IV TURKEY AND THE CONFERENCE (continued 2)

Moreover, the Greek claims which asserted themselves during the settlement of the Turkish question partly originated in the connection between the Orthodox Church, not with Hellenism in the old and classical sense of the word, as has been wrongly asserted, but with Greek aspirations. For the Œcumenical Patriarch, whose see is Constantinople, is the head of the Eastern Church, and he still enjoys temporal privileges owing to which he is, in the Sultan’s territory, the real leader of the Greek subjects of the Sultan. Though the countries of Orthodox faith in Turkey have long enjoyed religious autonomy, their leaders keep their eyes bent on Constantinople, for in their mind the religious cause is linked with that of the Empire, and the eventual restoration of the Greek Empire in Constantinople would both consolidate their religious faith and sanction their claims.

In spite of what has often been said, it seems that the Christian Church did not so much protect Hellenism against the Turks as the Orthodox Church enhanced the prosperity of the Greeks within the Turkish Empire. The Greek Church, thanks to the independence it enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire, was a sort of State within the State, and had a right to open and maintain schools which kept up moral unity among the Greek elements. So it paved the way to the revolutionary movement of 1821, which was to bring about the restoration of the Greek kingdom with Athens as its capital; and now it serves the plans of the advocates of Greater Greece. Let us add that nowadays the Greek Church, like the Churches of all the States that have arisen on the ruins of Turkey, has its own head, and has freed itself from the tutelage of the Patriarch for the administration of its property.

Lord Robert Cecil, who had taken the lead in that politico-religious movement, wrote on February 23 in the Evening Standard a strong article in which he said something to this purpose: “Constantinople is a trophy of victories, not the capital of a nation. From Constantinople the Turks issue cruel orders against the Christian population. From the point of view both of morality and of prudence, the Stambul Government must not be strengthened by such an exorbitant concession on the part of the Allies.”

In the debate which took place on Wednesday, February 25, 1920, in the House of Commons regarding the retention of the Turks in Constantinople, after a question of Lord Edmund Talbot, Sir Donald Maclean, who spoke first, urged that if the Turks were not expelled from Constantinople all the worst difficulties of the past would occur again, and would endanger the peace of the world.

“The decision of the Peace Conference was a great surprise to most people. We owed nothing to the Turks. They came into the war gladly and without any provocation on our part. They became the willing and most useful ally of Germany. If the Turks were left in the gateway of the world, they would be at their old game again.”16

Sir Edward Carson said just the reverse:

“It was suggested that we should drive the Turks out of Constantinople.... If the Allies wanted to drive the Turks out of Constantinople, ... they would have to commence another war, and it would not be a small war. You must not talk of cutting down the Army and the Navy, and at the same moment censure the Government because they had not settled the question of driving the Turks out.”17

Mr. Lloyd George, speaking after them both, began thus:

“This is not a decision, whichever way you go, which is free from difficulty and objection. I do not know whether my right hon. friend is under the impression that if we decided to expel the Turk from Constantinople the course would be absolutely clear. As a matter of fact, it is a balancing of the advantages and the disadvantages, and it is upon that balance and after weighing very carefully and for some time all the arguments in favour and all the arguments against, all the difficulties along the one path and all the difficulties you may encounter on the other, and all the obstacles and all the perils on both sides, that the Allied Conference came to the conclusion that on the whole the better course was to retain the Turk in Constantinople for achieving a common end.”

Then he explained that the agreement concerning the substitution of the Russians for the Turks in Constantinople had become null and void after the Russian revolution and the Brest-Litovsk peace, and that at the present date the Bolshevists were not ready to assume such a responsibility, should it be offered to them.

“I will deal with two other pledges which are important. My right hon. friend referred to a pledge I gave to the House in December last, that there would not be the same gate-keeper, but there would be a different porter at the gates.... It would have been the height of folly to trust the guardianship of these gates to the people who betrayed their trust. That will never be done. They will never be closed by the Turk in the face of a British ship again....

“The second pledge, given in January, 1918, was given after full consultation with all parties, and the right hon. member for Paisley and Lord Grey acquiesced. There was a real desire to make a national statement of war aims, a statement that would carry all parties along with it, and they all agreed. It was a carefully prepared declaration, which I read out, as follows: ‘Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race. Outside Europe we believe that the same principle should be applied.... While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homeland of the Turkish race, with its capital in Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalised and neutralised’ (as they will be), ‘Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to recognition of their separate national conditions.’ That declaration was specific, unqualified, and deliberate. It was made with the consent of all parties in the community....

“The effect of the statement in India was that recruiting went up appreciably from that very moment....

“Now we are told: ‘That was an offer you made to Turkey, and they rejected it, and therefore you were absolutely free.’ It was more than that. It was a statement of our war aims for the workers of this country, a statement of our war aims for India. It is too often forgotten that we are the greatest Mohammedan Power in the world. One-fourth of the population of the British Empire is Mohammedan.... We gave a solemn pledge and they accepted it, and they are disturbed at the prospect of our not abiding by it.... There is nothing which would damage British power in Asia more than the feeling that you could not trust the British word. That is the danger. Of course it would be a fatal reputation for us....

“When the peace terms are published there is no friend of the Turk, should there be any left, who will not realise that he has been terribly punished for his follies, his blunders, his crimes, and his iniquities. Stripped of more than half his Empire, his country under the Allied guns, deprived of his army, his navy, his prestige—the punishment will be terrible enough to satisfy the bitterest foe of the Turkish Empire, drastic enough for the sternest judge. My right hon. friend suggested that there was a religious issue involved. That would be the most dangerous of all, and the most fatal. I am afraid that underneath the agitation there is not only the movement for the expulsion of the Turk, but there is something of the old feeling of Christendom against the Crescent. If it is believed in the Mohammedan world that our terms are dictated by the purpose of lowering the flag of the Prophet before that of Christendom, it will be fatal to our government in India. It is an unworthy purpose to achieve by force. It is unworthy of Britain, and it is unworthy of our faith.

“Let us examine our legitimate peace aims in Turkey. The first is the freedom of the Straits. I put that first for two reasons, which I shall refer to later on. It was put first by my right hon. friend, and I accept it. The second is the freeing of the non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman sway; the preservation for the Turk of self-government in communities which are mainly Turkish, subject to two most important reservations. The first is that there must be adequate safeguards within our power for protecting the minorities that have been oppressed by the Turk in the past. The second is that the Turk must be deprived of his power of vetoing the development of the rich lands under his rule which were once the granary of the Mediterranean....

“You can get the great power of Constantinople from its geographical situation. That is the main point. It is the main point for two reasons. The first is, when you consider the future possibilities of the Black Sea. You have there six or seven independent communities or nations to whom we want access. It is essential that we should have a free road, a right-of-way to these countries, whatever the opinion of the Turk may be. His keeping of the gates prolonged the war, and we cannot have that again. Therefore, for that reason, it is coming to an end. The second reason why the guardianship of the gates is important is because of its effect upon the protection of minorities. How do we propose that that should be achieved? Turkey is to be deprived entirely of the guardianship of the gates. Her forts are to be dismantled. She is to have no troops anywhere within reach of these waters. More than that, the Allies mean to garrison those gates themselves.... I was going to say that we have been advised that, with the assistance of the Navy, we shall be able to garrison the Dardanelles and, if necessary, the Bosphorus, with a much smaller force because of the assistance to be given by the Navy for that purpose. Turkey will not be allowed a navy. What does she want with a navy? It was never of the slightest use to her when she had it. She never could handle it. That is the position in regard to the Straits.

“What is the alternative to that proposal? The alternative to that proposal is international government of Constantinople and the whole of the lands surrounding the Straits. It would mean a population of 1,500,000 governed by the Allies—a committee representing France, Italy, Great Britain, and, I suppose, some day Russia might come in, and, it might be, other countries. America, if she cared to come in. Can anyone imagine anything more calculated to lead to that kind of mischievous intriguing, rivalry, and trouble in Constantinople that my right hon. friend deprecated and, rightly, feared? How would you govern it? Self-government could not be conferred under those conditions. It would have to be a military government.... It would require, according to every advice we have had, a very considerable force, and it would add very considerably to the burdensome expenditure of these countries, and it would be the most unsatisfactory government that anyone could possibly imagine.

“We had hoped that two of the great countries of the world would have been able to help us in sharing the responsibility for the government of this troubled country; but for one reason or another they have fallen out. There was first of all Russia. She is out of the competition for a very unpleasant task. Then there was America. We had hopes, and we had good reason for hoping, that America would have shared these responsibilities. She might probably have taken the guardianship of the Armenians, or she might have taken the guardianship of Constantinople. But America is no claimant now, and I am not going to express an opinion as to whether she ever will be, because it would be dangerous to do so; but for the moment we must reckon America as being entirely out of any arrangement which we contemplate for the government of Turkey and for the protection of the Christian minorities in that land.... I ask my noble friend, if he were an Armenian would he feel more secure if he knew that the Sultan and his Ministers were overlooked by a British garrison on the Bosphorus, and that British ships were there within reach, than if the Sultan were at Konia, with hundreds of miles across the Taurus Mountains to the nearest Allied garrison, and the sea with its great British ships and their guns out of sight and out of mind? I know which I would prefer if I were an Armenian with a home to protect.”18

The Prime Minister concluded his speech by saying that the Allies chiefly desired to take from the Turks the government of communities of alien race and religion, which would feel adequately protected when they knew that their former persecutors must sign the decree for their liberation under the threat of English, French, and Italian guns. Yet he could not dissemble his own misgivings.

In the discussion that followed Lord Robert Cecil said that, in any settlement with regard to Armenia, he trusted there would not only be a considerable increase in the present area of the Armenian Republic, but that Armenia would be given some access to the Black Sea in the north. Without that he was satisfied that the Armenian Republic would have the greatest difficulty in living. He earnestly hoped that every influence of the British Government would be used to secure that Cilicia should be definitely removed from Turkish sovereignty. He repeated once more that he was sorry the Turks were going to be retained in Constantinople, but that—

“No one wished to turn the Sultan out; the central thing was to get rid of the Sublime Porte as the governor of Constantinople. That did not mean turning anybody out; it merely meant that we were not to hand back Constantinople to the Turkish Government.”

He had the greatest regard for the feelings of the Indians in that matter, but was surprised they insisted upon the retention of the Sultan in Constantinople. He thought that there was not the slightest ground for maintaining the Sultan as Caliph of Mohammedanism, and, even if there were, there was nothing at all vital about his remaining in Constantinople. So far as the Turks were concerned, what was Constantinople? It was not a national capital; it had been occupied by the Turks as their great trophy of victory. He entirely approved of the statement of 1918, and, in the same circumstances, he would make it again. It seemed to him perfectly fantastic to say that ever since 1918 we had held out to our Indian fellow-subjects an absolute undertaking that Constantinople should remain in the hands of the Turks.

Then Mr. Bonar Law rose, and declared that it would be easier to have control over the Turkish Government if it was left in Constantinople, instead of transferring it to Konia,

“Our fleet at Constantinople would be a visible emblem of power. The Allies believed that the pressure they would be able to exercise would have an effect throughout the Turkish Empire, but it would not be so if we sent the Turks to Konia. An hon. member had said that some Armenians had told him that they desired the Turks to be sent out of Constantinople. Let the Armenians consider the facts as they now were.

“If there was one thing which more than another was likely to make the League of Nations a failure it was to hand over this question to them. In 1917 it was arranged that if we were victorious in the war, Russia would become the possessor of Constantinople. But all that fell to the ground, and in 1918 a new situation arose, and a solemn document was put before the British people in which it was stated that one of our war aims was not to turn the Turks out of Constantinople. Overwhelming reasons were required to justify departure from that declaration, and those overwhelming reasons had not been forthcoming. When it was hoped and expected that America would accept a mandate in regard to Turkey there was no question of turning the Turks out of Constantinople.”19

The debate, which came to an end after this statement by Mr. Bonar Law, was not followed by a vote.

Mr. Montagu, Secretary for India, stated in an interview printed in the Evening Standard, February 25:

“If one of the results of the war must needs be to take away Constantinople from the Turks, I should take the liberty of respectfully telling Lord Robert Cecil, as president, of the Indian delegation in the Peace Conference, that we ought not to have asked Indians to take part in the war against Turkey. Throughout India, all those who had to express their opinion on this subject, whatever race or religion they may belong to, are of opinion that Constantinople must remain the seat of the Khilafat if the internal and external peace of India is to be preserved.

“The Turks, who are the chief part of the population in Constantinople, have certainly as much right as any other community to the possession of that city. So we have to choose between the Turks and an international régime. Now in the history of Constantinople examples have occurred of the latter régime, and the results were not so good that it cannot be said a Turkish government would not have done better.”

This opinion was upheld by a good many British newspapers, notwithstanding Lord Robert Cecil’s campaign.

Yet under the pressure of a section of public opinion and the agitation let loose against Turkey, England seemed more and more resolved to occupy Constantinople, and The Times, though it had never been averse to the eviction of the Turks from Constantinople, now showed some anxiety:

“We cannot imagine how the greatest lovers of political difficulties in Europe should have ever dreamt that Constantinople should be occupied exclusively by British troops, or that such a decision may have been taken without previously taking the Allies’ advice.

“As things now stand, we are not at all surprised that such stories may have given birth to a feeling of distrust towards us. These are the fruits of a policy tainted with contradiction and weakness. The Allied countries refuse to sacrifice any more gold or human lives, unless their honour is concerned. They will not consent to go to war in order to safeguard the interests of a few international financiers, who want to dismember Turkey-in-Asia.”

This movement was brought about by the explosion of very old feelings which had been smouldering for nearly forty years, had been kept alive by the Balkan war, and had been roused by the last conflict. Even at the time of Catherine II the merchants of the City of London merely looked upon Russia as a first-rate customer to whom they sold European and Indian goods, and of whom in return they bought raw materials which their ships brought to England. So they felt inclined to support the policy of Russia, and, to quote the words of a French writer in the eighteenth century, the English ambassador at Constantinople was “le chargé d’affaires de la Russie.” So a party which took into account only the material advantages to be drawn from a closer commercial connection with Russia arose and soon became influential. William Pitt inveighed against this party when, in one of his speeches, he refused to argue with those who wanted to put an end to the Ottoman Empire. But the opinion that England can only derive economic advantages from the dismemberment of Turkey in favour of Russia soon found a new advocate in Richard Cobden, the leader of the Manchester school, who expounded it in a little book, Russia, by a Manchester Manufacturer, printed at Edinburgh in 1835. This dangerous policy was maintained, in spite of David Urquhart’s campaign against the Tsarist policy in the East in a periodical, The Portfolio, which he had founded in 1833, and, notwithstanding the strenuous efforts made by Blacque, a Frenchman, editor of The Ottoman Monitor, to show that Europe was being cheated by Russia, and was going the wrong way in her attitude towards Turkey. And the same foolish policy consistently pursued by Fox, Gladstone, and Grey towards Tsardom is still carried on by Britain towards Bolshevism. The same narrowly utilitarian views, the typical economic principles of the Manchester School, linked with Protestant ideas, and thus strengthened and aggravated by religious feeling, seem still to inspire the Russian policy of Britain as they once inspired the old “bag and baggage” policy of Mr. Gladstone, the “Grand Old Man,” that the Turks should be expelled from Constantinople with bag and baggage. Indeed, this policy may be looked upon as an article of faith of the English Liberal party. Mr. Gladstone’s religious mind, which was alien to the Islamic spirit, together with the endeavours of the economists who wanted to monopolise the Russian market, brought about an alliance with Holy Orthodox Russia, and within the Anglican Church a movement for union with the Holy Synod had even been started.

That campaign was all the more out of place as the Turks have repeatedly proclaimed their sympathy for England and turned towards her. Just as after the first Balkan war the Kiamil Cabinet had made overtures to Sir Edward Grey, after the armistice of November 11 Tewfik Pasha, now Grand Vizier, had also made open proposals. England had already laid hands on Arabia and Mesopotamia, but could not openly lay claim to Constantinople without upsetting some nations with whom she meant to keep on good terms, though some of her agents and part of public opinion worked to that end. Generally she showed more diplomacy in conforming her conduct with her interests, which she did not defend so harshly and openly.

But religious antagonism and religious intolerance were at the bottom of that policy, and had always instigated and supported it. The Anglicans, and more markedly the Nonconformists, had taken up the cry, “The Turk out of Europe,” and it seems certain that the religious influence was paramount and brought on the political action. Mr. Lloyd George, who is a strong and earnest Nonconformist, must have felt it slightly awkward to find himself in direct opposition to his co-religionists on political grounds. Besides, the British Government, which in varied circumstances had supported contradictory policies, was in a difficult situation when brought face to face with such contradictions.

It also seems strange at first that the majority of American public opinion should have suffered itself to be led by the campaign of Protestant propaganda, however important the religious question may be in the United States. Though since 1831 American Protestant missionaries have defrayed the expenses of several centres of propaganda among the Nestorians (who have preserved the Nazarene creed), paid the native priests and supported the schools, America has no interests in those countries, unless she thus means to support her Russian policy. But her economic imperialism, which also aims at a spiritual preponderance, would easily go hand in hand with a cold religious imperialism which would spread its utilitarian formalism over the life and manners of all nations.

At any rate, the plain result of the two countries’ policy was necessarily to reinforce the Pan-Turkish and Pan-Arabian movements.

Of course, Mr. Wilson’s puritanism and his ignorance of the complex elements and real conditions of European civilisation could not but favour such a movement, and on March 5 the New York World, a semi-official organ, plainly said that Mr. Wilson would threaten again, as he had already done about Italy, to withdraw from European affairs, if the treaty of peace with Turkey left Constantinople to the Turks, and gave up all protection of the Christian populations in Turkey.

The traditional hostility of America towards Turkey—one of the essential reasons of which has just been given—demanded that Turkey should be expelled from Europe, and the Empire should be dismembered. President Wilson, in Article 12 of his programme, had mentioned the recognition of the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire; yet the American leaders, though they pointed out that a state of war had never existed between the United States and Turkey, were the first to demand the eviction of the Turks; and the Chicago Tribune of March 8 hinted that an American cruiser might be sent to the Bosphorus. On March 6 Senator Kling criticised in the Senate the Allies’ proposals aiming at tolerating Turkish sway in Asia Minor. The United States even backed the Greek claims, and on the same day Mr. Lodge moved that the Peace Conference should give to Greece Northern Epirus, the Dodecanese, and the western coast of Asia Minor.

Mr. Morgenthau, too, criticised the terms of the settlement which allowed Constantinople to remain a Turkish city; he maintained that such a solution could only be another inducement for America to keep away from European affairs, and declared that Europe would fail to do her duty if she did not punish Turkey. Yet at the same time America, and shortly after England, were endeavouring to mitigate the responsibility of Germany, objecting, not to her punishment, which had never been demanded by France, but to the complete execution of the most legitimate measures of reparation, and made concessions on all points that did not affect their own interests. In fact, they merely wanted to resume business with Germany at any cost and as soon as possible.

English newspapers printed an appeal to French and British public opinion drawn up by some eminent American citizens, asking for the eviction of the Turks from Constantinople and the autonomy of Armenia.

The British Press, however, remarked that it was not sufficient to express wishes, and it would have been better if the Americans had assumed a share of responsibility in the reorganisation of Asia Minor.

Now, why did a section of British and American public opinion want to punish Turkey, whereas it refused to support the French and Belgian claims to reparation? In order to form an impartial judgment on Turkey, one should look for the motives and weigh the reasons that induced her to take part in the war, and then ascertain why some members of her political parties most preposterously stood by the side of Germany. If the latter pursued such a policy, perhaps it was because Germany, who aimed at extending her influence over the whole of Eastern Asia, displayed more ability and skill than the Allies did in Turkey, and because the policy of the Powers and their attitude towards the Christians raised much enmity against them.

On such a delicate point, one cannot do better than quote the words of Suleyman Nazif Bey in a lecture delivered in honour of Pierre Loti at the University of Stambul on January 23, 1920:

“When we linked our fate with that of Germany and Austria, the Kaiser’s army had already lost the first battle of the Marne. It is under such untoward and dangerous circumstances that we joined the fray. No judicious motive can be brought forward to excuse and absolve the few men who drove us lightheartedly into the conflagration of the world war.

“If Kaiser Wilhelm found it possible to fool some men among us, and if these men were able to draw the nation behind them, the reason is to be found in the events of the time and in the teachings of history. Russia, who, for the last two and a half centuries has not given us a moment of respite, did not enter into the world war in order to take Alsace-Lorraine from Prussia and give it back to France. The Muscovites thought the time had come at last to carry out the dream that had perpetually haunted the Tsars ever since Peter the Great—that is to say, the conquest of Anatolia and the Straits.

“It is not to Europe but to our own country that we must be held responsible for having entered into the war so foolishly, and still more for having conducted it so badly, with so much ignorance and deceit. The Ottoman nation alone has a right to call us to account—the Great Powers had paid us so little regard, nay, they had brought on us such calamities, that the shrewd Kaiser finally managed to stir up our discontent and make us lay aside all discretion and thoughtfulness by rousing the ancient legitimate hatred of the Turks.

“Read the book that the former Bulgarian Premier, Guéchoff, wrote just after the Balkan war. You will see in it that the Tsar Nicholas compelled, as it were by force, the Serbs and Bulgars, who had been enemies for centuries, to conclude an alliance in order to evict us from Europe. Of course, Montenegro followed suit. France approved, then even urged them to do so; and then one of the leading figures of the times intervened to make Greece join that coalition intended to drive the Turks out of Europe. The rest is but too well known. The Bulgarian statesman who owns all this is noted for his hatred of Turkey.

“Let us not forget this: so long as our victory was considered as possible, the Powers declared that the principle of the status quo ante bellum should be religiously observed. As soon as we suffered a defeat, a Power declared this principle no longer held good; it was the ally of the nation that has been our enemy for two and a half centuries, and yet it was also most adverse to the crafty policy that meant to cheat us....

“Every time Europe has conferred some benefit upon us we have been thankful for it. I know the history of my country full well; in her annals, many mistakes and evil doings have occurred, but not one line relates one act of ingratitude. After allowing the Moslems of Smyrna to be slaughtered by Hellenic soldiers and after having hushed up this crime, Europe now wants—so it seems at least—to drive us out of Constantinople and transfer the Moslem Khilafat to an Anatolian town, as if it were a common parcel, or shelve it inside the palace of Top-Kapu (the old Seraglio) like the antique curios of the Museum. When the Turks shall have been expelled from Constantinople, the country will be so convulsed that the whole world will be shaken. Let nobody entertain any doubt about this: if we go out of Constantinople a general conflagration will break out, that will last for years or centuries, nobody knows, and will set on fire the whole of the globe.

“At the time when Sultan Mohammed entered the town of Constantinople, which had been praised and promised by Mohammed to his people, the Moslem Empire of Andalusia was falling to decay—that is to say, in the south-east of Europe a Moslem State arose on the ruins of a Christian State, while in the south-west of Europe a Christian State was putting an end to the life of a Moslem State. The victor of Constantinople granted the Christian population he found there larger religious privileges than those granted to it by the Greek Empire. The ulcer of Phanar is still the outcome of Sultan Mohammed’s generosity. What did Spain do when she suppressed the Moslem State in the south-west of Europe? She expelled the other religions, burning in ovens or sending to the stake the Moslems and even the Jews who refused to embrace Christianity. I mention this historical fact here, not to criticise or blame the Spaniards, but to give an instance of the way in which the Spaniards availed themselves of the conqueror’s right Heaven had awarded them. And I contrast the Christians’ cruelty with the Turks’ gentleness and magnanimity when they entered Constantinople!”

To adopt the policy advocated by Anglo-American Protestants was tantamount to throwing Islam again towards Germany, who had already managed to derive profit from its defence. Yet Islamism has no natural propensity towards Germanism; on the contrary, Islam in the sixteenth century, at the time of its modern development, intervened in our culture as the vehicle of Eastern influences. That policy also hurt the religious feelings of the Mussulmans and roused their fanaticism not only in Turkey, but even in a country of highly developed intellectual life like Egypt, and in this respect it promoted the cause of the most spirited and most legitimate Nationalism.

Besides, in the note which the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs handed in January, 1920, to the High Commissioners of the Allies, together with a scheme of judicial reforms, it was said notably:

“The Ottoman Government fully realises the cruel situation of Turkey after the war, but an unfortunate war cannot deprive a nation of her right to political existence, this right being based on the principles of justice and humanity confirmed by President Wilson’s solemn declaration and recognised by all the belligerents as the basis of the peace of the world. It is in accordance with these principles that an armistice was concluded between the Allied Powers and Turkey. It ensues from this that the treaty to intervene shall restore order and peace to the East.

“Any solution infringing upon Ottoman unity, far from ensuring quietude and prosperity, would turn the East into a hotbed of endless perturbation. Therefore the only way to institute stability in the new state of things is to maintain Ottoman sovereignty.

“Let us add that, if the reforms Turkey tried to institute at various times were not attended with the results she expected, this is due to an unfavourable state of things both abroad and at home.

“Feeling it is absolutely necessary to put an end to an unbearable situation and wishing sincerely and eagerly to modernise its administration so as to open up an era of prosperity and progress in the East, the Sublime Porte has firmly resolved, in a broadminded spirit, to institute a new organisation, including reforms in the judicial system, the finance, and the police, and the protection of the minorities.

“As a token that these reforms will be fully and completely carried out, the Ottoman Government pledges itself to accept the co-operation of one of the Great Powers on condition its independence shall not be infringed upon and its national pride shall not be wounded.”

As soon as it was known in what spirit the treaty of peace with Turkey was going to be discussed between the Powers, and what clauses were likely to be inserted in it, a clamour of protest arose throughout the Moslem world.

That treaty could not but affect the most important group of Mohammedans, the Indian group, which numbers over 70 million men and forms nearly one-fourth of the population of India. As soon as the conditions that were to be forced on Turkey were known in India, they roused deep resentment, which reached its climax after the Amritsar massacre. Some of the clauses which the Allies meant to insert in the treaty plainly ran counter to the principles of Mohammedanism; and as they hurt the religious feelings of the Moslems and disregarded the religious guarantees given to the Hindus and all the Moslem world by the present British Cabinet and its predecessors, they could not but bring on new conflicts in the future. Besides, the blunders of the last five years had united Hindus and Mohammedans in India, as they united Copts and Mohammedans in Egypt later on, and it was also feared that the Arabs, whose hopes had been frustrated, would side with the Turkish Nationalists.

At the end of 1918, Dr. Ansari, M.D., M.S., chairman of the Committee of the All-India Muslim League, in the course of the session held at Delhi at that time, set forth the Muslim grievances. But the address he read could not receive any publicity owing to the special repressive measures taken by the Government of India.

In September, 1919, a Congress of Mohammedans, who had come from all parts of India and thus represented Muslim opinion as a whole, was held at Lucknow, one of the chief Muslim centres. In November another congress for the defence of the Caliphate met at Delhi; it included some Hindu leaders, and thus assumed a national character. Next month a third congress, held at Amritsar, in the Punjab, was presided over by Shaukat Ali, founder and secretary of the Society of the Servants of the Ka’ba, who had been imprisoned like his brother Mohammed Ali and released three days before the congress; it was attended by over 20,000 Hindus and Mussulmans.

This meeting confirmed the resolution taken by the previous congress to send to Europe and America a delegation from India for the defence of the Caliphate. On January 19, 1920, a deputation of Indian Mussulmans waited upon the Viceroy of India at Delhi, to request that a delegation might repair to Europe and America, according to the decision of the congress, in order to expound before the allied and associated nations and their governments the Moslems’ religious obligations and Muslim and Indian sentiment on the subject of the Caliphate and cognate questions, and to be their representatives at the Peace Conference.

The non-Mussulman Indians supported the claims which the 70 millions of Indian Mussulmans, their fellow-countrymen, considered as a religious obligation. In an address drawn up by the great Hindu leader, the Mahatma Gandhi, and handed on January 19, 1920, by the deputation of the General Congress of India for the Defence of the Caliphate to His Excellency Baron Chelmsford, Viceroy and Governor of India, in order to lay their aims before him, they declared they raised a formal protest lest the Caliphate should be deprived of the privilege of the custody and wardenship of the Holy Places, and lest a non-Muslim control, in any shape or form whatever, should be established over the Island of Arabia, whose boundaries, as defined by Muslim religious authorities, are: the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, thus including Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, beside the Peninsula of Arabia.

This General Congress of India, according to the manifesto it adopted during its sittings at Bombay on February 15, 16, and 17, 1920, gave to the delegation sent to Europe the following mandate, with respect to the Muslim claims regarding the Caliphate and the “Jazirat-ul-Arab”:

“With respect to the Khilafat it is claimed that the Turkish Empire should be left as it was when the war broke out; however, though the alleged maladministration of Turks has not been proved, the non-Turkish nationalities might, if they wished, have within the Ottoman Empire all guarantees of autonomy compatible with the dignity of a sovereign State.”

And the manifesto continued thus:

“The slightest reduction of the Muslim claims would not only hurt the deepest religions feelings of the Moslems, but would plainly violate the solemn declarations and pledges made or taken by responsible statesmen representing the Allied and Associated Powers at a time when they were most anxious to secure the support of the Moslem peoples and soldiers.”

The anti-Turkish agitation which had been let loose at the end of December, 1919, and had reached its climax about March, 1920, had an immediate repercussion not only in India, where the Caliphate Conference, held at Calcutta, decided to begin a strike on March 19 and boycott British goods, if the agitation for the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople did not come to an end in England.

At Tunis, on March 11, after a summons had been posted in one of the mosques calling upon the Muslim population to protest against the occupation of Constantinople, a demonstration took place before the Residency. M. Etienne Flandin received a delegation of native students asking him that France should oppose the measures England was about to take. The minister, after stating what reasons might justify the intervention, evaded the question that was put him by declaring that such measures were mere guarantees, and stated that even if France were to take a share in them, the Mussulmans should feel all the more certain that their religious creed would be respected.

The measures that were being contemplated could not but raise much anxiety and indignation among the Moslem populations and might have had disastrous consequences for France in Northern Africa. This was clearly pointed out by M. Bourgeois, President of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, in his report read to the Senate when the conditions of the peace that was going to be enforced on Turkey came under discussion.

“We cannot ignore the deep repercussions which the intended measures in regard to Turkey may have among the 25 million Moslems who live under our rule in Northern Africa. Their reverence and devotion have displayed themselves most strikingly in the course of the war. Nothing must be done to alter these feelings.”

Indeed, as M. Mouktar-el-Farzuk wrote in an article entitled “France, Turkey, and Islam,” printed in the Ikdam, a newspaper of Algiers, on May 7, 1920—

“If the French Moslems fought heroically for France and turned a deaf ear to the seditious proposals of Germany, they still preserve the deepest sympathy for Turkey, and they would be greatly distressed if the outcome of the victory in which they have had a share was the annihilation of the Ottoman Empire.

“That sympathy is generally looked upon in Europe as a manifestation of the so-called Moslem fanaticism or Pan-Islamism. Yet it is nothing of the kind. The so-called Moslem fanaticism is a mere legend whose insanity has been proved by history. Pan-Islamism, too, only exists in the mind of those who imagined its existence. The independent Moslem populations, such as the Persians and the Afghans, are most jealous of their independence, and do not think in the least of becoming the Sultan’s subjects. As to those who live under the dominion of a European Power, they have no wish to rebel against it, and only aim at improving their material and moral condition, and of preserving their personality as a race.

“The true reasons of the Moslems’ sympathy for the Ottoman Empire are historical, religious, and sentimental reasons.”

The delegation of the Moslems of India for the defence of the Caliphate sent to the Peace Conference was headed by Mohammed Ali, who, in 1914, on behalf of the Government of India, had written to Talaat, Minister of the Interior, to ask him not to side with the Central Empires, and to show him how difficult the situation of the Indian Mussulmans would be if Turkey entered into the war against England. On landing in Venice, he told the correspondent of the Giornale d’Italia that the object of his journey was to convince the Allies that the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire would be a danger to the peace of the world.

“The country we represent numbers 70 million Mohammedans and 230 million men belonging to other religions but agreeing with us on this point. So we hope that if the Allies really want to establish the peace of the world, they will take our reasons into account. Italy has hitherto supported us, and we hope the other nations will follow her example.”

This delegation was first received by Mr. Fisher, representing Mr. Montagu, Indian Secretary, to whom they explained the serious consequences which the carrying out of the conditions of peace contemplated for Turkey might have in their country.

Mr. Lloyd George, in his turn, received the delegation on March 19, before it was heard by the Supreme Council. Mohammed Ali, after pointing to the bonds that link together the Mohammedans of India and the Caliphate, because Islam is not only a set of doctrines and dogmas but forms both a moral code and a social polity, recalled that, according to the Muslim doctrine, the Commander of the Faithful must always own a territory, an army, and resources to prevent the aggression of adversaries who have not ceased to arm themselves; he maintained, therefore, that the seat of the Sultan’s temporal power must be maintained in Constantinople; that Turkey must not be dismembered; and that Arabia must be left under Turkish sovereignty.

“Islam has always had two centres, the first a personal one and the other a local one. The personal centre is the Caliph, or the Khalifa, as we call him—the successor of the Prophet. Because the Prophet was the personal centre of Islam, his successors, or Khalifas, continue his tradition to this day. The local centre is the region known as the Jazirat-ul-Arab, or the ‘Island of Arabia,’ the ‘Land of the Prophets.’ To Islam, Arabia has been not a peninsula but an island, the fourth boundary being the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris....

“Islam required temporal power for the defence of the Faith, and for that purpose, if the ideal combination of piety and power could not be achieved, the Muslims said, ‘Let us get hold of the most powerful person, even if he is not the most pious, so long as he places his power at the disposal of our piety.’ That is why we agreed to accept Muslim kings, the Omayyids and the Abbasids, as Khalifas, now the Sultans of Turkey. They have a peculiar succession of their own. We have accepted it for the time being because we must have the strongest Mussulman Power at our disposal to assist us in the defence of the Faith. That is why we have accepted it. If the Turks agreed with other Muslims, and all agreed that the Khalifa may be chosen out of any Muslim community, no matter who he was, the humblest of us might be chosen, as they used to be chosen in the days of the first four Khalifas, the Khulafa-i-Rashideen, or truly guided Khalifas.

“But of course we have to make allowances for human nature. The Turkish Sultan in 1517 did not like to part with his power any more than the Mamluke rulers of Egypt liked to part with their power when they gave asylum to a scion of the Abbasids after the sack of Baghdad in 1258.”

It follows that “the standard of temporal power necessary for the preservation of the Caliphate must obviously, therefore, be a relative one,” and—

“Not going into the matter more fully, we would say that after the various wars in which Turkey has been engaged recently, and after the Balkan war particularly, the Empire of the Khalifa was reduced to such narrow limits that Muslims considered the irreducible minimum of temporal power adequate for the defence of the Faith to be the restoration of the territorial status quo ante bellum....

“When asking for the restoration of the territorial status quo ante bellum, Muslims do not rule out changes which would guarantee to the Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans, within the scheme of the Ottoman sovereignty, security of life and property and opportunities of autonomous development, so long as it is consistent with the dignity and independence of the sovereign State. It will not be a difficult matter. We have here an Empire in which the various communities live together. Some already are sufficiently independent and others hope—and here I refer to India—to get a larger degree of autonomy than they possess at the present moment; and consistently with our desire to have autonomous development ourselves, we could not think of denying it to Arabs or Jews or Christians within the Turkish Empire.”

He went on as follows:

“The third claim that the Mussulmans have charged us with putting before you is based on a series of injunctions which require the Khalifa to be the warden of the three sacred Harams of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem; and overwhelming Muslim sentiment requires that he should be the warden of the holy shrines of Nejef, Kerbela, Kazimain, Samarra, and Baghdad, all of which are situated within the confines of the ‘Island of Arabia.’

“Although Muslims rely on their religious obligations for the satisfaction of the claims which I have specified above, they naturally find additional support in your own pledge, Sir, with regard to Constantinople, Thrace, and Asia Minor, the populations of which are overwhelmingly Muslim. They trust that a pledge so solemnly given and recently renewed will be redeemed in its entirety. Although the same degree of sanctity cannot be claimed for Constantinople as for the three sacred Harams—Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem—Constantinople is nevertheless held very sacred by all the Muslims of the world, and the uninterrupted historic tradition of nearly five centuries has created such an overwhelming sentiment with regard to Islambol, or the ‘City of Islam’—a title which no city has up to this time enjoyed—that an effort to drive the Turks out ‘bag and baggage’ from the seat of the Khilafat is bound to be regarded by the Muslims of the world as a challenge of the modern Crusaders to Islam and of European rule to the entire East, which cannot be taken up by the Muslim world or the East without great peril to our own Empire, and, in fact, to the Allied dominions in Asia and Africa. In this connection, Sir, I might mention one point, that the Muslims cannot tolerate any affront to Islam in keeping the Khalifa as a sort of hostage in Constantinople. He is not the Pope at the Vatican, much less can he be the Pope at Avignon, and I am bound to say that the recent action of the Allied Powers is likely to give rise in the Muslim world to feelings which it will be very difficult to restrain, and which would be very dangerous to the peace of the world.”

With regard to the question of the Caliphate and temporal power, on which the Indian delegation had been instructed to insist particularly, M. Mohammed Ali, in order to make the Moslem point of view quite clear, wrote as follows:20

“The moment this claim is put forward we are told that the West has outgrown this stage of human development, and that people who relieved the Head of a Christian Church of all temporal power are not prepared to maintain the temporal power of the Head of the Muslim Church. This idea is urged by the supporters of the Laic Law of France with all the fanaticism of the days of the Spanish Inquisition, and in England, too. Some of the most unprejudiced people wonder at the folly and temerity of those who come to press such an anachronistic claim. Others suggest that the Khalifa should be ‘vaticanised’ even if he is to retain Constantinople, while the Government of India, who should certainly have known better, say that they cannot acquiesce in Muslim statements which imply temporal allegiance to the Khilafat on the part of Indian Muslims, or suggest that temporal power is of the essence of the Khilafat. Where such criticisms and suggestions go astray is in misunderstanding the very nature and ideal of Islam and the Khilafat, and in relying on analogies from faiths which, whatever their original ideals, have, for all practical purposes, ceased to interpret life as Islam seeks to do.”

As he had said in the course of his official interview with the British Premier, as Islam is not “a set of doctrines and dogmas, but a way of life, a moral code, and a social polity,”—

“Muslims regard themselves as created to serve the one Divine purpose that runs through the ages, owing allegiance to God in the first place and acknowledging His authority alone in the last resort. Their religion is not for Sabbaths and Sundays only, or a matter for churches and temples. It is a workaday faith, and meant even more for the market-place than the mosque. Theirs is a federation of faith, a cosmopolitan brotherhood, of which the personal centre is the Khalifa. He is not a Pope and is not even a priest, and he certainly has no pretensions to infallibility. He is the head of Islam’s Republic, and it is a mere accident, and an unfortunate accident at that, that he happens to be a king. He is the Commander of the Faithful, the President of their Theocratic Commonwealth, and the Leader of all Mussulmans in all matters for which the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet, whose successor he is, provide guidance.”

Therefore, according to the Moslem doctrine—

“There is no such theory of ‘divided allegiance’ here, as the Government of India consider to be ’subversive of the constitutional basis on which all Governments are established.’ ‘There is no government but God’s,’ says the Koran, ‘and Him alone is a Mussulman to serve,’ and since He is the Sole Sovereign of all mankind, there can be no divided allegiance. All Governments can command the obedience of the Muslims in the same way as they can command the obedience of other people, but they can do so only so far as they command it, as Mr. H. G. Wells would say, in the name of God and for God, and certainly no Christian Sovereign could expect to exercise unquestioned authority over a Muslim against the clear commandments of his Faith when no Muslim Sovereign could dream of doing it. Mussulmans are required to obey God and His Prophet and ‘the men in authority from amongst themselves,’ which include the Khalifa; but they are also required, in case of every dispute, to refer back to the Holy Koran and to the Traditions of the Prophet, which are to act as arbitrator. Thus the Khalifa himself will be disobeyed if he orders that which the Faith forbids, and if he persists in such unauthorised conduct, he may not only be disobeyed, but also be deposed.

“But whatever he could or could not do, the Khalifa was certainly not a pious old gentleman whose only function in life was to mumble his prayers and repeat his beads.

“The best way to understand what he is and what he is not is to go back to the Prophet whose Khalifa or Successor he is. The Koran regards man as the vicegerent of God on earth, and Adam was the first Khalifa of God, and free-willed instrument of divine will. This succession continued from prophet to prophet, and they were the guides of the people in all the affairs of life. The fuller and final revelation came with Mohammed, and since then the Commanders of the Faithful have been his Khalifas or Successors. But as religion is not a part of life but the whole of it, and since it is not an affair of the next world but of this, which it teaches us to make better, cleaner, and happier, so every Muslim religious authority has laid it down unequivocally and emphatically that the allegiance which Muslims owe to the Khalifa is both temporal and spiritual. The only limits recognised to his authority are the Commandments of God, which he is not allowed to disobey or defy....

“The Mussulmans, therefore, do not believe that Christ, for instance, could have said that His was the kingdom not of this earth but of Heaven alone; or that men were to render to Cæsar what was due to Cæsar, and to God what was due to God. Cæsar could not share the world with God or demand from mankind any allegiance, even if only temporal, if he did not demand it for God and on behalf of God. But the ordinary Christian conception has been that the kingdom of Christ was not of this world, and no Pope or priest could, consistently with this conception, demand temporal power. It is doubtful if the Papacy is based on any saying of Christ Himself. At any rate, the Pope has always claimed to be the successor of St. Peter and the inheritor of his prerogatives. As such he has been looked upon as the doorkeeper of the kingdom of heaven, his office being strictly and avowedly limited to the spiritual domain. A study of history makes it only too apparent that the doctrine of the Papacy grew in Christianity by the application to the Popes of the epithets which are applied to St. Peter in the Gospels. Just as St. Peter never had any temporal authority, so the Papacy also remained, in the first stages of its growth, devoid of temporal power for long centuries. It was only by a very slow development that the Popes aspired to temporal power. Thus, without meaning any offence, it may be said that the acquisition of temporal power by the Popes was a mere accident, and they have certainly been divested of it without doing the least violence to the religious feelings of one half of the Christian world.

“On the contrary, the temporal power of the Khilafat in Islam is of the very essence of it, and is traceable not only to the earliest Khalifas, but to the Prophet himself. This is obviously not the religious belief of Christian Europe or America; but equally obviously this is the religious Muslim belief, and after all it is with the Muslim belief that we are concerned....”

So, considering the ever-increasing armaments of European and American nations, “even after the creation of a nebulous League of Nations,” he asked himself:

“How then can Islam dispense with temporal power? Others maintain armies and navies and air forces for the defence of their territories or their commerce, because they love these more than they hate armaments. To Islam, its culture and ethics are dearer than territory, and it regards faith as greater than finance. It needs no army or navy to advance its boundaries or extend its influence; but it certainly needs them to prevent the aggression of others.”

Then M. Mohammed Ali dealt separately with the chief clauses of the Turkish treaty in the course of his interview with Mr. Lloyd George, and made the following remarks:

“As regards Thrace, it is not necessary to support the Turkish claim for the retention of Thrace by any further argument than that of the principle of self-determination. Its fair and honest application will ensure the satisfaction of that claim.

“As regards Smyrna, the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, who were not even at war with Turkey, under the auspices of the Allies, has shaken to a great extent the confidence which Muslims reposed in the pledges given to them, and the atrocities perpetrated in that region have driven them almost to desperation. Muslims can discover no justification for this action except the desire of Greek capitalists to exploit the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor, which are admittedly the homelands of the Turks. If this state of affairs is allowed to continue, not only will the Turk be driven out, ‘bag and baggage,’ from Europe, but he will have no ‘bag and baggage’ left to him, even in Asia. He would be paralysed, commercially and industrially, in a land-locked small Emirate in Asia Minor, the speedy bankruptcy of which is certain. The application of the principle of self-determination would entirely rule out the Greek claim in this fertile region, which obviously tempts the greed of the capitalist and the exploiter.

“As regards Cilicia, reasons similar to those that have promoted the action of Greeks in Smyrna seem clearly to prompt the outcry of the Christian population in Cilicia, and obviously it is the Gulf of Alexandretta which is attracting some people as the Gulf of Smyrna is attracting others.”

Afterwards, coming to the question of the massacres, M. Mohammed Ali declared:

“The Indian Khilafat delegation must put on record their utter detestation of such conduct and their full sympathy for the sufferers, whether they be Christian or Muslim. But, if the Turk is to be punished as a criminal, and populations of other races and creeds are to be released from their allegiance to the Ottoman Sovereign on the assumption that the Turks have been tyrants in the past and their rule is intolerable, then the delegation claim that the whole question of these massacres must be impartially investigated by an International Commission on which the All-India Khilafat Conference should be adequately represented.”

Moreover, the delegation had already said something similar in a telegram sent to Mr. Lloyd George:

“Where casualties have in fact taken place, not only should their true extent be ascertained, but the Commission should go fully into the so-called massacres and the intrigues of Tsarist Russia in Asia Minor after the success of similar intrigues in the Balkans; it should go into the question of the organisation of revolutionary societies by the Christian subjects of the Sultan, the rebellious character of which was subversive of his rule; it should go into the provocation offered to the Muslim majority in this region, and the nature of the struggle between the contending parties and the character of the forces engaged on either side....”

He went on:

“I have no brief for them; I have no brief for the Turks; I have only a brief for Islam and the India Muslims. What we say is this, as I said to Mr. Fisher: let there be a thorough inquiry, and if this thorough inquiry is carried out, and if it establishes to the satisfaction of the world that the Turks really have been guilty of unprovoked murders, and have been guilty of these atrocities and horrible crimes, then we will wash our hands of the Turks.

“To us it is much more important that not a single stain should remain on the fair name of Islam. We want to convert the whole world to our way of thinking, but with what face could we go before the whole world and say we are the brethren of murderers and massacrers?

“But we know the whole history of these massacres to some extent. It is only in Armenia that the Turk is said to be so intolerant; there are other parts of the world where he deals with Christian people, and where he deals with the Jewish community. No complaints of massacres come from those communities. Then the Armenians themselves lived under Turkish rule for centuries and never complained. The farthest back that we can go to discover any trace of this is the beginning of the last century. But in reality the ‘massacres’ begin only in the last quarter of the last century.

“It is pretty clear that they begin after the success of efforts like those made in the Balkans by Russia, which has never disguised its desire to take Constantinople since the time of Peter the Great. It has always wanted to go to Tsargrad, as it called it—that is, the city of the Tsars. They wanted to go there. They tried these things in the Balkans, and they succeeded beyond their expectation, only probably Bulgaria became too independent when it became Greater Bulgaria. But in the case of the Armenians, they had people who were not very warlike, who had no sovereign ambitions themselves, and who were also to a great extent afraid of conversion to another branch of the Orthodox Church, the Russian branch, so that they were not very willing tools. Still, they were egged on, and plots and intrigues went on all the time. These people were incited, and they understood that if they made a compromise with Tsarist Russia they would get something better. It was then that these massacres came on the scene. No doubt there have been several outcries about them; some evidence has been produced; but there has been no thorough international inquiry which would satisfy the entire world, Muslim as well as Christian. It is in that connection that we earnestly appeal to you, to the whole of Christendom, to the whole of Europe and America, that if the Turk is to be punished on the assumption that he is a tyrant, that his rule is a blasting tyranny, and that he ought to be punished, in that case the evidence should be of such a character that it should be absolutely above suspicion.”

Mr. Lloyd George in his reply upbraided Turkey with fighting by the side of the Central Powers though Great Britain had never fought against her, and protracting the hostilities by closing the Black Sea to the British fleet; but he did not seem to realise that the Russian policy of the Allies partly accounted for Turkey’s decision. Only at the end of the interview, in answer to a remark of the leader of the Indian delegation, he pleaded in defence of England “that she had made no arrangement of any sort with Russia at the expense of Turkey at the beginning of the war.” Then, before coming to the various points M. Mohammed Ali had dealt with, Mr. Lloyd George, who had kept aloof for a long time from the policy of understanding with France, said:

“I do not understand M. Mohammed Ali to claim indulgence for Turkey. He claims justice, and justice she will get. Austria has had justice. Germany has had justice—pretty terrible justice. Why should Turkey escape? Turkey thought she had a feud with us. What feud had Turkey with us? Why did she come in to try and stab us and destroy liberty throughout the world when we were engaged in this life-and-death struggle? Is there any reason why we should apply a different measure to Turkey from that which we have meted out to the Christian communities of Germany and Austria? I want the Mohammedans in India to get it well into their minds that we are not treating Turkey severely because she is Mohammedan: we are applying exactly the same principle to her as we have applied to Austria, which is a great Christian community.”

As to Arabia—which will be dealt with later on together with the Pan-Arabian movement—though M. Mohammed Ali had declared that “the delegation felt no anxiety about the possibility of an understanding between the Arabs and the Khalifa,” and that the Moslems “did not want British bayonets to subject the Arabs to Turkey,” Mr. Lloyd George answered:

“The Arabs have claimed independence. They have proclaimed Feisal King of Syria. They have claimed that they should be severed from Turkish dominion. Is it suggested that the Arabs should remain under Turkish dominion merely because they are Mohammedans? Is not the same measure of independence and freedom to be given to Mohammedans as is given to Christians? Croatia has demanded freedom, and we have given it to her. It is a Christian community. Syria has demanded it, and it is given to her. We are applying exactly the same principles in Christian places, and to impose the dominion of the Sultan upon Arabia, which has no desire for it, is to impose upon Arabs something which we certainly would not dream of imposing upon these Christian communities.”

With regard to Thrace, after owning it was difficult to give reliable figures and saying that according to the Greek census and the Turkish census, which differ but little, the Moslem population was in “a considerable minority,” Mr. Lloyd George stated that “it would certainly be taken away from Turkish sovereignty.” As to Smyrna, he asserted that according to his information “a great majority of the population undoubtedly prefers the Greek rule to the Turkish rule.”

Concerning the temporal power of the Khalifa, he seemed to have forgotten the difference which had just been pointed out to him between the Christian religion and Islam on this point, for he declared:

“I am not going to interfere in a religious discussion where men of the same faith take a different view. I know of Mohammedans—sincere, earnest, zealous Mussulmans—who take a very different view of the temporal power from the one which is taken by M. Mohammed Ali to-day, just as I know of Catholics who take one view and other Catholics who take a very different view of the temporal power of the Pope. That is a controversy into which I do not propose to enter.”

And as if M. Mohammed Ali’s remarks had quite escaped him, he added:

“All I know is this. The Turk will exercise temporal power in Turkish lands. We do not propose to deprive him of Turkish lands. Neither do we propose that he should retain power over lands which are not Turkish. Why? Because that is the principle we are applying to the Christian communities of Europe. The same principles must be applied to the Turk.”

Finally, without thoroughly investigating the question of the massacres, he concluded that the responsibility lay with the Ottoman Government, which “cannot, as it is now constituted, protect its own subjects”; that Turkey is a “misgoverned country”—a reproach that might be applied to many other countries, though nobody would think of declaring they must be suppressed on that account; and that as the Turks “have been intolerant and have proved bad and unworthy rulers,” the solutions proposed by the Allies are the only remedy and therefore are justified.

And so the old argument that Turkey must be chastised was recapitulated once more, and, through the mouth of her Prime Minister, England resorted to threats again, whereas she did not mean to compel Germany to carry out her engagements fully. This attitude seems to be accounted for by the fact that Turkey was weak, and was not such a good customer as Germany. England, while pretending to do justice and to settle accounts, merely meant to take hold of the Straits.

Islam has instituted a social polity and culture which, though widely different from British and American civilisations, and leading to different methods of life, is not necessarily inferior to them; and all religious sects, whether Protestant or Catholic, are wrong when they look upon their own moral conception as superior, and endeavour to substitute it for that of Islam.

If we refer to the letter which was written to Damad Ferid Pasha, president of the Ottoman delegation, in answer to the memorandum handed on June 17, 1919, to the Peace Conference, and which lacks M. Clémenceau’s wit and style though his signature is appended to it, we plainly feel a Puritan inspiration in it, together with the above-mentioned state of mind.

One cannot help being sorry to find in so important a document such a complete ignorance or total lack of comprehension of the Muslim mind, and of the difference existing between our modern civilisation and what constitutes a culture. For instance, we read in it the following:

“History records many Turkish victories and also many Turkish defeats, many nations conquered and many set free. The memorandum itself hints at a loss of territories which not long ago were still under Ottoman sovereignty.

“Yet, in all these changes not one instance occurs in Europe, Asia, or Africa when the establishment of Turkish sovereignty was not attended with a decrease of material prosperity or a lower standard of culture; neither does an instance occur when the withdrawal of Turkish domination was not attended with an increase of material prosperity and a higher standard of culture. Whether among European Christians or among Syrian, Arabian, or African Mussulmans, the Turk has always brought destruction with him wherever he has conquered; he has never proved able to develop in peace what he had won by war. He is not gifted in this respect.”

This stagnation, which to a certain extent has been noticed in modern times, may proceed from the fact that the old Turkish spirit was smothered and Islam was checked by the growth of foreign influence in Turkey. This is probably due, not chiefly to foreign intrusion in the affairs of the Ottoman State—for the latter needed the help of foreign nations—but rather to the selfish rivalries between these nations and to the mongrel solutions inherent in international régimes by which Turkish interests were sacrificed.

It is well known that the decadence of the Arabic-speaking countries had begun long before they were subjected by the Turks. It has even been noticed that Turkish domination in Arabia in 1513 checked the decline of Arabian civilisation, and roused the Syrians, who were in a similar predicament.

Besides, the prevailing and paramount concern for material prosperity which asserts itself in the above-mentioned document, together with the way in which business men, especially Anglo-Saxons, understand material prosperity, would account for the variance between the two civilisations, for it enhances the difference between their standpoints, and proves that the superiority conferred by spiritual eminence does not belong to the nations who consider themselves superior to the Turks.

The Turkish mind, enriched both by Islamic ethics and by Arabian, Persian, and Byzantine influences, has risen to a far more definite and lofty outlook on life than the shallow Anglo-Saxon morality. There is as much difference between the two as between the architecture of the Yeshil-Jami, the green mosque of Brusa, the dome of the Suleymanie, or the kiosk of Baghdad, and the art to which we owe the “sky-scrapers,” the “flat-iron” buildings, the “Rhine bridges,” and the “Leipzig buildings,” or between the taste of the man who can appreciate “loukoums” or rose-jam, and the taste of the man who prefers “chewing-gum” or the acidulated drops flavoured with amyl acetate, or even the sweets flavoured with methyl salicylate provided by the American Government for its army. In the same manner, a similar confusion is often made between comfort—or what vulgar people call comfort—and true ease and real welfare; or again between a set of practical commodities inherent in the utilitarian conception of modern life, and what makes up culture. The quality of culture evidently does not depend on the percentage of water-closets or bath-rooms, or the quantity of calico used per thousand of inhabitants, in a country where the walls of the houses were once decorated with beautiful enamels, where the interior courts were adorned with marble fountains, and where women wore costly garments and silk veils.

Before throwing contempt on Islam, despising the Arabian and Turkish civilisations, and hoping that the Moslem outlook on life will make way for the modern Anglo-Saxon ideal, Mr. Lloyd George and all those who repeat after him that the Turks have no peculiar gift for governing peoples, ought to have pondered over Lady Esther Stanhope’s words, which apply so fittingly to recent events. Being tired of Europe, she had travelled in the East, and, enticed by the beauty and grandeur of the Orient, she led a retired life in a convent near Said, dressed as a Moslem man. One day she was asked by the “Vicomte de Marcellus” whether she would ever go back to Europe, and she answered in some such words as these—we quote from memory:

“Why should I go to Europe? To see nations that deserve to be in bondage, and kings that do not deserve to reign? Before long the very foundation of your old continent will be shaken. You have just seen Athens, and will soon see Tyre. That’s all that remains of those noble commonwealths so famed for art, of those empires that had the mastery of the world’s trade and the seas. So will it be with Europe. Everything in it is worn out. The races of kings are getting extinct; they are swept away by death or their own faults, and are getting more and more degenerate. Aristocracy will soon be wiped out, making room for a petty, effete, ephemeral middle class. Only the lower people, those who plough and delve, still have some self-respect and some virtues. You will have to dread everything if they ever become conscious of their strength. I am sick of your Europe. I won’t listen to its distant rumours that die away on this lonely beach. Let us not speak of Europe any more. I have done with it.”

Besides, all religions accord with the character of the people that practise them and the climate in which they live. Most likely Islam perfectly fitted the physical and moral nature of the Turkish race, since the latter immediately embraced Mohammed’s religion, whereas it had kept aloof from the great Christian movement which, 500 years before, had perturbed a large part of the pagan world, and it has remained faithful to it ever since.

If the Allies tried to minimise the part played by that religion, which perfectly suits the character and conditions of life of the people who practise it, and attempted to injure it, they would really benefit the domineering aims of Rome and the imperialistic spirit of Protestantism. In fact, the Vatican tries to avail itself of the recent Protestant effort, as has already been pointed out, and as various manifestations will show, to bring about a Christian hegemony which would not be beneficial either to the peoples of the East or to the civilisation of the world.

By doing so, the Allies would drive those peoples towards Germanism, though they have no natural propensity for it, for they are averse both to the Lutheran spirit and to the Catholic spirit; yet Germanism has succeeded in finding its way and even gaining sympathy among them, because it pretended to come in a friendly spirit.

It cannot be denied that before the war the Turks endeavoured to find support among other nations to counterbalance German influence. But as, above all things, they dreaded the Russian sway—not without reason, as the latter had already grasped several Turkish provinces in Asia Minor and represented its advance as the revenge of Orthodoxy over Islamism—they had turned towards Germany, who, though it secretly favoured Tsardom, yet pursued an anti-Russian policy.

Of course, they could not have any illusion about what a German Protectorate might be to Turkey, for at a sitting of the Reichstag a German deputy had openly declared: “In spite of our sympathy for Turkey, we must not forget that the time of her partition has come.” As early as 1898 the Pan-German League issued a manifesto under the title Deutschlands Ansprüche an das Türkische Erbe (The Rights of Germany to the Heritage of Turkey). “As soon as the present events shall bring about the dissolution of Turkey, no other Power will seriously attempt to raise a protest if the German Empire lays a claim to a share of it, for it has a right to a share as a great Power, and it wants it infinitely more than any other great Power, in order to maintain the national and economic life of hundreds of thousands of its emigrants.” In the same manner, at the time of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, von Aerenberg did not scruple to say: “The opening to economic life of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia will always be looked upon as a high deed of German enterprise.” And, alluding to the new field of activity which was thus opened to Austria-Hungary, he added: “The possession of Bosnia has made us a Balkan Power; it is our task and duty to discern when the time shall come, and to turn it to account.”

But if the Turks chose to side with Germany, it was because the Emperor “Guilloun” represented himself as the protector of Islam, and promised to leave the Ottoman Empire its religious sovereignty and the full enjoyment of Muslim civilisation. Now, as the Turks acknowledge only Allah’s will, it is foolish to ask a Christian sovereign or a Christian community to exercise authority over them in order to ensure peace; and yet the Western Powers, urged on by religious interests, have continued to interfere in Ottoman affairs from the Christian point of view and in order to further Christian interests.

Now we see why Germany, in order not to lose the benefit of her previous endeavours, readily welcomed the Central Committee for the Defence of Islam, whose seat was in Berlin, whence it carried on a vigorous propaganda throughout the Muslim world.

At the beginning of December, 1919, that committee held a meeting in Berlin; among the people present were: Talaat Pasha, representing the Turanian movement; Hussein Bey Reshidof, representing the “Eastern Central Committee” instituted by the Moscovite Foreign Commissariat for the liberation of Islam—which is at the head of all the organisations at work in Persia, the Transcaspian areas, Anatolia, Afghanistan, and India; Kutchuk Talaat, a representative of the Union and Progress Committee; Nuri Bedri Bey, representing the Anatolian Kurds; and delegates from Persia and Afghanistan. There they discussed what measures should be taken and what means of action should be resorted to in Muslim countries, especially in Algeria, Tunis, and Morocco.

It must be owned, on the other hand, that the Catholics in Turkey had refused—as they have always tried to do in all countries—to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Turkish Government, and had looked upon themselves as above the laws of the land, though they laid a claim at the same time to a share in the government of the country; in short, they wanted to be both Roman legates and Turkish governors.

All this does not suffice to justify the measures of oppression the Turks resorted to, but explains how they were driven to take such measures, and accounts for the state of mind now prevailing in Turkey, which has brought about the present troubles. For the foreign Powers, urged by the Eastern Christians, kept on meddling with Turkish home affairs, which caused much resentment and anger among the Turks, and roused religious fanaticism on both sides.

If the liberal Western Powers carried on that policy—that is to say, if they continued to support the Christians against the Moslems—they would make a dangerous mistake.

At the present time the Holy See, which has never given up its ever-cherished dream of universal dominion, plainly shows by its growing activity that it means to develop its religious influence and avail itself of the war to strengthen and enlarge it.

For some time the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, though always a staunch supporter of the Papacy, restrained that tendency and became a moderating influence in Rome; but now the Holy See aims at playing a more important part than ever in all the affairs of Southern Germany and the countries that have broken loose from the former dual monarchy.

In order to strengthen the Church and to realise Catholic unity, the Vatican at the present juncture is exerting all its power in Central Europe and the Slavonic countries; and is doing its best at the same time to get in touch with the Protestant world in order to reinforce its own action by coupling it with the Protestant propaganda.

Benedict XV has revived the scheme of the longed-for Union of the Churches in order to win over to Catholicism part or the whole of the former Orthodox Empire.

In New Germany the Holy See is endeavouring to bring about an understanding between Catholics and Protestants, with a view to a common Christian—rather than strictly Catholic—action. In Austria, after upholding all the elements of the old régime so long as a monarchist movement seemed likely to triumph, it now gives its support to Christian Democracy. In Hungary, where the Jesuits and the Cistercians first worked hand in hand together with an Allied mission in Budapest to maintain Friedrich, or at least a clerical government, in power, the Primate, Mgr. Csernoch, and the Lutheran bishop, Mgr. Sandar Raffaï, have now agreed to work for the same purpose. The Polish Schlachta, of course, supports these schemes and intrigues, which are being carried on at Fribourg, in Switzerland, where certain princes connected with the Imperial House and Prince Louis of Windisch-Graetz used to meet Waitz, Bishop of Innsbrück.

Uniatism, or the rite of the United Greek Church, which, though retaining the Slavonic liturgy, acknowledges the Pope as the supreme head of the Church, and is paramount in the Carpathian Mountains, Eastern Galicia, and the Ukraine, favours the extension of the Pope’s sovereignty over these territories, and naturally the Holy See takes advantage of this movement to support and reinforce the Church and bring Orthodox countries under the dominion of Rome.

Till these great schemes have been carried out, and in order to further them, the Holy See means to establish between the Orthodox and the Catholic world an intermediary zone which would be a favourable ground for its penetration and conquest. To this intent Father Genocchi has been sent as apostolic visitor to the Ukraine by Cardinal Marini, prefect of the congregation newly established for the propaganda in the East, with full powers over both Latin and Greek Catholics, or Uniates. Father Genocchi is to act in close union with Mgr. Ratti, and both stand out as powerful agents of the great scheme of the Roman Church.

While pursuing this direct conquest, Rome endeavours in all countries to gain the support of all believers in Christ, even the Protestants, in order to be able to exert an influence on the policy of the Governments, and thus serve Christian interests.

At a recent conference of the Czecho-Slovak Catholics, Mgr. Kordatch, Archbishop of Prague, declared the Catholics would go so far as to resort to public political action and hold out the hand to the Protestants, who believe, like them, in the Divinity of Christ and the Decalogue.

So any undertaking against Islam or any other Eastern religion cannot but reinforce the power of Rome, for it aims at destroying the power of the other creeds which, as well as Catholicism, gratify the aspirations of the various peoples, and thus legitimately counterbalance its dream of hegemony.

Finally, though any communist conception is abhorrent to the Moslem spirit, which is essentially individualist and so has an aristocratic trend, and though Bolshevism, as we have already pointed out, is a specific doctrine which suits only the Russian mind, the attitude of the Western nations threatened to drive Islam towards Bolshevism, or at least to create a suitable ground for its expansion. In spite of the enlightened leaders of Islam, the attitude of the Powers risked inducing the Moslem masses to lend a willing ear to Bolshevist promises and to adopt Bolshevism in order to defend the Moslem creed and customs. Besides, Bolshevism, which was undergoing an evolution, and was growing more wily, less brutal, but all the more dangerous, no longer required other nations to adopt its social ideal. In order to serve a political purpose, it now turned its efforts towards the Caspian Sea to communicate with Asia Minor and create disturbances in Central Asia, while, on the other side, it advanced as far as Mongolia.

After the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian agreement forced by Great Britain upon Persia, which, in spite of what was officially said to the contrary, deprived Persia of her independence, Bolshevism saw what an easy prey was offered to it by the English policy, and concentrated its efforts on Asia Minor, where it could most easily worry England. It carried on a very active propaganda in all Asiatic languages in Turkistan and even in Afghanistan—the result being that the latter country sent a mission of inquiry to Moscow.

According to the statement of a Persian reproduced in the Journal des Débats of April 4, 1920, the representatives of the Soviet Government made advances to the Persian patriotic organisations and told them:

“England despises your rights. Your Government is in her hand. To organise your resistance, you need a help. We offer it to you, and ask for nothing in return, not even for your adhesion to our social doctrine. The reason that urges us to offer you our support is a political one. Russia, whether she is Bolshevist or not, cannot live by the side of an England ruling over nearly the whole of the East. The real independence of your country is necessary to us.”

Such suggestions could not but attract the attention of the Persians at a time when, without even waiting for the opening of the Chamber that had been elected under the influence of British troops in order to sanction the Anglo-Persian agreement, some English administrators had already settled in Teheran.

The same Persian, in agreement with the main body of Persian opinion, went on:

“Shall we have to submit to that shameful régime? Nobody thinks so in our country. Even those who were not bold enough to protest openly against the deed of spoliation which the Anglo-Persian agreement is, are secretly opposed to that agreement. But in order to avail ourselves of that discontent, to concentrate our forces, and chiefly to act fast and well, we need help from abroad, at least at the outset. The Bolshevists offer it to us. I do not know why we should discard the proposition at once. What makes us hesitate is their communist doctrine; yet they declare they do not want at all to ‘bolshevikise’ Persia. As soon as their promise seems to be quite genuine, it will be our national duty to accept their help.

“Whether the Red Dictator’s action in Russia was good or bad is a question that concerns the Russians alone. The only question for us is how to find an ally. Now we have not to choose between many.

“We should have been only too pleased to come to an understanding with Great Britain, even at the cost of some concessions, provided our independence were respected. But the British leaders have preferred trampling upon our rights. Who is to be blamed for this?”

In the same manner as the Kemalist movement, a Nationalist movement was gaining ground in Persia, like the one which had already brought on the Teheran events from 1906 to 1909.

Now, while the Bolshevists, in order to expand and strengthen their position, did their utmost to convince the Eastern nations that Bolshevism alone could free them, the Germans, on the other hand, seized the new opportunity that was given them to offer the Mohammedans their help, and sent them German officers from Russia. In this way, and through our fault, Bolshevism and Germanism united to foment disturbances in the East, and join with it against us. That is why Mr. Winston Churchill said, at the beginning of January: “New forces are now rising in Asia Minor, and if Bolshevism and Turkish Nationalism should unite, the outlook would be a serious one for Great Britain.”

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