ON THE IMPORTANCE OF A PUBLIC DECLARATION OF THE REASONS OF DECISIONS IN COURTS OF JUSTICE.

While a cause is pending I admit that all publications, and all the little arts of popularity, tending to raise the prejudices or to inflame the passions, are highly improper, and ought not to be permitted. But, after the decision of a cause, the freedom of inquiry into the conduct and opinions of the judges is one of the noblest and best securities that human invention can contrive for the faithful administration of justice.

It is for this very purpose that it has been established in this country, that judges shall give their opinions and decisions publicly,—an admirable institution, which does honour to Britain, and gives it a superiority in this respect over most of the other countries in Europe.

Laws may recommend or enforce the due administration of justice; but these laws are of little avail, when compared with the superior efficacy of the restraint which arises from the judgment of the public, exercised upon the conduct and opinions of the judges.

It would be extremely fatal to the liberties of this nation, and to that inestimable blessing, the faithful distribution of justice if this restraint upon judges were removed or improperly checked.

The public has a right, and ought to be satisfied with regard to the conduct, ability, and integrity of their judges. It is from these sources alone that genuine respect and authority can be derived; and an endeavour to make these the appendages of office, independent of the personal character and conduct of the judge, is an attempt which, in this free and enlightened country, most probably never will succeed.

This freedom of inquiry is not only essential to the interests of the community, but every judge, conscious of intending and acting honourably, ought to promote and rejoice in the exercise of it. It is a poor spirit indeed that can rest satisfied with authority and external regard derived from office alone. The judge who is possessed of proper elevation of mind will, both for his own sake and that of his country, rejoice that his fellow-citizens have an opportunity of satisfying themselves with regard to his conduct, and of distinguishing judges who deserve well of the public, from those who are unworthy. He will adopt the sentiment of the old Roman, who, conscious of no thoughts or actions unfit for public view, expressed a wish for windows in his breast, that all mankind might perceive what was passing there.

If these considerations are of any force for establishing the justness of the principle, the only objection I can foresee against this freedom of inquiry is, that it may happen sometimes to be improperly exercised.

This is an objection equally applicable to some of the greatest blessings enjoyed by mankind, whether from nature or from civil institutions. It is no real objection to health or civil liberty, that both of them often have been, and are, extremely liable to be abused.

When the freedom of inquiry now contended for happens to be improperly used, it will be found that the mischief carries along with it its own remedy. The most valuable part of mankind are soon disgusted with unmerited or indecent attacks made either upon judges or individuals; the person capable of such unworthy conduct loses his aim; the unjust or illiberal invective returns upon himself, to his own disgrace; and the judge whose conduct has been misrepresented, instead of suffering in the public opinion, will acquire additional credit from the palpable injustice of the attack made upon him.

⁂ From ‘Letters to Lord Mansfield, by Andrew Stuart, Esq.’