TRIAL OF PEDRO DE ZULUETA, JUN., ESQ., (continued 6)

Then he is asked about another vessel in which the name of Mr. Kidd was introduced—that is quite unimportant. He is asked, “You have no connexion with Mr. Kidd in any way?—No, nor any knowledge of him.” He then says something to which I should call your attention. Something had been said by another witness, “Zulueta, the gentleman in London to whom the vessel was sent, and who sold her again to her former Spanish owner, is a name well known on the coast in connexion with the slave trade.” That is what somebody had said before the Committee, which he came before the Committee voluntarily to contradict; he says, “Now, what is known on the coast I really cannot pretend to say; but I believe that not many persons can say that which I can say, that neither myself, nor my father, nor my grandfather, nor any body in our firm, has ever had any kind of interest of any sort, or derived any emolument or connexion from the slave trade.” Gentlemen, would to Heaven that every gentleman in a mercantile house could say the same I But this gentleman is challenging contradiction, he is speaking in the presence of those conversant with the trade, and in the presence of the Secretaries of State he is laying himself open to contradiction, and he says openly, knowing it will be published to the world, and knowing he may be denounced as a man guilty of gross falsehood if it is untrue, he says, “Neither myself, nor my father, nor grandfather, ever made one shilling by the slave trade:” and yet this young man is to be selected out of the firm and made the victim in respect of the Augusta, and that upon this statement, as my learned friend reminds me; that he who comes before the Committee and challenges disproof—he says, “I challenge any one to say that I was ever engaged in the slave trade—” that that is to be made evidence and offered in a British Court before a British Jury. Now see what follows, and I believe it is not a vain boast, it is not a mere statement—he says, “My father had at one time an interest in a bankrupt’s estate at the Havannah, upon which he was a creditor. There were some slaves on the estate, and they formed part of the property assignable to the creditors, and my father got the slaves assigned to him; because the other gentlemen and the creditors were not of the same opinion.” That is, because the other people did not think there was any thing wrong in the slave trade. “He got them assigned to him, and made them free; and that is all the connexion we have ever had with any slaves in the world. I do not know how far that may be considered irrelevant to the point, but I state it because we are here mentioned three or four times as connected with slave dealers, as a name well known in connexion with the slave trade. That sort of statement—” Well indeed may he say so, and I say on his behalf, “that sort of statement is rather a difficult thing to deal with.” It is indeed, Gentlemen. When I hear my learned friend say, that because he sent out a vessel with an English captain, and because at Portsmouth there are some shackles, and because Captain Hill and Captain Denman knew this was a slave trading colony, therefore you are to convict him; I say, “it is a very difficult thing to deal with.” That is what he said before the Committee; this has been published fifteen months, and before the public; the prosecutor has had it fifteen months—has he contradicted any one letter in it? He says, “My father, and my grandfather, and my house, never had any connexion with the slave trade; except that he took some slaves, because he wished to make them free, under a bankrupt’s estate, and he made them free, that is the only connexion we ever had with the slave trade in the world.” That is his evidence, and I beg you to contrast it with the other evidence of my learned friend and the doubtful inferences he has suggested.

Then he is asked, “If it is meant to insinuate by these observations that you ever had any other connexion with the slave trade, than being the shipping agent of goods which were sent to a man who was a dealer in slaves, you entirely deny it?” He says, “I assure the Committee, that although I have a general notion as to what interest Blanco and Martinez have in slaves, yet, if I was put upon my oath to make any particular statement, I really could not, because I do not know it. Of course I believe it; but my personal knowledge amounts only to that which the knowledge of what we read in a newspaper amounts to.” It is quite evident what he means—I know nothing of their being slave traders: since these matters have been under consideration I have read the newspapers, and I see enough to lead me to suppose that they deal in slaves. But he does not say he had that knowledge in 1840, when these transactions took place. Then he is asked, “There was nothing upon the face of the transactions which you had with those parties which spoke of a connexion with traffic in slaves?—Nothing whatever. It is well known, that, fifty years ago, it was in the ordinary course of business in Cadiz”—There is another point inviting attention and contradiction.—He says, “It is well known, that, fifty years ago, it was in the ordinary course of business in Cadiz to insure operations in slave trading.” So it was at that time: slave trading, in all its branches, and of the worst character, was perfectly legal both in Spain, and I grieve to say, also in England, or English colonies. And he goes on to say, “My house at that time were underwriters, and it was notorious that a policy of that kind would never enter the doors of our house; and nobody would come to offer such a thing to us upon any terms. It is notorious, both here and in Spain, that we set our faces distinctly against having any interest of any kind in the slave trade.”

Now, Gentlemen, is it not grievous, is it not cruel, that this young man, almost just entering life, belonging to a family, belonging to a house, which can say this with truth, that while the slave trade was deemed lawful by the British law and universally practised throughout Spain and the Spanish colonies, and recognized in all its forms, “My house would not execute a policy for slaves?” Is it not cruel, that the youngest partner at the very outset of life is to have his character blasted and held up as a felon, because it is said he had done something to assist that trade?

Then he is asked, “It is further stated, ‘It appears, that it is a regular thing sending vessels to him, that is to Mr. Zulueta; if they come to England to him, he sends them to Cadiz, and they get out again to the Havannah and come again into the trade.’ Have you any observation to make upon that?—It is all untrue, the whole of it; I have never received a vessel from those gentlemen; there has been nothing of the kind.” He denies it; it might have been proved, and it has not been proved. “Have you any thing further to state upon the subject?”—Then he states a number of other matters, which as nothing has been said upon them I do not comment upon. Then he says, at the end of the last answer, “‘My answer was intended to describe only the course of that particular transaction and not to apply to any other case.’ I never received a single vessel from the coast of Africa at any time, nor any body for us.”

Then Mr. Forster says, “Then that statement is entirely untrue?—Totally, from beginning to end; we never did so, and nobody for us; and nobody to our knowledge, or with our connivance; I deny it in the most distinct manner. In answer to Question 5487, Mr. Macaulay is asked, ‘Have you any thing further to say with regard to the connexion of Zulueta with the slave trade?’ The answer is, ‘I would refer to his connexion with the Gollupchik, which was lately captured. In that case it appeared that the vessel went out direct to the Gallinas from London.’—That is the same vessel as the Augusta, which I have already explained; it formerly bore the name of Gollupchik.”

Then he is asked about some other matters, but as they have not been made the subject of evidence here I will not comment upon them. He speaks upon the moral point, and he enters into a very lengthened statement in which he says, “I am not here to discuss the moral propriety or impropriety of the slave trade; I have my own opinions upon it, and if I thought it was a justifiable trade I should not shrink from expressing it.” That is the result of a long statement: and, in answer to a very comprehensive question of Sir Thomas Acland, “You have stated in your letter, that your principle is, that of ‘not wishing to derive profit or advantage from the sufferings of humanity, whether avoidable or unavoidable,’ and you have acted upon that principle?”—He says, “That is the principle upon which we have acted.” Then there is a great deal about the nature of various other transactions.

Then we come to something that appears upon another point—a point made a distinct matter, and which I very much rejoice is the last one to which I shall have to refer, and that not requiring any large consumption of your time. Among other reasons urged upon you as tending to the conclusion that this ship, was dispatched for the purposes of the slave trade was this by Mr. Serjeant Bompas, that the vessel in the course of the voyage unnecessarily put into Cadiz, as if there was some previous concert or arrangement that the vessel though dispatched nominally for the Gallinas should go to Cadiz, and that there some one or other should afford them facilities for carrying on the slave trade. Upon that I have some observations to make. First, one does not see how that was to be better promoted by touching at Cadiz than if she had proceeded direct to the Gallinas, and for this reason, if it had been found when she arrived on the coast of Africa that she had taken on board any materials to facilitate the carrying on the slave trade, that would be something to draw an inference from; but no such thing appears. Why she should have touched there to facilitate the carrying on the slave trade I do not understand, and still less do I understand why it is to be imputed to Mr. Zulueta that a vessel to all outward appearance cleared for the Gallinas, that it was intended she should touch at Cadiz; and I pray you to answer the question to yourselves, you cannot answer it to me, if it was intended for the purpose of good or evil she should touch there, why conceal it? Why not give out “with liberty to touch at Cadiz,” if any suspicion attached to the transaction?

Foreman of the Jury. Did we not understand that the English sailors were landed at Cadiz, and took in Spanish sailors there?

Mr. Kelly. No, some English sailors were discharged; but there is nothing about the Spanish sailors being taken in: there is nothing about that—some English sailors, two or three of them, did go on shore, but it was not in any way connected with Mr. Zulueta, or to which he could be a party. You understand, when they had sailed from England some of the sailors rebelled and mutinied; the captain, like a clear-sighted man, said, if I go to Cork these men will all leave me; I will not do that, but as it is necessary to go somewhere, I will go to Cadiz. It was not the result of any previous concert. They say it was intended before he left that he should stop there. If it had been intended I do not see why it should not have been stated in the charter-party, it would not have had a more suspicious appearance that the vessel should touch there than go to the Gallinas direct, the suspicion of the slave trade was the mention of the Gallinas. Captain Denman, who knew the place, might draw his suspicious inference from the mention of the Gallinas, but nobody would suspect it from Cadiz. It was from some mutiny of the men, added to the stress of weather, the master would not go to Cork, he went to Cadiz: it was an event arising from something in the course of the voyage, and not from any thing that occurred before the vessel left England, and it was when the vessel left England that the participation of Mr. Zulueta in the whole transaction ceased; but if it were of any importance for the purpose of the prosecution, you should have had it distinctly explained to you what took place on board the vessel, what the nature of the bad weather was which should have made it desirable to go to Falmouth or to Cork: why do they not produce the log? they have the ship’s papers.

Mr. Serjeant Bompas. My learned friend says he has not it.

Mr. Kelly. How did they get the papers from the Admiralty? The log is on board the vessel; some of the crew were on board; none of them were produced but the cabin-boy, who knew nothing; it was more convenient to bring a boy who knew nothing, than men who should enlighten you upon the object. But whether it was for a good or bad purpose that Captain Jennings went to Cadiz, what had Mr. Zulueta to do with it? To make it of any importance, the prosecutor should have proved that Mr. Zulueta had contrived, for some purpose or other, that he should touch at Cadiz. Nothing of the kind is proved upon the subject; all that is said upon the subject is what Mr. Zulueta says. Now what is it that he says? The Chairman says, “It would appear from Question 5087, that your name is supposed to have been mentioned in a Parliamentary Paper, as connected with a slave trade transaction. Will you refer to page 38, in Class B. Paper of 1839 and 1840, which is the place referred to in the answer, and see if there is any trace of your name in that transaction?—I do not find my own name there; I only find an allusion at the bottom to the name of Pedro Martinez, but in a manner in no way connected with me, and stating a circumstance which I never knew. In Question 7965*, it is stated, ‘The Augusta had touched at Cadiz on her way out from England?’ The answer is, ‘Yes, and landed part of her cargo at Cadiz, although it was consigned to be delivered at Gallinas.’ Now Captain Hill, who has given this answer, must have known why she touched at Cadiz, and why she discharged part of her cargo, for it must be in the log-book of the vessel. It was because she was nearly wrecked in her passage; she put into Cadiz in distress, and there she landed a part of her cargo, which was tobacco which was rotten, and sold for the benefit of the underwriters. Now that has not been stated here, but I think Captain Hill must have known it, because it is in the log-book of the vessel which he took.”

Now Captain Hill has said the same thing here to-day—the purpose of going to Cadiz was by some previous contrivance, for some purpose of Mr. Zulueta. The log would have shown the state of the weather registered from day to day during the passage of the vessel, and the rebellious part of the crew would have no desire to give Mr. Zulueta much benefit by their evidence.

Mr. Serjeant Bompas. It is not fair for Mr. Kelly to state that: the log would not be evidence against Mr. Zulueta. After you had decided against four documents, I would not offer a fifth.

Mr. Kelly. I have to thank my learned friend for this very singular instance of his forbearance; if the log, as it regards this transaction, was not evidence against me, and I do not say it would be, I cannot understand how letters written by other persons found in the vessel could be evidence against me;—but let us waste no more time upon that subject; if the log would not be evidence, he might have called some or the crew; he has only called the cabin-boy; there is no evidence to show the state of the weather; and you are called upon in a case like this to suppose that there was some previous contrivance by which the Captain was to touch at Cadiz.

Then he says, in answer to another question, and the question is directly put to him by Sir Thomas Acland, “It was not intended when she left England, that she should put into Cadiz?—Most certainly not; all the facts of the case show that she went there because she was obliged. I have not seen the log-book, but it must be there; because in the log-book the captain is bound to enter those things, and whoever captured the vessel must have seen the log-book of course. In answer to Question 7967*, it is said, ‘Messrs. Zulueta must be aware that it is contrary to law to act as agents or otherwise for the shipment of goods that are to be employed in the slave trade; they were bound to do nothing illegal; they are merchants residing in England, and they must conform themselves to the laws of England, and they cannot by the laws of England plead ignorance of those laws.’ Now I and my partners are British subjects, and therefore we are bound by the law, and we must obey the law; and I say that to endeavour to elude the law is criminal in my estimation of things. In the answer to Question 7970*, it is stated, ‘I have endeavoured to be particular in making it appear that this vessel was chartered to a place where there were no constituted authorities.’ I think that in the Gallinas there are constituted authorities. It is the first time that I ever heard that it is illegal for any merchant to ship goods for any places without ascertaining beforehand whether there are constituted authorities there.” Then, at the end of his examination, he is asked, “You have given the Committee the names of the parties drawing the bills, and on whose account they were drawn, and you speak of their being drawn in favour of Sierra Leone houses; have you any objection to furnish the names of the houses in whose favour they were drawn?—I say that I have no objection, except that I should not like to introduce names unnecessarily; but the bills are in my hands, and any gentleman can look at them who chooses; they are at the disposal of any body who likes to look at them.” He says, in another part of the evidence which refers to the documents, “I do not like in this transaction to mention names; any gentleman may see at my counting-house documents to verify what I state.” Gentlemen, I am reminded that it will appear that he put in the bills themselves in order to verify the statement; they were produced before the Committee, it is written down in express terms—“The witness produced the bills;” so that you see, when he makes a statement of what were his transactions, he verifies it by the documents, and produces them to the Committee.

Then, the next day, he states a fact which is perfectly conclusive as to this matter at Cadiz. He is asked, “The Committee understand that you have some further observations to make upon the evidence which has been given with reference to your house?—With reference to the destination of the Augusta, from Liverpool to Gallinas, and the fact of its having put into Cadiz unforeseen and unpremeditated altogether, in consequence of stress of weather, I omitted to mention a circumstance which will put the thing beyond doubt, and it is this: an insurance was made at Lloyd’s, from Liverpool to the Gallinas, and it is well known that, of course, we should have forfeited the insurance by going to any other port except from the peril of the sea, and the British consul at Cadiz is well aware of the circumstance, because he is Lloyd’s agent there; and therefore he had to interfere in the whole proceeding; without his sanction nothing could have been done. We have called upon the underwriters upon that account, and it has been paid, and which would not have been paid without its being proved. I stated yesterday that the transactions of my house with Pedro Martinez & Co. of the Havannah, with Blanco and Carvalho of the Havannah, and with Pedro Martinez of Cadiz, had amounted in the twenty years to 100,000l., I was afraid of overrating the amount; but on reference to the books of the house, I find that our transactions with them in twenty years have amounted to 400,000l., out of which the 22,000l. that was mentioned is the whole amount of goods that have been shipped by their orders for the coast of Africa.”

Now observe what he here states: he says, I am charged with having known, before this vessel quitted England, that she was to go to Cadiz, and that it was for some unlawful and improper purpose. He says—Not only do I deny that I knew it (I say not only is there no proof that he knew it, but he gives this convincing evidence), he says, before the vessel sailed I effected an insurance upon the ship and goods, and by that policy of insurance there was no provision for going to Cadiz. I need not observe that by the law, if a vessel deviates from the course stipulated in the policy, unless it is matter of compulsion and stress of weather, the policy is forfeited—here it is clear that there was a policy effected, under which the vessel was in no condition to touch at Cadiz—the policy would be forfeited; and yet it is supposed that this old established house, having effected this policy, into which they might have introduced the going to Cadiz, contrived that this deviation should take place, under which, if a loss had happened, they could not have recovered a shilling. It is perfectly clear, whether by accident or design, with which we have nothing to do—I think it was by accident—it is perfectly clear, that Zulueta & Co. knew nothing of it; and if a loss had happened, they could not have enforced it.

Now there are one or two more lines, and one or two only, with which I have to trouble you in this evidence. The witness is asked as to the former transactions of his house upon the coast of Africa: he is asked, “Have you bought other vessels for him (Martinez) than those which have been employed in the slave trade?—Yes, decidedly so; there was the Star, Captain Jennings.” You remember, I think, Captain Denman said there was no lawful trade carried on at the Gallinas—the question is, how far Mr. Zulueta knew that, and I asked him if he had heard of the Star; he said “No.” See what Mr. Zulueta says, “There was the Star, Captain Jennings. That vessel was sent from here to the Gallinas, precisely the same as the Augusta has been sent. She delivered her cargo; she went from thence to Cape Coast, I believe, and from there to Madeira; she received a cargo of wheat; she came back to Spain, and she was sold at Liverpool to a third party, not Martinez, or any body connected with him; in fact, she was sold for very little. The object of that vessel was just the same as the Augusta, to maintain a legal trade with Gallinas; that is within my own knowledge.”

Now I do think—I should rather say I venture to submit to you—that it appears to me, that this answer which might clearly have been contradicted, because there are specific facts stated which could have been contradicted if untrue—this answer, if true, is perfectly decisive of this case. What is it? Gentlemen, this is the nature of the transaction: he says—My house has had other transactions of the same description with the coast of Africa; we sent out the Star to this very place, the Gallinas. And the question is, whether Messrs. Zulueta & Co. had any reason to know that this was an illegal trade. If the goods had to their knowledge been bartered for slaves, if the Star had brought an illegal cargo, and if she had been seized and condemned for slave trading, then they might begin to suspect—Here is one vessel we have sent to the Gallinas for Martinez & Co. seized, we must consider before we send any more. But here was a case in which they had sent in a ship, commanded by Captain Jennings, a cargo of the same description—the transaction had been legally completed without any thing partaking of an illegal character—the ship had taken a cargo of wine and gone to some other part of the world, and then returned to England and been sold at Liverpool. Then I pray of you—and nothing can be safer than to ask you—to put yourselves for a moment in the situation of the party charged with this offence. Suppose that you had been charged with putting on board a ship a quantity of merchandise for the Gallinas—the question is, if you would have any reason to suspect there was any thing illegal in it? If you had the year before, when these British cruizers were in the seas, sent a cargo of the same goods for the same house to the same place, and the transaction had been legally completed, and if you had heard that the ship had carried a cargo of goods to Madeira, would not you say, I have done one transaction of this kind, I know nothing illegal in it, and I may enter into another of the same description? And that it was so here, you have the evidence that the Star had been there, a case in all forms of this transaction, and never impugned in the slightest degree. The present transaction of the Augusta is of the same character, and yet you are asked to believe that Zulueta & Co. knew that this last transaction was altogether unlawful and to encourage the slave trade, when they had completed a former transaction without any suspicion of any thing illegal in it.

Then he is asked some questions about the nature of the trade, and he says, “I could not say what trade there is at the Gallinas of a legal nature, but I know that those vessels would have taken nothing if there was nothing legal to take, from that place to the Havannah, or to any other place; I am aware that my answers upon this point must be deficient, because I am really very ignorant of the trade of the West Coast of Africa.” You are called upon to believe that this is all false, that he knew all about it; and he says—“At this period I am ignorant of it:” and it is not because a man is ignorant that he is to be impeached. He is asked, “Do you suppose that the vessels would be used to carry on a legal trade?—Most certainly I do; because persons find it worth while to send goods there constantly. The Committee will observe, that what the application of the goods is afterwards I cannot say, but I speak of the fact of the vessels having gone there with the intention of returning to the Havannah to bring a cargo of some description here, to pay a freight, and then to go again with the same kind of goods to Africa.” Then he is asked about Liverpool; and the Chairman says, “You have stated before, that you have cleared out for the Gallinas from Liverpool?—Yes.” “In carrying on operations of that kind, should you have ever thought it necessary to exercise any disguise as to what part of Africa you were clearing out for?—Not at all.” Nor did he. “You did not imagine, that in being the instrument of sending lawful goods to any part of Africa you were doing any thing which required concealment?—Nothing at all of the kind; and the proof of that is, that in the bills of entry in Liverpool any body could see our names as consignees of the vessel, and see entries made in our names of every thing.”

Now here again is a matter in which the prosecutors might, if they had thought proper, have contradicted this gentleman, and overset the foundation of his case. He says—“True it is that the goods may have been shipped in the name of Captain Jennings, but the whole of the transactions were conducted by our house, and the name of our house appeared in all the documents in Liverpool.” It is impossible there should have been any concealment: they might have produced the documents, or official copies of them, from Liverpool, and have shown that the shipment was not in the name of Zulueta & Co., and have contradicted him; they have produced no one document, and you are bound to suppose that it is true; and if it was so done—and there is no doubt of it, though Captain Jennings’s name may have been mentioned as the shipper, what becomes of the charge of secrecy, or any thing clandestine? It fades away before you, and vanishes before the truth, as it now appears.

Then he is asked, “Is not there a document officially published daily in London and at Liverpool, stating the daily entries at the Custom-house of all goods shipped, with the description of the goods, and the name of the port and of the shipper?—Yes, there is.” “Is not this printed from time to time in the public papers?”—There were on the Committee people connected with Liverpool, and knew every thing about the trade, or they could not have put these questions.—“It is in general circulation; there is hardly any merchant in Liverpool or in London who is not possessed of one. The Liverpool entries are reprinted in London, Liverpool being such an important place of business. The bill printed in London contains also Liverpool, Hull, and Bristol.” Then he is asked, “So that every such transaction is perfectly notorious to every one?—Notorious to every one who chooses to read the public papers. There is another thing which escaped me, till I came into the room this morning. As I have been in the business from my childhood, I know every thing that is going on in it.” Then he speaks of the Arrogante, but as that has not been made the subject of evidence, I do not trouble you with it. Then he was asked, “whether the Augusta was equipped for the slave trade the second time; the answer was ‘She was not.’ I wish to state, that before any goods were put on board of her”—he states, that an order was given, which we have evidence was obeyed—“it was our express wish and order that every thing in her that was fit for that trade should be taken down and the vessel put in the same condition as any other merchant vessel; and we should not have loaded any thing in her if that had not been done. It is stated in the evidence that the Augusta was consigned to three notorious slave dealers; now we had never in our lives heard of the name of any one of the parties to whom she was consigned.”

Now, Gentlemen, what becomes then of the evidence you had from either of the honourable officers called before you to prove that they, who almost lived upon the coast of Africa, knew that these parties were notorious slave dealers? and yet you are called upon to infer that Mr. Zulueta, who had never been there in his life, knew it himself, notwithstanding this account which he gave when not charged with felony. If he gave it now you might suspect it, but it was a voluntary statement; he need not have gone voluntarily to tell a series of falsehoods, he might have left it uncontradicted; but he is asked with reference to the persons to whom these vessels were consigned, Alvarez, Rolo, and Nimenes, and he says, “neither he, nor any of his house, ever heard of the names before.” If it were otherwise it could be proved, and it is not proved. His evidence is used against him, and it is surely but fair to use it as far as it goes for him. You have this young man freely coming forward and stating that, as to these parties to whom the goods were consigned, “I knew very little about it, and as to these people I never heard of any one of them.” Then, what becomes of the effect of the evidence of Captain Denman and others, which no doubt they have given truly, as to the nature of the slave trade? This gentleman never having been there and knowing nothing about it, how can you fix this dreadful charge of guilt upon him upon evidence which leaves him entirely untouched upon this important part of the case, and untouched by this part of the evidence given by himself?

There is a good deal more said in the course of the evidence which I do not feel it right to read. I know you must be wearied as I am myself by the exertions it has been my duty to make, and therefore I do not go over the rest of the evidence. The effect of the whole is, that as to these goods having been shipped, and this vessel consigned to the coast of Africa under the circumstances you have heard mentioned, the part that was taken in it by Mr. Zulueta, the prisoner, was but a small part, but as far as it went it was perfectly legal. The question remaining is, whether he participated in the transaction with the object, that is in order to accomplish the object, of the slave trade. That is the question to be submitted to you. The whole evidence shortly stated is, that Captain Denman and others familiar with the spot knew that the slave trade was carried on there to a very great extent, but the evidence does not show that this unfortunate gentleman, the prisoner, knew any thing of the place or the persons by whom it was carried on, that is a matter of speculation, and the only mode in which the case could be completed so as to induce you to find a verdict of guilty is, by bringing before you the evidence he himself gave upon the subject.

Gentlemen, take that evidence as it is; I am sure you will consider it fairly—consider it altogether; consider that if it had been false in its material parts, it could have been contradicted, and if it be true, as you have every reason to believe it is, what does it prove? It proves that these gentlemen, in trading with Spain and Portugal, and Africa and the Brazils, must trade with persons more or less engaged in the slave trade, and it proves his own solemn declaration, that in this transaction, as in every other in which the house was ever engaged, neither he, nor as far as he knows, his father or grandfather, ever had any participation, direct or indirect, to the most minute particular in this nefarious trade. He does not confine himself to a mere denial; he states facts, and points to other facts as far as concerns his father and the early history of the house; he details the taking of slaves under a bankrupt estate, and liberating them at a time when there were not the same opinions upon the subject which happily exist; he points to those facts as in confirmation of his solemn declaration, that as far as his own knowledge goes, that neither himself, nor to his belief his father, nor his family, nor any member of the house were directly or indirectly concerned in the trade, but endeavoured earnestly, and heartily endeavoured, to discountenance it.

Gentlemen, such is the case before you, and I have only to say in conclusion, not only do these facts appear in evidence before you, but I shall call before you a body of witnesses to the character of this gentleman; I shall call before you some of the most honourable and eminent men in the City of London in all branches of commerce, who have known this gentleman in trade, and in every way; and they will all tell you, Gentlemen, that to their experience and knowledge, according to the language in which they may express themselves, what was told you by one witness in the box before you, that this young man was a good son, a good brother, a good father, and a good and honourable member of society, incapable of wilfully evading or violating the law. Such is the character he has hitherto sustained, such is the character I shall sustain before you, and when I have called those witnesses to establish that character, rare indeed for a man so young, I shall then with confidence, under the Judge’s directions, leave this case in your hands, knowing well that when all that is dear in life, and all that which is more dear than life, his honour, is resting upon your verdict; it will not be upon vague suspicions, not upon doubts, but upon what does not exist here, clear and direct and positive proof of guilt, that you will convict him of that offence, of which he is incapable from his heart’s core.

I shall sit down confidently awaiting your verdict of Not Guilty, which will restore this young man to that high and honourable station, and to that happiness which he has hitherto worthily enjoyed.

EVIDENCE FOR THE PRISONER.

Mr. James Cook, sworn. Examined by Mr. Bodkin.

Do you reside in London?—Yes.

Are you a colonial-broker?—I am a colonial-broker under the firm of Truman and Cooke.

How long have you known the prisoner at the bar?—From ten to fifteen years.

What character has he borne during the time you have known him?—A very high character: I consider Mr. Zulueta to be one of the most honourable men in the City of London. It falls to my lot to be acquainted with a very large circle of the mercantile community. I am in close connexion with most of the large houses—Messrs. Baring, Messrs. Rothschilds, and houses of that stamp—and if I were put in a position to make any exception as to honour and integrity among the houses I have named, including Mr. Zulueta, the young man at the bar, I should put my finger upon him as the exception, as the most honourable and most straightforward man I ever knew.

Is that the mode in which you have heard him spoken of among mercantile men?—I believe I may say, without exception, it is generally understood to be so.

[Adjourned.

THIRD DAY. MONDAY, 30TH OCTOBER, 1843.

The names of the Jury were called over.—All present.

The Defendant took his place within the Bar.

Alderman Sir John Pirie, Bart., sworn. Examined by Mr. Bodkin.

I believe you are extensively connected with trade and shipping in the City of London?—Yes.

Do you know the house of Zulueta & Co.?—Perfectly.

And the defendant, who we understand is one of the firm?—I believe so.

How long have you been acquainted with him?—I should think about twelve years.

What character during that time has he borne among those who have known him for veracity and honour as a British merchant?—I have always considered him as one of the most respectable merchants in the City of London; a gentleman very unlikely to give encouragement to this nefarious trade.

Anselmo de Arroyave, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

I believe you live in Tavistock Square?—Yes.

Are you a merchant of this City?—Yes.

Extensively engaged in business?—Yes.

Do you know the gentleman who stands behind you, Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—Yes.

How long have you been acquainted with his firm?—With his firm I have been acquainted about thirty-two years—the firm in Spain.

How long have you known the gentleman who stands at the bar?—I should think about twelve years.

What character has the house, and himself a member of it, borne for the honourable nature of their transactions, their integrity, and their compliance with the laws of this country?—I always heard that they were men of the most correct principle in all dealings; his father and grandfather always bore the best character.

Mr. Justice Maule. I understand the gentleman to give him a very high character; I cannot hear the expressions.

Mr. Clarkson. Is there a house, in your judgment, in the City of London, which bears a higher character for principle and honour than the house of Zulueta?—It stands second to none.

Thomas Hallifax, Esq. sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you a banker of the firm of Glyn, Mills, & Co.?—I am.

How long have you known the gentleman who stands before you?—The firm have been known to our house, I believe, eighteen or nineteen years; I cannot say the precise time I became acquainted with Mr. Zulueta, but I should say from ten to fifteen years.

Have you had an opportunity of knowing during that time the reputation he bore in the City of London for the honour and integrity of his dealings and conduct?—I believe him to bear the highest possible character; I believe him to be a man of the highest honour, and the most amiable disposition. I have known him as connected with his eminent firm in the City, and also in private, and I have great pleasure in giving to the best of my knowledge the high character he has borne from his amiability and irreproachable conduct.

Samson Ricardo, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you a merchant of the City of London?—I am a member of the Stock Exchange.

Are you acquainted with Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—Very well.

You know the house and the whole of the members?—Yes, perfectly.

Have you had transactions with them?—Yes.

What has been the character and reputation of the gentleman in the dock for honour and integrity in his personal conduct and his mercantile dealings?—The highest possible, and most straightforward: he is quite incapable of engaging in any transactions of a questionable nature.

The Honourable Baron Lionel de Rothschild, sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you acquainted with the gentleman who stands in the dock?—Yes.

How long have you known him?—I have known him the best part of twenty years.

What character has he borne for honour and humanity as a man of business?—Most highly honourable as respects personal character, and as respects his firm the best and most straightforward.

Is he a man of humane disposition?—I should think perfectly so, incapable of being connected in any way with the offence charged.

Manuel Gregorio de Isasi, sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you a merchant of this City?—Yes.

Where do you carry on your business?—In Water Lane.

Are you concerned in shipping at all?—No.

What is the business in which you are engaged?—A wine-merchant.

Are you acquainted with Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—From his childhood.

Did you go to school with him?—Yes.

You knew him before he came to this country?—Yes, quite well, at Cadiz.

You are yourself from Cadiz?—Yes.

Have you had an opportunity of forming an opinion of the character he bears and deserves for integrity and honour, and his feelings of humanity in his personal character?—The highest, and his family at Cadiz. I should say that in every relation of life it is so.

José Maria Barrero, sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

You are at the head of the consulate of this country from Spain?—I am.

Are you acquainted with Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—Yes.

Have you known him long and well?—About twenty years.

That is very much the greater part of his life I suppose?—Yes.

What has been his conduct and character in the City of London?—The highest possible.

Are you acquainted with him in his relations in private life, as well as his conduct as a merchant?—Yes.

Have you had an opportunity of knowing whether his character and conduct in private life have been altogether unexceptionable?—Yes.

Charles Tottie, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you a merchant in this country?—Yes.

Are you also at the head of the consulate of Spain?—I am consul for Sweden and Norway.

Do you know Mr. Zulueta and his firm?—Yes.

What have you to say to his Lordship and the Jury respecting his character for integrity and humanity?—I have known Mr. Pedro de Zulueta for upwards of fourteen or sixteen years, and I always considered him of the highest character, and a truly Christian man. His cousins and my sons went to school together.

What has been his character for humanity and veracity?—Oh, very high.

Dr. Neil Arnott, sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Your name is Neil Arnot?—Yes.

You are a physician?—Yes.

Do you know the gentleman who stands by your side?—I have known him from his youth as physician to the family.

Have you had an opportunity of forming a judgment with relation to the character he has borne for honour and integrity as an individual and as a merchant?—From the many opportunities I have had of conversing with him, and knowing him in the character of a physician to his family, I have had an opportunity; also, as physician to most of the Spanish ambassadors; and I have known him as a countryman of theirs.

What character has he borne?—His father spared nothing on his education; it was the best this country could afford.

Is he a man of veracity and humanity?—In all the relations of life, kindred, friendship, and acquaintance, I consider him as standing very high.

Has he always borne the character of a humane, upright, Christian man?—As much as possible.

Charles Dodd, Esq., sworn.

I believe you are a solicitor?—I am.

Where do you live?—In Billiter Street, my house of business.

Are you acquainted with Pedro de Zulueta the prisoner?—I am.

I believe you have known him from his youth?—I have known him for twelve or fourteen years most intimately. I have the highest possible opinion of his honour and his integrity, and his moral and religious character. I have considered it a great blessing that my sons formed a strict intimacy with him, believing him as incapable of committing an offence against the law as it is possible for a man to be.

Christobal de Murrieta, sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you of the firm of Aguirre Solarte and Murrieta, merchants of London?—Yes.

Do you know the gentleman who stands in the dock?—Yes.

How long have you known him?—About eighteen years.

What is the reputation which he has borne for honour, veracity, uprightness of conduct, and humanity, during the whole of the time you have known him?—The highest in both ways.

You mean the highest in all ways?—Yes.

Mr. Charles Dodd, Jun., sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

You are the son of the gentleman who has been just examined?—I am.

Have you formerly been at school with the prisoner at the bar?—No, I have not been at school with him; I have known him since the year 1831.

What opinion have you formed as to his character for honour, veracity, and integrity of conduct?—I do not believe a more honourable man exists. I have felt the greatest pleasure in his acquaintance since when I first left school; and when I was forming those acquaintances which would conduct me through life, there is no man whose society I regretted losing more than Pedro de Zulueta’s when he left Camberwell.

Hugh Sandeman, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you a stock-broker in this City?—Yes.

Do you know Mr. Zulueta?—Yes, perfectly well, for sixteen years.

What opinion have you formed of him during that time?—Of the very highest description, and in all my intercourse with houses in the Royal Exchange, I have never found but the same opinion was expressed by all of him as a private individual, and as a member.

Has his moral and religious character been perfectly unexceptionable—Perfectly so.

William Gibbs, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you of the firm of Anthony Gibbs & Son of this City?—I am.

Do you know the house of Zulueta & Co.?—Perfectly well.

And every one of its members?—Perfectly well.

Have you had an opportunity of ascertaining the reputation which Mr. Pedro Zulueta has enjoyed in the City; whether it is an unexceptionable character, morally as well as religiously speaking?—I consider him as entitled to the highest honourable character. I have always heard him so described.

Have his transactions been to your knowledge of that character?—Perfectly; all marked with integrity and honourable conduct.

Timothy Bevington, Esq., solemnly affirmed. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

Are you a member of the Society of Friends?—I am.

The Society has expended much money and labour to put down the traffic to which reference has been made in the course of this trial?—Yes.

Do you know Mr. Pedro Zulueta?—Yes.

How long have you known him?—The last ten years.

What character has he borne during that time?—Excellent.

Do you know the house of which he is a member?—Very well; they have been my next door neighbours for many years.

Regard being had to the nature of the charge against him, what can you say as to his general character for uprightness and honour?—I have been perfectly satisfied in all the transactions I have had with him.

Have you always heard him spoken of as a man of humane and honourable conduct and feelings?—Perfectly so.

William Tindal, Esq., solemnly affirmed. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

You are a member of the Society of Friends?—I am of that persuasion.

Are you a ship-owner of the City of London?—I am.

Do you know Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—I know him well.

How long have you known him?—I have known the elder Mr. Zulueta for fifty years; the younger one ever since he came over.

During that time have you had opportunities of ascertaining the general character and reputation he has borne in all the relations of life?—Yes.

What can you say to his Lordship and the Jury in those respects?—He has been a very exemplary character, both as a merchant and in moral character in every way.

Do you know a house in the City of London which stands higher than that house?—There is not one; and also they have the same reputation in Cadiz.

For humanity and integrity?—Yes, for humanity and integrity, and in every way as merchants.

Samuel Jones Loyd, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

You are a banker in the City of London?—I am.

Do you know the house of Zulueta & Co., of which this gentleman is a partner?—I have no personal knowledge of the gentleman, but I know the house by character.

What character did the house bear in the City of London for general honour?—They have a very high reputation in every respect as mercantile men.

Frederick Huth, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Bodkin.

Are you a merchant in the City of London?—I am.

I believe you are one of the Directors of the Bank of England?—My son is.

How long have you known the house of Zulueta & Co.?—For the period of forty years. I have known them forty years.

Are you acquainted with the member of the firm who is unfortunately where he is now?—Perfectly so.

How long have you known him?—For twelve years.

As to individual character, how can you speak of him during the time you have known him with regard to integrity and humanity?—I cannot better describe him than that I know of no man in the City of London or any where else, a merchant, of whom I should give a higher character.

Have you ever heard a suggestion against his character as an individual, or against his regularity as a merchant?—Nothing whatever.

Abraham Mocatta, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Bodkin.

Are you one of the firm of Mocatta and Goldsmid?—I am.

You are bullion dealers in the City of London I believe?—Bullion merchants.

How long have you known Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—I have known him about sixteen years.

Have you also known the firm of which he is a member?—Yes, I have known them for that time or longer.

Have you any knowledge of their transactions in the City, the reputation they bear?—I have always understood them to bear the highest character that I have known as gentlemen of character. I have known the gentleman as a neighbour of mine for several years. He was in the habit of visiting our family, and we have the highest opinion of him; he was considered particularly humane and considerate of the wants of others.

Edwin Gower, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Bodkin.

Are you of the firm of Gower & Co.?—I am.

Merchants in this City?—Yes.

How long have you known Mr. Zulueta.—I have known him ever since he has been connected with the City of London, he and his senior.

And his family I suppose before him?—Yes.

What reputation has he enjoyed during the time you have known him, and his family, and the house as a mercantile firm?—I should say, as our connexions and theirs are very similar, we have almost daily more or less intercourse with him, and I never heard the most distant rumour against his character; I believe it to be quite unimpeachable: and the house, as a house of business, stands as high as any house in the City of London.

George Rougemont, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Bodkin.

Are you a merchant in the City?—I am.

How long have you known Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—I have known the house for a great number of years, and always heard it spoken of in the highest terms. Mr. Pedro de Zulueta I have been acquainted with and visited him perhaps six or eight years, and I have had frequent opportunities of seeing his conduct as a son, as a husband, as a father, and as a neighbour, and have always found it in the highest degree unexceptionable in every respect. I consider him an amiable and kind-hearted man, and quite incapable of any thing of the kind laid to his charge.

Joseph Sadler, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Bodkin.

Are you a merchant?—I am.

In the City of London?—Yes, Sadler, Harris, & Co. is my firm.

How long have you known Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—I have known him ten or twelve years.

What character has he appeared to bear as a man of integrity and humanity?—The very first character; I should say he is the last man I have known that I consider would be guilty of that which is charged.

F. I. Vanzeller, Esq., sworn. Examined by Mr. Clarkson.

You are the Portuguese consul I believe?—I am.

Do you know the house of Zulueta & Co.?—I have known it well.

Do you know Mr. Pedro de Zulueta?—I have known Mr. Pedro de Zulueta for ten years.

What character can you give of him, as a general character, to the Jury for humanity, integrity, and good conduct of every description?—The very highest character possible.

Is that the reputation which the house of which he is a member has borne in the city of London?—Certainly.

SUMMING UP.

Mr. Justice Maule. Gentlemen of the Jury—Pedro de Zulueta is indicted for an offence against an Act of Parliament made for the prevention of the slave trade, for employing a vessel for the purpose of accomplishing objects declared to be illegal by that Act; that is to say, dealing in slaves, and also having loaded goods on board a vessel for that purpose.

Now, although this case has occupied a very considerable portion of time, I do not think it will be necessary for me to add much to it in the observations I shall think it necessary to make to you with respect to the evidence. It is not very long, and the points to which it goes are not very numerous—I mean the evidence on the substance of the charge. The case occupied about fifteen hours on Friday and Saturday, but the evidence did not occupy much above four hours. It will not be necessary for me to occupy much time in observations upon it, and I should think it will not be necessary for me to read over the evidence.

The offence, as I have told you, is put in these two shapes—the employing a vessel, and the loading goods for a purpose prohibited by the statute; that is, for the purpose of dealing in slaves. The charge is not, it does not necessarily import, nor is it necessary to support it, that it should be proved that the ship in question, the Augusta, was intended to be used for the conveyance of slaves from the coast of Africa. If there was a slave adventure—if there was an adventure of which the object was that slaves should be brought from the coast of Africa, that there should be slave trading there, and if this vessel was dispatched and employed for the purpose of accomplishing that object, although it was intended to accomplish that object otherwise than by bringing home the slaves in that vessel, that is within the Act of Parliament. So, if the goods were loaded for the purpose of accomplishing the slave trade—whether it was intended to bring back the slaves in the vessel in question, or that they should be brought away in some other vessel, or whether that was a matter left undecided at the commencement of the adventure, and to be determined according as matters might turn out to be convenient for the accomplishment of it—in any of these cases the crime charged in this indictment would be committed, the allegations in the indictment would be supported, and the prohibition of the Act of Parliament would be violated. The Act would have been very imperfect indeed, if it had prohibited slave trading and had not prevented any dealing of that description, except where the same vessel was to bring home the slaves; if, at all events, it went out for the purpose of carrying goods which were to be bartered for them. From one of the witnesses, who, in the course of his public duty was conversant with what takes place on this slave coast of Africa, we hear that it frequently happens that the slaves are got away by a different vessel from that which carries out the goods which formed the fund for their purchase. That is the nature of the offence.

Gentlemen, I do not think there will be any great difficulty in some of the preliminary questions you will have to decide upon this occasion. One is, whether the prisoner at the bar did at all dispatch, did at all employ this vessel, the Augusta, or did at all load any goods on board; because, though a person may employ a vessel and load goods—he may do that quite innocently—the fact, that he employed a vessel and loaded goods, is by no means conclusive of his guilt till you go further and show that he did it for the illegal purpose charged in the indictment. If it had not been shown that the prisoner at the bar did employ the vessel, or load the goods, the inquiry would have been stopped; for the purpose never could have been brought in question, and there would have been an end, or rather there would have been no beginning of this enquiry: but with respect to that branch of the case, there appears to have been no doubt made on the part of the prisoner that he did employ this vessel. He says he did it as the agent of Pedro Martinez & Co., and that he did it without knowing what the purpose was for which the vessel was employed, or whether it was employed in the slave trade; and that he did load the goods on board the ship—and there appears to be to the value of a good many thousand pounds, a considerable cargo (the value I get only from the cockets), a considerable quantity of goods. The vessel undoubtedly was dispatched with the knowledge of the prisoner and through his agency to carry goods to the coast of Africa. So much does not seem to be a matter in dispute.

Then the matters in dispute are two—one, whether this vessel was dispatched for the purpose of slave trading at all; if it was not, there is an end of all question. If it appears that there was no slave trading, or intention of slave trading, no person is guilty of the violation of the law charged in this indictment. There is no offence on the part of any one, if a slave adventure was not contemplated by the persons engaged in this transaction. Unless you decide that question in the affirmative, that is to say, unless you think there was such an adventure, there is no case made at all against the prisoner at the bar. It has been contended, and strenuously—not in a separate form, but mixed up with the other point in the case to which I will next draw your attention—it has been contended on the part of the prisoner, that there was no slave adventure, that the ship Augusta went to the Gallinas loaded in this way not for the purpose of dealing in slaves, or for any unlawful purpose, but that she went either for some lawful purpose, or else without any purpose of dealing at all: you will say whether there could be any such possibility. It has been contended that at any rate the ship did not go for the purpose of slave trading. If you are of opinion there was no slave trading contemplated, that that was not the object of the voyage, there is an end of that question; but, supposing you should think there was slave dealing intended, and the vessel went out for the purpose of slave dealing, then there is another important question—and that is the object of the evidence to character—whether, supposing there was a slave trading intended, the prisoner was cognizant of it?

It appears from the evidence, that the Gallinas is a place described by some witnesses of great experience—two captains in the navy, and Colonel Nichol, who was the governor of a district in the neighbourhood, whose employment was mainly to watch the slave coast of which the Gallinas forms a part, and to contribute to the putting down the slave trade—that the Gallinas is a place of slave trading, and of no other trade at all. It seems that the Gallinas is a river navigable for vessels of some size about twelve miles, that there were some barracoons for slaves which were destroyed by Captain Denman—destroyed, as it is alleged, by Captain Denman some time ago—there being about six establishments called barracoons, which seem to be very large buildings in which five or six hundred negroes may be confined, and are confined when brought from the country till they can be exported in vessels carrying on this trade. These barracoons have, by way of appendages to them, store-houses for the various stores that may be wanted for those negroes, and also some places of residence for the Europeans, who appear to be some thirty in number, who live there; there is nobody else living there, except that there are two or three negro villages or towns, not places of any trade, but inhabited by those uncivilised savages. The country produces nothing, and exports nothing but slaves—that is the description of the place given by that gentleman. It is said, and I think with great probability, that the Gallinas is not generally known as a slave trading place, in fact, it seems very little known at all; it seems to be a place where any other description of felons may resort to concert their schemes and hide their stolen goods, and which, of course, they do not make public, and which is not likely to be known by honest and true people. Except those employed as police or otherwise in aid of justice, as these captains were, of course it would not be spoken of at all. There might be slave traders in London knowing it very well, but they would be perfectly silent probably, and hardly mention it by name even in speaking one to another. It is very probable, therefore, that the place was not very well known; that when these persons spoke of the Gallinas, they might say the Gallinas on the coast of Africa; and a person might be very conversant with the geography of Africa in an honest way, who had not been active in putting down the slave trade, and yet might not know where it was, except that it was on the coast of Africa. It is important to show not only that it is on the coast of Africa, but that it is itself a slave trading place; and that fact appears to be very evident from the case on the part of the prosecution. Probably those honest persons, those honestly dealing persons who know best about it, are those who have been called upon by their public duty to ascertain it. Such persons have been called, and they give it this character and description, and they state that it is distinguished from other parts of the coast of Africa; for on other parts of that coast it is said slaves are sold as one article of export, but that other things, such as palm oil—I believe that is the principle thing—and ivory, and wood, and other things, are sold in immense quantities on the coast of Africa; but that that is not the case at the Gallinas. They might be carrying out goods to other parts of Africa, intending to bring home palm-oil or slaves, as might be most profitable; they might intend to bring home an honest commodity, and not have to do with this dishonest and perilous commodity; but it appears difficult to conceive what a person carrying a cargo of goods to the Gallinas could intend to do with it, unless he intended to have those goods employed in the slave trade. The prisoner might say they were to be employed by others in the slave trade; that would be plain and simple: it is wrong, but it is a plain and simple account of that which was intended to be done. It is a place, as it appears, without any trade; and if there be an obvious plain interest in a person carrying goods to that place, it appears to me that it may be taken that they were for the purpose of the slave trade. If that be the plain and obvious inference, it appears to me that might be the inference very properly drawn by Colonel Nichol, that this was a slave adventure, unless the contrary were proved.

It is possible that this might be an adventure, not slave trading; if so, nothing can be more simple than to prove it; Martinez & Co. might prove that it is an honest adventure. If it was a dishonest adventure, it could not be expected that Martinez & Co. should be called to give evidence at all; but if it were an innocent adventure it would be very easy for them to be called. It is true that persons are to be convicted, not by evidence they did not produce, but by evidence produced against them; not on suspicion, but on conviction; but where such evidence is offered of the trade being slave trading, as is offered here, namely, that the vessel was loaded with goods, that a cargo of goods was dispatched to a place where slave trading is the only known object for which vessels ever go, a slave mart and nothing but a slave mart, you have a case, though it is an answerable case; but if the answer, which if it exist could be easily given, is not given, it may very fairly be inferred that the vessel was proceeding on a slaving voyage, a voyage either for the purpose of bringing home slaves, or of landing those goods for the purchase of slaves. That, Gentlemen, is the first question you have to consider. You will say whether, considering the nature of this charge, and considering that the vessel is chartered to go from this place to the Gallinas, that being the place and the only place mentioned in the charter-party for the outward voyage, she might have been subsequently employed in voyages to the West Indies or Madeira, at the discretion of the charterers; but it will be for you to say whether, in your judgment, in your opinion, on this occasion the vessel did not sail for the purpose of her being employed, or the goods on board her being employed, for the trading in slaves. If you are not satisfied of that, it will be your duty to give a verdict of not guilty. You need not trouble yourselves to go further, but the prisoner must be acquitted.

Gentlemen, I have not read over to you the evidence which establishes these facts I have mentioned to you, namely, that the vessel was chartered. You have heard the charter-party, and you have heard what Mr. Zulueta says in his evidence, that he did dispatch the vessel, and that the house were the agents in sending the vessel abroad, and in putting the goods on board; and you have heard the remainder of the evidence. I suppose I need not read the evidence which the captains gave at such great length.

Foreman of the Jury. No, my Lord.

Mr. Justice Maule. These are facts not disputed, except that it is disputed that the vessel went out for the purpose of slave trading—that is an inference to be drawn or not from the evidence.

Then the next question, and an important question is, whether the prisoner at the bar, Pedro de Zulueta, is a person who was cognizant of that fact. It certainly is a very grave and serious charge, and one of a very highly penal nature. It is, however, a trade, which till a recent period was lawful for persons in this country, and many persons of very good character certainly did engage in that trade, and a great number of persons justified it. I suppose those same persons would now say it is not to be engaged in, because it is a prohibited thing—it is a regulation of trade enforced by very severe penalties made by this country—but that the dealing in slaves is in itself a lawful, right, good, and proper thing, which ought not to be prohibited. Those persons would now consider slave trading as a thing prohibited only by positive regulation. There is no one who does not at once perceive that practical distinction between them. There is no person who, in point of feeling and opinion, does not perceive the difference there is between a thing which is prohibited by positive law, and that kind of thing, against which, if there were no law at all against it, the plain natural sense and conscience of mankind would revolt. This trading in slaves, in the opinion of a great many persons, is itself an abomination, a thing which ought to be considered with the greatest horror, whether prohibited or not; but those who think it was right when it was not prohibited, probably do not think it so very bad if it be committed now, since it has been prohibited by law, only that it is to be avoided on account of the penalty to which it subjects the individuals engaged in it.

This has some bearing on the question of how far considerations of character would have weight with respect to such an offence; but it is necessary undoubtedly on the part of the prosecution that there should be a case made of knowledge on the part of the prisoner, of the purpose for which this adventure was meant. Now, with respect to that, it is taken partly from what he says before the Committee of the House of Commons, and partly what is given in evidence here, that the house of Zulueta & Co., (of which the prisoner appears to be an active member, and with the whole proceedings of which in this matter he appears certainly according to the statement he himself made to the Committee of the House of Commons to have been quite conversant)—and it is admitted that the house of Zulueta were the doers in this country of whatever was done with respect to this vessel, the Augusta—the Augusta had been called the Gollupchik, had been captured as a slaving vessel, and she was then fitted up with the apparatus fitted to that traffic; she was brought to this country and proceeded against, and ultimately sold, whether sold under a condemnation which turned out effectual or not does not distinctly appear. Some one has said that the Russian Government claimed her, and she was given up to the Russian Government. It appears, however, that she was sold at Portsmouth; I think she was sold to Mr. Emanuel, or some person for whom he acted, for 600l., and the expenses, which were about 30l. Then she was bought with money furnished by Zulueta & Co., the amount being 650l.—it does not exactly appear by whom—according to the testimony one would say, bought by Jennings, who was employed as captain on the voyage in question, a letter having been previously written by the prisoner’s house, stating to Jennings that they could not give more than 500l., but it appears that ultimately 660l. was paid for her. On the occasion on which that money was paid, the witness says, “I sold her to Jennings and Bernardos; Bernardos came with Jennings—they came together and paid the money.” Now, probably you must not take that quite to the letter. This was a ship sold, not by means of a written instrument as the subject of a British registry, but as any other British chattel might be sold, such and such a bale of goods, merely by agreement altogether verbally, that one should have the goods and the other the money, the article being handed over when it was so sold. All that the seller cares for is, that he shall have his money. Whether there are one or a dozen persons present he may very properly, as a matter of business, leave it to them whether one or all of them is to pay the money. The witness who is called, Mr. Emanuel, seems to have thought that Bernardos and the other bought the vessel; but it seems, according to the charter-party, that the other party, Jennings, is the only purchaser. According to a representation I think made at the bar by Mr. Kelly, the real purchasers were Pedro Martinez & Co., who wanted Jennings for some purpose to appear as colourable owner, and wanted Jennings to command the vessel. An Englishman could not by the laws of Spain command a Spanish owned vessel, and Jennings therefore, if he was to command her, should be apparently made the owner of her, and that is the reason suggested why Jennings was made the owner (if he was the owner) by the desire of Pedro Martinez & Co.

At the end of the charter-party there is a recital, that whereas the owner, Jennings, is indebted to the charterer in a certain sum of money, as appears by an acknowledgment elsewhere, he consents that the earnings of the vessel shall be a lien for the money. Now that refers you see to another document, which other document, if we had it, would throw some light upon the transaction, but it is not called for or produced. The circumstance of Jennings being the commander, and made owner for the purpose of being the commander in apparent consistency with the law of Spain, may account for that which has been put very powerfully on the part of the prisoner as having been inexplicable on the supposition that any slave trade was intended; for, they say, if the slave trade was intended, why not have a Spanish captain; because then, though perhaps within the terms of the treaties there might be a power of search on the part of British cruizers, no power was given by foreigners which was not watched by those who gave that power, and such power might be exceeded by those who exercised it, who were not lawyers or special pleaders; and it is said it would be much more convenient in case of search to have that difficulty thrown in the way than the total absence of all difficulty which exists when a ship professes to be British owned. But if Jennings was an adventurer, if he were, as suggested, a very clever and intelligent person, and very conversant with every thing to be done on this occasion, a competent master of the vessel, supposing the slave trade to be intended, a thing which requires qualities one is sorry to see exercised so ill—a great deal of courage, sagacity, and presence of mind, and an unscrupulous readiness to employ them for the commission of this felony, not to be found in every body—a man of such a description would be the paramount object of a slave trader, whose aim would be, whoever the owner may be, to elude all search, so to manage the thing as that the cruizers of any country shall not stop him. Probably, if the adventure succeeds, it must succeed by such means; so that one sees a perfectly good reason why, consistently with this being a slave trading voyage, it may have been English owned.

The sale is negotiated in the first instance by Zulueta & Co.; they say they do it for Martinez. The vessel was bought by Bernardos or Jennings. I do not know whether I called your attention to that, that Bernardos was the man who commanded the vessel on an undoubted slave voyage when she was seized and brought into Portsmouth. Whether Pedro Martinez or the captain bought the ship, or however it was bought, that transaction appears to have been managed by Zulueta & Co., and through the intervention of Jennings.

Then there comes the transaction of chartering. The vessel was chartered subject to this proviso at the end of it, and the charter-party is negotiated entirely by Zulueta. Whatever Pedro Martinez & Co., supposing there were such persons (and it may be taken that there were such persons, though the evidence of there being such persons is, that Mr. Zulueta says so in his evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, and it is a fact the negative of which could easily have been proved, but it has not been proved); you may fairly assume, therefore, that there are such persons as Pedro Martinez & Co., for that observation of the learned counsel for the prisoner on the statement of Mr. Zulueta before the Committee is as far as it applies to that particular part of the evidence well founded, namely, that if it were not true the contrary might be proved; but that is not true in the generality to which Mr. Kelly applied it, for there might be a great many statements in that evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons which were not true, but which the prosecutor would not be allowed to prove were not true—I mean those not connected with this particular transaction. There are many things stated in that evidence, which I apprehend, if false, the prosecutor would not be entitled to prove the falsehood of; but I apprehend that does not apply to the existence of Pedro Martinez & Co. But they appear to have existed and to have employed as their agents in this country Pedro Zulueta & Co., and whatever is done in this country by Pedro Martinez is done by Pedro Zulueta & Co. just as much as if they had done it themselves; they knew as much about the matter as the parties themselves; they negotiated this charter-party, and they dispatched the vessel and put on board all the goods. The goods appear by the cockets to have been entered in the name of Captain Jennings; I do not know that that is a circumstance of any suspicion; it is not proved to be out of the way, and I do not see any good reason for suspecting the integrity of the transaction arising out of that particular circumstance. It seems to me, therefore, that Zulueta & Co. do stand in a very different situation from that put a considerable number of times to you by the learned counsel for the prisoner, namely, the situation of a person who is simply the manufacturer or dealer in goods, and who has those goods ordered, such a weight of gunpowder, and who inquiring, “Where shall I send it?” is answered, “Send it on board the Augusta, now lying at Liverpool.” It would be a strong thing from that circumstance to infer that a person sending that gunpowder had any thing to do with slave trading: but that appears not to be the nature of this transaction. In regard to there being a slave trading, all that is done, is done by Zulueta & Co. It is not merely that they had goods sent on board the ship, but they chose the number of the goods to be sent on board the ship—goods which they had bought, for which they had negotiated, and they made out such charter-party, and that charter-party provides that the ship shall proceed to Gallinas, on the coast of Africa.

Gentlemen, that is I think pretty nearly all the evidence that there is in the case. You have the evidence of the captains on the subject. If you think that this was a slaving voyage, you will consider the conduct of Zulueta & Co. in buying, and chartering, and loading it, and dispatching it. Now, Zulueta & Co. are shown to be merchants with very extensive connexions and concerns, and the prisoner particularly is a person of great knowledge and education, and generally speaking one would say that as merchants, though that is a matter for you to consider, I do not know that I can put it higher than this, that they are persons of great skill and great experience. The prisoner had the whole management and direction of the voyage to a particular place to carry goods to that place, that being a place not without suspicion; the vessel itself also being a vessel which had been used for the slave trade, though it might be innocently used afterwards; but, still your attention has been directed to that circumstance, and it has been particularly directed to the circumstance that every thing applicable to slave apparatus was ordered to be removed before the vessel was dispatched. That would be a thing of course to be done, whether the vessel was going on a slave expedition or not, for as has been suggested, the officers of Government always examine a vessel, particularly on going to the coast of Africa. With a view to this, I should think it would be quite a matter of course, even if the vessel was intended to be sent to promote the slave trade, that she should not go out with shackles or leagers, or any thing of that kind on board, for if they are on board, the vessel would be at the mercy of any Custom-house officer; it would be quite advertising the adventure. And there being found these shackles and these leagers on board the vessel at Portsmouth, and their being so dealt with, I do not think at all helps on the case for the prosecution, for the vessel undoubtedly had been a slave vessel, it had been fitted up with these things, and would naturally have them on board her, and as naturally, whether she was intended to be sent out on a slave expedition or not, these things would be taken from on board her; and you find that they were taken from on board. The fact of their having been on board, when the schoolmaster and the cooper saw them on board, does not appear to me to be any thing against her, for she had been a slave vessel. On the other hand, the circumstance of their being taken out and landed before she sailed on her voyage does not appear to be any thing for her, for both these circumstances would have taken place whether the voyage was an innocent or a guilty voyage; those circumstances, in my opinion, have no bearing on the question. Whether the vessel was intended to be engaged in slave trading or not, that is a point I have already put to you in considering whether the voyage was a slave voyage, or for the accomplishment of the slave trade. I did not before advert to the circumstance of these things being on board, and I mention it now only, as it has a sort of colourable look, to show why it is I do not lay any stress upon it.

I was observing that though people in general might not be well aware of this trade being intended to be carried on, yet persons not extremely simple, but skilful people, may be fairly taken to know what the object is with which a voyage is undertaken when they themselves are the agents, supplying, chartering, loading, and dispatching a ship for the voyage. It may be that the object may be concealed from them, or that they may not know that this voyage to the Gallinas was a slaving expedition. A simple person, who knew nothing about these matters and had not some special acquaintance with the trade, might know nothing at all about it, they might not know the nature of the trade carried on at this place. The mention of Gallinas on the coast of Africa would not convey to the mind of an ordinary person that it was to a mere den where this traffic and nothing else was carried on; but this vessel is sent to the Gallinas by these gentlemen, who are very skilful persons, who negotiate the whole transaction. Now, it may very generally be taken that people know what they are about, unless they can show there was some particular concealment, some hinderance to their knowing to this extent that this was a place connected with the slave trade, and so exclusively engaged in the slave trade as it really seems to be; but, supposing that a case is made which requires an answer, if it is shown that there was a slave trade, and that a person did employ a vessel in that business, and did load it for that business, that certainly is a case raising some degree of presumption against the person who has been engaged, and one would be very glad if the case were of a description in which it had been met by a decisive answer in point of fact.

It is said on the part of the prisoner, first, that this was not a slaving voyage. Now, if it had been a slaving voyage—it is possible that there might be a case, which unless fairly answered would lead to the presumption that that was the object—in which an answer might exist, but where it would be impossible for the prisoner to get it, you would feel a difficulty in acting on such a case; but in the present case, supposing that this was not a slaving expedition, the answer exists, and the answer might be given with the greatest ease. There appears to me no reason why it should not be given. The house of Martinez & Co. have a house at Cadiz, and a house at the Havannah, and if they did not send this vessel for the purpose of the slave trade, and they were quite innocent in this matter, any one of them or their clerks might with the greatest ease be called. There is no deficiency of funds here, and it would put an end to all question if they could say, “This was not for the slave trade; these goods were to be employed for—and then they might fill up the blank, I do not know how, but by some words expressing an innocent purpose, and that would be a full answer; but there is an absence of all answer that bears on the question whether there was slave trading intended or not.

Now, supposing you should be of opinion that there was no slave trading intended, there is an end of the case. I think you may perhaps be of opinion this vessel was intended for slave trading. Supposing you are of that opinion, then you come to that which is the anxious and important question, namely, whether the prisoner was cognizant of that fact. It is alleged that the prisoner is not the exclusive manager of the concerns of the house; it is not very likely he should be; he appears to have been fully cognizant of this particular matter; and, supposing that considering the exclusive part taken by these gentlemen in this transaction of dispatching the vessel, supposing you should think that a case requiring an answer, then you will consider whether it should not have an answer, if one exists. Now, it appears that the prisoner is not exclusively cognizant of all the transactions of this house. There are two other partners; there are—though it is not in evidence, but it may be presumed that there are—clerks and persons employed in the house of Zulueta, all or any of whom might have been called. It is alleged that the profit on this transaction would be extremely small. I do not think that the petty gain of this one transaction is the matter, for it appears that Pedro Martinez & Co. do a great deal of business, and it is possible that whenever persons have a large and valuable business to conduct, there is some small portion that the correspondent and agent would willingly get rid of if he could; but he is not allowed to pick and choose, but he must take the whole. That is one of the grounds they put; the other is as to character.

Now, inasmuch as there are two other partners, and it is probable there might be some other persons in the concern, there arises this consideration. It is true, supposing that there were a case made, but that the prisoner was innocent of it, that he could not call Martinez & Co. on that supposition as he might on the supposition of there being no slave trading, for Martinez & Co. would not be innocent persons, and they would not be willing to come into this country and say, “We carried on the slave trading, but it was disguised from our correspondent Zulueta & Co.” If you think there is a case requiring an answer, the question then is, would there have been any difficulty in the prisoner calling his two partners and others conversant with the business of the firm, and proving that Zulueta & Co. knew nothing at all about this, that they had not the least suspicion, that Martinez & Co. never communicated the fact to them, and that the illegal purpose was utterly unknown to them, for some reasons which the prisoner cannot give, but which his partners could? It would be extremely desirable they should do it, if the defence existed in point of fact.

Supposing the case made to require an answer, there are two modes of answering a charge. The one is, that of calling a great number of persons to prove that it was unlikely, from the high character of the firm, that they should engage in such a transaction; that is one. Another mode, is calling three or four persons, who if he were guilty must know it, and who will prove that he was not. The former of these modes has been adopted on this occasion. You have, however, the case before you. I do not think it necessary to go any further into the evidence, having, I conceive, stated the effect of it sufficiently. If you are satisfied that there was a slave trading, you will consider whether Zulueta, the prisoner, was cognizant of it, and shipped these goods, and dispatched the ship for the purpose of accomplishing the object of slave trading; and then, in considering that, you will consider the observations, as far as they are entitled to attention, and the evidence of the very high character of the prisoner—a character I should say very strong indeed, and almost conclusive, supposing the case were one that did not admit of an answer in point of fact. If he has the means of showing that he did not do that with which he is charged, and he only says, I will prove that I am extremely unlikely to do it; I do not say how far you should give weight to that sort of evidence. You ought to be well satisfied of a fact of this sort, before you find him guilty of such a charge as this.

Foreman of the Jury. We beg to retire, my Lord.

A Juryman. May we find on any particular count?

Mr. Justice Maule. You will consider the charge as that of employing a vessel, or loading goods on board, for the purpose of accomplishing the slave trade. The great question is, the knowledge and intention of the prisoner. If the thing was done with his knowledge and intention, and it was for the purpose of slave trading, there is no doubt that he bought and dispatched the ship, and loaded the goods. I do not see why you should trouble yourselves with any particular count.

[The Jury withdrew at Twenty Minutes before Twelve, and returned into Court at Ten Minutes after One, finding a verdict of “Not Guilty.”

Mr. Serjeant Bompas. My Lord, there is another indictment against the prisoner for a misdemeanour. It appears to me that it involves necessarily the very same question, and therefore, as far as I can judge of it, and of course with the authority of the prosecutor, I feel that it would be wrong to put the prisoner again on his trial for that offence. It seems to me that it will depend upon the same evidence, and I cannot but conclude that the Jury will come to the same conclusion. I will take the opportunity of saying one word. Observations having been made with respect to myself when the former case was going on, when I could not interfere, I can merely say, that with regard to myself, the prosecutor, and of every person connected with the prosecution, there was no possible fact or document which I could have admitted, which could have done the prisoner the slightest benefit.