Wednesday, May 6, 1964 TESTIMONY OF ALAN H. BELMONT

The President's Commission met at 9:25 a.m. on May 6, 1964, at 200 Maryland Avenue NE., Washington, D.C.

Present were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Chairman; Representative Gerald R. Ford, John J. McCloy, and Allen W. Dulles, members.

Also present were J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel; David W. Belin, assistant counsel; Norman Redlich, assistant counsel; Samuel A. Stern, assistant counsel; and Charles Murray, observer.

The Chairman. Well, gentlemen, the Commission will come to order.

Mr. Belin, you had something you wanted the record to show in connection with our testimony yesterday.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Would you present it to the Commission now, please.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir. We have a report from an FBI document that states that Roy Truly when interviewed on November 22, advised that "it is possible Oswald did see him with a rifle in his hands within the past few days," that is as of November 22, "as a Mr. Warren Caster, employed by Southwestern Publishing Co., which company has an office in the same building, had come to his office with two rifles, one was a .22 caliber rifle which Caster said he had purchased for his son, and the other a larger more high-powered rifle which Caster said he had purchased with which to go deer hunting if he got a chance," and Truly said that he examined the high-powered rifle and raised it to his shoulder and sighted over it and then returned it to Caster and Caster left with both rifles.

Then Truly went on to state that he does not own a rifle and has had no other rifle in his hands or in his possession for a long period of time. Now because of the problem that did arise, I believe the staff will promptly go down to Dallas to take the deposition of both Mr. Truly and Mr. Caster to fully get this in deposition form and find out where these rifles were as of November 22.

The Chairman. And their caliber, and so forth.

Mr. Belin. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Yes, sir; I think that is desirable. You ought to do that.

Mr. Belmont, the purpose of today's hearing is to take your testimony concerning the general procedures of the FBI and explain their relationship to the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Would you please rise and raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give before this Commission will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Belmont. I do.

The Chairman. Will you be seated, please.

Mr. Stern, will you conduct the examination, please?

Mr. Stern. Thank you, sir. Would you state your full name for the record, please?

Mr. Belmont. Alan H. Belmont.

Mr. Stern. And your address, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. Belmont. 2711 North Yucatan Street, Arlington, Va.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, what was your education at the college level?

Mr. Belmont. Graduate of Stanford University in California, with an A.B. degree, majoring in accounting.

Mr. Stern. What year?

Mr. Belmont. 1931.

Mr. Stern. What was your employment briefly before joining the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. Belmont. I joined the Bureau, the FBI, in 1936, and in the interim I worked for public accountants and as a public accountant myself in California.

Mr. Stern. Would you describe, please, for the Commission briefly your experience in the Federal Bureau of Investigation since 1936?

Mr. Belmont. I entered the FBI November 30, 1936, and after the period of training, was assigned to Birmingham, Ala., as my first office. I transferred to Chicago in about August 1937, and remained there until the summer of 1938 when I was transferred to Washington, D.C., headquarters.

In January of 1941 I was transferred to New York as supervisor of applicant and criminal investigative matters, remained there until the fall of 1942, when I was made assistant agent in charge of our Chicago office. In January of 1943 I was made agent in charge of our Cincinnati office and remained there until the summer of 1944 when I was transferred to New York as assistant agent in charge of criminal matters in New York.

Subsequently, I was placed in charge of all security work in New York for a number of years and was transferred to Washington in charge of the domestic intelligence division in February 1950. I headed that division until about June of 1961 when I was made assistant to the director in charge of all investigative work of the FBI and that is my present position.

Mr. Stern. Could you describe the organization of the FBI with two purposes in mind: First, to fix your position in the organization. Second, to provide a framework for describing the investigation of the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Belmont. The headquarters of the FBI is, of course, or the FBI is headed by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover as Director. Directly under him is Mr. Clyde Tolson, Associate Director. There are 10 divisions broken down in particular types of administration.

Mr. Dulles. May I say if any of this is classified, highly classified, you had better let us know because then we could go off the record.

Mr. Belmont. There is nothing classified here.

Mr. Dulles. Right. I know that you would have that in mind.

Mr. Belmont. Thank you.

Basically, the division of the 10 divisions at headquarters is between administrative and investigative. The 10th division is the inspection division and reports directly to Mr. Hoover. I am in charge of the investigative divisions which are comprised of the general investigative divisions handling general criminal work, the special investigative division handling special inquiries of applicant nature, and our aggressive approach to organized crime.

The laboratory division handles all examinations of a scientific nature, and the domestic intelligence division handles all types of security work. I am in charge of those four divisions, and thus am in charge and responsible for our investigative work.

Our field offices, numbering 55, are geographically located in accordance with the amount of work in a particular area. Each division in the field is headed by a special agent in charge, assisted by an assistant special agent in charge. They are responsible for the proper conduct of the work within their divisions. They are answerable to Mr. Hoover. They are also supervised, of course, in the particular area of the work concerned by the division at headquarters.

Depending on——

Mr. Dulles. May I ask is that 55 in the United States?

Mr. Belmont. United States and its possessions.

Mr. Dulles. And Puerto Rico?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. It doesn't include your legal——

Mr. Belmont. Legal attachés abroad?

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. No; they are under the direct supervision of our headquarters.

Depending on the size of the division in the field, we will have a supervisory staff in order to properly supervise the work of the agents in the field.

Mr. Stern. Can you describe the establishment of a typical case, indicating the meaning of the terms office of origin and auxiliary office?

Mr. Belmont. A case is opened by the FBI upon the receipt of information indicating a matter within the jurisdiction of the FBI. We restrict our investigations to those matters which are within our jurisdiction.

The office of origin is the office where the major part of the work is to be done. Thus it should be the controlling office of the investigation.

Normally, if an individual is under investigation, it will be the office where he resides. There will be in many cases investigation to be conducted by other offices. Those offices that have investigations in that case are considered auxiliary offices, and will cover the investigation sent to it, sent to them, by the office of origin or by another auxiliary office if a lead develops within that area that requires attention elsewhere.

I may say that the office of origin can be changed and is changed if during the investigation it becomes apparent that the focus of the investigation has shifted to another area.

It is logical, therefore, that that office which bears the brunt of the investigation should be in possession of all the material pertinent to the investigation and should be charged with the supervision and running of the investigation and the direction of it.

In the event the office of origin is changed at any given time, the previous office of origin will forward to the new office of origin all material pertaining to the case so that it will have a complete file and the necessary knowledge to run the case.

Mr. Stern. Can you tell us a bit more about how information is maintained and how it flows through the system from headquarters to office of origin, to the auxiliary office or in the other directions that are possible?

Mr. Belmont. Since the information is maintained in a standard and uniform filing system in both our field offices and our headquarters so that there is complete uniformity in the handling of information, our main filing system is at headquarters. Consequently, we need here all pertinent information in any case. Consequently, the reports and information developed during a case are sent to our headquarters for filing.

It is pertinent to observe that we conduct close to 2 million name checks a year for other agencies and departments of the Federal Government. Consequently, we must have here all pertinent information so that a name check will reflect the information in possession of the Bureau.

When a report is prepared in our field office—an investigation, and there are leads or investigation to be performed in another office, copies of this report are designated for that office, together with the lead or the investigation to be covered. Upon receipt of that the office gathers the background information from the report and proceeds with the investigation.

Mr. Stern. This is the auxiliary office?

Mr. Belmont. The auxiliary office.

If there is a matter of urgency rather than wait for an investigative report, the information will be transmitted by more rapid means, such as teletype. All of our offices have teletypes; radio, our offices have a radio system; telephone.

Mr. Dulles. Is that teletype from the office to Washington only, or is there some interoffice teletypes?

Mr. Belmont. Each office is connected with each other office by teletype.

Mr. Dulles. It is; all over the country?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; permitting rapid communication.

Mr. Dulles. That is, New Orleans and Dallas would have teletype between these two offices?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

The Chairman. What kind of radio communication, Mr. Belmont, did you say?

Mr. Belmont. We have an emergency radio communication so that both for normal use, in the matter of expense, to reduce expenses, and for an emergency, our offices can communicate with headquarters and with each other.

The Chairman. On your own transmission system?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; that is correct. We feel that in any type of an emergency we must, because of our heavy responsibilities——

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. Be able to communicate. As a matter of fact, during the recent disaster in Alaska, one of the few means of communication with the mainland was our radio system.

The Chairman. Is that so?

Mr. Belmont. And we assisted in passing messages down from Alaska.

We have a communication called AIRTEL which is simply a communication in letter form on a particular form which upon receipt is regarded as a matter of urgency and requires special handling.

So that you will understand that, in an effort to cut expenses, we determined that a matter which could not wait for a report or a letter was normally sent by teletype, which is a relatively expensive means of communication.

By sending an AIRTEL which would be recognized for special handling, the office could receive the same information by mail with a delay of perhaps 12 hours and it would still receive the urgent handling that we require for that particular thing. That is the purpose of the AIRTEL.

Mr. Stern. I think we might turn now to a description of your role in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, both before and after the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. As the individual in charge of all investigative operations, the Lee Harvey Oswald investigation is my responsibility, the same as any other investigative case in the Bureau.

Mr. Stern. Did you have any particular involvement that you can recall in the investigation of his case before November 22—personally?

Mr. Belmont. No; this case was not of the importance or urgency that it was considered necessary to call to my personal attention for personal direction. You must bear in mind that during the fiscal year 1963 the FBI handled something in the nature of 636,000 investigative matters. Necessarily, then, those matters which would be called to my personal attention for personal handling would have to be on a selective basis.

Mr. Stern. Have you been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. I have indeed.

Mr. McCloy. Before we get to this, how many cases of defections to the Soviet Union would you be investigating in the course of a fiscal year?

Mr. Belmont. I couldn't give you an exact figure on that. It is our system to investigate any individual where there is information or evidence that indicates a necessity for investigation within our jurisdiction. I do know that we have investigated, and currently are investigating, defectors not only to the Soviet Union but in other areas of the world.

Mr. McCloy. They also would not come per se to your attention, your personal attention?

Mr. Belmont. Depending on the case. If there is a matter which has some urgency or there is a question of policy, it would and does come to my attention, and indeed comes to the attention of Mr. Hoover.

I would not seek to give you any impression that I am not advised of many cases, I am. I am kept daily advised, as is Mr. Hoover, of all matters of policy or urgency or where there is a question of procedure. That is inherent in our system of close supervision.

Mr. McCloy. What I am getting at is, I think, is the matter of defection just out of its own character of such significance that it becomes a matter of out of the ordinary importance to the Bureau when you learn of it.

Mr. Belmont. Again, Mr. McCloy, I have no way of knowing the extent to which those particular cases would be called to my attention.

As shown in the Oswald case itself, we do take cognizance of these. Immediately upon the publicity on Oswald, there was a case opened. I do know that I see many such cases and where there is an indication of possible damage to the country through the leak of information, classified or in some other instance where there is a question of policy or urgency it is immediately called to my attention. I can only say in general I do see many such cases.

Mr. McCloy. Well, we had testimony here yesterday that in a preassassination investigation of Oswald that they learned he was a defector, they had interviews with him, and then they marked the case closed.

At one stage it was reopened and then it was closed again because, as I gather it, there was no indication other than his defection that would lead to their, to the agents, feeling that this man was capable of violence or that he was a dangerous character in any sense.

I gather that whether or not he was thought to be a dangerous character or whether he was capable of violence would be settled by the man in the field office, in the office that had charge, the man who was in charge of the office that was dealing with that case locally, is that right?

Mr. Belmont. That is a judgment that he would render, but that judgment would be passed on by our headquarters staff.

Mr. McCloy. Passed on by Washington?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, indeed. In this instance by the domestic intelligence division.

Mr. McCloy. In this case then the decision to close that case, I am talking always about the preassassination business, was approved or tacitly approved by the Washington staff.

Mr. Belmont. Not tacitly approved. Approved.

Mr. McCloy. Approved. Well, you mark the paper approved or you just accept it, accept the file with a notation "return for closing."

Mr. Belmont. When the closing report comes to our headquarters, it is reviewed by our supervisory staff, and if we do not agree with the action then the field office is notified to continue the investigation. That is a decision of substance.

Mr. McCloy. Well, I can understand that but I gather when the report comes in you simply let the report lie unless you feel from your examination of it that it justified further action. You don't notify the field office, do you, that the closing of the case is approved?

Mr. Belmont. No, Mr. McCloy. With the volume of work that we have that would be an unnecessary move.

Mr. McCloy. I can understand that.

Mr. Belmont. It is, however, thoroughly understood through our service, through the system that we follow, that if that report comes in and it is reviewed and it is filed here, if there is disagreement as to the handling of the closing of the case or any other matter pertaining to the investigation, the seat of government will then go out with instructions to the field.

Mr. McCloy. All right.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask one question further on that point?

The Chairman. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Dulles. As I recall from the testimony of your people yesterday, with regard to the situation in Dallas and later in New Orleans, that after the case was marked closed in Dallas, there was this incident in New Orleans of the distribution of the Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets, and then a case there, a live case, an open case was started.

Now, it wasn't quite clear to me yesterday from all the testimony, I missed a bit of it, unfortunately, as to whether the opening of a new case in New Orleans, because of the new incident, would operate to reopen it or change the closed status of the case in Dallas, and the case was then transferred from New Orleans to Dallas later. If you could clear that up for us I think it would be helpful.

Mr. Belmont. The agent, Fain at the time, who handled the case, closed the case after two interviews with Oswald, arriving at the conclusion that the purpose of our investigation of Oswald which was to determine whether he had been given an assignment by Soviet intelligence, had been served. He closed the case, as he felt there was no further action to be taken. The purpose had been satisfied. Headquarters agreed.

In March 1963 Agent Hosty received information in Dallas to the effect that Oswald had been in communication with The Worker, the east coast Communist newspaper. He therefore reinstituted the case, and sent out a lead to check Oswald's employment. He also received information, as I recall it, that Oswald had been in communication with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, so there were two incidents that aroused his interest.

In June 1963 our New Orleans office likewise received information that Oswald had communicated with The Worker or was on a subscription list for The Worker. So that the case was revived in Dallas by Hosty.

Mr. Dulles. That was even before what we call the New Orleans incident?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. And he learned that Oswald had left Dallas, the residence was then picked up in New Orleans, and the case was revived. So that actually there was a joint revival of the case.

Then on August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested by the New Orleans police in connection with a disturbance of the peace in passing out these pamphlets, which further aroused our interest. So that the reopening of the case after the closing was due to these incidents that I have mentioned.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you. So that at the time of the assassination, this was an open and not a closed case as regards the Dallas office.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct. At the time that Oswald was found to be living in New Orleans, and this was definitely established that he was actually residing there, the Dallas office in accordance with the procedure that I mentioned, transferred the case to New Orleans as office of origin.

Subsequently, the case was again transferred back to Dallas when it was determined that Oswald was again residing in the Dallas area.

The Chairman. All right, Mr. Stern.

Mr. Stern. We were getting, Mr. Belmont, to the question of whether you had been personally involved in the investigation since the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. I said I have indeed.

Mr. Stern. Yes. As a part of that you have reviewed in detail the investigation made prior to the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. Have you participated in or supervised the preparation of reports and other correspondence to the Commission in response to questions from the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. I show you a letter with attached memorandum which has been marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 833. Can you identify this document, Mr. Belmont?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter transmitted on April 6, 1964, to Mr. Rankin by the FBI with enclosure answering a number of questions which the Commission posed to the FBI.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this letter?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. And you have reviewed it and are familiar with it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. We have covered in your answers to Mr. Dulles and Mr. McCloy a good deal of the material in here.

I would like briefly to touch upon several of the questions, the more important questions, regarding the nature of the FBI's interest in Lee Harvey Oswald at various times, and I would like you to refer to each question that I indicate but not read your answer. Paraphrase it. I think we have had a good deal of the specific detail but what I am interested in is a description from your examination of the investigation as it was carried on, of the nature of the FBI interest in Oswald.

I would like to turn to the first question in which we asked——

The Chairman. You mean by that that you could get, we could get, a better idea from paraphrasing the answer than we could get from the exact answer itself?

Mr. Stern. I think he might be able to highlight the answer. We have the exact answer on the record, and I thought it might——

The Chairman. Well, highlight it, if there is anything in addition I would think that would be relevant and pertinent. But to ask him to paraphrase that which he has done with great meticulousness would seem to me to be abortive and would take a lot of our time, and I don't see what it would prove. If you have anything in addition that you want to ask him, if you want to ask him if there is anything in addition he has not put in there, that is all right. But to just ask him to paraphrase answers that have been done with great care would seem to me to be confusing the record, and serve no purpose.

Mr. Stern. I might ask, Mr. Belmont, whether there is anything you would like to add or amplify in these questions?

Mr. Belmont. I believe the answers speak for themselves, although in view of Mr. McCloy's questions a little while ago, I would be very happy to make clear our approach to this matter. For example, the fact that our interest in defectors, in this case, is shown by the fact that in early November 1959 we opened a file on Oswald based on the newspaper publicity as to his defection. And the fact that he had applied to renounce his citizenship. We checked our files then to see was this a man we had a record on, and found that we had a fingerprint record solely based on his enlistment in the Marines.

We had no other record on him but we placed a stop or a flash notice in our fingerprint files, at that time so that if he should come back into the country unbeknownst to us and get into some sort of trouble we would be immediately notified. That is our opening interest in the case with the thought in mind that should he come back to the country we would want to know from him whether he had been enlisted by Soviet intelligence in some manner.

That is our procedure because of our experience that these things have happened, and we consider it our responsibility to settle that issue whenever we can.

Mr. Stern. Could you explain, Mr. Belmont, this procedure of placing a stop in the files that you just referred to?

Mr. Belmont. We merely notify our identification division to place what we call a flash notice in the man's fingerprint file, which means that should he be arrested and the fingerprints be sent to the FBI, that the appropriate division, in this case the domestic intelligence division, would be notified that the man had been arrested, for what and where he was arrested, thus enabling us to center our attention on him.

Our next interest in this man arose as a result of the fact that his mother had sent, I believe, $25 to him in Moscow, so we went to her in April 1960 and we talked to her. At that time she told us that he had told her that he would possibly attend the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.

So as a followup, we had our legal attache in Paris make inquiry to see whether he had enrolled in this college. The resultant check showed that while they had expected him and a deposit had been placed that he did not show up at the college.

Mr. Stern. I think that is all covered in quite adequate detail in the answer to the first question.

Mr. Dulles. I have one question I would like to put to you on the first question and answer in your letter of April 6, in Exhibit 833—the Bureau's letter of April 6. You refer, first, to the fact that the first news you got about Oswald was from a news service item, and then later on at the bottom of the second full paragraph you state, "A file concerning Oswald was prepared and as communications were received from other U.S. Government agencies those communications were placed in his file."

The record may show the other communications, I guess our record does show, but do you feel that you adequately were advised by the State Department as this case developed or by the CIA or other agencies that might have known about it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes. We received a number of communications from other agencies, and we set up a procedure whereby we periodically checked the State Department passport file to be kept advised of his activities or his dealings with the Embassy in Moscow so that on a periodic basis we were sure we had all information in the State Department file.

We received communications from the Navy, and from other agencies.

Mr. Dulles. Is there any general procedure with respect to Americans abroad who get into trouble. Do you get informed so in case they come back you can take adequate precautionary measures? Is that established SOP?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, Mr. Dulles. We do receive such information, and if we pick up the information initially as we did here, from press reports or otherwise, we go to the other agencies and ask them whether they have any information and establish an interest there so that if they have not voluntarily furnished us the information they will do so upon our request.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Stern. On page 3, Mr. Belmont, in the answer to question No. 3, the second paragraph, could you tell us why the FBI preferred to interview Oswald after he had established residence and why it was not preferable to interview him upon his arrival in New York?

Mr. Belmont. This is a matter of experience. Generally speaking when an individual such as Oswald arrives back in the country and the press is there, there is an unusual interest in him. Immigration and Naturalization Service has a function to perform, and we prefer, unless there is a matter of urgency, to let the individual become settled in residence. It is a much better atmosphere to conduct the interview, and to get the information that we seek. If it is a matter of urgency, we will interview him immediately upon arrival.

Mr. Stern. On page 4, Mr. Belmont, in your answer to question No. 6, was it ordinary procedure for Agent Fain to re-interview Oswald so soon after his first interview under the circumstances? Is there anything unusual about that?

Mr. Belmont. There is nothing unusual whatsoever. Agent Fain interviewed Oswald on June 26, 1963—1962, I believe it was, was it not?

The Chairman. Yes; 1962.

Mr. Belmont. And was not satisfied that he had received all the information he wanted nor that it was a matter that should be closed at that time.

Therefore, he set out a lead to re-interview Oswald, and after an appropriate period he went back and re-interviewed him. This is within the prerogative of the investigative agent, and certainly if he was not satisfied with the first interview it was his duty and responsibility to pursue the matter until he was satisfied.

Mr. Stern. In your answer to question No. 5, does the response of Oswald to the question why he went to Russia seem typical to you of the returned defector, or unusual?

Mr. Belmont. There is no such thing as a typical response. Each case is an individual case, and is decided on its merits and on the background of the individual, and the circumstances surrounding it.

Mr. Stern. Would it be usual for the defector to agree to advise you if he got a contact? Are they generally that cooperative?

Mr. Belmont. We ask them because we want to know, and the purpose of our interview with him was to determine whether he had been recruited by the Soviet intelligence, and we asked him whether he would tell us if he was contacted here in this country. He replied he would. Whether he meant it is a question. However, you must bear in mind that this man, I believe it was when he was interviewed in July of 1961 in the American Embassy, the interviewing official there said it was apparent that he had learned his lesson the hard way, and that he had a new concept of the American way of life, and apparently had decided that Russia was not for him.

When we interviewed him likewise he told us that he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. He likewise commented that he had not enjoyed his stay in the Marines. So that in direct answer to your question, it is customary for us in such a case as this, to ask the man if he will report a contact, and it is customary for him to say yes, because frankly, he would be putting himself in a rather bad light if he didn't say yes.

Mr. Stern. Turning to——

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask a question there: Do I correctly read your report and those of your agents to the general effect that you had no evidence that there was any attempt to recruit Oswald in the United States?

Mr. Belmont. No evidence whatsoever.

Mr. Stern. Question 8, Mr. Belmont, on page 5, sets out the information from a report by Agent Hosty regarding alleged Fair Play for Cuba Committee activity by Oswald while he was still residing in Dallas. Have you found that an investigation was conducted to determine whether that was accurate and do you think it should have been investigated?

Mr. Belmont. As to whether he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas? We did check. We have rather excellent coverage of such activities. There is no evidence whatsoever to indicate that he was active with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Dallas. And, as a matter of fact, I can go a step further and say that following his dissemination of pamphlets and his activities in New Orleans, our inquiry of our sources who are competent to tell us what is going on in the organizations such as Fair Play for Cuba Committee, advised that he was not known to them in New Orleans. So that his activities in New Orleans were of his own making, and not as a part of the organized activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. McCloy. On that point, Mr. Belmont, where did he get his material, the printed material that he was distributing? Must he not have gotten that from some headquarters?

Mr. Belmont. It is my recollection that he had that printed up himself.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. McCloy. All of it, so far as you know, was self-induced, so to speak?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Stern. Does your answer imply, Mr. Belmont, that there were Fair Play for Cuba activities in Dallas and New Orleans that you knew about?

Mr. Belmont. No; we do not have information of Fair Play for Cuba activities in Dallas nor any organized activity in New Orleans. So that this letter that you refer to, which was undated, was, as in so many things that Oswald wrote, not based on fact.

Mr. Stern. On page 7 in the answer to question 12, you refer to the inconsistencies and contradictions between the information Oswald gave to Agent Quigley when he interviewed him in the New Orleans jail and the facts as they were known to the FBI before that, and say that "in the event the investigation of Oswald warranted a further interview, these discrepancies would have been discussed with him."

Can you explain why the fact of these inconsistencies and contradictions and perhaps outright lies to Agent Quigley was not itself reason for a further interview?

Mr. Belmont. Let me turn this just a little bit and say why should we re-interview him?

Our interest in this man at this point was to determine whether his activities constituted a threat to the internal security of the country. It was apparent that he had made a self-serving statement to Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in our files as a part of the case, and if we determined that the course of the investigation required us to clarify or face him down with this information, we would do it at the appropriate time.

In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling us something that wasn't true, and unless this required further investigation at that time, we would handle it in due course, in accord with the whole context of the investigation.

Mr. Stern. Do you know whether the fact of these contradictions was called to the attention of the Dallas office at the time of Oswald's return to Dallas?

Mr. Belmont. The entire file, of course, or the pertinent serials were sent to Dallas at the time that the case was transferred back to Dallas so they would have that information.

Mr. Stern. I gather what you are saying is they would note the contradictions from the reports?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. In the answer to question 14 on page 8, again in connection with these inconsistencies, the letter reads "These inconsistencies were considered in subsequent investigation."

Can you expand on that and tell us how they were considered?

Mr. Belmont. That is right along the line of my previous explanation to you, namely, that they were recorded in the file. In the event it was desired to talk to him further at a future date, they would be considered as to whether we desired to have him further explain.

Mr. Stern. On page 12, in response to question 22, which asked for an explanation of the reason for the investigation to ascertain his whereabouts, the letter reads, "In view of Oswald's background and activities the FBI had a continuing interest in him."

What was the nature of that continuing interest at that time?

Mr. Belmont. On August 21, 1963, because of his activities in distributing these pamphlets, and his arrest in New Orleans, headquarters here in Washington sent a letter to the New Orleans and Dallas offices instructing them to pursue the investigation. In other words, in evaluating this information we felt it desirable that we further explore his activities to determine whether they were inimical to the internal security of the country. So that we had this continuing interest based on our evaluation, and so instructed our field offices.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, I believe the answers to the other questions give us a complete enough record.

The Chairman. Very well.

Mr. Stern. May this exhibit which has been marked 833 for identification be admitted?

The Chairman. It may be admitted in evidence under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 833 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. McCloy. Is there anything else, Mr. Belmont, that you may want to add? You have already been asked this question as you went through all these questions and answers, but is there anything else you would like to add in view of your answers this morning in further elaboration of the answers that have been given?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; unless the Commission has further questions at this point, I believe that the questions are answered properly and sufficiently.

Mr. McCloy. You think that if you are interviewing a defector which is something that provokes your interest, and I guess the mere fact of defection and return to the United States would do so, and if you found that defector was lying to you, you think that without something in addition to that there would be no further necessity of examining him. Is that a fair question? Let me put it another way.

Mr. Belmont. I have just a little difficulty following you.

Mr. McCloy. Here is my point. Here was a defector who comes within the category of interesting cases naturally.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. McCloy. And you question him and you find he is lying to you. At that stage, as I understand your testimony, you say without something more you don't necessarily go any further, is that right?

Mr. Belmont. No; that is not correct. We had talked to this man twice in detail concerning the question of possible recruitment by Soviet intelligence. We had checked his activities. He was settling down. He had a wife and a child. He had, according to what he had told us, in our interview with him, he had not enjoyed his stay in Russia. The State Department evaluation of him in Moscow was that he had learned his lesson and, as a matter of fact, he had made some statement to the effect that he now recognized the value of the American way of life, along those lines.

So that we had pretty well settled that issue. At the time that we interviewed him in the jail in New Orleans, we had again been following his activities because of his communications, his contacts with The Worker and the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and our interest there was to determine whether he was a dangerous subversive. The interview in the jail was very apparently a self-serving interview in an attempt to explain his activities in the New Orleans area, and if I recall correctly, he took the position that the policy as directed against Cuba was not correct, and that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was merely addressing itself to the complaints of Cuba, and was not in effect a subversive organization.

If, Mr. McCloy, during those first two interviews where we were pursuing this matter of him being a defector and his recruitment, he had lied to us, and the agent was not satisfied we would have pursued it to the bitter end. Or if during any other time information came to our attention which indicated a necessity to pursue that further we would have pursued it to the bitter end.

Mr. McCloy. You speak of this as a self-serving interview. Do you think that he sought the interview with you, with Mr. Quigley eventually, because he had known of the prior contacts that he had had with the FBI, and he simply wanted to keep out of trouble?

Mr. Belmont. I don't know why he asked to see an agent. I simply do not know why.

Mr. McCloy. I think that is all.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter marked for identification Commission Exhibit No. 834. Can you identify that for the Commission, please?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter dated May 4, 1964, addressed to the Commission which sets forth in summary the contents of the headquarters file on Oswald prior to the assassination.

Mr. Stern. Do you have that file with you?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. Would you explain generally to the Commission what materials there are in that file that for security reasons you would prefer not to disclose?

Mr. Belmont. The file contains the identity of some of our informants in subversive movements. It contains information as to some of the investigative techniques whereby we were able to receive some of the information which has been made available to the Commission.

Mr. Stern. I think that is enough, Mr. Belmont, on that.

Mr. McCloy. You didn't have anything further to add to that, did you?

Mr. Belmont. No.

The Chairman. I think as to those things if it is agreeable to the other members of the Commission, we will not pursue any questioning that will call for an answer that would divulge those matters that you have just spoken of.

Mr. Belmont. I would like to make it clear, Mr. Chairman, that—I think that is very kind of you—I would like to make it clear that Mr. Hoover has expressed a desire to be of the utmost help to the Commission, and to make any information available that will be helpful to the Commission. I think your observation is very much worthwhile.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, have you reviewed the actual file and this letter of May 4 which summarizes each document in the file?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. And to your knowledge, is this an accurate summary of each piece of information in the file?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. The file is available to the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. If they want to look at any item in it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. The file does not include that security matter that you mentioned, or does it?

Mr. Belmont. This file is as it is maintained at the Bureau with all information in it.

The Chairman. With all information in it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; this is the actual file.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Belmont, are you willing to leave the file a reasonable time in case any of the Commissioners desire to examine it personally?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Rankin. We will return it.

The Chairman. I wonder if we do want it on those conditions. If we want to get anything from it don't you think, Mr. Rankin, that we ought to make it known here while the witness is here. I personally don't care to have this information that involves our security unless it is necessary, and I don't want to have documents in my possession where it could be assumed that I had gotten that information and used it, so I would rather, I would rather myself confine our questions to this file to the testimony of Mr. Belmont. Then if we want it, if we want any of those things, it then becomes a matter to discuss here in the open, and not just in privacy.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I felt it made a better record if the file is available only to the Commissioners in case they do want to examine it, and then it will be taken back and the staff will not examine it.

The Chairman. I think he has stated that the file will be made available to us whenever we want it.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

The Chairman. If we do want it to read it that is one thing. For myself, I think we can get what we want from examining the witness, and then if there is any portion of it that comes into play why we can determine the question here, but I really would prefer not to have a secret file, I mean a file that contains matters of that kind in our possession.

Mr. Rankin. There is one factor that I wanted to get before the Commission and in the record, and that is that you had all the information that the FBI had in regard to this matter, and I thought that was important to your proceedings, so that we would not retain such a file, and we had an accurate summary but that it is available so that the Commission can be satisfied that nothing was withheld from it in regard to this particular question. That was the purpose of the inquiry.

Mr. Dulles. I assume, Mr. Belmont, if later other testimony arises that would make us desire to refer to this file we could consult it in your offices or you would make it available to us?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I think I would personally rather have it done on that basis. What do you think, Mr. McCloy?

Mr. McCloy. I was just glancing at the file, and it seems to have the regular, the usual type of reports that we have seen. But there is a good bit of elaboration in those, in that file of the summary which is here. This summary I don't think can purport to be a complete description of the documents that are in here, as I glance through them here.

I just happened to see a good bit of detail in here which doesn't have anything to do with the security problem we talked about, but I would think that probably it would be wise for some member of the Commission or members of the Commission as a whole, to run through that file in order to be sure that we have seen the material elements of the file that we would not perhaps, might not, be able to get from this letter of May 4.

The Chairman. Well, there are so many of these questions in here that are obviously matters that we would have no more concern with than just to know about them.

Start from the very beginning, a news clipping from the Corpus Christi Times, dated October 2, 1959. Now if that excites any interest on the part of any member, why we could say, "Well, could you show us that?" Then the next is the United Press release, dated October 31 at Moscow, and a great many of these.

Now, I wonder if it wouldn't be better for us to look over all of these various things, items that are in the file, and then if there are any that happen to excite our interest, we can ask Mr. Belmont about it. If it is a matter that involves security, we could then discuss it and make our determination as to whether we wanted to see it. I would think that when we are dealing with things that are as sensitive as the FBI has to deal with in that respect, that that would be adequate; that is my opinion of it.

But if the rest of the Commission feel that they want to see it notwithstanding the security measure, I would, of course, have no objection.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chief Justice, what I was trying to deal with was a claim by someone that the Commission never saw all there was in the hands of the FBI about Lee Harvey Oswald, and we recognize that some of these items should not be considered important by anyone, as we look at the matter, but we wanted you to be able to satisfy the public and the country that whatever there was that the FBI had, the Commission had it, and we didn't think that in light of the security problems the whole file should be a part of the files of the Commission. And we tried to present here a summary, even of items that did not seem important, but we did want the record in such condition that the Commission could say in its report, "We have seen everything that they have." I think it is important to the case.

Mr. McCloy. I notice, Mr. Belmont, in running through this file, a note here that symbols are used in instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir.

Mr. McCloy. If that is so——

Mr. Belmont. In some instances.

Mr. McCloy. Only in some instances. There are other cases where that is not the case.

Mr. Belmont. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McCloy. There is a great deal of narrative in here about Oswald and his relations with the Embassy. Maybe it is elsewhere in the record.

Mr. Belmont. I would presume that you have received that from the other agencies. Those are copies of communications that the other agencies sent to us.

The Chairman. Well, why couldn't we go over this list and see what items we would be interested in and then we can determine, can we not, whether we want——

Mr. McCloy. I am not so sure, you can look through this yourself, I am not so sure if from reading just that short summary you get the full impact of all the narrative that is in the various reports. There is a good bit here. For example, one page I have here about this business of beating his wife and the drinking. There is a good bit of detail.

Mr. Belmont. Mr. McCloy, you have that record.

The Chairman. We have the record, I have read the records myself.

Mr. McCloy. Maybe we have that one.

Mr. Belmont. Any investigative report you have.

Mr. McCloy. Is there any investigative report in here that we have not got?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir.

Mr. Rankin. We are trying to develop, Mr. Chief Justice and Commissioners, that you have everything that the FBI had, this is their total file in regard to this matter of Lee Harvey Oswald so that there is nothing withheld from you as far as the FBI is concerned. That is part of what we are trying to develop this morning, in addition to the items themselves.

Mr. Dulles. I wonder if the staff, Mr. Rankin, could not go over this and check over those items we have from other sources and what the FBI has already furnished us so what we deal with with respect to this file are only items that are not in the Commission's records, already. That would cut this down by half, I would imagine or more.

Mr. Rankin. Yes; we could do that for you.

Mr. Dulles. Then we could have this available possibly at a later date just to check over the other items against your files to see if there is any information there that we really need.

The Chairman. You could come back, couldn't you, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. Belmont. I am at your disposal.

The Chairman. I think that would be better. I think, Mr. Rankin, your purpose is entirely laudable here, but I think we do have to use some discretion in the matter, and you say that you want it so we can say we have seen everything. Well, the same people who would demand that we see everything of this kind would also demand that they be entitled to see it, and if it is security matters we can't let them see it. It has to go back to the FBI without their scrutiny.

So unless, I would say, unless there is something that we think here is vital to this situation, that it isn't necessary for us to see the whole file, particularly in view of the fact that we have practically—we have all the reports, he says we have all the reports that are in that file, and it just seems like thrashing old straw to go over it and over it again.

Mr. McCloy. Do we have copies of all these telegrams that are in here from the Embassy?

Mr. Belmont. You are looking at——

Mr. McCloy. Not Embassy; here is one from Mexico. Do we have that? We don't have these in our files, for example.

Mr. Belmont. This is subsequent to the assassination. You see your area of interest at this point is information, all information we had prior to the assassination. I did not remove from this file the items that started to come in subsequent to the assassination, you see.

Mr. McCloy. My feeling is that somebody on the Commission should examine that file. I can't come to any other conclusion after reading it all, because I don't know what is in it, what is in our record, and what is in that file. There is a good bit of material there that is narrative, which I think would be relevant. Certainly, I don't believe we can be possibly criticized for deleting or not producing a file which contains the type of information that you are speaking of. We are just as interested in protecting the security of your investigative processes as you are. But I don't think that when it is on the record that we have this file, that may contain material that was not in our files, and we are given the opportunity to examine it, without disclosing these confidential matters that we ought not to have somebody go through it.

Mr. Dulles. I agree with that but I think we could save time if we checked off first what we have already and that would cut out about half of that file probably.

Mr. McCloy. I think in a rapid glance through it, I think just about half of it.

The Chairman. Well, suppose you do that then, get those and let's see. All right, proceed, Mr. Stern.

Mr. Stern. I think perhaps we ought to leave the entire matter of the file then until we can give you the information.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. Stern. May we admit for the purposes of the record this list at this time, Mr. Chief Justice, which has been marked No. 834?

The Chairman. Yes. There are no security matters in this?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir.

The Chairman. It may be admitted as Exhibit No. 834.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 834 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, can you identify this letter dated February 6 with an attached affidavit which has been marked for identification as Commission Exhibit No. 835?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 835, for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. Yes; this is a letter dated February 6, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached an affidavit by Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Stern. What is the subject?

Mr. Belmont. Stating flatly that Lee Harvey Oswald was never an informant of the FBI.

Mr. Dulles. Would you define informant. Obviously in the sense he knew some information as previously indicated from the previous interviews. I mean for the record, would you just define what you mean by an informant in this sense?

Mr. Belmont. An informant in this sense is an individual who has agreed to cooperate with the FBI and to furnish information to the FBI either for or without payment.

Mr. Stern. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. This would not, of course, include the cooperative citizen to whom we go, and who frequently and frankly discloses any information in his possession, but rather someone who joins an organization or seeks out information at the direction and instance of the FBI relative to subversive or criminal matters. In other words, I want to make it clear we do not regard patriotic citizens as informants.

Mr. Stern. I take it you also would not have regarded Lee Oswald as an informant from the contacts with him that you have told us about and the other agents have told us about?

Mr. Belmont. Indeed not; in no way could he be considered an informant; in no way.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation of the information contained here?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. And you are familiar with it?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; I am.

Mr. Stern. And to your knowledge, does it accurately and completely state the Bureau's practice in recruiting a prospective informant?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Is there anything you would like to add to the information covered in there with respect to your practices regarding informants?

Mr. Belmont. No; only in my personal knowledge this is a correct statement and Lee Harvey Oswald was not an informant of the FBI.

Mr. Stern. Did you ever use the term "agent" to apply to anyone other than an employee, a special agent employee of the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. No; we do not.

Mr. Dulles. Could I ask you, Mr. Belmont, whether Mr. Fain's separation from the FBI had anything whatever to do with the Oswald case or in his handling of the Oswald case?

Mr. Belmont. No; indeed not. Mr. Fain came to the retirement age and decided he wanted to retire, which is his privilege, and he retired and is presently working in Texas and very happy, I understand.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. He retired in good graces, good standing, so far as the FBI is concerned.

The Chairman. And a year before the assassination.

Mr. Belmont. Frankly, I don't recall.

The Chairman. Yes; it was August 1962, he testified.

Mr. Stern. You have already covered this, Mr. Belmont, but just so that the record is completely clear on this point, was Lee Oswald ever an agent of the FBI?

Mr. Belmont. Lee Oswald was never an agent of the FBI.

Mr. Stern. The letter of February 6, 1964, from Mr. Hoover, alludes to testimony furnished the Commission by District Attorney Wade. Have you subsequently been advised that Mr. Wade had not testified before the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; we received a letter from the Commission advising us that the incident referred to was an informal discussion rather than actual testimony before the Commission.

Mr. Stern. And also to complete the record, have you been advised that Mr. Wade was not suggesting that he believed the rumor about Oswald as an informant, but felt obliged to call it to the attention of the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. The Commission's letter so advised us.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Chairman, may this be admitted with No. 835?

The Chairman. It may be admitted under that number.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 835 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated February 12, 1964, a number of affidavits by special agents, attached to it. It was identified yesterday, parts of it were identified yesterday and it therefore carries the number for identification 825. Can you identify this letter for us?

Mr. Belmont. In order to be sure—I beg your pardon. This is a letter dated February 12, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI, to which is attached affidavits of FBI personnel who had reason to contact Lee Harvey Oswald and who were in a supervisory capacity over the agents who contacted Oswald.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise the preparation of this material?

Mr. Belmont. These affidavits were prepared, of course, by the men themselves. I have read the affidavits, and they were compiled as an enclosure and sent over with this letter.

Mr. Stern. You have reviewed them in preparation for your testimony before the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Stern. To your knowledge, are they accurate?

Mr. Belmont. They are accurate, to my knowledge, yes.

Mr. Stern. Are they complete?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. They do not omit any significant fact you know of?

Mr. Belmont. No.

Mr. Stern. In connection with the material they cover?

Mr. Belmont. No.

Mr. Stern. Unless there are any questions on that, Mr. Chairman, I suggest we admit this document.

The Chairman. It may be admitted as No. 825.

(The document referred to, previously marked Commission Exhibit No. 825 for identification, was received in evidence.)

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, I show you a letter dated March 31, 1964, from Director Hoover to Mr. Rankin, the General Counsel of the Commission, with a series of attachments. Can you identify this which has been marked for identification as No. 836. Can you identify this for the Commission?

(The document referred to was marked Commission Exhibit No. 836 for identification.)

Mr. Belmont. This is a letter dated March 31, 1964, to the Commission from the FBI to which is attached the instructions contained in our manuals as to the type of information which should be disseminated to Secret Service and our relations or liaison with Secret Service.

Mr. Stern. It was prepared in response to a request from the Commission?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Did you supervise or assist in the preparation?

Mr. Belmont. I did.

Mr. Stern. Have you reviewed it recently?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. Stern. Is it complete with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. Belmont. Yes; it is.

Mr. Stern. Is there anything you would like to add to it with respect to the matters covered?

Mr. Belmont. Well——

Mr. Dulles. May I just interrupt here a moment. Is this inquiry directed to the question of whether it is now adequate or whether this is complete as of the time of the assassination? I think we have two questions there to consider.

Mr. Belmont. Mr. Dulles, this letter outlines our relations with Secret Service and the material that is attached covers both the instructions to our agents prior to the assassination and the current instructions.

Mr. Dulles. Subsequent to the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. Yes.

Mr. Stern. What were the criteria you employed and instructed your agents to employ before the assassination in determining what information should be reported to the Secret Service regarding threats against the President, members of his family, the President-elect, and the Vice President?

Mr. Belmont. These are contained in detail in the attachments which represent sections of our manual of instructions which are available to all of our personnel in the field as well as the seat of Government, and also in the FBI handbook which is in possession of the individual agent in the field. These instructions require that any information indicating the possibility of an attempt against the person or safety of the persons mentioned by you must be referred immediately by the most expeditious means of communications to the nearest office of the Secret Service. Further, that our headquarters in Washington must be advised by teletype of the information and the fact that it has been furnished to Secret Service.

Mr. Stern. Specifically, the kind of information you were interested in, that is before the assassination?

Mr. Belmont. Yes. Specifically the kind?

Mr. Stern. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. Any information indicating the possibility of a threat against the President and Vice President and members of the family.

Mr. Stern. Have you broadened——

Mr. Belmont. I may say, sir——

Mr. Stern. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. That this practice was assiduously followed, and you will find that the files of the Secret Service are loaded with information over the years that we have furnished them. That was a practice religiously followed and a practice voluntarily followed without request. In other words, we do not have a written request for this type of information but rather considered it our responsibility and duty to furnish this information.

Mr. Stern. Did you ever participate in or do you know of any discussion with the Secret Service before the assassination regarding the kind of information they were interested in?

Mr. Belmont. We had close liaison with Secret Service, and I have no doubt that in oral discussions that the question came up. I wasn't present but I would assume it has come up, particularly as we were constantly furnishing information. We have no written criteria, you might say, as to what should be furnished.

Mr. Stern. That is, established by the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. And you yourself never participated in any discussion of——

Mr. Belmont. No; I did not.

Mr. Stern. This liaison function.

Mr. Belmont. This is something we have done for years on the basis that we consider it our responsibility not only as far as the President goes. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have also followed the same policy relative to other high officials when it appears desirable.

Mr. Stern. Have you subsequent to the assassination augmented your instructions to special agents in this respect?

Mr. Belmont. Yes. On December 26, 1963, we prepared additional instructions reiterating those already in effect, and adding other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President.

The Chairman. Where do those new ones appear in the exhibit, Mr. Belmont?

Mr. Belmont. They appear as an attachment—working from the back, I think, Mr. Chairman, I can help you most.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Belmont. Eight pages from the back it starts, it reads, "Manual of Instructions Section 83."

The Chairman. Yes; I have it.

Mr. Belmont. The first page is the same information that we previously furnished to Secret Service involving threats.

The Chairman. The first page is intact, as it was before.

Mr. Belmont. There may be some slight changes in wording but essentially it is the same dealing with possible threats.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Dulles. Mr. Belmont, I wonder if it would be possible for the Commission's convenience to date each one of these papers as of a certain date. It is quite difficult going through it now without referring to the letter in each case to determine whether the instructions are as of the date of the assassination or as of the present date?

Mr. Belmont. We can do that without any difficulty. I would be glad to do it with the staff, or can I help you here?

Mr. Dulles. Well, I think we can do that later but I think it would be useful when this goes into the record for our later reference in studying this to have those dates available to us on each one of the attachments.

Mr. Belmont. Very good.

Mr. Dulles. Thank you.

Mr. Belmont. Coming back to this item you inquired about, sir, the other dissemination to Secret Service concerning the security of the President is set forth on pages 2 and 3 of this inclusion in our manual, and it extends the dissemination to "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and fascists, (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb-making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government." That was prepared in an effort to provide additional, and a voluntary effort, without request, to provide additional information that might be helpful to avoid such an incident as happened November 22, 1963.

Mr. Stern. This did not come about, this change did not come about, through any request from the Secret Service or discussion with the Secret Service?

Mr. Belmont. No. We made these changes, as I say, in an effort to provide any additional information in the light of what happened that might be of assistance to Secret Service and might assist in protecting the President.

Mr. Dulles. I wonder, Mr. Belmont, whether you would consider possibly changing in section (d) the word "and" to "or" whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence" and then it now reads "and hatred against organized government". There have been cases, I believe, where the propensity for violence had not been previously noted but the hatred of organized government has.

Mr. Belmont. We will be happy to change that.

Mr. Dulles. I just suggest for your consideration, I don't wish to rewrite it.

Mr. Belmont. We would be happy to change it, Mr. Dulles.

Mr. Stern. Following Mr. Dulles' thought, in the line above that, Mr Belmont, should that "and" before (d) be "and" or "or"? Do you mean these——

Mr. Belmont. We do not mean that all of these items must be coupled together if that is your thought.

Mr. Stern. That is right.

Mr. Belmont. We will be happy to change the "and" before (d) to an "or".

Mr. Stern. This means any of the broad classifications of people, subversives, ultrarightists, racists or fascists who meet any of these four tests.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. Stern. Can you give the Commission some notion of the increase in volume which the broadening of your criteria has brought about? By volume, I mean the volume of your references to the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. I do not have an exact figure, however, I do know that more than 5,000 additional names have gone over to Secret Service under these criteria.

The Chairman. In what period of time?

Mr. Belmont. Since we put them out.

The Chairman. I see.

Mr. Belmont. Which was December 26.

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. McCloy. Have you included defectors in this list?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir; we do include defectors.

Mr. Stern. You mean as of December 26, 1963?

Mr. Belmont. Correct.

Mr. Stern. Has the expansion of your criteria led to any problem or difficulty for you or for individuals or do you anticipate any problem or difficulty under the expanded criteria?

Mr. Belmont. It seems to me that there is a necessity to balance security against freedom of the individual. This is a country of laws and a government of law, and not a government of men. Inevitably the increase in security means an increase in the control of the individual and a diminishment, therefore, of his individual liberties. It is a simple matter to increase security. But every time you increase security you diminish the area of the rights of the individual. In some countries the problem of a visiting dignitary is met without much difficulty. Persons who are suspect or may be considered dangerous are immediately rounded up and detained while the individual is in the country. The authorities have no problem because in those countries there is not a free society such as we enjoy, and the people who are detained have no redress. The FBI approaches this whole field of security—I am not boring you with this, am I?

The Chairman. No, indeed. This is tremendously important.

Mr. Belmont. The FBI approaches this whole field of security and its tremendous responsibilities to protect the internal security of the country as a sacred trust. In carrying out our investigations and our work in the security field, we do it in such a manner under the law that we strengthen rather than weaken the free society that we enjoy. It is for that reason that our men are trained carefully, thoroughly, and supervised carefully, to insure that their approach to the entire security field, which inevitably touches on control of thought, is handled with extreme care. Our activities are directed to meet the terrific responsibility we have for the internal security of the country, but to meet it under the law. We feel that to place security as such above the rights of the individual or to increase these controls beyond what is absolutely essential is the first step toward the destruction of this free society that we enjoy.

We have been asked many times why we don't pick up and jail all Communists. The very people who ask those questions don't realize that if action, unrestrained action, is taken against a particular group of people, a precedent is set which can be seized on in the future by power-hungry or unscrupulous authorities as a precedent, and which inevitably will gnaw away at this free society we have, and sooner or later will be applied to the very individuals who are seeking this action. Up until the time of the assassination we religiously and carefully and expeditiously furnished to Secret Service immediately on a local basis as well as on a national basis, headquarters basis, any and all information that in any way was indicated to be a possible threat against the President. This permitted Secret Service to take such action as was required against these individuals who had by their action set the stage for appropriate restraint or observation based on something they did. Therefore, they were not in a position to complain legitimately because they had by some word or deed set in motion a threat against the President of the United States. Since the assassination, as I have testified, we have broadened the area of dissemination in an effort to be helpful. It stands without question that we could have said, "No; we won't go any further." But we felt that it was our responsibility to do whatever we could do and, hence, we have broadened these criteria, and we have distributed thousands of pieces of information on individuals to Secret Service.

(At this point in the proceedings, Representative Ford enters the hearing room.)

We are not entirely comfortable about this, because under these broadened criteria after all we are furnishing names of people who have not made a threat against the President, people who have expressed beliefs, who have belonged or do belong to organizations which believe in violent revolution or taking things into their own hands. Unless such information is handled with judgment and care, it can be dangerous.

For example, we know that in one city when the President recently visited, the police went to these people and told them, "You stay in the house while the President is here or if you go out, we will go with you." We know that these people have threatened to consult attorneys, have threatened to make a public issue of the matter on the theory that this is restraint that is not justified as they have made no threats against the President. Now, when you examine this a bit further, we give these names to Secret Service. Secret Service must do something with those names, and Secret Service solicits the assistance of the police, quite properly. But I don't need, I think, to paint this picture any further, that when you get away from a specific act or deed of threats against the President, and you go into the broader area of what, perhaps, a man is thinking and, therefore, he may be a threat, and you take action against the man on the basis of that, there is a danger.

That is why, despite the fact that we have given this additional information and will continue to do so, we are uneasy. Again, if I may be permitted to continue, this is inherent in the entire approach of the FBI to the security field. We go as far in our investigations as is necessary. But we go no further. We do not harass people. We do not conduct an investigation of a man for what he may be thinking. We attempt to the very best of our ability to carry out this responsibility for internal security without adopting tactics of harassment or unwarranted investigation, and we will not pursue a security matter beyond that which is essential to carry out our responsibilities. Now, I say that because that is the broad field of our policy, and I say it with complete sincerity, because I know. I have been in this work with the FBI both in the actual investigative field and in the policymaking and supervisory field for 27 years, and I know the policies and the procedures that are followed, and the care with which this problem is approached, and I agree with it fully.

Mr. McCloy. You are going to impose a pretty heavy burden on the Secret Service when you dump them with the 5,000 more names than they have been used to having.

Mr. Belmont. It will be more than 5,000, sir. This will continue.

Mr. McCloy. From your knowledge of the situation, do you feel that the Secret Service is equipped to cope with this added burden? Is it something that you feel——

Mr. Belmont. The Secret Service, as it has in the past, is required to call on the police for assistance in this field when the President visits a city. I do not know the exact complement of personnel of Secret Service, but they are a relatively small organization.

Mr. McCloy. It may be they will have to reorganize some of their procedures to cope with this, won't they?

Mr. Belmont. I do not know.

Mr. McCloy. You have got a pretty broad classification here. "All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior." That may include a good many people in the United States and maybe some members of this Commission—I am speaking for myself. There is irrational behavior that I have been guilty of many times. [Laughter.] This doesn't mean you are going to send everybody over there, but the names that—all those under your classification, all of those in your opinion come under that classification unless you feel they have some, there is some, reason behind it. In other words, you are selective in this list. You purport to be selective in the numbers that you are going to convey to, the names you are going to convey to, the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. We endeavor to use good judgment, sir. Now, as you indicate there are what, 190 million people in this country, and who knows when someone may adopt abnormal behavior.

You cannot tell tomorrow who will pose a risk. This is an effort to be as helpful as possible and, as we have in the past, we will use our best judgment. But this will broaden considerably the type of people and the number of people who go to the Secret Service.

Mr. McCloy. That is what I am getting at really, Mr. Belmont. You are not saying that all those people that you characterize here under this paragraph 2 will ipso facto be sent over to the Secret Service every time the President makes a move. This simply says that all investigative personnel should be alert in that situation; am I right in that?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir. If you will follow in the next paragraph, we say, "If cases are developed falling within the above categories, promptly furnish Secret Service locally a letterhead memorandum" with the information.

Mr. McCloy. So without any further ado all the people in your list who are in that category will be transferred over to the Secret Service when there is an occasion, when the President travels?

Mr. Belmont. No. This is a continuing procedure. In other words, during our investigations we come across someone who is in this area or category, and this is a requirement that that man's name go to Secret Service with a brief description of him, and Secret Service then has that filed and is in a position to know that that individual has been referred to them.

Mr. McCloy. Well, that brings up again the comment that I originally made. This does put a big burden of investigation and judgment on the Secret Service, one which they have not heretofore presumably had placed on their shoulders.

Mr. Belmont. I think you are correct.

Mr. McCloy. The reason I am asking these questions is because by implication, at least, one of our directives is to look into this situation for the future protection of the President, and we want to see that we have got something that is practical as well as cautious.

Mr. Dulles. Do the memoranda attached, Mr. Belmont, to this exhibit indicate what classes were so identified for investigation under the procedures existing at the time of the assassination and what change has been made, how it has been extended?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir. If you——

Mr. Dulles. By the definitions under paragraph 2 of the Manual of Instructions.

Mr. Belmont. The previous page and the paragraph right above No. 2 sets forth the same information that we acted on prior to the assassination.

Mr. Dulles. That is paragraph 1?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. The Manual of Instructions, section 83.

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

Mr. Dulles. What are the various categories given now at the top of page 2 of this exhibit which have been added?

Mr. Belmont. At the top of page 2, sir, that is the information that should be included in the notification to headquarters as to who the individual is and the background information that was furnished to Secret Service so that we, too, can disseminate to Secret Service here.

Representative Ford. Under the new criteria would Oswald's name have gone to the Secret Service automatically?

Mr. Belmont. Well, Congressman, right now we are including all defectors automatically.

Now, the question whether Oswald meets these criteria here as set forth is a question of judgment. As I say, right now we do furnish all defectors.

Representative Ford. Defectors are for the time being at least a special category other than what is set forth here unless for some other reason they would fall into one of these categories.

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. McCloy. Do you under that category send forward all Communists?

Mr. Belmont. Yes.

Mr. McCloy. All Communists, yes.

Mr. Dulles. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether or not it would be wise for the record at this point to read into the record, in view of the importance of this, this paragraph which we are now discussing and which, as I understand it, contains the new definition of investigative cases?

The Chairman. Yes; we can put it into the record.

Mr. Dulles. Mr. Belmont, as I understand it, the new criteria are set forth in paragraph 2 on page 2 of the Manual of Instructions, section 83; is that correct?

Mr. Belmont. That is correct.

Mr. McCloy. Which, as I counted, is the 12th page of the Commission's Exhibit No. 836; is that right, Mr. Stern?

Mr. Stern. That is right number of the exhibit.

Mr. McCloy. 836, and I think it is the 12th page.

Mr. Dulles. For convenient reference I suggest that when this be included that we add the dates and the page numbers.

Mr. Stern. I think the witness can do this immediately.

The Chairman. We will give a copy of it to the reporter and he may copy it and incorporate it later in the record.

(Paragraph 2 reads as follows:)

"Other dissemination to Secret Service concerning security of the President. All investigative personnel should be alert for the identification of subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists (a) possessing emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal, State, or local government or officials of a foreign government, (c) who express or have expressed strong or violent anti-U.S. sentiments and who have been involved in bombing or bomb making or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and (d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence and hatred against organized government."

Mr. Dulles. Do I understand you, Mr. Belmont, to say, as drafted you would not consider that defectors automatically fell under this paragraph 2, but it is your practice to notify the Secret Service about defectors?

Mr. Belmont. We do notify Secret Service of any defectors coming to our attention.

Mr. Dulles. And by defectors, I guess we mean here maybe a redefector, meaning those who have gone to Russia and have come back or maybe those who have gone and not come back.

Mr. Belmont. If they haven't come back——

Mr. Dulles. They are not a danger.

Mr. Belmont. They are not within our cognizance and we don't notify Secret Service.

Mr. Dulles. These would be defectors who have gone to the Soviet Union and who then come back to the United States and tried to defect while they were over there.

Mr. McCloy. Not necessarily, not exclusively the Soviet Union, of course.

Mr. Dulles. Communist countries, I would say.

Representative Ford. Just to get an order of magnitude, how many are there? Is this a sizable number?

Mr. Belmont. I don't have a figure, Mr. Ford. You have had defectors in Korea from the military. You have had defectors——

Mr. McCloy. Germany.

Mr. Belmont. Berlin. When these are military personnel they are within the cognizance of the military, so that it is very difficult for me to give you a figure.

When we become interested is when they return to this country and warrant action by us from an internal security standpoint.

As in the Oswald case, we started our action based on newspaper publicity that he had attempted to or indicated his intention to, renounce his citizenship in Moscow. But I do not have a figure because many of these people are members of the armed services and I would hesitate to give you an estimate.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, do these terms "subversives, ultrarightists, racists, and Fascists" have a particular meaning of art in FBI parlance? Can you tell us how you use these terms in this regulation or what these mean to you and to your agents.

Mr. Belmont. I will have to refer you to the dictionary, I think, Mr. Stern. A subversive is an individual who is active in the Communist Party or front groups associated with it or one of the other groups that we term subversive, such as the Socialist Workers Party.

The ultrarightists——

Mr. Dulles. Socialist Workers Party is a Trotskyite Party, is it not?

Mr. Belmont. Yes, sir.

The ultrarightists, I believe here we attempt to spell out those people who are so far to the right that they do not consider themselves subject to the law and the proper procedures, and take things into their own hands.

The racists, I think, are—that speaks for itself, individuals who will go beyond the bounds of propriety in seeking their goals, and who adopt violence.

The Fascists——

Mr. McCloy. I was wondering how you were going to define that one.

Mr. Belmont. Is to give you the opposite end of the spectrum of subversives.

Mr. Dulles. Do we have anarchists in this country at the present time? There used to be an old anarchist society in the old days.

Mr. Belmont. That used to be, but it is dissolved. There is no organization. I venture to say we have individual anarchists at this time.

Mr. Dulles. No organized anarchist organization.

Mr. Belmont. No.

Mr. Stern. Mr. Belmont, in view of the quite important considerations you mentioned before, the danger of interfering with individual liberty, would it be possible within your organization to have the agents recommend to headquarters here and have someone at a higher level examine the recommendation before it is made to the Secret Service? This is, as I understand it, a continuing program and not one that comes into effect only when the President schedules a trip. This would operate without respect to scheduled trips by the President. Would that be possible? Would it fit your operation? Do you think it might help any?

Mr. Belmont. Well, what is your thought behind that, Mr. Stern? In other words, so that names of persons won't indiscriminately be sent on a local level?

Mr. Stern. Precisely. These categories are, after all, fairly gross. They use large terms which can mean different things to different people. The considerations you mention, I think, are quite real and important. Would it help any to do something of the sort?

Mr. Belmont. I think we will find that our agents are using good judgment in this matter. The danger involved in referring these matters to headquarters for a decision as to dissemination is the delay in time and, you will note, we stress the time element that when such information comes into the possession of our agents, immediate steps must be taken to transmit this information to Secret Service by the most expeditious means possible.

This might be of assistance to you. This information which we send to Secret Service in the field is placed in a control file, a separate file in the field, and is subject, under instructions, to inspection by our inspectors as they visit our field offices to insure that this requirement is being carried out properly; and they will examine the type of material that is being sent over.

Each field office is thoroughly inspected about once a year, and that is one of the requirements that they go through this to make sure this instruction is being properly carried out.

Mr. McCloy. I have no further questions. I have some general questions I would like to get to at the end, but I have to leave early this afternoon.

Mr. Rankin. I have one question I wanted to interject, Mr. Chairman, and that is as to statements, Mr. Belmont, about subversives, including persons who are members of Communist front groups. You mean to say that that includes any person who is a member of a Communist front group because, as you know, many leading citizens have been members of such groups.

Mr. Belmont. Now, Mr. Rankin, I wouldn't carry it by any means that far. It would be dependent upon the front group, the extent of activity in it, and the activities of the individual. By no means would we classify someone as a subversive who was connected with a front group by name or——

Mr. Dulles. By front groups you mean those on the Attorney General's list; you are taking that as a criterion of a front group?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; not necessarily that, sir. There are other groups that we consider front groups.

Mr. Dulles. I see.

Mr. Belmont. I am glad you raised that because each case would have to be considered on its own individual merits as to what is the extent of the activity and the purpose and intent of the activity.

Mr. Rankin. You recognize in the work in this field that there are many Americans who are interested in certain causes and purposes and front groups in connection with them who are loyal Americans, don't you?

Mr. Belmont. I have no doubt of that whatsoever.

Mr. Rankin. I just wanted to get that in the record.

Mr. Belmont. I also know many loyal Americans, unfortunately, who don't look behind some of these groups to determine their intents and purposes, and allow their names to be used where they would not otherwise do so if they took the time and trouble to check into what the organization was.

Mr. Rankin. So you don't lump them all under the term "subversive," that is what I was trying to get at.

Mr. Belmont. Right.

The Chairman. I suppose some join before an organization is infiltrated, too.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. They find themselves in a mousetrap then.

Mr. Belmont. That is correct, sir; that is right.

Mr. McCloy. In other words, you would expect your agents to exert some selection before they would send these names over to the Secret Service.

Mr. Belmont. Our agents use judgment in the pursuance of this work, and they would continue to use judgment in the selection of people who meet this criterion. Otherwise if you carried this to the extreme you would get out of hand completely. So that there is judgment applied here and our agents are capable of applying the judgment.

Representative Ford. What has been the reaction of the Secret Service to this greater flow of information that they have received?

Mr. Belmont. They have taken it. There has been no official reaction, to my knowledge.

Representative Ford. Have they objected to the greater burden?

Mr. Belmont. No, sir; I would like to say, I don't know whether you are going to cover this, Mr. Stern, that our relations with the Secret Service are excellent. We work closely together.

As a matter of fact, since the assassination, at the request of Mr. Rowley, we have furnished agents to assist on occasion in the protection of the President, which is primarily a function of Secret Service, but as a cooperative gesture we have on a number of occasions made agents available at the request of Mr. Rowley. I think the figure runs to something like 139 agents—yes, 139 agents that we have made available.

We do have a very close liaison with Secret Service both at the seat of Government and in our field offices. We have a supervisor here at the seat of Government whose duty it is to stay directly in touch with Secret Service, to cut redtape and produce results both for Secret Service and for the FBI; to see that the problems are handled immediately. He has direct access to Mr. Rowley, and we have on a number of occasions at the request of Secret Service, sent one of our agents with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad, particularly where we have a representative in the countries being visited, because our relations with the law enforcement officials in those countries have been built up over the years, and we are thus in a position to assist Secret Service in establishing the necessary security measures and the flow of information to serve their purpose.

In addition, when the President travels abroad we alert all of our offices to advise us of any information which may pertain to the travel of the President, and we set up a supervisor back here to receive that information and cable it or get it immediately to our man who is accompanying the President when he makes this trip.

This is done, this agent going with Secret Service is done, at the invitation and request of Secret Service.

Representative Ford. 169 agents of the FBI who have assisted since the assassination. Did Secret Service make a specific request for their help in these instances?