← Table of contents
The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century

Chapter I

Reading edition

INTRODUCTORY

I.—THE SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM

At the time of the discovery of America the Spaniards, as M. Leroy-Beaulieu has remarked, were perhaps less fitted than any other nation of western Europe for the task of American colonization. Whatever may have been the political rôle thrust upon them in the sixteenth century by the Hapsburg marriages, whatever certain historians may say of the grandeur and nobility of the Spanish national character, Spain was then neither rich nor populous, nor industrious. For centuries she had been called upon to wage a continuous warfare with the Moors, and during this time had not only found little leisure to cultivate the arts of peace, but had acquired a disdain for manual work which helped to mould her colonial administration and influenced all her subsequent history. And when the termination of the last of these wars left her mistress of a united Spain, and the exploitation of her own resources seemed to require all the energies she could muster, an entire new hemisphere was suddenly thrown open to her, and given into her hands by a papal decree to possess and populate. Already weakened by the exile of the most sober and industrious of her population, the Jews; drawn into a foreign policy for which she had neither the means nor the inclination; instituting at home an economic policy which was almost epileptic in its consequences, she found her strength dissipated, and gradually sank into a condition of economic and political impotence.

Christopher Columbus, a Genoese sailor in the service of the Castilian Crown, wishing to find a western route by sea to India and especially to Zipangu (Japan), the magic land described by the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, landed on 12th October 1492, on "Guanahani," one of the Bahama Islands. From "Guanahani" he passed on to other islands of the same group, and thence to Hispaniola, Tortuga and Cuba. Returning to Spain in March 1493, he sailed again in September of the same year with seventeen vessels and 1500 persons, and this time keeping farther to the south, sighted Porto Rico and some of the Lesser Antilles, founded a colony on Hispaniola, and discovered Jamaica in 1494. On a third voyage in 1498 he discovered Trinidad, and coasted along the shores of South America from the Orinoco River to the island of Margarita. After a fourth and last voyage in 1502-04, Columbus died at Valladolid in 1506, in the firm belief that he had discovered a part of the Continent of Asia.

The entire circle of the Antilles having thus been revealed before the end of the fifteenth century, the Spaniards pushed forward to the continent. While Hojida, Vespucci, Pinzon and de Solis were exploring the eastern coast from La Plata to Yucatan, Ponce de Leon in 1512 discovered Florida, and in 1513 Vasco Nunez de Balboa descried the Pacific Ocean from the heights of Darien, revealing for the first time the existence of a new continent. In 1520 Magellan entered the Pacific through the strait which bears his name, and a year later was killed in one of the Philippine Islands. Within the next twenty years Cortez had conquered the realm of Montezuma, and Pizarro the empire of Peru; and thus within the space of two generations all of the West Indies, North America to California and the Carolinas, all of South America except Brazil, which the error of Cabral gave to the Portuguese, and in the east the Philippine Islands and New Guinea passed under the sway of the Crown of Castile.

The actual results, however, of the social policy of the Spanish kings fell far below the ideals they had set for themselves. The monarchic spirit of the crown was so strong that it crushed every healthy, expansive tendency in the new countries. It burdened the colonies with a numerous, privileged nobility, who congregated mostly in the larger towns and set to the rest of the colonists a pernicious example of idleness and luxury. In its zeal for the propagation of the Faith, the Crown constituted a powerfully endowed Church, which, while it did splendid service in converting and civilizing the natives, engrossed much of the land in the form of mainmort, and filled the new world with thousands of idle, unproductive, and often licentious friars. With an innate distrust and fear of individual initiative, it gave virtual omnipotence to royal officials and excluded all creoles from public employment. In this fashion was transferred to America the crushing political and ecclesiastical absolutism of the mother country. Self-reliance and independence of thought or action on the part of the creoles was discouraged, divisions and factions among them were encouraged and educational opportunities restricted, and the American-born Spaniards gradually sank into idleness and lethargy, indifferent to all but childish honours and distinctions and petty local jealousies. To make matters worse, many of the Spaniards who crossed the seas to the American colonies came not to colonize, not to trade or cultivate the soil, so much as to extract from the natives a tribute of gold and silver. The Indians, instead of being protected and civilized, were only too often reduced to serfdom and confined to a laborious routine for which they had neither the aptitude nor the strength; while the government at home was too distant to interfere effectively in their behalf. Driven by cruel taskmasters they died by thousands from exhaustion and despair, and in some places entirely disappeared.

The Crown of Castile, moreover, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sought to extend Spanish commerce and monopolize all the treasure of the Indies by means of a rigid and complicated commercial system. Yet in the end it saw the trade of the New World pass into the hands of its rivals, its own marine reduced to a shadow of its former strength, its crews and its vessels supplied by merchants from foreign lands, and its riches diverted at their very source.

There was also, especially on the shores of the Caribbean Sea, a less elaborate commerce called "sloop-trade," for it was usually managed by sloops which hovered near some secluded spot on the coast, often at the mouth of a river, and informed the inhabitants of their presence in the neighbourhood by firing a shot from a cannon. Sometimes a large ship filled with merchandise was stationed in a bay close at hand, and by means of these smaller craft made its trade with the colonists. The latter, generally in disguise, came off in canoes by night. The interlopers, however, were always on guard against such dangerous visitors, and never admitted more than a few at a time; for when the Spaniards found themselves stronger than the crew, and a favourable opportunity presented itself, they rarely failed to attempt the vessel.

Thus the Spaniards of the seventeenth century, by persisting, both at home and in their colonies, in an economic policy which was fatally inconsistent with their powers and resources, saw their commerce gradually extinguished by the ships of the foreign interloper, and their tropical possessions fall a prey to marauding bands of half-piratical buccaneers. Although struggling under tremendous initial disabilities in Europe, they had attempted, upon the slender pleas of prior discovery and papal investiture, to reserve half the world to themselves. Without a marine, without maritime traditions, they sought to hold a colonial empire greater than any the world had yet seen, and comparable only with the empire of Great Britain three centuries later. By discouraging industry in Spain, and yet enforcing in the colonies an absolute commercial dependence on the home-country, by combining in their rule of distant America a solicitous paternalism with a restriction of initiative altogether disastrous in its consequences, the Spaniards succeeded in reducing their colonies to political impotence. And when, to make their grip the more firm, they evolved, as a method of outwitting the foreigner of his spoils, the system of great fleets and single ports of call, they found the very means they had contrived for their own safety to be the instrument of commercial disaster.

II.—THE FREEBOOTERS OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

It was the French chronologist, Scaliger, who in the sixteenth century asserted, "nulli melius piraticam exercent quam Angli"; and although he had no need to cross the Channel to find men proficient in this primitive calling, the remark applies to the England of his time with a force which we to-day scarcely realise. Certainly the inveterate hostility with which the Englishman learned to regard the Spaniard in the latter half of the sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth centuries found its most remarkable expression in the exploits of the Elizabethan "sea-dogs" and of the buccaneers of a later period. The religious differences and political jealousies which grew out of the turmoil of the Reformation, and the moral anarchy incident to the dissolution of ancient religious institutions, were the motive causes for an outburst of piratical activity comparable only with the professional piracy of the Barbary States.

The most venturesome of these sea-rovers, however, were soon attracted to a larger and more distant sphere of activity. Spain, as we have seen, was then endeavouring to reserve to herself in the western hemisphere an entire new world; and this at a time when the great northern maritime powers, France, England and Holland, were in the full tide of economic development, restless with new thoughts, hopes and ambitions, and keenly jealous of new commercial and industrial outlets. The famous Bull of Alexander VI. had provoked Francis I. to express a desire "to see the clause in Adam's will which entitled his brothers of Castile and Portugal to divide the New World between them," and very early the French corsairs had been encouraged to test the pretensions of the Spaniards by the time-honoured proofs of fire and steel. The English nation, however, in the first half of the sixteenth century, had not disputed with Spain her exclusive trade and dominion in those regions. The hardy mariners of the north were still indifferent to the wonders of a new continent awaiting their exploitation, and it was left to the Spaniards to unfold before the eyes of Europe the vast riches of America, and to found empires on the plateaus of Mexico and beyond the Andes. During the reign of Philip II. all this was changed. English privateers began to extend their operations westward, and to sap the very sources of Spanish wealth and power, while the wars which absorbed the attention of the Spaniards in Europe, from the revolt of the Low Countries to the Treaty of Westphalia, left the field clear for these ubiquitous sea-rovers. The maritime powers, although obliged by the theory of colonial exclusion to pretend to acquiesce in the Spaniard's claim to tropical America, secretly protected and supported their mariners who coursed those western seas. France and England were now jealous and fearful of Spanish predominance in Europe, and kept eyes obstinately fixed on the inexhaustible streams of gold and silver by means of which Spain was enabled to pay her armies and man her fleets. Queen Elizabeth, while she publicly excused or disavowed to Philip II. the outrages committed by Hawkins and Drake, blaming the turbulence of the times and promising to do her utmost to suppress the disorders, was secretly one of the principal shareholders in their enterprises.

There were other motives which lay behind these piratical aggressions of the French and English in Spanish America. The Spaniards, ever since the days of the Dominican monk and bishop, Las Casas, had been reprobated as the heartless oppressors and murderers of the native Indians. The original owners of the soil had been dispossessed and reduced to slavery. In the West Indies, the great islands, Cuba and Hispaniola, were rendered desolate for want of inhabitants. Two great empires, Mexico and Peru, had been subdued by treachery, their kings murdered, and their people made to suffer a living death in the mines of Potosi and New Spain. Such was the Protestant Englishman's conception, in the sixteenth century, of the results of Spanish colonial policy. To avenge the blood of these innocent victims, and teach the true religion to the survivors, was to glorify the Church militant and strike a blow at Antichrist. Spain, moreover, in the eyes of the Puritans, was the lieutenant of Rome, the Scarlet Woman of the Apocalypse, who harried and burnt their Protestant brethren whenever she could lay hands upon them. That she was eager to repeat her ill-starred attempt of 1588 and introduce into the British Isles the accursed Inquisition was patent to everyone. Protestant England, therefore, filled with the enthusiasm and intolerance of a new faith, made no bones of despoiling the Spaniards, especially as the service of God was likely to be repaid with plunder.

Hawkins and Drake, however, were by no means the only English privateers of that century in American waters. Names like Oxenham, Grenville, Raleigh and Clifford, and others of lesser fame, such as Winter, Knollys and Barker, helped to swell the roll of these Elizabethan sea-rovers. To many a gallant sailor the Caribbean Sea was a happy hunting-ground where he might indulge at his pleasure any propensities to lawless adventure. If in 1588 he had helped to scatter the Invincible Armada, he now pillaged treasure ships on the coasts of the Spanish Main; if he had been with Drake to flout his Catholic Majesty at Cadiz, he now closed with the Spaniards within their distant cities beyond the seas. Thus he lined his own pockets with Spanish doubloons, and incidentally curbed Philip's power of invading England. Nor must we think these mariners the same as the lawless buccaneers of a later period. The men of this generation were of a sterner and more fanatical mould, men who for their wildest acts often claimed the sanction of religious convictions. Whether they carried off the heathen from Africa, or plundered the fleets of Romish Spain, they were but entering upon "the heritage of the saints." Judged by the standards of our own century they were pirates and freebooters, but in the eyes of their fellow-countrymen their attacks upon the Spaniards seemed fair and honourable.

With the seventeenth century began a new era in the history of the West Indies. If in the sixteenth the English, French and Dutch came to tropical America as piratical intruders into seas and countries which belonged to others, in the following century they came as permanent colonisers and settlers. The Spaniards, who had explored the whole ring of the West Indian islands before 1500, from the beginning neglected the lesser for the larger Antilles—Cuba, Hispaniola, Porto Rico and Jamaica—and for those islands like Trinidad, which lie close to the mainland. And when in 1519 Cortez sailed from Cuba for the conquest of Mexico, and twelve years later Pizarro entered Peru, the emigrants who left Spain to seek their fortunes in the New World flocked to the vast territories which the Conquistadores and their lieutenants had subdued on the Continent. It was consequently to the smaller islands which compose the Leeward and Windward groups that the English, French and Dutch first resorted as colonists. Small, and therefore "easy to settle, easy to depopulate and to re-people, attractive not only on account of their own wealth, but also as a starting-point for the vast and rich continent off which they lie," these islands became the pawns in a game of diplomacy and colonization which continued for 150 years.

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · Footnote 1: (return) Herrera: Decades II. 1, p. 4, cited in Scelle: la Traite Négrière, I. p. 6. Note 2.Note 2 · Footnote 2: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. pp. 6-9.Note 3 · Footnote 3: (return) "Por cuanto los pacificaciones no se han de hacer con ruido de armas, sino con caridad y buen modo."—Recop. de leyes ..Note 4 · Footnote 4: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 35.Note 5 · Footnote 5: (return) Weiss: L'Espagne depuis Philippe II. jusqu'aux Bourbons., II. pp. 204 and 215. Not till 1722 was legislative sanction gNote 6 · Footnote 6: (return) Weiss, op. cit., II. p. 205.Note 7 · Footnote 7: (return) Ibid., II. p. 206.Note 8 · Footnote 8: (return) Oppenheim: The Naval Tracts of Sir Wm. Monson. Vol. II. Appendix B., p. 316.Note 9 · Footnote 9: (return) In 1509, owing to the difficulties experienced by merchants in ascending the Guadalquivir, ships were given permission Note 10 · Footnote 10: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 36 ff.Note 11 · Footnote 11: (return) In Nov. 1530 Charles V., against the opposition of the Contratacion, ordered the Council of the Indies to appoint a reNote 12 · Footnote 12: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 52 and note; Duro: Armada Espanola, I. p. 204.Note 13 · Footnote 13: (return) The distinction between the Flota or fleet for New Spain and the galleons intended for Terra Firma only began with theNote 14 · Footnote 14: (return) Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry, op. cit., p. 192 ff.).Note 15 · Footnote 15: (return) Memoir of MM. Duhalde and de Rochefort to the French king, 1680 (Margry, op. cit., p. 192 ff.)Note 16 · Footnote 16: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 64; Dampier: Voyages, ed. 1906, i. p. 200.Note 17 · Footnote 17: (return) Gage: A New Survey of the West Indies, ed. 1655, pp. 185-6. When Gage was at Granada, in February 1637, strict orders Note 18 · Footnote 18: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. pp. 64-5; Duhalde and de Rochefort. There were two ways of sending goods from Panama to Porto BelNote 19 · Footnote 19: (return) Nombre de Dios, a few leagues to the east of Porto Bello, had formerly been the port where the galleons received the tNote 20 · Footnote 20: (return) Gage, ed. 1655, pp. 196-8.Note 21 · Footnote 21: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 65.Note 22 · Footnote 22: (return) Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.Note 23 · Footnote 23: (return) When the Margarita patache failed to meet the galleons at Cartagena, it was given its clearance and allowed to sail alNote 24 · Footnote 24: (return) Duhalde and de Rochefort.Note 25 · Footnote 25: (return) Rawl. MSS., A. 175, 313 b; Oppenheim, ii. p. 338.Note 26 · Footnote 26: (return) Here I am following the MSS. quoted by Oppenheim (ii. pp. 335 ff.). Instead of watering in Hispaniola, the fleet sometNote 27 · Footnote 27: (return) Duhalde and de Rochefort.Note 28 · Footnote 28: (return) Quintal=about 100 pounds.Note 29 · Footnote 29: (return) These "vaisseaux de registre" were supposed not to exceed 300 tons, but through fraud were often double that burden.Note 30 · Footnote 30: (return) Duhalde and de Rochefort; Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 54.Note 31 · Footnote 31: (return) Gage, ed. 1655, pp. 199-200.Note 32 · Footnote 32: (return) Duhalde and de Rochefort; Oppenheim, ii. p. 318.Note 33 · Footnote 33: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. p. 45; Recop., t. i. lib. iii. tit. viii.Note 34 · Footnote 34: (return) There seems to have been a contraband trade carried on at Cadiz itself. Foreign merchants embarked their goods upon thNote 35 · Footnote 35: (return) Weiss, op. cit., ii. p. 226.Note 36 · Footnote 36: (return) Most of the offices in the Spanish Indies were venal. No one obtained a post without paying dearly for it, except the Note 37 · Footnote 37: (return) Froude: History of England, viii. p. 436 ff.Note 38 · Footnote 38: (return) 1585, August 12th. Ralph Lane to Sir Philip Sidney. Port Ferdinando, Virginia.—He has discovered the infinite riches oNote 39 · Footnote 39: (return) Scelle, op. cit., ii. p. xiii.Note 40 · Footnote 40: (return) Scelle, op. cit., i. p. ix.Note 41 · Footnote 41: (return) 1611, February 28. Sir Thos. Roe to Salisbury. Port d'Espaigne, Trinidad.—He has seen more of the coast from the RiverNote 42 · Footnote 42: (return) "An historical account of the rise and growth of the West India Colonies." By Dalby Thomas, Lond., 1690. (Harl. MiscelNote 43 · Footnote 43: (return) Oviedo: Historia general de las Indias, lib. xix. cap. xiii.; Coleccion de documentos ... de ultramar, tom. iv. p. 57 Note 44 · Footnote 44: (return) Hakluyt, ed. 1600, iii. p. 700; Froude, op. cit., viii. p. 427.Note 45 · Footnote 45: (return) Scelle., op. cit., i. pp. 123-25, 139-61.Note 46 · Footnote 46: (return) Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar. tom. vi. p. 15.Note 47 · Footnote 47: (return) Froude, op. cit., viii. pp. 470-72.Note 48 · Footnote 48: (return) Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, i. ch. 3.Note 49 · Footnote 49: (return) Corbett: Drake and the Tudor Navy, ii. chs. 1, 2, 11.Note 50 · Footnote 50: (return) Corbett: The Successors of Drake, ch. x.Note 51 · Footnote 51: (return) Marcel: Les corsaires français au XVIe siècle, p. 7. As early as 1501 a royal ordinance in Spain prescribed the constrNote 52 · Footnote 52: (return) Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tomos i., iv., vi.; Ducéré: Les corsaires sous l'ancien régime. Append. II.; Duro., oNote 53 · Footnote 53: (return) Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 22.Note 54 · Footnote 54: (return) Ibid., p. 23.Note 55 · Footnote 55: (return) Marcel, op. cit., p. 16.Note 56 · Footnote 56: (return) Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 360.Note 57 · Footnote 57: (return) Colecc. de doc. ... de ultramar, tom. vi. p. 360.Note 58 · Footnote 58: (return) Lucas: A Historical Geography of the British Colonies, vol. ii. pp. 37, 50.Note 59 · Footnote 59: (return) Weiss, op. cit., ii. p. 292.Note 60 · Footnote 60: (return) Duro, op. cit., iii. ch. xvi.; iv. chs. iii., viii.Note 61 · Footnote 61: (return) Portugal between 1581 and 1640 was subject to the Crown of Spain, and Brazil, a Portuguese colony, was consequently wiNote 62 · Footnote 62: (return) Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, iv. p. 36.Note 63 · Footnote 63: (return) Blok: History of the People of the Netherlands, iv. p. 37; Duro, op. cit., iv. p. 99; Gage, ed. 1655, p. 80.Note 64 · Footnote 64: (return) Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,325, No. 10.Note 65 · Footnote 65: (return) Robert Rich, Earl of Warwick, was created admiral of the fleet by order of Parliament in March 1642, and although remoNote 66 · Footnote 66: (return) Brit. Mus., Sloane MSS., 793 or 894; Add. MSS., 36,327, No. 9.Note 67 · Footnote 67: (return) Winwood Papers, ii. pp. 75-77.Note 68 · Footnote 68: (return) Brown: Genesis of the United States, i. pp. 120-25, 172.Note 69 · Footnote 69: (return) C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.Note 70 · Footnote 70: (return) C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660.Note 71 · Footnote 71: (return) Clarendon State Papers, ii. p. 87; Rymer: Fœdera, xx. p. 416.Note 72 · Footnote 72: (return) Duro, op. cit., ii. p. 462.Note 73 · Footnote 73: (return) Duro, op. cit., iii. pp. 236-37.Note 74 · Footnote 74: (return) C.S.P. Venet., 1603-07, p. 199.Note 75 · Footnote 75: (return) Winwood Papers, ii. p. 233.Note 76 · Footnote 76: (return) Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,319, No. 7; 36,320, No. 8; 36,321, No. 24; 36,322, No. 23.Note 77 · Footnote 77: (return) C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—1629, 5th and 30th Nov.; 1630, 29th July.Note 78 · Footnote 78: (return) Gage saw at Cartagena about a dozen English prisoners captured by the Spaniards at sea, and belonging to the settlemenNote 79 · Footnote 79: (return) C.S.P. Colon., 1574-1660:—1635, 19th March; 1636, 26th March.Note 80 · Footnote 80: (return) Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 36,323, No. 10.Note 81 · Footnote 81: (return) Duro, Tomo., iv. p. 339; cf. also in Bodleian Library:—"A letter written upon occasion in the Low Countries, etc. WherNote 82 · Footnote 82: (return) Rawl. MSS., A. 32,297; 31, 121.Note 83 · Ferdinand and Isabella in 1493 had consulted with several persons of eminent learning to find out whether it was necessary to obtain the invNote 84 · The colonization of the Spanish Indies, on its social and administrative side, presents a curious contrast. On the one hand we see the SpaniNote 85 · This Spanish commercial system was based upon two distinct principles. One was the principle of colonial exclusivism, according to which allNote 86 · While the Spanish Crown was aiming to concentrate and monopolize its colonial commerce, the prosperity of Spain itself was slowly sapped by Note 87 · In the colonies the most striking feature of Spanish economic policy was its wastefulness. After the conquest of the New World, it was to thNote 88 · In Spain, likewise, the colonial commerce was restricted to one port—Seville. For in the estimation of the crown it was much more important Note 89 · The administration of the complex rules governing the commerce between Spain and her colonies was entrusted to two institutions located at SNote 90 · The first means adopted by the northern maritime nations to appropriate to themselves a share of the riches of the New World was open, semi-Note 91 · The galleons generally consisted of from five to eight war-vessels carrying from forty to fifty guns, together with several smaller, faster Note 92 · The course of the galleons from San Lucar was south-west to Teneriffe on the African coast, and thence to the Grand Canary to call for proviNote 93 · The fleet reached Cartagena ordinarily about two months after its departure from Cadiz. On its arrival, the general forwarded the news to PoNote 94 · Meanwhile the viceroy at Lima, on receipt of his letters, ordered the Armada of the South Sea to prepare to sail, and sent word south to ChiNote 95 · Then began the famous fair of Porto Bello.19 The town, whose permanent population was very small and composed mostly of negroes and mulattosNote 96 · In view of the prevailing east wind in these regions, and the maze of reefs, cays and shoals extending far out to sea from the Mosquito CoasNote 97 · The Flota or Mexican fleet, consisting in the seventeenth century of two galleons of 800 or 900 tons and from fifteen to twenty merchantmen,Note 98 · If the Flota sailed from Spain in July it generally arrived at Vera Cruz in the first fifteen days of September, and the ships were at once Note 99 · We are accustomed to think of Spanish commerce with the Indies as being made solely by great fleets which sailed yearly from Seville or CadiNote 100 · It was this commerce, which we have noticed at such length, that the buccaneers of the West Indies in the seventeenth century came to regardNote 101 · The Spanish ships of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were notoriously clumsy and unseaworthy. With short keel and towering poop and Note 102 · By Spanish law strangers were forbidden to resort to, or reside in, the Indies without express permission of the king. By law, moreover, theNote 103 · From the beginning of the seventeenth century as many as 200 ships sailed each year from Portugal with rich cargoes of silks, cloths and wooNote 104 · Other nations in the seventeenth century were not slow to follow the same course; and two circumstances contributed to make that course easyNote 105 · Even as far back as the thirteenth century, indeed, lawless sea-rovers, mostly Bretons and Flemings, had infested the English Channel and thNote 106 · The policy of the marauders was simple. The treasure which oiled the machinery of Spanish policy came from the Indies where it was accumulatNote 107 · A pamphlet written by Dalby Thomas in 1690 expresses with tolerable accuracy the attitude of the average Englishman toward Spain during the Note 108 · On the 19th of November 1527, some Spaniards in a caravel loading cassava at the Isle of Mona, between Hispaniola and Porto Rico, sighted a Note 109 · This is the earliest record we possess of the appearance of an English ship in the waters of Spanish America. Others, however, soon followedNote 110 · The first voyage of John Hawkins was made in 1562-63. In conjunction with Thomas Hampton he fitted out three vessels and sailed for Sierra LNote 111 · The second of the great Elizabethan sea-captains to beard the Spanish lion was Hawkins' friend and pupil, Francis Drake. In 1567 he accompanNote 112 · In the autumn of 1585 Drake was again in command of a formidable armament intended against the West Indies. Supported by 2000 troops under GNote 113 · The last of the great privateering voyages for which Drake had set the example was the armament which Lord George Clifford, Earl of CumberlaNote 114 · The English in the sixteenth century, however, had no monopoly of this piratical game. The French did something in their own way, and the DuNote 115 · A letter dated 8th April 1537, written by Gonzalo de Guzman to the Empress, furnishes us with some interesting details of the exploits of anNote 116 · The corsairs, however, were not always so uniformly successful. A band of eighty, who attempted to plunder the town of St. Jago de Cuba, werNote 117 · In the seventeenth century, moreover, the Spanish monarchy was declining rapidly both in power and prestige, and its empire, though still foNote 118 · While these centres of trade and population were being formed in the very heart of the Spanish seas, the privateers were not altogether idleNote 119 · In 1639 we find the Spanish Council of War for the Indies conferring with the King on measures to be taken against English piratical ships iNote 120 · The first two Stuart Kings, like the great Queen who preceded them, and in spite of the presence of a powerful Spanish faction at the EnglisNote 121 · During this century and a half between 1500 and 1650, the Spaniards were by no means passive or indifferent to the attacks made upon their aNote 122 · By attacks upon some of the English settlements, too, the Spaniards gave their threats a more effective form. Frequent raids were made upon
Explore with AITake your curiosity a little further.

Reading settings