VOLUME VIII SLICE IX Dyer to Echidna (continued 9)

You should not lead trumps at starting, unless you hold king or queen, knave, or knave ace, with court cards out of trumps.

The score has to be considered. If the dealer is at four, and the king is not in your hand nor turned up, play any cards without proposing which give an even chance of three tricks, e.g. a queen, a guarded knave, and a guarded ten. The same rule applies to the dealer’s refusal.

At the adverse score of four, and king not being in hand or turned up, any hand with one trump should be played, unless the plain cards are very small and of different suits.

If the non-dealer plays without proposing when he is four to three, and the dealer holds the king he ought not to mark it. The same rule applies to the non-dealer after a refusal, if the dealer is four to three.

At the score of non-dealer three, dealer four, the dealer should refuse on moderate cards, as the player proposing at this score must have a very bad hand.

At four a forward game should not be played in trumps, as there is no advantage in winning the vole.

Laws of Écarté.—The following laws are abridged from the revised code adopted by the Turf Club:—A cut must consist of at least two cards. Card exposed in cutting, fresh cut. Order of distribution of cards, whether by three and two, or vice versa, once selected, dealer must not change it during game. Player announcing king when he has not got it, and playing a card without declaring error, adversary may correct score and have hand played over again. If offender wins point or vole that hand, he scores one less than he wins. Proposal, acceptance, or refusal made cannot be retracted. Cards discarded must not be looked at. Cards exposed in giving cards to non-dealer, he has option of taking them or of having next cards; dealer exposing his own cards, no penalty. Dealer turning up top card after giving cards, cannot refuse second discard. Dealer accepting when too few cards in stock to supply both, non-dealer may take cards, and dealer must play his hand. Card led in turn cannot be taken up again. Card played to a lead can only be taken up prior to another lead, to save revoke or to correct error of not winning trick. Card led out of turn may be taken up prior to its being played to. Player naming one suit and leading another, adversary has option of requiring suit named to be led. If offender has none, no penalty. Player abandoning hand, adversary is deemed to win remaining tricks, and scores accordingly. If a player revokes or does not win trick when he can do so, the adversary may correct score and have hand replayed.

See Académie des jeux (various editions after the first quarter of the 19th century); Hoyle’s Games (various editions about the same dates); Ch. Van-Tenac et Louis Delanoue, Traité du jeu de l’écarté (Paris, 1845; translated in Bohn’s Handbook of Games, London, 1850); “Cavendish,” The Laws of Écarté, adopted by the Turf Club, with a Treatise on the Game (London, 1878); Pocket Guide to Écarté (“Cavendish,” 1897); Foster’s Encyclopaedia of Indoor Games (1903).

ECBATANA (Agbatana in Aeschylus, Haňgmatāna in Old Persian, written Agamtanu by Nabonidos, and Agamatanu at Behistun, mod. Hamadān), the capital of Astyages (Istuvegu), which was taken by Cyrus in the sixth year of Nabonidos (549 B.C.). The Greeks supposed it to be the capital of Media, confusing the Manda, of whom Astyages was king, with the Madā or Medes of Media Atropatene, and ascribed its foundation to Deioces (the Daiukku of the cuneiform inscriptions), who is said to have surrounded his palace in it with seven concentric walls of different colours. Under the Persian kings, Ecbatana, situated at the foot of Mount Elvend, became a summer residence; and was afterwards the capital of the Parthian kings. Sir H. Rawlinson attempted to prove that there was a second and older Ecbatana in Media Atropatene, on the site of the modern Takht-i-Suleiman, midway between Hamadan and Tabriz (J.R.G.S. x. 1841), but the cuneiform texts imply that there was only one city of the name, and Takht-i-Suleiman is the Gazaca of classical geography. The Ecbatana at which Cambyses is said by Herodotus (iii. 64) to have died is probably a blunder for Hamath.

See Perrot and Chipiez, History of Art in Persia (Eng. trans., 1892); M. Dieulafoy, L’Art antique de la Perse, pt. i. (1884); J. de Morgan, Mission scientifique en Perse, ii. (1894). See Hamadan and Persia: Ancient History, § v. 2.

(A. H. S.)

ECCARD, JOHANN (1553-1611), German composer of church music, was born at Mühlhausen on the Unstrut, Prussia, in 1553. At the age of eighteen he went to Munich, where he became the pupil of Orlando Lasso. In his company Eccard is said to have visited Paris, but in 1574 we find him again at Mühlhausen, where he resided for four years, and edited, together with Johann von Burgk, his first master, a collection of sacred songs, called Crepundia sacra Helmboldi (1577). Soon afterwards he obtained an appointment as musician in the house of Jacob Fugger, the Augsburg banker. In 1583 he became assistant conductor, and in 1599 conductor, at Königsberg, to Georg Friedrich, margrave of Brandenburg-Anspach, the administrator of Prussia. In 1608 he was called by the elector Joachim Friedrich to Berlin as chief conductor, but this post he held only for three years, owing to his premature death at Königsberg in 1611. Eccard’s works consist exclusively of vocal compositions, such as songs, sacred cantatas and chorales for four or five, and sometimes for seven, eight, or even nine voices. Their polyphonic structure is a marvel of art, and still excites the admiration of musicians. At the same time his works are instinct with a spirit of true religious feeling. His setting of the beautiful words “Ein’ feste Burg ist unser Gott” is still regarded by the Germans as their representative national hymn. Eccard and his school are inseparably connected with the history of the Reformation.

Of Eccard’s songs a great many collections are extant; see K.G.A. von Winterfeld, Der Evangelische Kirchengesang (1843); Döring (Choralkunde, p. 47).

ECCELINO [or Ezzelino] DA ROMANO (1194-1259), Ghibelline leader, and supporter of the emperor Frederick II., was born on the 25th of April 1194. He belonged to a family descended from a German knight named Eccelin, who followed the emperor Conrad II. to Italy about 1036, and received the fief of Romano near Padua. Eccelin’s grandson was Eccelino III., surnamed the Monk, who divided his lands between his two sons in 1223, and died in 1235. The elder of these two sons was Eccelino, who in early life began to take part in family and other feuds, and in 1226, at the head of a band of Ghibellines, seized Verona and became podestà of the city. He soon lost Verona, but regained it in 1230; and about this time came into relations with Frederick II., who in 1232 issued a charter confirming him in his possessions. In 1236 when besieged in Verona he was saved by the advance of the emperor, who in November of the same year took Vicenza and entrusted its government to Eccelino. In 1237 he obtained authority over Padua and Treviso; and on the 27th of November in that year he shared in the victory gained by the emperor over the Lombards at Cortenuova. In 1238 he married Frederick’s natural daughter, Selvaggia; in 1239 was appointed imperial vicar of the march of Treviso; but in the same year was excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX. He was constantly engaged in increasing his possessions; was present at the siege of Parma in 1247, and after Frederick’s death in 1250 he supported his son, the German king Conrad IV. His cruelties had, however, aroused general disgust, and in 1254 he was again excommunicated. In 1256 Pope Alexander IV. proclaimed a crusade against him, and a powerful league was soon formed under the leadership of Philip, archbishop of Ravenna. Padua was taken from Eccelino, but on the 1st of September 1258 he defeated his enemies at Torricella. He then made an attempt on Milan, and the rival forces met at Cassano on the 27th of September 1259, when Eccelino was wounded and taken prisoner. Enraged at his capture, he tore the bandages from his wounds, refused to take nourishment, and died at Soncino on the 7th of October 1259. In the following year his brother Albert was put to death, and the Romano family became extinct. Eccelino, who is sometimes called the tyrant, acquired a terrible reputation on account of his cruelties, a reputation that won for him the immortality of inclusion in Dante’s Inferno; but his unswerving loyalty to Frederick II. forms a marked contrast to the attitude of many of his contemporaries.

Eccelino is the subject of a novel by Cesare Cantu and of a drama by J. Eichendorff.

See J.M. Gittermann, Ezzelino da Romano (Freiburg, 1890); S. Mitis, Storia d’ Ezzelino IV. da Romano (Maddaloni, 1896); and F. Stieve, Ezzelino von Romano (Leipzig, 1909).

ECCENTRIC (from Gr. ἐκ, out of, and κέντρον, centre), literally “out from the centre,” and thus used to connote generally any deviation from the normal. In astronomy the word denotes a circle round which a body revolves, but whose centre is displaced from the visible centre of motion. In the ancient astronomy the ellipses in which it is now known that the planets revolve around the sun could not be distinguished from circles, but the unequal angular motion due to ellipticity was observed. The theory of the eccentric was that the centre of the epicycle of each planet moved uniformly in a circle, the centre of which was displaced from that of the earth by an amount double the eccentricity of the actual ellipse, as the case is now understood. When measured around this imaginary centre, which is so situated on the major axis of the ellipse that the focus, or place of the real sun, is midway between it and the centre of the ellipse, the motion is approximately uniform. In engineering, an eccentric is a mechanical device for converting rotary into reciprocating motion (see Steam-engine). For eccentric angle see Ellipse.

ECCHELLENSIS (or Echellensis), ABRAHAM (d. 1664), a learned Maronite, whose surname is derived from Eckel in Syria, where he was born towards the close of the 16th century. He was educated at the Maronite college in Rome, and, after taking his doctor’s degree in theology and philosophy, returned for a time to his native land. He then became professor of Arabic and Syriac in the college of the Propaganda at Rome. Called to Paris in 1640 to assist Le Jay in the preparation of his polyglot Bible, he contributed to that work the Arabic and Latin versions of the book of Ruth and the Arabic version of the third book of Maccabees. In 1646 he was appointed professor of Syriac and Arabic at the Collège de France. Being invited by the Congregation of the Propaganda to take part in the preparation of an Arabic version of the Bible, Ecchellensis went again in 1652 or 1653 to Rome. He published several Latin translations of Arabic works, of which the most important was the Chronicon Orientale of Ibnar-Rāhib (Paris, 1653), a history of the patriarchs of Alexandria. He was engaged in an interesting controversy with John Selden as to the historical grounds of episcopacy, in the course of which he published his Eutychius vindicatus, sive Responsio ad Seldeni Origines (Rome, 1661). Conjointly with Giovanni Borelli he wrote a Latin translation of the 5th, 6th and 7th books of the Conics of Apollonius of Perga (1661). He died at Rome in 1664.

ECCLES, a municipal borough in the Eccles parliamentary division of Lancashire, England, 4 m. W. of Manchester, of which it forms practically a suburb. Pop. (1901) 34,369. It is served by the London & North-Western railway and by the Birkenhead railway (North-Western and Great Western joint). The Manchester Ship Canal passes through. The church of St Mary is believed to date from the 12th century, but has been enlarged and wholly restored in modern times. There are several handsome modern churches and chapels, a town hall, and numerous cotton mills, while silk-throwing and the manufacture of fustians and ginghams are also among the industries, and there are also large engine works. A peculiar form of cake is made here, taking name from the town, and has a wide reputation. Eccles was incorporated in 1892, and the corporation consists of a mayor, 6 aldermen and 18 councillors. The borough maintains the tramway service, &c., but water and gas are supplied from Manchester and Salford respectively. Area, 2057 acres.

Before the Reformation the monks of Whalley Abbey had a grange here at what is still called Monks’ Hall; and in 1864 many thousands of silver pennies of Henry III. and John of England and William I. of Scotland were discovered near the spot. Robert Ainsworth, the author of the Latin and English dictionary so long familiar to English students, was born at Eccles in 1660; and it was at the vicarage that William Huskisson expired on the 15th of September 1830 from injuries received at the opening of the Liverpool & Manchester railway. From early times “wakes” were held at Eccles, and bull-baiting, bear-baiting and cock-fighting were carried on. Under Elizabeth these festivals, which had become notoriously disorderly, were abolished, but were revived under James I., and maintained until late in the 19th century on public ground. The cockpit remained on the site of the present town hall. A celebration on private property still recalls these wakes.

ECCLESFIELD, a township in the Hallamshire parliamentary division of the West Riding of Yorkshire, England, 5 m. N. of Sheffield, on the Great Central and Midland railways. The church of St Mary is Perpendicular, with a central tower, and contains excellent woodwork. It formerly bore, and must have deserved, the familiar title of the “Minster of the Moors.” Ecclesfield was the seat of a Benedictine priory, which passed to the Carthusians in the 14th century. Cutlery and tools are largely manufactured, and there are coal-mines, paper mills and iron and fire-clay works. After the inclusion within the county borough of Sheffield of part of the civil parish of Ecclesfield in 1901, the population was 18,324.

ECCLESHALL, a market town in the north-western parliamentary division of Staffordshire, England; 7 m. N.W. from Stafford, and 4 W. of Norton Bridge station on the London & North-Western main line. Pop. (1901) 3799. The church of the Holy Trinity, one of the most noteworthy in Staffordshire, is principally Early English, and has fine stained glass. Several bishops of Lichfield are buried here, as Eccleshall Castle was the episcopal residence from the 13th century until 1867. Of this the ancient remains include a picturesque tower and bridge. To the west on the borders of Shropshire is Blore Heath, the scene of a defeat of the Lancastrians by the Yorkists in 1459.

ECCLESIA (Gr. ἐκκλησία, from ἐκ, out, and καλεῖν, to call), in ancient Athens, the general assembly of all the freemen of the state. In the primitive unorganized state the king was theoretically absolute, though his great nobles meeting in the Council (see Boulē) were no doubt able to influence him considerably. There is, however, no doubt that in the earliest times the free people, i.e. the fighting force of the state, were called together to ratify the decisions of the king, and that they were gradually able to enforce their wishes against those of the nobles. In Athens, as in Rome, where the Plebs succeeded in their demand for the codification of the laws (the Twelve Tables), it was no doubt owing to the growing power of the people meeting in the Agora that Draco was entrusted with the task of publishing a code of law and so putting an end to the arbitrary judicature of the aristocratic party. But there is no evidence that the Ecclesia had more than a de facto existence before Solon’s reforms.

The precise powers which Solon gave the people are not known. It is clear that the executive power in the state (see Archon) was still vested in the Eupatrid class. It is obvious, therefore, that a moderate reformer would endeavour to give to the people some control over the magistracy. Now in speaking of the Thetes (the lowest of the four Solonian classes; see Solon), Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens says that Solon gave them merely “a share in the Ecclesia and the Law Courts,” and in the Politics we find that he gave them the right of electing the magistrates and receiving their accounts at the end of the official year. Thus it seems that the “mixed” character of Solon’s constitution consisted in the fact that though the officials of the state were still necessarily Eupatrid, the Ecclesia elected those of the Eupatrids whom they could trust, and further had the right of criticizing their official actions. Secondly, all our accounts agree that Solon admitted the Thetes to the Ecclesia, thus recognizing them as citizens. Under Cleisthenes the Ecclesia remained the sovereign power, but the Council seems to have become to some extent a separate administrative body. The relation of Boulē and Ecclesia in the Cleisthenic democracy was of the greatest importance. The Ecclesia alone, a heterogeneous body of untrained citizens, could not have passed, nor even have drawn up intelligible measures; all the preliminary drafting was done by the small committee of the Boulē which was in session at any particular time. In the 5th century the functions of the Ecclesia and the popular courts of justice were vastly increased by the exigencies of empire. At the beginning of the 4th century B.C. the system of payment was introduced (see below). In 308 B.C. Demetrius of Phalerum curtailed the power of the Ecclesia by the institution of the Nomophylaces (Guardians of the Law), who prevented the Ecclesia from voting on an illegal or injurious motion. Under Roman rule the powers of the Ecclesia and the popular courts were much diminished, and after 48 B.C. (the franchise being frequently sold to any casual alien) the Demos (people) was of no importance. They still assembled to pass psephisms in the theatre and to elect strategi, and, under Hadrian, had some small judicial duties, but as a governing body the Ecclesia died when Athens became a civitas libera under Roman protection.

Constitution and Functions.—Throughout the period of Athenian greatness the Ecclesia was the sovereign power, not only in practice but also in theory. The assembly met in early times near the sanctuary of Aphrodite Pandemus (i.e. south of the Acropolis), but, in the 5th and 4th centuries, the regular place of meeting was the Pnyx. From the 5th century it met sometimes in the theatre, which in the 3rd century was the regular place. From Demosthenes we learn that in his time special meetings were held at Peiraeus, and, in the last centuries B.C., meetings were held at Athens and Peiraeus alternately. Certain meetings, however, for voting ostracism (q.v.) and on questions affecting individual status took place in the Agora. Meetings were (1) ordinary, (2) extraordinary, and (3) convened by special messengers (κύριαι, σύγκλητοι and κατάκλητοι), these last being called when it was desirable that the country people should attend. At ordinary meetings the attendance was practically confined to Athenian residents. According to Aristotle there were four regular meetings in each prytany (see Boulē); probably only the first of these was called κυρία. It is certain, however, that the four meetings did not fall on regular days, owing to the occurrence of feast days on which no meeting could take place. In the κυρία ἐκκλησία of each month took place the Epicheirotonia (monthly inquiry) of the state officials, and if it proved unsatisfactory a trial before the Heliaea was arranged; the council reported on the general security and the corn-supply, and read out lists of vacant inheritances and unmarried heiresses. In the sixth prytany of each year at the κυρία ἐκκλησία the question whether ostracism should take place that year was put to the vote. For all meetings it was usual that the Prytaneis should give five days’ notice in the form of a programma (agenda). On occasions of sudden importance the herald of the council summoned the people with a trumpet, and sometimes special messengers were despatched to “bring in” the country people (κατακαλεῖν).

After the archonship of Solon all Athenians over the age of eighteen were eligible to attend the assembly, save those who for some reason had suffered atimia (loss of civil rights). To prevent the presence of any disqualified persons, six lexiarchs with thirty assistants were present with the deme-rolls in their hands. These officers superintended the payment in the 4th century and probably the toxotae (police) also, whose duty it was before the introduction of pay to drive the people out of the Agora into the Ecclesia with a rope steeped in red dye which they stretched out and used as a draw net (see Aristoph. Acharn. 22 and Eccles. 378). The introduction of pay, which belongs to the early years of the 4th century and by the Constitution (c. 41 ad fin.) is attributed to Agyrrhius, a statesman of the restored democracy, was a device to secure a larger attendance. The rate rose from one to two obols and then to three obols (Aristoph. Eccles. 300 sqq.), while at the time of Aristotle it was one and a half drachmas for the κυρία ἐκκλησία and one drachma for other meetings. Probably those who were late did not receive payment.

Procedure.—The proceedings opened with formalities: the purification by the peristiarchs, who carried round slain sucking pigs; the curse against all who should deceive the people; the appointment (in the 4th century) of the proedri and their epistates (see Boulē); the report as to the weather-omens. The assembly was always dismissed if there were thunder, rain or an eclipse. These formalities over, the Prytaneis communicated the probouleuma of the council, without which the Ecclesia could not debate. This recommendation either submitted definite proposals or merely brought the agenda before the assembly. Its importance lay largely in the fact that it explained the business in hand, which otherwise must often have been beyond the grasp of a miscellaneous assembly. After the reading, a preliminary vote was taken as to whether the council’s report should be accepted en bloc. If it was decided to discuss, the herald called upon people to speak. Any person, without distinction of age or position, might obtain leave to speak, but it seems probable that the man who had moved the recommendation previously in the council would advocate it in the assembly. The council was, therefore, a check on the assembly, but its powers were to some extent illusory, because any member of the assembly (1) might propose an amendment, (2) might draw up a new resolution founded on the principal motion, (3) might move the rejection of the motion and the substitution of another, (4) might bring in a motion asking the council for a recommendation on a particular matter, (5) might petition the council for leave to speak on a given matter to the assembly. Voting usually was by show of hands, but in special cases (ostracism, &c.) by ballot (i.e. by casting pebbles into one of two urns). The decision of the assembly was called a psephism and had absolute validity. These decisions were deposited in the Metroön where state documents were preserved; peculiarly important decrees were inscribed also on a column (stēlē) erected on the Acropolis. It has been shown that the power of the council was far from sufficient. The real check on the vagaries of amateur legislators was the Graphē Paranomōn. Any man was at liberty to give notice that he would proceed against the mover of a given resolution either before or after the voting in the Ecclesia. A trial in a Heliastic court was then arranged, and the plaintiff had to prove that the resolution in question contravened an existing law. If this contention were upheld by the court, when the case was brought to it by the Thesmothetae, the resolution was annulled, and the defendant had to appear in a new trial for the assessment of the penalty, which was usually a fine, rarely death. Three convictions under this law, however, involved a certain loss of rights; the loser could no longer move a resolution in the Ecclesia. After the lapse of a year the mover of a resolution could not be attacked. In the 4th century the Graphē Paranomōn took the place of Ostracism (q.v.). In the 5th century it was merely an arrangement whereby the people sitting as sworn juries ratified or annulled their own first decision in the Ecclesia.

Revision of Laws.—In the 4th century, the assembly annually, on the eleventh day of Hecatombaeon (the first day of the official year), took a general vote on the laws, to decide whether revision was necessary. If the decision was in favour of alteration, it was open to any private citizen to put up notice of amendments. The Nomothetae, a panel selected by the Prytaneis from the Heliaea, heard arguments for and against the changes proposed and voted accordingly. Against all new laws so passed, there lay the Graphē; Paranomōn. Thus the Nomothetae, not the Ecclesia, finally passed the law.

Judicial Functions.—The Ecclesia heard cases of Probolē and Eisangelia (see Greek Law). The Probolē was an action against sycophants and persons who had not kept their promises to the people, or had disturbed a public festival. The verdict went by show of hands, but no legal consequences ensued; if the plaintiff demanded punishment he had to go to the Heliaea which were not at all bound by the previous vote in the Ecclesia. Cases of Eisangelia in which the penalty exceeded the legal competence of the council came before the Ecclesia in the form of a probouleuma. To prevent vexatious accusations, it was (at some date unknown) decided that the accuser who failed to obtain one-fifth of the votes should be fined 1000 drachmas (£40). (For the procedure in case of Ostracism see that article.)

Summary.—Thus it will be seen that the Ecclesia, with no formal organization, had absolute power save for the Graphē Paranomōn (which, therefore, constituted the dicasteries in one sense the sovereign power in the state). It dealt with all matters home and foreign. Every member could initiate legislation, and, as has been shown, the power of the council was merely formal. As against this it must be pointed out that it was by no means a representative assembly in practice. The phrase used to describe a very special assembly (κατάκλητος ἐκκλησία) shows that ordinarily the country members did not attend (κατακαλεῖν always involving the idea of motion from a distance towards Athens), and Thucydides says that 5000 was the maximum attendance, though it must be remembered that he is speaking of the time when the number of citizens had been much reduced owing to the plague and the Sicilian expedition. From this we understand the necessity of payment in the 4th century, although in that period the Ecclesia was supreme (Constitution of Athens, xli. 2). The functions of the Ecclesia thus differed in two fundamental respects from those which are in modern times associated with a popular assembly. (1) It did not exercise, at least in the period as to which we are best instructed, the power of law-making (νομοθεσία) in the strict sense. It must be remembered, however, in qualification of this statement that it possessed the power of passing psephismata which would in many cases be regarded as law in the modern sense. (2) The Ecclesia was principally concerned with the supervision of administration. Much of what we regard as executive functions were discharged by the Ecclesia.

With this article compare those on Solon; Boule; Areopagus; Greek Law, and, for other ancient popular assemblies, Apella; Comitia. See also A.H.J. Greenidge, Handbook of Greek Constitutional History (1896); Gilbert, Greek Constitutional Antiquities (trans. Brooks and Nicklin, 1895); Schömann, De comitiis Atheniensium; L. Schmidt, “De Atheniensis reipublicae indole democratica” in Ind. Lect. (Marburg, 1865); J.W. Headlam, Election by Lot at Athens (Cambridge, 1891). See also the histories of Greece by Meyer, Busolt, Grote, Evelyn Abbott, and J.E. Sandys’ edition of the Constitution of Athens (1892); for a comparative study, E.A. Freeman, Comparative Politics.

(J. M. M.)

ECCLESIASTES (Heb. קהלת, Kohelet, “Koheleth”; Sept. ἐκκλησιαστής; Jerome concionator), one of the Wisdom Books of the Old Testament (see Wisdom Literature). The book, as it stands, is a collection of the discourses, observations and aphorisms of a sage called Koheleth, a term the precise meaning of which is not certain. The Greek ecclesiastes means one who takes part in the deliberations of an assembly (ecclesia), a debater or speaker in an assembly (Plato, Gorgias, 452 E), and this is the general sense of the Hebrew word. Its form (singular feminine) has been supposed to be the adoption or imitation of the Arabic employment of a fem. sing. as the designation of a high official person, as is the case in the title caliph (whence the rendering in the margin of the Revised Version, “Great orator”); but the adoption of an Arabic idiom is not probable. This usage is not Hebrew; it is not found either in the Old Testament or in the later (Mishnaic) Hebrew. The form may have been suggested by that of the Hebrew word for “wisdom.” Koheleth, however, is employed in the book not as a title of wisdom (for “wisdom” is never the speaker), but as the independent name of the sage. It is intended to represent him as a member of an assembly (Kahal)—not the Jewish congregation, but a body of students or inquirers, such as is referred to in xii. 9-11, a sort of collegium, of which he was the head; and as instructor of this body he gives his criticism of life. The author begins, indeed, with identifying his sage with King Solomon (i. 12-ii. 11, 12b); but he soon abandons this literary device, and speaks in his own name. The rendering “preacher” has a misleading connotation.

In the book as we have it there is no orderly exposition of a theory; it rather has the appearance of a collection of remarks jotted down by a pupil (somewhat after the manner of Xenophon’s Memorabilia), or of extracts from a sage’s notebook. It is, however, characterized throughout (except in some scribal additions) by a definite thought, and pervaded by a definite tone of feeling. The keynote is given in the classic phrase with which the discussion opens and with which it closes: “Vanity of vanities (i.e. absolute vanity), all1 is vanity!” Life, says the author, has nothing of permanent value to offer. His attitude is one not of bitterness but of calm hopelessness, with an occasional tinge of disgust or contempt. He fancies that he has tried or observed everything in human experience, and his deliberate conclusion is that nothing is worth doing. He believes in an all-powerful but indifferent God, and is himself an observer of society, standing aloof from its passions and ambitions, and interested only in pointing out their emptiness.

This general view is set forth in a number of particular observations.

1. His fundamental proposition is that there is a fixed, unchangeable order in the world, a reign of inflexible law (i. 4-11, iii. 1-11, 14, 15, vii. 13, viii. 5-9): natural phenomena, such as sunrise and sunset, recur regularly; for everything in human experience a time has been set; birth and death, building up and destroying, laughing and weeping, silence and speech, love and hate, war and peace, are to be regarded not as utterances of a living, self-directing world, but as incidents in the work of a vast machine that rolls on for ever; there is an endless repetition—nothing is new, nothing is lost; if one thinks he has found something new, inquiry shows that it was in existence long ago; God, the author of all, seeks out the past in order to make it once more present; it is impossible to add to or take from the content of the world, impossible to change the nature of things, to effect any radical betterment of life; the result is unspeakable weariness—a depressing series of sights and sounds. No goal or purpose is discoverable in this eternal round; if the sun rises and goes on his journey through the sky, it is merely to come back to the place where he rose; rivers flow for ever into the sea without filling it. To what end was the world created? It is impossible to say. Such is Koheleth’s view of life, and it is obvious that such a conception of an aimless cosmos is thoroughly non-Jewish, if we may judge Jewish thought by the great body of the extant literature.

2. Further, says Koheleth, man is impelled to study the world, but under the condition that he shall never comprehend it (iii. 11, vii. 23, 24, viii. 16, 17). As to the meaning of the Hebrew term olam in iii. 11, there are various opinions, but “world” appears to be the rendering favoured by the connexion: “God has made everything beautiful in its time, and has put the olam into men’s minds, yet so that they cannot understand His work”: the olam, the sum of phenomena, is God’s work. The word is not found in this sense elsewhere in the Old Testament, but it so occurs in the Mishna (Pirke Aboth, iv. 7), and the vocabulary of Ecclesiastes is admittedly similar to that of the Mishna. Only here in the Old Testament does it stand as a simple isolated noun; elsewhere it is the definition of a noun (in “everlasting covenant,” &c.), or it is preceded by a preposition, in the phrases “for ever,” “of old,” or it stands alone (sing. or plur.) in the same adverbial sense, “for ever.” The word means first a remote point in past or future, then a future point without limit of time, then a period of history, and finally the world considered as a mass of human experiences (cf. αἰών). The renderings “eternity” and “future” in the present passage are unsatisfactory; the former has an inappropriate metaphysical connotation, and yields no distinct sense; the latter does not suit the connexion, though there is reference to the future elsewhere (ix. 1). God, the text here declares, has made the world an object of man’s thought, yet so that man can never find out the work that God has done (iii. 11). The reference seems to be not so much to the variety and complexity of phenomena as to the impossibility of construing them rationally or in such a way that man may foresee and provide for his future. Man is in the clutches of fate (ix. 11, 12): there is no observable relation between exertion and result in life: the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong; success does not attend wisdom, knowledge and skill; men are like fish taken in a net or birds caught in a snare.

3. Human life, Koheleth declares, is unsatisfying. He inquired, he says, into everything that is done by men under the sun (i. 12-16): God has inflicted on men a restless desire for movement and work2, yet life is but a catalogue of fruitless struggles. He gives a number of illustrations. In his character of king he tried all the bodily pleasures of life (ii. 1-11): he had houses, vineyards, gardens, parks, ponds, forests, servants, flocks and herds, treasures of gold and silver, singers, wives; all these he set himself to enjoy in a rational way—indeed, he found a certain pleasure in carrying out his designs, but, when all was done, he surveyed it only to see that it was weary and unprofitable. Dropping the rôle of Solomon and speaking as an observer of life, the author declares (iv. 4) that the struggle for success is the result of rivalry among men, which has no worthy outcome. The securing of riches is a fallacious achievement, for often wealth perishes by some accident (v. 13 f.), or its possessor is unable to enjoy it (vi. 1-3a), or he has no one to whom to leave it, and he cannot keep it—naked man comes into the world, naked he goes out. He does not consider the possibility of deriving enjoyment from wealth by helping the poor or encouraging learning (this latter, indeed, he looks on as vanity), and in general he recognizes no obligation on the part of a man to his fellows. A noteworthy survival of an old belief is found in vi. 3: though a man have the great good fortune to live long and to have many children, yet, if he have not proper burial the blank darkness of an untimely birth is better than he: this latter is merely the negation of existence; the former, it appears to be held, is positive misfortune, the loss of a desirable place in Sheol, though elsewhere (ix. 5) existence in Sheol is represented as the negation of real life. It is not necessary to suppose that the writer has here any particular case in mind.

If wealth be thus a vain thing, yet a sage might be supposed to find satisfaction in wisdom, that is, practical good sense and sagacity; but this also the author puts aside as bringing no lasting advantage, since a wise man must finally give up the fruit of his wisdom to someone else, who may be a fool, and in any case the final result for both fools and wise men is the same—both are forgotten (ii. 12-23). A particular instance is mentioned (ix. 13-15) of a beleaguered city saved by a wise man; but the man happened to be poor, and no one remembered him. The whole constitution of society, in fact, seems to the sage a lamentable thing: the poor are oppressed, the earth is full of their cries, and there is no helper (iv. 1); strange social upheavals may be seen: the poor3 set in high places, the rich cast down, slaves on horseback, princes on foot (x. 5-7). He permits himself a sweeping generalization (vii. 25-28): human beings as a rule are bad: one may occasionally find a good man, never a good woman—woman is a snare and a curse. He (or an editor) adds (vii. 29) that this condition of things is due to social development: man was created upright (Gen. i. 27; Enoch lxix. 11), but in the course of history has introduced corrupting complications into life.

4. The natural outcome of these experiences of the author is that he cannot recognize a moral government of the world. He finds, like Job, that there are good men who die prematurely notwithstanding their goodness, and bad men who live long notwithstanding their badness (vii. 15), though long life, it is assumed, is one of the great blessings of man’s lot; and in general there is no moral discrimination in the fortunes of men (viii. 14, ix. 2).

5. There is no sacredness or dignity in man or in human life: man has no pre-eminence over beasts, seeing that he and they have the same final fate, die and pass into the dust, and no one knows what becomes of the spirit, whether in man’s case it goes up to heaven, and in the case of beasts goes down into Sheol—death is practically the end-all; and so poor a thing is life that the dead are to be considered more fortunate than the living, and more to be envied than either class is he who never came into existence (iv. 2, 3). It is a special grievance that the wicked when they die are buried with pomp and ceremony, while men who have acted well are forgotten4 in the city (viii. 10).

6. That the author does not believe in a happy or active future life appears in the passage (iv. 2, 3) quoted above. The old Hebrew view of the future excluded from Sheol the common activities of life and also the worship of the national god (Isa. xxxviii. 18); he goes even beyond this in his conception of the blankness of existence in the underworld. The living, he says, at least know that they shall die, but the dead know nothing—the memory of them, their love, hate and envy, perishes, they have no reward, no part in earthly life (ix. 5, 6); there is absolutely no knowledge and no work in Sheol (ix. 10). His conclusion is that men should do now with all their might what they have to do; the future of man’s vital part, the spirit, is wholly uncertain.

7. His conception of God is in accord with these views. God for him is the creator and ruler of the world, but hardly more; he is the master of a vast machine that grinds out human destinies without sympathy with man and without visible regard for what man deems justice—a being to be acknowledged as lord, not one to be loved. There can thus be no social contact between man and God, no communion of soul, no enthusiasm of service. Moral conduct is to be regulated not by divine law (of this nothing is said) but by human experience. The author’s theism is cold, spiritless, without influence on life.

If now the question be asked what purpose or aim a man can have, seeing that there is nothing of permanent value in human work, an answer is given which recurs, like a refrain, from the beginning to the end of the book, and appears to be from the hand of the original author: after every description of the vanity of things comes the injunction to enjoy such pleasures as may fall to one’s lot (ii. 24, 25, iii. 12, 13, 22, v. 18, 19, viii. 15, ix. 7-10, xi. 7-xii. 7). Elsewhere (ii.), it is true, it is said that there is no lasting satisfaction in pleasure; but the sage may mean to point out that, though there is no permanent outcome to life, it is the part of common-sense to enjoy what one has. The opportunity and the power to enjoy are represented as being the gift of God; but this statement is not out of accord with the author’s general position, which is distinctly theistic. All the passages just cited, except the last (xi. 7-xii. 7), are simple and plain, but the bearing of the last is obscured by interpolations. Obviously the purpose of the paragraph is to point out the wisdom of enjoying life in the time of youth while the physical powers are fresh and strong, and the impotency of old age has not yet crept in. Omitting xi. 8c, 9b, 10b, xii. 1a, the passage will read: “Life is pleasant in the bright sunshine—however long a man may live, he must be cheerful always, only remembering that dark days will come. Let the young man enjoy all the pleasures of youth, putting away everything painful, before the time comes when his bodily powers decay and he can enjoy nothing.” To relieve the apparent Epicureanism of this passage, an editor has inserted reminders of the vanity of youthful pleasures, and admonitions to remember God and His judgment. The author, however, does not recommend dissipation, and does not mean to introduce a religious motive—he offers simply a counsel of prudence. The exhortation to remember the Creator in the days of youth, though it is to be retained in the margin as a pious editorial addition, here interrupts the line of thought. In xii. 1a some critics propose to substitute for “remember thy Creator” the expression of xi. 9, “let thy heart cheer thee”; but the repetition is improbable. Others would read: “remember thy cistern” (Bickell), or “thy well” (Haupt), that is, thy wife. The wife is so called in Prov. v. 15-19 in an elaborate poetical figure (the wife as a source of bodily pleasure), in which the reference is clear from the context; but there is no authority, in the Old Testament or in other literature of this period, for taking the term as a simple prose designation of a wife. Nor would this reference to the wife be appropriate in the connexion, since the writer’s purpose is simply to urge men to enjoy life while they can. The paragraph (and the original book) concludes with a sustained and impressive figure, in which the failing body of the old man is compared to a house falling into decay: first, the bodily organs (xii. 3, 4a): the keepers of the house (the arms and hands) tremble, the strong men (the legs and perhaps the backbone) are bent, the grinding women (the teeth) cease to work, those that look out of the windows (the eyes) are darkened, the street-doors are shut, the sound of the mill being low (apparently a summary statement of the preceding details: communication with the outer world through the senses is cut off, the performance of bodily functions being feeble); the rest of v. 4 may refer to the old man’s inability to make or hear music: in the house there is no sound of birds5 or of singers, there are none of the artistic delights of a well-to-do household; further (v. 5a) the inmates of the house fear dangers from all powerful things and persons (the old man is afraid of everything), the almond tree blossoms (perhaps the hair turns white). The two next clauses are obscure.6 Then comes the end: man goes to his everlasting home; the dust (the body) returns to the earth whence it came (Gen. ii. 7), and the breath of life, breathed by God into the body, returns to him who gave it. This last clause does not affirm the immortality of the soul; it is simply an explanation of what becomes of the vital principle (the “breath of life” of Gen. ii. 7); its positive assertion is not in accord with the doubt expressed in iii. 21 (“who knows whether the spirit of man goes upward?”), and it seems to be from another hand than that of the author of the original book.

There are other sayings in the book that appear to be at variance with its fundamental thought. Wisdom is praised in a number of passages (iv. 13, vii. 5, 11, 12, 19, viii. 1, ix. 16, 17, x. 2, 3), though it is elsewhere denounced as worthless. It may be said that the author, while denying that wisdom (practical sagacity and level-headedness) can give permanent satisfaction, yet admits its practical value in the conduct of life. This may be so; but it would be strange if a writer who could say, “in much wisdom is much grief,” should deliberately laud wisdom. The question is not of great importance and may be left undecided. It may be added that there are in the book a number of aphorisms about fools (v. 3[4], vii. 5, 6, x. 1-3, 12-15) quite in the style of the book of Proverbs, some of them contrasting the wise man and the fool; these appear to be the insertions of an editor. Further, it may be concluded with reasonable certainty that the passages that affirm a moral government of the world are additions by pious editors who wished to bring the book into harmony with the orthodox thought of the time. Such assertions as those of ii. 26 (God gives joy to him who pleases him, and makes the sinner toil to lay up for the latter), viii. 12 (it shall be well with those that fear God, but not with the wicked), xii. 13 f. (man’s duty is simply to obey the commands of God, for God will bring everything into judgment) are irreconcilable with the oft-repeated statement that there is no difference in the earthly lots of the righteous and the wicked, and no ethical life after death.

Many practical admonitions and homely aphorisms are scattered through the book: iv. 5, quiet is a blessing; iv. 9-12, two are better than one; iv. 17 (Eng. v. 1), be reverent in visiting the house of God (the temple and the connected buildings)—to listen (to the service of song or the reading of Scripture) is better than to offer a foolish (thoughtless) sacrifice; v. 1 (2), be sparing of words in addressing God; v. 1-5 (2-6), pay your vows—do not say to the priest’s messenger that you made a mistake; vii. 2-4, sorrow is better than mirth; vii. 16-18, be not over-righteous (over-attentive to details of ritual and convention) or over-wicked (flagrantly neglectful of established beliefs and customs); here “righteous” and “wicked” appear to be technical terms designating two parties in the Jewish world of the 2nd and 1st centuries B.C., the observers and the non-observers of the Jewish ritual law; these parties represent in a general way the Pharisees and the Sadducees; viii. 2-4, x. 20, it is well to obey kings and to be cautious in speaking about them, for there are talebearers everywhere; vii. 20, no man is free from sin; vii. 21, do not listen to all that you may overhear, lest you hear yourself ill spoken of; ix. 4, a living dog is better than a dead lion; xi. 1-6, show prudence and decision in business; do not set all your goods on one venture; act promptly and hope for the best. At the close of the book (xii. 9-12) there are two observations that appear to be editorial recommendations and cautions. First, Koheleth is endorsed as an industrious, discriminating and instructive writer. Possibly this is in reply to objections that had been made to what he had written. There follows an obscure passage (v. 11) which seems to be meant as a commendation of the teaching of the sages in general: their words are said to be like goads (inciting to action) and like nails driven in a building (giving firmness to character); they issue from masters of assemblies,7 heads of academies (but not of the Sanhedrin). The succeeding clause “they are given from one shepherd” may refer to a collection or revision by one authoritative person, but its relevancy is not obvious. The “shepherd” cannot be God (Gen. xlix. 24; Ps. xxiii. 1); the poetical use of the word would not be appropriate here. The clause is possibly a gloss, a comment on the preceding expression. A caution against certain books is added (v. 12), probably works then considered harmful (perhaps philosophic treatises), of which, however, nothing further is known.

Composition of the Book.—If the analysis given above is correct, the book is not a unit; it contains passages mutually contradictory and not harmonizable. Various attempts have been made to establish its unity. The hypothesis of “two voices” is now generally abandoned; there is no indication of a debate, of affirmations and responses. A more plausible theory is that the author is an honest thinker, a keen observer and critic of life, who sees that the world is full of miseries and unsolved problems, regards as futile the attempts of his time to demonstrate an ethically active future life, and, recognizing a divine author of all, holds that the only wise course for men is to abandon the attempt to get full satisfaction out of the struggle for pleasure, riches and wisdom, and to content themselves with making the best of what they have. This conception of him is largely true, as is pointed out above, but it does not harmonize the contradictions of the book, the discrepancies between the piety of some passages and the emotional indifference toward God shown in others. Other of the Biblical Wisdom books (Job, Proverbs) are compilations—why not this? It is not necessary to multiply authors, as is done, for example, by Siegfried, who supposes four principal writers (a pessimistic philosopher, an Epicurean glossator, a sage who upholds the value of wisdom, and an orthodox editor) besides a number of annotators; it is sufficient to assume that several conservative scribes have made short additions to the original work. Nor is it worth while to attempt a logical or symmetrical arrangement of the material. It has been surmised (by Bickell) that the sheets of the original codex became disarranged and were rearranged incorrectly;8 by other critics portions of the book are transferred hither and thither; in all cases the critic is guided in these changes by what he conceives to have been the original form of the book. But it is more probable that we have it in the form in which it grew up—a series of observations by the original author with interspersed editorial remarks; and it is better to preserve the existing form as giving a record of the process of growth.

Date.—As to the date of the book, though there are still differences of opinion among scholars, there is a gradual approach to a consensus. The Solomonic authorship has long since been given up: the historical setting of the work and its atmosphere—the silent assumption of monotheism and monogamy, the non-national tone, the attitude towards kings and people, the picture of a complicated social life, the strain of philosophic reflection—are wholly at variance with what is known of the 10th century B.C. and with the Hebrew literature down to the 5th or 4th century B.C. The introduction of Solomon, the ideal of wisdom, is a literary device of the later time, and probably deceived nobody. The decisive considerations for the determination of the date are the language, the historical background and the thought. The language belongs to the post-classical period of Hebrew. The numerous Aramaisms point to a time certainly not earlier than the 4th century B.C., and probably (though the history of the penetration of Aramaic into Hebrew speech is not definitely known) not earlier than the 3rd century. More than this, there are many resemblances between the dialect of Koheleth and that of Mishna. Not only are new words employed, and old words in new significations, but the grammatical structure has a modern stamp—some phrases have the appearance of having been translated out of Aramaic into Hebrew. By about the beginning of our era the Jews had given up Hebrew and wrote in Aramaic; the process of expulsion had been going on, doubtless, for some time; but comparison with the later extant literature (Chronicles, the Hebrew Ecclesiasticus or Ben-Sira, Esther) makes it improbable that such Hebrew as that of Koheleth would have been written earlier than the 2nd century B.C. (for details see Driver’s Introduction). The general historical situation, also, presupposed or referred to, is that of the period from the year 200 B.C. to the beginning of our era; in particular, the familiar references to kings as a part of the social system, and to social dislocations (servants and princes changing places, x. 7), suggest the troublous time of the later Greek and the Maccabean rulers, of which the history of Josephus gives a good picture.

The conception of the world and of human life as controlled by natural law, a naturalistic cosmos, is alien not only to the prophetic and liturgical Hebrew literature but also to Hebrew thought in general. Whether borrowed or not, it must be late; and its resemblance to Greek ideas suggests Greek influence. The supposition of such influence is favoured by some critics (Tyler, Plumptre, Palm, Siegfried, Cheyne in his Jewish Religious Life after the Exile, and others), rejected by some (Zeller, Renan, Kleinert and others). This disagreement comes largely from the attempts made to find definitely expressed Greek philosophical dogmas in the book; such formulas it has not, but the general air of Greek reflection seems unmistakable. The scepticism of Koheleth differs from that of Job in quality and scope: it is deliberate and calm, not wrung out by personal suffering; and it relates to the whole course and constitution of nature, not merely to the injustices of fortune. Such a conception has a Greek tinge, and would be found in Jewish circles, probably, not before the 2nd century B.C.

A precise indication of date has been sought in certain supposed references or allusions to historical facts. The mention of persons who do not sacrifice or take oaths (ix. 2) is held by some to point to the Essenes; if this be so, it is not chronologically precise, since we have not the means of determining the beginning of the movement of thought that issued in Essenism. So also the coincidences of thought with Ben-Sira (Ecclesiasticus) are not decisive: cf. iii. 14 with B.S. xviii. 6; v. 2-6 (3-7) with B.S. xxxiv. 1-7; vii. 19 with B.S. xxxvii. 14; x. 8 with B.S. xxvii. 26a; xi. 10 with B.S. xxx. 21; xii. 10, 11 with B.S. xxxix. 2 ff., xii. 13 with B.S. xliii. 27; if there be borrowing in these passages, it is not clear on which side it lies; and it is not certain that there is borrowing—the thoughts may have been taken independently by the two authors from the same source. In any case, since Ben-Sira belongs to about 180 B.C., the date of Koheleth, so far as these coincidences indicate it, would not be far from 200 B.C. The contrast made in x. 16 f. between a king who is a boy and one who is of noble birth may allude to historical persons. The antithesis is not exact; we expect either “boy and mature man” or “low-born and high-born.” The “child” might be Antiochus V. (164 B.C.), or Ptolemy V., Epiphanes (204 B.C.), but the reference is too general to be decisive. The text of the obscure passage iv. 13-16 is in bad condition, and it is only by considerable changes that a clear meaning can be got from it. The two personages—the “old and foolish king” and the “poor and wise youth”—have been supposed (by Winckler) to be Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164 B.C.) and Demetrius (162-150 B.C.), or (by Haupt) Antiochus and the impostor Alexander Balas (150-146 B.C.), or (by others) Demetrius and Alexander; in favour of Alexander as the “youth” it may be said that he was of obscure origin, was at first popular, and was later abandoned by his friends. Such identifications, however, do not fix the date of the book precisely; the author may have referred to events that happened before his time. The reign of Herod, a period of despotism and terror, and of strife between Jewish religious parties, is preferred by some scholars (Grätz, Cheyne and others) as best answering to the social situation depicted in the book, while still others (as Renan) decide for the reign of Alexander Jannaeus (104-78 B.C.). The data are not numerous and distinct enough to settle the question beyond determining general limits: for reasons given above the book can hardly have been composed before about 200 B.C., and if, as is probable, a Septuagint translation of it was made (though the present Septuagint text shows the influence of Aquila), it is to be put earlier than 50 B.C. Probably also, its different parts are of different dates.

Of the author nothing is known beyond the obvious fact that he was a man of wide observation and philosophic thought, of the Sadducean type in religion, but non-Jewish in his attitude toward life. He was, doubtless, a man of high standing, but neither a king nor a high-priest, certainly not the apostate priest Alcimus (1 Macc. vii. ix.); nor was he necessarily a physician—there are no details in ch. xii. or elsewhere that any man of good intelligence might not know. The book is written in prose, some of which is rhythmical, with bits of verse here and there: thus i. 2-11 is balanced prose, 12-14 plain prose, 15 a couplet, i. 16-ii. 25 simple prose, vii. contains a number of poetical aphorisms, and so on. Some of the verses are apparently from the author, some from editors.

The fortunes of the book are not known in detail, but it is clear that its merciless criticism of life and its literary charm made it popular, while its scepticism excited the apprehensions of pious conservatives. Possibly the Wisdom of Solomon (c. 50 B.C.) was written partly as a reply to it. The claim of sacredness made for it was warmly contested by some Jewish scholars. In spite of the relief afforded by orthodox additions, it was urged that its Epicurean sentiments contradicted the Torah and favoured heresy. Finally, by some process of reasoning not fully recorded, the difficulties were set aside and the book was received into the sacred canon; Jerome (on Eccl. xii. 13, 14) declares that the decisive fact was the orthodox statement at the end of the book: the one important thing is to fear God and keep His commandments. The probability is that the book had received the stamp of popular approbation before the end of the 1st century of our era, and the leading men did not dare to reject it. It is not certain that it is quoted in the New Testament, but it appears to be included in Josephus’ list of sacred books.

Literature.—For the older works see Zöckler (in Lange’s Comm.); for Jewish commentaries see Zedner, Cat. of Heb. books in Libry. of Brit. Mus. (1867), and for the history of the interpretations, C.D. Ginsburg, Coheleth (1861). Introductions of A. Kuenen, S.R. Driver, Cornhill, König. Articles in Herzog-Hauck, Realencykl. (by P. Kleinert); Hastings, Dict. Bible (by A.S. Peake); T.K. Cheyne, Encycl. Bibl. (by A.B. Davidson); Jew. Encycl. (by D.S. Margoliouth). Commentaries: F. Hitzig (1847); C.D. Ginsburg (1861); H. Grätz (1871); Tyler (1874); Delitzsch (1875); E.H. Plumptre (1881); C.H.H. Wright (1883); Nowack, revision of Hitzig (1883); Volck (in Strack u. Zöckler’s Kurzgef. Komm., 1889); Wildeboer (in Marti’s Kurzer Hand-Comm., 1898); C. Siegfried (in W. Nowack’s Handkomm., 1898); Oort (in De Oude Test., 1899). Other works: C. Taylor, Dirge of Koh. (1874); Wünsche, Midrash on Koh. (in his Biblioth. rabbin., 1880); E. Renan, L’Ecclésiaste (1882); Bickell, Der Prediger (1884) and Kohel.-Untersuchungen (1886; Engl. by E.J. Dillon, Sceptics of Old Test., 1895); Schiffer, Das Buch Koh. nach d. Auffass. d. Weisen d. Talmuds, &c. (1884); A. Palm, Qoh. u. d. nach-aristotel. Philosophie (1885) and Die Qoh.-Lit. (1886); E. Pfleiderer, Die Phil. d. Heraklit, &c. (1886); Cheyne, Job and Solomon (1887) and Jew. Relig. Life, &c. (1898); W. Euringer, Der Masorahtext d. Koh. (1890); W.T. Davison, Wisdom-Lit. of Old Test. (1894); H. Winckler, in his Altorient. Forschungen (1898); J.F. Genung, Words of Koh. (Boston, Mass., 1904); P. Haupt, Ecclesiastes (Baltimore, 1905). The rabbinical discussions of the book are mentioned in Shabbath, 30b; Megilla, 7a; Eduyoth, v. 3; Mishna Yadaim, iii. 5, iv. 6; Midrash Koheleth (on xi. 9), Aboth d’ Rab. Nathan, i.

(C. H. T.*)

1 The Hebrew has the definite article, “the whole,” τὸ πᾶν.

2 In fact, he suggests, a curse, as in Gen. iii. 17-19, though with a wider sweep than that passage has in mind.

3 The text has “folly,” but the parallelism and v. 7 point to social, not intellectual, conditions, and a slight change (מסכן for הסכל) gives the sense “poor.”

4 The Septuagint has less well: “They (the wicked) are praised in the city.”

5 The clause is obscure; literally “he (or, one) rises at (?) the voice of the bird,” usually understood to refer to the old man’s inability to sleep in the morning; but this is not a universal trait of old age, and besides, a reference to affairs in the house is to be expected; the Hebrew construction also is of doubtful correctness. A change of the Hebrew text seems necessary; possibly we should read ישפל קול, “low is the voice,” instead of יקום לקול “he rises up at the voice.”

6 The second is perhaps to be read: “the caper-berry blooms” (white hair); usually “the caper-berry loses its appetizing power”; Eng. Auth. Vers. “desire shall fail.” For the meaning of the word abyona (“caper-berry,” not “desire” or “poverty”), see art. by G.F. Moore in Journ. of Bibl. Lit. x. 1 (Boston, Mass., 1891).

7 This is the Talmudic understanding of the Hebrew expression (Jerus. Sanhed. 10, 28a, cf. Sanhed. 12a; see Ecclus. xxxix. 2). There is no good authority for the renderings “collectors of maxims,” “collections of maxims.”

8 It is not certain that the codex form was in use in Palestine or in Egypt as early as the 2nd or the 1st century B.C.

ECCLESIASTICAL COMMISSIONERS, in England, a body corporate, whose full title is “Ecclesiastical and Church Estates Commissioners for England,” invested with very important powers, under the operation of which extensive changes have been made in the distribution of the revenues of the Established Church. Their appointment was one of the results of the vigorous movements for the reform of public institutions which followed the Reform Act of 1832. In 1835 two commissions were appointed “to consider the state of the several dioceses of England and Wales, with reference to the amount of their revenues and the more equal distribution of episcopal duties, and the prevention of the necessity of attaching by commendam to bishoprics certain benefices with cure of souls; and to consider also the state of the several cathedral and collegiate churches in England and Wales, with a view to the suggestion of such measures as might render them conducive to the efficiency of the established church, and to provide for the best mode of providing for the cure of souls, with special reference to the residence of the clergy on their respective benefices.” And it was enacted by an act of 1835 that during the existence of the commission the profits of dignities and benefices without cure of souls becoming vacant should be paid over to the treasurer of Queen Anne’s Bounty. In consequence of the recommendation of these commissioners, a permanent commission was appointed by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners Act 1836 for the purpose of preparing and laying before the king in council such schemes as should appear to them to be best adapted for carrying into effect the alterations suggested in the report of the original commission and recited in the act. The new commission was constituted a corporation with power to purchase and hold lands for the purposes of the act, notwithstanding the statutes of mortmain. The first members of the commission were the two archbishops and three bishops, the lord chancellor and the principal officers of state, and three laymen named in the act.

The constitution of the commission was amended by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners Act 1840 and subsequent acts, and now consists of the two archbishops, all the bishops, the deans of Canterbury, St Paul’s and Westminster, the lord chancellor, the lord president of the council, the first lord of the treasury, the chancellor of the exchequer, the home secretary, the lord chief justice, the master of the rolls, two judges of the admiralty division, and certain laymen appointed by the crown and by the archbishop of Canterbury. The lay commissioners are required to be “members of the Church of England, and to subscribe a declaration to that effect.” The crown also appoints two laymen as church estates commissioners, and the archbishop of Canterbury one. These three are the joint treasurers of the commission, and constitute, along with two members appointed by the commission, the church estates committee, charged with all business relating to the sale, purchase, exchange, letting or management of any lands, tithes or hereditaments. The commission has power to make inquiries and examine witnesses on oath. Five commissioners are a quorum for the transaction of business, provided two of them are church estates commissioners; two ecclesiastical commissioners at least must be present at any proceeding under the common seal, and if only two are present they can demand its postponement to a subsequent meeting. The schemes of the commission having, after due notice to persons affected thereby, been laid before the king in council, may be ratified by orders, specifying the times when they shall take effect, and such orders when published in the London Gazette have the same force and effect as acts of parliament.

The recommendations of the commission recited in the act of 1836 are too numerous to be given here. They include an extensive rearrangement of the dioceses, equalization of episcopal income, providing residences, &c. By the act of 1840 the fourth report of the original commissioners, dealing chiefly with cathedral and collegiate churches, was carried into effect, a large number of canonries being suspended, and sinecure benefices and dignities suppressed.

The emoluments of these suppressed or suspended offices, and the surplus income of the episcopal sees, constitute the fund at the disposal of the commissioners. By an act of 1860, on the avoidance of any bishopric or archbishopric, all the land and emoluments of the see, except the patronage and lands attached to houses of residence, become, by order in council, vested in the commissioners, who may, however, reassign to the see so much of the land as may be sufficient to secure the net annual income named for it by statute or order. All the profits and emoluments of the suspended canonries, &c., pass over to the commissioners, as well as the separate estates of those deaneries and canonries which are not suspended. Out of this fund the expenses of the commission are to be paid, and the residue is to be devoted to increasing the efficiency of the church by the augmentation of the smaller bishoprics and of poor livings, the endowment of new churches, and employment of additional ministers.

The substitution of one central corporation for the many local and independent corporations of the church, so far at least as the management of property is concerned, was a constitutional change of great importance, and the effect of it undoubtedly was to correct the anomalous distribution of ecclesiastical revenues by equalizing incomes and abolishing sinecures. At the same time it was regarded as having made a serious breach in the legal theory of ecclesiastical property. “The important principle,” says Cripps, “on which the inviolability of the church establishment depends, that the church generally possesses no property as a corporation, or which is applicable to general purposes, but that such particular ecclesiastical corporation, whether aggregate or sole, has its property separate, distinct and inalienable, according to the intention of the original endowment, was given up without an effort to defend it” (Law Relating to the Church and Clergy, p. 46).

ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION. This phrase in its primary sense imports not jurisdiction over ecclesiastics, but jurisdiction exercised by ecclesiastics over other ecclesiastics and over the laity. “Jurisdiction” is a word borrowed from the jurists which has acquired a wide extension in theology, wherein, for example, it is frequently used in contradistinction to “order,” to express the right to administer sacraments as something superadded to the power to celebrate them. So it is used to express the territorial or other limits of ecclesiastical, executive or legislative authority. Here it is used, in the limited sense defined by an American Court, as “the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance of and decide causes.”

Such authority in the minds of lay Roman lawyers who first used this word “jurisdiction” was essentially temporal in its origin and in its sphere. The Christian Church transferred the notion to the spiritual domain as part of Origin of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. the general idea of a Kingdom of God correlative, on the spiritual side of man upon earth, to the powers, also ordained of God, who had dominion over his temporal estate (see Canon Law). As the Church in the earliest ages had executive and legislative power in its own spiritual sphere, so also it had “judicial officers,” “taking cognizance of and deciding causes.” Only before its union with the State, its power in this direction, as in others, was merely over the spirits of men. Coercive temporal authority over their bodies or estates could only be given by concession from the temporal prince. Moreover, even spiritual authority over members of the Church, i.e. baptized persons, could not be exclusively claimed as of right by the Church tribunals, if the subject matter of the cause were purely temporal. On the other hand, it is clear that all the faithful were subject to these courts (when acting within their own sphere), and that, in the earliest times, no distinction was made in this respect between clergy and laity.

The fundamental principle of ecclesiastical jurisdiction with its “sanction” of excommunication will be found in Christ’s words in Matt. xviii. 15-18. A very early example of criminal spiritual jurisdiction exercised by St Paul is found in the case of the incestuous Corinthian (1 Cor. v.). We find later the same apostle exercising like jurisdiction in the cause of Hymenaeus and Alexander (1 Tim. i. 20). After the time of the Apostles, we find this criminal jurisdiction exercised by the bishops individually over their respective “subjects”—doubtless with the advice of their presbyters according to the precept of St Ignatius (c. 110). As neighbouring dioceses coalesced into “provinces” and provinces into larger districts (corresponding to the civil “dioceses” of the later Roman Empire), the provincial synods of bishops and the synods of the larger districts acquired a criminal jurisdiction, still purely spiritual, of their own. At first this was “original” and mainly (although not exclusively) over bishops (of the province or larger district). The beginnings of an appellate jurisdiction in the cases of clerics and laymen may be traced before the conversion of the Empire. The bishop over whom the synod of neighbouring bishops had exercised jurisdiction had no formal right of appeal; but sometimes bishops in other parts of the Church would refuse to acknowledge the local synodical sentence and would communicate with a bishop whom they deemed unjustly deposed. The theory, as expressed in legal phrase by St Cyprian in the 3rd century, was that the apostolic power of delegated sovereignty from the Lord, alike legislative and judicial, was held in joint-tenancy by the whole body of Catholic bishops. In both capacities, however, a certain undefined pre-eminence was conceded to the occupants of “Apostolic” sees, i.e. sees traditionally founded by Apostles, or of sees with a special secular position.

Even before the edict of Milan, at least as early as the latter half of the 3rd century, the spiritual sentences of deposition from office had sometimes indirect temporal consequences recognized by the secular courts. The classical example is the case of Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch. It would seem that, in the intervals of persecution, some rights of property were recognized in the Christian Church and its officers; although the Church was an illegal society. After some previous abortive trials, Paul of Samosata was deposed and excommunicated, in 269, by a great synod of the Antiochene district. Paul, notwithstanding his deposition, kept possession of the episcopal residence. The local church sought recovery of it before the tribunals of the Empire. The judicial authorities requested a rescript from the emperor Aurelian for the decision of the cause. Aurelian referred the matter to the bishop of Rome and the bishops of Italy, who gave their award in favour of the Antiochene Church.

Side by side with this which we may call criminal jurisdiction—none the less real or coercive because its sanctions were purely spiritual—there grew up a quasi-jurisdiction in causes entirely temporal, based upon the free consent of the Temporal Jurisdiction of the Church. parties to accept the arbitration of the bishop. This system had also its roots in the New Testament (see Matt, xviii. 15-17 and 1 Cor. vi. 1-8). In the matter of criminal jurisdiction we paused for a moment at the edict of Milan; but we may at once trace this second or civil branch of episcopal judicature or quasi-judicature down as far as the reign of Charlemagne, when it underwent a fundamental change, and became, if either litigant once chose, no longer a matter of consent but of right.

Constantine decreed that judgment in causes might be passed by bishops when litigants preferred their adjudication to that of the secular courts (see his epistle to the Numidian bishops and Cod. Theodos. Tit. de Episcopis). The episcopal judgment was to be equivalent to that of the emperor and irreversible, and the civil authorities were to see to its execution. Saints Ambrose and Augustine both spent days in deciding temporal causes. Honorius, in the West, at the end of the 4th century, made a constitution providing that if any desired to litigate before the bishops they should not be forbidden, but that in civil matters the prelates should render judgment in the manner of arbitrators by consent (Cod. 1, Tit. iv.). Where the faithful had had recourse to the bishop, no appeal was to be allowed, and the judges were to command execution of the episcopal decree. A quarter of a century later, however, Valentinian III. in the West expressly provided that bishops were not to be permitted to be judges (that is, of course, in temporal causes), save by the consent of the parties. This legislation was, substantially, adopted by Justinian.

On the revival of the Western Empire, however, Charlemagne, in the beginning of the 9th century, under the mistaken belief that he was following the authority of Constantine I. and Theodosius I., took a great step forward, by which the bishop ceased to be a mere legally indicated arbitrator by consent in secular causes, and became a real judge. By a capitulary he provided that either litigant, without the consent of the other party, and not only at the beginning of a suit but at any time during its continuance, might take the cause from lay cognizance and transfer it to the bishop’s tribunal. He re-enacted the prohibition of appeal.

It should be remembered that, from the latter part of the 3rd century, the leading bishops had generally been trained in secular learning. St Cyprian, St Ambrose and St Augustine, St Paulinus of Nola and St John Chrysostom had practised law as teachers or advocates. St Ambrose and St Paulinus had even held high administrative and judicial offices.

To return to the evolution of ecclesiastical jurisdiction from the time of Constantine. With the “Nicene period” came a great development on the criminal side. A system begins to be formed, and the secular arm supports Roman empire from Constantine. the decrees of the Church. The first trace of system is in the limited right of appeal given by the first oecumenical council of Nicaea and its provision that episcopal sentences or those of provincial synods on appeal were to be recognized throughout the world. The fifth canon provides that those, whether clerics or laymen, who are cut off from communion in any particular province are not to be admitted thereto elsewhere. Still examination must be had whether persons have been expelled from the congregation by any episcopal small-mindedness (μικροψυχία), or contentious spirit, or such-like harshness (ἀηδία). That this may be conveniently inquired into, synods are to be held, three in every year, in each province, and questions of this kind examined. There is to be no “stay of execution”; the episcopal sentence is to prevail until the provincial synod otherwise decide. It will be noticed that as yet no provision is made for appeals by bishops from provincial synods sitting in first instance.

The edicts of Milan had only admitted the Christian Church among the number of lawful religions; but the tendency (except in the time of Julian) was towards making it the only lawful religion. Hence the practice, immediately after Nicaea I., of superadding banishment by the emperor to synodical condemnation. The dogmatic decrees of Nicaea I. were at once enforced in this temporal manner. On the other hand, the Arian reaction at court worked its objects (see Pusey, Councils of the Church) by using the criminal spiritual jurisdiction of synods against the Catholics—often packing the synods for the purpose. The acts of councils of this age are full of the trials of bishops not only for heresy but for immorality and common law crimes. The accusations are frequently unfounded; but the trials are already conducted in a certain regular forensic form. The secular authorities follow the precedent of Nicaea I. and intervene to supplement the spiritual sentence by administrative penalties. Sometimes an imperial officer of high rank (as, e.g. a “count”) is present at the synod, as an assessor to maintain order and advise upon points of procedure. Leading examples may be found in the various prosecutions of St Athanasius, in whose case also there is the germ of an appeal, tanquam ab abusu. It has been contended that, according to later and more formulated jurisprudence, such an appeal would have lain, since the trial at Tyre was not concerned with purely spiritual matters (see the case in Hefele, Councils, in loc.).

The trial of St Athanasius led to extensions of the right of appeal. This was favoured by the development of the greater sees into positions of great administrative dignity, shortly to be called “patriarchal.” A synod was held at Rome, attended by bishops from various regions, which reversed the original judgment of the synod of Tyre which had condemned Athanasius. A much larger synod at Antioch, gathered only from the East, on the other hand, confirmed that judgment. This last synod did something to systematize the criminal procedure of the Church, and its legislation has been always received.

This legislation marks another step forward. Deposition of a bishop by a synod, or of a priest or deacon by his bishop, is to take effect even pending an appeal, and a cleric continuing his functions after sentence in first instance is to lose all right of appeal. The appeal given by Nicaea I. to clerics and laymen from episcopal excommunications is extended. The synod may restore them if convinced of the justice of their cause (and not merely in cases of ἀηδία). A bishop may appeal to a great assembly of bishops. Any bishop, priest or deacon “importuning” the emperor, instead of exerting his right of appeal to synods, is to lose all right of appeal and never to be restored or pardoned. If a provincial synod be divided as to the guilt of a bishop, the metropolitan is to convene bishops from the neighbouring provinces to decide the cause jointly with the bishops of the original province.

A few years later, in 347, the council of Sardica, a council of practically the whole West save Africa, reversed Tyre and acquitted St Athanasius after a full judicial inquiry. This council endeavoured to set up a system of appeals in the case of bishops, in which the see of Rome was made to play a great part. “Out of honour to the memory of St Peter,” a condemned bishop may ask the intervention of Rome. If this be done, the synod of first instance is to send letters to Julius, bishop of Rome. If that prelate think the cause should be heard again, he is to appoint judges; if otherwise, the original judgment is to be confirmed. Pending appeal, the appellant’s see is not to be filled up. The judges appointed by the bishop of Rome to hear the appeal are to be from the neighbouring provinces. The appellant may, however, request that bishop to send priests from his side to sit with the synod of appeal. If such priests are sent, they are to preside in the court of appeal. These canons were always repudiated in the East, and when, sixty years afterwards, they were, for the first time, heard of in Africa, they were repudiated there also.

A rescript of Gratian in 378 empowered the bishop of Rome to judge bishops with the assistance of six or seven other bishops or, in the case of a metropolitan, of fifteen comprovincial bishops. A bishop refusing to come to Rome was to be brought there by the civil power. The rescript, however, was not incorporated in the Codes and perhaps was only a temporary measure.

The tendency to give pre-eminence to Rome appears again in an imperial letter to St Flavian, who, in the judgment of the East, was bishop of Antioch, but who was rejected by the West and Egypt, summoning him to Rome to be there judged by the bishops of the imperial city—a summons which St Flavian did not obey (Tillemont, Mém. Ecc.). In Africa in the beginning of the 5th century Apiarius, a priest who had been deposed by the bishop of Sicca for immorality, and whose deposition had been affirmed by the “provincial synod,” instead of further appealing to a general synod of Africa, carried his appeal to Pope Zosimus. The pope received the appeal, absolved him and restored him to the rank of priest, and sent a bishop and two priests as legates to Africa with instructions to them to hear the cause of Apiarius anew and for execution of their sentence to crave the prefect’s aid; moreover, they were to summon the bishop of Sicca to Rome and to excommunicate him, unless he should amend those things which the legates deemed wrong. The upshot of a long conflict was that the papal claim to entertain appeals from Africa by priests and deacons was rejected by the African bishops, who in their final synodical epistle also repudiate in terms any right of appeal by African bishops to “parts beyond the seas” (see Hefele, Councils, bk. viii.).

The story of the administrative development of the Church in the 5th century is mainly the story of the final emergence and constitution of the great “patriarchates,” as authorities superior to metropolitans and provincial synods. In consequence of the occupants of the thrones of Constantinople and Alexandria falling successively into opposite heresies, the question arose how “patriarchs” were to be judged. In both cases, as it seems, an attempt was made by the bishop of Rome to depose the erring patriarch by his authority as primate of Christendom, acting in concert with a Western synod. In both cases, apparently, an oecumenical synod ignored the Roman deposition and judged the alleged offences of the respective patriarchs in first and last instance. The third and fourth oecumenical synods (Ephesus, 431; Chalcedon, 451) were primarily tribunals for the trials of Nestorius and Dioscorus; it was secondarily that they became organs of the universal episcopate for the definition of the faith, or legislative assemblies for the enactment of canons. Nothing is more remarkable than their minute care as to observance of rules of procedure. In both cases, imperial assessors were appointed. At Ephesus the Count Candidian was commissioned to maintain order, but took little part in the proceedings. At Chalcedon, on the other hand, the imperial commissioners decided points of order, kept the synod to the question, took the votes and adjourned the court. But the synod alone judged and pronounced sentence. No oecumenical synod has tried a patriarch of Old Rome while yet in the flesh. The fifth oecumenical council came nearest to so doing, in the case of Vigilius. That pope, although in Constantinople, refused to attend the sittings of the council. He was cited three times, in the canonical manner, and upon not appearing was threatened in the third session with anathema (Hefele, Councils, sect. 268 ad fin.). He was not, however, charged with direct heresy, as were Nestorius and Dioscorus, and the synod seems to have hesitated to deal stringently with the primate of Christendom. In the seventh session it accepted the suggestion of Justinian, merely to order the name of Vigilius to be removed from the liturgical prayers, at the same time expressing its desire to maintain unity with the see of Old Rome (Hefele, sect. 273). After the council, Justinian banished the pope to Egypt, and afterwards to an island, until he accepted the council, which he ultimately did (ib. 276). The sixth oecumenical synod decreed that the dead pope Honorius should be “cast out from the holy Catholic Church of God” and anathematized, a sentence approved by the reigning pope Leo II. and affirmed by the seventh oecumenical synod in 787.

The constitution of the patriarchal system resulted in the recognition of a certain right of appeal to Rome from the larger part of the West. Britain remained outside that jurisdiction, the Celtic churches of the British islands, after those islands were abandoned by the Empire, pursuing a course of their own. In the East, Constantinople, from its principality, acquired special administrative pre-eminence, naturally followed, as in the case of “old Rome,” by judicial pre-eminence. An example of this is found in the ninth canon of Chalcedon, which also illustrates the enforcement upon a clerical plaintiff in dispute with a brother cleric of that recourse to the arbitration of their ecclesiastical superior already mentioned. The canon provides that any clerk having a complaint against another clerk must not pass by his own bishop and turn to secular tribunals, but first lay bare his cause before him, so that by the sentence of the bishop himself the dispute may be settled by arbitrators acceptable to both parties. Any one acting against these provisions shall be subject to canonical penalties. If any clerk have a complaint against his own bishop, he shall have his cause adjudicated upon by the synod of the province. But if a bishop or clerk have a difference with the metropolitan of his province let him bring it before the exarch of the “diocese” (i.e. the larger district answering to the civil “diocese”), or before the royal see of Constantinople, who shall do justice upon it. An “exarch” means properly a superior metropolitan having several provinces under him. In the next century Justinian (Nov. 123, c. 22) put the other patriarchates on the same footing as Constantinople. In c. 21 he gives either plaintiff or defendant an appeal within ten days to the secular judge of the locality from the bishop’s judgment. If there be no appeal, that judge is to give execution to the episcopal award. The growth of a special “original” jurisdiction at Constantinople, which perhaps developed earlier than the corresponding institution at Rome, may be traced to the fact that bishops from all parts were constantly in Constantinople. The bishop of Constantinople, even before he became properly “patriarch,” would often assemble a synod from these visiting bishops, which acquired the technical name of σύνοδος ἐνδημοῦσα, the synod of sojourners. This synod frequently decided questions belonging to other patriarchates.

The criminal jurisdiction thus exercised was generally speaking unlimited. It must be remembered that the forum externum of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, in the sense in which we now use the phrase, of a judge deciding causes, was not then clearly marked off from the forum internum, or what afterwards came to be called the “tribunal of penance” (see Van Espen, Jus ecc. univ. pars iii. tit. iv. c. 1). Ecclesiastical proceedings by way of prosecution are called “criminal,” but they are primarily pro salute animae; whereas temporal criminal proceedings are primarily for the protection of the state and its citizens. Hence a Christian might be first punished in the civil courts and then put to public penance by the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, or vice versa: an apparently double system of punishment which the medieval Church, when the forum externum had become quite separated from the forum internum, sometimes repudiated (see Maitland, English Canon Law, 138, 139, 144).

Theodosius began the system of giving secular authority to Church tribunals. Thus, in 376, L. 23 Cod. Theodos. de. Episcopis, &c., subjected clerics for small offences pertaining to the observances of religion to bishops and synods. In 399, L. 1 Cod. de Religione provides that, when it is a matter of religion, it beseems the bishop to judge. A rescript of Constantius, in 355, inserted in Cod. Theod. lxii. de Epis. Ecc. et Cler., excluded bishops from accusations before secular judges and commanded such accusations to be speedily brought before the tribunal of other bishops. This law was probably only intended to be of a temporary character. Then comes the law of Gratian already noticed. Then, in 399, a law of Honorius (Cod. Theod. L. 1 de Religione): “As often as it concerns religion, it is meet that the bishops should judge, but other causes which belong to ordinary jurisdiction or to public law are to be heard in the ordinary courts (legibus oportet audiri).” L. 3 de Epis. Jud., at the end of the Theodosian Code, seems spurious (see the comment of Gothofredus in loco). But a constitution of Honorius in 412 (Cod. Theod. L. xli. de Epis. Ecc. et Cler.) provides that clerks are not to be accused except before the bishop. Bishops, priests, deacons, and every other “minister of the Christian law” of inferior degree, are taken from secular jurisdiction in criminal cases. The words are quite general; but it has been contended that they apply only to crimes of an ecclesiastical character (see Gothofredus in loc.; Van Espen, pars iii. tit. iii. c. 1, 10). In 425 a constitution of Theodosius II. provides that a recent decree of the usurper John should be disregarded and that clerks whom he had brought before secular judges should be reserved for the episcopal jurisdictions, “since it is not lawful to subject the ministers of the divine office to the arbitrament of temporal powers.” Justinian has a clearer perception of the demarcation between the spheres of spiritual and temporal law. The 83rd Novell provides that if the offence be ecclesiastical, needing ecclesiastical correction, the bishop shall take cognizance of it. The 123rd Novell (c. 21) provides that if a clerk be accused of a secular crime he shall be accused before his bishop, who may depose him from his office and order, and then the competent judge may take him and deal with him according to the laws. If the prosecutor have first brought him before the civil judge, the evidence is to be sent to the bishop, and the latter, if he thinks the crime has been committed, may deprive him of his office and order, and the judge shall apply to him the proper legal punishment. But if the bishop think the evidence insufficient, the affair shall be referred to the emperor, by way of appeal both from bishop and judge. If the cause be ecclesiastical, the civil judges are to take no part in the inquiry. The law includes with clerics, monks, deaconesses, nuns, ascetics; and the word “clerics” covered persons in minor orders, down to doorkeepers. It will be noticed that Justinian supposes that the prosecutor may begin the proceedings before the civil judge. A constitution of Alexius Comnenus I. seems to send him to the special forum of the accused.

Certain enactments of later Saxon times in England have been sometimes spoken of as though they united together the temporal and spiritual jurisdictions into one mixed tribunal deriving its authority from the State. In the latter Anglo-Saxon courts. part of the 10th century, laws of Edgar provided that the bishop should be at the county court and also the alderman, and that there each of them should put in use both God’s laws and the world’s law (Johnson’s English Canons, i. 411). This probably was, as Johnson suggests, that the bishop might enforce secular laws by ecclesiastical censure and the alderman ecclesiastical laws with secular punishment. But the two jurisdictions were kept separate; for by another law of Edgar (Leges Edg. c. v.) it was provided that “in the most august assembly the bishop and alderman should be present, and the one should interpret to the people the law of God, the other the laws of men.” Edgar, in a speech to St Dunstan and the bishops in synod (in 969), said, “I hold in my hands the sword of Constantine, you that of Peter. Let us join right hands and unite sword to sword” (Hardouin, Conc. tom. vi. p. 1, col. 675). The juxtaposition of the judicatures may, however, have led to some confusion between them.