VOLUME V SLICE I Calhoun to Camoens (continued 3)

The growth of the university has been extremely rapid. From 1890 to 1900 the number of students increased fourfold. In the latter year the university of California was second to Harvard only in the number of academic graduate and undergraduate students, and fifth among the educational institutions of the country in total enrolment. In July 1907 there were 519 officers in the faculties and 2987 students, of whom 226 were in the professional schools in San Francisco. In addition there were 707 students in the 1906 summer session, the total for 1906-1907 thus being 3684; of this number 1506 were women. The university conferred 482 degrees in 1907, 546 in 1906, 470 in 1905. The affairs of the university are administered by a board of twenty-three regents, seven state officials and heads of educational institutions, being members ex officio, and sixteen other members being appointed by the governor and senate of the state; its instruction is governed by the faculties of the different colleges, and an academic senate in which these are joined. The gross income from all sources for 1905-1906 was $1,564,190, of which about $800,000 was income from investments, state and government grants, fees, &c., and the remainder was gifts and endowments. There is a permanent endowment of more than $3,000,000, partly from munificent private gifts, especially from Mrs Hearst and from Miss Cora Jean Flood. The financial support of the state has always been generous. No tuition fee is charged in the academic colleges to students resident in the state, and only $10.00 annually to students from without the state. The university maintains about 90 undergraduate scholarships, and 10 graduate scholarships and fellowships. All able-bodied male students are required to take the courses in military science, under instruction by an officer of the United States army detailed for the purpose. Physical culture and hygiene are prescribed for all men and women. A state law forbids the sale of liquor within one mile of the university grounds. To realize the ideal of the university as the head of the educational system of the state, a system of inspection of high schools has been developed, whereby schools reaching the prescribed standard are entitled to recommend their graduates for admission to the university without examination. It was anticipated at one time that the foundation of the Leland Stanford Junior University at Palo Alto would injure the state institution at Berkeley; but in practice this was not found to be the case; on the contrary, the competition resulted in giving new vigour and enterprise to the older university. Joseph Le Conte (professor from 1872 to 1901) and Daniel C. Oilman (president in 1872-1875) deserve mention among those formerly connected with the university. In 1899 Benjamin Ide Wheeler (b. 1854) became president. He had been a graduate (1875) of Brown University, and was professor first of comparative philology and then of Greek at Cornell University; his chief publications are Der griechische Nominalaccent (1885); Analogy, and the Scope of its Application in Language (1887); Principles of Language Growth (1891); The Organization of Higher Education in the United States (1897); Dionysos and Immortality (1899); and Life of Alexander the Great (1900).

CALIPASH and CALIPEE (possibly connected with carapace, the upper shell of a turtle), the gelatinous substances in the upper and lower shells, respectively, of the turtle, the calipash being of a dull greenish and the calipee of a light yellow colour.

CALIPH, Calif, or Khalif (Arab, khălīfa; the lengthening of the a is strictly incorrect), literally “successor,” “representative,” a title borne originally by Abu Bekr, who, on the death of Mahomet, became the civil and religious head of the Mahommedan state. In the same sense the term is used in the Koran of both Adam and David as the vicegerents of God. Abu Bekr and his three (or four) immediate successors are known as the “perfect” caliphs; after them the title was borne by the thirteen Omayyad caliphs of Damascus, and subsequently by the thirty-seven Abbasid caliphs of Bagdad whose dynasty fell before the Turks in 1258. By some rigid Moslems these rulers were regarded as only amirs, not caliphs. There were titular caliphs of Abbasid descent in Egypt from that date till 1517 when the last caliph was captured by Selim I. On the fall of the Omayyad dynasty at Damascus, the title was assumed by the Spanish branch of the family who ruled in Spain at Cordova (755-1031), and the Fatimite rulers of Egypt, who pretended to descent from Ali, and Fatima, Mahomet’s daughter, also assumed the name (see Fatimites).

According to the Shi‘ite Moslems, who call the office the “imamate” or leadership, no caliph is legitimate unless he is a lineal descendant of the Prophet. The Sunnites insist that the office belongs to the tribe of Koreish (Quraish) to which Mahomet himself belonged, but this condition would vitiate the claim of the Turkish sultans, who have held the office since its transference by the last caliph to Selim I. According to a tradition falsely ascribed to Mahomet, there can be but one caliph at a time; should a second be set up, he must be killed, for he “is a rebel.” (See Mahommedan Institutions.)

CALIPHATE.1 The history of the Mahommedan rulers in the East who bore the title of caliph (q.v.) falls naturally into three main divisions:—(a) The first four caliphs, the immediate successors of Mahomet; (b) The Omayyad caliphs; (c) The Abbasid caliphs. To these three groups the present article is confined; for the Western caliphs, see Spain: History (and minor articles such as Almohades, Almoravides); for the Egyptian caliphs see Egypt: History (§ Mahommedan) and Fatimites. The history of Arabia proper will be found under Arabia: History.

A.—The First Four Caliphs

After the death of Mahomet the question arose who was to be his “representative.” The choice lay with the community of Medina; so much was understood; but whom were they to choose? The natives of Medina believed themselves to be now once more masters in their own house, and wished to promote one of themselves. But the Emigrants (see Mahomet) asserted their opposing claims, and with success, having brought into the town a considerable number of outside Moslems, so as to terrorize the men of Medina, who besides were still divided into two parties. The Emigrants’ leading spirit was Omar; he did not, however, cause homage to be paid to himself, but to Abu Bekr, the friend and father-in-law of the Prophet.

The affair would not have gone on so smoothly, had not the opportune defection of the Arabians put a stop to the inward schism which threatened. Islam suddenly found itself once more limited to the community of Medina; only Mecca and Tāif (Tāyef) remained true. The Bedouins were willing enough to pray, indeed, but less willing to pay taxes; their defection, as might have been expected, was a political movement.2 None the less was it a revolt from Islam, for here the political society and the religious are identical. A peculiar compliment to Mahomet was involved in the fact that the leaders of the rebellion in the various districts did not pose as princes and kings, but as prophets; in this appeared to lie the secret of Islam’s success.

1. Reign of Abu Bekr.—Abu Bekr proved himself quite equal to the perilous situation. In the first place, he allowed the expedition against the Greeks, already arranged by Mahomet, quietly to set out, limiting himself for the time to the defence of Medina. On the return of the army he proceeded to attack the rebels. The holy spirit of Islam kept the men of Medina together, and inspired in them an all-absorbing zeal for the faith; the Arabs as a whole had no other bond of union and no better source of inspiration than individual interest. As was to be expected, they were worsted; eleven small flying columns of the Moslems, sent out in various directions, sufficed to quell the revolt. Those who submitted were forthwith received back into favour; those who persevered in rebellion were punished with death. The majority accordingly converted, the obstinate were extirpated. In Yamama (Yemama) only was there a severe struggle; the Banū Hanīfa under their prophet Mosailima fought bravely, but here also Islam triumphed.

The internal consolidation of Islam in Arabia was, strange to say, brought about by its diffusion abroad. The holy war against the border countries which Mahomet had already inaugurated, was the best means for making the new religion popular among the Arabs, for opportunity was at the same time afforded for gaining rich booty. The movement was organized by Islam, but the masses were induced to join it by quite other than religious motives. Nor was this by any means the first occasion on which the Arabian cauldron had overflowed; once and again in former times emigrant swarms of Bedouins had settled on the borders of the wilderness. This had last happened in consequence of the events which destroyed the prosperity of the old Sabaean kingdom. At that time the small Arabian kingdoms of Ghassān and Hira had arisen in the western and eastern borderlands of cultivation; these now presented to Moslem conquest its nearest and natural goal. But inasmuch as Hira was subject to the Persians, and Eastern Palestine to the Greeks, the annexation of the Arabians involved the extension of the war beyond the limits of Arabia to a struggle with the two great powers (see further Arabia: History).

After the subjugation of middle and north-eastern Arabia, Khālid b. al-Walīd proceeded by order of the caliph to the conquest of the districts on the lower Euphrates. Thence he was summoned to Syria, where hostilities had also broken out. Damascus fell late in the summer of 635, and on the 20th of August 636 was fought the great decisive battle on the Hieromax (Yarmuk), which caused the emperor Heraclius (q.v.) finally to abandon Syria.3 Left to themselves, the Christians henceforward defended themselves only in isolated cases in the fortified cities; for the most part they witnessed the disappearance of the Byzantine power without regret. Meanwhile the war was also carried on against the Persians in Irak, unsuccessfully at first, until the tide turned at the battle of Kadisiya (Kadessia, Qādisīya) (end of 637). In consequence of the defeat which they here sustained, the Persians were forced to abandon the western portion of their empire and limit themselves to Iran proper. The Moslems made themselves masters of Ctesiphon (Madāin), the residence of the Sassanids on the Tigris, and conquered in the immediately following years the country of the two rivers. In 639 the armies of Syria and Irak were face to face in Mesopotamia. In a short time they had taken from the Aryans all the principal old Semitic lands—Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Assyria and Babylonia. To these was soon added Egypt, which was overrun with little difficulty by ‘Amr ibn-el-Ass (q.v.) in 640. (See Egypt: History, § Mahommedan.) This completed the circle of the lands bordering on the wilderness of Arabia; within these limits annexation was practicable and natural, a repetition indeed of what had often previously occurred. The kingdoms of Ghassan and Hira, advanced posts hitherto, now became the headquarters of the Arabs; the new empire had its centres on the one hand at Damascus, on the other hand at Kufa and Baṣra, the two newly-founded cities in the region of old Babylonia. The capital of Islam continued indeed for a while to be Medina, but soon the Hejaz (Hijaz) and the whole of Arabia proper lay quite on the outskirt of affairs.

The ease with which the native populations of the conquered districts, exclusively or prevailingly Christian, adapted themselves to the new rule is very striking. Their nationality had been broken long ago, but intrinsically it was more closely allied to the Arabian than to the Greek or Persian. Their religious sympathy with the West was seriously impaired by dogmatic controversies; from Islam they might at any rate hope for toleration, even though their views were not in accordance with the theology of the emperor of the day. The lapse of the masses from Christianity to Islam, however, which took place during the first century after the conquest, is to be accounted for only by the fact that in reality they had no inward relation to the gospel at all. They changed their creed merely to acquire the rights and privileges of Moslem citizens. In no case were they compelled to do so; indeed the Omayyad caliphs saw with displeasure the diminishing proceeds of the poll-tax derived from their Christian subjects (see Mahommedan Institutions).

It would have been a great advantage for the solidity of the Arabian empire if it had confined itself within the limits of those old Semitic lands, with perhaps the addition of Egypt. But the Persians were not so ready as the Greeks to give up the contest; they did not rest until the Moslems had subjugated the whole of the Sassanid empire. The most important event in the protracted war which led to the conquest of Iran, was the battle of Nehāwend in 641;4 the most obstinate resistance was offered by Persis proper, and especially by the capital, Istakhr (Persepolis). In the end, all the numerous and partly autonomous provinces of the Sassanid empire fell, one after the other, into the hands of the Moslems, and the young king, Yazdegerd III. (q.v.), was compelled to retire to the farthest corner of his realm, where he came to a miserable end.5 But it was long before the Iranians learned to accept the situation. Unlike the Christians of western Asia, they had a vigorous feeling of national pride, based upon glorious memories and especially upon a church having a connexion of the closest kind with the state. Internal disturbances of a religious and political character and external disasters had long ago shattered the empire of the Sassanids indeed, but the Iranians had not yet lost their patriotism. They were fighting, in fact, against the despised and hated Arabs, in defence of their holiest possessions, their nationality and their faith. Their subjection was only external, nor did Islam ever succeed in assimilating them as the Syrian Christians were assimilated. Even when in process of time they did accept the religion of the prophet, they leavened it thoroughly with their own peculiar leaven, and, especially, deprived it of the practical political and national character which it had assumed after the flight to Medina. To the Arabian state they were always a thorn in the flesh; it was they who helped most to break up its internal order, and it was from them also that it at last received its outward death-blow. The fall of the Omayyads was their work, and with the Omayyads fell the Arabian empire.

2. Reign of Omar.—Abu Bekr died after a short reign on the 22nd of August 634, and as a matter of course was succeeded by Omar. To Omar’s ten years’ Caliphate belong for the most part the great conquests. He himself did not take the field, but remained in Medina with the exception of his visit to Syria in 638; he never, however, suffered the reins to slip from his grasp, so powerful was the influence of his personality and the Moslem community of feeling. His political insight is shown by the fact that he endeavoured to limit the indefinite extension of Moslem conquest, to maintain and strengthen the national Arabian character of the commonwealth of Islam,6 and especially to promote law and order in its internal affairs. The saying with which he began his reign will never grow antiquated: “by Allah, he that is weakest among you shall be in my sight the strongest, until I have vindicated for him his rights; but him that is strongest will I treat as the weakest, until he complies with the laws.” After the administration of justice he directed his organizing activity, as the circumstances demanded, chiefly towards financial questions—the incidence of taxation in the conquered territories,7 and the application of the vast resources which poured into the treasury at Medina. It must not be brought against him as a personal reproach, that in dealing with these he acted on the principle that the Moslems were the chartered plunderers of all the rest of the world. But he had to atone by his death for the fault of his system. In the mosque at Medina he was stabbed by a Kufan workman and died in November 644.

3. Reign of Othman.—Before his death Omar had nominated six of the leading Mohajir (Emigrants) who should choose the caliph from among themselves—Othman, Ali, Zobair, Ṭalḥa, Sa‘d b. Abi Waqqāṣ, and Abdarraḥmān b. Auf. The last-named declined to be a candidate, and decided the election in favour of Othman. Under this weak sovereign the government of Islam fell entirely into the hands of the Koreish nobility. We have already seen that Mahomet himself prepared the way for this transference; Abu Bekr and Omar likewise helped it; the Emigrants were unanimous among themselves in thinking that the precedence and leadership belonged to them as of right. Thanks to the energy of Omar, they were successful in appropriating to themselves the succession to the Prophet. They indeed rested their claims on the undeniable priority of their services to the faith, but they also appealed to their blood relationship with the Prophet as a corroboration of their right to the inheritance; and the ties of blood connected them with the Koreish in general. In point of fact they felt a closer connexion with these than, for example, with the natives of Medina; nature had not been expelled by faith.8 The supremacy of the Emigrants naturally furnished the means of transition to the supremacy of the Meccan aristocracy. Othman did all in his power to press forward this development of affairs. He belonged to the foremost family of Mecca, the Omayyads, and that he should favour his relations and the Koreish as a whole, in every possible way, seemed to him a matter of course. Every position of influence and emolument was assigned to them; they themselves boastingly called the important province of Irak the garden of Koreish. In truth, the entire empire had become that garden. Nor was it unreasonable that from the secularization of Islam the chief advantage should be reaped by those who best knew the world. Such were beyond all doubt the patricians of Mecca, and after them those of Tāif, people like Khālid b. al-Walīd, Amr-ibn-el-Ass, ‘Abdallāh b. abī Sarḥ, Moghīra b. Sho’ba, and, above all, old Abu Sofiān with his son Moawiya.

Against the rising tide of worldliness an opposition, however, now began to appear. It was led by what may be called the spiritual noblesse of Islam, which, as distinguished from the hereditary nobility of Mecca, might also be designated as the nobility of merit, consisting of the “Defenders” (Ansar), and especially of the Emigrants who had lent themselves to the elevation of the Koreish, but by no means with the intention of allowing themselves thereby to be effaced. The opposition was headed by Ali, Zobair, Ṭalḥa, both as leading men among the Emigrants and as disappointed candidates for the Caliphate. Their motives were purely selfish; not God’s cause but their own, not religion but power and preferment, were what they sought.9 Their party was a mixed one. To it belonged the men of real piety, who saw with displeasure the promotion to the first places in the commonwealth of the great lords who had actually done nothing for Islam, and had joined themselves to it only at the last moment. But the majority were merely a band of men without views, whose aim was a change not of system, but of persons in their own interest. Everywhere in the provinces there was agitation against the caliph and his governors, except in Syria, where Othman’s cousin, Moawiya, son of Abu Sofiān (see below), carried on a wise and strong administration. The movement was most energetic in Irak and in Egypt. Its ultimate aim was the deposition of Othman in favour of Ali, whose own services as well as his close relationship to the Prophet seemed to give him the best claim to the Caliphate. Even then there were enthusiasts who held him to be a sort of Messiah.

The malcontents sought to gain their end by force. In bands they came from the provinces to Medina to wring concessions from Othman, who, though his armies were spreading terror from the Indus and Oxus to the Atlantic, had no troops at hand in Medina. He propitiated the mutineers by concessions, but as soon as they had gone, he let matters resume their old course. Thus things went on from bad to worse. In the following year (656) the leaders of the rebels came once more from Egypt and Irak to Medina with a more numerous following; and the caliph again tried the plan of making promises which he did not intend to keep. But the rebels caught him in a flagrant breach of his word,10 and now demanded his abdication, besieging him in his own house, where he was defended by a few faithful subjects. As he would not yield, they at last took the building by storm and put him to death, an old man of eighty. His death in the act of maintaining his rights was of the greatest service to his house and of corresponding disadvantage to the enemy.

4. Reign of Ali.—Controversy as to the inheritance at once arose among the leaders of the opposition. The mass of the mutineers summoned Ali to the Caliphate, and compelled even Ṭalḥa and Zobair to do him homage. But soon these two, along with Ayesha, the mother of the faithful, who had an old grudge against Ali, succeeded in making their escape to Irak, where at Baṣra they raised the standard of rebellion. Ali in point of fact had no real right to the succession, and moreover was apparently actuated not by piety but by ambition and the desire of power, so that men of penetration, even although they condemned Othman’s method of government, yet refused to recognize his successor. The new caliph, however, found means of disposing of their opposition, and at the battle of the Camel, fought at Baṣra in November 656, Ṭalḥa and Zobair were slain, and Ayesha was taken prisoner.

But even so Ali had not secured peace. With the murder of Othman the dynastic principle gained the twofold advantage of a legitimate cry—that of vengeance for the blood of the grey-haired caliph and a distinguished champion, the governor Moawiya, whose position in Syria was impregnable. The kernel of his subjects consisted of genuine Arabs, not only recent immigrants along with Islam, but also old settlers who, through contact with the Roman empire and the Christian church, had become to some extent civilized. Through the Ghassanids these latter had become habituated to monarchical government and loyal obedience, and for a long time much better order had prevailed amongst them than elsewhere in Arabia. Syria was the proper soil for the rise of an Arabian kingdom, and Moawiya was just the man to make use of the situation. He exhibited Othman’s blood-stained garment in the mosque at Damascus, and incited his Syrians to vengeance.

Ali’s position in Kufa was much less advantageous. The population of Irak was already mixed up with Persian elements; it fluctuated greatly, and was largely composed of fresh immigrants. Islam had its headquarters here; Kufa and Baṣra were the home of the pious and of the adventurer, the centres of religious and political movement. This movement it was that had raised Ali to the Caliphate, but yet it did not really take any personal interest in him. Religion proved for him a less trustworthy and more dangerous support than did the conservative and secular feeling of Syria for the Omayyads. Moawiya could either act or refrain from acting as he chose, secure in either case of the obedience of his subjects. Ali, on the other hand, was unable to convert enthusiasm for the principle inscribed on his banner into enthusiasm for his person. It was necessary that he should accommodate himself to the wishes of his supporters, which, however, were inconsistent. They compelled him suddenly to break off the battle of Siffin, which he was apparently on the point of gaining over Moawiya, because the Syrians fastened copies of the Koran to their lances to denote that not the sword, but the word of God should decide the contest (see further below, B.1; also Ali). But in yielding to the will of the majority he excited the displeasure of the minority, the genuine zealots, who in Moawiya were opposing the enemy of Islam, and regarded Ali’s entering into negotiations with him as a denial of the faith. When the negotiations failed and war was resumed, the Kharijites refused to follow Ali’s army, and he had to turn his armies in the first instance against them. He succeeded in disposing of them without difficulty at the battle of Nahrawān, but in his success he lost the soul of his following. For they were the true champions of the theocratic principle; through their elimination it became clear that the struggle had in no sense anything to do with the cause of God. Ali’s defeat was a foregone conclusion, once religious enthusiasm had failed him; the secular resources at the disposal of his adversaries were far superior. Fortunately for him he was murdered (end of January 661), thereby posthumously attaining an importance in the eyes of a large part of the Mahommedan world (Shī‘a) which he had never possessed during his life.

B.—The Omayyad Dynasty

Summary of Preceding Movements.—The conquest of Mecca had been of the greatest importance to the Prophet, not only because Islam thus obtained possession of this important city with its famous sanctuary, but above all because his late adversaries were at last compelled to acknowledge him as the Envoy of God. Among these there were many men of great ability and influence, and he was so eager to conciliate them or, as the Arabic expression has it, “to mellow their hearts” by concessions and gifts, that his loyal helpers (Ansar) at Medina became dissatisfied and could only with difficulty be brought to acquiesce in it. Mahomet was a practical man; he realized that the growing state needed skilful administrators, and that such were found in much greater number among the antagonists of yesterday than among the honest citizens of Medina. The most important positions, such as the governorships of Mecca and Yemen, were entrusted to men of the Omayyad house, or that of the Makhzūm and other Koreishite families. Abu Bekr followed the Prophet’s example. In the great revolt of the Arabic tribes after the death of Mahomet, and in the invasion of Irak and Syria by the Moslems, the principal generals belonged to them. Omar did not deviate from that line of conduct. It was he who appointed Yazīd, the son of Abu Sofiān, and after his death, his brother Moawiya as governor of Syria, and assigned the province of Egypt to Amr-ibn-el-Ass (‘Amr b. Āṣ). It is even surprising to find among the leading men so few of the house of Hāshim, the nearest family of the Prophet. The puzzled Moslem doctors explain this fact on the ground that the Hashimites were regarded as too noble to hold ordinary administrative offices, and that they could not be spared at Medina, where their counsel was required in all important affairs. There is, however, a tradition in which Ali himself calls the Omayyads born rulers. As long as Omar lived opposition was silent. But Othman had not the strong personality of his predecessor, and, although he practically adhered to the policy of Omar, he was accused of favouring the members of his own family—the caliph belonged himself to the house of Omayya—at the expense of the Hashimites and the Ansar. The jealousy of the latter two was prompted by the fact that the governorship and military commands had become not only much more important, but also much more lucrative, while power and money again procured many adherents. The truly devout Moslems on the other hand were scandalized by the growing luxury which relaxed the austere morals of the first Moslems, and this also was imputed to Othman.

We thus see how the power of the house of Omayya developed itself, and how there arose against it an opposition, which led in the first place to the murder of Othman and the Caliphate of Ali, and furthermore, during the whole period of the Omayyad caliphs, repeatedly to dangerous outbreaks, culminating in the great catastrophe which placed the Abbasids on the throne. The elements of this opposition were of very various kinds:—(1) The old-fashioned Moslems, sons of the Ansar and Mohājir, who had been Mahomet’s first companions and supporters, and could not bear the thought that the sons of the old enemies of the Prophet in Mecca, whom they nicknamed ṭolaqā (freedmen), should be in control of the imamate, which carried with it the management of affairs both civil and religious. This party was in the foreground, chiefly in the first period. (2) The partisans of Ali, the Shi‘a (Shi‘ites), who in proportion as their influence with the Arabs declined, contrived to strengthen it by obtaining the support of the non-Arabic Moslems, aided thereto, especially in the latter period, by the Abbasids, who at the decisive moment succeeded in seizing the supreme power for themselves. (3) The Kharijites, who, in spite of the heavy losses they sustained at the hands of Ali, maintained their power by gaining new adherents from among those austere Moslems, who held both Omayyads and Alids as usurpers, and have often been called, not unjustly, the Puritans of Islam. (4) The non-Arabic Moslems, who on their conversion to Islam, had put themselves under the patronage of Arabic families, and were therefore called maula’s (clients). These were not only the most numerous, but also, in virtue of the persistency of their hostility, the most dangerous. The largest and strongest group of these were the Persians, who, before the conquest of Irak by the Moslems, were the ruling class of that country, so that Persian was the dominant language. With them all malcontents, in particular the Shi‘ites, found support; by them the dynasty of the Omayyads and the supremacy of the Arabs was finally overthrown. To these elements of discord we must add:—(1) That the Arabs, notwithstanding the bond of Islam that united them, maintained their old tribal institutions, and therewith their old feuds and factions; (2) that the old antagonism between Ma‘adites11 (original northern tribes) and Yemenites (original southern tribes), accentuated by the jealousy between the Meccans, who belonged to the former, and the Medinians, who belonged to the latter division, gave rise to perpetual conflicts; (3) that more than one dangerous pretender—some of them of the reigning family itself—contended with the caliph for the sovereignty, and must be crushed coûte que coûte. It is only by the detailed enumeration of these opposing forces that we can form an idea of the heavy task that lay before the Prince of the Believers, and of the amount of tact and ability which his position demanded.

The description of the reign of the Omayyads is extremely difficult. Never perhaps has the system of undermining authority by continual slandering been applied on such a scale as by the Alids and the Abbasids. The Omayyads were accused by their numerous missionaries of every imaginable vice; in their hands Islam was not safe; it would be a godly work to extirpate them from the earth. When the Abbasids had occupied the throne, they pursued this policy to its logical conclusion. But not content with having exterminated the hated rulers themselves, they carried their hostility to a further point. The official history of the Omayyads, as it has been handed down to us, is coloured by Abbasid feeling to such an extent that we can scarcely distinguish the true from the false. An example of this occurs at the outset in the assertion that Moawiya deliberately refrained from marching to the help of Othman, and indeed that it was with secret joy that he heard of the fatal result of the plot. The facts seem to contradict this view. When, ten weeks before the murder, some hundreds of men came to Medina from Egypt and Irak, pretending that they were on their pilgrimage to Mecca, but wanted to bring before the caliph their complaints against his vicegerents, nobody could have the slightest suspicion that the life of the caliph was in danger; indeed it was only during the few days that Othman was besieged in his house that the danger became obvious. If the caliph then, as the chroniclers tell, sent a message to Moawiya for help, his messenger could not have accomplished half the journey to Damascus when the catastrophe took place. There is no real reason to doubt that the painful news fell on Moawiya unexpectedly, and that he, as mightiest representative of the Omayyad house, regarded as his own the duty of avenging the crime. He could not but view Ali in the light of an accomplice, because if, as he protested, he did not abet the murderers, yet he took them under his protection. An acknowledgment of Ali as caliph by Moawiya before he had cleared himself from suspicion was therefore quite impossible.

1. The Reign of Moawiya.—Moawiya, son of the well-known Meccan chief Abu Sofiān, embraced Islam together with his father and his brother Yazid, when the Prophet conquered Mecca, and was, like them, treated with the greatest distinction. He was even chosen to be one of the secretaries of Mahomet. When Abu Bekr sent his troops for the conquest of Syria, Yazid, the eldest son of Abu Sofiān, held one of the chief commands, with Moawiya as his lieutenant. In the year 639 Omar named him governor of Damascus and Palestine; Othman added to this province the north of Syria and Mesopotamia. To him was committed the conduct of the war against the Byzantine emperor, which he continued with energy, at first only on land, but later, when the caliph had at last given in to his urgent representations, at sea also. In the year 34 (a.d. 655) was fought off the coast of Lycia the great naval battle, which because of the great number of masts has been called “the mast fight,” in which the Greek12 fleet, commanded by the emperor Constans II. in person, was utterly defeated. Moawiya himself was not present, as he was conducting an attack (the result of which we do not know) on Caesarea in Cappadocia. The Arabic historians are so entirely preoccupied with the internal events that they have no eye for the war at the frontier. The contention which Moawiya had with Ali checked his progress in the north.

Moawiya was a born ruler, and Syria was, as we have seen, the best administered province of the whole empire. He was so loved and honoured by his Syrians that, when he invited them to avenge the blood of Othman, they replied unanimously, “It is your part to command, ours to obey.” Ali was a valiant man, but had no great talent as a ruler. His army numbered a great many enthusiastic partisans, but among them not a few wise-acres; there were also others of doubtful loyalty. The battle at Siffin (657), near the Euphrates, which lasted two months and consisted principally in, sometimes bloody, skirmishes, with alternate success, ended by the well-known appeal to the decision of the Koran on the part of Moawiya. This appeal has been called by a European scholar “one of the unworthiest comedies of the whole world’s history,” accepting the report of very partial Arabic writers that it happened when the Syrians were on the point of losing the battle. He forgot that Ali himself, before the Battle of the Camel, appealed likewise to the decision of the Koran, and began the fight only when this had been rejected. There is in reality no room for suspecting Moawiya of not having been in earnest when making this appeal; he might well regret that internecine strife should drain the forces which were so much wanted for the spread of Islam. That the Book of God could give a solution, even of this arduous case, was doubtless the firm belief of both parties. But even if the appeal to the Koran had been a stratagem, as Ali himself thought, it would have been perfectly legitimate, according to the general views of that time, which had been also those of the Prophet. It is not unlikely that the chief leader of the Yemenites in Ali’s army, Ash‘ath b. Qais, knew beforehand that this appeal would be made. Certainty is not to be obtained in the whole matter.

On each side an umpire was appointed, Abu Mūsāa al-Ash‘arī, the candidate of Ash‘ath, on that of Ali, Amr-ibn-el-Ass (q.v.) on that of Moawiya. The arbitrators met in the year 37 (a.d. 658) at Adhroh, in the south-east of Syria, where are the ruins of the Roman Castra described by Brünnow and Domaszewsky (Die Provincio Arabia, i. 433-463). Instead of this place, the historians generally put Dūmat-al-Jandal, the biblical Duma, now called Jauf, but this rests on feeble authority. The various accounts about what happened in this interview are without exception untrustworthy. J. Wellhausen, in his excellent book Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz, has made it very probable that the decision of the umpires was that the choice of Ali as caliph should be cancelled, and that the task of nominating a successor to Othman should be referred to the council of notable men (shūrā), as representing the whole community. Ali refusing to submit to this decision, Moawiya became the champion of the law, and thereby gained at once considerable support for the conquest of Egypt, to which above all he directed his efforts. As soon as Amr returned from Adhroh, Moawiya sent him with an army of four or five thousand men against Egypt. About the same time the constitutional party rose against Ali’s vicegerent Mahommed, son of Abu Bekr, who had been the leader of the murderous attack on Othman. Mahommed was beaten, taken in his flight, and, according to some reports, sewn in the skin of an ass and burned.

Moawiya, realizing that Ali would take all possible means to crush him, took his measures accordingly. He concluded with the Greeks a treaty, by which he pledged himself to pay a large sum of money annually on condition that the emperor should give him hostages as a pledge for the maintenance of peace. Ali, however, had first to deal with the insurrection of the Kharijites, who condemned the arbitration which followed the battle of Siffin as a deed of infidelity, and demanded that Ali should break the compact (see above, A.4). Freed from this difficulty, Ali prepared to direct his march against Moawiya, but his soldiers declined to move. One of his men, Khirrīt b. Rāshid, renounced him altogether, because he had not submitted to the decision of the umpires, and persuaded many others to refuse the payment of the poor-rate. Ali was obliged to subdue him, a task which he effected not without difficulty. Not a few of his former partisans went over to Moawiya, as already had happened before the days of Siffin, amongst others Ali’s own brother ‘Aqīl. Lastly, there were in Kufa, and still more in Basra, many Othmaniya or legitimists, on whose co-operation he could not rely. Moawiya from his side made incessant raids into Ali’s dominion, and by his agents caused a very serious revolt in Basra. The statement that a treaty was concluded between Moawiya and Ali to maintain the status quo, in the beginning of the year 40 (a.d. 660), is not very probable, for it is pretty certain that just then Ali had raised an army of 40,000 men against the Syrians, and also that in the second or third month of that year Moawiya was proclaimed caliph at Jerusalem. At the same time Bosr b. Abi Artāt made his expedition against Medina and Mecca, whose inhabitants were compelled to acknowledge the caliphate of Moawiya. On the murder of Ali in 661, his son Hasan was chosen caliph, but he recoiled before the prospect of a war with Moawiya, having neither the ambition nor the energy of Ali. Moawiya stood then with a large army in Maskin, a rich district lying to the north of the later West Bagdad, watered by the Dojail, or Little Tigris, a channel from the Euphrates to the Tigris. The army of Trak was near Madāin, the ancient Ctesiphon. The reports about what occurred are confused and contradictory; but it seems probable that Abdallah b. Abbas, the vicegerent of Ali at Basra and ancestor of the future Abbasid dynasty, was in command. No battle was fought. Hasan and Ibn Abbas opened, each for himself, negotiations with Moawiya. The latter made it a condition of surrender that he should have the free disposal of the funds in the treasury of Basra. Some say that he had already before the death of Ali rendered himself master of it. Notwithstanding the protest of the Basrians, he transported this booty safely to Mecca. When his descendants had ascended the throne and he had become a demi-saint, the historians did their best to excuse his conduct. Hasan demanded, in exchange for the power which he resigned, the contents of the treasury at Kufa, which amounted to five millions of dirhems, together with the revenues of the Persian province of Darābjird (Darab). When these negotiations became known, a mutiny broke out in Hasan’s camp. Hasan himself was wounded and retired to Medina, where he died eight or nine years afterwards. The legend that he was poisoned by order of Moawiya is without the least foundation. It seems that he never received the revenues of Darābjird, the Basrians to whom they belonged refusing to cede them.

Moawiya now made his entry into Kufa in the summer of a.h. 41 (a.d. 661) and received the oath of allegiance as Prince of the Believers. This year is called the year of union (jamā‘a). Moghīra b. Sho’ba was appointed governor of Kufa. Homrān b. Abān had previously assumed the government of Basra. This is represented commonly as a revolt, but as Homran was a client of Othman, and remained in favour with the Omayyads, it is almost certain that he took the management of affairs only to maintain order.

One strong antagonist to Moawiya remained, in the person of Ziyād. This remarkable man was said to be a bastard of Abu Sofiān, the father of Moawiya, and was, by his mother, the brother of Abu Bakra, a man of great wealth and position at Basra. He thus belonged to the tribe of Thaqīf at Tāif, which produced many very prominent men. At the age of fourteen years Ziyād was charged with the financial administration of the Basrian army. He had won the affection of Omar, by his knowledge of the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet, and by the fact that he had employed the first money he earned to purchase the freedom of his mother Somayya. He was a faithful servant of Ali and put down for him the revolt excited by Moawiya’s partisans in Basra. Thence he marched into Fārs and Kirman, where he maintained peace and kept the inhabitants in their allegiance to Ali. After Ali’s death he fortified himself in his castle near Istakhr and refused to submit. Moawiya, therefore, sent Bosr b. Abi Artāt to Basra, with orders to capture Ziyād’s three sons, and to force Ziyād into submission by threatening to kill them. Ziyād was obdurate; and it was due to his brother Abu Bakra, who persuaded Moawiya to cancel the order, that the threat was not executed. On his return to Damascus, Moawiya charged Moghīra b. Sho’ba to bring his countryman to reason. Abdallah b. ‘Āmir was made governor of Basra.

As soon as Moawiya had his hands free, he directed all his forces against the Greeks. Immediately after the submission of Irak, he had denounced the existing treaty, and as early as 662 had sent his troops against the Alans and the Greeks. Since then, no year passed without a campaign. Twice he made a serious effort to conquer Constantinople, in 669 when he besieged it for three months, and in 674. On the second occasion his fleet occupied Cyzicus, which it held till shortly after his death in 680, when a treaty was signed. In Africa also the extension of Mahommedan power was pursued energetically. In 670 took place the famous march of ‘Okba (‘Oqba) b. Nāfi’ and the foundation of Kairawan, where the great mosque still bears his name. Our information about these events, though very full, is untrustworthy, while of the events in Asia Minor the accounts are scarce and short. The Arabic historians are still absorbed by the events in Irak and Khorasan.

The talented prefect of Kufa, Moghīra b. Sho’ba, eventually broke down the resistance of Ziyād, who came to Damascus to render an account of his administration, which the caliph ratified. Moawiya seems also to have acknowledged him as the son of Abu Sofiān, and thus as his brother; in 664 this recognition was openly declared.13 In the next year Ziyād was appointed governor of Basra and the eastern provinces belonging to it. As the austere champion of the precepts of Islam, he soon restored order in the whole district. Outwardly, this was the case in Kufa also. A rising of Kharijites in the year 663 had ended in the death of their chief. But the Shi‘ites were dissatisfied and even dared to give public utterance to their hostility. Moghīra contented himself with a warning. He was already aged and had no mind to enter on a conflict. He died about the year 670, and his province also was entrusted to Ziyād, who appointed ‘Amr b. Horaith as his vicegerent. At a Friday service in the great mosque ‘Amr was insulted and pelted with pebbles. Ziyād then came himself, arrested the leader of the Shi‘ites, and sent fourteen rebels to Damascus, among them several men of consideration. Seven of them who refused to pledge themselves to obedience were put to death; the Shi‘ites considered them as martyrs and accused Moawiya of committing a great crime. But in Kufa peace was restored, and this not by military force, but by the headmen of the tribes. We must not forget that Kufa and Basra were military colonies, and that each tribe had its own quarter of the city. A wholesome diversion was provided by the serious resumption of the policy of eastern expansion, which had been interrupted by the civil war. For this purpose Irak had to furnish the largest contingent. The first army sent by Ziyād into Khorasan recaptured Merv, Herat and Balkh, conquered Tokhāristān and advanced as far as the Oxus. In 673 ‘Obaidallah, the son of Ziyād, crossed the river, occupied Bokhara, and returned laden with booty taken from the wandering Turkish tribes of Transoxiana. He brought 2000 Turkish archers with him to Basra, the first Turkish slaves to enter the Moslem empire. Sa‘īd, son of the caliph Othman, whom Moawiya made governor of Khorasan, in 674 marched against Samarkand. Other generals penetrated as far as the Indus and conquered Kabul, Sijistan, Makrān and Kandahar.

Ziyād governed Irak with the greatest vigour, but as long as discontent did not issue in action, he let men alone. At his death (672-673), order was so generally restored that “nobody had any more to fear for life or estate, and even the unprotected woman was safe in her house without having her door bolted.”

Moawiya was a typical Arab sayyid (gentleman). He governed, not by force, but by his superior intelligence, his self-control, his mildness and magnanimity. The following anecdote may illustrate this. One of Moawiya’s estates bordered on that of Abdallah b. Zobair, who complained in a somewhat truculent letter that Moawiya’s slaves had been guilty of trespassing. Moawiya, disregarding his son Yazid’s advice that he should exact condign punishment for Zobair’s disrespect, replied in flattering terms, regretting the trespass and resigning both slaves and estate to Zobair. In reply Zobair protested his loyalty to Moawiya, who thereupon pointed a moral for the instruction of Yazid.

Moawiya has been accused of having poisoned more than one of his adversaries, among them Malik Ashtar, Abdarrahmān the son of the great captain Khālid b. Walīd, and Hasan b. Ali. As for the latter, European scholars have long been agreed that the imputation is groundless. As to Abdarrahmān the story is in the highest degree improbable. Madāinī says that Moawiya was prompted to it, because when he consulted the Syrians about the choice of his son Yazid as his successor, they had proposed Abdarrahmān. The absurdity of this is obvious, for Abdarrahmān died in the year 666.14 Others say15 that Moawiya was afraid lest Abdarrahmān should become too popular. Now, Abdarrahmān had not only been a faithful ally of Moawiya in the wars with Ali, but after the peace devoted all his energy to the Greek war. It is almost incredible that Moawiya out of petty jealousy would have deprived himself of one of his best men. The probability is that Abdarrahmān was ill when returning from the frontier, that Moawiya sent him his own medical man, the Christian doctor Ibn Othāl, and that the rumour arose that the doctor had poisoned him. It is remarkable withal that this rumour circulated, not in Homs (Emesa), where Abdarrahmān died, but in Medina. There a young relation of Abdarrahmān was so roused by the taunt that the death of his kinsman was unavenged, that he killed Ibn Othal near the mosque of Damascus. Moawiya imprisoned him and let him pay a high ransom, the law not permitting the talio against a Moslem for having killed a Christian. The story that this relative was Khālid, the son of Abdarrahmān, is absurd inasmuch as Moawiya made this Khālid commander against the Greeks in succession to his father. In the third case—that of Malik Ashtar—the evidence is equally inadequate. In fact, since Moawiya did not turn the weapon of assassination against such men as Abdallah b. Zobair and Hosain b. Ali, it is unlikely that he used it against less dangerous persons. These two men were the chief obstacles to Moawiya’s plan for securing the Caliphate for his son Yazid. The leadership with the Arabic tribes was as a rule hereditary, the son succeeding his father, but only if he was personally fit for the position, and was acknowledged as such by the principal men of the tribe. The hereditary principle had not been recognized by Islam in the cases of Abu Bekr, Omar and Othman; it had had some influence upon the choice of Ali, the husband of Fatima and the cousin of the Prophet. But it had been adopted entirely for the election of Hasan. The example of Abu Bekr proved that the caliph had the right to appoint his successor. But this appointment must be sanctioned by the principal men, as representing the community. Moawiya seems to have done his best to gain that approbation, but the details given by the historians are altogether unconvincing. This only seems to be certain, that the succession of Yazid was generally acknowledged before the death of his father, except in Medina. (See Mahommedan Institutions.)

Moawiya died in the month of Rajab 60 (a.d. 680). His last words are said to have been: “Fear ye God, the Elevated and Mighty, for God, Praise be to Him, protects the man that fears Him; he who does not fear God, has no protection.” Moawiya was, in fact, a religious man and a strict disciple of the precepts of Islam. We can scarcely, therefore, credit the charges made by the adversaries of his chosen successor Yazid, that he was a drinker of wine, fond of pleasure, careless about religion. All the evidence shows that, during the reign of the Omayyads, life in Damascus and the rest of Syria was austere and in striking contrast to the dissolute manners which prevailed in Medina.

2. Rule of Yazid.—When Moawiya died, the opposition had already been organized. On his accession Yazid sent a circular to all his prefects, officially announcing his father’s death, and ordering them to administer the oath of allegiance to their subjects. In that sent to Walīd b. ‘Otba, the governor of Medina, he enclosed a private note charging him in particular to administer the oath to Hosain, Abdallah b. Omar and Abdallah b. Zobair, if necessary, by force. Walid sent a messenger inviting them to a conference, thus giving them time to assemble their followers and to escape to Mecca, where the prefect Omar b. Sa‘īd could do nothing against them. In the month Ramadan this Omar was made governor of Medina and sent an army against Ibn Zobair. This army was defeated, and from that time Ibn Zobair was supreme at Mecca.

On the news of Yazid’s accession, the numerous partisans of the family of Ali in Kufa sent addresses to Hosain, inviting him to take refuge with them, and promising to have him proclaimed caliph in Irak. Hosain, having learned that the majority of the inhabitants were apparently ready to support him strenuously, prepared to take action. Meanwhile Yazid, having been informed of the riotous behaviour of the Shi‘ites in Kufa, sent Obaidallah, son of the famous Ziyād and governor of Basra, to restore order. Using the same tactics as his father had used before, Obaidallah summoned the chiefs of the tribes and made them responsible for the conduct of their men. On the 8th of Dhu’l-Hijja Hosain set out from Mecca with all his family, expecting to be received with enthusiasm by the citizens of Kufa, but on his arrival at Kerbela west of the Euphrates, he was confronted by an army sent by Obaidallah under the command of Omar, son of the famous Sa‘d b. Abi Waqqās, the founder of Kufa. Hosain gave battle, vainly relying on the promised aid from Kufa, and fell with almost all his followers on the 10th of Muharram 61 (10th of October 680).

No other issue of this rash expedition could have been expected. But, as it involved the grandson of the Prophet, the son of Ali, and so many members of his family, Hosain’s devout partisans at Kufa, who by their overtures had been the principal cause of the disaster, regarded it as a tragedy, and the facts gradually acquired a wholly romantic colouring. Omar b. Sa‘d and his officers, Obaidallah and even Yazid came to be regarded as murderers, and their names have ever since been held accursed by all Shi‘ites. They observe the 10th of Muharram, the day of ‘Ashūra, as a day of public mourning. Among the Persians, stages are erected on that day in public places, and plays are acted, representing the misfortunes of the family of Ali.16 “Revenge for Hosain” became the watchword of all Shi‘ites, and the Meshed Hosain (Tomb of the martyr Hosain) at Kerbela is to them the holiest place in the world (see Kerbela). Obaidallah sent the head of Hosain to Damascus, together with the women and children and Ali b. Hosain, who, being ill, had not taken part in the fight. Yazid was very sorry for the issue, and sent the prisoners under safe-conduct to Medina. Ali remained faithful to the caliph, taking no share in the revolt of the Medinians, and openly condemning the risings of the Shi‘ites.

Ibn Zobair profited greatly by the distress caused by Hosain’s death. Though he named himself publicly a refugee of the House of God, he had himself secretly addressed as caliph, and many of the citizens of Medina acknowledged him as such. Yazid, when informed of this, swore in his anger to have him imprisoned. But remembering the wisdom of his father, he sent messengers with a chain made of silver coins, and bearing honourable proposals. At the same time he received a number of the chief men of Medina, sent by the prefect, with great honour and loaded them with gifts and presents. But Ibn Zobair refused, and the Medinians, of whom the majority probably had never before seen a prince’s court, however simple, were only confirmed in their rancour against Yazid, and told many horrible tales about his profligacy, that he hunted and held wild orgies with Bedouin sheikhs, and had no religion. A characteristically Arabic ceremony took place in the mosque of Medina. “I cast off the oath of allegiance to Yazid, as I cast off my turban,” exclaimed the first, and all others followed, casting off one of their garments, till a heap of turbans and sandals lay on the floor. Ibn Ḥanẓala was made commander. The Omayyads, though they with their clients counted more than 1000 men, were not able to maintain themselves, and were allowed to depart only on condition of strict neutrality.

At last the patience of Yazid was exhausted. An army—the accounts about the number vary from 4000 to 20,000—was equipped in all haste and put under the command of Moslim b. ‘Oqba, with orders first to exact submission from the Medinians, if necessary by force, and then to march against Ibn Zobair. Moslim, having met the expelled Omayyads at Wādi ‘l-Qorā, encamped near the city (August 683) and gave the inhabitants three days in which to return to obedience, wishing to spare the city of the Prophet and to prevent the shedding of blood. When, however, after the lapse of three days, a final earnest appeal had been answered insultingly, he began the battle. The Medinians fought valiantly, but could not hold out against the well-disciplined Syrians. Moreover, they were betrayed by the Medinian family of the Banū Ḥāritha, who introduced Syrian soldiers into the town. Medina lies between two volcanic hills, called harra. After one of these the battle has been named “The Day of Harra.” For three days the city was given up to plunder. It is said that a thousand bastards (the “children of the Harra”) were born in consequence of these days. The remaining citizens were compelled to take the oath of allegiance to Yazid in a humiliating form; the few who refused were killed. Ali b. Hosain, who had refused to have anything to do with the revolt, was treated with all honour. Mahommed b. al-Hanafiya, the son of Ali, and Abdallah b. Omar had likewise abstained, but they had left Medina for Mecca.

Moslim then proceeded towards Mecca. He was already ill, and died about midway between the two cities, after having given the command, according to the orders of the caliph, to Hosain b. Nomair. It is quite natural that the man who delivered up the city of the Prophet to plunder, and at whose hands so many prominent Moslems fell, should have been an object of detestation to the devout. Even some European scholars have drawn a false picture of his personality, as has been clearly shown by Wellhausen. About Medina also false statements have been made. The city recovered very soon from the disaster, and remained the seat not only of holy tradition and jurisdiction, but also of the Arabic aristocracy. In no city of the empire, during the reign of the Omayyads, lived more singers and musicians than in Medina.

Hosain b. Nomair arrived before Mecca in September 683 and found Ibn Zobair ready to defend it. A number of the citizens of Medina had come to the aid of the Holy City, as well as many Kharijites from Yamāma under Najda b. ‘Ämir. The siege had lasted 65—others say 40—days, when the news came of the death of Yazid, which took place presumably on the 14th of Rabia I, 64 (12th November 683). Eleven days before a fire, caused by imprudence, had consumed all the woodwork of the Ka’ba and burst the black stone in three places. The evidence is quite conclusive; yet the fire has been imputed to the Syrians, and a tale was invented about ballistas which hurled against the House of God enormous stones and vessels full of bitumen. In fact, the siege had been confined to enclosure and skirmishes. It is said that on the news of the death of Yazid a conference took place between Hosain and Ibn Zobair, and that the former offered to proclaim the latter as caliph provided he would accompany him to Syria and proclaim a general amnesty. Ibn Zobair refused haughtily, and Hosain, with a contemptuous criticism of his folly, ordered his army to break up for Syria.

Hitherto Ibn Zobair had confined himself to an appeal to the Moslems to renounce Yazid and to have a caliph elected by the council (shūrā) of the principal leading men. He now openly assumed the title of caliph and invited men to take the oath of allegiance. He was soon acknowledged throughout Arabia, in Egypt and in Irak. The Omayyads, who had returned to Medina, were again expelled.

Yazid is described in the Continuatio Isidori Byz. §27, as “iucundissimus et cunctis nationibus regni eius subditis vir gratissime habitus, qui nullam unquam, ut omnibus moris est, sibi regalis fastigii causa gloriam appetivit, sed communis17 cum omnibus civiliter vixit.” This is confirmed by the fact that Moawiya II. is said to have been a mild ruler, like his father, and goes far to outweigh the prejudiced account given by his opponents and coloured still further by tradition. Against the accusation of being a drinker of wine he himself protested in verses which he recited when he sent the army against Ibn Zobair. Decisive is also the testimony of Ibn al-Hanafiya, who declared that all the accusations brought by the Medinians were false. It may be true that he was fond of hunting, but he was a peace-loving, generous prince. It is uncertain at what age he died. Accounts vary between 33 and 39. The latter finds confirmation in the statement that he was born in a.h. 25, though another account places his birth in 22. As his son Moawiya who succeeded him was certainly adult (the accounts vary between 17 and 23), the latter date seems to be preferable.

3. Moawiya II. had reigned a very short time—how long is again wholly uncertain—when he fell sick and died. Then commenced a period of the greatest confusion. The mother of Yazid, Maisūn, belonged to the most powerful tribe in Syria, the Kalb, and it seems that this and the cognate tribes of Qodā‘a (Yemenites) had enjoyed certain prerogatives, which had aroused the jealousy of the Qais and the cognate tribes of Modar. Immediately after the death of Yazid, Zofar b. Ḥārith, who had already fought with Ibn Zobair against Yazid, had induced northern Syria and Mesopotamia to declare for Ibn Zobair. In Homs (Emesa) the governor No‘mān b. Bashīr had pledged himself to the same cause. The prefect of Damascus, Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qais, seemed to be wavering in his loyalty. Khālid, the brother of Moawiya II., was still a youth and appears to have had no strength of character. There was, however, a much more dangerous candidate, viz. Merwān b. Ḥakam, of another branch of the Omayyads, who had been Othman’s right-hand man. He had pledged himself after some hesitation to Yazid, but now his turn had come. The amir of the Kalb, Ibn Baḥdal, persuaded probably by Obaidallah b. Ziyād, conceived that only a man of distinction could win the contest, and proclaimed Merwan caliph, on condition that his successor should be Khālid b. Yazid, and after him ‘Amr b. Sa‘īd al-Ashdaq, who belonged to the third branch of the Omayyads. Meanwhile Ḍaḥḥāk had declared himself openly for Ibn Zobair. A furious battle (a.d. 684) ensued at Merj Rāhiṭ, near Damascus, in which Ḍaḥḥāk and Zofar, though they had the majority of troops, were utterly defeated. This battle became the subject of a great many poems and had pernicious consequences, especially as regards the antagonism between the Qais-Moḍar and Kalb-Yemenite tribes.

4. Reign of Merwan I.—Merwan strengthened his position according to the old oriental fashion by marrying the widow of Yazid, and soon felt himself strong enough to substitute his own son Abdalmalik for Khālid b. Yazid as successor-designate. Khālid contented himself with protesting; he was neither a politician nor a soldier, but a student of alchemy and astronomy; translations of Greek books have been ascribed to him (Jāḥiz, Bayān, i. p. 126). In the year a.h. 435 there was still in Egypt a brazen globe attributed to Ptolemy which had belonged to Khālid (Ibn Qiftī, p. 440, 1.15). He was also consulted about future events. There were, however, not a few who deplored the fact that the throne had passed from the descendants of Abu Sofiān. This feeling gave rise to the prophecy that there should appear later a Sofianī on the throne, who would reign with might and wisdom. ‘Amr Ashdaq made no opposition till the death of Merwan. After the victory at Merj Rāhiṭ, Merwan conquered Egypt, and installed as governor his second son Abdalazīz. An army sent to the rescue by Ibn Zobair under the command of his brother Muṣ‘ab was beaten in Palestine by ‘Amr Ashdaq. But a division sent by Merwan to the Hejaz was cut to pieces. Obaidallah b. Ziyād set out with the purpose of subduing Mesopotamia and marching thence against Irak. But he was detained a whole year in the former country, by a rising of the Shi‘ites in Kufa, who were still in mourning for Hosain and had formed an army which called itself “the army of the penitent.” They were routed at Ras ‘Ain, but Obaidallah had still to fight Zofar.

Meanwhile Mokhtār (son of that Abu ‘Obaid the Thaqifite who had commanded the Arabs against the Persians in the unfortunate battle of the Bridge), a man of great talents and still greater ambition, after having supported Ibn Zobair in the siege of Mecca, had gone to Kufa, where he joined the Shi‘ites, mostly Persians, and acquired great power. He claimed that he was commissioned by Ali’s son, Mahommed ibn al-Hanafiya, who after the death of Hosain was recognized by the Shi‘ites as their Mahdi. A vague message from Mahommed, that it was the duty of every good Moslem to take part with the family of the Prophet, was interpreted in favour of Mokhtār, and thenceforward all the Shi‘ites, among them the powerful Ibrāhīm, son of Ali’s right hand Malik Ashtar, followed him blindly as their chief. Afterwards Ibn al-Hanafiya seems to have acknowledged him distinctly as his vicegerent. Ibn Zobair’s representative in Kufa was compelled to flee, and all those who had participated in the battle of Kerbela were put to death. An army despatched against Obaidallah under Ibrāhīm routed the Syrians near Mosul (battle of Khāzir); Obaidallah and Hosain b. Nomair were slain. Mokhtār was now at the zenith of power, but Ibn Zobair, determined to get rid at all costs of so dangerous an enemy, named his brother Muṣ‘ab governor of Basra and ordered him to march against Kufa. Basra was at that time full of fugitives from Kufa, Arabian chiefs who resented the arrogance of Mokhtār’s adherents, and desired eagerly to regain their former position in Kufa. The troops of Basra had been, since the death of Yazid, at war with the Kharijites, who had supported Ibn Zobair during the siege of Mecca, but had deserted him later. Their caliph, Nāfi’ b. Azraq, after whom they were called also Azraqites, threatened even the city itself, when Mohallab b. Abi Ṣofra, a very able general, compelled them to retire. Mohallab then marched with Muṣ‘ab against Kufa. Mokhtār fell, and with him the ephemeral dominion of the Persian Shi‘ites. This had been their first attempt to dispute the authority of their Arabian conquerors, but it was not to be the last. Ibrāhīm b. Ashtar, Mokhtar’s governor of Mesopotamia, submitted and acknowledged the Caliphate of Ibn Zobair.

5. Reign of Abdalmalik.—Merwan died on the 27th of Ramadan 65 (7th May 685); according to tradition, he was suffocated by his wife, because he had insulted her son Khālid and herself. The accession of Abdalmalik was attended with no difficulty, but the first years of his reign were occupied by troubles in northern Syria, where, instigated by the Greeks, the Mardaites of the Amanus, called Jarājima by the Arabs, penetrated into the Lebanon. He was obliged to conclude an unfavourable treaty first with them, later with the emperor of Constantinople. Moreover, in the year 68 (a.d. 687-688) Syria was afflicted by a serious famine. Ibn Zobair, however, was occupied at Mecca with the rebuilding of the Ka’ba, and Muṣ‘ab was harassed not only by the Kharijites, but also by a noble freebooter, Obaidallah b. Ḥorr, who had created for himself a principality in the vicinity of Madāin (Ctesiphon).

The period of the pilgrimage caused a momentary truce to all these struggles, and in Dhu ‘l-hijja, a.h. 68 (January 688), was seen the curious spectacle of four different standards planted near Mecca, belonging respectively to four chiefs, each of whom was a pretender to the empire; the standard of Abdallah b. Zobair, caliph of Mecca; that of the caliph of Damascus, Abdalmalik; that of Ali’s son Mahommed b. al-Hanafiya, Mahdi of the Shi‘ites; and that of the Kharijites, who were at that time under the command of Najda b. ‘Āmir. Such, however, was the respect inspired by the holy places, that no disorders resulted.

When, in the year (69 a.h.) 689 Abdalmalik had at last encamped at Boṭān Ḥabīb in the vicinity of Kinnesrin (Qinnasrīn),18 with the purpose of marching against Muṣ‘ab, his cousin ‘Amr Ashdaq, to whom by the treaty of Jābia, before the battle of Merj Rāhit, the succession to Merwan had been promised, took advantage of his absence to lay claim to the supreme power, and to have himself proclaimed caliph by his partisans. Abdalmalik was obliged to retrace his steps and to lay siege to his own capital. The garrison of Damascus took fright, and deserted their posts, so that ‘Amr Ashdaq was compelled to surrender. The caliph Abdalmalik summoned him to his palace and slew him with his own hand. Abdalmalik has every claim to our esteem as one of the ablest monarchs that ever reigned, but this murder remains a lasting blot on his career.

Abdalmalik could now give his whole attention to the projected expedition against Irak. Muṣ‘ab was encamped at Bājomairā in the neighbourhood of Takrīt. But Abdalmalik’s first task was to subdue Zofar and his Qaisites at Kerkesia (Qarqīsia), and the rest of the partisans of Mokhtār at Nisibis. Meanwhile, Muṣ‘ab had to curb a violent revolt in Basra, brought about by agents of Abdalmalik, and called after a place in the city the revolt of the Jofrites. About the middle of a.d. 691 Abdalmalik at last encamped at Dair al-Jathalīq (the monastery of the Catholicus) between Maskin, not far from the site of Bagdad, and Bājomairā. Muṣ‘ab’s best troops were fighting under Mohallab against the Kharijites; many Basrians were secretly favourable to the Omayyads, nor were the Kufian soldiers to be trusted. The people of Irak had never been accustomed to discipline, and no improvement had taken place during the troubles of the last years. Abdalmalik, therefore, wrote secretly to the chiefs of Muṣ‘ab’s army, and persuaded them to desert to him, with the exception of Ibrāhīm b. Ashtar, the brave son of a brave father, who, after the fall of Mokhtār, had become a faithful supporter of Ibn Zobair. His death, in the beginning of the battle, decided the fate of Muṣ‘ab, who was slain sword in hand by a Shi‘ite of Kufa.

This victory opened the gates of Kufa to Abdalmalik, and all Irak received him with acclamation. Thence, a few days later, he sent Hajjāj b. Yusuf at the head of 2000 Syrians against Ibn Zobair in Mecca, and despatched a messenger to Tāriq b.‘Amr, who was encamped at Wādi ‘l-Qorā with 5000 men, to make himself master of Medina and thence to rejoin Hajjāj. Before the arrival of this reinforcement, Hajjāj confined himself to skirmishes, in which his soldiers always had the advantage. Then, in Dhu ‘l Qa‘da 72 (March 25th, 692) Mecca was invested. The blockade lasted more than six months, during which the city was a prey to all the horrors of siege and famine. Hajjāj had set up a balista on the hill of Abu Qobais, whence he poured on the city a hail of stones, which was suspended only in the days of the pilgrimage. Ibn Zobair employed against him Abyssinians armed with Greek-fire-tubes, who, however, quitted him soon under the pressure of famine. This at length triumphed over his last adherents. Ten thousand fighting men, and even two of the sons of the pretender (it is said, on his own advice), left the city and surrendered. Mecca being thus left without defenders, Ibn Zobair saw that ruin was inevitable. Hajjāj having promised him amnesty if he would surrender, he went to his mother Asmā, the daughter of Abu Bekr, who had reached the age of a hundred years, and asked her counsel. She answered that, if he was confident in the justice of his cause, he must die sword in hand. In embracing him for the last time, she felt the cuirass he wore and exclaimed that such a precaution was unworthy of a man resolved to die. He, therefore, took off the cuirass, and, when the Omayyad troops made their way into the city, attacked them furiously, notwithstanding his advanced age, and was slain. His head was cut off, and sent by Hajjāj to Damascus.

With Ibn Zobair perished the influence which the early companions of Mahomet had exercised over Islam. Medina and Mecca, though they continued to be the holy cities, had no longer their old political importance, which had already been shaken to its foundations by the murder of Othman and the subsequent troubles. Henceforward we shall find temporal interests, represented by Damascus, predominating over those of religion, and the centre of Islam, now permanently removed beyond the limits of Arabia, more susceptible to foreign influence, and assimilating more readily their civilizing elements. Damascus, Kufa and Basra will attract the flower of all the Moslem provinces, and thus that great intellectual, literary and scientific movement, which reached its apogee under the first Abbasid Caliphs at Bagdad, steadily becomes more marked.

After the burning of the Ka’ba during the siege of Mecca by Hosain b. Nomair, Ibn Zobair had rebuilt and enlarged the house of God. It is said that he thus carried out a design of the Prophet, which he had not ventured to undertake for fear of offending the newly converted Koreishites. Hajjāj pulled down the enlargements and restored the Ka‘ba to its old state. Meanwhile, the caliph committed to him the government of the Hejaz. The Medinians, whose loyalty was suspected, were treated by him with severity; not a few maulas (clients) were obliged to wear a leaden badge on their neck (Tabarī, ii. p. 854 seq.).

Thus the protracted war against Ibn Zobair was brought to an end; hence this year (71) also is called the “year of union” (jamā‘a). But the storms in Irak and Mesopotamia had not yet altogether subsided. The Qais could not leave unavenged the blood shed at Merj Rāhit. For about ten years the Syrian and Mesopotamian deserts were the scene of a series of raids, often marked by great cruelty, and which have been the subject of a great many poems. Abdalmalik had need of all his tact and energy to pacify ultimately the zealous sectaries, but the antagonism between Yemenites (Kalb and Azd) and Moḍarites (Qais and Tamīm) had been increased by these struggles, and even in the far east and the far west had fatal consequences.

When Abdalmalik, after a stay of forty days, returned from Irak to Syria, he left two Omayyad princes as his vicegerents in Kufa and Basra. Mohallab, who at the time of the battle of Bājomairā was in the field against the Azraqītes (Kharijites), and had put himself at the disposal of the caliph, had orders to carry on the war. But the two princes proved unequal to their task and did not support Mohallab sufficiently, so that the Kharijites gained more than one victory. Abdalmalik in alarm made Hajjāj governor of Irak with the most extensive powers. The troops of Kufa, who accompanied Mohallab in an expedition against the Kharijites, had abandoned their general and dispersed to their homes, and nothing could induce them to return to their duty. Then, in the year 75 (a.d. 694), at the moment when the people were assembled in the mosque for morning prayers, an unknown young man of insignificant appearance, with a veil over his face, ascended the pulpit. It seemed at first that he could not find his words. One of the audience, with a contemptuous remark, took a handful of pebbles to pelt him with. But he let them fall when Hajjāj lifted his veil and began to speak.

“Men of Kufa,” he said, “I see before me heads ripe for the sickle, and the reaper—I am he. It seems to me, as if I saw already the blood between your turbans and your shoulders. I am not one of those who can be frightened by inflated bags of skin, nor need any one think to squeeze me like a fig. The Prince of the Believers has spread before him the arrows of his quiver, and has tried every one of them by biting its wood. It is my wood that he has found the hardest and strongest, and I am the arrow which he shoots against you.”

At the end of this address he ordered his clerk to read the letter of the caliph. He began: “From the servant of God, Abdalmalik, Prince of the Believers, to the Moslems that are in Kufa, peace be with you.” As nobody uttered a word in reply, Hajjāj said: “Stop, boy,” and exclaimed: “The Prince of the Believers salutes you, and you do not answer his greeting! You have been but poorly taught. I will teach you afresh, unless you behave better. Read again the letter of the Prince of the Believers.” Then, as soon as he had read: “peace upon ye,” there remained not a single man in the mosque who did not respond, “and upon the Prince of the Believers be peace.” Thereupon Hajjāj ordered that every man capable of bearing arms should immediately join Mohallab in Khūzistān (Susiana), and swore that all who should be found in the town after the third day should be beheaded. This threat had its effect, and Hajjāj proceeded to Baṣra, where his presence was followed by the same results. Mohallab, reinforced by the army of Irak, at last succeeded, after a struggle of eighteen months, in subjugating the Kharijites and their caliph Qatara b. Fojā‘a, and was able at the beginning of the year 78 (a.d. 697) to return to Hajjāj at Baṣra. The latter loaded him with honours and made him governor of Khorasan, whence he directed several expeditions into Transoxiana. In the meantime Hajjāj himself had, in 695 and 696, with great difficulty suppressed Shabīb b. Yazīd at the head of the powerful tribe of Shaibān, who, himself a Kharijite, had assumed the title of Prince of the Believers, and had even succeeded in occupying Kufa. In the east the realm of Islam had been very much extended under the reign of Moawiya, when Ziyād was governor of Irak and Khorasan. Balkh and Tokhāristān, Bokhara, Samarkand and Khwarizm (modern Khiva), even Kabul and Kandahar had been subdued; but in the time of the civil war a great deal had been lost again. Now at last the task of recovering the lost districts could be resumed. When, in 697, Hajjāj gave the government of Khorasan to Mohallab, he committed that of Sijistān (Seistan) to Obaidallah b. Abi Bakra, a cousin of Ziyād. This prefect allowed himself to be enticed by Zanbīl, prince of Zabulistan, to penetrate into the country far from his base, and escaped narrowly, not without severe losses. The command over Sijistān was now given to Abdarrahman b. Ash‘ath, a descendant of the old royal family of Kinda, and a numerous army was entrusted to him, so magnificently equipped that it was called “the peacock army.” Not long after his arrival in Sijistān, Ibn Ash‘ath, exasperated by the masterful tone of Hajjāj, the plebeian, towards himself, the high-born, decided to revolt. The soldiers of Irak, who did not love the governor, and disliked the prospect of a long and difficult war far from home, eagerly accepted the proposition of returning to Irak, and even proclaimed the dethronement of Abdalmalik, in favour of Ibn Ash‘ath. The new pretender entered Fārs and Ahwāz (Susiana), and it was in this last province near Tostar (Shuster) that Hajjāj came up with him, after receiving from Syria the reinforcements which he had demanded in all haste from the caliph. Ibn Ash‘ath drove him back to Baṣra, entered the city, and then turned his arms against Kufa, of which he took possession with aid from within. Hajjāj, afraid lest his communications with Syria should be cut off, pitched his camp at Dair Qorra, eighteen miles west from Kufa towards the desert, where Mahommed, the brother of the caliph, and Abdallah, his son, brought him fresh troops. Ibn Ash‘ath encamped not far from him at Dair al-Jamājim with a far more numerous army. In great alarm Abdalmalik endeavoured to stifle the revolt by offering to dismiss Hajjāj from his post. The insurgents rejected this offer, and hostilities recommenced. At the end of three months and a half, in July 702, a decisive action took place. Victory declared for Hajjāj. Ibn Ash‘ath fled to Baṣra, where he managed to collect fresh troops; but having been again beaten in a furious battle that took place at Maskin near the Dojail, he took refuge at Ahwāz, from which he was soon driven by the troops of Hajjāj under ‘Omāra b. Tamīm. The rebel then retired to Sijistān, and afterwards sought an asylum with the king of Kabul. His partisans fled before ‘Omāra’s army and penetrated into Khorasan, where they were isarmed by the governor Yazīd, son of the celebrated Mohallab, who had died in the year 701. The pretender was betrayed by the king of Kabul and killed himself. His head was sent to Hajjāj and then to Damascus. This happened in the year 703 or 704. Yazid b. Mohallab was soon after deprived of the government of Khorasan, Hajjāj accusing him of partiality towards the rebels of Yemenite extraction. He appointed in his stead first his brother Mofaḍḍal b. Mohallab, and nine months after Qotaiba b. Moslim, who was destined in a later period to extend the sway of Islam in the east as far as China.

The struggle of Ibn Ash‘ath was primarily a contest for hegemony between Irak and Syria. The proud Arabic lords could not acquiesce in paying to a plebeian like Hajjāj, invested with absolute power by the caliph, the strict obedience he required. They considered it further as an injustice that the Syrian soldiers received higher pay than those of Irak. This is apparent from the fact that one of the conditions of peace proposed by Abdalmalik before the battle of Dair al-Jamājim had been that henceforth the Irakian troops should be paid equally with the Syrian. Moreover, Hajjāj, in order to maintain the regular revenue from taxation, had been obliged to introduce stringent regulations, and had compelled a great many villagers who had migrated to the cities to return to their villages. Several of these were faqīhs, students of Koranic science and law, and all these seconded Ibn Ash‘ath with all their might. But, as Wellhausen has shown, it is not correct to consider the contest as a reaction of the maula’s (Persian Moslems) against the Arabic supremacy.

Immediately after the victories of Dair al-Jamājim and Maskin, in 702, Hajjāj, built a new residence on the Tigris, between Baṣra and Kufa, which he called Wāsit (“Middle”). There his Syrian soldiers were not in contact with the turbulent citizens of the two capitals, and were at any moment ready to suppress any fresh outburst.

At the beginning of his reign Abdalmalik had replaced the humble mosque built by Omar on the site of the temple at Jerusalem by a magnificent dome, which was completed in the year 691. Eutychius and others pretend that he desired to substitute Jerusalem for Mecca, because Ibn Zobair had occupied the latter place, and thus the pilgrimage to the Ka‘ba had become difficult for the Syrians. This is quite improbable. Abdalmalik was born and educated in Islam, and distinguished himself in his youth by piety and continence. He regarded himself as the champion of Islam and of the communion of the believers, and had among his intimates men of acknowledged devoutness such as Rajā b. Ḥaywa. The idea of interfering with the pilgrimage to the House of God at Mecca, which would have alienated from him all religious men, and thus from a political point of view would have been suicidal, cannot have entered his mind for a moment. But the glorification of Jerusalem, holy alike for Moslems, Christians and Jews, could not but exalt the glory of Islam and its rulers within and without.

As soon as the expedition to Irak against Muṣ‘ab had terminated, the holy war against the Greeks was renewed. The operations in Asia Minor and Armenia were entrusted to Mahommed b. Merwan, the caliph’s brother, who was appointed governor of Mesopotamia and Armenia, and in 692 beat the army of Justinian II. near Sebaste in Cilicia. From this time forth the Moslems made yearly raids, the chief advantage of which was that they kept the Syrian and Mesopotamian Arabs in continual military exercise. After the victorious march of Okba (Oqba) b. Nāfi’ through north Africa and the foundation of Kairawan, his successor Qais b. Zohair had been obliged to retreat to Barca (Cyrenaica). In the year 696 Abdalmalik sent Hassān b. No‘mān into Africa at the head of a numerous army. He retook Kairawan, swept the coast as far as Carthage, which he sacked, expelling the Greek garrisons from all the fortified places; he then turned his arms against the Berbers, who, commanded by the Kāhina (Diviner), as the Arabs called their queen, beat him so completely that he was compelled to retreat to Barca. Five years later he renewed the war, defeated and killed the Kāhina, and subdued the Berbers, who henceforward remained faithful to the Arabs. Hassān continued to be governor of Kairawan till after the death of Abdalmalik.

In the meantime Abdalmalik reconstituted the administration of the empire on Arabic principles. Up to the year 693 the Moslems had no special coinage of their own, and chiefly used Byzantine and Persian money, either imported or struck by themselves. Moawiya, indeed, had struck dinars and dirhems with a Moslem inscription, but his subjects would not accept them as there was no cross upon them. Abdalmalik instituted a purely Islamitic coinage. If we may believe Theophanes, who says that Justinian II. refused to receive these coins in payment of the tribute and therefore declared the treaty at an end, we must put the beginning of the coinage at least two years earlier. Hajjāj coined silver dirhems at Kufa in 694. A still greater innovation was that Arabic became the official language of the state. In the conquered countries till then, not only had the Greek and Persian administration been preserved, but Greek remained the official language in the western, Persian in the eastern provinces. All officials were now compelled to know Arabic and to conduct their administration in that language. To this change was due in great measure the predominance of Arabic throughout the empire. Lastly, a regular post service was instituted from Damascus to the provincial capitals, especially destined for governmental despatches. The postmasters were charged with the task of informing the caliph of all important news in their respective countries.

All the great rivals of Abdalmalik having now disappeared, he was no longer like his predecessors primus inter pares, but dominus. Under his rule the members of the Omayyad house enjoyed a greater amount of administrative control than had formerly been the case, but high office was given only to competent men. He succeeded in reconciling the sons of ‘Amr Ashdaq, and also Khālid b. Yazid, to whom he gave his own daughter in marriage. He himself had married ‘Ātika, a daughter of Yazid, a union which was in all respects a happy one. He took great care in the education of his sons, whom he destined as his successors. His brother Abdalazīz, governor of Egypt, whom Merwan had marked out as his successor, died in the year 703 or 704, and Abdalmalik chose as heirs to the empire first his son Walīd, and after him his second son Suleimān. He himself died on the 14th Shawwāl 86 (9th October 705) at the age of about sixty. His reign was one of the most stormy in the annals of Islam, but also one of the most glorious. Abdalmalik not only brought triumph to the cause of the Omayyads, but also extended and strengthened the Moslem power as a whole. He was well versed in old Arabic tradition and in the doctrine of Islam, and was passionately fond of poetry. His court was crowded with poets, whom he loaded with favours, even if they were Christians like Akhtal. In his reign flourished also the two celebrated rivals of Akhtal, Jarīr and Farazdaq.

6. Reign of Walid I.—This is the most glorious epoch in the history of Islam. In Asia Minor and Armenia, Maslama, brother of the caliph, and his generals obtained numerous successes against the Greeks. Tyana was conquered after a long siege, and a great expedition against Constantinople was in preparation. In Armenia Maslama advanced even as far as the Caucasus. In Africa, Mūsā b. Noṣair, who succeeded Hassān b. No‘mān as governor, in a short time carried his conquests as far as Fez, Tangier and Ceuta, and one of his captains even made a descent on Sicily and plundered Syracuse. When he returned from the west to Kairawan, he made his client Ṭāriq (or Tarik) governor of Tangier and of the whole western part of Africa. Under him the chiefs who had submitted to the Moslem arms retained their authority. One of them was the Greek exarch of Tangier, Julian, who, supported by the powerful Berber tribe of Ghomēra, had long resisted and even asked for aid from Spain, but had been compelled to surrender and was left governor of Ceuta. Meanwhile in Spain, after the death of the Gothic king Witiza in the year 90 (708-709), anarchy arose, which was terminated by the council of noblemen at Toledo electing Roderic, the powerful duke of Baetica, to be his successor in the fifth year of Walid. The eldest son of Witiza then applied to Julian, and asked the aid of the Arabs for the recovery of his father’s throne. Ṭāriq forwarded the embassy to Kairawan, and Mūsā asked the caliph’s permission to send an expedition into Spain. Authorized by Mūsā, Ṭāriq now sent, in Ramadan 91 (July 710), 500 Berbers under the command of Ṭārif to reconnoitre the country. This expedition, seconded by partisans of Witiza, was successful. In the beginning of a.d. 711 Roderic had been summoned to the north on account of an invasion of Navarra by the Franks, caused, it is said, by the conspirators. Ṭāriq, thus certain of meeting no serious opposition to his landing, passed into Spain himself with an army composed mainly of Berbers of the Ghomēra tribe under the guidance of Julian. The spot where he landed thence acquired the name of Jebel Ṭāriq, “Mountain of Ṭāriq,” afterwards corrupted into Gibraltar. Having made himself master of Algeçiras and thereby secured his communication with Africa, Ṭāriq set out at once in the direction of Cordova. At the news of the invasion Roderic hastened back and led a numerous army against the combined forces of Ṭāriq and the partisans of Witiza. A fierce battle took place in the plain of Barbata on the little river of Guadaleta (north of Medina Sidonia), in which Roderic was completely routed. The spoils of the victors were immense, especially in horses, but the king himself had disappeared. Fearing lest he should have escaped to Toledo and should there fit out another army, the partisans of Witiza insisted that Ṭāriq should march immediately against the capital. Ṭāriq complied with their wishes, notwithstanding the express command of Mūsā b. Nosair that he should not venture too far into the country, and the protests of Julian. Having made himself master of Ecija and having despatched a detachment under Moghīth against Cordova, Ṭāriq took Mentesa (Villanueva de la Fuente) and marched upon Toledo, which he soon conquered. At the same time Moghīth took Cordova. But, notwithstanding these successes, Ṭāriq knew that his situation was most critical. King Roderic, who had escaped to Lusitania, and the noble Goths, who had fled from Toledo, would certainly not be slow in making efforts to regain what they had lost. He therefore sent a message in all haste to Mūsā, entreating him to come speedily. Mūsā, though angered by the disobedience of Ṭāriq, hastened to the rescue and embarked in April 712 with 18,000 men, among them many noble Arabs, and began, advised by Julian, a methodical campaign, with the purpose of establishing and securing a line of communication between the sea and Toledo. After having taken Seville, Carmona and Merida, he marched from the latter place by the Via Romana to Salamanca, after having ordered Ṭāriq to rejoin him in order to encounter king Roderic. Not far from Tamames the king was defeated and killed. King Alphonso the Great found his tombstone at Viseo with the inscription, “Hic requiescit Rodericus rex Gothorum.” After this battle Mūsā reconquered Toledo, which, after the departure of Ṭāriq, had recovered its independence, and entered the capital in triumph. Already, before the expedition to Salamanca, he had perceived that the sons of Witiza had neither military nor political ability. He therefore proclaimed the caliph of Damascus as sole ruler of the whole peninsula. The Gothic princes must content themselves with honours and apanages, in which they readily acquiesced. In the same year 93 (a.d. 712) Mūsā struck Moslem coins with Latin inscriptions. Mūsā then continued the subjugation of Spain, till Walid recalled him to Damascus. He obeyed after having appointed his son Abdalazīz governor of Andalos (Andalusia), as the Arabs named the peninsula, and assigned Seville as his residence. Abdalazīz consolidated his power by marrying the widow of the late king Roderic. Mūsā left Spain about August 714, and reached Damascus shortly before the death of Walid. Notwithstanding the immense booty he brought, he did not receive his due reward. Accused of peculation, he was threatened with imprisonment unless he paid a fine of 100,000 pieces of gold. The old man—he was born in the year 640—was released by Yazid b. Mohallab, the then mighty favourite of the caliph Suleiman, but died in the same year 716 on his way to Mecca. His son Abdalazīz was an excellent ruler, who did much for the consolidation of the new conquests, but he reigned only one year and eleven months, when he was murdered. His death has been falsely imputed by some historians to the caliph Suleiman.19