Morning Session
Reading edition
MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now hear the applications for witnesses on behalf of the various organizations, taking the SS first.
MAJOR JONES: If Your Lordship pleases, with regard to the SS organization, defending counsel have applied for seven witnesses. Five of these—Von Eberstein, Hinderfeld, Hausser, Riedel, and Reinicke—are among the 29 SS witnesses whose evidence has been heard on commission. The Prosecution have no objection to the calling of these witnesses although, as there is a certain amount of overlapping in the evidence of Eberstein and Hinderfeld, it is suggested with respect that this might be avoided when those two witnesses are examined by Dr. Pelckmann.
As to the other witnesses applied for; with regard to Rode, the Tribunal will see from defending counsel’s application that an affidavit from this witness was put in by the Prosecution as Exhibit USA-562. Dr. Pelckmann has informed me that he does not propose or desire to call Rode to testify before the Tribunal itself, but will be quite content to cross-examine Rode on commission. Therefore, if the Tribunal think that the interests of justice demand the resumption in this particular case of the taking of evidence on commission, the Prosecution have no objection to Dr. Pelckmann’s suggestion. Perhaps in fairness to Dr. Pelckmann, I ought to add that I understand that Rode only arrived in Nuremberg a few days ago.
The last witness applied for is Hermann Rauschning, the former Senate President of the former Free City of Danzig and the author of the book The Voice of Destruction, extracts from which the Prosecution have submitted in Document USSR-378, as part of the Prosecution case. No affidavit from Rauschning has ever been used by the Prosecution. I understand that Dr. Rauschning himself is now in the United States. With regard to him, the Prosecution object to his being called as a witness upon the following grounds. If the Tribunal will look at defending counsel’s application, it will be seen that there are three matters which it is desired to have clarified by Rauschning. Insofar as some of these facts may be relevant or have evidential value, I submit that those facts can be extracted from Rauschning’s book The Voice of Destruction, and that in those circumstances it is quite unnecessary to have Rauschning here as a witness himself. The Prosecution would, of course, have no objection to further extracts from that book being put in as part of the defense case of the SS organization.
THE PRESIDENT: Would the Prosecution object to interrogatories being put to Rauschning?
MAJOR JONES: No, My Lord, we should have no objection to that.
There are facts set out in the first two paragraphs of defending counsel’s application with regard to Rauschning. I submit that with regard to the first, a Cassandra-like statement by Rauschning that up to 1939 his warnings were not heeded, it has, I submit, no evidential value whatsoever. With regard to the second paragraph, in which it is stated that Rauschning has knowledge of the fact that in 1936-37 Hitler did not yet have the intention of exterminating the Jews, it is not in any way clear how Rauschning could, in fact, have had any knowledge of Hitler’s intentions at all—even the devil knoweth not the heart of man.
I do not submit that testimony of that kind from Rauschning would be wholly irrelevant. Whatever I have said, the Prosecution would have no objection to further extracts being taken from Rauschning’s book, or interrogatories being administered to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann.
HERR PELCKMANN: May it please the High Tribunal, I am in complete agreement with what Mr. Elwyn Jones has said, as far as it applies to the rest of the witnesses.
Regarding his statement about the witness Rauschning, I should like to say the following. The decision of 13 March, Figure 6a, Paragraph 3, specifies that it is relevant to submit evidence on whether the possible criminal aims and activities of the SS were quite obvious, or were known to the bulk of the members. I tried before the Commission to prove that the aims and activities were not criminal, that the crimes committed were only individual acts or acts of certain groups, and that these acts were not known to the majority of the members. I tried to prove this by means of relatively very few witnesses, compared with the number of members as the Prosecutor has stated, by means of 29 witnesses from among thousands of affidavits. All this material will still be submitted to the High Tribunal in due course, but it all concerns the so-called legal standing of membership. The Prosecution, on the other hand, submitted their evidence against the SS, as well as against the other organizations, directly to the Tribunal through documents and through the direct testimony of witnesses, a procedure which took many weeks.
With regard to the further assertion that the bulk of the SS knew of such criminal aims of the SS and of the criminal acts of individual members or certain groups, the Prosecution did not present any proof, but merely asserted that this could be seen from the circumstances, and was a matter of course. I consider it only just and proper that in addition to the statements of SS members, which as indirect proof I shall submit in large numbers in the form of affidavits, and the probative value of which could be disputed by the Prosecution because they are statements of the people in question themselves, of the SS members—as I say, I consider it only right and proper that in addition the witness Rauschning, the only one of my witnesses who is not under automatic arrest, should testify before this Tribunal, and should testify in person. The only other witnesses who will appear in person are the five witnesses of the SS who held a relatively high rank in the SS and, therefore, have an over-all knowledge; but it can be held against them that their testimony is not quite credible.
As for the person of Rauschning and the relevance of his testimony I should like briefly to say the following: As has already been stated, he was an SS Standartenführer and President of the Danzig Senate. He had the complete confidence of Hitler until 1936, when the rupture with Hitler occurred. Rauschning emigrated and was very active in publishing material abroad. In his books, which have become well known throughout the world, he constantly warned against Hitler and his plans, and he is still known everywhere as a man who did not defend or protect the Hitler regime and its guilty members.
In his many conversations with Hitler, he learned—and now I come to the main point of my application—first, that, at least in the years 1936 and 1937, Hitler did not intend to exterminate the Jewish population. He has given detailed reasons for this statement, and the objection of the Prosecution that it was impossible to recognize Hitler’s intentions is not quite apposite, because this precisely is the task of the Tribunal, to recognize Hitler’s intentions with regard to the salient points of the Indictment. If Hitler’s intentions are recognized then perhaps one can judge the responsibility of the bulk of the members of the organizations. Of course, we have only circumstantial evidence and must, if possible, obtain and evaluate direct evidence of Hitler’s intentions. This direct evidence of Hitler’s intentions, the witness Rauschning can give on the basis of his conversations with Hitler, and I do not think that one can find a better witness for this subject. Second—continuing with the points of my application—Rauschning learned that Hitler ...
THE PRESIDENT: What is it, Dr. Pelckmann, that makes you think that Rauschning would be able to give this evidence?
HERR PELCKMANN: I know his books, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: Then if it is in his book, how will it help to have him say what is in his book again?
HERR PELCKMANN: Of course, his books represent only a very small part of his entire knowledge, and he certainly did not write them with this Trial in mind. The chief points brought up by the Prosecution in this Trial can now be answered much more satisfactorily by the witness himself than by quotations from his book torn out of their context.
THE PRESIDENT: I understand you to be saying that the only reason you have got for thinking that he would be able to answer these questions is because of what you see in the book. Then you do not know that he can give any further evidence than is in the book.
HERR PELCKMANN: Of course, I do not know that but it is probable, and my assumption that he can do it is based on experience. I do not think that I am asking for anything out of the ordinary. I expect a man who in the years from 1933 to 1936 concerned himself so intensively with Hitler and Nazism, and then studied this regime in later years and discussed it with foreigners—I expect such a man to know much more than is set down in his books.
And I also have the following reasons for my application. In preferring their charges the Prosecution used quotations from the books of Rauschning, and these quotations are practically identical with affidavits. The Prosecution would equally well have been able to obtain affidavits on the pertinent passages in Rauschning’s book which would perhaps have contained his assertions in more detail. According to the rules of procedure established by this Tribunal, I am entitled to ask that witnesses who have deposed affidavits for the Prosecution be cross-examined by the Defense before the Tribunal. I believe that if ...
THE PRESIDENT: I am not aware that such a rule applied to witnesses in the United States. The rule, insofar as any rule at all was made, was that people who were in this country, if they had made affidavits, might be brought here for cross-examination. That rule has never been applied to persons who were in the United States or in any other country outside this country. The case of Mr. Messersmith is an instance, and there has never been a case of anybody being brought in, except perhaps the witness Dahlerus.
HERR PELCKMANN: Since the Indictment and the Tribunal’s verdict is of great importance for all members of the SS, and since, unlike the cases of the individual defendants, I can only call members of the organization as witnesses—and this is a considerable restriction—I think I may ask the Tribunal that this witness—the only one who is not implicated and can tell the Tribunal something about conditions at that time and his views on them—that this witness be brought here; for technical difficulties should play no part in this Trial of surely world-wide significance. This is my full conviction.
May I continue, My Lord?
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
HERR PELCKMANN: The witness is to testify further that it was Hitler’s deliberate policy to deceive the German people, as well as foreign countries, about his plans and intentions—for instance, about his war intentions. In very intimate conversations with Rauschning, Hitler remarked—and almost joked about it—how successful he was in leading by the nose not only foreign countries but even his own people. These questions are relevant for the decision regarding evidence.
With reference to the Jewish question, I refer to the assertion of the Prosecution that the Party program resulted directly in the extermination camp at Auschwitz. The Party program, as the bulk of the SS members saw it, provided only for a solution of the Jewish question on the basis of the statute of minorities, supplemented by the somewhat more severe Nuremberg Laws of 1935. But, however this may be, it would not yet constitute a crime against humanity. If it could be proved that during this time Hitler actually did not intend to exceed this program, then the assertion of the Prosecution could no longer be upheld. If this attitude of Hitler, at that time, can be proved, then the SS and the simple SS man who followed this program could not have had any other attitude either.
Secondly, the deception of the German people. The following is clear. 1) We know today from the various documents just what did take place at that time. We need only read the Reichstag speech about Hitler’s will for peace, or the reasons given for the murders on 30 June 1934. But it would be startling if a witness asserted that Hitler had confided to him that it was his principle to deceive the Germans about his true intentions. In answer to this, the Prosecution would have to prove that just the SS was not to be deceived—that the SS, in agreement with Hitler, knew what Hitler actually wanted.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, the Tribunal did not desire to hear a general argument from you upon the whole case. They are simply dealing with the question of whether this man Rauschning should be brought from the United States.
HERR PELCKMANN: If the relevance of his testimony is not disputed, then I can very well understand ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Pelckmann, we have your written application before us, and you are dealing with a variety of matters which are not mentioned in that written application.
HERR PELCKMANN: I cannot, of course, set down in my application everything that I would want to include. This application, naturally, contains only my main points: (1) The Jewish question, (2) the deception of the German people, and (3) of the SS members.
THE PRESIDENT: We have indicated to you what the view of the Tribunal is—that we think that you have dealt with the application, and we do not desire to hear a general argument.
HERR PELCKMANN: Mr. President, I tried only to show the relevance of my three points of evidence. If the Tribunal can assume that these points are relevant, then, I think, I need only add this: A single witness who is outside the SS, who, it is true, at one time ...
THE PRESIDENT: You have already said that, Dr. Pelckmann, more than once, and the Tribunal are quite aware of what you have said.
HERR PELCKMANN: Mr. President, do you not want an answer to the question why we should deviate from the general rule and bring this witness here from America? Do you not want an answer to that?
THE PRESIDENT: You have already presented argument to that effect.
Now we will deal with the SD.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, counsel for the SD has asked for only two witnesses, and the Prosecution have no objection to these two witnesses being heard by the Tribunal. It seems like a reasonable number.
While I am before the Tribunal, may I go on with the applications for the Reich Cabinet and High Command as well?
THE PRESIDENT: The Reich Cabinet, we understood, was not going to be dealt with today.
MR. DODD: We received the application for one witness this morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. Certainly, go on and deal with these.
MR. DODD: With respect to the High Command, counsel for the defendant organization has asked for six witnesses, and our position is that it is at least twice as many as are necessary, and that three—something like three—would be a much more reasonable number to present before the Tribunal. We have no particular preferences or no objections—no particular objections—to any of the three. I understand, however, that counsel prefers Von Rundstedt, Von Brauchitsch, and Von Manstein, and we have no objections if that is his choice of the six, but we do object to six, on the ground that they are too numerous, and all of them have been heard before the Commission.
With respect to the application of the Gestapo, only two witnesses are asked for—the witness Best and the witness Hoffmann—and we have no objection to the appearances of these two witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: The two names, Karl Heinz, are Christian names, I suppose?
MR. DODD: Yes, so I have understood, Mr. President.
I am not clear, Mr. President, whether or not you wish to have me deal with the Reich Cabinet. Shall I make known our attitude toward the one witness?
THE PRESIDENT: I think so. Certainly, you may deal with them now if they are ready. Dr. Kubuschok ...
MR. DODD: In any event, he has only asked for one witness, Mr. President, and we have no objection—the witness Schlegelberger.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, Mr. Dodd. Unless counsel for the SD, Gestapo, and the Reich Cabinet want to say anything, the Tribunal do not think it is necessary to hear them.
Then, they would hear counsel for the High Command, Dr. Laternser. Yes, Dr. Laternser.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, in view of the importance of the accusations raised against the military leaders, I am convinced that the application for six witnesses is justified. In order to be able to decide the question whether the military leaders were criminal or not, the Tribunal must first obtain a personal picture and a personal impression of some of these military leaders. If only a few of the 129 persons affected by the Indictment against the organization I defend are heard here, can one assume that the High Tribunal will have gained a true picture? My definite answer is “no.”
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell me how many of the 129 we have already heard before the Tribunal?
DR. LATERNSER: Before this Tribunal, Mr. President—before the Commission, seven members of the group were heard, two are still outstanding.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not say before the Commission; I said before the Tribunal.
DR. LATERNSER: I put questions to about five or six persons, I believe, of this group when they appeared here.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Go on.
DR. LATERNSER: In estimating the number of witnesses to be heard here, I ask that the following also be taken into consideration. In regard to the calling of witnesses who could refute the statements made by the witnesses of the Prosecution, the defense of the organizations are handicapped greatly by the resolution of the Tribunal which says that witnesses can be heard before the Tribunal only if they have previously been heard before the Commission, even though in any other legal proceedings there would be extensive examinations of witnesses on many points. The circle of witnesses is thus restricted from the beginning and dependent upon the scope of the Commission’s activities.
I consider it necessary, Mr. President, to be in a position to convey to the Tribunal a personal picture of the group indicted, and I should, therefore, like to make the following suggestion, which I believe to be practicable. May I suggest that for the group which I represent—only for my group, since I am not entitled to make a similar application on behalf of the other organizations—that for my group the Tribunal fix a certain time within which I may examine my witnesses before the Tribunal, and that the actual distribution of the time allotted be left to the defense. Then I should be able to question the six witnesses for whom I asked. I would even be prepared to use only two-thirds of the time to be allotted by the Tribunal, and to put one-third of it at the disposal of the Prosecution for cross-examination. In this way, Mr. President, I merely want to accomplish one thing—in my opinion the most important point—I want the Tribunal to gain a personal impression of the persons falling under the Indictment. I assume that the Tribunal will not object to this.
I would also like to suggest for the consideration of the Tribunal that the case against the organizations ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, let me make certain that I understand the suggestion. You are suggesting that the Tribunal should allot a certain time for the witnesses for the High Command, and that you, as counsel examining the witnesses, should take up two-thirds of the time, and that the Prosecution, in cross-examination, should take up one-third of the time. Is that correct?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes. I agree that within this time I may examine as many witnesses as I choose.
THE PRESIDENT: How much time are you contemplating?
DR. LATERNSER: That is rather difficult for me to answer.
THE PRESIDENT: It is your suggestion. The Tribunal would like to know how much time you are suggesting.
DR. LATERNSER: One and a half to two days in all.
I should like to make two more suggestions to the Tribunal which have some significance in this connection. All the witnesses appearing here have already been heard by the Commission, and the transcripts of the interrogations are in the hands of the Tribunal. If the same questions are put again, the evidence would certainly be cumulative. How then is the examination of the witnesses to be carried through without interruptions? Looked at from this angle, the suggestion I have just made becomes even more important, and also seems to remove the difficulties which I have described. If this is taken into consideration I believe the Tribunal would be able to follow my suggestion.
Finally, I should like to suggest the Tribunal also make a decision with regard to the handling of the final words on behalf of the accused organizations.
That is all.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to hear you with reference to Dr. Laternser’s suggestions, Mr. Dodd.
MR. DODD: Very well, Mr. President.
We have, insofar as we recall, made a list of the names of the people who have appeared before the Commission as members of the organization, or of the groups, and those who have appeared before the Tribunal. I stated a few minutes ago that all of those who have not appeared—such as Von Brauchitsch, who was to appear, and who may have appeared yesterday, I am not informed—will appear in a day or so.
With reference to the suggestion of Dr. Laternser that he be allowed a specific time and may use as many witnesses in that time as he sees fit, we find two difficulties. First of all, we do not feel that he is being generous enough in allotting us one-third of the time. Possibly we may require more time for such a number of witnesses. In any event, we do not want to have a restriction placed on us to the effect that we have only one-third of the time that he has. If we are to examine witnesses on the time standpoint, we feel that much of the time would be taken up before the Tribunal on matters that have already been thoroughly dealt with before the Commission. All the witnesses have been heard before the Commission, and Dr. Laternser has had a full opportunity to examine and cross-examine before the Commission, and it seems unnecessary to burden the Tribunal with a great number of witnesses here.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know whether it would make any difference to the arguments just presented to us if the Prosecution were allotted the same amount of time as Dr. Laternser?
MR. DODD: Well, it would make a little difference. Frankly, I did not consider that too important a point.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps there is one other thing which bears upon it. The Tribunal would like to know how you think the difficulty is to be met, that it seems unnecessary for the witnesses who are called before us here to give the whole of the evidence given before the Commission, or even to enter upon the subjects which have been entered upon before the Commission; and the Tribunal would like to know how that difficulty is to be met.
MR. DODD: We have been thinking about this very problem, and we had assumed that the witnesses who have appeared before the Commission, and who have been examined there, would not go over the same grounds before the Tribunal, otherwise the proceedings of the Commission would be rather senseless, and we might just as well get up and read the record of what was said before the Commission. We had understood that the witnesses would have something new to add to what they had already said before the Commission. That is our understanding.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, I think Dr. Laternser has said on various occasions that he attached importance to the actual presence of the witness so that the Tribunal could see him and form their own opinion of the witness’ credibility.
MR. DODD: Yes, that is what I understood to be one of the reasons, but three members ...
THE PRESIDENT: In addition to our seeing the witnesses and forming an opinion of their credibility, he would be able to summarize the evidence given.
MR. DODD: Yes, I assume that would be so. Of course, four of these members of the groups we are in the dark about—and two of the members of Naval Command, Von Brauchitsch and Milch, and a number of others.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
MR. DODD: With respect to the time suggestion which I made, I repeat I do not think that is too important. I know we can confine ourselves in cross-examination to the important matters, but I think it is the experience of the Tribunal that we seldom stayed within the limits which were established.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary to hear further argument. We will consider your suggestion; and your arguments, Dr. Laternser, are unnecessary unless there is anything particularly new that you wish to say. The Tribunal will consider your suggestion.
We will now deal with the political leaders.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The Leadership Group has asked for seven witnesses: Two of them are Gauleiter, and are witnesses Kaufmann and Wahl; one Kreisleiter, Meyer-Wendeborn; one Ortsgruppenleiter, Wegscheider; Blockleiter Hirth and two experts on the staff of the Hoheitsträger—namely, a farming expert who was also a political leader, and Hupfauer who was a political leader in the DAF. The Prosecution have no objection to any of these witnesses, but we feel that the grounds could not be adequately and properly covered. And it may be of help to the Tribunal if I suggested the witnesses most important, and those which might be dispensed with.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably the Defense Counsel would wish to make their own selection.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: My Lord, I fully appreciate that. I was only trying to assist the Tribunal if I could.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, in indicating which appeared to you to be the most important.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, perhaps you could do that.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: The Blockleiter Hirth, I respectfully submit, ought to be called, as he is the only Blockleiter represented. The witness Hupfauer ought to be called, because he represents the experts on these staffs. There is a certain amount of dispute about them. And also, he represents a number of political leaders who were in the DAF itself. Of the Gauleiter, Kaufmann and Wahl are experienced. Kaufmann comes from an industrial district and Wahl from an agricultural district, and I understand, if there were to be any preference, that Dr. Servatius prefers Kaufmann. There are also representing the agricultural districts, in addition to the Gauleiter Wahl, the Ortsgruppenleiter Wegscheider and the farmer Mohr. My Lord, I would respectfully suggest that certainly three of those witnesses are unnecessary. They really cover very much the same ground as each other and the Prosecution, quite frankly, would have preferred the witness Wahl. I simply put that forward to explain that they are all from agricultural areas and perhaps one, or certainly two, would be sufficient. Meyer-Wendeborn is an experienced Kreisleiter from an industrial district, and does, to a great extent, cover the same ground as the Gauleiter Kaufmann, so that the Tribunal might consider having one or the other if they felt that the present number was excessive.
Now, I do not think I can assist the Tribunal further than that.
DR. SERVATIUS: Mr. President, I named two Gauleiter; one from the industrial area—that is, the witness Kaufmann—and the witness Wahl from a rural area in the vicinity of Augsburg. I believe it would be important to get an impression of these two types of Gauleiter; one of these men was active in the Party for 20 years, and the other for 17 years, and both were political leaders. Before being able to judge the activities of the political leaders over such a wide area, and throughout such a long period of time, it is necessary to hear two people from the top level. I should, therefore, like to ask that, if possible, both witnesses be allowed. I should like the witness ...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Servatius, two things I should like to ask you about these Gauleiter. Did not these two, Kaufmann and Wahl, deal with exactly the same topics before the Commission?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, but I want to divide the topics, and ask Kaufmann about relations with the top authorities, with the Reich Government, and Wahl about relations with the lower echelons, with the Kreis and Ortsgruppen. Of course, I could limit myself to one witness, but then the topics would not lie separated and would be bigger.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean you have not asked them about it before the Commission?
DR. SERVATIUS: Yes, but in the same way, separately.
THE PRESIDENT: There is one other thing. How many Gauleiter have we heard already before the Tribunal?
DR. SERVATIUS: I should think three or four, I do not know the exact figure; but they were not questioned about this topic, because it would have disturbed the taking of evidence at the time if we had gone into such detail.
THE PRESIDENT: Go ahead and deal with the other matters.
DR. SERVATIUS: The next witnesses are for Kreis, Ortsgruppe, and Block, and I think that from each level there should be one witness who can speak of the conditions in his field. Their testimony will, of course, overlap, but it can be shortened so that the actual examination will perhaps be quite brief and not too far afield; but it is, I think, important to have one witness from each level.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you give the Tribunal any estimate of the time you think it would take to deal with these seven witnesses?
DR. SERVATIUS: I am sure I can do it in one day; it depends upon how the evidence is to be taken. I assume we shall have a brief summary and clarify only a few questions on principle.
Then there are two more witnesses, Hupfauer and Mohr. One is from the German Labor Front, from an industrial region, and the other is from the Reich Food Estate and can speak about rural conditions. Both witnesses can speak about the position of the specialist offices which were not political directing offices, and can thus differentiate between the nonpolitical and the political leaders.
That is all I have to say.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal makes the following order:
With reference to the case of the SS, the five witnesses, Brill, Von Eberstein, Hinderfeld, Reinicke, and Hausser are allowed. Rode may be called to be cross-examined before the Commissioners. Interrogatories may be administered to Rauschning, but they must be administered immediately, and they will only be considered if they are received before the case is closed. Further extracts from Rauschning’s book, which has been referred to, may be submitted to the Tribunal.
With reference to the case of the SD, the two witnesses applied for, Höppner and Rössner, are allowed.
The two witnesses applied for by the Gestapo, Best and Hoffmann, are allowed.
With reference to the application on behalf of the Reich Cabinet, the witness named must be called before the Commission.
With reference to the General Staff and High Command, General Von Manstein and two others will be allowed. If it is desired that General Von Brauchitsch should be one of the two, he must be called before the Commission, and it is necessary that these matters should be decided by counsel for the defendant organization at once.
With reference to the political leaders, the defendant’s counsel must select five out of the witnesses applied for and those five will be allowed.
That is all.
I call on Dr. Von Lüdinghausen.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: May it please the Tribunal: Yesterday I attempted to show the weighty and compelling reasons why the leaders of the German State had to decide to reinstate Germany’s armed sovereignty.
But also before making this decision Germany had waited for the outcome of the negotiations for a general agreement on disarmament, which the British Government had opened again with the so-called London Communiqué of 3 February 1935, and in which Germany, faithful as always in its foreign policy to the principle of peace, had at once agreed to participate. Germany was prepared to wait even longer, until one could see whether or not these new negotiations would succeed; but before the negotiations had really begun, the French Government, on 1 March 1935, suddenly brought out a new defense bill prolonging military service, and almost simultaneously the British Government published its White Paper, which has already been mentioned. In view of these two measures, the German Government had no alternative: It had to take the steps which I have described, otherwise it would have betrayed its own people.
The effect of these German measures on the Western Powers was a varied one. England and Italy, it is true, at once protested against them as an alleged unilateral cancellation of international treaties; but they did not by any means exclude the possibility of further negotiations, and the British note of protest explicitly inquired whether the German Government was ready to conduct further negotiations of the nature and extent provided in the London communiqué. This inquiry was immediately answered in the affirmative by the Defendant Von Neurath. The reply was contained in the German Communiqué of 18 March 1935, Neurath Document Book 3, Document Number 98, and the then British Foreign Secretary Eden went to Berlin at the end of March 1935 for conversations about the possibilities of an agreement in the naval question.
In this connection, I particularly want to draw attention to the testimony of the witness Ambassador Dr. Dieckhoff, who was heard here. Only France, in consequence of her attitude that only the League of Nations was entitled to solve collectively the problems of disarmament and, therefore, of peace—only France considered it necessary to submit the measures taken by Germany to the League of Nations, on 20 March 1935, and to induce the League to establish that Germany had committed a violation of a duty incumbent on all nations, the duty of carrying out contracted obligations. It goes without saying that the German Government, in its note of 20 April 1935, refused to accept the renewed discrimination contained in this resolution of the League of Nations.
However, neither this resolution, nor the signing, on 2 May 1935, of the afore-mentioned Franco-Russian Treaty of Mutual Assistance, nor the Russian-Czechoslovak Treaty of Mutual Assistance which supplemented it, prevented Germany from continuing her very active efforts for an agreement with the Western Powers. On 21 May 1935 Hitler, in the German Reichstag, proclaimed a new peace program, in which he again stressed and underlined in the most emphatic manner possible his own and the German people’s irrevocable will for peace, and his full readiness to participate in any system, or in a collective collaboration, which would guarantee European peace, to re-enter the League of Nations, provided that Germany’s equality of rights was acknowledged, and to apply to the rearmament of the German Wehrmacht any restriction which the other powers might also adopt. This speech of Hitler and the diplomatic discussions with other powers, initiated at the same time, had the promising result that the well-known Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935, establishing a fixed ratio of the respective naval forces, was concluded between England and Germany.
This German-English agreement is of the greatest importance in two respects. On the one hand, from a diplomatic point of view, it constitutes no more and no less than the de facto acknowledgment, on the part of England, of German armed sovereignty, the negation of the League of Nations’ resolution and, therefore, of the French point of view, and England’s acknowledgment and approval of the German act which had been stigmatized by the League of Nations as a treaty violation. For the first time, therefore, Germany’s equality of rights was recognized not only de jure but also de facto by one of the Western Powers, and by one of the most important ones.
On the other hand, this agreement proves irrefutably, from the point of view of this Trial, that the Prosecution’s contention that Germany’s rearmament was an act of preparation for Hitler’s future wars of aggression is incorrect. On the contrary, this naval agreement shows quite clearly that German foreign policy, at that time, while it was still conducted by my client, had no warlike intentions of any sort, not to speak of plans, and that the reinstatement of German armed sovereignty was not under any circumstances an indication of warlike intentions, but an obviously defensive measure and nothing else. Would a statesman who harbors warlike intentions or plans, moreover, voluntarily consent to a restriction of his armaments to the extent provided by the naval agreement, and thus endanger the successful execution of his intentions and plans? Even the most malevolent person cannot earnestly maintain that the naval power granted Germany by this agreement was even remotely sufficient for a war of aggression; that has been clearly established by the evidence in this Trial. Through this agreement Hitler actually deprived himself of the possibility of creating a navy sufficiently powerful to wage a war of aggression. It is clear that any considerable transgression of the agreed ratio of the two navies which, as things were, could under no circumstances and by no means have been kept secret, would beyond doubt have induced England immediately either to increase her own navy accordingly or to obstruct this German intention by force, as she had the power to do at any time. From whatever point of view one may look at this naval agreement, nothing can remove the fact that it was, and is, an unshakable proof of the absolute honesty and sincerity of the repeated declarations of Germany’s will for peace, an irrefutable proof against the existence of any, even the most secret warlike designs or plans of German foreign policy and, therefore, of its leader, the Defendant Von Neurath.
In France this Anglo-German naval agreement met with general opposition. It was regarded as an arbitrary act on the part of England, a departure from the common line which still found expression in the resolution of the League of Nations, a departure, moreover, which was bound to interfere with French plans. So France was very reluctant and negative in her attitude toward the negotiations which England had begun with the aim of concluding a general air pact, and which ran parallel with the negotiations for the naval agreement. Hitler’s speech of 21 May 1935 had also been the cause for these negotiations, because in it, Hitler, referring to the London communiqué, had also offered to take part in an agreement for the limitation of air armament, and the German Government, taking up the English suggestion, actually presented a draft for such an air pact on 29 May 1935. But talks of nearly 3 months’ duration between the English and French Governments were necessary before England succeeded in inducing France to consent even to participate in these negotiations. This consent, however, was in reality not a consent at all because, among other things, it was made dependent on the condition that the realization of this air pact must keep pace with the negotiations for the Eastern treaty, and since this treaty had, at that time, to be rejected by Germany for reasons of her own security, as has already been mentioned, it was clear that the French condition would block the way to successful negotiations from the very beginning. When the Soviet-sponsored Comintern Congress met in Moscow on 25 July 1935, and it became quite clear that the Comintern’s aim was world revolution, Germany’s opposition—as will be understood—only stiffened.
It could not be surprising that on 16 September 1935 the Defendant Von Neurath informed the English Ambassador that the German Foreign Office did not consider that an answer to the memorandum of the British Government of 5 August 1935 would be opportune; that was the memorandum which had demanded answers to a number of French questions hardly connected with the air pact. Besides, the conflict between Italy and Abyssinia had already cast its shadows, which alone were sufficient to suspend further negotiations for the air pact. For how could a political agreement between the five powers of the Locarno Treaty be possible—and the German Foreign Office very rightly pointed this out—if co-operation between these powers was in a state of dissolution, and if some of these powers were even facing each other in armed readiness. On 7 September 1935, as is known, the British Home Fleet set out for the Mediterranean, and negotiations between England and France for the application of sanctions against Italy were in full swing. On 3 October 1935 war broke out between Italy and Abyssinia.
German foreign policy succeeded in keeping out of the events which now followed in Africa and the efforts of the powers to apply sanctions against Italy. But nevertheless these events proved of importance for German foreign policy, too; because they prepared, and especially the question of sanctions, a new constellation of powers, which on one hand led to a closer union between England and France and the adoption by England of France’s point of view, and on the other hand brought Germany, again defamed by the resolution of the League of Nations of 17 April 1935, naturally closer together with Italy, who was also defamed by the sanctions applied against her. These sanctions, at the same time, logically enough resulted in the dissolution of the Locarno Treaty, for it was quite impossible to consider a treaty as still justified in its existence if its participants were opposed to one another in such a hostile way that the danger of warlike actions was always present.
The efforts of the French Government, already having begun in its note of 10 September 1935 to draw England also into the net of its pacts and obligations, clearly showed the tendency of French policy, and were only to confirm the German statesmen’s conviction that France was consistently following her policy of encirclement, which was regarded as a menace to Germany. But Germany’s leaders and the Defendant Von Neurath were still reluctant to draw the consequences from this state of affairs and take the absolutely essential step for the most primitive needs of Germany’s security. German foreign policy, in its unshakable desire for peace and its readiness to negotiate, was still hoping that an agreement could be reached, that France would abandon her course, and that a really honest and sincere understanding with France could be reached. This hope, however, was soon a delusion.
On 16 January 1936 the French Foreign Minister Laval announced that after his return from Geneva at the beginning of February he would ask the French Parliament to ratify the Pact of Mutual Assistance concluded with Russia. And at about the same time the Defendant Von Neurath heard from reliable sources that the French General Staff had worked out military plans for an attack on Germany, providing for the advance of French troops from the Rhineland, along the course of the river Main, for a link with the Russian armies through Czechoslovakia. This proved even to the most naive the offensive character of the Franco-Russian pact, and there was even less room for doubt if one took into consideration the negotiations which took place inside and outside the French Chamber before the ratification of the pact. For even in France, opposition to this pact, specifically on account of its offensive character, was not small. The French veterans of the first World War headed the opposition: The Union Nationale des Combattants declared, in a resolution of 8 February 1936, that this pact contained more certainties of war than possibilities of peace. And the speech of Deputy Montigny in the French Chamber on 13 February 1936 was a single flaming protest—this is contained in my Document Book 4, Document Neurath-107. The pact, Montigny said, only widened the breach between France and Germany, and Germany must more than ever gain the impression that she was being encircled if a party dependent on Moscow, like the Communist Party, followed the policy of Delcassé, the policy of revenge and the policy of the former Russo-French pact. The greatest danger of war would arise if France were to convey the impression that she enjoyed the secret protection of Moscow.
Even the German Government made a last attempt to dissuade France from ratifying the pact. In the interview which he gave to Bertrand de Jouvenel, the correspondent of the French newspaper Paris Midi, on 21 February 1936—Document Book 4, Document Neurath-108—Hitler once again held out his hand to the French people for an understanding, for lasting peace and for friendship. “I want to prove to my people,” Hitler said, “that the idea of hereditary enmity between France and Germany is an absurdity.” And in that interview Hitler once and for all disposed of the continual references to his book Mein Kampf, which were being made at that time just as much as today in this courtroom, when he said:
“When I wrote this book, I was in prison. At that time, French troops occupied the Ruhr—it was at the moment of greatest tension between our two countries. Yes, we were enemies, and I stood by my country as I was bound to do, just as I stood by my country against yours when I spent 4 years and 6 months in the trenches. I should despise myself if, in the event of a conflict, I had not considered myself a German first and foremost. But today there is no longer any reason for a conflict.
“You would like me to correct my book, as a writer would do.... But I am not a writer; I am a politician. I make my corrections in my foreign policy, which is directed toward an understanding with France. If I achieve this German-French understanding, it will be a worthwhile correction.”
In the same interview, however, Hitler drew attention quite clearly to the inevitable consequences of the Franco-Russian pact:
“My personal efforts for such an understanding will never cease. But this more than regrettable pact would, in fact, create a new situation. Are you in France not conscious of what you are doing?
“You are allowing yourself to be drawn into a diplomatic game of a power which is interested only in causing confusion among the great European nations, a state of affairs from which this power alone will derive an advantage. One must not lose sight of the fact that Soviet Russia is a political factor with an explosive revolutionary idea and gigantic armaments.”
He concluded the interview by emphasizing again that France could, if she wanted, end this alleged German danger permanently, because the German people had complete confidence in him, their leader, and he desired friendship with France. That Hitler was honest and sincere in these declarations has been proved by the evidence of the Trial.
But it was all in vain. The French Government could no longer be moved to abandon its rigid attitude, and on 27 February 1936, the French Chamber, in spite of all warnings, voted to ratify the pact. The die was cast. On 7 March 1936 German troops again marched into their old garrisons in the Rhineland zone, demilitarized until then. The German Reich had restored its full sovereignty over the entire territory of the Reich. The last of the barriers of the Versailles Treaty, restricting this full sovereignty, had fallen.
This reinstatement of the full sovereignty of the Reich over the Rhineland, however, was of importance for a reason which, from the standpoint of existence of the German State and nation, far surpassed the politics and prestige of this step, and which was also the sole cause for the grave decision of the German Government. This reason was the security of the Reich. As long as the Rhineland was demilitarized, not only was one of the most valuable and most important provinces of the Reich, but the Reich itself, and especially its life source, the Ruhr territory, defenseless against any military attack from the West. The only protection for Germany against this terrible latent danger was the Locarno Treaty of 1925, which was guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy, and in which France and Belgium, on the one hand, and Germany on the other hand, undertook not to wage war against each other. Therefore, for the German Reich, if it was in the future to accept the vulnerability of its western frontier in the form of a demilitarized Rhineland, it was a matter of life and death that the protection which this treaty afforded should not be falsified.
But the meaning of this treaty and its essence, the protection of Germany, were, in fact, falsified at the moment when the political conditions and constellations which had existed at the time of the conclusion of the treaty changed fundamentally. When the Locarno Treaty was concluded, political conditions in Europe, and also in Germany, were governed and determined solely by the four power—England, France, Italy, and Germany—acting in unison. And, therefore, the men who made the Locarno Treaty for Germany could legitimately rely on the faithfulness to this treaty of France and Belgium as sufficient protection. These circumstances, however, ceased to exist—and, therefore, the meaning and essence of this treaty, and with it the conditions for the protection for Germany, were bound to change or to be falsified—when France altered this political relationship in Europe fundamentally by concluding her pact of mutual assistance with Russia, and thereby creating a situation which frustrated the aim and purpose of the Locarno Treaty—namely, to give Germany protection against the permanent danger arising from the demilitarization of the Rhineland.
The political constellation of Europe had been completely changed, indeed reversed, by this pact, because the world’s greatest military power, which was, moreover, at that time openly revolutionary-minded, had now entered the political arena. In the face of the obscure situation in the East, amply strewn with the seeds of a conflict, the pact could easily result in the possibility of France, in view of her obligations toward Russia, being drawn into a war against Germany, and attacking Germany who might be involved in a conflict in the East. One has to admit that it was in no way certain, or in any case highly problematical, whether the guaranteeing powers, England and Italy, would under those circumstances consider the case in point as one in which the guarantee applied, and would actively assist Germany against a French attack, or whether they would not rather prefer to stay neutral. That this possibility actually existed, also from the legal point of view of the treaty, was already shown in the German note of 25 May 1935 about the French-Russian pact—Document Book 3, Document Neurath-105—and was emphasized again in the German memorandum of 7 March 1936 to the signatory powers of the Locarno Treaty—Document Book 4, Document Neurath-109.
As I have already said, this possibility, this danger, became even greater and more imminent as a result of the events leading up to the ratification of the French-Russian pact by the French Chamber, and as a result of the ratification itself. It was, therefore, an imperative and manifest act of self-defense and self-preservation when the German Government, in realizing this tremendous danger, took the minimum steps necessary to meet this danger—namely, when it restored the armed sovereignty of the Reich in 1935, when one year later it reoccupied the demilitarized zone, the ideal base for any French attack, and thus advanced the defense line against any attack from the West forward to the border of the Reich.
With all due respect to the rights and rightful interests of other nations, the very highest, overriding duty of every government—and of all responsible statesmen—was, is now, and always will be, to maintain and safeguard the existence and life of its own state and nation. A statesman who neglects this duty commits a sin against his nation. The re-establishment of armed sovereignty, rearmament, and the reoccupation of the Rhineland were the natural reactions, the dutiful answer, of the German statesmen—and of the Defendant Von Neurath—to the policy of the French Government, in which, after all that had gone before, they saw a threat to Germany.
Far be it from, me—and I wish to state this quite emphatically—to reproach by my foregoing statements the French Government here, morally or otherwise, for its policy as I have described it. I am, in fact—together with the Defendant Von Neurath—firmly convinced, and I recognize fully, that the French policy was dictated solely by France’s interests, and that the French statesmen surely did only what they believed was right from the French point of view. And if, in doing this, they proceeded on a premise which, according to German conviction, was a false one—namely, the premise that a Germany which had regained her strength constituted a danger and a threat to France, and that the German people had always regarded the French people with blind rage, hatred, and enmity, and were animated only by a passion for aggression and a desire for revenge—then my client and I can only sincerely deplore this, but we cannot condemn it.
But, on the other hand, I, too, must claim for the German statesmen—for the Defendant Von Neurath—the right that their deeds and actions be judged on the basis of their reasons, on the basis of the needs and circumstances of the time, and from the viewpoint of German interests; and that these men not be accused of motives which in themselves are more than improbable and were, in any case, far from their minds.
Politics, diplomacy, is history come to life. Like the entire universe, like everything that lives and moves in it, this living history, too, is subject to an unchangeable fundamental law, the law of causality. And I believe, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, that I have been able to produce clear evidence that the two actions with which the defendant is charged by the Prosecution, and which are said to incriminate him, in particular, because they constituted treaty violations in preparation for war—namely, the re-establishment of the armed sovereignty of the Reich and the remilitarization of the Rhineland—were a logical and inevitable sequence of the events and the political development during the years of my client’s activity as Foreign Minister, the result of the policies of the Western Powers; and that neither he nor Hitler consciously, intentionally, or according to a preconceived plan, brought them about, but that they were the unavoidable outcome of French policy. They, therefore, not only cannot have an aggressive character or tendency, and cannot indicate preparations for war, as the Prosecution assert in their retrospective consideration of these things but, on the contrary, they served only the defensive purpose of warding off a possible attack, and have a decidedly defensive and, therefore, peaceful character. That they cannot, therefore, be viewed as actions preparatory for a future war of aggression on the part of Germany, I need hardly emphasize.
The assertion of the Prosecution proves only that it is absolutely inappropriate and quite absurd to view retrospectively and draw conclusions from single historical actions and events torn out of their context and roughly and incoherently put together. This way of viewing things is absolutely useless for the purpose of investigating and finding historical truth, which is surely the first condition and duty of this High Tribunal not only for the forming of their judgment but also for their task of showing the way for a new conception.
But a critical examination of the two steps charged against the defendant as breaches of international treaties fails, upon closer scrutiny of the circumstances, to prove the charges sound. For the Treaty of Versailles, as well as the Treaty of Locarno, had, in the course of time and events, not only lost their significance and therewith their inherent justification, but both of them had long since been broken by French policy and, therefore, annulled. The Treaty of Versailles had been broken by the obstinate refusal to carry out the disarmament obligations imposed upon France, as well as upon the other contracting nations, in return for Germany’s disarmament; and the Treaty of Locarno had been broken by the conclusion of the agreement with Russia, which was incompatible with the Locarno Treaty. History, as often before, had passed over them, and had thus shown the absurdity of applying rigidly the dogma Pacta servanda sunt, as France tried to do with regard to Germany. This fact cannot be altered by the League of Nations resolution of 19 March 1936, which had been proposed by France, and which in itself was not astonishing in view of France’s dominating position in the League of Nations; in this resolution the League stated that by reoccupying the Rhineland, Germany had violated Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles. But history passed over that, too.
I do not think that further comments are needed upon this resolution and the statements and parleys between the participating nations which preceded and followed it; they came to nothing, in the course of events, and Europe finally made the best of the accomplished facts.
But even on the supposition that this resolution were correct, a breach of an international treaty is punishable—according to the Charter of the High Tribunal—only if it served in the preparation of a war of aggression. And during this Trial one of the gentlemen of the American Prosecution expressly stated that it was absolutely legal and justifiable to bring about the revision or annulment of treaties by peaceful means; and German foreign policy did nothing else. The whole military action of the reoccupation of the Rhineland was, in view of the small force of troops used—only one division, and the Luftwaffe did not take part in it at all—in reality only a symbolic act for the restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich; that was already evident from the fact that, as early as 12 March 1936, the German Government, through a statement of its Ambassador in London, contained in my Document Book 4, Document Neurath-113, made the proposal that in the case of reciprocity it would not reinforce its troops and would not order them to advance closer to the borders. The proposal was rejected by France.
German policy has throughout, and in every respect, remained true to its principle of peace for which it had consistently stood for many years; and in reality it only desired to serve and did serve peace and its maintenance in Europe. Both steps, the restoration of armed sovereignty and the reoccupation of the Rhineland, were—and I especially want to emphasize this here—were nothing else but the visible expression of the full and unrestricted sovereignty of the Reich. This sovereignty had already been recognized by the Western Powers in the oft-mentioned Five Power Agreement of 11 December 1932, containing the recognition of Germany’s right of equality. More conclusive evidence can hardly be found for the love of peace and the clear policy of peace of the Defendant Von Neurath than the fact that he waited for years for the realization of this recognition in order to avoid complications which, in view of the earlier attitude of the French and their policy, might possibly have arisen. He waited for years—up to the moment when, in consequence of the changed balance of power, this realization became an unquestionable necessity for the security of the Reich, a necessity of self-defense.
And German foreign policy continued unchanged in practice to follow this peaceful tendency even after, and in spite of this resolution. In the German memorandum of 31 March 1936—Document Book 4, Document Neurath-116—the German Foreign Office, on behalf of the Reich Government, once more submitted to the powers a new great peace plan for a quarter of a century of peace in Europe, by means of which, as is stated at the end, it wanted to make its contribution to the building of a new Europe on the basis of mutual respect. This again was clear and unmistakable evidence of its unalterable will for peace. It was not Germany’s fault that this German peace plan—and its absolute honesty and sincerity has been affirmed here upon oath by the defendant—was not successful and did not lead to the building of a new and peaceful Europe.
The same peaceful tendencies and intentions continued to be uppermost in the defendant’s policy during the years 1936-1937, in spite of all disappointments. Evidence of this is, above all, the treaty between the German Reich and Austria, which was concluded on 11 July 1936, as the result of negotiations which had been conducted for some time by the Defendant Von Papen. Not only the defendant’s own testimony but also the testimony of the witnesses Köpke and Dieckhoff proves beyond doubt that the view on the Austrian question, which from the very beginning the defendant consistently held and supported, was this: closer co-operation between the two countries—both in the political and particularly in the economic field—must indeed be aimed at, but Austria’s independence must, under all circumstances, be respected and remain untouched. For that reason, the defendant was an implacable opponent of any German attempts to interfere in the internal politics of Austria, and of the attempts of the Party to support the Austrian National Socialists in their fight against the Austrian Governments of Dollfuss and Schuschnigg; and he again and again protested to Hitler against them, not without success. That he, this Christian-minded and honorable man, abhorred and condemned the murder of Dollfuss from the bottom of his heart, I need not emphasize. And exactly from that point of view he welcomed the agreement of 11 July 1936, since it so fully corresponded to his own opinions. This alone refutes the assertion of the Prosecution that the agreement was concluded with intent to defraud—that is, with the intention to lull the Austrian Government into security and thereby to prepare and facilitate for the future the real intention already existing at that time—namely, to incorporate Austria by force into the German Reich.
The absolute sincerity and honesty of the defendant during the conclusion of the agreement is confirmed by the sworn testimony of the then Austrian Foreign Minister Dr. Guido Schmidt. And that the Defendant Von Neurath had no reason to doubt Hitler’s honesty and sincerity with regard to this treaty was shown quite irrefutably by the witness Köpke, who confirmed Hitler’s statements to the British Foreign Secretary Simon during his visit to Berlin in March 1935; the defendant himself gave evidence that, immediately after the conclusion of the agreement, Hitler told the leaders of the Austrian National Socialists Rainer and Globocznik that it was their duty and the duty of the Austrian Nazis to adhere strictly to this agreement. And so, from his viewpoint, the defendant considered this agreement as another step on the road toward peace in Europe, since the recognition of Austria’s independence, which he had pronounced in the agreement, eliminated the European danger point inherent in the Austrian problem.
In the same way, the defendant worked for an improvement of the relations between Germany and the Czechoslovakian Republic. It was only with this aim in mind that he so often pointed out to the Czechoslovak Ambassador Dr. Mastny that the Czechoslovak Government must at last meet the demands of the Sudeten Germans, still very moderate at that time, which were based on a promise once given by the Czechoslovak Government in Versailles, but not kept. Nothing, however, was further from the defendant’s mind, in both the Austrian and the Czechoslovak question, than the idea of a solution of these questions by force, a solution which later, after the defendant had left his position as Foreign Minister, Hitler considered right.
And his efforts to improve the relations between the Reich and the southeastern European nations also did not serve any aggressive intentions or even plans to partition Czechoslovakia with the help of these nations. If in Messersmith’s affidavit it is alleged that in order to secure this aim Germany had promised to the southeastern states, and also to Poland, parts of Czechoslovakia and even of Austria, then these are entirely absurd ideas which do not contain a word of truth. What the true value of these assertions is becomes clear from the fact that the Prosecution have not been able to submit a single report from one of the diplomats of the Western Powers accredited in the states in question, which could confirm the accuracy of these assertions. Was only Mr. Messersmith clever enough to obtain knowledge of such plans? In reality, the defendant’s efforts and his trip to Budapest, Belgrade, and Sofia served only peaceful purposes—namely, the exchange and strengthening of economic relations between Germany and these states. As the testimony of the witness Köpke showed, the defendant was particularly interested in these efforts, and they influenced his policies.
How much he opposed any policy which seemed to him even remotely out of line with his own policy of peace and international reconciliation is best proved by the fact that he rejected the negotiations with Japan, which the Defendant Von Ribbentrop had entered into and conducted in London without his assistance and completely independent of him on direct instructions from Hitler, and also the Anti-Comintern Pact which was finally concluded with Japan. He expressed his opposition clearly by refusing to sign this pact, and it was, as is well known, signed by Herr Von Ribbentrop as Ambassador, which was a most unusual procedure. The objection of the defendant to this kind of policy could hardly find a stronger form of expression.
The Defendant Von Neurath adhered faithfully and unflinchingly to his consistent peace policy up to the last moment, in spite of the influences of other circles—especially Party circles—on Hitler which made themselves felt during the defendant’s last years in office. He hoped, until the last moment, that he would be able to check these influences successfully, to eliminate them and to continue directing the policies of Germany along peaceful lines, according to his own convictions and his promise to Hindenburg.
When Hitler’s speech on 5 November 1937, and the defendant’s subsequent conversation with Hitler about it, forced him in 1938 to the conclusion that he no longer had any influence on Hitler, that Hitler would no longer shrink back from aggressive, warlike measures, he immediately took the consequences and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. His task, entrusted to him by Hindenburg, had become impossible to fulfill. He would not, and could not, have anything to do with a policy which did not shrink from warlike measures. It was completely out of the question for him to endorse such a policy with his name; it would have been the negation of his entire life work; he would have betrayed himself and his people.
But this did not mean that the defendant, who placed the welfare of his people above everything, even above all his personal interests and desires, would not make himself available again if the need arose, or if he believed that he would be able to save Germany from warlike complications, for that was the danger of the policy which Hitler now directed along a line different from that of the defendant. This attitude of the defendant readily explains why, when Hitler summoned him on 11 March 1938 to inform him of the march of German troops into Austria and, because Reich Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop was away in London, to ask him to advise him and to answer the note of protest from the British Embassy, he declared himself willing to do so.
If the Prosecution now charge that the contents of this answer were factually incorrect, the following must be pointed out in response. In this letter the defendant only stated what Hitler himself had told him about the events. The defendant himself knew just as little about the actual events as the rest of the world, since after his resignation as Foreign Minister he no longer received political information of any sort. Hitler’s announcement that German troops were marching in surprised him just as much as it surprised everybody else, and as the order for it had surprised even the highest commander of the German Armed Forces, which Henderson himself admits in his well-known book, wherein he adds that Hitler’s decision to march in could have been made only a few days before. There was even less reason for him to doubt the accuracy of the description which Hitler had given him of the preceding events, because he had given it in the presence of Göring who had not contradicted it. It did not even occur to him—because of his own upright and true nature, and because of his entire previous official activity under clean and honest governments—that the head of the State, Hitler, could lie to him and at such an important moment, for the purpose of answering the British note of protest, give him information which was bound within a very short time to be proved manifestly incorrect. And whom could he really have consulted? Only very few men besides Göring had real knowledge; but those he could not approach, because they were not in Berlin. Göring did not contradict Hitler’s description.
I particularly want to point out that the reply which the defendant authorized to be drafted on the basis of Hitler’s description, and for which he also did not use the letterhead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was not signed by him in his own name nor on behalf of the absent Foreign Minister but, as the wording of the document discloses, the description of the events was forwarded by him on the order of the Reich Government. But the Reich Government was Hitler, or rather on that day Göring. He, therefore, made perfectly plain that he was not writing in his own name, on his own responsibility, but that like an attorney, he was only forwarding information of a third person—namely Hitler. He really cannot be reproached for not having doubted the accuracy of this information and for not having checked the official description of the head of the State—and Hitler was, after all, the head of the State—quite apart from the fact that he would not have been in a position to check it.
He also cannot be reproached for the statement which he made a short time later to the Czechoslovak Ambassador Dr. Mastny. In the first place, according to the sworn statement of the defendant, the discussion in question took place in a way rather different from that described in the report of Ambassador Dr. Mastny, which apparently aimed at greater emphasis and effect. But, in any case, the penultimate paragraph of this report—Document Book 5, Document Neurath-141—shows clearly that even Mastny interpreted and understood the statement of the defendant that Hitler had no intention of attacking Czechoslovakia and, now as before, considered himself bound by the provisions of the agreement of arbitration which offered no guarantee for ever after but only for the immediate future; that is, until the action against Austria had been terminated. In view of the insufficient preparations of the Wehrmacht for a war, confirmed here by the Defendant Jodl, there was absolutely no reason to doubt the accuracy of this statement; that is, to doubt that it actually corresponded to Hitler’s wish at the time, in spite of the references of the Prosecution to Hitler’s statements, in his speech on 5 November 1937, about the conquest of Austria and Czechoslovakia. For these statements referred only to the possibility of war with other states and to a much later period.
So the accusations raised by the Prosecution against the defendant on this point are also unfounded. That already a few months after his speech on 5 November 1937 Hitler decided to incorporate Austria into Germany came as a surprise to all, even to his closest collaborators. This decision, however, was taken not only on the basis of developments in Austria, but most likely not least on the basis of conferences between Hitler, the defendant, and Lord Halifax, the then Lord President of the Council, in November and December 1937, in which, according to the sworn statement of the defendant, Lord Halifax declared that the British people would not understand why they should enter a war because two German countries had united.
[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]