TRIAL OF PEDRO DE ZULUETA, JUN., ESQ., (continued 5)

But, Gentlemen, let us see what are the circumstances upon which the prosecutor calls upon you to infer, not only that Zulueta & Co., and particularly the prisoner at the bar, purchased this vessel, and dispatched this vessel, and loaded the goods on board it, but that he did it not merely knowing, but for the very purpose, in the language of the indictment, “to accomplish the object of using them in the slave trade.” What is the evidence upon which they call upon you to infer that? First of all they do this, and I do pray your attention to this part of the case, because it is a point affecting, and vitally affecting, the safety of every manufacturer, every merchant, nay every tradesman in this country, who happens to deal in any goods, however lawful, but which may be shipped to the coast of Africa; they say this, you, young man, Pedro Zulueta, a member of this firm, you knew that these goods in this ship were to be used for the slave trade, and you dispatch the ship and goods that they may be used in the slave trade. Why, have you ever admitted you knew it? No, I have denied it, and have offered to deny it upon oath.—Have we proved you ever gave any secret instructions they should be used for that purpose? We give you notice that we call for your instructions, but before the Court and Jury we dare not call for them.—Did you receive any information from Martinez & Co. that they might be used for that purpose? No. We give you notice to produce all the letters from Martinez & Co., and his counsel comes forward and says—Here is every document, here is every account, every scrap of paper at all relating to this transaction,[15] and I offer you the oaths of every body in the counting-house, without examining them myself, that this is all that can be found. No, says the prosecutor, it suits us better to charge you with a felony, and call for documents which might or might not support the charge; but when you have got them here we will not read them before the Jury, we will not lay them before the Jury, but we will do this—in order that Sir George Stephen, sitting near Mr. Serjeant Bompas and instructing him from his own grossly perverted views of the facts and the truth, to misrepresent and to colour almost every material document to be given in evidence in the cause, in order to give them a reply, they say “you may produce them.” That is what they do. This, then, is a case in which they say we will call for your instructions to the captain, because we say, although there was nothing in your handwriting found in the vessel, except this innocent letter offering 500l. for the purchase of the ship, and the charter-party signed by the house, there were some secret instructions. We call for all the letters, we will not use one, but we leave you to prove there were none such. We say, you were informed by Martinez & Co. that they were to be so used, and we give you notice to produce the letters; we will not call for them, we leave it to you: and if we were to read twenty different letters, all the letters from Martinez & Co. to Zulueta & Co., you would have from Mr. Serjeant Bompas, with Sir George Stephen behind him suggesting—Oh, there were secret instructions behind! How do we know there was not a letter behind, which contained secret instructions? That is the way that a case for felony is to be conducted; and therefore I beseech you not to look at what my learned friend urges upon you, but look at the facts. The facts are, that this young man offered 500l. for the vessel, and that this young man signed the charter-party, and those facts he admitted before the Committee of the House of Commons; he admitted that this ancient and honourable house, without a stain upon its character, purchase the ship, and charter the ship, and ship the goods, as the agents of Martinez & Co., to the coast of Africa. Then, when they have to prove the guilty knowledge that this was done for the purpose of these goods being used in the slave trade, after going through this farce of calling for papers they dare not use, they say this—We cannot prove that this young man ever thought, or wrote, or sent, about the slave trade; we cannot prove he ever said a single word to Captain Jennings that he was to use the ship or goods in the slave trade; we cannot prove that their correspondents ever wrote or said a word to them upon the subject; but I will tell you what we will do, he was never at the Gallinas, but Captain Denman was at the Gallinas, Captain Hill was at the Gallinas, Colonel Nichol was at the Gallinas, and we will prove by them that the slave trade is carried on to a considerable extent there; we will prove through them, that there are such persons there as Rolo, Alvarez, and Ximenes; and we will prove that those three persons are notorious slave dealers; and we trust that the Jury will say, here are goods sent to the coast of Africa—and it is true, because goods are constantly sent there, British produce to the amount of millions is sent there, and forms a great part of our commerce, but it is sent to that part of the coast where these three honourable gentlemen will say that nothing but the slave trade is carried on—and it will then lie upon him to show that they were not intended to be so used.

Now, Gentlemen, if Mr. Zulueta had known as much of the Gallinas as Captain Denman does, who has been cruizing about there since 1835, or as much as Captain Hill knows, who has been upon that coast for several years past, or as much as Colonel Nichol, who has been there twenty years; if he had ever been there or lived there to see the kind of commerce carried on, and to know that there is no lawful commerce at all, but that there is the slave trade only, I should say that you put a man living in England in a very peculiar situation, to which I will call your attention in a moment, but it would raise the question in your minds, whether he might not suspect that these goods might be sold for money, and the money applied in the purchase of slaves, or the slave trade be promoted by the transaction. But, Gentlemen, I beseech you to remember this; they have not proved this, and the contrary appears, that this young man—and I speak of the father as well—that neither he nor his father were ever on the coast of Africa. “Oh, but” says my learned friend, Mr. Serjeant Talfourd, in a question put on re-examination to Captain Denman, “could a person who had traded for twenty years to the Gallinas be ignorant that nothing but the slave trade was carried on there?” If it was so, if he had thought so, it is not by his inferences—whose honourable zeal in putting down the slave trade has carried him so far as to make him a defendant in two or three actions, which may come on to be tried in this country—however honourable his motives and feelings (and I admire the zeal he feels upon the subject, political as well as private zeal)—it is not what he knows which is to determine whether Mr. Zulueta is to be convicted of felony. But it is not that to which I was about to call your attention. If my learned friend, Mr. Serjeant Talfourd had reflected when he used that expression in the question he put, “Do you think that a person trading twenty years there could be ignorant of the nature of the trade carried on?”—he would have seen it was wholly inapplicable to the case of Messrs. Zulueta & Co. In the first place, this young man has not been a third part of twenty years in the house; in the next place, the house has not traded to the extent of 20s. to the Gallinas, they have never had any communication with it. Mr. Serjeant Bompas opened among many other things which he has left unproved, that he would show that was untrue, and that he had had dealings with them. If that was so, it would have been easy to do it; but they find he never had any dealing with the place; he had no letter or bill from the place, or any article or thing of any sort or kind from any person there, which could convey to his mind whether it was a slave trading place, or a place where a great deal of commerce was lawfully carried on—nothing of the kind. I pray your attention to what it is my learned friend has founded this observation upon. All that Zulueta & Co. have done, as you will see by the evidence before you, is, that they have received directions from their foreign correspondents to ship goods to the Gallinas, and have put those goods on board a vessel, and then dispatched that vessel, and shipped those goods for the Gallinas; and from that time forth they have heard no more of them. Now, I beg to ask you, their correspondence taking place with Martinez &. Co. at the Havannah or Cadiz, but having no correspondence with the Gallinas, unless their curiosity led them, as it did me this morning to look at the map or globe to find the place—and they looked in vain, unless they looked at a pretty large map, to see whether it was a river, or an island, or city, or what place it was—how should they know any thing about it? I agree we did not want Captain Denman’s evidence, for that they had shipped goods for twenty years, and traded there in the ordinary sense of the word, if they had had correspondents there and dealt on their own account with them, and sent them goods from time to time, and had goods in return, or written letters to them, and had letters in return, they might through them have obtained some information of the nature of the business carried on there. But, it is no such thing. What this young man said in his evidence before the Committee turns out to be true; if it had not been so, they had abundant means to contradict that evidence: and Sir George Stephen, whose zeal spares no expense, no effort, would have satisfied you that they had written letters to the Gallinas, and had sent goods there. All that appears is, that from time to time—the transactions being really a drop of water in the ocean of their great mercantile dealings—they have out of 400,000l. in ten or twenty years shipped goods to the amount of 22,000l., which have gone to the Gallinas. But how should they have known it was for the purposes of the slave trade? Suppose any one of you were a dealer in muskets (for they are some of the goods shipped on board this vessel) and that a person in Spain writes to you, saying, I want a thousand muskets for a place called Gallinas, on the coast of Africa—would you dream, if you prepared the muskets and sold them, and made out the proper papers and dispatched them according to the order—would you dream, that you were committing a felony? That is what it comes to.

Just see how the case stands—Captain Denman knows, and Captain Hill knows very well, that shipments to the Gallinas may be something suspicious, because they say, as far as their experience goes, there is no lawful trade there, and that they are all slave traders there; but how is any body in this kingdom who has never been there, and never corresponded with the place, to know that?

What is the next fact? Captain Hill proves—though it was with the greatest reluctance he ever gave an answer in favour of this young man whom he is endeavouring to send to Botany Bay—at last, he let out by accident that there are places, on the coast of Africa, to which British produce in large quantities is sent, where the trade is perfectly proper, and where goods lawfully are sent and disposed of; and that at many of those places there are persons, who trade largely, and to a very great extent in British produce, who also deal in slaves.

Here, again, I beseech you to turn your attention to the facts and forget the statement. You may be manufacturers of guns or gunpowder, or commission-agents living in the country, who for the purpose of shipment purchase those goods; in either case a party comes and says, I want a thousand muskets and two tons of gunpowder to be shipped to a certain place on the coast of Africa. I ask you—are you first to consult the map to ascertain the place, and having ascertained where it is, are you to go to somebody you may hear of—Captain Hill or Captain Denman—and inquire, whether they have been upon the coast of Africa, and can tell you the character of the trade carried on there? Are you next, the person being a Spaniard or Portuguese, to inquire whether they ever deal in slaves, and if you find they do, are you to say, I will execute no order you give me? That would annihilate two-thirds of the commerce of Great Britain, and would prevent the most useful transactions of commerce which can occur upon the coast of Africa. It is, therefore, I say, in a charge of this momentous character, it is not to be determined upon suspicion. You are not to hang or transport a man upon vague suspicion; you must show that the crime has been committed; you must have before you direct evidence to prove that he must have known—not that he might have known—by inquiry, if it had been duly answered, and in the mean time the orders would be lost—not that he might have learnt, or that the result of the inquiry might be that the goods might by possibility be unlawfully employed—you must have direct evidence that they were shipped for that purpose. The statute does not say, that every one who ships goods to a slave colony shall be guilty of slave dealing; the Act does not say, that whoever ships goods to a place where the slave trade is principally carried on shall be guilty of slave dealing; the Act does not say, that any body who shall ship goods without taking care that they shall not be employed in slave dealing shall be guilty of felony; the Act does not say, that any one who ships goods which may be employed in the slave trade shall be guilty of felony—God forbid that it should say that!—but the Act says, if a man ships goods for that object, if he ships goods with the intent—which as far as in him lies he seeks to carry into effect, that they may be used in the slave trade—that is a felony. Where, in God’s name, is there a particle or scintilla of evidence to that effect here? Where Captain Denman tells you it is a well-known slave trading colony, and that he knew it before he went there? Did you know it? I apprehend, if my learned friend knew it before he was instructed in this case, he knows geography, as he does every thing else, much better than I do. My learned friend says, you are not to shut your eyes to what you are doing. No; I agree if a man commits a crime, or does a mischief, he is not to shut his eyes to the consequences of it. I deny, once for all—and I appeal to the learned Judges whether I am not correctly stating the effect of the law—whether a man, who has no intention to do an unlawful act in the shipment of goods, is bound to make any inquiry as to what is to be done with goods, which, in obedience to the orders of a foreign correspondent, he ships to any place on the face of the earth. He is not bound to make inquiries; if he was, it would throw impediments in the way of commerce more injurious than the slave trade itself in any part of the world. Again, they speak of Messrs. Martinez being slave traders, and they speak of the admission that appears upon the evidence of Mr. Zulueta, that he knew that Martinez & Co. had been engaged in the slave trade. I will show you, when I come to refer to this evidence, which is all-important in this case, that there is nothing of the kind—he speaks of the knowledge he had; he gave his evidence in 1842, and you will find, when you look on a little further, he had learnt it since the transactions in 1840.

Now, suppose he did know it—suppose a commission-agent knows that a foreign correspondent of his house is extensively engaged in the slave trade—he knows, at the same time, he is extensively engaged in a lawful trade in sugar, tobacco, and other commodities—I ask you, whether if that foreign correspondent, by letter, desires him to freight a ship with a quantity of goods, and he does so, he is to be treated as a felon? whether, because a trader in both ways—a trader lawful and unlawful—may use his goods unlawfully, and the shipper knows it and cannot prevent it, he is to be treated as a felon or wrong doer? I deny it: if it were so, the first mercantile houses in the country would consist of none but felons. It would be in vain to suggest houses—though one rose before my mind, whose extent of transactions is equalled only by the honour and integrity of their character, that house trading largely as it does with the Havannah and the Brazils, where all the extensive merchants are slave dealers, that house must sacrifice two-thirds of its trade—and all that loss must accrue to Great Britain, because that trade may enable those who carry it on to carry on also a trade in slaves. It is quite intelligible, that that was the very object of the inquiry before the Committee, where Mr. Zulueta, Captain Hill, and Captain Denman, and a score of other persons were examined before the Colonial Secretaries under both governments, and some of the most practical men of the present day—it was for the purpose of determining and reporting to the House, whether it would be desirable to extend the criminal law of the country, and prohibit the trade altogether with places where the slave trade was carried on, or with persons notoriously carrying it on. Nobody ever dreamt, but Sir George Stephen, that it was illegal to trade with a slave dealing place, or a notorious slave dealer; it is only illegal where you know the trade you carry on is to promote the slave trade, and you know that to be the object. That was one of the objects of the Committee, to ascertain whether it was desirable to prevent the trading with slave dealers, or slave trading places. I may not regularly refer to their opinion; but they made a Report in 1842, and no law is passed at all affecting transactions of that nature—the only Act is that, which, for another purpose, I called my Lord’s attention to, and which made that illegal, not illegal before, namely, the trading by British subjects in foreign ports—not making it criminal to trade with slave traders or slave trading places. Then let us see the result. You are called upon, where the shipment is innocent, and the employment of the ship is innocent, you are called upon to destroy this man, because he has put his name to one or two innocent documents, and because they say it was so notoriously a slave trading place that he must have known that they were to be so used. My answer is in a single sentence—he knew nothing of the kind; they have not proved it; they have proved that Captain Hill, and Captain Denman, and others, conversant with the spot, knew it; they have not proved that Mr. Zulueta knew it—the evidence is entirely a blank upon the subject. If he thought of it at all, and I think that a man is bound to inquire about the matter, he would probably think this—there are a great number of houses in the city of London executing large commissions for the African trade, and a great deal of British commerce goes to the coast of Africa is lawfully disposed of, and promotes the civilisation of Africa; and I have every right to suppose that this goes for a lawful purpose; if that is not so, it must be shown to be for an unlawful purpose. If that is not fair in the mouth of Mr. Zulueta’s house, it is not fair in the mouth of any firm trading in that way with the coast of Africa; and unless it had been shown that Mr. Zulueta himself was personally informed of, or knew, the character of this place, what is proved by Captain Denman or Captain Hill has nothing to do with the question—so much for that part of the proof, from which you are called upon to infer that the prisoner shipped these goods to accomplish this wicked object, because it is proved the slave trade was carried on there.

Now, Gentlemen, let me say one word more of Captain Denman: he does not show, in the correct sense of the words, that the slave trade is extensively carried on there; he may be right in saying there is no produce there; but is there no mode of receiving goods and selling them for money, though no goods are exported? There are various towns or villages, one of nine hundred inhabitants, and others of various numbers, and native chiefs also; there are also Europeans, principally Spaniards—I should like to know, whether the native chiefs, and the Spanish population, and the nine hundred, the population of Tiendo, do not lawfully, for pieces of money or doubloons, buy British produce lawfully? It may be said, that they can only get this money by the slave trade; that is, by having previously dealt in slaves; but where is that to stop? If you are to trace the money from hand to hand, in order to ascertain whether, since a bank note was made or stamped, or the money coined, it has not been the medium of some illegal transaction, there is an end to all commerce. It may be, that these men, Rolo and Pedro Blanco, may have sold a thousand slaves for dollars, and may have paid a debt to Rolo, and with that Rolo may have paid somebody else, who may have bought the goods of Mr. Zulueta—I wish to know, whether Mr. Zulueta for that is to be accused of dealing in slaves, or shipping goods to dealers in slaves? There is nothing of the kind, as far as regards that part of the evidence, relating to the character of the place, or as relating to the character of the parties there. My answer to that is, that, however well known to Captain Denman and Captain Hill, it was unknown to Pedro de Zulueta; that he neither knew the place nor the persons, but that there was such a place to which his house had, without a suspicion, shipped considerable quantities of goods for their foreign correspondents—and it would be hard and cruel to say, that because other people possess a knowledge that he does not, he is to be charged as a felon—because he did not know what other parties, who had passed the latter part of their lives upon the spot, knew.

But, Gentlemen, a great deal has been said upon the mode in which this was to be carried into effect; and they say, because this vessel was bought really by Martinez & Co., and with their money—but Captain Jennings was made the captain, and Captain Jennings was made the apparent owner; therefore, that is a mark of suspicion, that is a concealment, that is putting a false colour upon the transaction—and therefore you are to infer that the transaction was with some guilty intent with respect to the slave trade. Upon that, in the first instance, I would say, this is not an indictment against Mr. Zulueta for putting an English captain on board a foreign ship, and treating it as an English ship—such a proceeding is not, that I am aware of, contrary to the law at all; and it can only be important in this case, if the nature of the transaction is such as necessarily to lead you to infer that the object of the transaction was connected with the slave trade.

Now, let me try that in all its parts; let us see if there is any thing in the mode in which the transaction was carried into effect, which ought fairly to lead a Jury to infer that the object in sending the vessel to Africa was that it should be engaged in the slave trade. First, as to the English captain—I had some difficulty in getting the facts out—it is always desirable, when the Jury have some experience in the matter, for the ends of justice—I hope you may be some of you familiar with Spanish maritime transactions: but we have the notary of the Spanish consulate, before whom charter-parties and other maritime documents come, and we have had the judgment of a naval officer upon the spot, and their evidence goes to show, that by the maritime laws of Spain, a Spanish vessel cannot be commanded by an English captain. Then, if Messrs. Martinez & Co. wished to ship these goods to the coast of Africa from England, and they wished at the same time to employ Captain Jennings as the captain, how are they to do it, except by giving an English name to the vessel, putting it under English colours, and making Captain Jennings the apparent owner? And, Gentlemen, is that to be wondered at? Is the character of a British sailor so low, that there is any thing upon which you are to suspect a man of felony, because one of his foreign correspondents prefers that a vessel he is going to freight to Africa should be commanded by an Englishman and not a Spaniard? You will find, from the evidence, that Captain Jennings had been more than once employed by Martinez & Co.—there is no doubt he is a man of considerable experience; he is a man of considerable courage, as all English sailors are—and explained in that way, what more natural than that Martinez & Co., hearing he was in England, should wish that a man they could trust should be employed in bringing out a cargo of goods to Africa, or wherever it was? Therefore it was he would employ Captain Jennings. How was he to do it? If the vessel was their own, it must sail under the Spanish flag, it would be a Spanish vessel, and could not be commanded by an English captain; so, to obtain that object, they employed Captain Jennings, whom they thought a trustworthy person—and in order to employ him, he is obliged to make the vessel appear an English vessel, and make him appear as the owner of the vessel—and this arrangement is accordingly made. And, Gentlemen, let me observe, though it was not given in evidence—but I will not stand upon technical points, I am dealing with the character of a house as high as any in Britain; I believe their Lordships, after some argument, excluded the bill of lading, in which the name of Captain Jennings appeared as the shipper—I do not know how it is—suppose he appeared—

Mr. Justice Maule. He appeared so in the cockets.

Mr. Kelly. I do most earnestly hope that some of you have sufficient experience of the mode in which business is conducted, with respect to ships, to know, that this is not an unusual circumstance. Just consider the object of the voyage: these goods were to be taken to the Gallinas, and they were consigned to those persons whose names you have heard. You have heard that slave trading is carried on there, as it is along the whole coast—that is known to Martinez & Co.—they have a great deal of trade there, and no doubt they would know it; they would know very well that the seas swarmed with British cruizers, for the purpose of interrupting and preventing the slave trade—what more natural? If their correspondents should happen not to be upon the spot at the time the goods arrived, so that they could not be delivered, or that there should be a blockade, and the ship could not enter with the goods shipped by Martinez & Co., the captain must sail back to England or to Cadiz, and get authority from Martinez to alter the destination of the goods; if, on the contrary, they were shipped in the name of Captain Jennings, if he found a blockade, or the correspondents of Messrs. Martinez were not there, or there was any opposition to his communications with the shore, he would have the complete disposal of the goods; he might take them to other parts of the coast of Africa, or any other part of the world, or deal with them as he pleased—and the whole mystery is explained. Every body, who knows any thing of these commercial transactions, knows that a supercargo is sent out with goods, and the shipment is most frequently in the name of the supercargo; and it is for that reason, that in case when the goods arrive at the place to which they are consigned, if there is any difficulty, or any thing which requires the control or disposition of the owner, the supercargo is the party to act, and he can only do that when the shipment is in his name. Here there is a supercargo, or somebody they had confidence in, Captain Jennings, and accordingly the shipment is made in the name of Jennings, in order, in a case of difficulty, that he may exercise a control over the goods. And so far from there being any thing illegal in it, so far from there being any thing unusual in the transaction—because Captain Jennings was made the master, the apparent owner of the vessel, and the person in whose name the goods were shipped—it is the constant custom. If Messrs. Martinez wished to send these goods to the coast of Africa, and if, by reason of any blockade, it would be necessary to give them another destination, they wished to have the benefit of an English captain, Captain Jennings—and by taking the course they did, of making out the charter-party from Captain Jennings to Martinez & Co., and at the same time shipping the goods in his own name, retaining a share of the superintendence as the real owner throughout the voyage, they accomplished that. To tell me, because that is done, which is a matter of constant custom, the good sense of which strikes one at the first sight—for my learned friend to rise and say, this is a concealment, and you are to condemn this young man to transportation—is perfectly monstrous. But I will tell you what the prosecutor ought to have done—and what I should have expected from the experience of my learned friend, who has called Sir George Stephen the public prosecutor—if he meant to say, that a charter-party in this form was an illegal and unmercantile act, he ought to have called persons engaged in the trade, parties engaged in shipments of the same description, or any other foreign trade, to prove that this was an illegal, and consequently an unusual transaction. He has left that in blank. I make the same observation as to the nature of the trade: how is it—when you are called upon here to denounce this young man as a felon, because it is supposed that slave trading was carried on at this place, the Gallinas, and that any body engaged in trade to that part of the world must have known that slave trading was carried on there—how is it, that out of the scores, to say the least, of highly respectable, intelligent, and experienced merchants, carrying on trade in this city, not one is called before you—not a merchant, not a shipper, not an individual is called to speak to any part of this transaction? You are to take Mr. Serjeant Bompas’s statement for every thing—whatever Sir George Stephen instructs him to say in this case, unless you have experience in it yourself, you are to take every thing as proof. I say it became the public prosecutor to call merchants, acquainted with the coast of Africa, to give a fair mercantile character to the transaction; they have not done so; and I protest against the doctrine, that any man is to be treated as guilty, and denounced as tainted with crime, not upon any proof that the character of the transaction is contrary to mercantile usage, but upon the statement of counsel, unsupported by evidence, and more particularly where that evidence is so completely within the power of the prosecutor.

Gentlemen, let me make another observation upon this point—I fear that the length to which this case has been drawn may weary you, and my address more so than any other part of the case; but, for mercy’s sake, consider—

Foreman of the Jury. We are quite glad to hear all you have to say.

Mr. Kelly. I thank you, Gentlemen. What would be my feelings, if any thing adverse was to happen to this young man, from my omitting to say what occurred to me as important? It is said by Mr. Serjeant Bompas, but not proved, that this was done under concealment: they have not called man or boy from Liverpool to prove that any part of the transaction was unusual. I appeal to any man, who knows any thing of the nature of shipments, whether it is possible that this cargo could have been shipped without clerks and shipping agents being employed, and without the cargo and ship undergoing the inspection of the Custom-house officers. All that has been done, and my learned friend and Sir George Stephen know that that has been done; and I believe, in his opening speech, he alluded to evidence from Liverpool; but not one witness has been called. You will see the effect of that in another part of the transaction to which I have not arrived; but when Mr. Serjeant Bompas tells you, that the employment of Mr. Jennings, as captain and owner, and shipping the goods in his own name, was done for the purpose of concealment, I say it is idle; and it is an insult to the understanding of any man to say there was any concealment. Messrs. Zulueta employ Captain Jennings—he employs other people—you heard that that was the mode in which the business was conducted—the Russian consul and Mr. Emanuel are not Zulueta & Co.—it appears that the transaction could not have been conducted but by the house of Zulueta—and yet my learned friend contents himself by saying, that this was secretly done, though he has not called one witness to prove it.

Gentlemen, I was upon the point, that the employment of Captain Jennings, and the making it appear that Captain Jennings was the owner, was a circumstance of concealment. If it was, I have told you the reasons humbly occurring to my own mind for thinking it was not; but suppose it was concealed—concealment, which would facilitate the carrying on the slave trade. Now, Gentlemen, I pray your attention to this question—Was the putting this ship under British colours, and under the command of a British captain, calculated at all to enable it to carry on the slave trade? That is the question. If it was, I clearly admit—though God forbid a man should be convicted upon it!—that it is a circumstance that may require some consideration in your minds; but if I demonstrate to you, that for all the objects of the slave trade, the employment of a British captain, and the employment of British colours, was fatal to it, and rendered discovery, and forfeiture, and punishment, almost inevitable, what becomes of the statement that all this was done clandestinely to facilitate the slave trade? Recollect the account of the trade given by Captain Denman. If it be a foreign vessel, a Portuguese or Spanish, which engages in the slave trade, there are very great impediments and very great difficulties in interrupting it, in searching and in bringing the transaction to light, or the perpetrators to justice, investigating the matter judicially, and finally causing the vessel and goods to be condemned. Our newspapers are filled with discussions about the right of search. Whereas, Captain Denman could, without a moment’s pause, without any obstruction, enter upon any English vessel, and seize the English captain, and search the vessel from top to bottom—while, in an American vessel, and many other vessels, he might be met by obstruction, and it might be the cause of a war. It is true, under some treaties, it may be done; but it is not so as to Russia, because this vessel ultimately, according to my learned friend, defeated justice, and was given up to the Russian government. Where a vessel, therefore, is under foreign colours, there are many difficulties in searching, and if suspicious circumstances appear, in bringing the vessel, if I may so speak, to justice. What does Captain Denman say? “If it is an American vessel, I could not search at all unless by main force, at the peril of a war; if a Russian, it is the same thing; if a Spanish or French vessel, then, under the treaty, a search may take place.” But, remember the mode of searching: if he saw an English vessel, the English captain would feel that of necessity he must, unless he meant to be condemned, tender his vessel, and all in it, to the investigation of a British naval officer; and if the vessel has any thing suspicious about it, you may prosecute it in the British Vice-Admiralty Court, in any of the colonies throughout the world; and, if condemned, as it may be, by British law, by British officers of justice; whereas, if it be a Spanish or Russian vessel, or a Portuguese, or of any other country, there are all sorts of difficulties and formalities before a search can take place; and if any thing suspicious is found, even Captain Hill, with all his furious zeal, would pause before he seized a foreign vessel. Again, supposing there are suspicious appearances, and the officer determines to try the question, it is tried not in the British Vice Admiralty Court—not in any British court at all—but before a Mixed Commission, composed of British, Spanish, and, perhaps, the subjects of other nations, surrounded with all these difficulties, and, I grieve to say, all that corruption which taints the administration of justice in almost every other country but this.

Now, Mr. Serjeant Bompas says—Sacrifice this young man, and condemn him as a felon. Why? Because, the more easily to carry on the slave trade, he fitted out a vessel—not as a Spaniard, with a Spanish crew and Spanish colours, but with English colours, an English captain, and an English crew, which Captain Denman, Captain Hill, or any other captain might search and condemn. Now, I am the humble and inefficient advocate of this young man, and the matter may occur to my mind erroneously; I may take an erroneous view, from the zeal I feel in the case, in presenting it before you, in the terms in which his innocence will ultimately appear; but, unless I grievously deceive myself, that argument admits of no answer, as Captain Denman said there are difficulties in the one case and none in the other—a trial by a British Court in the one case, and a Mixed Commission in the other; that there are great impediments where it is a foreign vessel, and none in the other. And has the prosecutor a right to call upon you to come to a conclusion that this young man is guilty of felony, because he fitted out a vessel with English colours, and an English captain, the more easily to carry on the slave trade? You will have to answer that question, if you think the slave trade could be more easily carried on by an English captain and an English crew. You have heard of the mutiny before they reached Cadiz; if you think an English crew were used, and English colours hoisted, the more safely to carry on the trade, it must be for some reason that does not occur to my mind, and I trust in God it will not occur to yours.

Now, Gentlemen, we come to the next point. They say—Though true it is, that this vessel was not employed in the slave trade, there is the most direct evidence that the man who fitted out the vessel meant to employ it in the slave trade, and really employed it with that object. If you cannot show the orders given by him to the captain so to employ it, the next thing would be to show it was so employed. If this ship had sailed from England to the Gallinas and discharged its cargo, and had taken in a number of slaves; or if it had bartered its cargo against a number of slaves; if that had been done, unless you can show it was done by Mr. Zulueta’s orders, he is not responsible: you may challenge the captain, and you might say, whether Mr. Zulueta intended it or not, it was so used: but there is no such evidence. Captain Hill, with his zeal to discharge his duty and to prevent slave trading, took time by the forelock, and seized the vessel in the hands of the captain before it reached the shore, and you have therefore no means of drawing inferences of what was intended by what was done. But they endeavour to make up for that in this way: they say, we will show that the vessel was originally built for the slave trade; and we will show that, while it was in the hands of Mr. Zulueta, or while Captain Jennings had it under his hands, it had fittings added, or articles furnished, calculated to assist in the slave trade. And I must say, upon this part of the case, it grieves me to refer to the mode in which it has been conducted in terms of reprobation; but I should ill discharge my duty if I did not say, that the mode in which the evidence was laid before you was unworthy the high reputation and the honourable character of my learned friend. I pray you to remember what it is has been proved upon this occasion. He calls a witness from Portsmouth, or two or three; and, as Mr. Clarkson, and my other learned friend, obtained from them on cross-examination they had been lately subpœnaed, the prisoner could not be prepared by any possibility for their testimony; and what do they prove? They prove, that on board this vessel, while Captain Jennings was in command of it, they had seen, I do not know how many, water-casks for slave trading; that they had seen shackles and bolts, and all the muniments necessary to carry on the slave trade. Now, I ask you, is that fair? Is that just? The prisoner is charged, not with having thrown away those things, and destroyed them, and fitted up a vessel, which, for aught he knew, might be used in the slave trade, or might be for perfectly lawful purposes; but he is charged with having dispatched it from Liverpool for the purposes of the slave trade; and, in order to prove that, the prosecutor thinks it right to give in evidence what was done at Portsmouth with these shackles and water-casks which were on board the vessel, and there he leaves the case. I cannot trust myself to speak of that mode of giving evidence. Gentlemen, the way in which they ought to have convinced you there was any thing on board this vessel calculated to carry on the trade, was to show the condition of the vessel at the time she left the port of Liverpool. There all the control of the house of Zulueta & Co. finished; the charter-party was made out, the goods were put on board, and the ship, on the 8th of November, 1840, sailed from Liverpool; then, if this young man is a felon, the felony was completed. What was the condition of the ship then? Had it then the water-casks for the nourishment of the slaves? Had it shackles and other instruments of torture, or for the conveyance of the slaves from one part of the world to the other? Gentlemen, that was the time; that was the place to show it: and it could not be by inadvertence it was omitted. Why, Captain Hill, their witness, who would not drop a single syllable, who could not bring himself to say any thing favourable to this young man (not from any improper motive, he will not understand me to say), that even Captain Hill was obliged to say—“When I seized the vessel, where the slave trade was to be carried on, it was not fitted up for the slave trade;” and one of you gentlemen of the Jury—and from the bottom of my heart I thanked you—put the question in another form through my Lord, and the answer was—“No; at the time the vessel was seized it was not fitted up for the slave trade.” So that you have this fact, that when it left Liverpool it was not fitted up for the slave trade, and had not the means on board to be so fitted up, and when on the coast of Africa it was not so fitted up; but, from their own witnesses knowing that, they call other witnesses to raise a suspicion in your minds that it was secretly prepared for the slave trade, because there were water-casks and shackles on board. And remember the evidence of the cabin-boy: they had the choice of the whole crew, and no one can say that the crew would be favourable to Mr. Zulueta, the owner, or his house; they were discharged as mutineers: they had their choice of the whole crew, and no expense, and no exertions have been spared, and yet they dare not call one of the crew to say what Captain Jennings stated, or what his object was; they called the cabin-boy, who says, “I know nothing of the loading of the vessel.”

There is a person to be tried for a felony in fitting out a vessel perfectly lawfully, but for the slave trade, and they seek to show that it was fitted up for the slave trade: they do not show it at the only time it was material to show it, but they seek to ruin and destroy this unfortunate young man, by giving evidence of its state at Portsmouth, when we have from this boy the damning fact for the integrity of their case, that though the water-vessels were changed in their form, which was to make you think that they were sent in a disguised form, they were put on shore at Liverpool, and not put back again. If there had been an inch or a scrap of old iron, or a nail, the ship was in the possession of Captain Hill, and those who acted under him, as long as he thought fit to keep it. It was put into the Vice-Admiralty Court; it was open to the witnesses for the prosecution: I have no doubt they searched it from end to end, and from top to bottom, and every crevice and cranny, and in no place was a scrap of rusty iron found applicable to the slave trade; and yet you are to be told by Mr. Serjeant Bompas, that he will prove it was adapted for the slave trade, when his own instructions had already told him that they gave a false appearance to the case, and the true appearance of the case was entirely left out of consideration. However, Gentlemen, I thank God, whatever may be the consequence, and however terrible to my own feelings as counsel for the prisoner, I had no hand—God forbid!—in such a prosecution.

Gentlemen, it is not only in the mode and to the extent I have pointed out to you, that the evidence has been sought to be perverted—and if there had been a case, and facts to be proved from the condition of the vessel, it is only from the evidence they have submitted to you that it can appear—Captain Hill seized the vessel and cargo; he had the full control of it; every species of information, every scrap of paper on board is in their power, and every thing that could be given in evidence before you has been brought before you.

Gentlemen, I must observe that I am not counsel for Captain Jennings. Captain Jennings, for aught I know, though he is an Englishman, and there is no charge against him, may have been in collusion with Martinez & Co. I am not responsible for his acts. I thought there had been some refusal to give up the papers, but Captain Hill negatived that altogether; he did not say there was any opposition; the vessel did not sail away from him, on the contrary, it sailed up to him. I do not know how that was. He asked for papers and they were given up to him—he made some request which was refused, but as to the running away, or concealment, nothing of the kind was practised; but you have here a felon, in the situation of a partner in the house of Zulueta & Co., trading to the amount of millions, trading with the house of Martinez & Co. to an immense amount in sugar and tobacco, and all sorts of goods passing between Britain and its Colonies, and a little trading upon commission in the last fifteen years, in which the commission put into the pocket of Zulueta & Co., would not pay a day’s salary to their clerks in their office, and you have a charge of felony for what this young man has done as it appears in the evidence to which I have called your attention. To talk of its being a concealment to use an English captain and an English vessel, when it would have insured a prosecution—when it would have insured discovery—when it would have insured punishment—is absurd. They say, here was something in the nature of the vessel, and to enable you to arrive at the same conclusion they prove her condition at Portsmouth, which was altered before the voyage was embarked upon, and they do not prove the condition of the vessel at the only time important for you to inquire into.

Gentlemen, Captain Hill said it would be very easy when the vessel arrived at Gallinas to get the fittings up there; that it would be easy for the factor there, when he expected the vessel, to get them ready. No doubt it would be very easy for a man to get a gun, and load it with powder and ball, and so shoot the Queen. But, good God! are we in cases of felony not to look for evidence, not to look for facts, but to suppose a felony, because it is physically possible that somebody may do something to put this ship into a condition that may be unlawful? So I might say of Captain Hill, that when he went with one of Her Majesty’s ships upon the coast, he was disposed to assist in the slave trade instead of destroying it; he might have harboured the slaves in his vessel, or turned it into a slave establishment, or any thing else. But we are dealing with something more than the life of this young man. You are not to look at what a man 4000 miles off did, but what this man did. What he has done he is responsible for, and he is ready to answer here—he is ready to answer at a higher tribunal; but, in the name of that Judge before whom we must all stand, I implore you, do not visit him with suppositions of what other men might have done, instead of what he is proved to have done in this transaction.

Gentlemen, the evidence in the cause would have gone no further than I have stated but from the circumstance—a most extraordinary one, and unprecedented as far as my experience goes in criminal cases—of a great body of evidence being produced, that being neither more nor less than the voluntary, unsought, and unasked testimony of the criminal himself in his evidence given before the Committee of the House of Commons; and it is that to which I have finally to call your attention. I have stated to you, that the house of Zulueta & Co. had enjoyed the highest reputation from the time of their establishment, nearly seventy years ago, until the year 1842. That Committee was appointed, and is declared to have been assembled for the purpose of inquiring into the mode in which the slave trade at various places on the coast of Africa was effected by British commerce and by the employment of British capital. It was suggested, and perhaps truly suggested, that from various British houses, dealing largely in British manufactures, and exporting them as principals, or as agents to the order of Spanish houses, or Portuguese houses, or American houses, particularly in the states of South America—that by reason of those exports, commerce was introduced, and great sums of money procured, which money, being employed in the slave trade, thereby British capital and commerce tended to support the slave trade. The object of the Committee was to determine to what extent this particular allegation was true, and if true, whether it could be remedied by any alteration in the law. It is not necessary to notice the result of their deliberations; but it is important to observe, that upon the Committee were two most zealous men, Lord Stanley and Lord John Russell, neither of whom could have seen enough in the conduct of this young man to justify his prosecution. And this Committee seem to have thought whatever evil might arise in fostering or in facilitating the slave trade, directly or indirectly, by British capital and commerce, that they would too fatally interfere with the commerce and civilization of the Africans themselves, from which, and not the force of arms, the destruction of slavery must ensue, if further restrictions were placed upon general commerce of the country; and no further restrictions have been placed. But in the course of the investigation before this Committee, and at a very late period of their sittings, because it is after this part of this immense volume[16] had been given the house of Zulueta & Co. learnt that some evidence had been given ex parte and in their absence, which they thought threw some reflection upon the honour and integrity of their house. They felt their honour involved, and they felt themselves entirely innocent of the charge—they felt that the house of Zulueta & Co., both here and abroad, so far from assisting in the slave trade, had cautiously desisted from it, and made great sacrifices, even when both nations were engaged in it; and one of their firm came forward to give such explanation as he thought necessary to clear the house, if possible, from the imputation cast upon it—not because he knew more of it than any other member of the firm, that will appear from the evidence; but, because he spoke English more fluently than his father, he came forward and gave the evidence which is before you. And, Gentlemen, but for that evidence the whole case would have been, that the house of Zulueta & Co. shipped these goods and dispatched this vessel, and in the course of their proceedings this letter and charter-party were signed by the prisoner at the bar. But they say, what is wanting, that evidence will complete, and out of his own mouth they can clearly show he has betrayed himself into a most awful predicament—that when he went before this Committee voluntarily, he has admitted himself to be a felon. But, thank God, that is for you to judge of. It is for you, a Jury of British men, not dealing with a fellow-countryman, but where you would be more tender than with any of your own countrymen—it is you, and I thank God for it, who are to decide whether this young man has admitted himself to be a felon: if he has, he must be punished for it; but he has given a fair statement from beginning to end, and if there was any thing false, the prosecutor could prove it false by the clearest evidence; and I can, with that confidence with which I should appeal to Heaven for truth and justice, appeal to you for a verdict of acquittal of the prisoner.

Gentlemen, he appears before the Committee upon the 22nd of July, 1842, and the Chairman says to him, “You have seen some statements that have been made to this Committee upon the subject of a transaction in which your house was engaged; have you any observations to offer upon it?—I received from the Clerk of the Committee a letter.” He accounts for having heard of it, and then says, “I would beg, first of all, to refer to the letter which I had the honour to address to the Chairman.” That letter ought to have been brought before you—it is not—we have it not, and have no control over it. The prosecutor could have produced it, because, with the permission of the House, by which he has produced this evidence, he might have produced that letter, or had a copy of it. He says, “My reason for wishing to be examined before this Committee was, that the statements contained in the evidence which I have mentioned are all of them more or less incorrect, some of them totally so. I will begin by stating what has been the nature of our, I will not say trade, for we have not had a trade ourselves, but of our connexion with the shipment of goods to the coast of Africa.” I pray your attention to this—it is not, as my learned friend Mr. Serjeant Talfourd seems to assume in a question put to Captain Denman, it is not that this house has ever traded, in the proper sense of the word, to the coast of Africa; they never send goods there on their own account, and they never received goods from there; they never had any transaction or correspondence with any person at the Gallinas, or any where else upon the coast of Africa; all their transactions were confined to the execution of foreign orders from the Havannah, and other parts of the world; all that they did being to dispatch the vessels and ship the goods; and from the moment of shipping the goods in England, from that moment their interference entirely ceased. He says, “I will begin by stating what has been the nature of our, I will not say trade, for we have not had a trade ourselves, but of our connexion with the shipment of goods to the coast of Africa. We have been established as merchants for upwards of 70 years in Spain, for nearly 20 years in this country, and we have had connexions to a large extent in Spain, and in the Havannah, and in South America, and in several other places; among them we have had connexions, or commercial intercourse, with the house of Pedro Martinez & Co. of the Havannah, and with Blanco and Cavallo of Havannah. With them we have carried on a regular business in consignments of sugars and of cochineal, which they have made to us.” I pray you to put this case—Suppose the house of Zulueta & Co. received a consignment of cochineal and sugars from the house of Martinez, the value of the consignment being 5,000l., they convert it into money, and they have that 5,000l. at the disposal of Martinez & Co.; suppose any one of the gentlemen, who are doing me the honour of attending to me, had money of Martinez by him, say 10,000l., the house of Martinez, instead of drawing it out, order it to be invested in English goods; suppose they write and say, we have received your account sales of sugars and cochineal, we find we are credited for 10,000l., and we request you to ship the undermentioned goods by the Augusta, Captain Jennings, for the Gallinas, or any other place on the coast of Africa, and they set one against the other—would you hesitate in doing it? would you dream you were committing a felony? It is not that this is an only transaction (I do not know whether that would affect the case)—there is a trading for twenty years—it is a little more than ten years that they have had transactions of that kind, and have shipped goods to, they did not know who—they have never heard of the goods being seized, or the vessels seized, or what became of the money, whether invested in the slave trading, or any other traffic—all they know is, that they have received the consignments of cochineal or sugars, that they have sold them, and hold 5,000l. or 10,000l. in their hands—they are ordered this day to pay part of the money by accepting bills, and the next day they are ordered to send the remainder of the money they owe, in brandy, tobacco, or iron, to be shipped to the Gallinas, or any where else, and they act upon it—whether the goods are sold for slaves, whether they are used, whether they are sold for money, and the money spent in the purchase of other merchandise or in the support of the families of those who have received them, to them is indifferent—they have shipped the goods, they have debited the account, and there the matter ends, that is perfectly clear. He says, “With them we have carried on a regular business in consignments of sugars and of cochineal, which they have made to us; and in specie received by the packets from Mexico and other places. We have several times acted for them here in this country, buying raw cotton for instance at Liverpool, and re-selling it very largely; that has been principally with Pedro Martinez & Co.” “They are general merchants?—They are general merchants, and their transactions with us have been of that nature. As general merchants, we have bought stock here for them rather largely; and, in the course of those transactions, we have received orders from Don Pedro Martinez & Co., of the Havannah, and from Don Pedro Martinez, of Cadiz, to ship goods to the coast of Africa.” It must be doubtless so that they received the order one day to remit money, and the next to remit goods to the coast of Africa. If they were slave traders, you have no right to assume that they knew it; it is not proved that they knew it; and if Martinez & Co. were notorious slave dealers, if they are also much larger traders in cochineal and sugars, what right had they to suppose, if, instead of the money they owe, they are to ship merchandise, what right have they to suppose that they will deal unlawfully with this commodity? It is a case to which the law never pointed, and it would go to the destruction of commerce if any man was bound to pause or make any inquiry at all before he shipped. He is then asked, “Have you received orders from Pedro Martinez for shipments for the coast of Africa?—Yes; in the course of business we have received orders to ship goods upon the funds in our hands belonging to them; and we have shipped the goods described in the letter, and sent the bills of lading to Pedro Martinez; but beyond that we have never had any returns from the coast of Africa.”

This is the whole case; it is a full defence to this prosecution, and disposes of the offence it is supposed this young man was committing. And further, he says, “Nor any control of any kind from the moment the cargoes left the ports of this country.” Now here again, if this is false, it might be proved. They have given us notice to produce the accounts, and all letters that have passed between Martinez and Zulueta & Co.; they might have shown that this was false, that they had dealt in some other way, and that they had some interest in the final event of the shipment: they have not proved any thing of the kind. I say they have proved the contrary, and I will never in my person establish so fatal a precedent as to recognise the notion that any man upon his trial for a felony is to prove himself innocent before evidence is given to prove him guilty.

He is then asked, “You have had no interest in the result of the venture?—No, nor any notice, nor any acquaintance, nor any correspondence with any one upon the coast; we have never had any kind of knowledge, either subsequently or previously, of the shipments, except the mere fact of buying the goods and shipping them.” “Your whole interest was a commission upon the transaction?—Entirely. The extent of those transactions has been so limited in the course of nearly twenty years that we have been in this country, that the amount of the invoices that we have sent out has been something like 20,000l. or 22,000l. in the course of all that time. That is one part of the operations we have performed. The other operations are the acceptance of bills drawn by people on the coast; among them Pedro Blanco when he was there, upon ourselves, on account of Blanco & Cavallo, of Havannah, upon funds which Blanco & Cavallo had in our hands: for instance, the people at the Havannah, or in Spain, open a credit with us, and we accept the bills of the parties on that credit with us, just the same as we should do with any other correspondent in any other part.” “You would have funds in your hands, arising from some commercial transactions between you and the Havannah merchant, or the Cadiz merchant; and Pedro Blanco, upon the coast of Africa, would draw upon the credit of those funds, being authorised by the Cadiz or the Havannah merchant?—Yes; and if Pedro Blanco had drawn 5s. beyond that, we should have protested, and in some instances we have protested.” This shews they had nothing to do with the owner of the property abroad. They had received consignments, and had accounted for the sums of money, and they either accept bills or consign goods; if bills are drawn beyond the amount due, they protest them, and if they are asked to consign goods beyond that amount, they refuse to do so. “With regard to the vessel alluded to in this Report, the Augusta, our part in that concern has been simply that which appears from one of the letters: that is to say”—

Now here again, Gentlemen, I must refer you to the mode in which this prosecution has been carried on.

In this evidence before the Committee, the prisoner now at the bar refers to one of the letters received by the house from Martinez & Co.: I must say where the counsel for the prosecution availed themselves of this evidence before the Committee, as evidence against the prisoner upon the charge of felony, I think they were bound to make evidence of every document he referred to in it, as explanatory of the evidence he gave.

I speak this subject to the correction of their Lordships; and I know that their Lordships will overrule and correct what I say, if I am wrong, and therefore I say it with the more confidence, because I know it will not be controverted; I say, that in a prosecution for a felony, or any other crime, if the counsel for the prosecution give in evidence a statement made by a prisoner, charged with a crime which refers to a document, he ought—

Mr. Serjeant Bompas. I understood this was the letter about the 500l.; that and all the other letters are in the Appendix, and to be found there: they are deposited, every one.

Mr. Kelly. We will try my learned friend’s accuracy by looking at what it was. He says, “With regard to the vessel alluded to in this Report, the Augusta, our part in that concern has been simply that which appears from one of the letters: that is to say, Pedro Martinez, of Cadiz, had made choice of Jennings to buy the vessel, and lent him money to buy the vessel; because Pedro Martinez wanted him to have a vessel in the trade, for the purpose of taking his goods to their destination.” He says that the object of Pedro Martinez was, that Captain Jennings should buy the vessel, and that it should be conducted in the way he states. That may appear in a letter—how could it appear but in a letter from Martinez & Co. to Zulueta, containing their instructions? That letter my learned friend should have called for—he has given notice to produce it, and he ought to have called for it and made it a part of the examination, as if the witness had produced and read the letter, and it had not been set out in the evidence. He then says, “I have now described the three kinds of operations in which we have been concerned, and our knowledge of all of them terminated with the execution of the orders of our correspondents. We had nothing more to do than to follow the orders of the purchaser in shipping the goods. With regard to the purchase of the vessel by Jennings; Jennings is a man—” Here is a solution of every thing called concealment. “Jennings is a man who has been employed some time by Martinez; he has served Martinez as a chartered captain, and Martinez, having been satisfied with his services, agreed to lend him that money on the security of the vessel, provided it did not exceed a certain amount.” Now the next question is put by Mr. Forster, the member for Berwick. Mr. Forster all the world knows, and I hope you know, is very extensively concerned in the African trade; he is a man as perfectly conversant with this subject as any man in Britain; and I cannot help making the same observation as to him which I did as to Lord Stanley and Lord John Russell, I cannot help thinking, if there had been any thing dishonourable in the character of the trade and to the character of a British merchant, instead of bringing out the true colour of the transaction, as you will see he did, he would have done every thing to hold it up to reprobation. He learns from the witness the nature of the transaction as to the purchase of the vessel, that Captain Jennings had been engaged in similar transactions; he catches at it in a moment, and puts it in a few words—“You advanced the money to Captain Jennings for the purchase of the vessel, Jennings transferring the vessel to you as a security for the money so advanced?—That is just the description of operation, which is a very general one in business.” If the counsel for the prosecution says it is not the ordinary course of business, why does he not call Mr. Forster, or any other gentleman in the trade, to show that it is not correct, and that it is not a usual transaction? He has attempted no such thing; the evidence is a blank; you have only the evidence of this young man. I do not pretend to say that because this gentleman has given a long statement, in which he has vindicated his house from the statement made against them, that you are bound to believe all he says; but I do appeal to you whether, if what he says could be proved false by the prosecutors, they would not have done so? They have proved nothing false. He is speaking of an ordinary transaction of commerce before some of the first commercial men in Britain: there was a check upon his evidence which would have restrained him, if wicked enough to tell a lie, which would have prevented him saying what was not true. I say that the character of the Committee is a guarantee of the correctness of his statement, speaking of it as the ordinary course of trade.

The Chairman then says, “What is the object of such an operation?—I know very little, or almost next to nothing, of the operations in those parts of the world.” Is that true or untrue? That is the very essence of the case, as I submit to you: he has been only six or seven years in the business; they have only in the last ten years had seven or eight transactions, and in the last six or seven years they may have two or three. He says, “I know very little, or almost next to nothing, of the operations in those parts of the world.” Why, are you to suppose that he, by intuition or by magic, was to know all that Captain Hill, Captain Denman, and Colonel Nichol knew in twenty-five years of constant observation? Mr. Serjeant Bompas asks you to believe he knew every thing as well as any body living upon the spot. Then he speaks of the object of the transaction, which I will not weary you in repeating.

Then he is asked, “What advantage would there be in Mr. Jennings taking the articles rather as the owner than as captain under Martinez; was not he commander of the vessel as well as owner of the vessel?—Yes.” “He is made the owner, instead of being captain?—He is the owner as well as the captain of the vessel; he stands indebted to Martinez, and gives a bottomry bond for the vessel.” Then he goes on to illustrate what he says.

Then Mr. Forster says, “You acted in this transaction merely as agent in the usual manner, as you would have acted for any house in any part of the world?—Exactly; if Martinez had told me, ‘You have got 500l. in your hands, pay that to Captain Jennings,’ I should have known nothing more of the transaction; I should have paid the money. But Martinez did not wish to go beyond a certain amount; and he says, ‘You exercise control, do not allow the man to pay more than 500l. for the vessel.’” “But beyond the purchase of the vessel and the shipment of the goods, the other arrangements and the subsequent transactions were entirely between Jennings and Martinez & Co.?—Most assuredly; except with the order of Martinez, I do not know how we could have done any thing with him in any way.”

Gentlemen, that reminds me of this fact: my learned friend has sought to give in evidence certain papers, which were found in the year 1841 on board this vessel, and which it is now perfectly manifest were put on board that vessel in Cadiz long after she had sailed from Liverpool; I objected to that evidence. Gentlemen, I will not go over again what I said at the time: I certainly did think, considering that these letters were in print and before my Lords, that the only object of the discussion was to have a legal opinion of my Lords whether these letters were admissible in evidence. My learned friend could have argued the point without referring to the contents of the letters, and so filling your minds with the contents of those letters, which, as they were rejected, ought not to have been submitted to you; for any one, knowing how the human mind is constituted, must feel that in the mind of one or two out of the twelve the effect might have been to draw your attention to something foreign to the matter; and I objected and complained of Mr. Serjeant Bompas for referring to the letters. My Lords held that they were not evidence, but my learned friend seemed to be pressing upon you their contents in opposition to the opinion of my Lord. I will remind you that these letters were written by Martinez & Co., and put on board this vessel at Cadiz months after the vessel had sailed from England. Mr. Zulueta had never heard of these proceedings; and whether he is guilty or innocent, all that is charged against him had been committed months before these letters were in existence, and therefore to attempt to use what Martinez had said or written, against the prisoner, was only calculated to raise a prejudice injurious to the administration of justice. You may easily imagine that Martinez may be, for aught I know, a man who, besides dealing to the extent of a million a year in sugars and other things, does deal to some extent in slaves, and it is possible he may have written letters to his correspondents in Africa relating to the slave trade; and consider the wickedness of using these letters against Mr. Zulueta, who never saw the letters, and could not know any thing of them or their contents, or have any control over them. It was this sentence reminded me of that: he is asked, “But beyond the purchase of the vessel and the shipment of the goods, the other arrangements and the subsequent transactions were entirely between Jennings and Martinez & Co.?—Most assuredly; except with the order of Martinez, I do not know how we could have done any thing with him in any way.” It therefore comes to this, whatever might have passed between Martinez and Captain Jennings, Captain Jennings may be responsible for, or Martinez; but Mr. Zulueta is wholly irresponsible: all that passed through his hands he is ready to account for and abide by, and stand to the consequences of it; but what took place between Captain Jennings and Martinez is wholly beyond his knowledge; and it is unjust and unreasonable that I, as his counsel, should for one moment permit it to be given in evidence if I could prevent it.

Then Sir Thomas Acland asks him, “Do you mean that you know that the Augusta was not engaged in any slaving transactions during the voyage upon which she left Liverpool?—Most assuredly not; in fact, my testimony is hardly required of that, because every thing proves that. When she was detained, it was never said that she was upon a slaving operation at all. Before she left this port, after she was bought, she was completely rendered useless for that purpose.” Here again have they attempted to prove that the contrary was the fact, and that this answer was false? Remember that this is not said by this young man as if then upon his trial and defending himself against the charge of felony, and when he would have a strong temptation, if capable of falsehood, to say what was false to protect himself against the heavy punishment. All this is said freely. If any one of you were to hear to-morrow morning that another had said of you, you had been offered a bribe to give a particular verdict, you would go before the first tribunal and deny the statement, and request that it might be made public; that is all this young man has said, he is denying the accusation and submitting that what his accusers have said is untrue. If he was saying what was untrue, they could have shown it. He says, “After she was bought she was completely rendered useless for that purpose;” and it is proved that she was—for the leagers, the water-vessels, it was proved to you were rendered useless; and though my learned friend would not admit it, I proved that they were put ashore at Liverpool, and therefore this is every word of it true, and my learned friend has failed in proving it false.

The Chairman then says, “The charge is, that she was engaged in carrying goods to a person engaged in the slave trade; not that she was engaged in the slave trade herself?” Then he says, and here is a very important answer—“I most certainly say, that I do not know whether the person is so engaged or not.” That is, the consignee of the vessel. The Chairman observes, “The charge is, that this vessel was sent to somebody engaged in the slave trade?” And what does he say?—“I do not know whether he is or not; I do not know any thing about him.” Whether they could have proved the contrary as to Ximenes or Rolo, or all of them, I do not know. Then he goes on to say, “It seems to me that English captains and English subjects are not prohibited from borrowing money from Spaniards.” There is no doubt of that; it is quite lawful. “She was bought with money lent by Pedro Martinez to Captain Jennings for the purpose.”

Then Mr. Wilson Patten asked him, “You have stated that yours is an agency trade?—It is so; and in the multitude of business, any one can understand that 20,000l. in 15 or 20 years, can only be a mere trifle in the business of any merchant, without laying claim to a large business; and in following that business, we have executed shipping orders.”

This is another repetition of the observation made before, that it was a shipping order in the transactions of their house, and that he had only executed the orders given by a foreign correspondent. Then he is asked, “To what part of the coast of Africa has that business been chiefly conducted?—I believe, almost exclusively to the Gallinas.”

Then he goes on, and this is the part of the evidence upon which Mr. Serjeant Bompas relies—this is really the only part of this body of evidence given by this young man upon which the learned Serjeant relies in support of the prosecution—“Do you know the nature of the trade of Pedro Martinez at the Gallinas?—I know from general report, that Don Pedro Martinez himself is supposed to deal in slaves, and I believe it is so.” “Is he known at the Havannah as a dealer in slaves?—I do not know, but I believe so. I do not know why it should not be known at the Havannah, if it is known in other parts.” From that my learned friend says he does know it. You must take the whole of the evidence together. He says his house “never had any thing to do with any slave transaction, nor does he know that any vessel that ever went from their house was engaged in slave transactions, but he had heard that Pedro Martinez was engaged in the slave trade;” but you have it from other parts of the case, that he was a large dealer in other transactions quite lawful.

Now this is a statement, not of what this young man knew at the time he participated more or less in the transaction now under your consideration—these transactions took place in 1840—this examination takes place in July 1842. He does not say, that at the time they sent the Augusta they knew that Pedro Martinez was engaged in the slave trade; he says, “I know it,” speaking in the present tense, meaning “I now know it.”

Now, Gentlemen, I beg your attention to a question I besought my learned friend to read, I besought in vain—I thank God I have now the means of reading it—

Mr. Serjeant Bompas. Yes, I did read it.

Mr. Kelly. “Have you reason to suppose that a large portion of the trade that they carry on at the Havannah is the slave trade?”—His answer is, “I had no reason to know any thing of the kind; I have known more of their transactions with the slave trade since these things have been mooted than I ever knew before; I have had more knowledge of these things lately than I ever had in my life before; and when I say, ‘I,’ I beg to state that I ought to state, ‘we,’ for all my partners are in the same situation.”

Now, what does this come to? This gentleman tells you, that out of many hundred thousand pounds, a few trifling orders are sent to the coast of Africa; he is asked in 1842 if he knows of their correspondent being engaged in the slave trade, and he says he does only from common report; and in another part of the evidence, when his attention is more particularly called to it, he says, “I had no reason to know any thing of the kind; but since these transactions have been mooted I have known more of their connexion with the slave trade.” What is the meaning of this? I do implore you to remember that we are here upon a grave crime, the effect of a conviction upon which would expose this young man to utter and irremediable ruin, and bring disgrace upon his family; he is called upon after a loose examination upon the subject to explain what he has in a long examination loosely admitted, that a man was a slave trader, and also that these goods were to be so used. Looking at it fairly, what is it?—I had no reason to know it four years ago; but since these matters have been discussed I have inquired more about it, and have found, from the evidence of Captain Denman, that an event took place there which made the Gallinas, and in the character of the trading there, a matter of as much notoriety as the battle of Waterloo, or any other great event.—It appears that this officer of Her Majesty’s navy descended upon the coast and burnt every slave establishment upon the spot, and the consequence is, that reclamations have been made and actions have been brought; it was the subject of investigation before this Committee, and is the subject of proceedings in Courts of Justice, and the attention of every body has been called to it, and of course that brings to the mind of this young gentleman a great deal of knowledge of the character of the place, and those who have lived in it, more than he ever possessed before; and I put it to you, if this was a civil instead of a criminal case, and in which a man was to pay a sum of money, whether the fair inference is not, that, they shipped these goods without knowing that they were to be employed in the slave trade, that they did not know that Martinez was engaged in it till it became the subject of discussion; and I ask you, what is there to establish that it was so notorious that Martinez was a slave dealer, that Mr. Zulueta must have known that the goods were to be so employed? I ask you, why may not Mr. Zulueta, as much as any other merchant or manufacturer in the kingdom, who is asked to sell goods to go to the coast of Africa, why may he not, when there is an immense extent of lawful trade to that coast, have supposed that they were to be used in the lawful trade as in the unlawful trade, which it would be criminal in him to promote? I say that in a civil case, but in a criminal case, if there is a shadow of doubt upon your minds whether he is innocent or guilty—and in this I shall be sanctioned by my Lords the Judges—if doubt be left in your minds, when it was the duty of the prosecutor to remove that doubt, the prisoner must have your verdict. It is not because it is probable or possible that the goods might have been so employed—it is not because there is something doubtful in the transaction—you must be satisfied that he knew they were to be so employed, and that he shipped them with that object—and unless you are convinced of that, there is no case fora verdict of guilty. I say the whole question rests upon the notoriety of the place and the character of the parties, and upon that you find that this gentleman knew nothing at the time of these transactions either of the nature of the trade or the character of the persons there.

Then they talk about the ship, and so on. Then Mr. Forster says, “Your house had nothing to do with any letters that might be put on board the Augusta after she sailed from this country?—Nothing whatever.” And that is the way that was perfectly disposed of, and so the Judges have held in rejecting the letters put on board after the vessel left the country. He says, “The Augusta was seized on the coast of Africa, on the charge of slave trading?—I believe that was the case.” Then he is asked, “Have you reason to suppose that the whole of that large commerce is subservient to the carrying on of the slave trade by the house of Blanco and Martinez at the Havannah?—I do not know; I know that they have large transactions in general business. I know that a short time ago I got 40,000l. or 50,000l. of Spanish bonds in the market for Martinez. I know that he is a large speculator in Spanish bonds and in securities of state.” Then he names the house for whom that was done. Then he goes on, “Have you been employed by the house at the Havannah to ship manufactured goods from this country to Havannah, suitable for the African trade?—We have sometimes shipped goods to the Havannah of the same kind as those that were in the ‘Augusta;’ cotton goods and other things of that sort.” Would that make it felony if you shipped goods to the Havannah, if the persons there used them in the slave trade? Where is it to stop? It is essential that it should be so understood by juries, as well as mercantile men; there must be some clear and distinct rule. Men are not, while carrying on their fair and mercantile transactions, to be treading on the verge of transportation every moment of their lives, which they would be if they deal in these goods which are sent in these ships, and may be so employed or engaged.

Then he is asked, “Have you been employed by the house at the Havannah to ship manufactured goods from this country to Havannah, suitable for the African trade?—We have sometimes shipped goods to the Havannah of the same kind as those that were in the ‘Augusta;’ cotton goods, and other things of that sort.” “Have you sent any goods of that description since you first began to send goods out direct to the coast of Africa?—They have been mixed; I cannot draw a distinction between the two destinations; some have gone to the Havannah, some to the Gallinas.” Then he is asked, “How long have you conducted the trade upon the coast of Africa?—As I said before, I do not think we have conducted any trade on the coast of Africa, either legal or illegal.” He persists in maintaining, as I do on his behalf, that his transactions were closed at Liverpool; he knows nothing more about it. Then he is asked, “How long have you acted as agents for Martinez, on the coast of Africa?—As long as we have had any connexions with Martinez; it is part and parcel of other operations; that is to say, in the multitude of other operations that have intervened we have shipped goods as I have said.” And it would be a strange thing if these gentlemen, for the sake of putting into their pockets an inconsiderable sum of money by this purchase—I am afraid to calculate it, for fear I should fall into an error—were to put themselves in jeopardy of an indictment for a felony, and transportation for fourteen years. If they have done so, it must be from some strange ignorance. To suppose they would do so for that which would not pay their clerks’ salary for a day, when they have stood so far above suspicion, is absolutely incredible and impossible.

Then he is asked, “Have you ever received consignments from them, or on their behalf, of palm oil, gold dust, or ivory, from the coast of Africa?”—He says, “Never; we never have received any thing from the coast of Africa whatever. With regard to all these transactions, it will perhaps appear strange to the Committee that I should not know more of the coast of Africa, having shipped things there; but if we had shipped to the amount of 100,000l. to the coast of Africa, or carried on any considerable trade there, we should certainly have known more about the coast of Africa; but in transactions of a very large amount, an invoice occasionally of about 2,000l. or 3,000l. of goods was a thing that we sent as a matter of course, and did not trouble our heads about, especially as the remuneration we got was a mere trifle, not of itself worth pursuing, if it had not been for the general business we had?”

Now you see, Gentlemen, this in one respect confirms what I do not intend to dispute, the testimony of these naval gentlemen that there are not shipments from this colony; but the question is not whether that is the fact, or what information it conveyed to them, or what information it conveyed to Mr. Zulueta; he says, “We never received any produce from that country but that would not show that there were no produce. “Our shipments were in discharge of former liabilities; we had received sugars and sold them, and we were called upon to make shipments to the coast of Africa, and we do so; and the nature of the transaction is such that we could not have any return;” and therefore he says, “if our transactions had been larger, we should have known a great deal more of this trade than we do. We had a sum of money, the proceeds of sugar and other articles, and we sent a small shipment to Africa debiting the house with that shipment; that being all we knew, and our transactions closing the moment the ship left Liverpool, how can we know any more of it? We know no more, and that accounts for our ignorance.”