I. GENERAL SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM IN GERMANY

Prosecution Documents

Doc. No.Pros. Ex. No.Description of DocumentPage

L-793Extract from minutes of Fuehrer conference, 23 May 1939.387

EC-686Letter from the Ministry of Finance and Economics of Baden, 6 March 1941, containing directives regarding the treatment of Polish farm workers.389

3005-PS7Extracts from letter from the Reich Labor Ministry to presidents of regional labor offices, 26 August 1941, concerning the use of French and Russian PW’s.392

EC-1948Memorandum of Keitel, 31 October 1941, concerning the use of PW’s in the armament industry.393

1206-PS9Outlines of directives of Goering regarding the employment of PW’s in the armament industry, 7 November 1941.395

3040-PS10Extracts from secret order of Himmler, 20 February 1942, concerning the commitment and treatment of manpower from the East.399

016-PS13Letter from Sauckel to Rosenberg, 24 April 1942, and extracts from report on Sauckel’s labor mobilization program, 20 April 1942.405

084-PS16-AExtracts from interdepartmental report of the Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories, 30 September 1942, concerning the status of eastern laborers.408

294-PS19-AExtracts from top secret memorandum, signed by Braeutigam, 25 October 1942, concerning effects of slave labor program.411

L-6120Letter from Sauckel to the presidents of labor offices, 26 November 1942, concerning deportation and employment of Poles and Jews.413

1063-D-PS21Extract from order of Mueller, 17 December 1942, concerning prisoners qualified for work to be sent to concentration camps.415

1526-PS25Extracts from letter from German-appointed Ukrainian main committee to Frank, February 1943.416

407-V-PS30Extracts from letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 14 April 1943, concerning labor questions.418

407-IX-PS33Letter from Sauckel to Hitler, 3 June 1943, concerning foreign labor situation.420

3000-PS34Extracts from report rendered to Riecke, Ministerialdirektor in the Ministry of Agriculture, 28 June 1943, on experiences in political and economic problems in the East.422

265-PS35Extracts from report by Leyser to Rosenberg, 30 June 1943, on conditions in the district Zhitomir.423

204-PS39Extracts from memorandum of a conference, 18 February 1944, concerning the release of indigenous labor for purposes of the Reich.424

R-10340Extracts from a letter from the (German-appointed) Polish main committee to the General Government of Poland on the conditions of Polish workers in Germany, 17 May 1944.426

208-PS55Report by Sauckel, 7 July 1944, on the accomplishments of labor mobilization in the first half of 1944.428

3819-PS56Minutes of a conference on 11 July 1944 attended by Milch, concerning the labor problem.430

Defense Documents

Doc. No.Pros. Ex. No.Description of DocumentPage

R-1241Extract from report on Fuehrer conference attended by Milch on 19 February 1942.438

R-12432Extract from the Fuehrer conference minutes, 21 and 22 April 1942.438

R-1242Extract from the Fuehrer conference minutes of 3, 4, 5 January 1943.439

407-II-PS3Report from Sauckel to Hitler, 10 March 1943, concerning difficulties originating from the draft of manpower in former Soviet territories.439

R-12433Extract from report on Fuehrer conference of 30 May 1943.441

R-1244Extract from report of Fuehrer conference of 11-12 September 1943.442

R-12434Extract from Fuehrer conference of 1-4 January 1944, concerning Speer’s report on the French labor situation.443

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-79^[74]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 3

EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF FUEHRER CONFERENCE, 23 MAY 1939

Top Secret

To be transmitted by officer only

Minutes of a Conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuehrer’s Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjutant on duty: Lt.-Col. (GSC) Schmundt.

Present:The Fuehrer, Field Marshal Goering, Grand Admiral [Admiral of the Fleet] Raeder. Col. Gen. [General] von Brauchitsch, Col. Gen. Keitel, Col. Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) [Lt. General] Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear Admiral Schniewind, Col. (GSC) Jeschonnek, Col. (GSC) Warlimont, Lt.-Col. (GSC) Schmundt, Capt. [Army] Engel, Lt. Comdr. Albrecht, Capt. [Army] v. Below.

Subject:Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

The Fuehrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

1.Analysis of the situation.

2.Definition of the tasks for the armed forces arising from the situation.

3.Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.

4.Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success. The Fuehrer’s observations are given in systematized form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view: (1) the actual development of events between 1933 and 1939; (2) the permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany’s demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany reemerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as “Encroachments”. The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force.

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle by which one evades solving the problems by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years’ time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that.

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is shared by two other nations—Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years the situation is today as follows:

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarcation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no supplementary enemy. Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. [Remember]—blockade!

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. Upon record harvest we shall be able to rely even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labor.

The problem “Polish” is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland’s internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision; questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-68

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 6^[75]

LETTER FROM THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS OF BADEN, 6 MARCH 1941, CONTAINING DIRECTIVES REGARDING THE TREATMENT OF POLISH FARM WORKERS

49-7

Copy

III B 5 C (in pencil)

Karlsruhe, 6 March 1941

Minister of Finance and Economics of Baden

Provincial [Land] Food Office Dept. A.

(Provincial Farmers Association)

Confidential Only for Official Business

To all District Farmers Associations [Kreis]

Subject:Directives regarding the treatment of foreign farm workers of Polish nationality.

The agencies of the Reich Food Estate, Provincial Farmers Association of Baden, have received the results of the negotiations with the Higher SS and Police Leader in Stuttgart on 14 February 1941, with great satisfaction. Appropriate memoranda have already been turned over to the District Farmers Associations. Below, I promulgate the individual regulations, as they have been laid down during the conference and how they are not to be applied accordingly:

1. Fundamentally, farm workers of Polish nationality no longer have the right to complain, and thus no complaints may be accepted any more by any official agency.

2. The farm workers of Polish nationality may not leave the localities in which they are employed, and have a curfew from 1 October to 31 March from 2000 hours to 0600 hours, and from 1 April to 30 September from 2100 hours to 0500 hours.

3. The use of bicycles is strictly prohibited. Exceptions are possible, for riding to the place of work in the field, if a relative of the employer or the employer himself is present.

4. The visit of churches, regardless of faith, is strictly prohibited, even when there is no service in progress. Individual spiritual care by clergymen outside of the church is permitted.

5. Visits to theaters, motion pictures or other cultural entertainment are strictly prohibited for farm workers of Polish nationality.

6. The visit of restaurants is strictly prohibited to farm workers of Polish nationality except for one restaurant in the village, which will be selected by the Rural Councillor’s Office, and then only one day per week. The day, which is determined as the day to visit the restaurant, will also be determined by the Rural Councillor’s Office. This regulation does not change the curfew regulation, mentioned above under No. 2.

7. Sexual intercourse with women and girls is strictly prohibited, and wherever it is established, it must be reported.

8. Gatherings of farm workers of Polish nationality after work is prohibited, whether it is on other farms, in the stables, or in the living quarters of the Poles.

9. The use of railroads, buses, or other public conveyances by farm workers of Polish nationality is prohibited.

10. Permits to leave the village may only be granted in very exceptional cases, by the local police authority (mayor’s office). However, in no case may it be granted if he wants to visit a public agency on his own, whether it is a labor office or the District Farmers Association, or whether he wants to change his place of employment.

11. Arbitrary change of employment is strictly prohibited. The farm workers of Polish nationality have to work daily so long as the interests of the enterprise demand it, and as it is demanded by the employer. There are no time limits to the working time.

12. Every employer has the right to give corporal punishment to farm workers of Polish nationality, if instructions and good words fail. The employer may not be held accountable in any such case by an official agency.

13. Farm workers of Polish nationality should if possible be removed from the community of the home, and they can be quartered in stables, etc. No remorse whatever should restrict such action.

14. Report to the authorities is compulsory in all cases when crimes have been committed by farm workers of Polish nationality which are to sabotage the enterprise or slow down work, for instance, unwillingness to work, impertinent behavior; it is compulsory even in minor cases. An employer who loses his Pole who must serve a longer prison sentence because of such a compulsory report will receive another Pole from the competent labor office on request with preference.

15. In all other cases, only the state police is still competent.

For the employer himself, severe punishment is contemplated if it is established that the necessary distance from farm workers of Polish nationality has not been kept. The same applies to women and girls. Extra rations are strictly prohibited. Noncompliance of the Reich tariffs for farm workers of Polish nationality will be punished by the competent labor office by the taking away of the worker.

In any case of doubt, the Provincial Farmers Association—IB—will give information.

Forwarding in writing of the above agreement to the farm workers of Polish nationality is strictly prohibited.

These regulations do not apply to Poles who are still prisoners of war and are thus subordinated to the armed forces. In this case, the regulations published by the armed forces apply.

Heil Hitler!

By Order:

[Signed] Dr. Klotz

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3005-PS

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 7

EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM THE REICH LABOR MINISTRY TO PRESIDENTS OF REGIONAL LABOR OFFICES, 26 AUGUST 1941, CONCERNING THE USE OF FRENCH AND RUSSIAN PW’S

Vol. 78-L

Annex 1 to the Decree of the Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions

THE REICH MINISTER OF LABOR

Va 5135/1277

Nr. 371-4770/41 secret 216/985

Berlin, SW 11, 26 August 1941

Special Delivery

To the Presidents of Regional Labor Offices

(including Nuernberg Branch Office)

Subject: Use of Russian PW’s.

Reference: Circular of 14 August 1941—Va 5135/1189—.

Upon personal order of the Reich Marshal [Goering], 100,000 men are to be taken from among the French PW’s not yet employed in armament industry, and are to be assigned to the armament industry (airplane industry). Gaps in manpower supply resulting therefrom will be filled by Soviet PW’s. The transfer of the above-named French PW’s is to be accomplished by 1 October. Russian PW’s can be utilized only in larger concentrated groups under the well-known, tougher employment conditions. In the civilian field the regional labor offices will have to determine immediately those work projects where French prisoners of war can be withdrawn and replaced by Soviet groups. For the time being, no additional assignment of Soviet prisoners of war can be considered. Initially all replacement possibilities must be completely exhausted. Similarly, all French PW’s no longer needed are not to be channeled into agriculture and forestry any more, but exclusively into armament industry (aircraft industry).

All branches of economic life employing French PW’s, with the exception of armament industry and mining, are to be encompassed in determining those work projects where exchanges are feasible. The absolute necessity that Soviet PW replacements be employed in larger concentrated groups, requires, among other things, special checking of all larger construction projects of any kind (including construction of the Reich railroads, navigational and cultivation projects). Reich Minister Dr. Todt has already consented to the exchange of French PW’s employed by the Reich super highways. In agriculture the exchange can naturally be effected only in the case of large estates (especially estates with outlying farms).

Exchange of PW’s will frequently encounter resistance. The factories concerned will be reluctant to exchange the trained and proven French PW’s for Soviet PW’s. In such cases the labor offices have to draw the factories’ attention to the necessities of state, and to the directive of the Reich Marshal.

As soon as the regional labor offices have determined the work projects affected by the exchange, they will inform the Service Commands Headquarters, indicating how many French PW’s are being made available and how many Soviet PW’s will be needed to replace the French PW’s. Without my express consent not more than 120 Soviet PW’s may be requested for each 100 French PW’s made available. Since the determining factors in the allocation of Soviet PW’s are military and counter-intelligence considerations, final decision about the exchange rests with the Service Commands [Military Districts] Headquarters.

The first 100,000 French prisoners of war shall be channeled into the aircraft industry. * * *

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT EC-194

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 8

MEMORANDUM OF KEITEL, 31 OCTOBER 1941, CONCERNING THE USE OF PW’S IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY

Copy

Fuehrer Headquarters, 31 October 1941

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Secret

WFSt/Abt. L (II Org/IV Qu [sic]

No. 0 2588/41 Secret

Subject: Use of prisoners of war in the war industry.

The lack of workers is becoming an increasingly dangerous hindrance for the future German war and armament industry. The expected relief through discharges from the armed forces is uncertain as to extent and date. Its possible extent will by no means correspond to expectations and requirements in view of the great demand.

The Fuehrer has now ordered that also the working power of the Russian prisoners of war should be utilized to a great extent by large scale assignment for the requirements of the war industry. The prerequisite for production is adequate nourishment. Also very small wages are to be planned for the most modest supply with a few consumers’ goods for every day life, and perhaps rewards for production.

For labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz], the following may be considered as examples:

I. Armed Forces.

a. Clearing and construction units of all kinds in the occupied eastern territories.

b. Work and construction battalions in the other occupied territories and in Germany.

c. Large scale employment in units to relieve soldiers in labor service.

II. Construction and Armament Industry.

a. Work units for construction of all kind, particularly for the fortification of coastal defenses (concrete workers, unloading units for essential war plants).

b. Suitable armament factories which have to be selected in such a way that their personnel should consist in the majority of prisoners of war under guidance and supervision (perhaps after withdrawal and transfer to other employment of the German workers).

III. Other War Industries.

a. Mining as under II b.

b. Railroad construction units for building tracks, etc.

c. Agriculture and forestry in closed units.

The utilization of Russian prisoners of war is to be regulated on the basis of above examples by:

To I. The armed forces.

To II. The Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions and the Inspector General for the German road system, in agreement with the Reich Minister of Labor and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Economic Armament Office).

Commissioners of the Reich Minister of Armament and Munitions are to be admitted to the prisoner of war camps to assist in the selection of skilled workers.

To III. The Reich Minister of Labor. Limitations are—

1. The securing of guards to protect the German people from dangers.

2. Housing in closed camps.

3. Securing adequate nourishment.

The observance of the counter-intelligence regulations which apply for the use of prisoners of war will be supervised by military counter-intelligence agencies as until now.

OKW (AWA)^[76] will furnish the Reich Minister of Labor with blueprints based on professional selection for the appropriate use of labor and will also permanently provide workers for assignment to the labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz].

Furthermore, the Commander in Chief of the Army is asked to take the necessary measures for the recruiting of voluntary labor in the eastern operational zone in cooperation with the Reich Minister of Labor.

[Signed] Keitel

Distribution:

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1206-PS

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 9

OUTLINES OF DIRECTIVES OF GOERING REGARDING THE EMPLOYMENT OF PW’S IN THE ARMAMENT INDUSTRY, 7 NOVEMBER 1941

Draft

Rue(IV)

Berlin, 11 November 1941

Top Secret

6 Copies—6th Copy

NOTES ON OUTLINES LAID DOWN BY THE REICH MARSHAL [GOERING] AT THE MEETING OF 7 NOVEMBER 1941 IN THE REICH AIR MINISTRY [RLM]

Subject: Employment of laborers in war industries

The Fuehrer’s point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far, a total of 5 million prisoners of war—employed so far 2 million.

Directives for employment:

Frenchmen:Individual employment, transposition into the armament industry. [Rue-Wirtschaft.]

Belgians:Individual employment, transposition into the armament industry. [Rue-Wirtschaft.]

Serbs:Preferably agriculture.

Poles:If feasible, no individual employment.

Output of Russian armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly line work, a great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled workers.

Readiness of Russians to work in the operational area is strong. In the Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as free labor. In Krivoi Rog, large numbers of workers are available due to the destruction of the factories.

Employment of Russian PW’s

As a rule, employment in groups [geschlossener Arbeitseinsatz]; no individual employment, not even in agriculture. Guard personnel, not only soldiers but also foremen, at least during the working time proper. As a rule soldiers in the camp.

One has to distinguish between employment in:

1.Operational area,

2.Reich Commissariats (occupied territories in the East),

3.General Government, and

4.Interior and Protectorate.

To 1: In the operational area take preferably into consideration:

a.Railroads.

b.Highway construction.

Very important that in the Ukraine some roads be built with increased speed, not by German skilled labor but by Russian PW’s.

c.Clearing work.

d.Agriculture.

The Ukraine being conquered, we now finally have to secure the feeding of the German people. If necessary Frenchmen and Belgians are to be used for directing the work of the Russian farm workers in the eastern area. If farm machinery is lacking, employ masses of workers. Transfer of German farmers only where actual success can be expected.

e.Railroad-repair-factories, etc.

Best supervision: “Field kitchen”. Quick evacuation from operational area necessary. Losses during transport very heavy (escaping and joining with partisan and robber bands).

Barbed wire hard to get. (Discarding of barbed wire fences in East Prussia desirable.)

Leave Asiatic people in operational area if possible.

From construction battalions 69,000 workers have been transferred to the armament industry: replacement by prisoner-of-war battalions.

Again and again skilled workers are being found in the construction battalions (machine [wood or metal] operators). Investigation by army desirable. Express will of the Fuehrer, that every skilled worker is used in the proper place. If necessary, repeated checking should be instituted.

To 2: The same applies to employment in Reich Commissariats.

To 3: The above is also applicable to the General Government.

Attention is to be paid to avoiding of unnecessary transport of machinery, as thereby often the available manpower in the General Government is not fully utilized and, on the other hand, the machinery cannot be made use of for a long time in other places.

To 4: In the Interior and the Protectorate it would be ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian PW’s except the employees necessary for direction. For employment in the Interior and the Protectorate the following are to have priority:

a. At the top, coal mining industry.

Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of Russians. At times manning the entire plant with Russian laborers.

b. Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars, repair shops).

Railroad repair and industry workers are to be sought out from the PW’s. Railroad is most important means of transportation in the East.

c. Armament industries.

Above all factories producing tanks and guns. Possibly also construction of parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians. For the remainder, employment in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm tractors, generators, etc. In emergency, erect in individual places barracks for occasional workers which are used as unloading details and similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities.)

The General Armed Forces Office of the Supreme Command Armed Forces [OKW/AWA] is competent for transporting Russian PW’s, employment through “Planning Board for Employment of all PW’s.” If necessary, offices of Reich Commissariats.

No employment where danger to people [fuer Menschen] or their supply exists, i.e., factories sensitive to explosions, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no “solidarity”. German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.

Food is a matter of the Four Year Plan. Supply their own food (cats, horses, etc.).

Clothing, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home where part of the people live in caverns.

Supply of shoes for Russians, as a rule wooden shoes; if necessary install Russian shoe repair shops.

Examination of physical fitness, in order to avoid importation of diseases.

Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians, if possible by selected Russian engineers.

Employment offices for civilian workers to be kept separate from those for PW’s. In this respect the wage problem is to be considered. Furthermore, families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule employment in groups [geschlossener Einsatz].

Some aspects for labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz] in general.

Rather employ PW’s than unsuitable foreign workers. Draft Poles, Dutchmen, etc., if necessary as PW’s, and employ them as such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong action.

General employment of all German women repudiated by the Fuehrer.

Where Russians can be employed, labor service is not to be used. Labor service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War situation to be taken into consideration.

As a matter of principle, central interests precede local interests, therefore no resistance from Reich Commissioners and other local authorities against labor utilization [Arbeitseinsatz] in the homeland.

Savings in wages are to be offset by compensatory contributions [to the Reich] by the respective management.

Express order by the Fuehrer. Under no circumstances may the wage level in the East be raised or assimilated to the wages in western Germany. Strong action is imperative against recruiting agents who offer high wages.

It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of wages for foreign workers.

Foreigners not to be treated like German workers, on the other hand do not provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters.

The welfare installations of the German Labor Front [DAF] are under no circumstances to be used by PW’s or eastern workers.

All agencies are to promote maximum utilization of Russian manpower.

Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly organized in the operational area. Speed is necessary, as the mass of manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets).

Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of escaping prisoners. Especially in and around Berlin, strictest guarding is essential.

[illegible initials]

Distribution:

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3040-PS^[77]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 10

EXTRACTS FROM SECRET ORDER OF HIMMLER, 20 FEBRUARY 1942, CONCERNING THE COMMITMENT AND TREATMENT OF MANPOWER FROM THE EAST

GENERAL COLLECTION OF DECREES [ALLGEMEINE

ERLASSAMMLUNG (AES)]

Part 2

Secret

Printed by RSHA (Reich Security Main Office) I Org

Section 2 A III f

Commitment of Manpower from the East. Circular Decree of the Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior dated 20 February 1942—S IV No. 208/42 (foreign workers).

Enclosed I am sending you general regulations concerning the recruiting and the committing of manpower from the East for your information and careful attention.

I have the following additional directives for the Security Police and the SD [Security Service]:

A. MANPOWER FROM THE ORIGINAL SOVIET RUSSIAN TERRITORY

I. General security measures.

1. The commitment of manpower in the Reich from the original Soviet Russian territory results in greater dangers than any other employment of foreigners in spite of the special standards of their way of living, since a complete separation from the German and other foreign laborers and a strict supervision will frequently, in practice and especially at the place of work, scarcely be effected. The Security Police is charged with the responsibility for preventing the danger and it must do everything to accomplish its tasks; that is, to diminish the possibilities of danger to a minimum. Since enforcements cannot be counted on, it is the special task of the inspectors and state police administrative offices to urge the other administrative offices, charged with the commitment of the manpower, to take over the affairs of the Security Police within the sphere of their jurisdiction.

III. Combatting violations against discipline.

1. According to the equal status of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory with prisoners of war, a strict discipline must be exercised in the quarters and at the working place. Violations against discipline, including work refusal and loafing at work, will be fought exclusively by the Secret State Police [Gestapo]. The smaller cases will be settled by the leader of the guard according to instruction of the state police administration offices with measures as provided for in the enclosure. To break acute resistance, the guards shall be permitted to use also physical power against the manpower. But this may be done only for a cogent cause. The manpower should always be informed about the fact that they will be treated decently when conducting themselves with discipline and accomplishing good work.

2. In severe cases, that is in such cases where the measures at the disposal of the leader of the guard do not suffice, the state police office has to act with its means. Accordingly, they will be treated, as a rule only with strict measures, that is, with transfer to a concentration camp or with special treatment.

3. The transfer to a concentration camp is done in the usual manner.

4. In especially severe cases special treatment is to be requested at the Reich Security Main Office, stating personal data and the exact history of the act.

5. Special treatment consists of hanging. It should not take place in the immediate vicinity of the camp. A certain number of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory should attend the special treatment; at that time they are warned about the circumstances which led to this special treatment.

6. Should special treatment be required within the camp for exceptional reasons of camp discipline, this is also to be requested.

IV. Subversive activities against the Reich.

Anti-Reich activities, especially dissemination of communist ideology, propaganda of disunity, sabotage acts, are to be fought against with the strictest measures. The care in obtaining information shall not suffer through quick arrests, in order to catch the whole group of perpetrators. Anti-Reich conduct is, as a rule, to be punished by special treatment, in slighter cases a transfer to a concentration camp may be considered.

V. Criminal violations [Kriminelle Verfehlungen].

1. As a matter of principle, criminal violations—regardless of whether committed inside or outside the camp—shall be punished by state police measures. * * *

2. Criminal offenses [Kriminelle Delikte] are generally to be punished as violations against discipline, that is, the state police measures provided for, shall take place in cases of smaller violations, and special treatment shall take place in cases of crimes—such as, murder, homicide, and robbery.

3. Concerning capital crimes against German persons, punishment by criminal court procedure may, however, in an individual case appear suitable. If the (superior) state police agency considers this opportune, it can transfer the case to the prosecuting attorney, under the provision that pursuant to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the perpetrator.

VI. Sexual Intercourse.

Sexual intercourse is forbidden to the manpower of the original Soviet Russian territory. Because of their closely confined quarters they have no opportunity for it. Should sexual intercourse occur nevertheless—especially by the individually employed manpower on the farms—the following is directed:

1. For every case of sexual intercourse with our German countrymen or women [deutschen Volksgenossen oder Volksgenossinnen] special treatment is to be requested for male manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp for female manpower.

2. When exercising sexual intercourse with other foreign workers, the conduct of the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory is to be punished as severe violation of discipline with transfer to a concentration camp.

VII. Measures against fraternization with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory.

1. Special attention is to be paid to the fundamental segregation of manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory from the German population. It is important to prevent a penetration of communistic ideology into the German population by cutting off every contact not directly pertaining to the work and, if possible, to avoid every solidarity between German people and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory. Against Germans who act to the contrary, steps are to be taken by the state police according to the situation of the individual case.

2. If German countrymen or women should exercise sexual intercourse or commit indecent acts with manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, transfer to a concentration camp is to be requested.

3. The intercourse between other foreign workers employed in the Reich and the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory also brings great dangers to be dealt with by the Security Police; therefore, it should also be fought with measures against the foreign workers. As a rule, the transfer to a correction camp (deportation for Italians) will be proper; this also applies to cases of sexual intercourse.

VIII. Search.

2. When caught, the fugitive must receive special treatment.

B. MANPOWER FROM THE BALTIC COUNTRIES AND FOREIGN MANPOWER, NOT OF POLISH ORIGIN, FROM THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT AND FROM THE ANNEXED EASTERN TERRITORIES

I. General.

1. This manpower is to be treated uniformly in the Reich by the state police. In view of the political attitude of these nations, or ethnic groups [Volksstaemme] toward the Reich on the one hand and their position in the East on the other hand, they are to be governed by the regulations valid for foreign manpower in general, but are subject to special limitations in their way of living.

2. These limitations consist essentially in a conspicuous separation of this manpower from the German people. Since the employment and housing of this manpower is not closely confined and guarded, it is the task of the Secret State Police to be especially watchful about the observation of the mentioned principle. The Secret State Police has to inform the offices charged with the employment of foreigners through constant communication, that this principle will be considered in all measures of work employment. Settlement of these persons in the Reich, individual billeting in spite of existing collective quarters, position superior to that of a German worker, etc., must not be tolerated. As far as these people themselves violate the established principle, and act unlawfully against Germans by insubordination and acts of violence, such a conduct will be met with state police measures.

3. This manpower must, however, by no means be put on the same level as the Poles or the manpower from the original Soviet Russian territory, on account of their nations’ fundamental antagonism toward the Polish people and Bolshevism. Nevertheless, special attention should be paid to them—especially by the establishment of an active intelligence service among this manpower—since their rather receptive attitude toward the German nation might change into the opposite, but at least could stiffen, because too high political expectations are not fulfilled.

III. Fighting against breach of labor contract.

1. The fight against breach of labor contract of this manpower is principally the duty of the Secret State Police.

2. This does not mean, of course, an interference with the activity of the Reich trustee of labor, with the means at his disposal in the regulation and settlement of industrial difficulties as long as no active intervention is necessary. If more stringent measures are necessary, the Reich trustee of labor will transfer the proceedings to the Secret State Police.

3. In every case, however, it is the task of the (superior) state police agency to check whether the violation of the working duty by this manpower is not caused by the plant through breach of contract as well as general bad treatment. If the conduct of the concerned manpower appears justified through the fault on the part of this plant, the state police is not to interfere, since this is free manpower.

4. In any other case, however, immediate action is necessary and, in case of a breach of contract on part of this manpower, the transfer to a correction camp is to be ordered, as a rule. In cases of severe repetition the transfer to a concentration camp can also be requested. In the cases of breach of contracts handled by the state police, the Reich trustee of labor has to be informed each time about the decision.

IV. Criminal violations.

3. * * *. Crimes against decency, acts of violence, and acts of sabotage are to be punished, as a matter of principle, by state police measures (special treatment); however, I have no objection against a transfer of the inquiry proceedings to the competent public prosecutor if, pursuant to the criminal laws, one can safely count on the death penalty for the perpetrator. In these cases it is to be ascertained what the outcome of the trial is; should, against expectations, a death sentence not be passed, a report has to be made to me, attaching copy of the judgment.

Inquiry proceedings concerning other offenses are, as a rule, to be transferred to the competent public prosecutor. If a strong increase of crimes is noted in certain spheres, then there are no objections at all against punishing purely criminal acts, as a deterrent example, by state police measures.

VI. Sexual intercourse with Germans.

1. The sexual intercourse of the manpower from the Baltic states as well as of the foreign manpower of non-Polish origin from the General Government and from the annexed eastern territories with Germans is punishable by severest penalties. (Changed by Circular Decree dated 23 October 1943.) The workers will be thoroughly instructed through the attached orientation sheet (enclo. 3) [not reproduced] in the foreign languages when they report upon their arrival at the local police offices. An instruction of the German population will be effected through the Party administration offices.

2. The district [Kreis] police offices have received instructions to arrest without delay workers who violate this regulation and to report them to the competent (superior) state police agency.

3. For male manpower who had sexual intercourse with Germans, special treatment is to be requested, for female manpower, transfer into a concentration camp. The directives issued for the special treatment of Polish civil workers are valid correspondingly; this is also applicable for the treatment of the involved German persons.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 016-PS^[78]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 13

LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO ROSENBERG, 24 APRIL 1942, AND EXTRACTS FROM REPORT ON SAUCKEL’S LABOR MOBILIZATION PROGRAM, 20 APRIL 1942

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation

GBA

Berlin W. 8, 24 April 1942

Mohrenstrasse 65

(Thuringia House)

Phone: 126571

[Stamp]

Bureau of Ministry [Ministerbuero]

received 27 April 1942, No. 0887 Min. 28/v

Dr. K.P. has been informed

Very esteemed and dear Party Member Rosenberg:

Enclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. Please excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few corrections.

Heil Hitler!

Yours,

[Signed] Fritz Sauckel

5 copies

copy for Mr. Wittenbacher.

[Signed] Wachs

Chancellory 1 May 1942

[Kanzlei]

[Stamp] Mischke

read: ILFL/KS 4.5.42

filed: 1-5, 5/5 42 Pg

To The Reich Minister for the

Occupied Eastern Territories,

Party Member Rosenberg

Berlin

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

The Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation

20 April 1942

Sckl./We.

The Labor Mobilization Program

The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by our fighting armed forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, for the armament of the armed forces and also for the nutrition of the homeland. The raw material as well as the fertility of the conquered territories and their human labor power are to be used completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and their allies.

VII. * * * Should we succeed with the help of the Party to convince all the German intellectual and manual workers of the great importance of the labor mobilization for the outcome of the war, and succeed to take good care of and keep up the morale of all the men, women, and the German youths who work within the labor mobilization program under extraordinarily strenuous circumstances, as far as their physical and mental capabilities of endurance are concerned and should we furthermore be able, also with the help of the Party, to use the prisoners of war as well as civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only without harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our war and nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most difficult part of the labor mobilization program.

The Task and its Solution

(No figures are mentioned because of security reasons. I can assure you, nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest labor problem of all times, especially with regard to figures.)

B. The Solution:

3. The armament and nutrition tasks make it vitally necessary, not only to include the entire German labor power but also to call on foreign labor.

Consequently, I immediately tripled the transport program which I found when I took charge of my mission.

The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the months of May-June in order to assure in time and under any circumstances the availability of foreign labor power from the occupied territories for an increased production, in view of coming operations of the army, as well as of agricultural labor in the sector of the German food economy.

All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well as of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorporated into the German armament and nutrition industries. Their production must be brought to the highest possible level.

It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous number of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The greatest pool for that purpose is the occupied territories of the East.

Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor.

Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers

The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution of the mobilization of labor program in this war.

All the men must be fed, sheltered, and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure.

It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from cruelty and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if he has proved himself the most bestial and most implacable adversary, and to treat him correctly and humanely, even when we expect useful work of him.

As long as the German armaments industry did not make it absolutely necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the use of Soviet prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men or women, from the Soviet territories. This has now become impossible and the working capacity of these people must now be exploited to the greatest extent.

Therefore, I want to impress most cordially but also most emphatically upon all the men and women who participate decisively in this war in the labor mobilization program, the necessity to comply with all these necessities, decisions and measures, according to the old National Socialist principle:

Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work,

that is, for the future of our Nation!

[Signed] Fritz Sauckel

[Stamp]

(The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS^[79]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 16-A

EXTRACTS FROM INTERDEPARTMENTAL REPORT OF THE MINISTRY FOR OCCUPIED EASTERN TERRITORIES, 30 SEPTEMBER 1942, CONCERNING THE STATUS OF EASTERN LABORERS

Berlin NW 7, Hegelplatz 2, 30 September 1942

Central Office for Members of Eastern Nations

Ih (ZO)

Subject: Present situation of the Eastern Labor Problem

* * * The manner and method by which the problems created through the importation of millions of members of the eastern peoples into the Reich are being solved is relevant with respect to two big tasks:

1. the development of the war situation,

2. the enforcement of the German claim for leadership in the East after the end of the war.

* * * The facts which, by the fall of 1942, have been changed only partially or incompletely, are, among other, as follows:

1. The definition of workers from the occupied territories of the USSR was narrowed down to the legal labor and social labor concept of “Eastern workers”; thereby, a particular “employment relationship of a special type” was created among “foreigners”—something which had to be looked upon, by those affected, as degrading.

2. The drafting of eastern male and female workers often occurred without the necessary examination of the capabilities of those concerned, so that 5 to 10 percent sick and children were transported along. On the other hand, in those places where no volunteers were obtained, instead of recruiting them pursuant to labor conscription law, coercive measures were used by the police (imprisonment, penal expeditions, and the like).

3. The allocation to enterprises was not undertaken by considering the occupation and previous training but according to the chance assignment of the individual to the respective transports or transient camps.

4. The billeting did not follow the policies for other foreigners, but was done like for civilian prisoners, in camps which were fenced in with barbed wire and were heavily guarded and which they were not permitted to leave.

5. The treatment by the guards was, on the average, without intelligence and cruel so that the Russian and Ukrainian workers, in enterprises with foreign laborers of different nationalities, were exposed to the ridicule of the Poles and Czechs, among other things.

6. The food was so bad and insufficient in the camps for the eastern laborers employed in industry and mining that, on the average, the good capability of the camp members dropped quickly and many sicknesses and deaths occurred.

7. Payment was carried out in the form of a ruling in which the industrial worker would be left on the average with 2 or 3 RM each week, and the farm laborers with even less, so that the wage transfer to their homes became illusory, not to mention the fact that no procedure was as yet developed for such transfer.

8. The postal service with their families was not feasible for months because of the lack of preparatory measures, so that instead of factual reports, wild rumors arrived in their countries—among others, by way of emigrants.

9. The promises which had been made time and time again in the areas of enlistment were in gross contradiction with the facts mentioned under 3 to 8.

Apart from the natural impairment of morale and working capacity resulting from these measures and conditions, the result was that the Soviet propaganda seized upon this matter and exploited it carefully; for this, an ample basis was provided not only by the actual conditions and the letters which reached the home country [of the workers] in spite of the initial blockade, as well as by stories of fugitives and such, but also by the clumsy publications in the German press about the respective legal regulations. As early as April 1942, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in his note to the enemy powers referred to this, especially in section III of that note in which among other things it is stated:

“The German administration is stamping under its feet the long recognized laws and customs of warfare by ordering its troops to take into captivity the male civilian population, in many places even the women, and to apply to them the kind of regime, which the Hitlerites have introduced for the prisoners of war. This does not only mean slave labor for the captured peaceful inhabitants but in most cases also inescapable death by starvation or death through sickness, corporal punishment, and organized mass murders.

“The deportation of peaceful inhabitants to the rear which has been very widely practiced by the German-Fascist Army at the time of its advance is taking on a mass character; it is carried out at direct orders of the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces (OKW) and its effects are especially cruel in the immediate rear areas during the retreat of the German Army. In a series of documents which have been found by units of the Red Army at the staffs of destroyed German units, there is a reference to the Order of the High Command under No. 2974/41 of 6 December 1941 which orders the deportation of all grown men from the occupied places to prisoner of war camps. * * *

“Sometimes, all the inhabitants were deported, sometimes the men were torn away from their families, or mothers were separated from their children. Only the smallest number of these deported people have been able to return to their homes. These returnees report about unheard-of degradations, heaviest forced labor, enormous numbers of deaths among inhabitants because of starvation and tortures, about the murder by the Fascists of all the weak, wounded, and sick.”

The effects of this large-scale radio, press, and leaflet propaganda which is based on documentary evidence, a propaganda operating even into German-administered territories, must be considered as one of the main reasons for this year’s stiffening of the Soviet resistance as well as the threatening increase of guerilla bands up to the borders of the General Government.

In the meantime, after a betterment of the condition of the eastern laborers had been insisted upon, not only by the Main Office for Politics in the Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern territories, which has been able to find support in the repeated requests by the High Command of the Armed Forces, but also by the gentleman charged with the responsibility for all labor employment as well as the Department of Labor Employment in the German Labor Movement, which has the supervision of the eastern laborers—those previously existing legal and police rulings have been mitigated and the conditions in the 8-10,000 camps in the Reich have, on the whole, been improved. * * *

In spite of the improvements mentioned as well as others, which in many cases can be traced back to the personal intervention of the Plenipotentiary General of Labor Allocation, the total situation of the eastern laborers (sampling date: 1 October 1942) must still be considered unsatisfactory, * * *.

There remains such a quantity of grievances and problems that it would be impossible to relate now.

[Signed] Gutkelch

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 294-PS^[80]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 19-A

EXTRACTS FROM TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM, SIGNED BY BRAEUTIGAM,^[81] 25 OCTOBER 1942, CONCERNING EFFECTS OF SLAVE LABOR PROGRAM

Copy

Top Secret Matter of State [Geheime Reichssache]

[handwritten:] II 1 1161/44 g Rs.

Memorandum

In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war for the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of the Greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition of colonial territory for colonizing purposes and economic exploitation.

* * * With the instinct characteristic of the eastern peoples, even the primitive person has soon found out that for Germany, the slogan “liberation from Bolshevism” was merely a pretext, in order to enslave the Slavic peoples of the East in her own manner. But lest any doubts at all exist as to this German war aim, the German public is, to an ever increasing extent, unabashedly pointing at this intention. Not only for Germany is the conquered territory publicly being claimed as colonization area, but even for Germany’s bitter enemies, the Dutch and Norwegians. * * *

Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war should be named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps. Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It is especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only for prisoners of war from the Soviet Union, while complaints about the treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and English, have not been heard of. It is obvious that nothing was so suitable for strengthening the resistance of the Red Army as the knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable death is to be met. To be sure, the Main Department for Politics has succeeded here by unceasing efforts in bringing about a material improvement of the fate of the prisoners of war. However, this improvement is not to be ascribed to political insight, but to the sudden realization that our labor market must be supplied with laborers at once. We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to recruit millions of laborers from the occupied eastern territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within Germany. Now the food question suddenly no longer existed. With the usual unlimited abuse of the Slavic humanity, “recruiting” methods were used which probably have their model only in the blackest periods of the slave trade.

A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health or age, the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned out immediately that many more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious illnesses and other incapabilities for work. It need not be emphasized that these methods would of necessity have their effect on the resistance of the Red Army; of course, these methods were used only in the Soviet Union, and in no way remotely resembled this form in enemy countries like Holland or Norway. Actually we have made it quite easy for Soviet propaganda to augment the hate for Germany and the National Socialist system. The Soviet soldier fights more and more bravely in spite of the efforts of our politicians to find another name for this bravery. Valuable German blood must flow more and more, in order to break the resistance of the Red Army. Obviously, the Main Department for Politics has struggled unceasingly to place the methods of acquiring workers and their treatment within Germany on a rational foundation. Originally it was thought in all earnestness to demand the utmost efforts with a minimum of food. Here, as well, not political insight, but merely the most primitive biological knowledge has led to an improvement. Now 400,000 female household workers from the Ukraine are to come to Germany, and already the German press announces publicly that these people have no right to free time and may not visit theaters, movies, restaurants, etc., and may leave the house at the most three hours a week, except for duty purposes.

In addition, there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Reich Commissariat itself. With an unequalled arrogance, we put aside all political knowledge and, to the happy surprise of all the colored world, treat the peoples of the Occupied Eastern Territories as whites of class 2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for Germany and Europe. Only the most limited education is suitable for them, no social services must be given them. Their sustenance interests us only insofar as they are still capable of labor, and, in every respect, they are given to understand that we regard them as of minute value.

Berlin, 25 October 1942

[Signed] Braeutigam

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-61

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 20

LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO THE PRESIDENTS OF LABOR OFFICES, 26 NOVEMBER 1942, CONCERNING DEPORTATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF POLES AND JEWS

Copy

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation

Berlin S.W. 11, Saarlandstr. 96

26 November 1942

Va 5431/7468/42 g

To the Presidents of the Landes

Labor Offices (excl. Labor

Office Brandenburg)

Special-delivery letter

Secret

Subject:Employment of Jews. Specif: Replacement of Jews in war-essential jobs by Polish labor.

In agreement with the Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service, Jews still employed will now be evacuated from the territory of the Reich and replaced by Poles, who are being deported from the General Government.

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service has informed me on 26 October 1942, that it is anticipated that during the month of November the evacuation of Poles in the Lublin district will begin, in order to make room there for the resettlement of Germans.

Poles slated for evacuation, as a result of this measure, will be committed to concentration camps and put to work insofar as they are criminal or asocial elements. The remaining Poles, if fit for labor, will be transported without their families to the Reich, particularly to Berlin; there they will be put at the disposal of the labor allocation offices to serve as replacements for Jews to be eliminated from armament factories.

The Jews who will become available as a result of the employment of Polish labor will be deported at once. This will apply first to Jews engaged in unskilled labor since they can be exchanged most easily. The remaining so-called “qualified” Jewish laborers will be left in the industries until their Polish replacements have been made sufficiently familiar with the work processes by a period of apprenticeship to be determined for each case individually. Loss of production in individual industries will thus be reduced to the absolute minimum.

I reserve the right to issue further instructions. Please inform the labor offices concerned accordingly.

To the President of the Landes Labor Office Brandenburg, Berlin W. 62

I transmit the foregoing copy for your information. Insofar as the removal of Jews allocated for work concerns your district, too, I request that you take the necessary measures in cooperation with the competent offices of the Chief of the Security Police and of the Security Service.

[Signed] Fritz Sauckel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1063-D-PS^[82]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 21

EXTRACT FROM ORDER OF MUELLER, 17 DECEMBER 1942, CONCERNING PRISONERS QUALIFIED FOR WORK TO BE SENT TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Berlin, 17 December 1942

The Chief of the Security Police and the Security Service

B. Nr. IV 656/42 Secret

Secret

Distribution—Secret:

All Commanders of the Security Police and the Security Service

All Inspectors of the Security Police and the Security Service

All Commandants of the Security Police and the Security Service

All Chiefs of State Police Headquarters

For information:

The Chief of the SS Economic and Administrative Main Office,

SS Obergruppenfuehrer [Lt. Gen.] Pohl

All Higher SS and Police Chiefs

The Inspector of Concentration Camps

For reasons of war necessity, which need not be specified here, the Reich Leader SS and Chief of the German Police has ordered on 14 December 1942 that at least 35,000 prisoners fit for work are to be committed to the concentration camps before the end of January 1943.

In order to reach this number, the following measures are required:

1. As of now (and for the time being, until 1 February 1943) eastern workers or such foreign workers, who have been fugitives, or who have broken contracts, insofar as they do not belong to allied, friendly, or neutral states, are to be brought by the quickest means to the nearest concentration camps under observance of the simplest formalities listed under No. 3. In order to eliminate or forestall complaints by outside public offices, explanations will be furnished, if required, stating that the measures are essential for reasons of public security on the basis of the facts in the individual cases.

2. The commanders and the commandants of the Security Police and the Security Service, and the Chiefs of the State Police Headquarters will make immediate checks, applying especially rigorous and strict standards, on (a) prisons, and (b) labor correction camps. All prisoners fit for work, if at all possible physically and from a humanitarian aspect, will be committed at once to the nearest concentration camp, according to the following instructions, even if criminal procedures have already been or will be instituted in the near future. Only such prisoners who are to remain in solitary confinement, for investigation purposes, may be left.

By order:

[Signed] Mueller

Certified correct.

[Signed] Hellmuth

[Seal of Secret State Police] Chief Secretary of Police

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS^[83]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 25

EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM GERMAN-APPOINTED UKRAINIAN MAIN COMMITTEE TO FRANK, FEBRUARY 1943

Copy

Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytch,

Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee

Krakow, February 1943

To the Governor General,

Reich Minister Dr. Frank.

Your Excellency:

Complying with your request I am sending you this letter, in which I should like to state briefly the critical conditions and the distressing incidents which are creating an especially grave situation for the Ukrainian population in the General Government. * * *

II. Measures of labor procurement.

The general nervousness is enhanced yet by the wrong methods to obtain labor, which have been used increasingly in recent months.

The wild and ruthless manhunt carried on everywhere in towns and country, in streets, public squares, railway stations, even in churches, as well as in homes at night, has badly shaken the sense of security of the population. Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized anywhere and at any time by the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and being taken into an assembly camp. The family does not know what has happened to him, until weeks or months later one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.

I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:

a. During such a drive a schoolboy in Sokal lost his life and another was wounded (App. 2).

b. 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity cards, were assigned in Krakow to a transport of “Russian prisoners of war” and delivered into a punishment camp in Graz (App. 3).

c. 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by the labor office in the middle of January, were sent via East Prussia to Pskov in Russia, where most of them died as a result of the very severe conditions (App. 4).

d. Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment (Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys from classes (Biala Podlaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieszow) (App. 5).

III. Question of Personal Security.

Of a much worse character are the mass executions of absolutely innocent persons * * *.

Appendix 12

As this holiday is celebrated by the Ukrainians with great piety, the shootings of these innocent people on this holy day caused great indignance and embitterment. These events depress the Ukrainian population. The view is current that now the shootings of the Jews are coming to an end those of the Ukrainians begin. The case of Ustrzyki is commented upon as follows: The Germans do not care about any non-German sanctity and holidays, they even shoot Ukrainians on the Ukrainian “Schtschedryj Wetschir” (the case in Ustrzyki).

The Ukrainian population is suspicious of all orders given by the German authorities and even keep away from the communal kitchens, for fear that those in need may be considered as beggars and shot.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V-PS

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 30

EXTRACTS FROM LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 14 APRIL 1943, CONCERNING LABOR QUESTIONS

G.B.A.

April 14th, [1943]

Sckl./We.

Forwarded We.

[in ink] April 15th

To the Fuehrer

Obersalzberg

My Fuehrer,

As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am going to the eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 1 million workers from the east for the German war economy in the coming months.

The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact fulfilment of the last program, another 450,000 workers from the western areas, too, will come into the Reich by the beginning of the summer.

With the addition of about 150,000 workers who furthermore may be obtained from Poland and from the other territories, it will then be possible by summer again to put 5-600,000 workers at the disposal of German agriculture and 1,000,000 workers at the disposal of the armament and other war industries.

I ask for your approval to have the new French workers come into the Reich under conditions similar to those of the last group. I have taken contact with the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW).

Since the largest part of the Belgian civilian workers and prisoners of war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that a similar statute to that which was granted to the French be made for some 20,000 Belgian prisoners of war. This very great concession by you has made a very deep impression upon Laval and the French Ministers. Laval has repeatedly asked me to transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my Fuehrer.

1. After one year’s activity as Plenipotentiary for the Allocation of Labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers have been added to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 31 March this year.

As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory performances. Their feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so indisputably regulated that, in this respect too, our National Socialist Reich presents a shining example compared to the methods of the capitalist and bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inevitable that mistakes and blunders still occur here and there. I will continue to endeavor with the greatest energy to reduce them to a minimum.

In addition to the foreign civilian workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war are also employed in the German economy.

2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the following branches of the German war economy:

Armament1,568,801

Mining industry163,632

Building218,707

Transportation199,074

Agriculture and forestry1,007,544

Other branches of the economy480,298

In addition to the foreign workers, 5 million male and female German workers were channelled into the German war economy proper through transfer from enterprises unimportant to the war effort, to war-essential industries, etc.

Yours faithfully and obediently,

[Signed] Fritz Sauckel

The following persons received a copy of the above version:

Reich Marshal Goering

Reichsleiter Bormann

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers

Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels

Additional text on the original letter to the Fuehrer.

Since I will be in the eastern territories on April 20th, I ask you, my Fuehrer, to accept in advance my most sincere congratulations along with those of my district [Gau] and my family.

Let me assure you that the district [Gau] of Thuringia and I will serve you and our dear people with all our strength.

It is the most fervent wish that you, my Fuehrer, may always enjoy the best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to your complete satisfaction.

Faithfully and obediently yours

[Signed] Fritz Sauckel

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 33

LETTER FROM SAUCKEL TO HITLER, 3 JUNE 1943, CONCERNING FOREIGN LABOR SITUATION

The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan

The Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation

1751/43 [pencilled]

forwarded on 6 June 1943

Berlin W 8, 3 June 1943

To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany

The Fuehrer’s Headquarters.

My Fuehrer,

I beg to be permitted to read to you [a report] on the situation of the labor allocation for the first 5 months of 1943.

The following number of new foreigners and prisoners of war was for the first time put at the disposal of the German war industry:

January 1943120,085

February 1943138,354

March 1943257,382

April 1943160,535

May 1943170,155

————

TOTAL846,511

I may remark that it was possible to reach this figure of 850,000 only under great difficulties which had not existed during the previous year and only because all labor allocation agencies, particularly also in the occupied territories, approached their task with the greatest devotion.

Unfortunately, quite a number of our officials and employees became victims of assassination, attack, and the like, by partisans.

In addition to the labor forces put at the disposal of the economy within the Reich, several hundred thousand laborers were made available within the occupied territories by the agencies of the Labor Allocation Administration to the Organization Todt as well as to the enterprises working for the German war economy in the East and the West. Furthermore, it was possible to assign to the Wehrmacht, in addition to a large number of laborers, some considerable numbers of labor volunteers.

Moreover, by virtue of the order concerning compulsory registration, dated 27 January 1943, the following number of men and women are made available.

MenWomenTotal

February14,594163,012177,606

March45,606494,931540,537

April19,315269,374288,689

May11,485186,683198,168

————————————

TOTAL91,0001,114,0001,205,000

However, approximately 600,000 of these persons are available only for less than 48 hours of work per week.

Altogether German war industry recruited 2,000,000 laborers during 5 months of 1943.

Furthermore, as regards wage control and increase of the output of the laborers in the various European territories, especially in France, negotiations were conducted as well as arrangements made and regulations issued, which enabled us to keep the wage system in the occupied European territories in order to secure, as far as possible, the living conditions of laborers working for German interests, in spite of the difficult conditions created by the war, and to increase production by means of wage regulations also in these territories. The coordination of these measures was achieved through agreements with the respective armament and agricultural agencies, as well as with the Reich Commissioner for Price Control.

Heil!

Yours faithfully and obediently,

[Signed] Sauckel

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3000-PS

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 34

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT RENDERED TO RIECKE, MINISTERIALDIREKTOR IN THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, 28 JUNE 1943, ON EXPERIENCES IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE EAST

Freitag, Chief of Main Office III

with the Commissariat General in Minsk

Minsk, 28 June 1943

Secret!

[stamp]

Main Group Food and Agriculture

Rec’d. 14 July 1943; no encl.

III E 733/43 Secret

To Ministerialdirektor Riecke

in Berlin

Subject:Report on experiences in political and economic problems in the East, particularly the Commissariat General White Ruthenia.

* * * The task of the military agencies and, subsequently, of the German administration, is: “Exploitation of the region for the German war economy,” and the motto: “Everything you do for Germany is right, everything else is wrong!”

* * * The recruitment of labor for the Reich, however necessary, had disastrous effects. The recruitment measures in the last months and weeks were absolute manhunts, which have an irreparable political and economic effect * * * From * * * White Ruthenia, approximately 50,000 people have been obtained for the Reich so far. Another 130,000 are to be obtained. Considering the total population of 2.4 million, these figures are impossible * * *.

* * * Due to the sweeping drives [Grossaktionen] of the SS and police in November 1942, about 250,000 acres of farmland are left unused, as the population has gone and the villages have been razed.

[Signed] Freitag

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 265-PS^[84]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 35

EXTRACTS FROM REPORT BY LEYSER TO ROSENBERG, 30 JUNE 1943, ON CONDITIONS IN THE DISTRICT ZHITOMIR

The Commissioner General

Zhitomir, 30 June 1943

Secret

Oral report on the situation in the general district [Generalbezirk] Zhitomir, by Commissioner General Leyser, delivered at a conference with Reich Minister Rosenberg, in Vinnitsa, on 17 June 1943.

Mr. Reich Minister,

The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no doubt, well known to the Reich Minister through reports and his own observations. Therefore, I shall not report them. It is certain that a recruitment of labor, in the sense of the word, can hardly be spoken of. In most cases, it is nowadays a matter of actual conscription by force. The population has been stirred up to a large extent and views the transports to the Reich as a measure which does in no way differ from the former exile to Siberia, during the Czarist and Bolshevist systems.

To date, almost 170,000 male and female workers have been sent to the Reich from the general district Zhitomir. It can be taken for granted that, during the month of June, this number is going to rise to approximately 200,000.

The struggle which has to be carried on is hard and full of sacrifices. But it will and must be carried through. Enormous moral forces have been mobilized in the personnel of the civil administration in their daily efforts. The successes which they were able to achieve so far are impressive, particularly with regard to the resistance encountered. May I, therefore, be permitted at the conclusion of this report to thank all my co-workers for their excellent work. They know that they are practically on the front. I can promise your Excellency, that we all shall do our duty now, and in the future, as our Fuehrer has ordered.

[Signed] Leyser

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 204-PS

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 39

EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM OF A CONFERENCE, 18 FEBRUARY 1944, CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF INDIGENOUS LABOR FOR PURPOSES OF THE REICH

The City Commissioner in Kaunas.

Kaunas, 18 February 1944.

PROCUREMENT OF INDIGENOUS WORKERS FOR PURPOSES OF THE REICH

Numerous drives for the purpose of recruiting indigenous workers for the Reich have taken place since the entry of German armed forces into the general district [Generalbezirk] Lithuania in June 1941. A few weeks after the entry of the German troops, thousands of Lithuanian male and female farm workers were recruited at the instigation of the military administration, to work for 6 months on large estates in the Gau East Prussia. Unfortunately, the promises made then were not kept. These farm workers were not released after 6 months nor after 12 months; their families remaining behind were left without any support for months; they were for a long time refused a short vacation in Lithuania, and now it is even considered to transfer these farm workers, recruited in 1941 for 6 months, to the armament industry in the Reich.

The second major drive was started by the armed forces in the spring of 1942 and concerned the collecting of approximately 7,000 male workers as so-called transport helpers. The action, which was rushed into without sufficient propaganda preparation, was greatly handicapped by unwise measures on the part of the nervous armed forces command. Thus for instance, the Lithuanians, ordered to the official agencies “only for registration”, were not allowed to return home and were taken away under military escort to the local barracks, leaving them no way of either saying good-by to their families or putting in order their most important personal affairs. No wonder that the enemy propaganda exploited this “blemish” with avidity comparing the procedure with the deportation methods used barely a year ago by the Soviets.

Until most recent times, numerous additional drives have been undertaken for the purpose of obtaining volunteers for the armed forces, the police and the Reich Labor Service, or for obtaining workers for the armament industry in the Reich. * * *

Finally it must be recalled that the indigenous administration in its present form and since its inception has completely failed in the question of procuring workers for the Reich. * * *

3. Gauleiter Sauckel requested that 30,000 indigenous workers for the Reich be recruited at short order and be shipped to Germany. At a conference between the Commissioner General and the First Councillor General [Ersten Generalrat] on 7 September 1943, the latter offered to assume the entire responsibility for the execution of this drive for the native administration and to recruit and ship the specified number of 30,000 workers by 7 November 1943.

4. In the meantime, Gauleiter Sauckel made an additional demand to the effect that the general district Lithuania had to furnish 100,000 native workers (instead of the 30,000 demanded up until now) for the Reich. At a conference with all the general councillors on 24 January 1944, the commissioner general did not leave any doubts as to the fact that this number would have to be furnished regardless of any consideration, even at the risk of leaving many work projects in the general district unfinished and permanently removing workers needed on jobs in the country. The responsibility for the execution of this new drive lies again in the hands of the local administration, and, with the consent of the commissioner general, indigenous conscription commissions have been formed with all district chiefs and all chiefs of judicial and local districts. The total number to be made available has been divided up into contingents, and the quota to be furnished by every mayor or district chief was exactly determined. This is the way the matter looks in the district of the City of Kaunas:

New quota, to be supplied7,000 workers

20 percent addition1,400 workers

———————

TOTAL8,400 workers

In the district of the City of Kaunas, according to the records of my labor office on 1 February 1944, there were 7,000 unfilled jobs in industry and the agencies of the armed forces, police, etc., so that to all intents and purposes 15,400 workers would have to be found in the city of Kaunas alone, in order to comply fully with the demands of the Reich and the local economy. And all that with a total indigenous population of only a little over 130,000.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT R-103^[85]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 40

EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER FROM THE (GERMAN-APPOINTED) POLISH MAIN COMMITTEE TO THE GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF POLAND ON THE CONDITIONS OF POLISH WORKERS IN GERMANY, 17 MAY 1944

Polish Main Committee

5 Vischer Street, Krakow

Krakow, 17 May 1944

To the Administration of the General Government,

Main Department Internal Administration,

Dept. Population and Welfare,

13 University Street, Krakow

No.Pa 1/724

————

6699/44

Subject: Situation of the Polish Workers in the Reich.

The living conditions of about 2 million Polish male and female workers in the Reich have given rise to shortcomings which are largely lowering the will and the capacity to work of many workers, endanger their health and even their lives, and also have a strong influence on the situation of their families within the General Government, thus directly affecting the sphere of our own work.

These bad conditions are felt with particular intensity by those groups of workers who have been assigned for work in factories and have been lodged in large camps [Massenlagern]. With regard to workers on the land, they occur as individual cases and are more easily dealt with. * * *

Food relief allotments—We receive letters from the camps for eastern workers and their large families, beseeching us for food. The quantity and quality of camp rations mentioned therein—the so-called fourth category of rations—is absolutely insufficient to maintain the energies spent in heavy work. 3.5 kg. bread weekly and a thin soup at lunch time, cooked with swedes or other vegetables without any meat or fat, with a meager addition of potatoes now and then, is a hunger ration for a heavy worker.

Sometimes punishment consists of starvation, which is inflicted e.g., for refusal to wear the badge “East”. Such punishment has the result that workers faint at work (Klosterteich Camp, Gruenheim, Saxony). The consequence is complete exhaustion, an ailing state of health, and tuberculosis. The spread of tuberculosis among the Polish factory workers is a result of the deficient food rations meted out in the community camps, because energy spent in the heavy work assigned to them cannot be replaced.

The quantities of bread and [other] food fixed for Polish children in the camps is thoroughly insufficient for building up substance for growing and developing their bodies. In some cases children up to the age of 10 and even more are allotted 200 grams of bread daily, 200 grams of butter or margarine and 250 grams of sugar monthly, and nothing else (factory in Zeititz, near Wurzen, Saxony). * * *

Care of Children—* * * An indication of the awful conditions this may lead to is given by the fact that in the camps for eastern workers (camp for eastern workers “Waldlust”, Post Office Lauf, Pegnitz) there are cases of 8-year-old, weak and undernourished children put to forced labor and perishing from such treatment. * * *

Health Care—The fact that these bad conditions dangerously affect the state of health and the vitality of the workers is proved by many cases of tuberculosis found in very young people returning from the Reich to the General Government unfit for work. Their state of health is usually deteriorated past hope of recovery.

The reason is that a state of exhaustion resulting from overwork and malnutrition is not recognized as a disease condition until the illness manifests itself in high fever and fainting spells.

Protection of the Family—Grave depression is caused among the eastern workers by the order forbidding marriage among them within the borders of the Reich. * * * No less suffering is caused by the separation of families when wives and mothers of small children are torn away from their families and sent to the Reich for forced labor.

Religious Care—If under these bad conditions there is no moral support such as is normally provided by regular family life, then at least such moral support which the religious feeling of the Polish population require should be maintained and increased. The elimination of religious services, worship, and religious care from the life of the Polish workers, the prohibition of church attendance at a time when there is a religious service for other people, and other measures show a certain contempt for the influence of religion on the feelings and outlook of the workers. * * *

[Stamp] THE POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE

[Signed] [name illegible]

President

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 208-PS

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 55

REPORT BY SAUCKEL, 7 JULY 1944, ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF LABOR MOBILIZATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1944

Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan

Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation

Berlin W8, 7 July 1944

65 Mohren Street

Thuring House

Secret

NR 520/44/g Dr. ST/Ka

Special Delivery Letter

To:All Top Reich Authorities

The Reich Leader of the NSDAP

All Top Army Agencies

All Gauleiters

Subject:Accomplishments of the Labor Mobilization in the first half of 1944.

Enclosed I am submitting the total figures on additional manpower placed at the disposal of the German war effort by the German Labor Offices in the first half-year of 1944. They represent only such manpower that was not previously employed in the German war effort.

According to the quota of 4,050,000 laborers set for this year, 2,000,000 new workers would have had to be secured in the first half of the year. Because of increased difficulties in Italy and in the occupied Western countries, regrettably one-half million less than that were found. If despite the known difficult situation it was possible to mobilize 1,500,000 people in the first half of the year, it is solely due to the exertion of all available energy.

Since the Proclamation of 17 February 1944, around 62,000 women have reported for “Voluntary Honorary Service,” and 52,000 of them have already been assigned to work.

Heil Hitler!

[Signed] Fritz Sauckel

Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan

Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation

Berlin, 7 July 1944

New Manpower Placed at the Disposal of the Economy between 1 January and 30 June 1944

A. Entire Economy:

Total1,482,000

Of these were:Germans848,000

Foreigners537,400

War prisoners96,600

B. Breakdown of allocation of [the persons listed under] A:

Agriculture and Forestry231,000

Of them, foreigners156,000

Mining46,000

Of them, foreigners34,000

Metal industry415,000

Of them, foreigners250,000

All other [branches of] economy790,000

Of them, foreigners194,000

C. Origin of foreign labor:

Occupied Eastern Territories284,000

General Government52,000

Protectorate23,000

France, excluding Northern France33,000

Belgium, including Northern France16,000

Netherlands15,000

Italy37,000

Rest of Europe77,400

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3819-PS^[86]

PROSECUTION EXHIBIT 56

MINUTES OF A CONFERENCE ON 11 JULY 1944 ATTENDED BY MILCH, CONCERNING THE LABOR PROBLEM

LIST OF ATTENDANCE FOR THE CONFERENCE IN THE REICH CHANCELLERY ON 11 JULY 1944 1600 HOURS

NameOfficial capacityAgency

Dr. KuehneChief of Mil. Adm.[illegible]

(1) WarlimontGeneral of Artillery [Lt. Gen.]OKW

Dr. KohlhaaseDirector of LaborSection of the Supreme Commissioner, Adriatic Coast, Trieste

Dr. LandfriedState Secretary, Chief of Mil. Adm.Italy

(2) Walter Funk and Albert Speer

Milch[illegible]

(3) Krosigk

(3) SteengrachtState SecretaryForeign Office

AbetzAmbassadorGerman Embassy in Paris

Hanel [?]Major GeneralArmaments Commissioner Staff, France

von LinstowColonel, GSCMilitary Commander, France

SassColonel, GSCGeneral [Plenipotentiary] for Italy

FranssenMajor GeneralArmaments Inspector, Belgium

WaegerMajor GeneralArmaments Office

SarnowMinisterialdirektorGen. Staff of Army, QM Section

KoegelLieut. Col., GSCGen. Staff of Army, QM Section

ReederChief of Mil. Adm.Brussels

HeiderChief of General StaffBrussels

(4) Ley

(5) SauckelLabor PlenipotentiaryBerlin

H. BackeMinisterReich Food Ministry

MarrenbachChief [of Dept.]German Labor Front

LeyersArmaments PlenipotentiaryItaly

Also present:

Ministerial Direktor Klopfer (Party Chancellery)

Ministerialrat Froehling

Ambassador Rahn

Dr. Huber

(6) Chief of Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner

General Labor Fuehrer Kretschmann

Colonel Meixner (OKW)

(1) United States vs. Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. See vols. X and XI.

(2) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of Major War Criminals, vols. I-XIII, Nuremberg, 1947.

(3) United States vs. Ernst von Welzsaecker et al. See vols. XII, XIII and XIV.

(4) Trial before International Military Tribunal. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, vols. I-XLII, Nuremberg, 1947.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

Berlin, 12 July 1944

To Rk. 5815 C

Subject: Stepped-up Procuring of Foreign Manpower

Executive Conference, 11 July 1944

Note

Participating in the executive conference were the departmental chiefs and representatives indicated in the attached list of those present. No guarantee can be given for the completeness of the list, as not all participants signed the register.

Reich Minister Dr. Lammers^[87] reported by way of introduction on the various proposals on hand by the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation calculated to bring about the increase in labor in Germany which is absolutely essential for winning the final victory. He limited the theme of the discussion by saying that all possibilities were to be examined by which the present deficit of foreign manpower could be offset, for example, the question of the reestablishment of an acceptable price and wage differential between the Reich and non-German territories. But the primary consideration will have to remain the solution of the question whether and in what form greater compulsion could be exerted to accept work in Germany. In this connection it must be examined how the police agencies, regarding the inadequacy of which the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation has serious complaints, could be strengthened, on the one hand, through bringing influence to bear on the foreign governments and, on the other, through reorganizing the indigenous police forces by an increased use of the Wehrmacht, the police or other German agencies. Reich Minister Dr. Lammers then gave the floor to the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation, Gauleiter Sauckel.

Gauleiter Sauckel stated that the present deficit of the half-year program for 2,025,000 foreign workers, to be filled by 30 June of the current year, totals 500,000. Of the total of 1,500,000 workers procured up to now, no less than 865,000 were Germans, of whom half were apprentices and women, two categories which cannot be regarded as full-fledged workers. Of the 560,000 foreigners put to work, three-fourths came from the East alone. This result was a scandal considering that the German people now are mobilized for work to the fullest extent and it represents the complete bankruptcy of German authorities in Italy and France, where hundreds of thousands of workers were still idling. In mobilizing the manpower we did not exert the necessary severity and, in particular, we were unable to achieve the necessary unity of the German authorities. It was quite improper for German authorities to interfere irresponsibly in the tasks of the GBA [Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation]. He had to have much greater freedom of action, just as was the case in 1942. With the present methods of recruitment for voluntary employment we would not make any progress, for one thing because any volunteers still available exposed themselves to danger to life and limb from reprisals by their own fellow countrymen. If, on the other hand, they were forcibly hired and decently treated at their jobs, they would do completely satisfactory work. Attention to the wage and price questions connected with the subject was desirable, but in the present situation no longer so important. If no effective action were taken now, our manpower mobilization program would fail, with the consequence that the combat troops would no longer receive the weapons they need.

State Secretary von Steengracht, Foreign Office, stressed that the Reich Foreign Minister from the beginning had favored the same standpoint as the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Allocation. The Foreign Office, however, could do nothing except press the foreign governments more or less urgently to meet German demands, and this has been done consistently up to the present. The police power was handled by others who, therefore, would now have to voice their opinion on the subject of the conference.

The Deputy for the Chief of the OKW, General Warlimont, referred to a recently issued Fuehrer order, according to which all German forces had to put themselves at the disposal of the task to secure manpower. Wherever the Wehrmacht was not employed exclusively in essential military duties (as, for example, in the construction of the coastal defenses), it would be available, but it could not actually be assigned for the purposes of the GBA [Sauckel]. General Warlimont made the following practical suggestions:

a. The troops employed in fighting partisans are to take over the additional task of securing manpower in the partisan areas. Everyone who cannot fully show cause for his presence in these areas is to be seized for labor;

b. When large cities, due to the difficulty of providing food, are wholly or partly evacuated, the population suitable for labor commitment is to be put to work with the assistance of the Wehrmacht;

c. The seizing of labor recruits among the refugees from the areas near the front is to receive special attention with the assistance of the Wehrmacht.

Gauleiter Sauckel accepted these suggestions with thanks and said that he expected that a certain measure of success would no doubt be achieved by these means.

On behalf of the Military Commander of Belgium and Northern France, the Chief of the Military Administration, Reeder, put up for discussion the possibility of expanding the Military Police, now totaling only 70, and of the Civilian Searching Service [Fahndungsdienst] consisting of Flemings and Walloons (1,100 strong). If the Military Police were increased to 200, appreciable results could be achieved. Upon inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, General Warlimont promised on behalf of the OKW that the searching service would be reinforced.

On further inquiry by Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, as to whether the population suitable for work could not be taken along as the troops withdrew from an area, Colonel Saas ([Plenipotentiary] General for Italy) stated that Field Marshal Kesselring had already directed that the population in a zone of 30 kilometers’ depth behind the front was to be “captured”. This measure, however, could not be extended to areas extending farther behind the lines, because of the most severe shock that would be inflicted on the whole structure of these areas, especially in regard to the industry still in full production.

Gauleiter Sauckel was of the opinion that widest circles of the Wehrmacht saw something disreputable in the labor recruiting program. There had been actual instances where German soldiers had endeavored to protect the population from being taken away by German labor recruiting agencies. Therefore it was essential to explain to the front troops the extraordinary importance of labor recruiting. In contrast to the much too mild German method, it was part of the Bolshevist conception of war for the fighting troops, on occupying a new territory, to put the entire population to work at once. The question for the administration thus was not one of mass recruiting, but of being consistent. It would be necessary to establish a few object lessons, and the passive resistance would quickly change into active cooperation. Nor ought one to shrink from proceeding drastically against the administrative heads [Behoerdenleiter] themselves who sabotage the labor recruitment. Not the small refractory offenders should be punished, but the responsible administrative heads. In addition to these compulsory measures, other means too must be applied. Thus it would be advisable to remove a large part of the exceptional Italian crops in order to improve the rations of the German and foreign workers. A special problem was presented by the entirely insufficient rations for the Italian military internees who were almost starving. The Fuehrer should be asked to have the statute for these military internees gradually altered. This would release a not inconsiderable labor potential.

Reich Leader Dr. Ley underscored these statements and suggested the establishment of a searching service made up by all German forces in the non-German territories, that would carry out the ruthless recruiting in large areas.

These proposals were countered by the following objections:

Reich Minister Funk holds that ruthless raids would entail considerable disturbances in the industries of the non-German territories. The same opinion is held by the Chief of the Military Administration of Italy, State Secretary Dr. Landfried, who believes that the German forces making up the executive body are too weak, and fears that the Italian population would escape seizure in great numbers and flee to uncontrollable areas.

Reich Minister Speer states that he had an interest in both promoting increased labor recruiting for the Reich and maintaining the production in the non-German territories. Up to the present, 25 to 30 percent of the German war production was furnished by the occupied Western territories and Italy, with Italy alone supplying 12½ percent. The Fuehrer had recently decided that this production must be maintained as long as possible, in spite of the difficulties already existing, especially in the field of transportation. The Military Administration, in the opinion of Reich Minister Speer, was easily capable to seize sufficient foreign workers at its present strength, as only a relatively small police force was needed for that purpose. The chief need was for stricter orders, but violent measures or large-scale round-ups were not to be carried out. Rather it would be advisable to proceed gradually with clean methods.

On behalf of the Military Commander in France, Chief of Military Administration Dr. Michel, referred to the statements of State Secretary Dr. Landfried and stated that the situation in France was similar. The calling up of entire age groups was being prepared in France, but had not yet begun as the German military authorities had not yet been able to give their consent. The good will of the highest French authorities could not be doubted, but it was lacking partly at the lower and middle levels. The friendly administrators and individuals willing to work and showing cooperativeness toward the German authorities, exposed themselves to reprisals by the French population.

Ambassador Abetz confirmed these statements. The application of severe measures, such as the shooting of French functionaries, was of no avail. Such a policy only served to drive the population into the Maquis. In these territories, where there were large German armed forces, it would no doubt be possible to obtain a few more ten-thousands of workers. Then these same German forces could be employed in police duty, which would also turn up large numbers of workers. In Paris, the evacuation of which was being considered, 100,000 to 200,000 workers could be seized. In this connection it might be possible to transfer the manpower of entire industries in a body.

The Chief of the Security Police, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, declared himself willing, if asked by the GBA, to place the Security Police at his disposal for this purpose, but pointed out their numerical weakness. For all of France he had only 2,400 men available. It was questionable whether entire age groups could be seized with these feeble forces. In his opinion, the Foreign Office must exercise a stronger influence on the foreign governments.

State Secretary von Steengracht, Foreign Office, commented to the effect that the agreements made with the foreign governments were entirely sufficient. The governments had always been willing, upon requests of the Foreign Office, to issue the necessary orders. If these orders were not carried out, this was due to the inadequate police power of the foreign governments themselves. In France, it had been reduced to a minimum for political reasons. In Italy an executive power was no longer extant. The Foreign Office was willing at any time, he said, to exercise stronger pressure on the foreign governments, but did not expect too much from that. State Secretary von Steengracht asked Ambassador Rahn to comment on this for Italy.