pencil note illegible] 27/7 22.7.1944 2 Copies 2nd Copy
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
Minutes of a meeting
1. The Fuehrer has decided that members of Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan fighting in the South-East, are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a commando-operation and not as prisoners of war.
2. Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl., following queries made by the RSHA—Military Section—has put forward for decision the question of how British and American soldiers, captured with the partisan groups are to be treated.
The following are the resulting opinions:
a. C-in-C, South-East
The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the SD, should the opinion below (b) be inapplicable.
b. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of war general in conjunction with Supreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff Alien Armies in the West and Armed Forces Ops. Staff/Op. (Army).
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops. Staff/Op (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.
c. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War Section in conjunction with Armed Forces Reserve (WR) and Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org I.
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43, which disregards differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of commando operations. (then they are handed over to the Security Service [SD]).
d. RSHA/Section IV
Fundamentally treatment as prisoners of war under the directives mentioned in b and c, but a more definite ruling is required to decide whether and in what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the Security Service [SD].
e. RSHA/Military Section
Considers that the Commando Order cannot be applied to partisan fighting in the south East, that to do so would be dangerous in that it might imperil those taking part in our own operation (Brandenburg).
No opinion on the question of foreign missions.
f. Ag. Ausl.
Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, that implies that members of missions were taking part in a commando-operation.
g. Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army)
Treatment as the members of partisan groups themselves, i.e., as prisoners of war if they are in uniform and are captured or surrender in open battle, or executed if they are in civilian clothes or are captured in a sabotage- or commando-operation.
[The whole of g is crossed out.]
3. Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops. Staff
According to the orders issued to date, even for example, the British captured in the "Rosselsprung" operation must be treated as prisoners of war. This is especially evident in the Op. (Army)-Order dated 18.8.43.
[This last sentence is put in parenthesis, underlined, Op (Army) crossed out and a large query inserted in the margin.]
The Commando Order has never yet been applied to such missions, its extended application to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission acting with the partisan groups in the South-East is to be called a commando-operation and therefore treated as such. Such a decision seems to be indicated even if it does not correspond completely to the wording of the Commando-Order or to the previous definition of a commando operation (as an especially under-hand and still unusual form of warfare which must be combatted with the appropriate counter measures). The principle must be adopted from the start that all members of partisan groups, even in the South-East are fundamentally guerrillas. Indeed they are treated as prisoners of war for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters and workers. There is no reason for this with regard to the members of foreign missions who are not numerous. There is therefore no necessity to treat them, in every case, in the same way as the members of partisan groups themselves. Basically, it would be far more appropriate to consider Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian military missions as commando-operations and to treat their members accordingly.
The appended Order is therefore proposed.
W [Initialed by Warlimont]
MOST SECRET WFSt/Qu (Admin. 1) 27.7.1944 No. 009074/44 Most Secret 2 Copies 1st Copy
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
K [initialled in pencil by Keitel] Minutes of a meeting
1. The Fuehrer has decided that members of Anglo-American and Soviet-Russian so-called "military missions", captured in the partisan fighting in the South East, are to be treated in the same way as those taking part in a commando-operation and not as prisoners of war.
2. Independently of the above, the Ag. Ausl. following queries made by the RSHA—Military section—, has put forward for decision the question of how British and American soldiers, captured with the partisan groups, are to be treated.
The following are the resulting opinions:
a. C-in-C, South East.
The members of allied military missions are to be handed over to the SD, should the opinion below (b) be inapplicable.
b. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Prisoners of War General in conjunction with Supreme Command of the Army/Army General Staff/Alien Armies in the West:
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Armed Forces Ops Staff/Op. (Army) No. 03408/43 Secret, dated 18.8.43.
c. Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Chief of Prisoners of War Section in conjunction with Armed Forces Reserve (WR):
Treatment as prisoners of war in accordance with Order: Armed Forces Ops. Staff/Org II No. 02958/43 Secret, dated 8.7.43 which disregards differences of nationality. The only exception made is in the case of commando-operations (then they are handed over to the Security Service [SD]).
d. RSHA/Section IV
Fundamentally as prisoners of war under the directives mentioned in b and c, but a more definite ruling is required to decide whether, and in what circumstances, they are to be handed over to the Security Service [SD].
e. RSHA/Military Section:
Considers that the Commando-Order cannot be applied to partisan fighting in the South East that to do so would be dangerous in that it might imperil those taking part in our own operations (Brandenburg).
No opinion on the question of Foreign Missions.
f. Ag. Ausl.
Fundamentally, treatment as prisoners of war, that implies that members of missions were taking part in a commando-operation.
3. Opinion and proposal of the Armed Forces Ops Staff
According to the Orders issued to date, even, for example, the British captured in the "Ruesselsprung" operation must be treated as prisoners of war.
The Commando-Order has never yet been applied to such missions, its extended application to cover them has not yet been ordered. If the missions are to be treated otherwise than in accordance with the orders to date, it must first be decided whether a foreign mission acting with the partisan groups in the South East is to be called a commando operation and therefore treated as such. Such a decision seems to be indicated even if it does not correspond completely to the wording of the commando-order or to the previous definition of a commando-operation (as an especially under-hand and still unusual form of warfare which must be combatted with the appropriate counter measures). The principle must be adopted from the start that all members of partisan groups, even in the South East, are fundamentally guerillas. Indeed, they are treated as prisoners of war, for reasons of expediency, in order to obtain the largest possible number of deserters and workers. There is no reason for this with regard to the members of foreign missions who are not numerous. There is therefore no necessity to treat them in every case, in the same way as the members of partisan groups themselves. Basically, it would be far more appropriate to consider Anglo-American as well as Soviet-Russian military missions as commando-operations and to treat their members accordingly.
The appended Order is therefore proposed.
Sgd: Warlimont Distribution:
Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces via the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Ops Staff.
1st Copy Qu. (Draft) 2nd Copy
[The second copy of the above dated 27.7.1944 marked "Draft" is also contained in 1279-PS it is initialled at the end by Warlimont and has an illegible pencil note at the top. In the second copy the first words of 2 and 3 are underlined in pencil. The type-script of both copies is identical.]
MOST SECRET Draft Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 007893/4 Most Secret/Armed Forces Ops. Staff/QU (Admin. 1)
[The number is changed to 009074/44] Fuehrer Headquarters 22.7.1944 —Copies, —Copy
Subject: Treatment of members of foreign "military missions" captured with partisan groups.
The Special Orders for the treatment of captured members of partisan groups do not apply to members of foreign so-called "military mission" (Anglo-American or Soviet-Russian) captured in the fight against partisan groups in the areas under the command of the C-in-C South East and South West. They are therefore to be treated, not as prisoners of war, but in accordance with the Fuehrer's Order on the extermination of terrorist and sabotage troops, dated 18.10.1942 (OKW/WFSt No. 003830/42 Most Secret).
This order is not to be distributed beyond the divisional or equal-ranking staffs of the other branches of the Armed Forces. Any papers distributed to Army Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs, of the Armed Forces are to be recalled, when read, and destroyed.
[This last sentence is changed to "This order is not to be distributed beyond General Headquarters and equal-ranking staffs of other branches of the Armed Forces and is to be destroyed when read."]
Keitel
Distribution:
C-in-C South East Copy 1
C-in-C South West Copy 2
Army General Staff Copy 3
OKM/Naval War Staff Copy 4
OKL/Air Force Ops. Staff Copy 5
Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police— Headquarters Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS— for the attention of SS Brigadefuehrer and Major-General of the Waffen SS Rohde, also for RSHA Copy 6
OKW/Gen. Armed Forces Dept. Copy 7
/Chief of P.W. section Copy 8
/Armed Forces Reserves (WR) Copy 9
/WFSt/W Pr Copy 10
/Op (Army-Air Force-Navy) Copy 11
/Org Copy 12
/War Diary Copy 13
/Qu (Draft) Copy 14
Reserve Copy 15-25
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1285-PS
"The German Police" [Extracts from handbook "Die Deutsche Polizei" 1943] B. Use of weapons on command
1. Every policeman is compelled to make use of his weapon if a superior officer, in compliance with his duty, orders him to do so.
2. In such a case, the superior officer alone bears the responsibility.
Use of weapons on the part of the police in the case of fugitive PWs
3. Fugitive Russian prisoners of war shall be fired upon without previous challenge.
4. Under no circumstances will warning shots be fired.
To a: According to paragraph 1 of the law mentioned * * * the following become as of 1 April 1937 immediate Reichs officials [unmittelbare Reichsbeamte]:
1. Officials occupying TO positions [Planstellen] in the agency "Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior".
2. The officials of the Security Police [Secret State Police—Gestapo], and Criminal Police, however not the Police administrative officials working with the state police administrations for the criminal police.
3. The officials of the Protective Police [Schutzpolizei] and the Gendarmerie [Landjaegerei] and the police medical and police veterinary officials, police vocational school teachers and technical officials working with these organizations.
The personal salaries and welfare expenses of these officials and the operational expenses of the whole state police will be borne from 1 April 1937 on by the Reich, the same for the salaries, etc. of all employees and workers working at police agencies, who likewise on 1 April 1937 enter the Reichs service (paragraph 1(2) and paragraph 2). Hence from the fiscal year 1937 on there will be made up a Reichs budget for the police.
To b: For all police officials uniform official titles are introduced through the law cited * * * along with equal pay; only a few exceptions (retaining of some former official designations for the present incumbents) are permitted in the implementative regulations (transition lists).
To c: Through the German police official law [24 June 1937, RGBl I, 653] the same legal situation is created for all process servers without differentiation. Hence in Germany there is no longer a Prussian or a Bavarian process server, but now only a German process server, who is everywhere subject to the same legal regulations, wears the same uniform, and has the same official designation of rank.
The laws cited [relating to police officials] are valid since 1 October 1938 also for the former Austrian federal executive police, which including the police administrative officials by the decree of 27 October 1938 (RGBl. I, p. 1633) is at the same time taken over into the Reichs budget and thereby brought into the Reichs service.
More detailed regulations on this matter are to be found in the implementative regulations of 15 May 1939 [RGBl. I, p. 945]. According to these the valid functional police law in the former state of Austria is not affected.
To d: According to paragraph 1 of the law [28 March 1940, RGBl. I, p. 613] the police administrative officials of upper middle and simple civil service rank are transferred onto the Reichs budget. The officials of the higher police administrative service of a federal state can with the consent of the latter be transferred onto the Reichs budget.
[Pp. 81-82] III. Security Police [Sicherheitspolizei]
At the head of the Security Police is the chief of the security police and of the Security Service [SD]. Provisionally the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reichs Ministry of the Interior has taken over leadership personally. He unites in his person the direction of the security police and of the "Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS".
The security police is composed of the secret state police (including frontier police) and criminal police which in the central instance together with the central offices of the security service are united in the Chief Office for Reichs Security [RSHA].
Thereby the governmental security police and the party's SS intelligence activity complement each other in the unified central agency both organizationally and in leadership.
With the Chief Office for Reichs Security rest the elaboration of all organizational, personnel, economic, and technical affairs of the security police and security service; besides this however, the central agencies of the state police and criminal executives and the central direction of the security service information nets are also included.
In the field of functional legislation the Chief Office for Reichs Security, insofar as its interests are touched upon, either controls the framing of the law or has a part therein.
The chief office for Reich security is composed at present of 7 offices, to these several special institutes are attached.
The following serve to train the members of the security police and the security service:
1. The leaders' school of the security police in Berlin-Charlottenburg.
2. The elementary school of the security police in Fuerstenberg/Mecklenburg.
The establishment of special sport and technical schools is planned.
The criminal-technical institute [KTI] is available for all chemical and physical experiments and research to the whole security police.
The chief of the security police and of the security service is president of the international criminal-police commission. Through this personal union an especially close exchange of findings and methods of the German criminal police with other nations which are also connected with the IKpK is assured.
IV. Higher SS and Police Leaders
Higher SS and police leaders are installed for the area of every military district [Wehrkreis] as well as in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, in the General Government, in Norway, the Netherlands and in parts of the occupied area of the Soviet Union, who are in their areas the representatives of the Reichsfuehrer SS and chief of the German police in regard to all duties for which the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police is responsible.
Inspectors of the order and security police are subordinate to the higher SS and police leaders.
[P. 83]
Inspectors (Commanders) of the Security Police and Security Service
Inspectors of the Security Police and Security Service—without prejudice to their subordination to the higher SS and police leaders—are installed in the field of responsibility of the security police in corresponding manner for the exercise of inspectoral authority.
Outside of territory strictly a part of the Reich, commanders of the security police and security service are appointed whose duty it is to lead the security police forces employed there.
PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1292-PS
Fuehrer Headquarters, 4th Jan. 1944 To Rk. 13402 c Double Ref.: Allocation of Labor 1944
1. A conference took place with the Fuehrer to-day which was attended by:
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Gauleiter Sauckel,
The Secretary for Armament and War Production, Speer,
The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Army, General Field Marshal Keitel,
General Field Marshal Milch,
The Acting Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture, State Secretary Backe,
The Minister of the Interior, Reich Fuehrer of the SS, Himmler,
and myself.
(The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of National Economy had repeatedly asked to be permitted to participate prior to the Conference, but the Fuehrer did not wish their attendance).
The Fuehrer declared in his introductory remarks:
I want a clear picture:
(1) How many workers are required for the maintenance of German War Economy?
(a) For the maintenance of present output?
(b) To increase its output?
(2) How many workers can be obtained from Occupied Countries, or how many can still be gained in the Reich by suitable means (increased output)?
For one thing, it is this matter of making up for losses by death, infirmity, the constant fluctuation of workers, and so forth, and further it is a matter of procuring additional workers.
The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that, in order to maintain the present pool of workers, he would have to add at least 2-1/2 but probably 3 million new workers in 1944. Otherwise production would fall off. Reichminister Speer declared that he needs an additional 1.3 million laborers. However, this would depend on whether it will be possible to increase production of iron ore. Should this not be possible, he would need no additional workers. Procurement of additional workers from Occupied Territory would, however, be subject to the condition that these workers will not be withdrawn from armament and auxiliary industries already working there. For this would mean a decrease of production of these industries which he could not tolerate. Those, for instance, who are already working in France in industries mentioned above, must be protected against being sent to work in Germany by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor. The Fuehrer agreed with the opinions of Reichminister Speer and emphasized that the measures taken by the Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor should order no circumstances which would lead to the withdrawal of workers from Armament and auxiliary industries working in occupied territories, because such a shift of workers would only cause disturbance of production in occupied countries.
The Fuehrer further called attention to the fact that at least 250,000 laborers will be required for preparations against air attacks in the field of civilian air raid protection. For Vienna alone 2000-2500 are required immediately. The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor must add at least 4 million workers to the manpower pool, considering that he requires 2-1/2 million workers for maintenance of the present level, that Reich Minister Speer needs 1.3 million additional workers, and that the above-mentioned preparations for security measures against air attacks call for 0.25 million laborers.
The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor, Sauckel, declared that he will attempt with fanatical determination to obtain these workers. Until now, he has always kept his promise as to the number of workers to be furnished. With the best of intentions, however, he is unable to make a definite promise for 1944. He will do everything in his powers to furnish the requested manpower in 1944. Whether it will succeed depends primarily on what German enforcement agents will be made available. His project cannot be carried out with domestic enforcement agents.
The Reichfuehrer SS explained that the enforcement agents put at his disposal are extremely few, but that he would try helping the Sauckel project to succeed by increasing them and working them harder. The Reichfuehrer SS made immediately available 2000 to 2500 men from concentration camps for air raid preparations in Vienna.
Generally all participants in the conference agreed that it will be possible to treat additional manpower even at home by activation and intensification of available labor, especially the Prisoners of War, provided they are given awards in form of additional food, clothing, and so forth. State Secretary Backe will examine to which extent help can be given with additional food. Field Marshal Milch remarked that especially in agriculture, many women, who are really able to work, evade it because they receive family-allotments from their husbands who were inducted into the Armed Forces, and the wages for work done would be deducted from their family allotment. In their primitive way of thinking they therefore believe that they would have to work for nothing. Therefore on one hand, wages should not be deducted from the family allotment; on the other hand, it should be ruled that women who refuse work would, in consequence, receive no family allotment, or only a reduced family allotment.
The Fuehrer did not comment, declaring that he did not wish to go into details any longer.
Results of the Conference:
(1) The Plenipotentiary for Employment of Labor shall procure at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories.
(2) These workers may not be taken from armament and auxiliary industries in actual production in the occupied territories.
(3) It is to be examined by what means the output of workers now on hand can be increased and intensified, especially that of Prisoners of War.
(4) The Plenipotentiary for the Employment of Labor shall get in touch with the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs before taking any action.
Signed: Dr. Lammers
II. Reichleiter Bormann has received a copy of paragraph I.
III. To the State Secretary for cognizance.
IV. Original to Mr. C. Please return. (Arrival at Fuehrer Headquarters, 6 January 1944.)
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1301-PS
Financing of the armament
The following explanations take as their premise the fact that the execution of the armament program is by its speed and extent the mission of German policy, that everything else therefore must be subordinated to this purpose, unless the neglect of other questions would endanger the main goal. Even after 16 March 1935, the difficulty continues to exist, that one cannot attempt the influencing of the German people by propaganda for support of the armament, without endangering internationally our position. The financing of the armament program, already almost impossible, is being made especially difficult by that.
Further, another prerequisite must be presented. The printing press can only be used for the financing of armament to the extent which the maintenance of money value allows. Each inflation increases the prices of foreign raw materials, and increases the prices within the country; thus it is a snake, which bites its tail. The fact that our armament had to be camouflaged completely until 16 March 1935, and for the biggest part even afterwards, has led to that, that the printing press has already been made use of at the start of the armament program; whereas it would have been natural to put it at the final point of the financing. Of the 3775 millions in the portfolio of the Reichsbank plus 866 millions set aside in bills of exchange==total of 4641 millions, the bills of exchange to finance armament represent 2374 millions (status of 30 April 1935). The Reichsbank has invested most of the German mark sums, available to its administration and belonging to foreigners, in armament bills of exchange. Thus our armament was partly financed with the property of our political opponents. Also used for the financing of the armament program were the 500 millions RM, which came together through the Reich loan placed at the savings banks in Jan 1935. In the regular budget the following amounts were provided for the armed forces: fiscal year 1933/34 RM 750 millions, fiscal year 1934/35 RM 1100 millions, fiscal year 1935/36 RM 2500 millions.
The sum of the deficits of the budgets increase since 1928, according to the estimate 1935/36, up to 5 to 6 billions RM. At present this total deficit is already being financed by short-term credits from the money market. Thus it already burdens in this amount the possibilities of use of the public market for armament. The Reich Minister of Finance is justified in saying in his budget explanations: "Since an annual deficit ... is an impossibility permanently, since one cannot count with certainty on an increased tax income, covering the deficit and other previous debts; since on the other hand only a balanced budget offers a secure basis for our great future task in the armament policy, fundamentally and consciously—a budget policy must be followed, which will solve the problem of financing of armament by organic and planned decrease of other expenses, not only from the point of view of income, but also of expenses, that means saving."
How urgent this demand is can further be construed from the fact that an unending number of tasks were attacked and are in the process of execution by state and party, all of which cannot be covered by the budget but by subscriptions and credits, which must be raised besides the regular taxes by business. This simultaneous existence of various budgets, which however all serve a more or less public purpose, present the greatest obstacle to the gaining of a clear picture of the financing possibilities of armament. A whole series of ministries and numerous agencies of the party have their own budget in addition to their share of the Reich budget, and thus accordingly income and expense possibilities, which, although they are based on the financial sovereignty of the state, are not subordinated to the control of the Minister of Finance and thus also not to the control of the cabinet. Exactly as in the field of politics, the too far reaching delegation of legislative authority to individuals in Germany has led to the condition of many states within the state, thus the condition of parallelism and divergence [Nebeneinander und Gegeneinander] of numerous state and party agencies has absolutely a disastrous effect on the financing possibility of armament. If in this field, no concentration and no unified control is introduced finally, one must fear the worst for the solution of the almost impossible task of financing of armament.
Thus the following tasks result:
1. A commissioner must at first determine all sources and incomes, which are derived from Reich, State and Party funds, as well as from profits of public or party enterprises.
2. Then, a commission, appointed by the Fuehrer must investigate how these funds were used up to now, and how much can be taken from these funds in the future from their present purpose, and made available to the financing of armament.
3. The same commission has to examine the assets of all public and official party organizations, how the assets have been invested, and to what extent these assets can be utilized for the financing of armament.
4. The Reichministry of Finance is to be commissioned to investigate the possibilities of an increased tax income by the introduction of new taxes or the increase of existing tax rates.
The financing of armament previously by the Reich Bank was a necessity under the existing political conditions, and the political success has proved the correctness of this action. However, now other methods of financing of armament must be attempted under all conditions. With that, all not absolutely necessary expenses in other fields must be refrained from, and the entire, actually small, financial power of Germany must be concentrated on this one goal, the financing of armament. Whether the financial problem will succeed with this method of approach is as yet doubtful, but without such concentration it will fail with certainty.
Memorandum 9.III.1936 on the supply situation in the field of fuels and its effect on the Wehrmacht.
The simultaneous throttling and blocking of foreign sources of liquid fuel has caused an increasingly critical situation of supply of the German market since the beginning of the year 1936.
This situation calls for a description of the serious effects on the preparedness for action of the Wehrmacht and of the extraordinary measures which necessitate a decision in this matter.
The supply of the Wehrmacht is based on the home production, the reserves which can be made available in case of mobilization and the foreign imports which still for some time must fill the present gaps of supply.
I. The German production.
The anticipating measures taken during the last 2 years by the Reich Cabinet to increase the home production of fuel, will not bring about an essential improvement of the supply situation during the current year because of the time required for factory construction and the uninterrupted increase of demand, but cannot bring an appreciable relief until the year 1938. The list in enclosure 1 of the requirements in case of mobilization and of the supply of these requirements by production, as well as the graphs added to the other enclosures, show the influence to be expected from the German production on the entire supply.
The expanding German production favors mainly light fuels, especially fuel for airplanes, and in addition, oil for airplane engines. As to the other kinds required by the Wehrmacht in case of war, we cannot expect any improvement for the time being; as to heating oils it may be anticipated that the situation will deteriorate. The developments of new processes (Uhde and Pott), the extent of which will shortly permit an opinion, offers certain possibilities of auxiliary supply which do not appear on the graphs, because the extent of the production possible until 1938 cannot yet be foreseen.
The inadequacy of the supply on the basis of home production is a fact which cannot be eliminated during the next 2-3 years, even with the greatest efforts and in spite of the planning started for additional expansion of production.
II. Reserves.
To assure the requirements of the Wehrmacht it becomes necessary to bridge the supply gaps by reserves. For the first period of mobilization the Wehrmacht relies on the reserves of business, especially of great importing corporations, which also in peace time consider stored reserves for about 3 months as indispensable for smooth distribution. The Wehrmacht ought to be enabled to count on the amount of these reserves remaining constant.
Beyond that the Wehrmacht accumulates its own reserves in large storage houses so that considerable national reserves will be available as buffers in case of supply difficulties.
III. Dependency of the overall supply on imports.
The obstacle to importing encountered to a large extent during the last weeks, and which have been brought about by an accumulation of economic-political events in foreign trade, endanger not only the maintenance of industrial reserves but also the continuation of the storage policy of the Wehrmacht. They shake the very foundations of the motorization program of industry and consequently also of Wehrmacht mobilization of mechanized vehicles to the extent planned for in case of war.
In particular large gaps have been opened:
1. due to the Russian prohibition of exporting petroleum, by which the benzol-association supplying about 20% of the German market got into considerable difficulties.
2. due to suddenly considerably increased demands of the Rumanians, who offer fuel only in exchange for foreign bills proper [Bardevisen] and/or at greatly increased prices in marks. The contribution of Rumanian imports to the supply of German requirements was 40% during the last year. The firm Olex which contributes 11% to the German market has already been forced, due to the obstruction of Rumanian deliveries, to decrease its business considerably, and will face a close-down of its market supply if relief is not procured before June 1936. Due to this reduction of imports similar stoppages are to be expected by the other great organizations of distribution during the same period.
IV. Means to secure the supply.
In considering how to meet the situation the following devices are unbearable for the Wehrmacht:
1. Reduction of mechanized traffic because this would, in addition to precarious economic and psychological effects, bring about a throttling of German motorization, which in view of the requirements of the Wehrmacht in case of war, would be a shock to mobility and supply of replacements.
2. Just as undesirable is to be considered the diminishing of reserves. The industrial reserves constitute the basis for mobilization, which has to rely on firm figures which remain about constant. As a decrease of reserves has already started, the further development in this direction is to be counteracted immediately. Aid from the reserves of the Wehrmacht cannot be granted because these modest quantities being ultimate reserves cannot be diminished under any circumstances.
Consequently, only the following means are to be considered:
1. Conceding to the Rumanian demands of paying imports in marks on a considerably raised price-basis.
2. Additional payments in foreign bills proper [Bardevisen] of imports from Anglo-Saxon countries.
3. Investigation to what extent an improvement can be achieved by accelerating or expanding the facilities for German production.
The first course has been followed by the authorization to negotiate new contracts on the basis of the Rumanian demands. Adequate and punctual delivery to the market, however, is not yet assured hereby.
Re. 2. Foreign bills [Devisen] for the minimum of the indispensable import requirements can probably be obtained only by reduction of import of other necessities. The narrow limits of the presently assured raw materials for armament do not allow for a decrease of such imports which are indispensable for the Wehrmacht. In particular we cannot do without the necessary quantities of metals required by the Wehrmacht for current procurements.
Re. 3. As a result of investigations made, essential changes cannot be expected at a date within sight.
V. Uniform management of the petroleum industry.
During the last few months the Wehrmacht has repeatedly emphasized the unavoidable call for a uniform and planned steering of the entire German petroleum industry. The present dangerous situation of the German fuel industry puts this necessity again into the spotlight. The lack of stern guidance in the present moment must lead to severest damages to the public and the defense of the country. The duty of a management according to plans of the petroleum industry must be in the first line to avert the permanent threat to mechanized traffic and the preparedness of the Wehrmacht for action lying in the extensive dependency on forces outside of the German sphere of control.
Enclosure 1 to "memorandum on the supply situation in the field of fuels and its effect on the Wehrmacht" of 9 March 36.
Mob. requirements Supply of requirements by production
1936 t/Jahr 1938 t/Jahr 1936 % 1938 %
Light fuels for car engines 900 000 1 530 000 43 60.5
Light fuels for airplane engines 460 000 600 000 39 61.5
(illegible), Fuel oil 650 000 1 280 000 11.6 22
Heating oil 800 000 1 200 000 22 30.6
Lubricating oil for car engines 80 000 150 000 22.5 23
Lubricating oil for airplane engines 35 000 55 000 -- 22
IIa Needed raw materials 4/28/1936 with consideration of the program for the supply of ammunition, amounting to 200 million marks [Mil. RM.] (for the months of April 1936 to March 1937=12 months)
Supply needed, submitted to R.Wi.Min. (letter of 1/1336.)
Copper 5400 t/month (without plate VIII)
lead 2300 t/month (without plate VIII)
zinc 3100 t/month (without plate VIII)
Supply needed, considering the 200 Mill-plan.
Copper 5850 t/month (without plate VIII)
lead 3350 t/month (without plate VIII)
zinc 4020 t/month (without plate VIII)
Therefore the additional need amounts to
Copper 450 t/month
lead 1050 t/month
zinc 920 t/month
Raw materials needed by parts of the Armed Forces
(for the months of April 1936 to March 1937)
copper 4830 670 175 175 5850
lead 2750 280300 20 3350
zinc 2420 160 260 1180 4020
SECRET
Raw materials needed by the armed forces during the years 1935 and 1936
Raw materials need 1936 t/month 1935
Iron and steel
Iron ore Fe 130,000 80,000
Manganese ore Mn 7,000 4,000
Chromium 0,5 C 220 88
0,5 C 160 86
Wolfram 80 15
Molybdenum 40 8
Vanadium 3 1
Tantalum 2 0.5
Silicon 400 250
Non-iron metals
Copper 7,5001) 4,670
Lead 6,5002) 3,520
Nickel 275 174
Tin 150 89
Zinc 3,1003) 1,830
Aluminum 2,720 1,900
Antimone 55 25
Cadmium 10 0.62
Mercury 20 12
Cobalt 10 3
Leather goods (economy)
skins and pelts 1 300 1 400
natural tanning matter 800 860
Wood
special foreign timber 170 150
Grain, fodder and further agricultural products
linseed 1 500 1 900
Coal and Salt
oil coke and Pitch coke—of these 1500 t/month to produce the aluminum needed by the armed forces. 1 700 1 300
Various goods
diamonds, amounting to a value of RM. 15 000 /month 11 000RM
cane 200 160
mica 18 15
magnesite 1 200 1 000
Rubber and asbestos
rubber 280 150
asbestos [spinasbest] 100 70
Fat for industrial purposes
glycerine 165 120
Petroleum oils
gas for plane engines 7 000 4 000
light fuel f. motor vehicles 3 000 1 500
lubrication oil f. plane engines 700 200
lubrication oil f. motor vehicles 500 150
gas-oil, (diesel) 7 500 1 200
heating oil 15 000 6 000
Note: 1. for cables 2100 t/months; starting on 1 Apr. 36 possibly only 6000 t/month, including 2100 t/ for cables;
Note: 2. for cables 4200 t/months; starting 1 Apr. 36 7800 t/months which means 5500 t/month for cables;
Note: 3. from this amount: sheet-zinc in the limits of the quota of the association of zinc-rolling-mills 340 t/month; starting 1 Apr. 36 possibly only 2700 t/month including sheet-zinc.
Situation re fuel
Fuel for motorized vehicles Fuel for airplanes Gas-Oil Diesel
Peace 36 Case of mobil. 38 Peace 36 Case of mobil. 38 Peace 36 Case of mobil. 38
Total need of armed forces and economy t/year 1,000,000 1,650,000 80,000 600,000 800,000 1,300,000
Production in entire Reich-territory t/year 900,000 80,000 280,000
Missing quantity t/year 1,100,000 750,000 —— 520,000 520,000 1,020,000
New planning 700,000 300,000 200,000
Heating fuel Oil for motor vehicles Oil for airplane engines
Peace 36 Case of mobil. 38 Peace 36 Case of mobil. 38 Peace 36 Case of mobil. 38
Total need of armed forces and economy t/year 500,000 1,200,000 75,000 150,000 5,000 55,000
Production in entire Reich-territory t/year 270,000 20,000 ——
Missing quantity t/year 230,000 930,000 55,000 130,000 5,000 55,000
New planning ? 20,000 15,000
Copy Berlin, 15 May 1936 Prime minister General Goering Raw material and Foreign exchange staff Top Secret To the Reichminister of war Generaldfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Enclosed, a record of the conference of the council of ministers of 12 May 1936 in the afternoon is forwarded.
By order
/s/ Loeb Lt. Col. in the General Staff
Top Secret Record of the council of ministers on 12 May 1936 1700 hours
Chairman: Prime minister General Goering.
Reichminister of War Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg.
Reichsbank President and acting Reich and Prussian minister for Economy Dr. Schacht
Reichminister of Finance Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
Prussian minister of Finance Prof. Dr. Popitz as the recording secretary Lt. Col. in the General Staff Loeb
Minister Schacht: shows the development up to now when two years ago, the decision for rearmament was made, it was decided to carry out the financing mainly outside the means of the Reichministry of Finance. This meant the commitment of the last reserve from the very beginning. A decision which did not seem without hazards. The memorandum of 3 May 1936 says the same thing.
In the course of the last two years, the program was increased more and more in its extent and speed. Thus the requirements to the Reichsbank were increased steadily.
It would be necessary to create, as basis for financing, a steady, prosperous economy, and therefore renounce the execution of other, partially irrational ideas and aims of the party. The psychological prerequisite was not disturbed by the party as such, but by many individual groups of the party, again and again; personal attacks against Dr. Schacht and thus against the economy followed. Dr. Schacht has emphasized again and again, that one must follow a cultural and legal policy, which will leave economy alone. However one must not describe it as greedy and selfish from the beginning.
Also money theories of the most variable kind have been published repeatedly, thus causing anxiety for the economy; to counteract this was practically impossible, as the propaganda machine of the party did not permit this.
Despite all this, Dr. Schacht continued to work, because he stands with unswerving loyalty to the Fuehrer, because he fully recognizes the basic idea of national socialism and because at the end, the disturbances, compared to the great task, can be considered irrelevant. Previously, approximately 11 billion marks besides the budget have been raised for rearmament and re-employment without shaking the rates of exchange and currency; the rate of interest could be lowered.
The Fuehrer has repeatedly emphasized in personal talks and cabinet meetings, that the speed of rearmament must be kept up until the spring of 1936. This was agreed to and carried out.
Prime Minister Goering: has never heard about this time limitation.
Minister Schacht: The main question for the further execution of the program is, how much money can be gotten out of business. Some 2 billion can be consolidated annually by long term loans, 8 to 9 billion cannot be asked for; the possibility of making available depends on the development of the money market. Full concentration of the money market through the Reichsbank is necessary.
If the Reichsbank should have to issue more notes than could be born by the currency, one must reach back to other factors.
Dr. Schacht will never be part to an inflation; the Fuehrer also has decided in this sense. The danger of such a development is imminent. If a road is to be taken, which contains this danger, Dr. Schacht would like to drop out on time, so that he does not disturb the new course.
Dr. Schacht considers it impossible, that prices can be fixed by the state, if the same money policy is continued.
Prime Minister Goering: What is the basis of currency with the Reichsbank?
Minister Schacht: This question has nothing to do with the gold standard. It is a question of something imponderable, to recognize the time of which must be left up to fine sensitivity. If by a surplus of money, the danger of devaluation of the mark exists, the state can and must take action from the financial side by taxes, etc. Considering the material factor, it must be determined, that we are dependent for numerous goods on foreign countries. Even small percentages as a whole have considerable effect. In many cases, the necessity for import is caused by trade political relations; therefore the raw-material situation may not only be viewed and attacked from the production within Germany. The foreign relations must be decreased all of a sudden. For instance the negotiations with Standard and Shell were carried out on this basis.
Prime Minister Goering: When substitutes [ersatzstoffe] are sufficient in quantity, we shall no longer need the import, which presents us such difficulties.
Minister Schacht: In a series of cases, to be able to carry out the import, work from within Germany was utilized for compensation, for instance tankers for oil import corporations.
However it is especially required that nothing be said about intentions and measures of this field in public, so as not to aggravate the importers.
Prime Minister Goering: If the Fuehrer has expressed himself in this direction, he did it to counteract the increasing pessimism in the country in respect to this field.
Minister Schacht: In any case, all anxiety must be prevented. Foreign exporters have already shown less readiness to deliver against certificate of foreign exchange, since they apparently have no confidence in the cashing of these certificates.
Prime Minister Goering: Our raw material situation is generally known to the world. The article published in the papers on 28 April 1936 did not contain anything secret. Actually the confidence abroad should have been increased by this publication, because generally the opinion was held abroad that Dr. Schacht was protected by the Prime Minister against the party.
Minister Schacht: The situation at present is thus:
Some 64 million marks are already claimed by reimbursement.
We must buy especially crude rubber and textiles; we have practically no crude rubber. Cellulose wool is not an adequate substitute, especially not for export goods.
The necessity for the closing down of manufacturing plants will soon result from this accordingly.
It must be decided whether the available gold should be all spent at the present speed or whether it should already be slowed down.
Swedish ores are still available for about 3 months. The export to Sweden becomes more difficult, and thus the import possibilities decrease.
Prime Minister Goering: is of the opinion that our export to Sweden continues, so that one can further count on import.
Minister Schacht: The raw material supply of Germany amounted at the beginning of the war to a value of about 7 to 8 billions; now it is less than 1 billion.
Prime Minister Goering: has heard repeatedly, that export business was refused by the Reichminister for Economy. In the future, the departments will be caused by him to re-examine such occurrences; perhaps then it will work differently than until now.
Minister Schacht: Increase of our export appears improbable in the near future. Further obligations arise through the Foreign Office, the Reichsbank, Post Office, Party and other agencies; soon the consular service cannot be paid any more.
The time will come, when we will have no longer any reserves of either raw materials or foreign exchange at our disposal.
Prime Minister Goering: If we have war to-morrow, we must help ourselves by substitutes. Then money will not play any role at all. If that is the case, then we must be ready to create the prerequisites for that in peace. The account just described could have also been presented, in his opinion, in the meeting this morning.
Minister Schacht: Publication is recommended for only the smallest circle.
Prime Minister Goering: It is necessary to inform the people required for the execution.
Minister Schacht: In his opinion only the ministers, not the state secretaries. In addition, each department must be called in individually.
Prime Minister Goering: The psychological prerequisites for the correct approach to the work must be created everywhere. The actual work is done by the state-secretaries and the experts. In the future one must go much more into detail; confidence in the persons employed in this is absolute necessity.
Prime Minister Goering: summarizes the explanation by Minister Schacht: In short, demands on the Reichsbank can no longer be covered; only 64 million marks are still available.
Minister Schacht: declares that besides these 64 million Reichsmarks in the private banks, there are another 72 million gold with the Reichsbank.
Prime Minister Goering: continues with the summary: The shortage of raw material is known in its extent. A considerable increase is no longer possible, in the opinion of Minister Schacht.
Minister Schacht: The production of raw materials within Germany finds its limitation there, when an increase of prices of export goods is created by it.
Prime Minister Goering: One can separate requirements within Germany and export. Even the smallest details are important. The following appears necessary.
1. Increase of export despite all difficulties.
2. The raw material coverage within Germany.
3. The possibly necessary resettlement of workers and food-fundamentals for the execution of all measures.
These problems all affect each other, so that the participation of all departments is necessary.
Appropriate example: Position of the farmer, who does not utilize the available possibility of intensifying of fertilizing, because the capital lost is not bearable for him in case of bad harvests. In such a case, the risk lying with the weather must be partially taken from the farmer by a special organization.
The Reichministry of Finance must also be consulted greatly in reference to the regular budget. Re-awakening of thriftiness in all fields belongs to this program.
Minister Popitz: The final conclusions made by Dr. Schacht are clear and convincing, under the condition that the bases for these conclusions are correct. That must be examined. It must be determined again, whether the principles, according to which the present raw material and foreign currency policy has been carried out with such a big success, are unalterable and correct.
The time when perhaps an inflation is feared is unclear; actually it is already here, even if it has a bearable extent.
An increase of export cannot be expected with the present system. However it is to be examined, whether there is not a better system. The basis of the present economic policy is deflationary. However it appears impossible to integrate the deflation into an actually existing inflation. It must be discussed, whether forced economy of export is to be continued.
It is to be examined further, whether the money for rearmament can be drawn out from the remaining economy. In no case may the condition arise, that the Reichminister for Finance and the Reichminister for Economy push the responsibility for the providing of funds to each other.
The difference between 2 billion Reichsmarks, which the Reichsbank believes to be able to raise on a long term basis, and the 8 to 9 billion Reichsmarks required for armament, cannot be covered by taxes. Therefore the following suggestion:
1. The raw material question, which can be solved comparatively simply, must be attended to at once by a special committee.
2. Illuminate critically the export question, so to say, in a scientific manner.
Minister von Krosigk: Economy of foreign exchange in detail is necessary. In that, small things also play a part. Equal saving is necessary in spending money within Germany. In contrast to Minister Popitz, he is of the opinion that expenses for armament must be taken over more and more by the regular budget. Expenses above this budget are to be covered
a. by long term consolidation of annually some 2 billion marks.
b. by short term bills of exchange and similarly.
The financing has succeeded up to now by these two means.
However the danger exists, the short-term bills of exchange can no longer be negotiated, so that flooding of the Reichsbank with MEFO bills would have an increased printing of banknotes as consequence.
Minister Popitz: In this case, printing of bank notes is only necessary if the money is absolutely necessary for payment of wages among other unavoidable things.
Minister von Krosigk: The decisive question for that is, whether inflation would actually happen by printing of banknotes to this extent. He does not believe so. The increase of prices observed so far was not caused by monetary reasons, but can be derived from increase of prices for raw materials and agricultural products. Thus one cannot speak of an inflation.
Prime Minister Goering: does not believe that an inflation would happen from the monetary angle.
Measures which in a state with a parliamentary government would probably bring about inflation, do not have to have the same results in a totalitarian state.
Important for this is the application of an appropriate propaganda, so that the co-operation of the propaganda ministry, promised by the Fuehrer, is of great importance.
Minister Schacht: gives a summary of the holdings of bills of exchange in the Reichsbank at present:
4,353,000,000.—RM bills of exchange
3,731,000,000.—RM of which are in MEFO bills of exchange
2,200,000.—MEFO bills of exchange are deposited in clearing accounts.
More than 5 billions in bills of exchange are deposited thus, that they can be presented immediately in case of disturbances of the money market, caused by any measure. Therefore any disturbance must be prevented under all conditions.
Prime Minister Goering: agrees to be the "shield" for the measure of financial nature, so that no disturbances would happen.
The regular budget is to take over the current upkeep of the armed forces, but not the costs of the reconstruction.
Minister Popitz: It is to be examined whether the regular budget cannot be relieved from interests and amortization quotas of advance drawings. Even the observing of the international bank law cannot prevent the using of these recognized necessary measures in this direction.
If the economy is started by increased export, naturally the circulation of money will increase and with that the possibility of further financing.
If the money, which had to be put into circulation, is only used for payment of wages, no inflation can take place.
Prime Minister Goering: orders:
1. Determination as rapidly as possible of the basis of payment.
2. Beginning of the execution work in the realm of raw material production within Germany.
3. Examination of the question of the export system.
In the next conference, contemplated for Friday afternoon, the examination of the export system is to take place.
First under his chairmanship (Goering's) the ministers Dr. Schacht, Graf Schwerin von Krosigk and Prof. Dr. Popitz will consult each other. Then, immediately thereafter, the suggestions voiced there are to be discussed by a board of experts. The following were named for this board:
By Minister Schacht: Reichsbank Director Brinkman Reichsbank Director Blessing Ministerialdirektor Dr. Sarnow By Minister von Blomberg: Dr. Trendelenburg By Minister Popitz: Dr. Springorum Dr. Sogemeier Further Reg. Burgermeister Kroogmann Prof. Wayemann and others, who will be appointed by the Prime Minister.
Prime Minister Goering: states that he can expect and demand discipline from the party, so that the protection of the individual auditor, called, is guaranteed.
Close of the conference; 1910.
Summary of the raw material situation 2 May 1936
Iron ores Aluminum
Total requirement for the armed forces and the industry (estimated) peace 1936 case of mobil. 1938 peace 1936 case of mobil. 1938
9.5 million 11 million 105,000 160,000
Production entire Reich industry 1.8 million 96,000
Deficit 7.7 million 9.2 million 9,000 64,000
Excess -- -- -- --
Tentative plans for expansion of own production 1.2 million proposal Keppler --
Crude Rubber Cellulose Wool
Total requirement for the armed forces and the industry (estimated) peace 1936 case of mobil. 1938 peace 1936 case of mobil. 1938
75,000 85,000 12,000- 70,000 depending on import of natural fiber
Production entire Reich industry 1,000 12,000-70,000
Deficit 74,000 84,000 any increase in production would be taken up by the market
Excess -- --
Tentative plans for expansion of own production 2,400 first increase until end of 1936 70,000 t
Berlin, 30 May 1936 Behrenstrasse 68-70 Telephone A 2 0048 Prime Minister General Goering Raw Material and Foreign Exchange Staff Journal No. * * * /36 [initial] BG th 2/6 [initial] Rubber Stamp Top Secret
To the Reichminister of War Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Berlin
Enclosed, a report of the conference of the council of ministers of 27 May 1936, is forwarded.
By Order
Loeb Lt. Col. in the General Staff 1 Inclosure:
Top Secret
Copy of meeting of Minister on 27 May 36, at 1130 o'clock.
Chairman: Ministerpraesident Generaloberst Goering
Reichskriegsminister Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg
Reischsbankpraesident und kommissarischer Reichs- und Preussischer Wirtschaftsminister Dr. Schacht
Reichsfinanzminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk
Preussischer Finanzminister Prof. Dr. Popitz
Recording Secretary: Lt. Col in the General Staff Loeb
Prime Minister Goering: The two sessions of the board of experts held so far have brought forth interesting discussions. Naturally, opinions frequently disagree. The experts are invited to state their concepts in writing.
Today, discussion concerning the question of substitute-material. What objections are made to the production of war-raw materials within the Reich?
Minister Schacht: Principly there is nothing to object; a solution of the raw material problem by self-producing is absolutely necessary and agreed with, theoretically.
Difficulties are encountered with regard to:
1. serious monetary strain because of investments. Providing money by taxing capital is impossible. Circulation of money can not be increased beyond a certain amount. Previous measures executed correctly and without danger to monetary value. Further increase seems precarious; matter of confidence. This point of view alone, however, not determining; possible that funds could be drawn from industrial profits.
2. special scruples, regarding the cases where prices for substitute [Ersatz] material are far beyond world-market prices, and therefore the products cannot compete (for example: tires made from Buna). Adjustment would further increase the excise tax on exports. Inflation cannot be chosen, as this would immediately upset the state's budget.
It must be attempted to produce those raw materials within Germany which are economically favorable; for other raw materials ready reserves for the case of mobilization [Mobfall]. Especially clear is the situation of flax; the complete covering of the requirement is possible; however not with hemp.
Certain raw materials for war must be stocked.
These viewpoints are recognized and followed by the Reich ministry for Economy. The execution is mainly dependent on the question of funds. Therefore, necessity to save in all fields, to make saved funds available for investment.
Prime Minister Goering: All measures are to be considered from the standpoint of an assured waging of war.
Ready reserves must ordinarily be accumulated already in peace in certain amounts.
It is to be attempted to use cheap imported raw materials for export purposes, expensive raw materials from within Germany. In cases where the price differences are small, probably creation of a settlement is preferred.
Minister Schacht: This settlement can be carried out either by compulsory mixing or by a price settlement by the state of the expensive raw materials.
In any case, price supervision must be introduced again.
Minister Popitz: Placing of the burden of increased prices on the consumer is possible when the difference is only small.
The other possible method is sales monopoly or wholesale monopoly of certain goods.
Minister Schacht: It is recommendable not to influence individual, large fields, for instance textiles, by prices; but to concentrate funds for the monetary subsidation of other fields of raw materials.
Minister von Krosigk: The question cannot generally be judged theoretically, but only practically with the use of individual examples.
Prime Minister Goering: At first, the specially urgent petroleum question is to be treated.
General agreement to that.
Minister von Krosigk: Present experience is that the beginning of new methods of sale or price guarantee by the Reich results thus, that soon new and cheaper production methods are found. This recommends a not too sudden expansion of production.
Prime Minister Goering: Waiting for new methods is no longer appropriate. Plan of the Reich forestry office for the utilization of wood is ready. Import of timber must be cut down in any case; strongest demands on German forests to be preferred at present and can be advocated.
It is to be decided, whether at the beginning, a risk bonus over 6% profit is to be granted.
Minister Schacht: turns against higher profits than 6%. Guarantee of interest-bearing is to be preferred, and must be sufficient.
Minister von Krosigk: discusses the advantages of the amortization program.
Minister von Popitz: In contracts many times rapid cancellation is contemplated.
Minister Schacht: At the beginning more consideration is recommended, later stronger concentration, with profit sharing by the Reich.
Minister Popitz: requests that the cancellation periods be re-examined by a special committee.
Prime Minister Goering: The summary is to be prepared for the next committee meeting about:
1. Inventory of German Raw Material possibilities.
2. Form of the present decrease.
3. Mobilization requirement.
4. How shall raw materials be handled? Especially clarifications whether production within Germany is to start already in peace or whether the stocking or reserves is more important.
Subject of petroleum also can be considered concluded, therefore is to be handled immediately.
In the next council of Ministers, discussion of the agricultural question, then Minister Darré and State secretary Backe present.
Minister von Blomberg: In the fuel industry it is to be decided whether conversion to solid fuels should already be carried out in peace, or whether, as in France, it is to be prepared for the mobilization case. If possible and recommendable, increased use of tar coke [Schwelkok], no diesel oil for railroads.
Prime Minister Goering: Economy also absolutely necessary and to be insisted on in other fields of raw materials.
Minister von Blomberg: Examine as an example substitution of heavy metal by light metal (for instance cans of aluminum): general increase of the use of glass, especially for aerial bombs, maybe also for grenades; use of plastics for wide fields, even as far as transmissions. Certain hopes can be set on China. Therefore prevent political estrangement. Careful advances in the approaching of Japan necessary, at present the recognition of Manchukuo would be disastrous for Mr. Klein's current plans in China.
Prime Minister Goering: Common front of China with Japan against Soviet Russia can probably be produced.
[in green pencil] I did not express myself so specifically BL/
Minister von Blomberg: Japan is doubtful as a factor of military power.
Prime Minister Goering: Furthermore, the danger of Japan's turnabout always exists.
Results of the China affair cannot be viewed clearly because of the unclear inner political situation.
Minister Schacht: always has supported the attempts of Mr. Klein, because he especially hopes for food, raw materials from China.
Minister von Blomberg: recommends further collaboration with the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft, with whom the Reichministry of War had very good experiences. At its head is the scientific authority; other imminent changes for solution proposed by the party unbearable.
Minister Popitz: Nomination of Geheimrat Bosch is possible for this post, when his resignation from the IG is possible.
Minister Schacht: General complaints about the deterioration of German science; this is also harmful for export, since the missing replacement limits the execution of German engineering missions abroad and thus German orders from abroad.
Minister Popitz: Seconds these complaints. Actions by the party which remove the most important people is unbearable. Explanation by examples.
In the liberal arts, the consequences are not being felt immediately, all the more so in the natural sciences. If service etc., should be limited to the first two semesters of study, then full time and freedom for scientific activity.
Prime Minister Goering: In Prussia then, difficulties are partially removed. Influence of the liaison staff not always fortunate. Role of Professor Wagner.
Puts to discussion a taking over of a Spanish tin source, which is being offered from the Swedish side.
Minister Schacht: Basically in agreement, particularly when in a partnership enterprise German achievements will result by deliveries of machines.
Prime Minister Goering: asks Minister Schacht to conduct negotiations in this spirit during his visit in Belgrade relative to Jugoslavia in the near future.
Minister Schacht: The copper mining in Jugoslavia must take place by excluding the French, who sell copper for foreign exchange only.
Prime Minister Goering: During the next ministerial session, the investigation of the problems in the agricultural sector has to be conducted in such a way that direct statements of Minister Schacht/Minister Darré should be made about the single problematic issues.
End of the session 13 o'clock.
Fuel-supply situation (1st draft of a plan for solution) 27 May 1936
Light vehicle fuel Airplane fuel
Peace 36 case of mobil. 38 Peace 36 case of mobil. 38
Total requirement Armed Forces and Industry tons/years 2,000,000 1,650,000 80,000 600,000
Production in the entire Reich industry tons/years 1,300,000
Deficit from requirements of mobilization tons/years 950,000
To be covered by conversion (substitute fuel)
Necessary new plans 950,000
Proposal for a solution 3 Fischer plants of 320,000 tons each by the end of 1937
Costs 380 million RM
Gas Oil Heating Oil
Peace 36 case of mobil. 38 Peace 36 case of mobil. 38
Total requirement Armed Forces and Industry tons/years 800,000 1,300,000 500,000 1,200,000
Production in the entire Reich industry tons/years 220,000 270,000
Deficit from requirements of mobilization tons/years 1,080,000 930,000
To be covered by conversion (substitute fuel) 200,000
Necessary new plans 880,000 930,000
Proposal for a solution 4 IG-Pott plants of 220,000 tons/year each by end of 1937 3 Fischer whole-Pott or distilling plants of 310,000 tons/year each
Costs 400 million RM 370 million RM
Copy of draft Top Secret 31 August 1936
The War Minister and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2001/36 Top Secret WH
4 copies— 1st copy—draft 2nd copy—Reich Air Ministry 3rd copy—Reich Ministry for Finances 4th copy—President of the Reichsbank
1. To the Reich Minister of Air and the Supreme Commander of the Air Forces General Goering
Berlin W 8 Dear General Goering!
The negotiations conducted until now in the commission for foreign exchange and raw materials which is under your leadership, have already shown the necessity of dealing also with the financing of the armed forces there also. I believe the time has now arrived that the commission should take up the treatment of this problem.
As a preparation of such a discussion I suggest the following:
I. Overstepping of the 1936 budget.
It has been proven, particularly from the decree issued 7 March 1936, that the sum of about 10 billions of RM which was provided for the Wehrmacht for 1936 is not sufficient.
1. Additional expenses in the army are needed in first place for
a. the remilitarizing of the Rhineland
b. the fortification of the Rhineland
c. the setting up of all the 36 divisions already by 1 Oct 1936
d. the speeding-up of motorization, particularly the establishment of 4 fully motorized Infantry divisions.
e. the necessity of markedly increasing the reserve ammunition because of the increased number of divisions.
f. industrial preparations in a great variety of fields.
2. In the navy the required faster increase of personnel, the building of a 4th entry to Wilhelmshaven and the refortification of Helgoland cause additional expenses.
3. Air Force
a. According to an order of the Fuehrer, the setting up of all air force units has to be completed on 1 April 1937. Therefore considerable expenditures have to be made in 1936 which at the time when the budget for 1936 was made, were planned for later years only. Special additional expenses are caused by the creation of sufficient ground force personnel.
b. In the air force the first introduction of new types has to take place in 1937. Therefore the required industrial preparations have to begin in 1936.
It follows that an additional sum of at least 3.6 billions of RM will be needed by the Wehrmacht for 1936.
Of this about 1 billion RM is allotted to Army and Navy together. In the case of the Army and Navy, the execution of the orders and, in consequence, the dead-lines for the payments of the deliveries lagged quite considerably behind the placing of the orders. Therefore it can be assumed that these 1 billion RM will not be needed in cash before 1 Apr 1937. However, the orders for these 1 billion RM have been placed and in the fiscal year 1937 these 1 billion RM will also be needed in cash.
In the air force the additional expenditures amount to 2600 millions RM. Here the execution of the orders from the budget funds of 1936 as well as of the orders for the additional requirements is in full progress. The 2600 millions RM for the air force have to be made available in the fiscal year 1936.
As yet it cannot be ultimately settled whether the introduction of the two years' service will lead to further additional expenses.
II. Requirements for 1937
The preparatory works for the budget of 1937 have not been concluded. At present the requirements for 1937 are estimated to be for:
1. the army 6.5 billions RM
2. the navy 1.2 billions RM
3. the air force 6.0 billions RM
————————
Total 13.7 billions RM
Besides these 13.7 billions RM about 500 millions RM will be needed for the Reich defense requirements of the civilian departments.
III. Permanent requirements
According to a recently conducted survey, the component of the armed forces will have the following permanent requirement after the rearming is completed:
1. Army 3.6 billions RM
2. Navy 0.73 billions RM
3. Air Force 2.507 billions RM
—————————
Total 6.837 billions RM
At present it is hardly possible to make an accurate estimate of the permanent requirements. In the case of the Army it is very likely that the amount for the permanent requirement will be considerably raised.
Later I will submit further material, particularly a statement about the requirements for the years until the completion of the rearming, as soon as the necessary inquiries are concluded.
I submitted copies of this letter to the Reich Minister for Finance, and to the President of the Reichsbank.
Heil Hitler! Yours, [unsigned]
2. To the Reich Minister for Finances Berlin W 8
3. To the President of the Reichsbank Dr. Schacht Berlin SW 111
Copy (of 1) for your kind information
4. WV
Chief WA Chief WH signed P Remark:
1. Major v. Wolff has given the letter addressed to General Goering to Lt. Col. Bodenschatz on 31 Aug.
2. I have personally handed the letters 2 and 3 to the President of the Reichsbank, Dr. Schacht, and to the Reich Minister of Finance, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, on Aug 31.