Morning Session (continued 2)

The decree of 1 December 1942 leaves no doubt that the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was authorized to examine requests for labor submitted to him which came from the armaments industry. Thus, when a factory asked for additional laborers in order to carry out the production job assigned to it, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor reserved for himself the right to examine the requests submitted with a view to determine whether they were necessary. The intention was to make each factory practice the greatest possible economy in the use of labor within its own precincts.

Another purpose of these commissions was to determine the extent to which an establishment might be able to release its own labor for work in other plants, without prejudice to the task assigned to it. It was the task of the Ministry for Armament and War Production, and of the agencies subordinate to it, to determine the sequence of priority of requests for labor received by establishments under its jurisdiction. They also had to determine which of the plants was in a position to release workers for other plants manufacturing similar products for similar Armed Forces requirements. To give an example: The supply program of a plant manufacturing component parts for vehicles was modified, then it was left to the Armament Command to decide that the labor power thus set free should be assigned to another factory in the same line of production.

In general, the allotment of labor remained in the hands of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The agencies of Speer’s Ministry were merely concerned with directing the labor already available in this economic branch which had been procured and assigned to these establishments by the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor. The procurement of labor from other plants remained in the hands of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, and the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor participated authoritatively in the examination of the question as to what extent plants could release labor in order to make it available to others—the so-called combing-out action.

The authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor was, therefore, not limited to any considerable extent through this mutual agreement between him and the Reich Minister for Armament and War Production. His task, now as before, was merely to procure labor for the plants. He was even given a considerable amount of authority in labor questions—to look over the armament plants under the control of the Defendant Speer and to examine if, and to what extent, these plants could make available labor for other plants.

The decree of 22 June 1944 ordained that labor which was already available was to be used in accordance with the directives of the central authorities or according to the orders of the Chairman of the Armament Commission. It must also be noted in this respect that it was not a matter of using new labor, which was unskilled in armament work, and which was still procured through the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, but solely of so-called transfer actions from one armament plant to another. Therefore, the Sauckel agencies, in accordance with this decree, could no longer check the demands for labor made by the plants which were controlled by the Speer Ministry, if the Chairman of the Armament Commission had recognized these demands. This decree brought about a change in the basic distribution of authority, according to which the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor had to procure the required labor and to handle the whole allocation of labor. If the agencies of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor allocated labor in response to demands which had been checked, then it was left to their judgment as to what type of labor, whether native or foreign, et cetera, was to be furnished. The authority of the agencies of the Minister for Armament and War Production in questions of the commitment of labor was limited to a large extent to the execution of so-called transfer actions, that is, the assignment of labor from one armament plant to another.

It would be wrong to try to conclude from these decrees that there was a considerable limitation of the authority of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor and a fundamental expansion of authority on the side of Speer. It would be just as wrong to conclude from this that the influence of the Ministry for Armament and War Production had been increased over other authorities of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor.

In order apparently to characterize the relationship between Speer and Sauckel, the Prosecution have finally submitted a file note by General Thomas, the Director of the War Economy and Armament Division in the OKW, regarding a discussion which took place on 24 March 1942 between the Defendant Speer on the one hand, himself, and the directors of the armament offices of the three branches of the Armed Forces on the other hand, in which Thomas states that the Führer considered Speer as his main authority and his agent for all economic spheres. This note can only be understood in connection with the report of the account given by General Thomas of his activity as Director of the War Economy and Armament Office, and which has been presented to the Tribunal in excerpt form under Document 2353-PS.

Prior to Speer’s appointment as Minister for Armament and War Production, Thomas had to try to bring about an expansion of the position of Plenipotentiary for Economy as it had been provided in the Reich Defense Law, so that it should become an office which would control the whole war economy. When now the armament economy was confronted with heavy demands in connection with the first winter campaign in Russia, and the losses which had been sustained there, and Hitler, after the death of Dr. Todt, appointed Speer to be his successor in the Ministry for Armaments and Munitions, Thomas thought he would find in Speer a personality who would receive the authority which he had striven to obtain for the Plenipotentiary for Economy.

This, however, did not occur. As has been shown from the evidence, Speer was entrusted only with the equipment of the Army and construction tasks. The control of the new office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor by his Ministry, for which the Defendant Speer was striving, was not sanctioned by Hitler. Speer’s rights as Minister for Armament and War Production are stated in the decree. The expectations which General Thomas held on the whole with regard to the appointment of Speer, were therefore not fulfilled in any way. Speer only received increased authority when in the year 1943 he took over industrial production from the Ministry of Economy. But even then he was still far from having the same field of tasks as General Thomas had expected for him. Relying on his expectations, General Thomas thought that he had found in the person of Speer the man appointed by Hitler who would settle matters on all economic questions. In the file note of General Thomas, which confines itself merely to generalities, it is a matter of an expression of opinion which was not justified by the actual state of affairs. It offers no grounds on which to answer the question as to how we must distribute responsibility for the policy of the labor commitment to which the Prosecution object.

In summarizing, it must be stated to this count of the Indictment: Speer is not responsible for the means employed for the procurement of foreign labor, nor for its removal to Germany. He is at the most responsible for the utilization of part of this labor in Germany.

As a further count of the Indictment, it has been stated that the defendant employed prisoners of war in the economic sector which was under his direction, and that he thereby violated Article 32 of the Geneva Convention of July 1929, regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. The defendant never denied that he employed prisoners of war in plants under his control. This, however, cannot be regarded simply as a violation of Articles 31 and 32 of the previously mentioned agreement.

The expression “armament economy” and/or “armament plant” has not the same meaning as “plant” or “economy,” the task of which is the manufacture of arms and direct war requirements.

The term “armament plant” can only be understood from its development. When, at the beginning of rearmament, there began to be a limitation of raw materials, plants which were working for rearmament were given preference in obtaining raw materials. These plants were controlled by the armament inspections, which were set up by the Armed Forces and called “armament plants.” In addition to all other plants, those were included in it which served the manufacture of iron, steel, and metals, as well as those plants which manufactured machine boilers, vehicles, and appliances; also the entire manufacture of raw steel in the first stages of preparation—foundries, rolling works, forges—as well as the whole remaining subsidiary supply industry, for example, electro-technical plants, plants which produced optical instruments, plants which manufactured ball bearings, cogwheels, et cetera. This is shown by the testimony of the witness Schieber—Question 9, document book, Page 114.

Only 30-35 percent, roughly, of the whole iron production was used for the production of armaments to the extent previously described, and 60 percent for the maintenance of production for other consumers—Reich railroads, the construction of merchant vessels, agricultural machines, export goods, appliances for the chemical industry, et cetera. We refer to the testimony of the witness Kehrl, which has been submitted under Exhibit Speer-36, and particularly to his answer to Question 5.

Since the iron quota assigned to the armament industry also includes the production of raw steel and the different stages of manufacture, it can be safely presumed that of all the plants which were combined in the armament inspections, only approximately 20-30 percent manufactured armament products in the sense implied in the Geneva Convention. These details had to be examined in order to gain an idea as to what extent Article 31 of the Geneva Convention could be violated by the employment of prisoners of war.

The Prosecution have presented an affidavit of the American economic statistician Deuss under Document 2520-PS, in order to prove thereby how many prisoners of war and foreign workers were employed in the armament industry. This compilation, which is principally supported by figures taken from the documents in the possession of the Defendant Speer, does not, however, state in which branches of the armament industry the individual prisoners of war worked. A large enterprise which falls under one of the above-listed categories and as a result thereof was considered an armament plant in its entirety, needs only to manufacture a fraction or perhaps no weapons or equipment at all which stand in direct relationship to war activities. If prisoners of war are employed in it, then their occupation does not represent a violation of Article 31 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Such a plant, however, appears in its entirety in Deuss’ affidavit. The affidavit thereby loses its value as evidence as to what extent Article 31 of the Geneva Convention was violated. Thus we have no proof of whether, and to what extent, Article 31 was violated by the employment of prisoners of war in the armament industry.

The French Prosecution have taken the point of view that the employment of French civilian workers who had been released from confinement as prisoners of war, and who were employed in the armament industry, was also to be considered a violation of Article 31. This is not applicable. From the time of their release the former prisoners of war were free people who were unlimited in their freedom of movement, and who were restricted only by the obligations embodied in their labor contracts. In addition to this, no French prisoner of war could be forced to agree to his release under the obligation of putting himself as a worker at the disposal of German industry. It was his own free decision if he preferred to accept his release as a prisoner of war under these conditions. If he did so, from this moment onward he was no longer a soldier, and was no longer subject to military discipline; he received his working wages like every free worker, and was not subjected to any camp discipline or any other restrictions of the same nature. To those prisoners of war who preferred to agree to their release under these circumstances, the advantages apparently appeared far greater than the protection which they enjoyed as prisoners of war. If they did so, then their occupation, even in work which in itself is prohibited for prisoners of war in accordance with Article 31, cannot be considered a violation of this article.

The employment of prisoners of war in the industry of the country which is holding them prisoner is not prohibited by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Only that work is prohibited which is directly connected with military operations—for example, the use of prisoners of war for fortification works for a combat unit. The Defendant Speer cannot be accused of anything of that kind. It is also prohibited for them to manufacture and transport weapons of all kinds, as well as to transport war material for combat units. In the armament economy under the control of the Defendant Speer, the only thing which could be considered as a violation of the afore-mentioned rule is the manufacture of weapons and munitions of all kinds. Such a violation, however, has so far not been proved by the Prosecution at all.

It must furthermore be examined how the assignment of prisoners of war to plants took place. According to the testimony of the Defendant Sauckel, this as a matter of principle was done by the war economy officers with the military district commanders, who submitted the number of prisoners of war available for work to the Gau labor office; and the transfer of the prisoners of war to the plants then took place in the same manner as with ordinary labor. The only difference was that the camp officers—the prisoners of war were billeted in so-called enlisted men’s camps (Stammlager)—were responsible for seeing that the directives issued by the OKW for the employment and treatment of prisoners of war were complied with. It was the responsibility of these camp officers to see that in the employment of prisoners of war any violation of Article 31 of the Prisoners of War Convention was made impossible. The commitment officers (Einsatzoffiziere) appointed by the camp commanders had constantly to control and examine the working conditions and the nature of the occupation of prisoners of war in armament plants, and they had to watch to see that no prohibited work was imposed on the prisoners of war. The Defendant Keitel has given an exact description of the manner in which the control of prisoners of war in the home area was carried out. Documents have also been submitted which give information about the treatment of prisoners of war.

The prisoners of war who were confined in assembly camps were constantly being examined by camp commitment officers to see that their employment was in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. As far as French prisoners of war were concerned, a special authority existed for them in the person of Ambassador Scapini, who had to forward to the OKW any complaints which were made against the use of prisoners of war for labor in a way which violated international law. Complaints of this kind by Ambassador Scapini were immediately investigated, and if they were found to be justified, improvements were made. It is, of course, possible that mistakes sometimes occurred in view of the vast organization necessitated by the large number of French prisoners of war. Measures for the correction of mistakes of this kind are, after all, provided by the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention itself in its regulations. These regulations were also effective in the last war. The representatives of the protecting powers intervened against bad conditions brought to their attention through complaints, and they also demanded and achieved their abolition. If such mistakes were recognized and reported, they were then immediately remedied. It would be wrong to try to conclude from individual occurrences that there was a premeditated plan. The protection which prisoners of war found through the labor commitment officers even laid Defendant Speer open to criticism by individual plant directors as being too extensive.

In this respect, as far as the Defendant Speer’s position in law is concerned, we must first examine whether the employment of prisoners of war in the armament industry is to be fundamentally regarded as a violation of the rules of international law. After the previous statements as to the character of the plants which were combined in the armament industry, this must be answered in the negative. Only insofar as prisoners of war were actually employed in the production of arms and in the production of urgent war materials could there be any mention of a violation of Article 31. That this regulation may have been violated in individual cases we will not deny. If, for example, as the photographs submitted by the American Prosecution show, prisoners of war were used near the front lines to unload munition trains, then this undoubtedly represents a violation of the regulations of Article 31. The Defendant Speer, however, cannot be accused of such incidents, as they do not fall within his competence. To use the fact of the employment of prisoners of war in the armament industry to conclude a violation on a large scale of the regulations of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention is not justified.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours.]