Volume 1 — CHAPTER V. (continued 2)

The Dutch nation appears to have pursued, as a principle of policy, the propagation of Christianity among the Eastern Islands. The same object had been previously followed by the Portuguese with great success, and there are now several small islands in the Malayan Archipelago, inhabited almost exclusively by Christians of the Catholic persuasion. In many other islands the Protestant persuasion has made considerable progress, and teachers, in the flourishing times of the Batavian Regency, were dispersed over all the low chain of islands which extend from Báli and Lumbok (Sásak) to the great island Timor. The islands in which the Christian faith has been most extensively diffused are the great island Endé or Meng' arái, the great island of Tímor, and the several small islands in the vicinity, and Amboina. In many of these islands the natives having no written character of their own, have been instructed in the Roman character, and taught to read Malayan and other dialects in it There have also been various formularies printed for their use, and translations have been executed for them in some of their languages, which have little or no affinity to the Malayan. The propagation of Christianity among these islands is obviously liable to none of those objections which have been urged against its missionaries on continental possessions. A great proportion of the natives are still pagans, under the influence of a wild and almost unintelligible superstition, the principles of which are not recorded in books, but are handed down, like stories of ghosts, fairies, and witches, with all the uncertainty of tradition. In most instances, the people, though they stand in great awe of the priests or enchanters, or dealers with invisible spirits, are very little attached to the superstition in which they are educated. Many of them are said to be very desirous of procuring instruction, and in some places they look up with a degree of veneration to the Mahomedans, as a people who have received something which they still want.

These observations on the Malayan Islands in general, apply to no part of the Archipelago more than to the important and great island of Borneo.

Borneo is not only one of the most fertile countries in the world, but one of the most productive in gold and diamonds[71]. Its camphor is the finest known, and it is thought capable of producing every kind of spice. Its eastern coasts, which abound in sago, also furnish a greater quantity of birds'-nests, sea-slug, and other commodities in great demand in the Chinese market, than the other islands of the East; but the interior has never been explored by Europeans. It may be conjectured, that the ignorance of the state of the country is one of the principal causes that no European settlement on it has hitherto proved advantageous, but has generally been abandoned after a short trial. The only exception to this observation is the Dutch settlement of Bánjer-másin, which continued from 1747 to 1810, when it was formally abandoned by Marshal Daendals to the Sultan, by agreement, for the sum of fifty thousand Spanish dollars. The Sultan soon after sent an embassy, inviting the English to settle; and previous to the conquest of Java, the Earl of Minto received the ambassadors at Malacca, and accepted their invitation.

The only territory to which the Dutch had any claim on the island of Borneo, was the coast from Súkadána to Mempáwa; this territory they acquired by virtue of a cession from the Sultan of Bantam in 1778. They destroyed Súkadána, and established factories at Pontiána and Mempáwa, which however they abandoned as unproductive after a period of fourteen years.

In no other part of the island of Borneo has there been any European settlement. The English, in 1772, intended to have established a factory at Pásir, but they abandoned the design on some commotions taking place in that state. Its object was to make Pásir a depót for opium and India piece goods, and for the contraband trade in spices. In 1774, a short time after the first settling of Balambángan, Mr. Jesse was deputed as Resident to Borneo proper, and concluded a treaty with that state, by which he acquired for the settlement of Balambángan the exclusive trade in pepper, stipulating in return to protect Borneo from the piratical incursions of the Súlu and Mendanáwi men. Neither of the parties, however, fulfilled its agreement, though the Residency at Borneo was continued for some years after the first breaking up of the settlement of Balambángan in 1775.

On the north-east of Borneo proper lies a very considerable territory, the sovereignty of which has been long claimed by the Súlu government; a very considerable part of this, together with the islands off the coast, have been for upwards of forty years regularly ceded to the English by the Súlus, and has also at different periods been assumed by them, without any objection on the part of the government of Borneo proper. This ceded district, extending from the river Ki-manis on the north-west, which forms the boundary of Borneo proper, to the great bay on the north-east, is undoubtedly a rich and fertile country, though in a rude and uncultivated state, and it is admirably situated for commerce, notwithstanding the different failures of Balambángan may seem to indicate the contrary. Balambángan is one of the small islands off the northern extremity of the island of Borneo, and included in the Súlu grant to the English. It would be foreign to the present object to enter into any details concerning the history of the settlement of Balambángan, but it may be proper to mention, that all the gentlemen who were engaged in the last attempt were convinced that the bottom of the great Malúdu Bay would have been infinitely preferable as a settlement on every account. Balambángan is exactly analogous, in every respect, to Pinang; it does not admit of territorial extension, and must exist, if at all, by commerce solely. Malúdu, on the other hand, is a dependency on the island of Borneo, which admits of any degree of territorial extension, may always subsist any number of inhabitants by its own produce, and is said to communicate, by a land carriage of little more than forty miles, with the central lakes in the vicinity of the gold countries.

From every inquiry, however, and the result of some experience, and much reflection, it may be stated, that no settlement which is founded on a commercial, instead of a territorial basis, is likely to succeed in that quarter. We have already acquired territorial rights, and therefore the only question seems to be, whether these cannot be turned to advantage, as well by cultivation as by commerce. The Dáyaks, or original inhabitants of Borneo, are said to be not only industrious, but particularly disposed to agriculture, and so manageable, that a handful of Maláyus have, in numerous places, reduced many thousands of them to the condition of peaceful cultivators of the ground. Indeed nothing seems wanting but a government strong enough to afford efficient protection to person and property. In the case of the Dáyaks, it must be considered as an advantage, that they have not hitherto adopted the religion of Islam, and would consequently be more ready from the first to regard us as their friends. It ought to be calculated among the inducements to form a settlement on Borneo, that in that quarter our territorial arrangement would interfere with the claims or the rights of no European nation. To recommend, however, the immediate establishment of a settlement at this particular spot, and on a basis so new, would obviously be premature, as notwithstanding the length of time we occupied Balambángan, not only the interior of Borneo was almost unknown, but until lately, even a great part of its coasts. This supineness in the government of Balambángan is perhaps not unexampled. The want of local information has, indeed, often proved fatal to the infant settlements of the English. "Colonies and settlements of every kind," says the author of the Letter on the Nagrais Expedition, "must at first be attended with many difficulties, which however a judicious perseverance will surmount, if there be not some original fault in the establishment. It must be obvious to every one, that the English never made a settlement, in which they were not impeded by some unforeseen difficulties, so as at least frequently to make abandoning the infant establishment appear the most prudent step, without even hoping any return for the prodigious expense which may have been incurred by the undertaking."​—"Various reasons," adds that author, "may be ascribed for this event; but incapacity in the person entrusted with the management, and the want of previous examination of the place, seem to me the most common and the most considerable." Without stopping to inquire how far the want of success in our several attempts to settle Balambángan may have been fairly attributable to either of these causes, it may be confidently asserted, that the last establishment failed chiefly from its being solely of a military nature, without either professional merchants or mercantile adventurers being attached to it.

These observations respecting Balambángan apply to it chiefly as a territorial establishment; but there is no doubt that it would speedily attain commercial importance. Many of the commercial advantages which recommended its selection still exist, to an equal or greater extent; especially those which related to Cochin China, Champa, and Cambodia. But this digression has already exceeded its reasonable limits, and it is necessary to revert to the more immediate point under consideration, the commerce of Java. Any account of this commerce would be imperfect, which after stating the extent to which it is carried, and the mode in which it is conducted with the adjacent islands in the same Archipelago, should omit to mention the advantages of an intercourse with Japan, and some notices on the Japan trade.

The history of the Dutch connexion with that country is well known, and can never be forgotten. Perhaps there is not such an instance in the annals of commerce, of the disgraceful arts to which mercantile cupidity will resort, and the degradation to which it will submit for the attainment of its object, as in the Dutch proceedings at Japan; nor is there, perhaps, a more remarkable example of the triumphant success, and complete disappointment of commercial enterprize. As it may be interesting to many readers to see an authentic history of the origin, fluctuations, and decline of the Dutch Japan trade, and as even a very succinct statement of it would swell this chapter to a disproportioned size, I have placed a short history of it in the Appendix to this work, to which I beg leave to refer those who have any curiosity for such details[72]. From the year 1611, when the Dutch established commercial relations with Japan, till 1671 (a period of sixty years), their speculations were unrestricted and their profits were enormous. This was the golden age of their trade: they opened a mine of wealth, and they fondly thought it inexhaustible, as well as rich and easily wrought. In 1640, the Company obtained a return in gold, that yielded a profit of upwards of a million of guilders. They had been accustomed to procure, for some time previous to 1663, a return of silver to the extent of two hundred chests of one hundred pounds each, and it was suggested that it would be desirable for as many chests of gold of the same weight to be sent in future. The golden and silver ages of Japan commerce being past, the latter half of the seventeenth century began with what the Dutch called its brazen age, that is its export of copper, which has ever since continued the staple of the Japan market. The trade was on the decline during the whole of the last century, and had become of so little importance about 1740, that the Company deliberated upon the expediency of its total abandonment. From employing, as at one time, eight or nine ships, and exporting copper alone to the amount of more than thirty thousand píkuls, of one hundred and twenty-five pounds each, it diminished to the use of two vessels, and the purchase of cargoes of five or six thousand píkuls. The Appendix contains an account of the nature of the trade, and the result of the Dutch adventures of 1804-5 and 1806, and of our own in 1813.

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