Afternoon Session (continued 2)

But with respect to the concentration camps and the cruelties committed in them, I consider it my duty to state once and for all, for the honor of the German people: It is not true that the great majority of the German people, up to the last period of the war, had any knowledge about what was going on in the concentration camps. An assertion to the contrary can only be made by someone who has no idea of the actual conditions in Germany, about the cunningly devised system of keeping conditions in the concentration camps, and even the existence of most of them, a secret. After all, how could it have been possible for larger groups of the people to have learned about the conditions in the camps? The Prosecution itself has tried to prove here that only a very small percentage of concentration camp prisoners were set free again, and those who were set free had to bind themselves in writing, under threat of capital punishment, to keep absolutely silent about their experiences during their imprisonment. They knew that if they violated these obligations and the Gestapo became informed of the fact they would forfeit their lives. I have myself been faced in my practice with a number of liberated concentration camp prisoners, but I have not been able to induce any one of them to speak and it was the same with many others. And if one or other of them did tell anything, his audience was careful not to repeat it, because they knew that they incurred inevitable arrest and internment in a concentration camp if the Gestapo should become informed of the fact. When in the course of the war particulars concerning concentration camps slowly transpired, most German cities were already under the hail of Allied bombs. It is admittedly only too human that faced with the horror of daily air raids the populace should have harbored no thoughts for the fate of concentration camp internees, but rather for their own fate and that of their kinsfolk, and for sheer life, for existence. And lastly, let me ask you, Gentlemen, who should have revolted, who should have risen up with violence against the domination of Hitler and the Party? Since the outbreak of war, since the autumn of 1939, the flower of the male population was under arms and fighting a hard battle at the front. A revolution cannot be made by children, women, old people, and more or less disabled or feeble men. And who was going to take the initiative, who was going to lead it? No revolution has ever yet been carried out by leaderless masses. Always and everywhere there must be leadership to guide and lead the masses and manage them. A levée en masse, especially when undertaken by an unarmed populace against an armed and organized power, is as doomed to remain a hopeless issue in the internal sphere as it is in war. The hopelessness of a popular rising or revolt is clearly conveyed by the fact that the conspiracy of 20 July 1944 failed, long prepared as it was with every conceivable precautionary measure, by real leaders enjoying wide popular support. The fact of this conspiracy alone, however, proves one thing: that the French prosecutor, M. De Menthon, is not right when, in his very brilliant and interesting address on 11 January 1946, he represented the abhorred National Socialist ideology and its glorification of race and German racial superiority over every other nation on earth as the expression and supreme product of the German mind and of its true nature, and names Fichte and Hegel as heralds of this development: Fichte, one of the greatest and noblest champions of Christianity, Christian ethics, and morals, is worlds removed from this National Socialist ideology. And how can anyone so much as name such an ideology in the same breath with Hegel, whose philosophical system was perhaps the most idealistic of all systems, who saw in the state the union of every moral force and purpose, to whom the state appeared as the materialization of the notion of morality in a manner reminiscent of the antique ideal, as something divine on earth. And the French prosecutor forgets that it was the German nation which produced a Kant, whose imperishable doctrine of the categorical imperative, except for Christian ethics, is probably the profoundest and most august expression of the moral principle of all times. Arid he is mistaken when he brings Nietzsche, the unique thinker who stands alone in the whole German spiritual universe, and his longed-for superman, into any relation whatsoever to the ideology of the National Socialist leaders. He also is worlds removed from them. No, Gentlemen, these spiritual heroes of the German nation have nothing in common with Nazi ideology. The latter stands, in truth, in the sharpest contradiction to real, genuine German thought and sentiment, the real character and dispositions of the German nation and, most of all, its attitude toward the other nations of the world. For this nation has never assumed itself to be better or more august than other nations. Neither was it ever possessed by a desire to destroy other nations. It is, above all, ignorant of hatred and revenge. The great tragedy of the relations between the German and the French nations is precisely that the latter has always refused to understand that the German nation has not, like France from the war of 1870 to the World War, been possessed by the thought of revenge, nor obsessed, even after Versailles, by the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine. The idea of Pan-Germanism, of the Greater German Empire, has never, even in the period of greatest enthusiasm for Hitler, stirred any echo in the German nation despite the undeniably kindred example offered by the Pan-Slavic doctrine and its enthusiastic reception by the Slav populations. And these very ideologies, preached by the spiritual leaders of the Party, immediately determined and fortified the opposition, first in the intellectual circles and classes of the German nation and then in other classes and in the very ranks of the Party, as a result of further constraints and limitations of personal freedom. For those reasons the nation in its overwhelming majority was by no means inflamed by the war initiated by Hitler in the summer of 1939. What the nation’s frame of mind was like as early as the autumn of 1938, I take the liberty of illustrating for you, Gentlemen, by a minor personal experience on 25 or 26 September 1938.

I happened, on this day, to have my car held up in a street leading to one of the large thoroughfares running south out of Berlin, because the whole street was jammed with vehicles. When I asked a common woman of the people, who happened to pass by, the reason for the traffic jam, she answered, “They are going to war down there,” with such an expression of abysmal despair and horror that I was chilled. Such, was the attitude of the population toward war, an attitude likewise evidenced by the fact that the departing troops were by no means hailed and cheered by enthusiastic crowds, but were gazed at with dull, frightened eyes. And if you ask me why the nation did not then rise up and revolt, you will find the explanation in what I have said before. As a nation accustomed to be led and to centuries of obedience, the German nation followed once again the order of the leader which it had raised to power. As a nation slowly but surely fettered by this leadership, it had likewise no possibility of a spontaneous, unprepared and unguided uprising against its leaders. Such a contingency could only occur as the pressure of war became ever more stringent, and when conscientious men in leading positions concurred in the attempt by slow and determined work, in order to put an end to the folly of Nazi domination and resulting war, and to save the German nation from an otherwise certain catastrophe. Nevertheless, Providence denied success to the attempt. But, I repeat, the very fact of the attempt, its support by wide circles of the nation and even of the Party, definitely proves that the Nazi ideology, which clearly governed politics since 1938, was neither in keeping with the real character of the German people nor with their nature, talents, soul, and mentality; neither was it engendered by them, but rather it was foreign and naturally opposed to them.

But there were not only the men connected with 20 July 1944 who had striven to do away with Hitler and the whole National Socialist domination. There were other men who were determined to reach the same goal, if by different methods, and had already taken the first steps to that end. As you heard in witness Ströhlin’s testimony, the Defendant Von Neurath was one of them. How could it have been otherwise with this offspring of an old family which has given many a trustworthy civil servant to its Württemberg home; whose whole life, inspired by the spirit prevailing in his family home, has been filled with the most ardent patriotism and devotion to his nation, whose entire aspirations were directed toward the exclusive purpose of placing all his strength and all his power, all his talents and capacities, at the service of his nation’s welfare, and to subject and, indeed, sacrifice his personal interests to it.

[A recess was taken.]

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Born as a scion of an old family which gave its small home state Württemberg so many loyal high government officials, the Defendant Von Neurath grew up with a simple and strict education in a parental home filled not only with a real Christian spirit and true love for mankind, but also with an ardent, devoted love for his German people and fatherland. From his tenderest age and during his entire life his thoughts and actions had implanted in him the desire and will, the holy duty, to place all his powers, all his ability, all his gifts and capacities at the service of the welfare of his people, to subordinate and even sacrifice all his personal interests to this. But, and this must certainly be emphasized in this place, aside from this aspiration there was alive in him and woven into his being in an equally strong degree a deep religious feeling, love of the truth and love of mankind that made him from the beginning adverse to the use of any form of violence against his fellow men not only in his private life, in his relations with his fellow men, but which ruled rather to the same extent his entire official activity, even after the Treaty of Versailles. His acts bore the stamp of this feeling and it became the law governing his official dealings as a representative of the Reich in other countries, as well as Foreign Minister and lastly as Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia.

Not only by his conciliatory amiability, his skill and demeanor, so understandable in a man of his origin and education, but also primarily through the love of peace and sincerity which permeated all his actions as a diplomat and statesman, he won the unlimited and sincere respect and sympathy of all people with whom he came into contact the world over, even of his political opponents. As unequivocal proof of this fact, the truth of which, Your Honors, may be confirmed by your own diplomats, it will suffice to refer to the fact that, as you know from the sworn affidavit of my client, King George V and King Edward VIII of England received the defendant in private audiences on the occasions of his presence in London in 1933 and 1935; that the British Government in the summer of 1937 and again in 1938, when he was no longer Foreign Minister, invited him to visit England for political discussions, and finally, that on his sixty-fifth birthday on 2 February 1938 the entire diplomatic corps called on him to congratulate him and to express through Monsignore Orsenigo, who at that time was doyen, its thanks and its appreciation for the reasonable and understanding manner in which he always discharged all his duties. Do you, Your Honors, credit your own diplomats and statesmen with so little knowledge of human nature, so little experience and knowledge of the world that in the course of the defendant’s 6 years’ activity they would not have found out, if the assertion of the Prosecution were true, that Herr Von Neurath had knowingly let himself and his good reputation be used as a covering shield by the Nazis, and that all his statements and assurances as Foreign Minister were mere camouflage, that is to say, a deliberate deceiving of the whole world?

In this connection, it may well be pointed out as quite obvious that such old and experienced democracies as England, America, France, as well as the Vatican, had delegated to the post of Ambassador in Berlin, the most important post at that time, their cleverest and most experienced diplomats. And I am tempted to assume that the Prosecution possibly did not realize quite clearly what a dubious compliment they paid to their own diplomats by their assertion about the defendant, when they produce in proof of this assertion only the highly fantastic report of the American Consul Messersmith. I am moreover unshakably convinced that you, Your Honors, based on the very reason of your long judicial experience, have far too much knowledge of human nature not to see at first glance that my client, by his entire personality is absolutely incapable of such a perfidious and untruthful way of acting, let alone capable of play-acting to such an extent that for 6 long years he could have fooled the ablest and most experienced diplomats in the whole world. A man like the defendant, who for 60 years has led an honorable and absolutely decent life, would never in the world at the end of such a life have lent himself to such a disavowal and negation of all that he had so far held highest. That would be contrary to personal experience.

And on the same level stands the Prosecution’s assertion that the Defendant Von Neurath, by joining and remaining in Hitler’s Cabinet, served as a fifth columnist in the conservative circles of Germany for the express purpose of winning them over to National Socialism. This slandering of the defendant which, moreover, was brought forward without any attempt of proving it, is contradicted by the sworn statements of all witnesses and the affidavits submitted, which unanimously state that the resignation of the defendant from the office of Foreign Minister was viewed in just these circles with the greatest dismay and concern, because these circles considered that this withdrawal of the defendant from the Government was in itself a sign that from then on his pronounced peace policy would be replaced by another more belligerent tendency in foreign policy, which was quite rightly considered as a national calamity. For, like everybody else, they shared the conviction of Reich President Von Hindenburg that Herr Von Neurath was the exponent of the peaceful foreign policy of the Reich and the guarantor of a consistent continuation of this peace policy against any possible, undesired aggressive experiments by Hitler and the Nazi Party and that for this reason the Reich President stipulated that the defendant should remain in the Cabinet as Foreign Minister when Hitler was called to the Reich Chancellery.

This fact is confirmed beyond doubt by the sworn statements of all the witnesses heard, as well as by the carbon copy submitted by me of the letter of the witness Dr. Koepke of 2 June 1932 to Ambassador Rümelin, Neurath Document Book 1, Exhibit Number Neurath-8, and the affidavit of Baroness Ritter, Neurath Document Book 1, Exhibit Number Neurath-3.

But the latter proves also at the same time how unwillingly and after how long a struggle the defendant finally decided to accept this call and, therefore, supports the defendant’s own sworn statement that he only decided to do so after the Reich President, whom he so highly venerated, appealed to his love for his country and reminded him of the promise he had made 2 years before not to leave him in the lurch whenever he, the Reich President, needed him.

There is certainly no need for further proof for the utter emptiness and inaccuracy of the further assertion of the Prosecution, also submitted without proof, that the defendant had used his position, his reputation, his connections, and his influence to lift Hitler and the Nazi Party into the saddle, and to help them to secure supreme power in the Reich. Therefore, I hardly need to refer again to the statements of the Defendant Göring and other witnesses, particularly Dr. Koepke, from which it appears beyond doubt that at that time there were absolutely no relations between Hitler and the Nazis and the defendant, and, therefore, even less could the defendant have taken any part in the negotiations which took place before Hitler’s call to the chancellorship.

Love for his country, a strong sense of responsibility, deepest concern about the weal and woe of his people and his promise not to leave Reich President Von Hindenburg in the lurch in this time of need, these were the only reasons which moved this man to leave the post of Ambassador in London he had come to like so much, to assume the office of Foreign Minister of the Reich at that critical and fateful hour, and to accept the task assigned him by the President of the Reich to continue to guide the foreign policy of the Reich in a peaceful manner, even perhaps against the will of Hitler.

The Defendant Von Neurath can claim rightly that he carried out this grave task at all times with all his strength and with the full allegiance of his personality, even after the death of Reich President Von Hindenburg, up to the time he was forced to admit that this task was beyond his strength, that Hitler no longer let himself be influenced by him but had decided to pursue a line of foreign policy along which the defendant, owing to his inmost convictions and his personal point of view, could not follow.

Up to 5 November 1937, the date of the famous speech of Hitler to the commanders of the various branches of the Armed Forces, the Defendant Von Neurath remained at his post, in the most faithful performance of his promise to the Reich President Von Hindenburg, even after the death of the latter. By reason of this loyalty to the deceased Reich President, he endured the odium, in many cases concerning Hitler’s domestic politics, of having been compelled as a member of the Reich Cabinet to allow in silence things to happen which were contrary to his own convictions, which did not agree with his views and even were in direct contradiction to them. It was not in his power to prevent them. So he was forced to be satisfied with trying as far as possible to mitigate their effects and consequences, as you could see from the affidavit of the Bishop Dr. Wurm, Neurath Document Book 1, Number 1, and the statements of the other witnesses heard in this connection.

The reproach of the Prosecution that he did not make such cases an excuse to lay down his office of minister, but that by remaining in office he had consciously approved and abetted them, is entirely irrelevant. The first law governing his actions was the carrying out of the duty assigned him by President Von Hindenburg, to secure the continuance of the Reich’s peaceful foreign policy. He would have broken his word had he resigned his post as Foreign Minister before this was accomplished or before there was no possibility of its accomplishment. What person thinking objectively could bring himself to reproach him regarding this, or even identify him with the Nazis, as does the Prosecution?

But this attitude of the defendant, however, is the only reason why he did not refuse, as did Minister Von Eltz-Rübenach, his nomination to the rank of honorary Gruppenführer of the SS in September 1937 and the presentation by Hitler of the Golden Party Badge at the cabinet session of 30 January 1937, which facts are made a reproach by the Prosecution and a proof of his alleged National Socialist sentiments. For as the statement of the Defendant Göring indicates, such a refusal by the Defendant Von Neurath, as was the case with Von Eltz-Rübenach, would have been resented by Hitler as an act of rudeness which would without any hesitation have been answered by the immediate dismissal of the defendant. But this was just what the defendant wished to avoid, for at that time he was still in a position to carry out to the full extent the task assigned him by the President of the Reich—to be the guarantor of peace in the foreign policy of the Reich, because he was fully justified in his conviction that his influence over Hitler was still strong enough to insure his agreement with the peace policy he was then fostering.

The evidence submitted proves beyond doubt that in both cases it was not a question of actual membership of the SS and the Party, but only a matter of uniform, an external whim of Hitler in regard to the men of his retinue during Mussolini’s impending visit; and secondly, it was a matter of a visible recognition for the services rendered by the defendant as Foreign Minister, which at the same time implied a proof of the unlimited agreement of Hitler with the peaceful foreign policy followed by the defendant—in other words, an entirely normal awarding of decorations as is practiced in every state. The conferring of decorations in the ordinary sense was not yet possible because at that time they did not yet exist in the Third Reich. That the defendant in both cases nevertheless expressed at once that under no circumstances did he wish to proclaim his entry or admission into the SS or the Party by accepting this decoration, intended by Hitler as a mark of honor, has been proved by his affidavit. Moreover, he never took the oath required of a member of the SS; he never exercised even the slightest activity in the SS and wore the SS uniform only twice in his life at Hitler’s explicit request. This has also been confirmed by his affidavit.

Both cases actually concerned a personal sacrifice of the defendant to the promise he had given Hindenburg. If the Prosecution consequently believe it must infer from these two incidents a National Socialist conviction from the defendant’s agreement with Hitler’s ideas and his entire governmental system, it has altogether missed the mark. And the conferring of the Order of the Eagle supports the Prosecution’s assertion even less. For this Order was not conferred on him nor on the Defendant Ribbentrop as a personal distinction for services rendered, but it was merely conferred on them in their positions as Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs and Reich Protector as such. This was done in order to give this Order, which was intended to be conferred on foreign personalities only, a special significance in the eyes of people abroad, which is even shown by the fact that it had to be returned by the defendant when he resigned.

The presentation of evidence, through the affidavits of all the witnesses examined in this connection, unequivocally resulted in the fact that the defendant’s attitude toward the National Socialist system and its maxims were negative from the beginning to the end, and that, therefore, certain Party circles continually bore him ill will and opposed him. For these circles knew quite well that the Defendant Von Neurath, as is proved by his own statement and by those of the witnesses Dr. Koepke and Dr. Dieckhoff, energetically and successfully opposed to the last day all attempts to introduce members of the Party as officials into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in so doing, open it to Nazi influences; and that in spite of various intrigues he could not be dissuaded from his definite peace policy. On account of his inviolable sense of responsibility and his patriotism, the defendant also took upon himself this enmity and these intrigues, endeavoring only to conduct German foreign policy along those lines, which were prompted by his convictions, formed by long years of successful diplomatic activity. He was fully convinced that when he resigned his office it meant the collapse of the last bulwark against the infiltration of members of the Party and of the Nazi spirit into the Reich Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also meant that the danger of renouncing the peace policy embodied in his policies was imminent, which indeed came true on his resignation on 4 February 1938.

It was therefore for the defendant the bitterest disillusionment in his official life when he was forced to recognize in Hitler’s speech on the ominous day of 5 November 1937 that all his efforts, his entire struggle, all his personal sacrifices during the last 5 years appeared to be in vain and that his influence with Hitler was broken, that the latter had decided to abandon him and the policy of peace and agreement advocated by him, and, if the occasion arose, to make use of military means in order to carry out his more than Utopian plans set forth in this speech. The recognition struck him like a bolt from the blue, since up to then nothing had intimated that Hitler might no longer agree on the peace policy advocated by the defendant. The heart attack which he had the next day may testify to the fact how seriously he felt this blow, which seemed to shatter all his hopes, all his efforts to protect German y from the dangers of this foreign policy, from military entanglements, and a possible, nay probable, catastrophe.

But in consciousness of his responsibility, his burning concern regarding the future of his people, before drawing the last self-evident conclusions and resigning, he considered it his duty to try once again by a very detailed and serious conversation to dissuade Hitler from persevering in his fatal plans and intentions. Yet, having to recognize from this conversation that Hitler’s decisions were unalterable, he did not hesitate for one instant to tell Hitler that he had decided under no circumstances to take part in this pernicious policy, and that for such a foreign policy Hitler must find another foreign minister. Hitler accepted his resignation by his letter of 4 February 1938.

I ask you, Gentlemen, is there a more unequivocal and clearer proof than this resignation to show the absolute inaccuracy, the entire hollowness of the charges made against my client at this Trial of having assisted or having wished to assist by his foreign policy in the planning and the preparation of wars of aggression which took place one and a half years later? Is there a more unequivocal and clearer proof of the absurdity of the application of the principles of conspiracy to the acts and deeds of statesmen and, in particular, of the defendant? Finally, is there a more unequivocal and clearer proof of the absurdity of a retrospective judgment of the policy of states, constituting as they do here one of the main bases of the whole prosecution?

All of you, Gentlemen, who are here to do justice, know from your own activity and experience at least as well as I do, how dangerous conclusions a posteriori are regarding the actions of a man, regarding the thoughts, views, and deeds of this man, several years removed in time. Tempora mutantur et nos in illis. Each of us has surely experienced the truth of this sentence more than once in his life. Convictions and views, intentions and resolutions, which we have held and carried out at a certain time, have in the course of years become changed and altered, partly because of the transformation of one’s own personality, partly because of exterior circumstances, or change of conditions. Does one really wish to expound this thesis and draw a conclusion retrospectively, that the former views, assertions, and actions were only camouflage, and that the person already intended to do and was determined to do what he did years later under quite different circumstances? Why should you demand a different standard of a politician, a statesman? He, too, is only a human being and is subject to the same changes of ideas, opinions, and intentions as others. He is even more acutely subject to exterior influences, exterior conditions, to certain imponderable circumstances than the ordinary man. Just one example for this: What would you say to a man who would dare to assert in earnest that Napoleon Bonaparte, when he went to Paris during the great revolution, or later on when taking over the supreme command of the French armies in northern Italy, already had the plan or even the intention of making himself in 1804 Emperor of the French and of marching on Moscow in 1812? I believe that whoever adopted this attitude would stand alone in the world. And an able dialectician with more or less apparent logic and justice could still base this opinion on the historical development of events, like the Prosecution with regard to their opinion that Hitler, at the time of his assumption of power, yes, already with the presentation of the Party program in 1920, had not only the intention but even the plan ready for conducting his later wars of aggression, and everything which Hitler and the Nazis or his collaborators did, from the very moment of the assumption of power, both in domestic and foreign politics, was the conscious preparation for those wars of aggression.

Your Honors, I believe whoever follows the Prosecution and their principle, which still stands on a very weak basis, and their retrospective consideration of things, overrates too highly the spiritual and statesmanlike abilities, not only of his satellites but also of Hitler himself. Because, after all, it is in any case already evidence of a certain mental limitation if a person, and particularly a statesman, founded his policy on the basis, as Hitler indisputably did, that the governments and statesmen of the remaining states would again and again let themselves be fooled and bluffed by the same methods, that they would again and again stand for actions which they considered to be violations of treaties, and that they would watch quietly until Hitler believed himself to be ready to attack the whole world by force of arms. And is it not all the more proof of a mental limitation if a statesman in this way underestimates the abilities, astuteness, and the weapons of his opponents as Hitler did? In addition to all this, however, there is something which must not be underestimated either; that is Hitler’s desultory way of thinking and the thought processes resulting in snap decisions. I do not consider it necessary to have to give you any further evidence of these, as they are generally well known. Hitler, however, was also a man who did not stand for any argument or any resistance, and who on encountering obstacles which he could not remove by an emphatic word, forthwith changed his plans and intentions and made contrary decisions, the very opposite of those he had formerly cherished.

All this speaks against the intention of planning and preparing wars at the time of the seizure of power, or even in previous years, which the Prosecution have ascribed to Hitler. The impossibility of this charge is further apparent, if one considers the following: It is indisputable that Hitler not only testified his love for peace in public speeches, addresses, and diplomatic notes on several occasions from the day of the seizure of power until 1937, as can be seen from documents presented by me, but he also made positive suggestions for the practical limitation of armament of all states, including therefore Germany, from which it can be readily seen that he declared himself satisfied with a reduced land and air power in proportion to the others, which from the very beginning excluded any aggressive war against the other states. And now just suppose that one of these offers of Hitler had been accepted by the remaining states, then the war of aggression which Hitler supposedly had been planning and preparing for years would never have been possible. All efforts, work, and expenses in connection with it would have been in vain. Or do you perhaps consider it possible that Hitler looked ahead and figured that his offers would be refused, and that he only made them in this realization? Then he would really be an almost demoniacal genius, a prophetic seer of the first rank. Do you really wish to assume from it the claim of the Prosecution that aggressive war of the year 1939 had been planned a long time before the seizure of power? And even if you should answer this question in the affirmative for the person of Hitler, do you also ascribe such a gift of second sight to his collaborators, his servants, yes, even all Party members? To ask this question is to answer it in the negative. With this question alone also falls the painfully constructed and artificial structure of the motivation ascribed by the Prosecution. And along with it falls also the classification of the whole charge, and in particular the coresponsibility of all collaborators of Hitler generally under the conception of conspiracy, at least until the period of time when it could be recognized by the most extensive circles of his followers that Hitler finally wanted war and had decided on it. Simultaneously with this, however, the unconditional accuracy of the postulate advanced by me at the beginning of my statements becomes evident after examining the subjective joint guilt of every single defendant, after the denial of the coresponsibility of each individual only from the fact of his participation in the actions which are considered as preparations for a war of aggression by the Prosecution at any period of time, simply without examination and investigation of his knowledge of Hitler’s aims and intentions. To disregard this postulate, as the Prosecution do, would be to contradict every sense of justice, the most primitive as well as the most highly developed, in every nation on earth. The summum jus sought in this Trial would become a summa injuria.

The best evidence of the truth of this assertion is personified by the Defendant Von Neurath himself. Is it not pure folly, is it not summa injuria to accuse this man of connivance in planning and preparing wars of aggression, this man who deemed it his exclusive duty, a duty to which he has made great personal sacrifice, to prevent every form of entanglement involving war—and who, the moment he realized that the task was beyond him, forthwith resigned his function and demanded his dismissal? The Prosecution obviously feel this themselves, otherwise they would not have brought as evidence of the defendant’s alleged joint culpability his presence at Hitler’s conference on 5 November 1937, wittingly omitting, however, that it was this conference and Hitler’s deviation from a peace to a war policy which caused the defendant to refuse further collaboration and thereby make it clear that he never concurred in the past and was not prepared in the future to concur in or approve of, the planning, preparation or waging of a war of aggression. Thus, every charge of guilt made in the Indictment against the Defendant Von Neurath is void, once and for all. For should he be further accused of having broken international treaties while responsible for the conduct of German foreign policy, it must be pointed out in answer that according to the clear wording of the Charter, the breach of international treaties does not constitute a punishable crime in itself, and becomes a punishable crime only when it serves the purpose of preparation for wars of aggression. If such a breach of treaty serves this purpose, it must be intended to do so by its author, or at least its author must be conscious of the fact. That Defendant Von Neurath had no such intention, nor indeed the faintest knowledge of the above implication, is quite clearly proved by his resignation from the office of Foreign Minister. But I shall moreover demonstrate to you that even the charge of violating or breaking international treaties is without foundation.

When, on 2 June 1932, the Defendant Von Neurath took over the Foreign Office at Hindenburg’s request, there were two questions that far surpassed in importance every other European problem and demanded an urgent solution; they were the problem of the German reparations and the problem of the disarmament of the victorious powers and of German equality of rights, a factor which was inseparable from it.

The defendant and Von Papen who was Reich Chancellor at the time managed to treat the first question satisfactorily at the conference held by the powers in Lausanne on 10 June 1932, a few days after the defendant’s assumption of office. At the closing session of the conference on 9 July 1932, Germany was freed of the financial servitude established by the Treaty of Versailles of a single final payment of 3 milliard marks. The Young Plan was obsolete, and only Germany’s obligations deriving from the loans granted her remained in force. Thus Part VIII of the Treaty of Versailles in which the reparation obligations were contained by virtue of Article 232 became obsolete for Germany. The first gap was made.

Matters were different with regard to the disarmament problem. This arose from the obligation for disarmament imposed on Germany according to Part V of the Treaty of Versailles which, I presume, is well known. In case of its fulfillment, the preamble to this part likewise prescribed disarmament for the highly armed victorious nations in reciprocity. Germany had disarmed. It had already fully met its obligations in 1927, an uncontested fact which the League of Nations also had expressly recognized. This was the basis for Germany’s request for reciprocal compliance by the other partners to the treaty, as provided for in the preamble to Part V. And Germany had announced its request for disarmament by the highly armed states and in conjunction therewith recognition of her equality of rights a considerable time before the defendant took office. However, during the so-called Disarmament Conference the negotiations not only had made no progress by the time the defendant took over the Foreign Office, but just at that time, the summer of 1932, they had become considerably more difficult. In view of the short time allotted for my disposal, I again refer for details to the German memorandum of 29 August 1932—my Document Book 2, Exhibit Number Neurath-40—and to my client’s interview of 6 September 1932 with a representative of the Wolff telegraph office, to be found in the same document book under Exhibit Number Neurath-41. Lastly, I should like to refer to the defendant’s declaration of 30 September 1932 before the German press, submitted to the Tribunal under Exhibit Number Neurath-45, my Document Book 2.

These declarations, all of which were made preparatory to the resumption of negotiations by the Disarmament Conference on 16 October 1932 and in order to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation to the world and to the Western Powers, prove clearly and unequivocally the great, fundamental tendency of the defendant’s ideas, his trend of thought and intentions as a human being, as a diplomat and as Foreign Minister, which dominated his entire policy from the beginning until his resignation, and which can be summarized in the statement: To avoid and prevent the settling of differences through force of arms; to realize all goals and tasks of German foreign policy by peaceful means only; to reject war as a means of policy; in a word, to strengthen and safeguard peace among the nations.

It is the same tendency which M. François Poncet, the former French Ambassador to Berlin, so eloquently referred to as a characteristic of the defendant in his letter—which I submitted to the Tribunal as Number 157 of my Document Book 5—and which was unanimously confirmed by all witnesses and affidavits.

While the opening of negotiations at the Disarmament Conference started with what really might be termed an affront to Germany, which caused the head of the German delegation to declare that under such conditions it would not be possible for him to continue to attend the negotiations, the Western Powers in the end could not close their minds to the ethics of a policy inspired by such tendencies, and following a suggestion by the British Government, on 11 December 1932, the well-known Five Power Agreement was concluded (see my Document Book 2, Exhibit Number Neurath-47a) in which England, France, and Italy, with the consent of the United States of America, recognized Germany’s equality of rights. On 14 December 1932, the main committee of the Disarmament Conference expressed its satisfaction in acknowledging this agreement, and the German delegate expressed his readiness to resume participation in the deliberations of the conference, stressing also that the equality recognized on 11 December 1932 in regard to Germany was the conditio sine qua non for this continued participation by Germany. It seemed that a great step forward had thus been made in the path leading to an understanding on the question of disarmament.

However, things were to take a different turn. Immediately following the opening of the conference meeting again in Geneva on 2 February 1933, serious clashes occurred between the German and the French delegations, in the course of which M. Paul Boncour, the French delegate, even went so far as to declare the Five Power Agreement of 11 December 1932 legally invalid because it involved five powers only. To the astonishment not only of Germany, the cause for these increasingly acute differences was the fundamental change in France’s attitude with regard to the basic question of the entire armaments problem laid down in the French plan of 14 November 1932 as a basis for these negotiations. For, contrary to the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles and its own attitude heretofore, France suddenly took the position in this plan that armies composed of professional soldiers with a long period of service were aggressive in character and consequently meant a threat to peace and that only armies with a short period of service were defensive in character.

I regret that for lack of time I must desist not only from referring at greater length to the details of the French plan, but also to the sequence of the differences which became more and more critical between Germany and the other powers. I must assume that they are known and confine myself to stressing that the new French thesis, which the Disarmament Conference adopted as its own, was clearly and unequivocally directed against Germany and the Reichswehr as it had come into being in accordance with the disarmament stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, a thesis which, if it was to be carried into effect, would have required the transformation of the Reichswehr into a militia army with a short period of service, thus signifying a still further reduction in its armament, inadequate as it already was for an effective protection against attack. The establishment of this thesis, however, also proved clearly that France was unwilling to disarm, which was also shown by statements of the French representative himself.

This new plan of France, as also her attitude particularly in the question of the ratio in the reduction of the individual armies, was merely a new expression of her old thesis, first security, then disarmament, which brought about the failure not only of the previous negotiations but also that of a new plan of mediation, the so-called MacDonald Plan, proposed by England to prevent the threatening break-down of negotiations.

Germany’s reference to consideration for her own security and her demand for general disarmament as a result of the right to equality by reason of recognition accorded her on 11 December 1932 were received by the other parties as a provocation, indication being given that, should negotiations fail, responsibility would rest with her.

In the interest of the clarification of these things and of the presentation of the increasing gravity of the whole situation before world publicity, my client felt it necessary to publish an article in the well-known Geneva periodical Völkerbund, on 11 May 1933—Neurath Document Book 2, Number 51—in which he discussed the result which the conference had so far achieved, described the German attitude in detail, and finally established that the German demand for the practical realization of the equality of rights of Germany by disarmament of the heavily armed countries was wrecked by the lack of will of those countries to disarm, and that Germany, therefore, in the interest of her own security was forced to start completing her armament, should the general limitation and disarmament within the framework of the English MacDonald Plan not satisfy her justified demands for security.

This conclusion was wholly justified in view of the entire foreign political situation at that time. These aggravated events which had intensified the crisis at the Disarmament Conference were only a small part, so to speak, of the expression of the international tension which prevailed since Hitler’s assumption of power. Domestic events occurring in Germany were first observed abroad with astonishment, but also with a certain lack of comprehension.

Soon after Hitler had assumed power, on 30 January 1933, an opinion was formed abroad—the discussion of which would lead too far here—about the so-called German revolution, which made it appear a European danger not only to France and her allies but also to Great Britain as well. The fear of such a danger affected the attitude of the Western Powers at the Disarmament Conference to an ever increasing degree, where Germany’s completely logical and consistent point of view was regarded as a provocation. But these worries of theirs, their insecurity in the face of the new Germany, led to even much more extensive measures and threats.

With England’s consent France began military preparations in the first days of May 1933, placing the border fortifications—which had already been provided with increased garrisons during the winter—in a state of alarm by alerting the large camps in Lorraine, the deployment area of her army of the Rhine, and carrying out a large trial mobilization between Belfort, Mulhouse, and St. Louis, at which the Chief of the French General Staff, General Weygand, appeared in person. And at the same time the French Foreign Minister Paul Boncour ostentatiously declared in his speech on 12 May 1933 before the French Senate that, in view of the revolutionary explosions in Germany, Italy would have to be kept firmly among the group of Western Powers; and, in response to Germany’s attitude at the Disarmament Conference, he added that Germany must adhere strictly to the Treaty of Versailles if she wanted to keep the Reichswehr. And these words of the French Minister, which could only be understood as a threat, were still further emphasized and confirmed by similar statements of the British Minister of War, Hailsham, and the otherwise so pacifist-minded Lord Cecil, in the English House of Commons; the latter even encouraged France to carry out further military operations. The situation was so strained that Europe seemed to be standing directly on the brink of a new war.

This increasing gravity of the situation, this obvious crisis which was leading Europe close to disaster is one of the basic reasons for the entire subsequent policy of the Defendant Von Neurath during the following years. Therefore, the question must be examined as briefly as possible, to see what consequences it was bound to have and did have, for German foreign policy, from the German point of view. One thing is undeniably clear. In the spring of 1933 Germany was in no condition whatsoever to fight a war; it would have been complete madness, a sheer desire for self-destruction, to fight a war against the armies of France and her allies, which counted millions of men and were excellently equipped with the latest weapons of attack, to fight with the small Reichswehr of one hundred thousand men which had at its disposal no motorized weapons of attack whatsoever, no tanks, no heavy artillery, no military airplanes.

Fear of an imminent warlike attack on the part of Germany could, therefore, from the point of view of the Western Powers, under no circumstances be the reason for their position and attitude. The one plausible reason could lie only in the attitude of the Western Powers with regard to the question of disarmament as such, that is, in their unwillingness to carry it out, to continue to discriminate against Germany, to continue to refuse her the realization of her equality of rights and to continue to keep her down.

In this alone, in the eyes of the leader of German foreign policy, lay the reason for the final French and English proposals at the Disarmament Conference, which were unacceptable to Germany for reasons of justice as well as for reasons of her own security and her national honor. Because even in spite of Germany’s equality recognized by the Western Powers in the Five Power Declaration, the French plan of 14 November 1932, as well as also the English plan of 16 March 1933, the MacDonald Plan, and the resolutions of the Disarmament Conference included therein, lacked practical realization of equality, even from the most objective standpoint.

What justly and objectively thinking person would reproach the German state leadership, if they drew their conclusions from all this, and recognized that this behavior of the Western Powers contained not only a violation of existing treaties and of the Treaty of Versailles with regard to disarmament, but also the will of the Western Powers to prevent Germany from fulfilling her demands justified by treaty, by force of arms if necessary, and furthermore to keep her as a second-rate state, and to refuse her the security guaranteed her also in the Treaty of Versailles?

Can you, Your Honors, reproach a state leadership which was aware of its responsibility towards its people, if this realization from now on had to be decisive for the continued direction of foreign policy? Because the highest duty of every state leadership, which is aware of its responsibility in foreign policy, is the securing and maintenance of the existence and the independence of its state, the regaining of a respected and free position in the council of nations. A statesman who neglects this duty sins against his own people. This realization should carry all the more weight because, on the part of Germany, nothing had happened which might have been interpreted as a threat against the Western Powers. On the contrary in his first program speech in a Reichstag still elected in accordance with democratic principles, Hitler had emphatically declared on 23 March 1933, punctuated by unanimous applause, his will for peace, particularly emphasizing this with regard to France; and he confessed himself prepared for peaceful collaboration with the other nations of the earth, but emphasized also that as a prerequisite for this he considered necessary the final removal of the discrimination against Germany, the division of the nations into victors and vanquished.

To these declarations of his, however, not the slightest attention was paid by the Western Powers, although they corresponded throughout with the given conditions and might have contained anything but certainly no threat. Unfortunately, they were unable to effect a change in the attitude of the Western Powers and to prevent an acceleration of the crisis.

A discernible relaxation only took place when Hitler, under the influence of the Defendant Von Neurath, at the climax of the crisis, repeated once more to the world, with the greatest emphasis, his and the German people’s will for peace in his great so-called peace address before the Reichstag on 17 May 1933—it is in excerpt form in my Document Book 2, Exhibit Number Neurath-52—and expressed his conviction that, as he declared literally, no new European war would be in the position to replace the unsatisfactory conditions of today by something better; the outbreak of such an insanity, as he described the war, would be bound to lead to the collapse of the present social and state order.

This speech of Hitler, whose honesty and sincerity cannot be denied according to the evidence, and whose power of conviction also proved irresistible to the Western Powers, effected a general relaxation of the situation; the danger of a new international war was averted, and the world took a deep breath. This, however, also marked the end of the isolation of Germany which had made for inner change and revolution, and German foreign policy gladly and with a sincere will took the opportunity for active collaboration in the political state gamble, an opportunity offered her by the suggestion of Mussolini to unite the great powers, England, France, Italy, and Germany, in a so-called Four Power Pact. This treaty, which was drawn up on 8 June 1933 in Rome and which was signed in the middle of June 1933 also by Germany, and which in its preamble also referred expressly to the Five Power Agreement of 11 December 1932, was to place the participating powers in such a position that, if further negotiations in a larger circle, as for example in the Disarmament Conference, should reach a stalemate they could meet at a smaller conference table. For Germany, the main motive lay in the fact that she again became an active member in the body of European policy in which she was participating as a partner with equal rights in an international agreement.

As a matter of fact, this pact was concluded at a time when a new international tension was already arising and increasing which again threatened to isolate Germany. This time it had its source not so much in the Disarmament Conference, the proceedings of which after the customary fruitless endeavors were again suspended on 29 June 1933 until 16 October 1933, as in the position of Germany and Austria in the World Economic Conference which opened in London on 12 June 1933. The Austrian Prime Minister Dollfuss made use of this conference to call the attention of the powers to an alleged threat to Austria’s independence by Germany, in that he accused Germany of lending support to the Austrian National Socialists in their fight against his Government. Making the Austrian question the center of gravity for European policy and calling on the powers for protection against an alleged threat to Austria’s independence by Germany—which the former considered a cornerstone in the construction of European power relations—he fanned the old embers into a new flame. What the mood was then in the summer of 1933 is shown in my Document Book 1, under Exhibits Number Neurath-11 and 12, reports of the defendant to Reich President Von Hindenburg and Hitler, dated 19 June 1933; but reference is also made to it in the speech by the defendant on 15 September 1933—Document Book 2, Exhibit Number Neurath-56—before representatives of the foreign press, which also comments on the consequences of such an attitude for the prospects of the proposed negotiations to be resumed by the Disarmament Conference on 16 October 1933, and which is reflected in his words:

“Judging by certain indications the readiness of highly armed states to carry out disarmament obligations for which they pledged themselves today seems to be smaller than ever. Finally, there is only one alternative: Realization of the right to equality or else a collapse of the entire idea of disarmament, with incalculable consequences, for which responsibility would not rest on Germany.”

This skepticism of the defendant with regard to the political situation in general, and prospects of the Disarmament Conference in particular, were only too well founded. For the new so-called Simon Plan—submitted even before the conference started by Sir John Simon, head of the English delegation, as a basis for negotiations—and to no less a degree the statement relative thereto made by Sir John, made it clear beyond doubt that the attitude of the Western Powers still continued to be the same as in the spring of 1933 and that they were even still less disposed to do justice to Germany’s demand for an equality of rights. For Sir John declared in plain language that in view of the present nonclarified conditions in Europe, and considering the seriously shaken confidence in peace, a disarmament conference, even according to the pattern of the MacDonald Plan, which Germany had declared unacceptable in the spring, was an impossibility.

This not only meant bringing an unjustified accusation against Germany—which had done no more than stand on the rights accorded it by treaty—but it also was a clear denial of Germany’s equality of rights and of disarmament. As a matter of fact, this Simon Plan falls even farther short than previous plans in doing justice to Germany’s rightful demand for equality of right and disarmament, that is, a balancing of all states’ armament in accordance with one another, including Germany.

Time being too short, I once more have to refrain here from going into detail and must confine myself to pointing out that it meant an increased restriction and reduction of German armament in favor of the other nations. For it provided that during the first half of the 8 years’ duration of the proposed disarmament, Germany alone—through the conversion of its Reichswehr into an army with a brief period of service—would practically be still further disarmed, subjecting herself, in addition, to an armament control by the powers, while the highly armed powers were not scheduled to begin disarming until the fifth year, and then only in terms of manpower reserve, not in terms of arms. These provisions demonstrated more clearly than ever that not only did the Western Powers not intend to disarm, but that they wanted to weaken Germany still more and make her tractable to their power interests. There was no more mention made of the fact that the Five Power Agreement of 11 December 1932 had agreed to recognize Germany’s equality of rights.

It really should have been clear to the Western Powers as well that such a plan depriving her of a chance to participate in further negotiations at the conference was bound to be unacceptable to Germany from the outset. However, on the strength of the lessons which German foreign policy learned in the spring of 1933—when Germany came very near having the Western Powers threaten her with war because she was unwilling to renounce her just demands—nothing was left to her this time but to answer the new threat which this plan undoubtedly involved, not only by rejecting the plan but also by withdrawing from the Disarmament Conference as well as the League of Nations. Further negotiations during the conference under such conditions were deemed hopeless from the very start and could only result in a still greater heightening of contrasts.

It is difficult to understand why the Western Powers failed to foresee Germany’s attitude and were surprised by her withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. In Hitler’s speech, already referred to here, an appeal for peace, delivered on 17 May 1933, he expressed in unequivocal terms that notwithstanding the sincere will for peace and further disarmament—provided it were mutual—on the part of the German Government and the German people, they would never consent to further humiliation and to renunciation of their claim for equality of rights but that if such were the demand they would rather assume the consequences without hesitation. Still more incomprehensible is the fact that in all earnestness the Prosecution place the blame for this withdrawal by Germany on its foreign policy, and that they believe they can find evidence of deliberate action for the preparation of wars of aggression; and this can only be understood by the fact that the Prosecution preserves complete silence on the events which led up to this withdrawal and thereby tries to create the impression that Germany’s withdrawal occurred entirely without cause. The Prosecution’s interpretation of the withdrawal as an action in preparation for war is contrary to objective history as becomes clearly apparent from the fact—which the Prosecution also passed over in silence—that concurrent with its declaration of withdrawal, the German Government, through Hitler’s speech of 14 October 1933 as well as also through the speech of the Defendant Von Neurath of 16 October 1933, not only declared with all possible emphasis their unchanging desire for peace and readiness to negotiate in the case of any disarmament plan which would consider Germany’s equality of rights, but tried to carry into practice this willingness to negotiate by submitting on her part practical proposals for general disarmament, as set forth in the memorandum prepared by my client and submitted to the powers on 18 December 1933 (Neurath Document Book 2, Exhibit Number Neurath-61).

The interview granted by the defendant to the representative of The New York Times in Berlin is an expression of the same endeavor. A government or a foreign minister that intends to prepare or even plan an aggressive war is hardly likely to make proposals for limiting or even reducing still further the armament of that country.

Diplomatic negotiations between Germany and the individual Western Powers which followed the memorandum of 18 December 1933 ended, as I may presume to be well known, with the note of the French Government to the English Government of 17 April 1934, which closed the door to further negotiations as proposed in an English memorandum of 29 January 1934 as well as another memorandum of the German Government of 13 March 1934, as this was fully stated in the speech of the Defendant Von Neurath on 27 April 1934 (Neurath Document Book 3, Exhibit Number Neurath-70).

The fact which appeared in the preceding discussions is interesting and must be emphasized here, that in their course an indisputable change was shown in relations between France and Russia, the further development of which became more or less authoritative, not only for German foreign policy, but also for the entire European policy in the coming years. The Russian representative in his speech to the Office of the Disarmament Conference on 10 April 1934 took the stand, contrary to the point of view always previously represented by Russia, that the task of the Disarmament Conference was to decide on a most wide-reaching reduction of armaments to provide maximum security, and though he admitted the failure of their disarmament efforts he did not however draw the conclusion therefrom that the conference had broken down, but on the contrary held that the creation of new security instruments of international law was the sole task of the Disarmament Conference, a point of view which was endorsed by the Russian Foreign Minister Litvinov on 29 April 1934. With this thesis Russia had adopted France’s point of view: First security, then disarmament, and, beyond that, the door was opened to the increased armament of all nations from now on. It is evident how important this fact was in the light of the French-Russian Assistance Pact which was signed one year later, made for the re-establishment of German armed sovereignty and an increase in the armament of all the remaining states. A direct path leads from this declaration of the Russian Foreign Minister via the extensive negotiations during the summer of 1934 regarding the so-called Eastern Pact to the Franco-Russian Assistance Pact of 2 May 1935 and the Russian-Czechoslovak Assistance Pact of 16 May 1935.

The French note of 17 April 1934 with its categorical “no” signified the end of one epoch and the beginning of a new one in international policy. France finally made it clear that she was no longer willing to carry on with a general agreement among all states desiring a solution of the questions of disarmament and security, but decided to go her own way from now on. The reason for this lay obviously in the fact that she recognized or thought she had recognized that the most important of the participating powers, England and Italy, were no longer prepared to follow her unconditionally, and to continue to refuse Germany the equality of rights theoretically granted her on 11 December 1932. This was expressed through the far-reaching rapprochement of the English and Italian points of view in the English memorandum of 29 January 1934 and in the declaration of Mussolini to the English Minister Eden on 26 February 1934, which dealt with the clearly outlined German point of view in the memoranda of 13 March and 16 April 1934. A similar tendency was shown in the memorandum of the so-called neutral powers, namely Denmark, Spain, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland of 14 April 1934, and above all the speech of the Belgian Prime Minister Count de Brocqueville of 6 March 1934 (Neurath Document Book 3, Exhibit Number Neurath-66) showed the same tendency.

In this note of 17 April 1934, to which the Defendant Von Neurath referred in his speech of 27 April 1934 before the German press, he explained his attitude thoroughly and convincingly. France, as was soon apparent, finally abandoned the principles of the Versailles Treaty, the preamble to Part V which fixed in an unmistakable manner the general disarmament of all states of the League of Nations as the basis for the disarmament of Germany. The new French policy set up immediately after the note of 17 April 1934 soon made it known that she had decided to proceed along lines diametrically opposed to the basic idea of the Versailles Treaty regarding German disarmament.

On 20 April 1934 the French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou began his journey eastward, which took him to Warsaw and Prague. He first tried to prepare the ground for the resumption of diplomatic relations between the states of the so-called Little Entente with Russia, which so far did not exist, and thus prepare the way for the inclusion of the greatest military power of Europe on the side of France. He succeeded. Czechoslovakia and Romania, the most important states of the Little Entente, recognized and renewed diplomatic relations with the Russian Government on 9 June 1934. Thus France had made the first breach in the ideological and psychological opposition at that time felt by the European states against Soviet Russia, and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, then on his second journey to the East, was not only able to gain the consent of all states of the Little Entente to the so-called Eastern Pact which France had long ago been negotiating with Russia, but subsequently was able to place it openly on the agenda of the International Policy Conference in London at the beginning of July. With this, as the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs Beneš justly stated in his speech of 2 July 1934, a regrouping of the European powers was announced, which appeared capable of overthrowing to a certain extent all former relations on the continent.

Stanley Baldwin, who at that time was Lord President of the Council, had on 18 May 1934 already stated before the House of Commons that in view of the question of collective peace which of necessity involved the need for sanctions, England stood before one of the most difficult decisions in her history. He coined the phrase: Sanctions are war. England agreed at the beginning of July 1934, on the occasion of the visit of Barthou to London, not only to the Eastern Pact but in addition also to the entry of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations, which had been suggested by France. On 18 December 1934 the League of Nations officially resolved to accept Russia into the League. Thus France had for the most part already reached her goal, the inclusion of Russia, the strongest military power, into European politics and indeed on her side as will shortly be shown.

In spite of this heralded change in European power relations, German foreign policy under the direction of the defendant not only continued calmly and consistently in its peaceful struggle for the practical recognition of German equality—even after the French note of 17 April 1934 which it considered disastrous—but also in its policy of peace. In his speech of 27 April 1934—previously quoted—my client once more unreservedly expressed the will of Germany that she was still prepared for any understanding even at the price of further armament limitations by agreement, if this would correspond with her demand for equality. She did not, however, limit herself to this alone. In order to resume the international discussions and negotiations regarding the disarmament question, which had been interrupted by France’s “no” of 17 April 1934, Hitler met Mussolini in Venice in the middle of June 1934. The purpose and subjects of discussion at this meeting were at that time summarized by Mussolini with the words: “We have met in order to try to disperse the clouds which are darkening the political horizon of Europe.”

May I, then, for the sake of prudence, recall the fact that Italy at that time was still entirely on the side of the Western Powers. Several days later, in his speech at the Gautag at Gera on 17 June 1934 (Neurath Document Book 3, Exhibit Number Neurath-80), Hitler used the opportunity to emphasize once more his and Germany’s unshakable wish for peace, when he stated literally among other things:

“If anyone says to us: ‘If you National Socialists wish equality for Germany, then we must increase our armaments,’ then we can only say: ‘As far as we are concerned you can do so, because after all we have no intention of attacking you. We merely wish to be so strong that the others will have no wish to attack us. The more the world speaks of the formation of blocks, the clearer it becomes to us that we must concern ourselves with the maintenance of our own power.’ ”

There was a definite clearly defined change in power relationships and the political tendencies were taking shape, which were also the basis of the English air armament program announced before the House of Commons on 19 July 1934, and the idea became prevalent expressed by the French Prime Minister Doumergue in his speech of 13 October 1934 at the bier of the assassinated Minister Louis Barthou: “The weak nations are booty or a danger.” No matter how irrefutable this idea really was, as far as the attitude of the Western Powers toward Germany was concerned, it received as little consideration as all attempts of German foreign policy to carry on the negotiations regarding the disarmament question and as the repeated declarations of Germany about her readiness for an understanding. Now, as before, Germany was denied the de facto recognition of her equality. Apart from the encirclement policy of France which became more discernible every day, this fact also made it impossible for German foreign policy to join the Eastern Pact. The reasons for this rejection of the Eastern Pact have been presented in detail in the communiqué of the German Government of 10 September 1934 (Neurath Document Book 3, Exhibit Number Neurath-85). They culminated in the statement that Germany, in view of her indisputable military weakness and inferiority, could not take on any treaty obligations toward the highly armed states which might involve her in all possible conflicts in the East, and could make her a probable theater of operations.

It was not the lack of preparedness to participate in international treaties or even a lack of a will for peace which caused Germany to maintain this attitude, but first and foremost her notorious military weakness. Added to this was the true character of France’s policy which showed itself more and more, and that of the Eastern Pact as an instrument of the French policy of encirclement directed against Germany. This character became clear to all the world when, in the session of the Army Committee of the French Cabinet on 23 November 1934, the reporter Archimbaud described it as an undeniable fact that a formal entente existed between France and Russia on the basis of which, in the event of a conflict, France would be prepared to furnish a considerable well-equipped and well-trained army (Neurath Document Book 3, Exhibit Number Neurath-89). This fact, however, was clearly and openly proved by the declaration of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Laval on 20 January 1935 before a representative of the Russian newspaper Izvestia, in connection with the French-Russian record of 5 December 1934 (Neurath Document Book 3, Exhibit Number Neurath-91) and Litvinov’s interpretations of it of 9 December 1934. For those well informed there could exist no further doubt of the existence of a close French-Russian alliance, even if the ratification of its final text only took place on 2 May 1935, which was then immediately followed by the ratification of the Russo-Czechoslovak Non-Aggression Pact of 16 May 1935.

It was forced upon the mind of every clear-thinking person that the French system of alliances made in this way was desperately akin to the one which had opposed Germany once already in the year 1914. This involuntary parallel was bound to make every German statesman draw the conclusion that those alliances could only be directed against Germany and accordingly constituted, at least, a menace to her. And this, much more so, as these alliances, this obvious encirclement of Germany, were by no means the only alarming events. Coupled with it, a vast increase in military armaments of nearly all non-German countries had been carried out in the course of the preceding months. Not only had England begun to carry out her large-scale armament program, as is shown by the British White Book of 1 March 1935, the submission of which does not seem necessary, since it is an official historical document, but in France too the efforts to reinforce her Army had begun under the guidance of Marshal Pétain, her most popular general at that time, while in Russia an increase in the peacetime figure of her Army from 600,000 to 940,000 men had taken place, with the joyful acquiescence of France. Czechoslovakia had introduced a 2-year compulsory service in December 1934 (Neurath Document Book 3, Exhibit Number Neurath-92) and Italy, too, was continually increasing her armaments.

After the bitter experiences of the latter years, all this was bound to be felt from the point of view of German politics, as I have shown you, My Lords, as nothing but a serious menace, and interpreted accordingly, a menace which left Germany all but defenseless.

A foreign policy, conscious of its responsibility, had to reckon at each moment with the danger that such a concentrated and continually increasing power of France and her Allies could fall upon Germany and crush her. For nothing is more dangerous than a concentration of power in one hand. According to experience, it is bound to cause an explosion sometime, if not counterbalanced by some other power, and this explosion is then directed toward the nearest country considered as an enemy. This latter was and could be only Germany, as this country alone was considered by France as her foe, and no other country in the world besides her.

And now I beg to ask you, My Lords, whether it was not an obvious command of self-defense, an obvious demand of the most primitive instinct for self-preservation of any living being—and nations, too, are living entities with such an instinct for self-preservation—that now the German Government and the German people took back the military sovereignty which had constantly been denied them for no reason and that they on their part tried to take measures of security against the menace hanging over Germany by organizing a military air fleet and by the law concerning the establishing of a peacetime army of only 36 divisions on the basis of compulsory military service. I refer to the proclamation of the German Reich Cabinet concerning the restoration of German compulsory service of 16 March 1935 (Neurath Document Book 2, Exhibit Number Neurath-97).

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[The Tribunal adjourned until 24 July 1946 at 1000 hours.]