VI THE TREATY WITH TURKEY

In the course of the debate on the foreign policy of England which opened on Thursday, March 25, on the third reading of the Finance Bill, Mr. Asquith, speaking of the Turkish problem as leader of the Opposition, urged that the Ottoman Government should no longer hold in Europe the political power that belonged to it before the war. He urged, however, that the Sultan should not be relegated to Asia Minor, where he would quite escape European control. He proposed, therefore, that the Sultan should be, as it were, “vaticanised”—that is to say, he should remain in Constantinople, but should only retain his spiritual power as Caliph, as the Pope does in Rome.

The Great Powers or the League of Nations would then be entrusted with the political power in Constantinople, and if the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles were neutralised or internationalised, the presence of the Sultan in Constantinople would not be attended with any serious danger.

As to Mesopotamia, Mr. Asquith objected to the status quo ante bellum. As the frontiers of that region were not quite definite, sooner or later, he thought, if England remained there, she would be driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even the Caspian Sea, and she had not adequate means for the present to do so. So it was better for her to confine her action within the Basra zone.

The Prime Minister, rising in response, first remarked that the cause of the delays in the negotiations with Turkey and the settlement of peace was that the Allies had thought it proper to wait for the decision of America, as to the share she intended to take in the negotiations. He recalled that the Allies had hoped the United States would not only assume the protection of Armenia properly speaking, but of Cilicia too, and also accept a mandate for the Straits of Constantinople, and went on as follows:

“If we had not given time for America to make up her mind it might have suspected the Allies wanted to take advantage of some political difficulty to partition Turkey; and it is only when the United States definitely stated she did not intend to take part in the Conference that the Allies proceeded to take definite decisions with regard to the Turkish peace. I think that it is due to the Allies to make that explanation.”

Mr. Lloyd George went on to state that the Allies had contemplated maintaining only the spiritual power of the Sultan, but unfortunately this scheme did not seem likely to solve the difficulties of the situation. For Constantinople had to be administered at the same time, and it is easier to control the Sultan and his Ministers in Constantinople than if they were relegated to Asia Minor.

Then, resorting to the policy of compromise which bore such bad fruits in the course of the Peace Conference, Mr. Lloyd George, in order not to shut out the possibility of reverting to the opposite opinion, added that if it was proved that the Allies’ control weakened the power of the Sultan in Asia Minor, it would always be possible to consider the question afresh—but he hoped that would not be necessary.

As to the question of Asia Minor and the distribution of the mandates, he declared:

“If America had accepted the responsibility for controlling Armenia, the French, who, under what is called the Sykes scheme, had Cilicia assigned to their control, were quite willing to hand it over to American control. The British, French, and Italians are quite agreed on the subject, but we have not yet seen a sign. We have only received telegrams from America, asking us to protect the Armenians; we have had no offers up to the present to undertake the responsibility.... We are hoping that France will undertake that responsibility, but it is a good deal to ask of her. We have also got our responsibility, but we cannot take too much upon our own shoulders....

“With regard to the Republic of Erivan, which is Armenia, it depends entirely on the Armenians themselves whether they protect their independence.... I am told that they could easily organise an army of above 40,000 men. If they ask for equipment, we shall be very happy to assist in equipping their army. If they want the assistance of officers to train that army, I am perfectly certain there is no Allied country in Europe that would not be willing to assist in that respect.”26

Finally, with, respect to Mesopotamia, Mr. Lloyd George urged “it would be a mistake to give up Baghdad and Mosul.”

“I say that, after incurring the enormous expenditure which we have incurred in freeing this country from the withering despotism of the Turk, to hand it back to anarchy and confusion, and to take no responsibility for its development, would be an act of folly quite indefensible.... They have been consulted about their wishes in this respect, and I think, almost without exception, they are anxious that we should stay here, though they are divided about the kind of independent Government they would like....

“We have no right, however, to talk as if we were the mandatory of Mesopotamia when the treaty with Turkey has not yet been signed. It is only on the signing of that treaty that the question of mandatories will be decided, but when that time comes we shall certainly claim the right to be the mandatory power of Mesopotamia, including Mosul.”

In its leading article, The Times, criticising the attitude Mr. Lloyd George had taken in the debate on the Mesopotamian question, wrote on March 27:

“The Prime Minister made statements, about the future of Mesopotamia which require further elucidation. He said that when the Treaty of Peace with Turkey has been finally decided, the British Government would ‘claim the right’ to be the ‘mandatory Power’ for Mesopotamia, including the vilayet of Mosul....

“Judging from some passages in his speech, even Mr. Lloyd George himself has never grasped the full and dangerous significance of the adventure he now advocates....

“The Prime Minister’s reply conveyed the impression that he has only the very haziest idea about what he proposes to do in this region, which has been the grave of empires ever since written history began.”

After pointing out the dangers of a British mandate over Mesopotamia, including the vilayet of Mosul, The Times thought, as had been suggested by Mr. Asquith, that England should confine her direct obligations to the zone of Basra, and pointed out that it was only incidentally and almost in spite of himself that Mr. Asquith had been driven in 1915 to occupy the larger part of Mesopotamia.

“Mr. Asquith says—and he is entirely right—that if we hold a line in the mountains of Northern Kurdistan we shall sooner or later be driven to advance to the shores of the Black Sea, or even to the Caspian. His view is in complete accord with every lesson to be derived from our history as an Empire. We have never drawn one of these vague, unsatisfactory frontiers without being eventually compelled to move beyond it. We cannot incur such a risk in the Middle East, and the cost in money and the strain upon our troops are alike prohibitive factors.”27

The next day, in a similar debate in the French Chamber, M. Millerand, being asked to give information about the leading principles of the French Government in the negotiations that were being carried on in regard to the Turkish treaty, made the following statement, which did not throw much light on the question:

“First of all the Supreme Council deems it necessary to organise a Turkey that can live, and for this purpose—this is the only resolution that was made public and the only one that the British Government disclosed in the House of Commons—for this purpose it has seemed fit to maintain a Sultan in Constantinople.

“The same principle implies that Turkey will include, together with the countries inhabited mainly by Moslems, the economic outlets without which she could not thrive.

“In such a Turkey France, whose traditional prestige has been enhanced by victory, will be able to exercise the influence she is entitled to by the important moral and economic interests she owns in Turkey.

“This idea is quite consistent with an indispensable clause—the war has proved it—viz., the freedom of the Straits, which must necessarily be safeguarded by an international organisation. It is also consistent with the respect of nationalities, in conformity with which some compact ethnic groups who could not possibly develop under Turkish sovereignty will become independent, and other guarantees will be given for the protection of minorities.

“We have in Turkey commercial and financial interests of the first order. We do not intend that any of them should be belittled; we want them to develop safely and fully in the future. We shall see to it especially that the war expenditures of Turkey shall not curtail the previous rights of French creditors.

“In the districts where France owns special interests, these interests must be acknowledged and guaranteed. It goes without saying that the Government intends to base its claims on the agreements already concluded with the Allies.”

At the sitting of March 27, after a speech in which M. Bellet asked that the Eastern question should be definitely settled by putting an end to Turkish sovereignty in Europe and Asia Minor, M. P. Lenail revealed that the Emir Feisal received two million francs a month from the English Government and as much from the French Government; he wondered why he was considered such an important man, and demanded the execution of the 1916 agreements, which gave us a free hand in Cilicia, Syria, and the Lebanon. Then M. Briand, who had concluded these agreements, rose to say:

“It is time we should have a policy in Syria and Cilicia. If we are not there, who will be there? The 1916 agreements were inspired, not only by the wish of safeguarding the great interests of France and maintaining her influence in the Mediterranean, but also because the best qualified representatives of the peoples of those countries, who groaned under the Turkish yoke, entreated us not to forsake them. And it is under these circumstances that in the middle of the war, urging that a long-sighted policy always proves the best, we insisted on the settlement of these questions.

“Thus were Syria and Cilicia, with Mosul and Damascus, of course, included in the French zone.

“Shall we always pursue a merely sentimental policy in those countries?

“If we wanted Mosul, it is on account of its oil-bearing lands; and who shall deny that we need our share of the petroleum of the world?

“As for Cilicia, a wonderfully rich land, if we are not there to-morrow, who will take our place? Cilicia has cotton, and many other kinds of wealth; when we shall see other States in our place, then shall we realise what we have lost, but it will be too late!

“It has been said that it will be difficult for us to settle there. As a matter of fact, the difficulties which are foreseen look greater than they are really; and some of these difficulties may have been put forward to dissuade us from going there.

“It remains that the 1916 agreements are signed; they are based on our time-honoured rights, our efforts, our friendships, and the summons of the peoples that hold out their arms to us. The question is whether they shall be countersigned by facts.

“The name of the Emir Feisal has been put forward. It is in our zone he has set up his dominion; why were we not among the populations of that country at the time? If we had been there, the Emir Feisal would have received his investiture from us by our authority; instead of that, he was chosen by others. Who is to be blamed for it?

“Britain knows the power of parliaments of free peoples; if our Parliament makes it clear that it really wants written treaties to be respected, they will be respected.”

Mr. Wilson had been asked by a note addressed to him on March 12, 1920, to state his opinion about the draft of the Turkish settlement worked out in London, and at the same time to appoint a plenipotentiary to play a part in the final settlement. His answer was handed to M. Jusserand, French ambassador, on March 24; he came to the conclusion finally that Turkey should come to an end as a European Power.

In this note President Wilson declared that though he fully valued the arguments set forward for retaining the Turks in Constantinople, yet he thought that the arguments against the Turks, based on unimpeachable considerations, were far superior to the others. Moreover, he recalled that the Allies had many a time declared that Turkish sovereignty in Europe was an anomalous thing that should come to an end.

Concerning the southern frontiers to be assigned to Turkey, he thought they should follow the ethnographic boundaries of the Arabian populations, unless it were necessary to alter them slightly; in which case the American Government would be pleased—though that did not imply any criticism—to be told for what reasons new frontiers had been proposed.

Mr. Wilson was pleased to see that Russia would one day be allowed to be represented in the International Council that was going to be instituted for the government of Constantinople and the Straits, as he felt sure that any arrangement would be stillborn that did not recognise what he thought was a vital interest to Russia. For the same reason he was pleased that the condition of the Straits in wartime had not yet been settled, and was still under discussion; he thought no decision should be taken without Russia giving her consent.

Turning to the territorial question, he said:

“In regard to Thrace, it seems fair that the part of Eastern Thrace that is beyond the Constantinople area should belong to Greece, with the exception of the northern part of this province; for the latter region has undoubtedly a Bulgarian population, and so, for the sake of justice and equity, the towns of Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, together with their surrounding areas, must be given to Bulgaria. Not only are the arguments set forth by Bulgaria quite sound from an ethnic and historical point of view, but her claims on this territory seem to deserve all the more consideration as she had to cede some wholly Bulgarian territories inhabited by thousands of Bulgarians on her western frontier merely that Serbia might have a good strategic frontier.”

He was chiefly anxious about the future of Armenia. He demanded for her an outlet to the sea, and the possession of Trebizond. He went on thus:

“With regard to the question whether Turkey should give up her rights over Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and the Islands, the American Government recommends the method resorted to in the case of Austria—namely, that Turkey should place these provinces in the hands of the Great Powers, who would decide on their fate.

“As to Smyrna, this Government does not feel qualified to express an opinion, for the question is too important to be solved with the limited information possessed by the Government.”

Finally, the President declared he did not think it necessary for his ambassador to be present at the sittings of the Supreme Council; yet he insisted on being informed of the resolutions that would be taken.

The Philadelphia Ledger, when this note was sent, commented on Mr. Wilson’s opinion as to the Turkish problem, and especially the fate of Constantinople, and did not disguise the fact that he favoured the handing over of Constantinople to Russia, in accordance with the inter-Allied agreements of 1915, 1916, and 1917.

“Mr. Wilson wants Turkey to be expelled from Europe, and the right for democratic Russia to have an outlet to the Mediterranean to be recognised. Thus, to a certain extent, Mr. Wilson will decide in favour of the fulfilment of the secret promises made by the Allies to Russia in the course of the war.

“Mr. Wilson’s opinion is that Bolshevism is about to fall, and next autumn the new Russia that he has constantly longed for and encouraged will come into being. It is calculated that if America gives her support to Russia at this fateful juncture, Russia will throw herself into the arms of America, and this understanding between the two countries will be of immense importance.”

After the Allies had occupied Constantinople and addressed to the Porte a new collective note requesting the Ministry officially to disown the Nationalist movement, affairs were very difficult for some time. As the Allies thought the Ottoman Cabinet’s answer to their note was unsatisfactory, the first dragomans of the English, French, and Italian commissioners on the afternoon of April 1 again called upon the Ottoman Premier.

Owing to the unconciliatory attitude of the English, who made it impossible for it to govern the country, the Ministry resigned. The English required that the new Cabinet should be constituted by Damad Ferid Pasha, on whom they knew they could rely.

Indeed, a secret agreement had already been concluded, on September 12, 1919, between Mr. Fraster, Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Churchill, on behalf of Great Britain, and Damad Ferid Pasha on behalf of the Imperial Ottoman Government. The existence of this agreement was questioned at the time, and was even officially denied in the Stambul Journal, April 8, 1920, but most likely there was an exchange of signatures between them. According to this agreement,28 the Sultan practically acquiesced in the control of Great Britain over Turkey within the limits fixed by Great Britain herself. Constantinople remained the seat of the Caliphate, but the Straits were to be under British control. The Sultan was to use his spiritual and moral power as Caliph on behalf of Great Britain, to support British rule in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the other zones of British influence, not to object to the creation of an independent Kurdistan, and to renounce his rights over Egypt and Cyprus.

Damad Ferid agreed to do so, with the co-operation of the party of the Liberal Entente. If the information given by the Press is reliable, it seems that the composition of the new Cabinet was endangered at the last moment through the opposition of one of the Allied Powers; yet it was constituted at last.

The members of the new Cabinet, headed by Damad Ferid Pasha, who was both Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister, were: Abdullah Effendi, Sheik-ul-Islam; Reshid Bey, an energetic man, an opponent of the Union and Progress Committee, who was Minister of the Interior; and Mehmed Said Pasha, who became Minister of Marine and provisionally Minister of War. The last-named Ministry had been offered to Mahmoud Mukhtar Pasha, son of the famous Ghazi Mukhtar, who broke off with the Committee of Union and Progress in 1912, was dismissed from the army in 1914 by Enver, and was ambassador at Berlin during the first three years of the war; but he refused this post, and also handed in his resignation as a member of the Paris delegation; so the Grand Vizier became War Minister too. The Minister for Public Education was Fakhr ed Din Bey, one of the plenipotentiaries sent to Ouchy to negotiate the peace with Italy. Dr. Jemil Pasha, who had once been prefect of Constantinople, became Minister of Public Works, and Remze Pasha Minister of Commerce.

The investiture of the new Cabinet took place on Monday, April 5, in the afternoon, with the usual ceremonies. The Imperial rescript ran as follows:

“After the resignation of your predecessor, Salih Pasha, considering your great abilities and worth, we hereby entrust to you the Grand Vizierate, and appoint Duri Zade Abdullah Bey Sheik-ul-Islam.

“The disturbances that have been lately fomented, under the name of nationalism, are endangering our political situation, which ever since the armistice had been gradually improving.

“The peaceful measures hitherto taken against this movement have proved useless. Considering the recent events and the persistence of this state of rebellion, which may give rise to the worst evils, it is now our deliberate wish that all those who have organised and still support these disturbances shall be dealt with according to the rigour of the law; but, on the other hand, we want a free pardon to be granted to all those who, having been led astray, have joined and shared in the rebellion. Let quick and energetic measures be taken in order to restore order and security throughout our Empire, and strengthen the feelings of loyalty undoubtedly prevailing among all our faithful subjects to the Khilafat and the throne.

“It is also our earnest desire that you should endeavour to establish trustful and sincere relations with the Great Allied Powers, and to defend the interests of the State and the nation, founding them on the principles of righteousness and justice. Do your utmost to obtain more lenient conditions of peace, to bring about a speedy conclusion of peace, and to alleviate the public distress by resorting to all adequate financial and economic measures.”

The Sheik-ul-Islam in a proclamation to the Turkish people denounced the promoters and instigators of the Nationalist movement, and called upon all Moslems to gather round the Sultan against the “rebels.”

The Grand Vizier issued an Imperial decree condemning the Nationalist movement, pointing out to Mustafa Kemal the great dangers the country ran on account of his conduct, wishing for the restoration of friendly relations between Turkey and the Allies, and warning the leaders of the movement that harsh measures would be taken against them. The Ottoman Government, in a proclamation to the population—which had no effect, for most of the Turks thought it was dictated by foreign Powers—denounced all the leaders and supporters of the Nationalist movement as guilty of high treason against the nation. The proclamation stated:

“The Government, though eager to avoid bloodshed, is still more eager to save the nation, which is running into great danger. So it will not hesitate to resort to strict measures against those who might refuse to go back to their duty according to the high prescriptions of the Sherif, as is ordered by the Imperial rescript.

“With this view, the Government proclaims:

“First, anyone who, without realising the gravity of his act, has allowed himself to be driven by the threats or misleading instigations of the ringleaders, and has joined the insurrectionist movement, gives tokens of repentance within a week and declares his loyalty to the Sovereign, shall enjoy the benefit of the Imperial pardon.

“Secondly, all the leaders and instigators of the movements, together with whosoever shall continue to support them, shall be punished according to the law and the Sherif’s orders.

“Lastly, the Government cannot in any way allow any act of cruelty or misdemeanour to be committed in any part of the Empire either by the Moslem population against other elements, or by non-Moslem subjects against the Moslem population. So it proclaims that whosoever shall commit such acts, or countenance them, or be party to them, shall be severely punished individually.”

A Parliamentary commission set off to Anatolia in order to call upon Mustafa Kemal to give up his hostility to the Entente and lay down arms with the least delay.

Moreover, the Government decided to send some delegates in order to make inquiries and point out to the leaders of the Nationalist movement the dangerous consequences of their stubbornness and open rebellion.

The first delegation was to include an aide-de-camp of the War Minister, and an Allied superior officer. Another delegation was to consist of members of Parliament, among whom were Youssouf Kemal Bey, member for Sivas; Vehbi Bey, member for Karassi; Abdulla Azmi Bey, member for Kutahia; and Riza Nuri, member for Sinope, the very man who had brought in a motion against the occupation of Constantinople and the arrest of some members of the Ottoman Parliament, and who was credited with having said: “Anatolia has a false conception of the occupation of Constantinople. We are going to give clear explanations of the seriousness of the situation in order to avoid disastrous consequences. We are going to tell Anatolia the ideas of the Government about the interests of the nation.”

An Imperial decree prescribed the dissolution of the Chamber, and the members before whom it was read left the Chamber quietly.

But it was obvious that the Damad Ferid Pasha Cabinet no longer represented the country, and that in the mind of most Turks it could no longer express or uphold the free will of the Turkish people, whose hidden or open sympathies, in view of the foreigner’s threat, were given to the Nationalist movement.

It must be owned that the Turkish Nationalist movement had at the outset co-operated with some questionable elements and had been mixed up with the intrigues of the former members of the Committee of Union and Progress. But it now became impossible, in order to belittle it, to look down upon it as a mere plot or insurrectionary movement. In consequence of the successive events that had taken place since the armistice and of the attitude of the Allies, especially England, after the occupation of Constantinople, carried out under British pressure with the approbation of the French Government notwithstanding the protest of the French Press, and in view of the provisions that were likely to be included in the Peace Treaty, Turkish patriotism, which could not allow Turkey to be destroyed and meant to maintain her traditional rights, had tacitly joined that movement. Besides, Mustafa Kemal, who, at the very outset, had been a member of the Committee of Union and Progress, had soon disagreed with Enver, and it should be borne in mind that he was his enemy during the greater part of the war, as he was an opponent of the German Marshal Falkenhayn. Some people have tried to make out there was only personal enmity between them, and have denied the possibility of political opposition; but the very fact that their enmity would have ruined any common political designs they might have had proves there were no such designs.

So Mustafa Kemal did not seem greatly moved by the measures mentioned in the manifesto issued by the Government under pressure of the foreign occupation and amidst the perturbation caused by recent events.

At the end of March Mustafa Kemal warned the Sultan that, in consequence of the occupation of Constantinople, he broke off all connection with the central Government, which henceforth was quite under foreign control. In a proclamation issued to the Mussulmans, he declared it was necessary to form a new independent Ottoman State in Anatolia and to appoint an assistant Sheik-ul-Islam. The reason he gave was that the Sultan could no longer be looked upon as Caliph, for it is a fundamental principle of Islam that the Caliph must be an independent Sovereign, and, since the Allied occupation of Constantinople, he no longer enjoyed his freedom of action. In that appeal, which was not intended for the Mussulmans of Algeria, Tunis, Morocco, and Tripoli, for it seemed to be aimed at Great Britain alone, he regarded the occupation of Constantinople as a new crusade against Islam.

According to news from Nationalist sources, Mustafa Kemal formed a Cabinet, in which he was War Minister of the new Anatolian Government.

It was said at the time he had proclaimed Viceroy of Anatolia and nahib—i.e., the Sultan’s representative in Anatolia—Prince Jemal ed Din, a member of the Imperial Family, son of the late Prince Shevket Effendi, and general inspector of the recruiting service; but the official circles of Constantinople never believed that the prince had allowed him to use his name.

At the same time he had a Constituent Assembly elected, which he intended to convene at Angora. This assembly consisted of the members of Parliament who had been able to escape from Constantinople and of deputies chosen by delegated electors and met on April 23 at Angora, where all sorts of people had come from quite different regions: Constantinople, Marash, Beyrut, Baghdad, etc. The National Assembly of Angora meant to be looked upon as a Constituent Assembly, and strove to introduce wide reforms into the administrative and financial organisation of the Empire. It elected a rather large committee, which styled itself the Government Council, and it included General Mustafa Kemal, Jemal ed Din Chelebi, from Konia, as first Vice-President, and Jelal ed Din Arif Bey as second Vice-President, etc.

The members of the Government which was instituted at Angora when the Great National Assembly met in this town were: General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, President; Bekir Samy Bey, Foreign Affairs; Jamy Bey, Interior; General Feizi Pasha, National Defence; General Ismail Fazil Pasha, Public Works; Youssouf Kemal Bey, National Economy; Hakki Behij Bey, Finance; Dr. Adnan Bey, Public Education; Colonel Ismet Bey, Chief of Staff.

The Sheik of the Senussi, who had joined the National movement, and owing to his prestige had influenced public opinion in favour of this movement, was not appointed, as has been wrongly said, Sheik-ul-Islam; religious affairs were entrusted to a member of a Muslim brotherhood belonging to the National Assembly.

According to the information it was possible to obtain, the political line of conduct adopted by the Nationalists was not only to organise armed resistance, but also to carry on a strong political and religious propaganda, both in Turkey and in foreign countries.

No official letter from Constantinople was to be opened by the functionaries, who, if they obeyed the Constantinople Government, were liable to capital punishment. The religious authorities in the provinces and the heads of the great Muslim brotherhoods were called upon to protest against the fetva by which the Sheik-ul-Islam of Constantinople had anathematised the Nationalists.

But the chief difficulty for the Nationalists was how to raise money.

On behalf of that National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal addressed to M. Millerand the following letter, in which he vehemently protested against the occupation of Constantinople and laid down the claims of the Ottoman people:

“I beg to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency that, owing to the unjustifiable occupation of Constantinople by the Allied troops, the Ottoman people looks upon its Khalifa, together with his Government, as prisoners. So general elections have been held, and on April 23, 1920, the Grand National Assembly held its first sitting, and solemnly declared it would preside over the present and future destiny of Turkey, so long as her Khalifa Sultan and her Eternal City should remain under the dominion and occupation of foreigners.

“The Grand National Assembly has done me the honour to charge me to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency the earnest protest of its members against that arbitrary deed, which violates the terms of the armistice, and has once more confirmed the Ottoman people in its pessimism as to the results of the Peace Conference. Not long ago our Parliament—though a Parliament has always been looked upon as a holy sanctuary by all civilised nations—was violated in the course of a sitting; the representatives of the nation were wrested from the bosom of the assembly by the English police like evildoers, notwithstanding the energetic protest of the Parliament; many a senator, deputy, general, or man of letters, was arrested at his home, taken away handcuffed, and deported; lastly, our public and private buildings were occupied by force of arms, for might had become right.

“Now the Ottoman people, considering all its rights have been violated and its sovereignty encroached upon, has, by order of its representatives, assembled at Angora, and appointed an Executive Council chosen among the members of the National Assembly, which Council has taken in hand the government of the country.

“I have also the honour to let Your Excellency know the desiderata of the nation, as expressed and adopted at the sitting of April 29, 1920.

“First, Constantinople, the seat of the Khilafat and Sultanry, together with the Constantinople Government, are henceforth looked upon by the Ottoman people as prisoners of the Allies; thus all orders and fetvas issued from Constantinople, so long as it is occupied, cannot have any legal or religious value, and all engagements entered upon by the would-be Constantinople Government are looked upon by the nation as null and void.

“Secondly, the Ottoman people, though maintaining its calm and composure, is bent upon defending its sacred, centuries-old rights as a free, independent State. It expresses its wish to conclude a fair, honourable peace, but declares only its own mandatories have the right to take engagements in its name and on its account.

“Thirdly, the Christian Ottoman element, together with the foreign elements settled in Turkey, remain under the safeguard of the nation; yet they are forbidden to undertake anything against the general security of the country.

“Hoping the righteous claims of the Ottoman nation will meet with a favourable reception, I beg Your Excellency to accept the assurance of the deep respect with which I have the honour to be Your Excellency’s most humble, most obedient servant.”

On the eve of the San Remo Conference, which met on April 18, 1920, Ahmed Riza Bey, ex-President of the Chamber and Senator of the Ottoman Empire, who kept a keen lookout on the events that were about to seal the fate of his country, though he had been exiled by the Damad Ferid Ministry, addressed another letter to the President of the Conference, in which he said;

“The Turks cannot in any way, in this age of liberty and democracy, acknowledge a peace that would lower them to the level of an inferior race and would treat them worse than the Hungarians or Bulgarians, who have lost comparatively small territories, whereas Turkey is to be utterly crippled. We want to be treated as a vanquished people, not as an inferior people or a people in tutelage. The victors may have a right to take from us the territories they conquered by force of arms; they have no right to intrude into our home affairs. The Turkish people will willingly grant concessions of mines and public works to the foreigners who offer it the most profitable conditions; but it will never allow the arbitrary partition of the wealth of the nation. To get riches at the expense of an unfortunate nation is immoral; it is all the more unfair as the responsibility of Turkey in the world war is comparatively slight as compared with that of Austria-Germany and Bulgaria. In respect of the crimes and atrocities against Armenia and Greece which the Turks are charged with, we deny them earnestly and indignantly. Let a mixed international commission be formed, and sent to hold an impartial inquiry on the spot, and we pledge ourselves to submit to its decisions. Till such an inquiry has proved anything to the contrary, we have a right to look upon all charges brought against us as slanders or mere lies.

“The Sublime Porte had already, on February 12, 1919, addressed to the High Commissioners an official note requesting that neutral States should appoint delegates charged to inquire into facts and establish responsibilities; but the request of the Ottoman Cabinet has hitherto been in vain, as well as that of the League for National Ottoman Unity made on March 17 of the same year.

“Yet the report of the international Commission of Inquiry assembled at Smyrna, which proved the charges of cruelty brought against the Turks were unfounded, should induce the Allies, in the name of justice, to hold an inquiry into the massacres supposed to have taken place in Cilicia and elsewhere.

“I hope Your Excellency will excuse me if this letter is not couched in the usual diplomatic style, and will consider that when the life and rights of his nation are so grievously endangered it is most difficult for a patriot to keep his thoughts and feelings under control.”

As early as April 19, the San Remo Conference, which seemed to have come to an agreement about the main lines of the treaty to be submitted to Turkey, but had not yet settled the terms of this treaty, decided to summon the Ottoman plenipotentiaries to Paris on May 10.

In a note sent on April 20, 1920, to M. Nitti, as president of the San Remo Conference, Ghalib Kemaly Bey, formerly Ottoman minister plenipotentiary to Russia, now living in Rome, wrote:

“In order to justify the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire it has been asserted that the Turks are not able to administer a large country inhabited by various races, and they have been especially charged with hating and oppressing the Christian element. But a history extending over ten centuries at least plainly shows, by innumerable facts and truths, the absurdity of such assertions.

“If the Ottoman Empire, in spite of its wonderful efforts for the last 130 years, has not been able to reform and renovate itself as the other States have done, that is because, in addition to a thousand other difficulties, it has never had, for the last two centuries, either the power or the peacefulness that would have been necessary to bring such a protracted task to a successful end; for every ten, fifteen, or twenty years, it has been attacked by its neighbours, and the events of the last twelve years testify still more forcibly than any others to the fact that any step taken by the Turks on the way to progress—in the European sense of the word—was not only resented, but even violently opposed by their merciless enemies.

“As to the would-be oppression which the Christians are supposed to have endured in the Empire, let us merely consider that, whereas in Europe the Christians mutually slaughtered each other mercilessly and unceasingly in the name of their sacred Faith, and the unfortunate Jews were cruelly driven away and tortured in the name of the same Faith, the Turks, on the contrary, after ruling for a thousand years over Turkish Asia with many vicissitudes, not only tolerated the presence of millions of Christians in their large, powerful Empire, but even granted them without any restriction, under the benefit of Turkish laws and customs, all possibilities to subsist, develop, and become rich, often at the expense of the ruling race; and they offered a wide paternal hospitality to many wretched people banished from Christian Europe.

“To-day Greece, trampling upon justice and right, lays an iniquitous claim to the noble, sacred land of Turkish Thrace and Asia. Yet can she show the same example of tolerance, and give a strict account of her home policy towards the non-Greek elements, especially concerning the condition and fate of the 300,000 Turks who, before 1883, peopled the wide, fertile plains of Thessaly, of the hundreds of thousands of Moslem Albanians, subjects of the Empire, of the 150,000 Moslems in Crete, and of the 800,000 Moslems in Macedonia, whose unfortunate fate it was to pass under her dominion?

“I need not dwell at length on this painful subject, which will be an eternal shame to modern civilisation, for the victorious Powers know a great deal more—after the inter-Allied inquiry held four months ago in Smyrna—about the ‘gentle and fatherly’ manner in which thousands of Mussulmans were slaughtered and exterminated by the descendants of the civilisation of ancient Greece, who invaded that essentially Turkish province during the armistice under pretence of restoring order.”

And after recalling the figures of the various elements of the population of the Turkish Empire after the 1914 statistics, he concluded:

“Such figures speak but too eloquently, and the painful events that drenched with blood the unfortunate Ottoman land since the armistice raise only too much horror. So the Turkish people most proudly and serenely awaits the righteous, humane, and equitable sanction of the victorious Powers that have assumed before history the heavy responsibility of placing the whole world on a lasting basis of justice, concord, and peace.

“God grant they may choose the best way, the only way, that will lead them to respect, as they solemnly pledged themselves to do, the ethnic, historical, and religious rights of the Ottoman nation and its Sultan, who is, at the same time, the supreme head of the 350 million Mussulmans throughout the world.”

On the same date (April 20, 1920) the Indian Caliphate delegation addressed a note to the president of the Allied Supreme Council at San Remo, to the English, French, Italian Prime Ministers, and to the Japanese ambassador. In this note they summed up their mandate with the Allied and Associated Powers, and insisted again on the claims they had previously laid before Mr. Lloyd George in the course of the interview mentioned previously.

“Firstly, the Mussulmans of India, in common with the vast majority of their co-religionists throughout the world, ask that, inasmuch as independent temporal sovereignty, with its concomitants of adequate military and economic resources, is of the essence of the institution of the Khilafat, the Empire of the Khalifa shall not be dismembered under any pretext. As the Sultan of Turkey is recognised by the vast majority of Mussulmans as Khalifa, what is desired is that the fabric of the Ottoman Empire shall be maintained intact territorially on the basis of the status quo ante bellum, but without prejudice to such political changes as give all necessary guarantees consistent with the dignity and independence of the sovereign State for the security of life and property, and opportunities of full autonomous development for all the non-Turkish communities, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, comprised within the Turkish Empire. But on no account is a Muslim majority to be placed under the rule of a non-Muslim minority contrary to the principle of self-determination. In behalf of this claim, the delegation draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the declaration of the British Prime Minister, equally binding on all the Allied and Associated Powers, when on January 5, 1918, he said: ‘Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race,’ and to President Wilson’s twelfth point in his message to Congress, dated January 8, 1918, on the basis of which the armistice with Turkey was concluded, and which required ‘that the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured of secure sovereignty; that the other nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured security of life and autonomous development.’ The delegation submit that any departure from the pledges and principles set forth above would be regarded by the people of India, and the Muslim world generally, as a breach of faith. It was on the strength of these and similar assurances that tens of thousands of India Mussulmans were induced to lay down their lives in the late war in defence of the Allied cause.

“Secondly, we have to submit that the most solemn religious obligations of the Muslim Faith require that the area known as the Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of Arabia,’ which includes, besides the Peninsula of Arabia, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, shall continue to be, as heretofore for the last 1,300 years, under exclusively Muslim control, and that the Khalifa shall similarly continue to be the Warden and Custodian of the Holy Places and Holy Shrines of Islam—namely, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Nejef, Kerbela, Samarra, Kazimain, and Baghdad, all situated within the Jazirat-ul-Arab.

Any encroachment upon these sanctuaries of Islam by the inauguration of non-Muslim control in whatever guise or form, whether a protectorate or mandate, would be a direct violation of the most binding religious injunctions of Islam and the deepest sentiment of Muslims all the world over, and would, therefore, be utterly unacceptable to the Mussulmans of India and the rest of the Indian community. In this connection, apart from the religious obligations to which we refer, the delegation would draw the attention of the Supreme Council to the proclamation issued by the Government of India, on behalf of His Britannic Majesty’s Government, as also the Governments of France and Russia, on November 2, 1914, in which it was specifically declared that ‘no question of a religious character was involved’ in this war, and it was further categorically promised that ‘the Holy Places of Arabia, including the Holy Shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jedda, will be immune from attack or molestation.’”

After pointing out that these were the lowest possible claims the Mussulmans could set forth, the note went on as follows:

“But the Mussulmans of India have already submitted to the British Government that a Turkish settlement made in disregard of their religious obligations, on respect for which their loyalty has always been strictly conditional, would be regarded by Indian Mussulmans as incompatible with their allegiance to the British Crown. This is a contingency which the Mussulmans of India, in common with all their compatriots, constituting a population of over three hundred millions, naturally view with the keenest apprehension and anxiety, and are most earnestly desirous of preventing by every means in their power. We believe that the British Government, at any rate, is fully apprised of the range and intensity of public feeling that has been aroused in India on this question, and we content ourselves, therefore, by simply stating here that the Khilafat movement represents an unprecedented demonstration of national feeling and concern. Only on March 19 last, the day when the delegation was received by the British Prime Minister, all business was suspended throughout the continent of India by Mussulmans and Hindus alike, as a reminder and reaffirmation of the Muslim case in respect of the future of the Khilafat. This unprecedented yet peaceful demonstration involved a loss of millions to the public at large, and was undertaken solely with the object of impressing the authorities and others concerned with the universality of Indian and Muslim sentiment on the question. If, notwithstanding all constitutional and loyal representations which the Mussulmans of India have put forward on behalf of the obligation imposed upon them by their Faith, a settlement is imposed upon Turkey which would be destructive of the very essentials of the Khilafat, a situation would arise in which it would be futile to expect peace and harmony to prevail in India and the Muslim world.

“The delegation, therefore, feel it their duty most solemnly to urge upon the Supreme Council the desirability of endeavouring to achieve a peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire which would be in consonance with the most binding religious obligations and overwhelming sentiments of so large and important a section of the world community.”

As a consequence of what has just been said:

“The delegation would beg, even at this late hour, that the Supreme Council will defer taking any final decisions on this question in order to afford to them an opportunity, such as they have repeatedly applied for, of laying their case before the Council. In answer to our request to be allowed to appear before the Supreme Council, the British Secretary to the Council intimated to us that only the accredited Governments of the territories with whose future the Peace Conference is dealing are allowed to appear before it, and that at the request of the British Government the official delegation of India had already been heard. But we have already represented that the Turkish settlement, involving as it does the question on the Khilafat, in the preservation of which the Mussulmans of the world are so vitally interested, does not obviously seem to be a question on which the Peace Conference should hear only the Governments of territories with whose future they are dealing. In fact, the concern of the Muslim world for the future of the Khilafat, which is the most essential institution of Islam, transcends in importance the interests of the various Governments that are being set up in different parts of the Khilafat territories; and the delegation trusts that no technical objection will be allowed to stand in the way of doing justice and securing peace.”

And, finally, the note concluded:

“With reference to the official delegation of India, which the Supreme Council has already heard, the Indian Khilafat delegation would invite the attention of the Council to the fact that, so far at least, the State and the nation are not one in India, and the delegation submit that a nation numbering more than 315 millions of people is entitled to a hearing before a final decision is taken on a question that has incontestably acquired a national status. The delegation hope that they may, without may disrespect to the members comprising the official delegation of India, also refer to the fact that no Indian Mussulman was represented on the delegation in spite of Muslim protest.”

In a second telegram, dated April 24, 1920, the Indian Caliphate delegation, after the reply made to them by the British secretary of the Supreme Council at San Remo on April 20, expressed their deep regret that—

“the Council, while giving a hearing to a number of delegations representing at best microscopic populations inhabiting meagre areas and permitting the Premier of Greece, which was not at war with Turkey, to take part in the discussions relating to the Turkish settlement, should have ignored the claims of a nation numbering more than 315 millions of people inhabiting the vast sub-continent of India even to a hearing, and should have denied the right of several hundred millions more in the rest of the world professing the Muslim Faith to express their views on the question involving the disintegration of the Khilafat. In the name of our compatriots and co-religionists, we deem it to be our duty once more to point out to the Government of Great Britain and to her Allies, that it would be perfectly futile to expect peace and tranquillity if, to the humiliating disregard of the overwhelming national sentiment of India, which would in any case lessen the value of citizenship of the British Empire to the Indian people, is added, as a result of the secret diplomacy of a few persons, however exalted and eminent, who are now settling the fate of Islam behind closed doors, a contemptuous disregard of the most binding and solemn religious obligations imposed on the Muslims by their Faith.”

The delegation did not conceal their disappointment at the way they had been received by the Allied representatives and the little attention paid to the objections they had set forth. Yet they had viewed the Ottoman question from a lofty standpoint, and had brought forward powerful arguments in favour of Turkey. While the Indian delegation were setting forth the Turkish claims before the Peace Conference, the Press, public opinion, and political circles which had been influenced in some degree by the coming of the delegates evinced more sympathy for Turkey, and the deliberations of the Conference seemed likely to assume a more favourable attitude towards Turkey. Yet the Conference, in this case as in many others, and in spite of the warnings it had received, kept to its first resolutions, though everything seemed to invite it to modify them.

On May 6 the Ottoman delegation arrived in Paris. It comprised the former Grand Vizier Tewfik Pasha; Reshid Bey, Minister of the Interior; Fakhr ed Din Bey, Minister of Public Education; and Dr. Jemil Pasha, Minister of Public Works, accompanied by seventeen advisers and five secretaries.

On the previous Thursday, before they left Constantinople, the Sultan had received the delegates, and had a long conversation with each of them.

The draft of the treaty was handed to the delegates on the expected date, May 11.

We refer the reader to this document, which contains thirteen chapters; some of the most important provisions are so laboriously worded that they may give rise to various interpretations, and it is impossible to sum them up accurately.

Several clauses of that draft called forth many objections, and we shall only deal with the most important ones.

The treaty assigned to Greece all the Turkish vilayet of Adrianople or Eastern Thrace—that is to say, the territory which includes Adrianople, the second town and former capital of the Ottoman Empire, and the burial-place of Selim the Conqueror. It only left to European Turkey a mere strip of land near Constantinople up to the Chatalja lines. Besides, this region is entirely included in the “Zone of the Straits” to be controlled by a Commission of the Powers which includes Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria, but excludes Turkey herself.

Now, according to the official census of March, 1914, the Adrianople vilayet which includes Kirk Kilisse, Rodosto, and Gallipoli, had a population of 360,400 Turks—i.e., 57 per cent. of the inhabitants—as against 224,680 Greeks, or 35·5 per cent., and 19,888 Armenians. In addition, though in Eastern Thrace the Moslem populations are mingled with numerous Greek elements, the majority of the people are Mussulmans. Out of the 673,000 inhabitants of Thrace, 455,000 are Mussulmans.

It is noteworthy that after 1914 a good number of the Greeks in that vilayet emigrated into Macedonia, where they were replaced by the Mussulmans expelled by the Greek administration, and that out of the 162,000 Orthodox Greeks amenable to the Greek Patriarch, 88,000 are Gagavous—that is to say, are of Turkish descent and speak Turkish.

Out of about 4,700,000 acres of land which make up the total area of the Adrianople vilayet, 4,000,000 acres, or 84 per cent., are in Moslem hands, and the Orthodox Greeks hardly possess 600,000 acres.

The Moslem population of Western Thrace, which is no longer under Turkish sovereignty, rises to 362,000 souls, or 69 per cent., against 86,000 Greeks, or 16·5 per cent., and if the figures representing the Moslem population in both parts of Thrace are counted, we get a total number of 700,000 Mussulmans—i.e., 62·6 per cent.—against 310,000 Greeks, or 26 per cent.

Mr. Lloyd George had already guaranteed to Turkey the possession of that region on January 5, 1918, when he had solemnly declared: “Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race,” and he had repeated this pledge in his speech of February 25, 1920.

Yet a month after he declared to the Indian Caliphate delegation, as has been seen above, that the Turkish population in Thrace was in a considerable minority, and so Thrace should be taken away from Turkish rule. If such was the case, it would have been logical to take from Turkey the whole of Thrace.

As the Indian delegation inquired at once on what figures the Prime Minister based his Statements he answered:

“It is, of course, impossible to obtain absolutely accurate figures at the present moment, partly because all censuses taken since about the beginning of the century are open to suspicion from racial prejudice, and partly because of the policy of expulsion and deportation pursued by the Turkish Government both during and before the war. For instance, apart from the Greeks who were evicted during the Balkan wars, over 100,000 Greeks were deported into Anatolia from Turkish Thrace in the course of these wars, while about 100,000 were driven across the frontiers of Turkish Thrace. These refugees are now returning in large numbers. But after the study of all the evidence judged impartially, the best estimate which the Foreign Office could make is that the population of Turkish Thrace, in 1919, was 313,000 Greeks and 225,000 Turks.... This is confirmed by the study of the Turkish official statistics in 1894, the last census taken before the Greco-Turkish war, after which ... all censuses as to races in these parts became open to suspicion. According to these statistics, the population of Turkish Thrace and of the part of Bulgarian Thrace ceded to the Allies by the treaty of Neuilly was: Greeks, 304,500: Mussulmans, 265,300; Bulgarians, 72,500.”

On receipt of this communication, the delegation naturally asked to what region the Greeks “who were evicted during the Balkan wars” had migrated, and to what extent, according to the Foreign Office estimates, “counter-migration of Turks had taken place into what is the present Turkish Thrace,” when Macedonia was made, on the authority of Englishmen themselves, “an empty egg-shell” and when the Greeks and Bulgarians had decided to leave no Turks in the occupied territories, to make a “Turkish question” within the newly extended boundaries of Greece and Bulgaria. It was natural that part of the Turkish population driven away from Macedonia should settle down in the Turkish territory conterminous to Eastern Thrace, as it actually did.

With regard to the “100,000” Greeks “deported into Anatolia from Turkish Thrace during the course of these wars,” and the “100,000 driven across the frontiers of Turkish Thrace,” the delegation asked to what part of Anatolia the deportees had been taken, and to what extent this deportation had affected the proportion of Turkish and Greek populations in that part of Anatolia. It would certainly be unfair to make Turkish Thrace preponderatingly Greek by including in its Greek population figures of Greek deportees who had already served to swell the figures of the Greek population in Anatolia. Under such circumstances, as the figures which the Prime Minister considered as reliable on January 5, 1918, had been discarded since and as the figures of a quarter of a century ago were evidently open to discussion, the delegation proposed that the Supreme Council should be given a complete set of figures for every vilayet, and if possible for every sanjak or kaza, of the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914. But the Prime Minister’s secretary merely answered that it was impossible to enter into a discussion “on the vexed question of the population statistics in these areas.”

As to Smyrna, the statistics plainly show that, though there is an important Greek colony at Smyrna, all the region nevertheless is essentially Turkish. The figures provided by the Turkish Government, those of the French Yellow Book, and those given by Vital Cuinet agree on this point.

According to the French Yellow Book, the total population of the vilayet included 78·05 per cent. Turks against 14·9 per cent. Greeks.

M. Vital Cuinet gives a total population of 1,254,417 inhabitants (971,850 Turks and 197,257 Greeks), and for the town of Smyrna 96,250 Turks against 57,000 Greeks.

According to the last Ottoman statistics in 1914 the town of Smyrna, where the Greek population had increased, had 111,486 Turks against 87,497 Greeks; but in the whole vilayet there were 299,097 Greeks—i.e., 18 per cent.—against 1,249,067 Turks, or 77 per cent., and 20,766 Armenians.

From the 299,097 Greeks mentioned in the statistics we should deduct the 60,000 or 80,000 Greeks who were expelled from the vilayet, by way of reprisal after the events of Macedonia in January to June, 1914. The latter, according to the agreement between Ghalib Kemaly Bey, Turkish minister at Athens, and M. Venizelos (July, 1914), come under the same head as the Greeks of Thrace and Smyrna who were to be exchanged for the Mussulmans of Macedonia.

Mr. Lloyd George’s secretary, whom the Indian delegation also asked, in reference to Smyrna, on what figures he based his statements, answered on behalf of the Prime Minister:

“The pre-war figures for the sanjak of Smyrna, according to the American estimates, which are the most up-to-date and impartial, give the following result: Greeks, 375,000; Mussulmans, 325,000; Jews, 40,000; and Armenians, 18,000. These figures only relate to the sanjak of Smyrna, and there are other kazas in the neighbourhood which also show a majority of Greeks.”

Now, according to the official Turkish figures, the sanjak of Smyrna had, before the war, 377,000 Mussulmans as against 218,000 Greeks, while during the war the Muslim figure rose to 407,000 and the Greek figure was considerably reduced. Only in the kazas of Urla, Shesmeh, Phocœa, and Kara-Burun in the sanjak of Smyrna, are there Greek majorities; but in no other kaza, whether of Magnesia, Aidin, or Denizli, is the Greek element in a majority. Moreover, the Greek minority is important only in the kaza of Seuki in the sanjak of Aidin; everywhere else it is, as a rule, less than 10 per cent., and only in two kazas is it 15 or 16 per cent.

The treaty recognises Armenia as a free and independent State, and the President of the United States is to arbitrate on the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis. Now, though everybody—including the Turks—acknowledges that as a principle it is legitimate to form an Armenian State, yet when we consider the nature of the population of these vilayets, we cannot help feeling anxious at the condition of things brought about by this decision.

As a matter of fact, in Erzerum there are 673,000 Mussulmans, constituting 82·5 per cent. of the population, as against 136,000 Armenians, or 16·5 per cent. In Trebizond the Mussulmans number 921,000, or 82 per cent. of the population, as against 40,000 Armenians, or 23·5 per cent. In the vilayet of Van the Muslim population is 179,000, or 69 per cent., and the Armenian population 67,000, or 26 per cent. In Bitlis the Mussulmans number 310,000, or 70·5 per cent., as against 119,000 Armenians, constituting 27 per cent. Thus, in these four vilayets the Mussulmans number 2,083,000, and the Armenians 362,000, the average being 80 per cent. against 13 per cent.

On the other hand, it is difficult to prove that Turkey has persistently colonised these territories. The only fact that might countenance such an assertion is that at various times, especially after the Crimean war, many Tatars sought shelter in that part of the Empire, and that in 1864, and again in 1878, Circassians, escaping from the Russian yoke, took refuge there after defending their country. The number of the families that immigrated is estimated about 70,000. Turkey encouraged them to settle down there all the more willingly as they were a safeguard to her against the constant threat of Russia. But as early as 1514, at the time of the Turkish conquest, the Armenians were inferior in number, owing to the Arabian and Persian pressure that repeatedly brought about an exodus of the native population northwards and westwards, and because some Persian, Arabian, Seljukian, Turkish, and Byzantine elements slowly crept into the country. In 1643 Abas Schah, after his victorious campaign against Turkey, drove away nearly 100,000 Armenians, and later on a huge number of Armenians emigrated into Russia of their own free will after the treaty of Turkmen-Tchai in 1828.

It is noteworthy that an Armenian Power first came into existence in the second century before Christ. It consisted of two independent States, Armenia Major and Armenia Minor. After the downfall of Tigrane, King of Armenia Major, defeated by the Romans, Rome and Persia fought for the possession of those regions, and, finally, divided them. Later on there were various Armenian States, which were more or less independent, but none of them lasted long except the State of Armenia Minor, which lasted from the twelfth century to the fourteenth, till Selim II conquered that territory, where the Arabs, the Persians, the Seljukian Turks, and the Byzantines had already brought the Armenian dominion to an end.

Therefore the numerical majority of Mussulmans in Armenia has not been obtained or maintained, as has been alleged, by the “Turkish massacres”; it is the outcome of more complex causes—which, of course, is no excuse for the tragic events that took place there. As the Conference did not seem to pay any attention either to the figures of M. Vital Cuinet (Turquie d’Asie, Paris, 1892), or to the figures published by the French Government in the Yellow Book of 1897, based upon the data furnished by the Christian Patriarchates, or to the figures given by General Zeleny to the Caucasian Geographical Society (Zapiski, vol. xviii., Tiflis, 1896), the Indian delegation asked that a report should be drawn up by a mixed Moslem and non-Moslem Commission, consisting of men whose integrity and ability were recognised by their co-religionists; but this suggestion met with no better success than the international inquiry already suggested by the delegation in regard to the population of every vilayet in Thrace.

The chapter dealing with the protection of minorities plainly shows how much influence the aforesaid Protestant Anglo-American movement had on the wording of the treaty. In none of the four previous treaties are included such stipulations as those contained in the Turkish treaty, and there is a great difference in this respect between the Bulgarian treaty and the Turkish treaty. The latter, under the term “minority,” only considers the condition of the Christians, and ensures to them privileges and power in every respect over the Mussulmans.

As the Permanent Committee of the Turkish Congress at Lausanne remarked in its critical examination of the treaty:

“Whereas in the Bulgarian treaty freedom of conscience and religion is guaranteed so far as is consistent with morality and order, this clause does not occur in the Turkish treaty.

The Turkish treaty states that all interference with any religious creed shall be punished in the same way; in the Bulgarian treaty this clause is omitted, for here it would imply the protection of a non-Christian religion.”

In regard to Article 139, that “Turkey renounces formally all right of suzerainty or jurisdiction of any kind over Moslems who are subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State,” the Indian Caliphate delegation raised an objection in a letter addressed to Mr. Lloyd George, dated July 10, 1920:

“It is obvious that Turkey has, and could have, no ‘rights of suzerainty or jurisdiction’ over Mussulmans who am not her subjects; but it is equally obvious that the Sultan of Turkey, as Khalifa, has, and must continue to have so long as he holds that office, his very considerable ‘jurisdiction’ over Muslims who are ’subject to the sovereignty or protectorate of any other State.’ The law of Islam clearly prescribes the character and extent of the ‘jurisdiction’ pertaining to the office of Khalifa, and we cannot but protest most emphatically against this indirect, but none the less palpable, attempt on the part of Great Britain and her allies to force on the Khalifa a surrender of such ‘jurisdiction,’ which must involve the abdication of the Khalifa.”

The delegation also considered that Article 131, which lays down that “Turkey definitely renounces all rights and privileges, which, under the treaty of Lausanne of October 12, 1912, were left to the Sultan in Libya,” infringes “rights pertaining to the Sultan as Caliph, which had been specially safeguarded and reserved under the said treaty of Lausanne.” It also expressed its surprise that “this categorical and inalienable requirement of the Muslim Faith, supported as it is by the unbroken practice of over thirteen hundred years, was totally disregarded by Articles 94 to 97 of the Peace Treaty, read in conjunction with Articles 22 and 132,” which cannot admit of any non-Muslim sovereignty over the Jazirat-ul-Arab, including Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.

Referring again to the objection the British Prime Minister pretended to base on the proclamation of the Emir Feisal, King of Syria, and on the Arabs’ request to be freed from Turkish dominion, the Indian Caliphate delegation in the same letter answered Mr. Lloyd George, who had asked them in the course of his reception “whether they were to remain under Turkish domination merely because they were Mohammedans”:

“We would take the liberty to remind you that if the Arabs, who are an overwhelmingly large majority in these regions, have claimed independence, they have clearly claimed it free from the incubus of so-called mandates, and their claim to be freed from Turkish dominion is not in any way a claim to be subjected to the ‘advice and assistance’ of a mandatory of the principal Allied Powers. If the principle of self-determination is to be applied at all, it must be applied regardless of the wishes and interests of foreign Powers covetously seeking to exploit regions and peoples exposed to the danger of foreign domination on account of their unprotected character. The Arab Congresses have unequivocally declared that they want neither protectorates nor mandates nor any other form of political or economic control; and the delegation, while reiterating their view that an amicable adjustment of Arab and Turkish claims by the Muslims themselves in accordance with Islamic law is perfectly feasible, must support the Arab demand for complete freedom from the control of mandatories appointed by the Allies.

“With regard to the Hejaz, Article 98, which requires Turkey not only to recognise it as a free and independent State, but to renounce all rights and titles there, and Article 99, which makes no mention of the rights and prerogatives of the Khalifa as Servant of the Holy Places, are, and must ever be, equally unacceptable to the Muslim world.”

On the other hand, as the Jewish question and the Eastern question are closely connected and have assumed still more importance owing to the Zionist movement, the treaty forced on Turkey concerns the Jews in the highest degree.

It must be borne in mind that if Sephardic Judaism has been gradually smothered by Turkish sovereignty, the Ottoman Empire has proved most hospitable to the Jews driven away by Christian fanaticism, and that for five centuries the Jews have enjoyed both tolerance and security, and have even prospered in it. So the Jews naturally feel anxious, like the Moslems in the provinces wrested from the old Ottoman Empire, when, following the precedent of Salonika, they see Greece annex the region of Adrianople and Smyrna; and they have a right to ask whether Greece, carried away by a wild imperialism, will not yield to her nationalist feeling and revive the fanaticism of religious struggles. So the Allies, foreseeing this eventuality, have asked Greece to take no action to make the Jews regret the past; but as the Greek anti-Semitic feeling is rather economic than religious in character, it is to be feared that the competition of the two races in the commercial struggle will keep up that feeling. The annexation of Thrace would probably concern 20,000 Jews—13,000 at Adrianople, 2,000 at Rodosto, 2,800 at Gallipoli, 1,000 at Kirk Kilisse, 1,000 at Demotica, etc. Great Britain having received a mandate for Palestine—that is to say, virtually a protectorate—on the condition of establishing “a national home for the Jews”—whatever the various opinions of the Jews with regard to Zionism may be—a question is now opened and an experiment is to be tried which concerns them deeply, as it is closely connected with Judaism.

In the course of the reception by Mr. Lloyd George of the Indian Caliphate delegation, M. Mohammed Ali told the British Prime Minister in regard to the Jewish claims in Palestine:

“The delegation have no desire to cause an injustice to the Jewish community, and I think Islam can look back with justifiable pride on its treatment of this community in the past. No aspiration of the Jewish community which is reasonable can be incompatible with Muslim control of the Holy Land, and it is hoped that the Ottoman Government will easily accommodate the Jewish community in such aspirations of theirs as are reasonable.

“Some responsible propagandists of the Zionist movement, with whom I have had conversations, frankly admit: ‘We do not want political sovereignty there; we want a home; the details can be arranged and discussed.’ I asked them: ‘Do you mean that Great Britain herself should be the sovereign Power there, or should be the mandatory?’ and they said: ‘No, what we want is an ordinary, humanly speaking reasonable guarantee that opportunities of autonomous development would be allowed to us.’ We, ourselves, who have been living in India, are great believers in a sort of Federation of Faiths. I think the Indian nationality, which is being built up to-day, will probably be one of the first examples in the world of a Federation of Faiths, and we cannot rule out the possibility of development in Palestine on the lines of ‘cultural autonomy.’ The Jews are, after all, a very small minority there, and I do not believe for one moment that Jews could be attracted there in such large numbers as the Zionist enthusiasts sometimes think. I would say the same thing of an Armenian State, without desiring to say one word which would be considered offensive to any class of people. Because we, ourselves, have suffered so many humiliations, we do not like ourselves to say anything about other people that they would resent. If the Allied Powers brought all the Armenians together and placed them all in a contiguous position, excluding the present Kurdish community from them, no matter what large slice of land you gave them, I think they would very much like to go back to the old status....

“In the same way I would say of the Jewish community, that they are people who prosper very much in other lands, and although they have a great hankering after their home, and no community is so much bound up with a particular territory as the Jewish community is, still, I must say that we do not fear there will be any great migration of such a character that it will form a majority over the Muslim population. The Jewish community has said: ‘We have no objection to Turkish sovereignty remaining in that part of the world so long as we are allowed to remain and prosper there and develop on our own lines, and have cultural autonomy.’”

M. Mohammed Ali, in his letter to Mr. Lloyd George, dated July 10, 1920, also observed that—

“With regard to Palestine in particular, the delegation desire to state that Article 99, embodying the declaration of the British Government of November 2, 1917, is extremely vague, and it is not clear in what relation the so-called national home for the Jewish people, which is proposed to be established in Palestine, would stand to the State proposed to be established there. The Mussulmans of the world are not ashamed of their dealings with their Jewish neighbours, and can challenge a comparison with others in this respect; and the delegation, in the course of the interview with you, endeavoured to make it clear that there was every likelihood of all reasonable claims of Jews in search of a home being accepted by the Muslim Government of Palestine. But if the very small Jewish minority in Palestine is intended to exercise over the Muslim, who constitute four-fifths of the population, a dominance now, or in the future, when its numbers have swelled after immigration, then the delegation must categorically and emphatically oppose any such designs.”

The telegram in which Tewfik Pasha informed Damad Ferid of the conditions of the treaty, and which the latter communicated to the Press, was printed by the Peyam Sabah, surrounded with black mourning lines. Ali Kemal, though he was a supporter of the Government and could not be accused of anglophobia, concluded his article as follows:

“Better die than live blind, deaf, and lame. We have not given up all hope that the statesmen, who hold the fate of the world in their hands and who have officially proclaimed their determination to act equitably, will not allow this country, which has undergone the direst misfortunes for years and has lost its most sacred rights, to suffer a still more heinous injustice.”

All the Constantinople newspapers, dealing at full length with the conditions, unanimously declared that the treaty was unacceptable. The Alemdar, another pro-English newspaper, said:

“If the treaty is not altered it will be difficult to find a man willing to sign it.”

Another newspaper, the Ileri, wrote:

“The anguish which depressed our hearts while we were anxiously waiting seems a very light one compared to the pang we felt when we read the treaty.”

The aforesaid Peyam Sabah, after a survey of the conditions, came to this conclusion:

“Three lines of conduct are open to the Turkish people:

“To beg for mercy and make the Powers realise that the loss of Smyrna will be a great blow to Turkey and will bring no advantage to Greece, and that the Chatalja frontier will be a cause of endless hostility between the various races.

“To sign the treaty and expect that the future will improve the condition of Turkey; but who in Turkey could sign such a treaty?

“To oppose passive resistance to the execution of the conditions of peace, since all hope of armed resistance must be given up.”

Public opinion unanimously protested against the provisions of the treaty, but fluctuated and hesitated as to what concessions could be made.

Damad Ferid, receiving a number of deputies who had stayed at Constantinople and wanted to go back to the provinces, told them that he saw no objection to their going away, and that orders to that effect had been given to the police. Then he is said to have declared that they might tell their mandatories that he would never sign a treaty assigning Smyrna and Thrace to Greece and restricting Turkish sovereignty to Constantinople, and that on this point there was no difference of opinion between him and the Nationalists. He also informed them that in due time he would hold fresh elections, and the treaty would be submitted for approval to the new Chamber.

The Grand Vizier, who had asked Tewfik Pasha to let him see the note which was being prepared by the Turkish delegation at Versailles, was, on his side, elaborating the draft of another answer which was to be compared with that of the delegation, before the wording of the Turkish answer to the Peace Conference was definitely settled.

But the occupation of Lampsaki, opposite to Gallipoli, by the Turkish Nationalists, together with the Bolshevist advance in Northern Persia and Asia Minor, made things worse, and soon became a matter of anxiety to England.

After the text of the Peace Treaty had been presented to the Turks, and when the latter had the certainty that their fears were but too well grounded, it appeared clear that the decisions taken by the Allies would be certain to bring about a coalition of the various parties, and that all Turks, without any distinction of opinion, would combine to organise a resistance against any operation aiming at taking from them Eastern Thrace—where the Bulgarian population was also averse to the expulsion of the Turkish authorities—at assigning Smyrna and the Islands to Greece, and at dismembering the Turkish Empire.

Colonel Jafer Tayar, who commanded the Adrianople army corps and had openly declared against the Sultan’s Government since the latter was at war with the Nationalists, had come to Constantinople at the beginning of May, and it was easy to guess for what purpose. Of course, it had been rumoured, after he left Constantinople, that the Government was going to appoint a successor to him, but nothing of the kind had been done, and he still kept his command. When he came back to Adrianople, not only had no conflict broken out between him and the troops under his command, but he had been given an enthusiastic greeting. As soon as it was known that the San Remo Conference had decided to give Thrace to Greece, up to the Chatalja lines, resistance against Greek occupation was quickly organised. Jafer Tayar, an Albanian by birth—he was born at Prishtina—became the leader of the movement. He hurriedly gathered some contingents made up of regular soldiers and volunteers, and put in a state of defence, as best he could, the ports of the western coast of the Marmora. Jafer Tayar wondered why Thrace was not granted the right of self-determination like Upper Silesia or Schleswig, or autonomy under the protection of France, whose administration in Western Thrace had proved equitable and had given satisfaction to that province. In face of this denial of justice, he had resolved to fight for the independence of Thrace.

It was soon known that the Moslem population of Adrianople had held a meeting at the beginning of May, in which, after a speech by Jafer Tayar, all the people present had pledged themselves to fight for the liberty of Thrace. A similar demonstration took place at Gumuljina. A congress including above two hundred representatives of the whole of Western Thrace had been held about the same time at Adrianople.

In Bulgaria a movement of protest was also started, and on Sunday, May 9, numerous patriotic demonstrations were held in all the provincial towns.

On May 16 the inhabitants of Philippopolis and refugees from Thrace, Macedonia, and the Dobruja living at that time in the town, held a meeting of several thousand people, and without any distinction of religion, nationality, or political party carried the following motion against the decision taken by the San Remo Conference to cede Thrace to Greece:

“They enter an energetic protest against the resolution to cede Thrace to Greece, for that would be a flagrant injustice and an act of cruelty both to a people of the same blood as we, and to the Bulgarian State itself; they declare that the Bulgarian people cannot, of their own free will, accept such a decision of the San Remo Conference, which would be a cause of everlasting discord in the Balkans—whereas the victorious Powers of the Entente have always professed to fight in order to restore peace to those regions; and they entreat the Governments, which have come to this decision, to cancel it and to raise Thrace to the rank of an autonomous, independent State under the protection of all the Powers of the Entente, or one of them.”

On May 25—that is to say, two days before the Greek occupation—a few “Young Turk” and Bulgarian elements proclaimed the autonomy of Western Thrace, and formed a provisional Government to oppose the occupation. At the head of this Government were Tewfik Bey, a Young Turk, Vachel Georgieff, and Dochkoff, Bulgarian komitadjis. But the latter were expelled by General Charpy before the Greek troops and authorities arrived, and the Greek Press did its best to misrepresent that protest against Greek domination. They set off to Adrianople, taking with them the treasury and seals of the Moslem community, and were greeted by Jafer Tayar.

On the other hand, the resistance of the Turkish Nationalists was becoming organised, and as soon as the conditions of peace were known new recruits joined Mustafa Kemal’s forces.

The Nationalist elements, owing to the attitude of the Allies towards Turkey, were now almost thrown into the arms of the Russian Bolshevists, who carried on an energetic propaganda in Asia Minor and offered to help them to save their independence, though they did so to serve their own interests.

Damad Ferid, Mustafa Kemal’s personal enemy, who stood halfway between the Allied Powers and the Nationalists, believed that if he did not displease the Allies, he could pull his country out of its difficulties.

Before the draft of the treaty was handed to the Turks, the Ottoman Government had already begun to raise troops to fight the Nationalists. They were to be placed under command of Marshal Zeki, who had formerly served under Abdul Hamid. It was soon known that this military organisation had been entrusted by the Turkish War Minister to the care of British officers at whose instigation the first contingents had been sent to Ismid, which was to be the Turkish base.

It was soon announced that Damad Ferid Pasha’s troops, who had remained loyal and were commanded by Ahmed Anzavour Pasha and Suleyman Shefik Pasha, had had some hard fighting with the rebels in the Doghandkeui and Geredi area, east of Adabazar, which they had occupied, and that the Nationalists, whose casualties had been heavy, had evacuated Bolu. The information was soon contradicted, and at the beginning of the last week of April it became known that Anzavour and his troops had just been utterly defeated near Panderma, and that this port on the Marmora had fallen into the Nationalists’ hands. Ahmed Anzavour had had to leave Panderma for Constantinople on board a Turkish gunboat, and Mustafa Kemal now ruled over all the region round Brusa, Panderma, and Balikesri. Moreover, in the Constantinople area, a great many officers and soldiers were going over to the Nationalists in Anatolia.

It should be kept in mind that Ahmed Anzavour, though he was of Circassian descent, was unknown in his own country. He had been made pasha to command the Government forces against the Nationalists with the help of the Circassians, who are numerous in the Adabazar region, and to co-operate with the British against his fellow-countrymen, who merely wished to be independent.

Suleyman Shefik Pasha resigned, and some defections took place among the troops under his command.

About the same time, the emergency military court had sentenced to death by default Mustafa Kemal, Colonel Kara Yassif Bey, Ali Fuad Pasha, who commanded the 20th army corps, Ahmed Rustem Bey, ex-ambassador at Washington, Bekir Sami Bey, Dr. Adnan Bey, ex-head of the sanitary service, and his wife, Halidé Edib Hanoum, all impeached for high treason as leaders of the Nationalist movement.

Yet, despite all the measures taken by Damad Ferid and the moral and even material support given to him by the Allies, what could be the outcome of a military action against the Nationalists? How could the Ottoman Government compel the Turks to go and fight against their Anatolian brethren in order to force on them a treaty of peace that it seemed unwilling to accept itself, and that sanctioned the ruin of Turkey?

In some Turkish circles it was wondered whether a slightly Nationalist Cabinet co-operating with the Chamber would not have stood a better chance to come to an understanding with Anatolia and induce her to admit the acceptable parts of the treaty; for should Damad Ferid, who was not in a good position to negotiate with the Nationalists, fail, what would be the situation of the Government which remained in office merely because the Allies occupied Constantinople?

Of course, the Foreign Office proclaimed that foreign troops would be maintained in every zone, and that the treaty would be carried out at any cost. Yet the real Ottoman Government was no longer at Constantinople, where Damad Ferid, whose authority did not extend beyond the Ismid-Black Sea line, was cut off from the rest of the Empire; it was at Sivas. As no Government force or Allied army was strong enough to bring the Nationalist party to terms, it was only in Anatolia that the latter Government could be crushed by those who, with Great Britain, had conspired to suppress 12 million Turks and were ready to sacrifice enough soldiers to reach this end.

On the other hand, it soon became known that at Angora the question of the Caliph-Sultan had been set aside, and even the Sultan’s name was now being mentioned again in the namaz, or public prayer offered every Friday—that is to say, all the parties had practically arrived at an understanding.

Besides, as most likely Greece would have to face difficulties, if not at once, at least in a comparatively short time, inspired information, probably of Greek origin, already intimated that the Supreme Council would decide whether France, England, and Italy would have to support Greece—though one did not see why France and Italy should defray the expenses of that new adventure by which England first, and Greece afterwards, would benefit exclusively.

On Saturday, May 22, the very day on which a Crown Council met under the Sultan’s presidency to examine the terms of the treaty, over 3,000 people held a meeting of protest at Stambul, in Sultan Ahmed Square. Some journalists, who were well known for their pro-English feelings—such as Ali Kemal, an ex-Minister, editor of the Sabah; Refi Jevad, editor of the Alemdar; Mustafa Sabri, a former Sheik-ul-Islam—and some politicians delivered speeches. The platform was draped with black hangings; the Turkish flags and school banners were adorned with crêpe. After the various speakers had explained the clauses of the treaty and showed they were not acceptable, the following motions were passed:

“First, in contradiction to the principle of nationalities, the treaty cuts off from the Empire Thrace, Adrianople, Smyrna, and its area. In case the Allied Powers should maintain their decisions—which seems most unlikely—we want these regions to be given local autonomy.

“Secondly, now the Arabian territories have been cut off from the Ottoman Empire, the Turks, in accordance with the principle of nationalities, should be freed from all fetters and bonds hindering their economic development on the path to progress and peace. To maintain the Capitulations and extend them to other nations is tantamount to declaring the Turks are doomed to misery and slavery for ever.

“Thirdly, the Turks, relying on the fair and equitable feelings of the Allied Powers, require to be treated on the same footing as the other vanquished nations.

“Fourthly, the Turkish people, feeling sure that the peace conditions are tantamount to suppressing Turkey as a nation, ask that the treaty should be modified so as to be made more consistent with right and justice.

“Fifthly, the aforesaid resolutions shall be submitted to the Allied High Commissioners and forwarded to the Peace Conference.”

These resolutions were handed after the meeting to M. Defrance, the senior Allied High Commissioner, who was to forward them to the Peace Conference.

As the difficulties increased, and more important and quicker communications with the Ottoman delegation in Paris were becoming necessary, the Cabinet thought of sending the Grand Vizier to Paris. Upon the latter’s advice, and probably at the instigation of the English, several members of the dissolved Chamber set off to Anatolia in order to try and bring about an understanding between Damad Ferid and the Nationalists, for the conditions of the treaty, as was to be expected, had now nearly healed the rupture between the Central Government and the Turkish Nationalists, especially as the Anglo-Turkish Army was unable to carry out the treaty and Damad Ferid and his supporters were neither willing nor able to enforce it. Even the English had sent delegates to Mustafa Kemal, who had refused to receive them.

The Grand Vizier, after reviewing the troops at Ismid, found they were not strong enough, and requested the headquarters merely to stand on the defensive. Indeed, after a slight success in the Gulf of Ismid, the Government forces found themselves in a critical condition, for the Anatolian troops had occupied Kum Kale, close to the Dardanelles, and Mustafa Kemal had concentrated forces in that region.

The Chamber, which had been dissolved at Constantinople, resumed its sittings at Angora. It criticised the Allies’ policy with regard to Turkey, especially the policy of England, at whose instigation Constantinople had been occupied and military measures had been taken on the coasts of the Black Sea.

In the speech he delivered at the first sitting of the Chamber, Mustafa Kemal showed that the English occupation of Constantinople had been a severe blow at the prestige of the Caliph and Sultan. “We must do our best,” he said, “to free the Sultan and his capital. If we do not obey his orders just now, it is because we look upon them as null and void, as he is not really free.”

The same state of mind showed itself in a telegram of congratulation addressed to the Sultan on his birthday by the provisional vali of Angora, who, though he did not acknowledge the power of the Central Government, stated that the population of Angora were deeply concerned at the condition to which the seat of the Caliphate and Sultanry was reduced owing to the occupation of Constantinople. This telegram ran thus:

“The people have made up their minds not to shrink from any sacrifice to make the Empire free and independent. They feel certain that their beloved Sovereign is with them at heart and that their chief strength lies in a close union round the Khilafat.”

Similar dispatches were sent from the most active Nationalist centres such as Erzerum and Amasia, and by Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, commanding the 15th army corps at Erzerum.

It was plain that, through these demonstrations, Mustafa Kemal and the Anatolian Nationalists aimed at nullifying the religious pretexts Damad Ferid availed himself of to carry on the struggle against them. Mustafa Kemal had even ordered all the ulemas in Anatolia to preach a series of sermons with a view to strengthening the religious feeling among the masses. He had also the same political purpose in view when he sent a circular to the departments concerned to enjoin them to remind all Mussulmans of the duty of keeping the Ramadhan strictly and of the penalties they incurred if they publicly transgressed the Moslem fast.

Besides, the Nationalists strove to turn to account the movement that had taken place among all classes after the terms of the treaty had been made known, and their activity continued to increase. Sali Pasha, who was Grand Vizier before Damad Ferid, had escaped to Anatolia in order to put himself at the disposal of the Nationalists. So their opposition to the Central Government was asserting itself more and more strenuously, and the struggle that ensued assumed many forms.

An armistice, which came into force on May 30, and was to last twenty days, was concluded at Angora by M. Robert de Caix, secretary of the High Commissionership in Syria, between the French authorities and the Turkish Nationalists. Though the terms of this agreement were not made public, it was known that they dealt chiefly with Cilicia and allowed France to use the railway as far as Aleppo. Meanwhile, conversations were being held on the Cilician front, and finally at Angora, to extend the armistice.

Indeed, it was difficult to understand why, after the Italians had evacuated Konia, the French troops had not been withdrawn before the treaty had been handed to Turkey, for it gave France no right to remain in Cilicia; and now the situation of the French there was rather difficult, and their retreat had, of course, become dangerous. It seemed quite plain that the evacuation of Cilicia had become necessary, and that henceforth only the coastlands of Syria properly so called would be occupied.

So the French policy at this juncture had lacked coherency, for it seemed difficult to go on with the war and carry on peace negotiations at the same time.

This armistice was denounced on June 17 by Mustafa Kemal, who demanded the evacuation of Adana, the withdrawal of the French detachments from Heraclea and Zounguldak, and the surrender of the mines to the Nationalists who lacked coal and wanted Constantinople not to have any. Besides, some incidents had occurred in the course of the armistice: some French soldiers who were being drilled near Adana had been fired at, the railway track had been cut east of Toprak Kale, and telegraphic communications interrupted repeatedly between Adana and Mersina.

An encounter occurred on June 11 between the Nationalists and a company which had been detached at the beginning of the month from a battalion of a rifle corps that guarded the port and mining works of Zounguldak. On June 18, after an inquiry, the French commander withdrew from the spot which had been occupied near Heraclea and the company of riflemen was brought back to Zounguldak.

It was obvious that the staff of Cilicia did not seem to have approved of the armistice which had been concluded by the French authorities in order not to have anything to fear in this region, and to send all their forces against the Arabs; and so the head of the Turkish staff, Ismet Bey, naturally did not wish to renew it.