TENTH CONGRESS.—FIRST SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. (continued 2)

Mr. Cook said he lived in a port in which there was sufficient depth of water for any British man of war, and he thought he should feel as indignant at any proposition for destroying the harbor as the gentleman from New York. He hoped the feelings of other gentlemen in the House would be in unison with his. If they were arrived at such a point of degradation, that, in case of attack, they must retreat to or beyond the mountains, and if instead of defending they must abandon the coast to its fate, they had better adopt this measure, and block up their ports altogether. After such a proposition as this, he should not be surprised at any one which could be made; it appeared to him that the spirit of our forefathers was departing the country. He was alarmed when he heard such a proposition as this, and he hoped there would be sufficient magnanimity in the House to give the amendment a decided negative.

Wednesday, December 9.

Another member, to wit, Edward St. Loe Livermore, from Massachusetts, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Fortifications and Gunboats.

The House proceeded to consider the amendments reported yesterday by the Committee of the Whole to the bill, sent from the Senate, entitled “An act to appropriate money for the construction of an additional number of gunboats.”

Mr. Durell said, as there appeared to be a considerable diversity of opinion on this gunboat business, and as a number of gentlemen from, the North did not readily fall into the scheme of the Southern gentlemen, and as he was from the North, he would state some reasons why this bill should not pass. He thought, as every gentleman appeared to think, that this was a crisis which called for union and great exertion; the great object was, to arm the nation to meet an event which they would be called to meet ere long. The question was now on one species of this arming, on which there were different opinions.

It appeared that, in addition to fortifications, the precise number of one hundred and eighty-eight gunboats was called for. A question had been asked, why that number was exactly calculated as being necessary; the chairman of the committee, who reported the bill, states that this number was thought necessary by the Executive Department. It was not to the system of gunboats that he had an objection, for he believed that, to a certain extent, they might be useful; but he did not believe that gunboats in connection with fortifications, would attain the end for which they were acknowledged to be proposed. In casting his eye over the documents before him, he perceived that gunboats were assigned to certain situations in the North, where he was confident they could never be of use. He was positive of this fact. Four gunboats were assigned to the port of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. He would appeal to gentlemen in the House, acquainted with the situation of that port, whether they seriously believed that four gunboats, or that twenty, would be of any service there? It was impossible that they should; the situation of the port, the strength and rapidity of the tide, were such that they could not be used. The same observation would apply to a number of ports east of that; it was generally conceded that gunboats were not calculated for deep and turbulent waters; the Northern shores were not sand banks, and gentlemen seemed to think these were necessary to allow gunboats to defend even themselves.

He saw that for the ports of Norfolk and New York, there were assigned a large number of gunboats. He was inclined to believe that a number of frigates, to the amount of the expense of these gunboats, would be more consonant with the wishes of the people in the mouth of the Hudson, than so many gunboats.

One hundred and twenty-eight gunboats to Norfolk and New York! The expense of sixty-four, one half of this number, would be fully equal to the expense of four forty-four gun frigates; and he was of opinion that these, at one-half the expense, would be considered by the gentlemen from Norfolk and New York, and by the House, as better calculated than gunboats to defend those ports. Mr. D. could see no reason why they should not have their choice in this respect. He, therefore, concluded with moving to strike out “one hundred and eighty-eight gunboats,” and insert “one hundred and twenty-four gunboats, and four forty-four gun frigates.”

Mr. Blount called for a division of the question, wishing the first question taken on striking out.

Mr. Gardner felt very conscious of the importance of fortifying the various ports and harbors of the United States, and should give the bill his support on its passage; but he had been in hopes yesterday that the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, would have prevailed. He wished to see the system of gunboats put into operation, and to see the efficiency of that mode of defence properly tested. There appeared to be many different opinions on the subject; and he perceived the House would not be satisfied till the experiment was tried, and their utility known. He was willing that as many gunboats should be employed as was sufficient for defence in those waters where they might be useful; but he did not think they would be efficient in the Northern and Eastern ports of the United States. He should be obliged to gentlemen if they would strike out a part of this number of gunboats, and appropriate the sum applicable to them to another mode of defence. There appeared to be a large majority in favor of the bill, but if they would be so condescending as to fortify the Northern ports in a way most agreeable to the people interested in their defence, he should feel gratified at it. He was in favor of the amendment, though he would rather a large number should be stricken out; and hoped the question on striking out would be carried, whether ships of war were inserted or not. It had been yesterday said, by a gentleman from Virginia, that if a less number were built than that proposed, they would be useless. This argument could have no weight with those who did not think they would afford defence at all; but, for his own part, he should vote for any thing in the shape of defence, till it should be found insufficient by experiment.

Mr. Bacon observed, that some gentleman had undertaken in themselves, to represent the whole Northern part of the Union, and had expressed their wishes that the House would condescend to listen to the united prayers of the representatives from those States. He only rose to say, that he, for one, protested against being considered as joining in that request. He was of opinion that the mode embraced by the bill would better accord with the sentiments of the people of the Northern States, than that which those gentlemen had proposed. He had no intention of making any calculation on the subject, because he did not consider himself qualified to do it; but would barely observe that, were the question fairly tried in the Northern interest, those gentlemen would be found in the negative.

Mr. Crowninshield said he considered the present proposition as much the same with that which was yesterday offered in Committee of the Whole, and to which the committee was decidedly opposed. He trusted the decision of the House to-day would be the same as that of the committee yesterday. He thought his friend from New Hampshire was extremely mistaken in his calculations of the comparative expense of gunboats, and frigates of forty-four guns. It would be seen by the report of the Secretary of the Navy, that the estimates for gunboats would amount to about $5,000; and he thought it would not go beyond it. Taking this for granted, the gentleman’s calculations of expense must fall to the ground. Mr. C. then stated the expense of frigates which had been built, from which it appeared that the expense of building one frigate was fully as much as that of sixty-four gunboats. If they proposed to strike out this number of gunboats in order to build frigates, they must add a sum of one million of dollars to the appropriation.

Mr. Sawyer said it was not his intention to trouble the House often with his observations; for, being but a young member, he sat there more for the purpose of acquiring information than of giving it; nor should he have risen at this time, had not his duty compelled him to reply to some remarks, and to oppose the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Hampshire, (Mr. Durell.) The gentleman wished the United States to have a fleet; to have four forty-four gun frigates to assist in the defence of New York. For his own part, Mr. S. wished the United States were in such a situation as to enable them to usher into existence a fleet capable of annihilating at one blow the whole naval power of England, which had so long proved a scourge to all nations, and to this nation in particular. Such a consummation was devoutly to be wished; but the attainment of such an object by the United States, was utterly impossible: they had not means wherewith to do it, and an attempt which should fall short of the end, would do the nation more injury than good, by tending to swell the already overgrown naval power of Great Britain. At present, he must say, he was entirely opposed to a Naval Establishment, and differed entirely with the gentleman from Massachusetts, upon the propriety of any such establishment in the present situation of affairs; he wished to have nothing to do with any establishment unconnected with a system of land defence. There was a time when a Naval Establishment might have been consistent with national policy; when a naval armament, such as could then have been constructed, might have been instrumental, by proper management, in maintaining the balance of naval power in Europe; that time was, when the combined fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, were nearly a match for the British naval force; but that time was now elapsed; that opportunity, which might have been so advantageously seized, was, through an unfortunate prejudice in favor of one nation and against another, suffered to escape unheeded. They now saw the effects of that policy; the fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, were swept from the ocean; the British Navy retained the undisputed possession of every sea, and it would be an extravagant undertaking in the United States to attempt the creation of a naval force calculated to make a serious impression upon Great Britain; they would become the mere shipwrights of Great Britain, who would be ready to receive their ships as fast as they could be launched. Could they erect a navy equal to that which Denmark had possessed? Could they build and equip twenty-four sail of the line at once? If they could do this, experience had fatally shown, that so far from aiding in the defence of this nation, that force would soon be turned against it; England, with a superior force, would soon convert them into a means of offence against this nation. But it would not be in the power of the United States, encumbered as they were by a great national debt, and cramped in their resources by interruptions of their trade, to provide a navy as respectable as that of Denmark was; and surely any smaller force could not be contemplated. Let us then, said he, apply our limited means to a mode of defence on which more reliance may be placed; let us in the first place put our ports and harbors in such a state of defence as will, in a great degree, prevent our feeling the want of a navy. To effect this object, he said, they must have recourse to gunboats. He did not conceive this means of defence to be so trivial as the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. Durell) seemed to think them; not that they could be relied on as an efficient system of defence by themselves; not that they were to expel the British squadron from our shores, (though it was thought they could effect that object;) but because, in conjunction with land batteries and fortifications, they would ensure some safety of person and property in our seaport towns. By judicious management, by disposition in shoal waters, so as to aid the batteries on shore, they might be the means of preventing our cities from being plundered and burned, and our banks and stores from being rifled of their wealth. In this point of view, he considered them as part of a land defence, totally unconnected with a navy; they were not to go into deep water; the ocean was not their element; they were to remain in stations from which they might afford the greatest assistance to our forts and batteries, and when hard pressed or overpowered by force they could take shelter under them. This, said Mr. S., is the great advantage they have over heavy ships, there being no danger of their capture while we can maintain possession of our forts.

The British have not dared to attack a single French port since, though they had full possession of the channel and every means of attack which their unopposed naval superiority could afford. Though they saw preparing in those ports materials for their destruction, though they saw rising up in them means of offence so much dreaded as to require the utmost vigor of national exertion to provide against them, still did they stand aloof. Had Copenhagen been defended by gunboats distributed so as to act with the batteries, she would not have fallen so easy a prey; in fact, the few gunboats they had did all the execution that was done to the British shipping; for the fleet which remained in the port for its defence had no retreat from the superior force of the enemy, but where they could be pursued by vessels of equal size, while the gunboats ran under the forts and continued to annoy the British ships until those forts were taken by land. And if all the vessels which were captured had been gunboats, how much better would it have been for the Danes; how much less heavy would the loss of a few boats have been than that of so many large ships, so long building and accumulating, and at such an immense expense! But in order to show the inutility of gunboats, as well as fortifications, this House was told the British could succeed against our towns by landing a sufficient number of men below our forts and attacking them by land. This is exactly, Mr. S. said, what he wished to hear; for it was conceding at once that our gunboat and fortification defence would be too much for them to pass, that they would be compelled to give up the idea of carrying the place by water, and thus lose all the great advantages which their boasted irresistible naval power could afford them.

Mr. Cook said he could have wished that the different modes of defence should have been united, and decided upon together; but from the disposition of gentlemen who were in favor of the gunboat system, the House appeared to be compelled now to decide on this alone. It was well known that he was not averse to the proposition for constructing a number of gunboats; that he had last session given his vote in favor of them, and was now in favor of increasing the number, believing that in some situations they might be eminently useful; but when he found that so large a sum had been appropriated, almost to the exclusion of any other mode of defence, he deemed it his duty to give his vote in favor of a proposition tending more equally to apportion the modes of defence.

It had been moved to strike out of the bill a certain number of gunboats, and insert a certain number of ships of war. That a navy was necessary for the protection of our commerce was the opinion of President Washington, expressed at a time when our commerce was comparatively small. [Mr. C. here read an extract from an address to Congress from President Washington.] Mr. C. acknowledged that he had not experimental knowledge on this subject; but he appealed to the candor of those gentlemen who advocated this mode of defence, to accord to him that liberality which he would exercise towards them. He meant to impeach the motives of no man. He conceived that every gentleman would act according to the dictates of his conscience, and he claimed their indulgence to do the same.

Were the navy now to be increased to repel aggression from any foreign power, it would be regarded as a proper measure. He was not in favor of a large increase of our Navy; but he conceived it necessary to have a few large ships to drive from their ports scattering ships of an enemy. He thought himself not out of order, since the opinion of the President of the United States on the subject of gunboats had been read, verbally to quote his opinion on this subject. The President was in favor of large ships; he thought it was improper that any single ship should be able to block up a port or harbor of the United States; and that a remedy should be provided. Mr. C. thought that no danger could arise to the liberties of the people from an increase of the Navy; he called upon gentlemen who supported that doctrine to quote a single instance where any nation had lost its liberties from a navy. He did not himself consider an increase of our Navy necessary at the present moment, but it might be necessary at a future time; it would not, therefore, be improper now to provide materials, that they might have them in readiness when wanted. At present their attention should be directed solely to the defence of their cities on the seacoast; but at any future time, when it should be made satisfactorily to appear to this Government that the nations of Europe were disposed to coalesce for the purpose of asserting those rights which were dear to every maritime power, he hoped the United States would be ready and willing to join them in maintaining the freedom of navigation. It has been said, by some people, observed Mr. C., that we ought to lie by on our arms and avert the event of the European contest; let them alone, say they, let Buonaparte fight it out with them. Now this was a doctrine to which Mr. C. could not subscribe. If there was one great power disposed to control and domineer over the ocean, and the United States had great property at stake, why not pay their proportion, their footing as it were? He considered an opposite conduct pusillanimous and unjust. They had more tons of shipping afloat, and were more largely concerned in the freedom of the seas, than any nation on earth, one only excepted; and should they say that they would lie by unconcerned, while the dearest rights of nations were destroyed by any one nation! It must be clear to every one that they should not, and yet instead of increasing their defensive powers where they were assailable and most vulnerable, he was hurt to hear gentlemen propose means of defence for points perfectly unconnected with existing evils, which consisted in the harassing their navigation, and inflicting injuries on their floating commerce.

Mr. C. did not want ships for protection of our cities; he had no fear of their being burnt; he considered them as sufficiently protected by the proposed fortifications and gunboats, but all the money in the Treasury should not be applied to these subjects. The merchants of the United States were more concerned for the defence of their property which they had sent beyond seas than for the burning or sacking of our cities. Some cities, it was true, had been burnt during the Revolutionary War; but it should be recollected that the enemy then carried on a war of extermination, and even invited the savages to burn our towns. The war which was now feared was not a war of the same stamp; it would be merely a war for the right of trade, and not carried on in so sanguinary a manner.

Mr. Fisk said the gentleman from Massachusetts was opposed to this measure because it would take all the money out of the Treasury. He should show: First, That it was beyond their means; and Second, That it was not a measure of exigency. Would he be willing to leave our ports and harbors unprotected, and go abroad to protect our commerce? Mr. F. did not think that the merchants of the United States would support that doctrine. If they did, he wished they were out of the United States. The gentleman had told the House that his feelings had been wounded at the deference shown to the statements of the Secretary of War, and a few minutes after, read an extract from an English newspaper, giving an account of a transaction which had taken place between gunboats and English vessels. Mr. F. confessed he was not a little surprised at his preferring the authority of English newspapers to that of the Head of a Department in our own country. A gentleman who did this, might be allowed to indulge in the spirit of prophecy. He had said, if they adopted this measure, they would soon feel the effects of it. Mr. F. wished the gentleman would show how. The gentleman had said, because a few towns were burnt last war, the House seemed to think that the war which was expected would be a war of extermination; but that this was to be a harmless war, a mere war of trade. He would ask that gentleman what was the conduct of Great Britain towards Denmark? Had they spared the town of Copenhagen? He believed not. Would they spare the towns of New York or Norfolk, if it were in their power to destroy them? He thought not. Mr. F. thought the great question now was, What was the most efficient force—what would afford the most complete protection to our ports and harbors? The gentleman had said that they had now no force which could contend with an eighty or ninety gun ship. If that were the case, Mr. F. said, his argument completely recoiled upon himself. They had now eight or ten frigates, and if these could not contend with one eighty or ninety gun ship, they had better stop where they were, and not erect more of such inefficient force. Let us consider the subject for a few moments, said Mr. F. This is not an untried force; it was tried before that gentleman had existence. The instance mentioned by the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Sawyer,) might have shown that this force would be sufficient. It was the opinion of a most experienced naval commander, and whose standing and information entitled him to more than ordinary credit, that he would rather have four gunboats than a forty-four-gun frigate. A frigate could not carry the same metal as a gunboat. If a frigate was dismasted, becalmed, or any accident whatever happened to her, she could not get out of the way. These reasons should have weight on the minds of any gentleman, particularly of one who did not pretend to experimental knowledge on this subject. If the Treasury was as low as it was said to be, they should surely pursue the cheapest means of defence. By adopting the mode of defence by gunboats, in preference to defence by frigates, they would have, at the same expense, a third more in number of guns, besides double the weight of metal. With gunboats there was no loss of time in putting about. Not so with a frigate. She must first discharge one side, and then go about, before she could fire the other. But, gentlemen who were steeled against conviction, and determined, at all events, to have a Navy, would not be influenced by argument or reason. Had not Denmark a Navy? What became of it? It fell into the hands of a superior naval power, and that will be the fate of our Navy if we erect one.

Mr. Thomas said that the gentleman on his right, his colleague, (Mr. Gardenier,) had told the House that he should vote to build the whole number of gunboats, not because he thought them an efficient defence, but because he considered them feeble machines. This reasoning might be conclusive in the mind of that gentleman, and he did not care what influenced him, since it appeared they should have his vote for the bill.

However, Mr. T. said he merely rose to reply to one remark of that gentleman. He knew that it had been rung through the country, by electioneering gentry, for these number of years, that the formidable navy, so carefully raised by the former Administration, had been sold off by the present one, and the nation left without defence; and that gentleman (Mr. G.) had repeated the same story, that the formidable navy which had been raised with so much care had been sold off, to the eternal disgrace of the nation. Hearing this assertion, Mr. T. thought it his duty, on that floor, to declare that not a single national ship had been ordered to be sold since the present Administration came into power; that not a single vessel had been sold except from orders issued previous to the time that the administration of this Government was taken out of the hands of those coinciding with that gentleman in political sentiment.

The amendment offered by Mr. Durell was then negatived—ayes 19.

The bill being about to be read a third time this day, its decision was, on motion of Mr. Elliot, postponed till to-morrow.

Thursday, December 10.

Fortifications and Gunboats.

The bill sent from the Senate, entitled “An act to appropriate money for the construction of an additional number of gunboats,” together with the amendment agreed to yesterday, was read the third time.

Mr. Elliot.—When an humble and uninfluential individual, voluntarily isolating himself from the several great parties that divide, distract, and ruin our devoted and degraded country—our devoted and degraded country—(I repeat the expression, sir, for I know it to be as consonant to the rules of order as I shall prove it to be incontestably true;) when such an individual rises to deliver his sentiments upon an important subject of national concern, it would seem that the singularity of his situation might attract attention, however deficient he may be in the solid powers of argument, or the brilliant tones of eloquence. But these are inauspicious times. These are not the mollia tempora fundi—the soft reasons of persuasion—the calm hours of peace. They are times of alarm and denunciation. For myself, peculiar and almost irresistible reasons would impel me to continue silent, not only this day, but for the short remainder of my political existence. But there are periods when silence is almost equivalent to an abandonment of duty. Private afflictions, as inconceivable by others as they are indescribable by myself, were I disposed to describe them, indispose me for political exertion. There are times, however, when even the most refined feelings of the human heart should give place to the sublime energies of the human mind. When imperious duty calls, the latter should be exerted, even if it be only that the former, when the great effort is over, should resume their empire with more exquisite sensibility.

The present is one of those great crises that rarely occur in the annals of nations—it is, indeed, a crisis of most awful moment. Our political day of hope and joy and peace is suddenly overcast with thick and dark clouds. In the language of sacred oriental poetry, it is a day of darkness and gloominess—a day of clouds and thick darkness—as the morning spread upon the mountains.

In casting my eye over the various documents upon the table, my attention is for the moment attracted by one which has been placed upon it this morning—a report from the Committee on Revisal and Unfinished Business, upon matters undetermined at the last session. In this I find mention made of several propositions upon the subject of the defence of the nation, which I had the honor then to propose, and which it was not the pleasure of the House then to act upon. Propositions of a similar character, so far as respects the fortification of the ports and harbors, the organization and arming of the militia, and the equipment of the frigates, it is now hinted, will be carried into effect in the course of the present session. I am happy that my doctrines are becoming popular, and that there is some prospect of their adoption. But it is because I fear, and indeed believe, that the present bill is pressed upon us for the purpose of superseding every measure of national defence which would comport with the true interest and the honor of the nation, that I am so decidedly opposed to it, and that I consider the Republic degraded by the substitution of a weak and miserable policy for measures of a manly and magnanimous character, at a crisis which peculiarly requires them.

The principal argument, although this does not seem to be openly avowed, in favor of the present measure, is the supposed predilection of the Executive for this system of defence. Indeed, this is but a new edition, or rather a new volume, of the celebrated proclamation and gunboat system, which, instead of elevating us in the scale of nations, has greatly sunk the national character. The objects in view are to protect the commerce of the Union to a certain extent, and to protect our coasts and seaports. Of course this measure is to constitute a material, if not the principal part of a general system of national defence and protection. The object is proper and patriotic, and it is a subject of deep regret that the means are inefficient. But history and human experience have settled the true character of these machines, and as we have nothing else to hope for, we can expect nothing like an energetic and effectual system.

The President shall recommend. The voice of the constitution is imperative. It makes it the duty of the Chief Executive Magistrate to take upon himself the responsibility of explicitly recommending to the Legislature such measures as he deems the public welfare to require. In making the inquiry, in what manner has this great and solemn duty been performed at the present moment? the transition is easy to the Message of the President at the commencement of this session. These messages, as public documents, and addressed exclusively to the Legislature, are certainly fair subjects of criticism; and whoever shall be impelled by duty to speak unpleasantly of the present system of administration, will have an abundant source of rich consolation in the reflection, that, when gunboats are the subject of discussion, it is impossible to be out of order. The present system begins and ends with gunboats. In the Message to which allusion has been made, which should have been as a polar star to guide us at this dark season, not a single measure is explicitly and unequivocally recommended. I will read that part of it which relates to the Naval Establishment:

“The gunboats already provided have been chiefly assigned to New York, New Orleans, and the Chesapeake. Whether our movable force on the water, so material in aid of the defensive works on the land, should be augmented in this or any other form, is left to the wisdom of the Legislature. For the purpose of manning these vessels, in sudden attacks on our harbors, it is a matter for consideration whether the seamen of the United States may not justly be formed into a special militia, to be called on for tours of duty, in defence of the harbors where they shall happen to be; the ordinary militia of the place furnishing that portion which may consist of landsmen.”

Here the Executive submits certain matters for consideration, without assuming to himself the responsibility of expressly recommending them. In relation to the Naval Establishment, he only talks of a movable force on the water; and if we should build our flotilla of two hundred and fifty-seven gunboats, at an expense which will be shown to be enormous, and, in the event of a war with Great Britain, two or three British ships of the line, and as many frigates, should come upon our coast, and blow them all to atoms, as would infallibly be the case if they were to come in contact with them, we shall no doubt be told that a wise and prudent Executive never recommended such an ill-judged, degrading, and disastrous measure. But for what purpose are gunboats to be built? To protect commerce and the coast. Every one knows that we cannot protect our commerce in every clime and on every sea against the naval power of Great Britain. It would be unwise, therefore, at present, to exhaust our resources by building a navy of ships of the line. It does not follow, however, that nothing can be done; that we cannot support our own jurisdiction. Nothing effectual, it is certain, can be done by gunboats. They have never been of use but as auxiliaries to more extensive and substantial establishments; and they have always been of so little comparative use, as to render it impossible to ascertain the amount of the service they have rendered. We may safely challenge their advocates to produce a single instance in which, alone and unconnected with works of more consequence, they have been of any essential use at all, for purposes either of offence or defence. In my researches into their history I have met with no instance of the kind. Here I shall advert to a document, the reading of which has been called for by the honorable chairman of the committee on that part of the President’s Message relative to aggressions committed within our waters, and with which I should not otherwise have troubled the House. I do it at this time, because I find my voice failing so fast that I shall be unable to go so fully into the subject as I originally contemplated. This I shall not regret myself, and still less will the House regret it. In the message of February 10, 1807, communicating the information requested by the House of Representatives in relation to the utility and efficacy of gunboats, we find, indeed, that gunboats apparently constitute but a subordinate species of defence, and yet they are spoken of as competent to almost all the purposes of national protection. A flotilla of no less than two hundred is contemplated.

Annexed to the Message are the opinions of several military and naval officers, some of them celebrated and some of them obscure. General Gates, whose memory we all venerate, has been mentioned. He merely gives his opinion, and furnishes no particular information upon the subject. He is followed by General Wilkinson, the hero of the Sabine and New Orleans, the man who violates your constitution at the point of the bayonet in order to preserve it inviolate; the idol of popular delusion for the moment, but the object of a very different homage from the wise and good. Unfortunately, the letter of this great character conveys no information. Commodore Barron says: “Ten or twelve of these boats will probably be sufficient to compel to remove from her position a frigate, and so on in proportion to the size and number of the enemy’s ships. To do more than annoy would be difficult. With those vessels a great number and a long time would be necessary to capture a ship of war; but few commanders would feel secure while open to the attack of an enemy, which, however inferior, he could not destroy.” This is all very candid and very strong reasoning against the cause it is produced to support. It is matter of regret, however, if it ever has been ascertained that gunboats have been able to remove a ship of war from her position, that we have not been put in possession of that information. The following remarks are taken from the communication of Captain Tingey: “The efficacy of gunboats in the defence of coasts, ports, and harbors, must be obvious to every person capable of reflection; when it is considered with what celerity they can generally change their position and mode of attack, extending it widely to as many different directions as their number consists of, or concentrating nearly to one line of direction. Such, indeed, is believed to be the great utility of gunboats for defence, that, notwithstanding the gigantic power of the British Navy, in its present state, a judicious writer in the British Naval Chronicle, after advising a plan for raising a fleet of 150 or 200 gunboats to assist in repelling the threatened invasion of that country, says, ‘a gunboat has this advantage over a battery on shore, that it can be removed at pleasure from place to place, as occasion may require, and a few such vessels, carrying heavy guns, would make prodigious havoc among the enemy’s flat-bottomed boats crowded with soldiers.’” Surely we do not expect the British will come to invade us in flat-bottomed boats. If they should do so, we may array this miserable machinery against them, and shall probably be victorious.

But it is a popular system—the people are in favor of it—and this is an overwhelming answer to every argument that can be urged against it.

With whom is it popular? Certainly not with the people in the Northern States, for a very great majority of them are opposed to it. Within two or three years we have received addresses from the Legislature of New York and Rhode Island, passed, I believe unanimously, in both States, in favor of an enlarged and more efficient system of naval defence. Those two States, of course, may be considered as opposed to this project. No one will set down Connecticut as friendly to gunboats. Is it popular in Massachusetts? One gentleman from that State (Mr. Bacon) protests against being considered as the Representative of a people hostile to this mode of defence. But that gentleman will not tell us that a very large majority of his constituents are attached to the system, or that among those who are, one in fifty has any practical or even historical information upon the subject. Are your constituents, Mr. Speaker, in favor of this mode of defence? I presume not. When, two or three years ago, you opposed this establishment in its infancy, you undoubtedly represented their sentiments and feelings, as most certainly you supported their true interest. The Representatives from New Hampshire, and others from the Eastern States, ask you to excuse them from accepting their proportion of these boats, and to give them a few frigates in exchange. You refuse their request.—They ask for frigates, and you give them gunboats. As it respects my own constituents, I have not been able to find any gunboat men among them. It is probable, however, that there are some, as there may be men in that quarter, as in others, willing to believe whatever the Executive believes; but I trust there are fewer of these miserable minions in that district than in some others in the Union.

Mr. Crowninshield said he regretted that the present had been represented as a local question, applicable to the South; and it had been stated that the defence of the North was not at all in the question. Mr. C. viewed it in a very different light. He considered the whole seaboard of the United States, that every inhabitant on the coast, was deeply interested in the bill now about to pass. Gunboats would as well assist to protect the passage leading into Boston harbor, as the mouth of the Chesapeake. They were certainly fit to aid in the protection of any of the Northern ports. He was astonished when he heard a doubt expressed upon the subject. He was glad to hear a gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) say he should vote for the bill. He would rather have his vote than his speech on the subject, as well also the vote of one of his colleagues (Mr. Upham) who followed him in debate, and took the same course. Both these gentlemen said they should vote for the bill on the table, and yet they observed they could not approve of this mode of defence. It would thus appear that their votes were vastly more reasonable than their arguments. He trusted that on this bill the House would give a unanimous vote. What was the proposition? To put our ports and harbors in some state of defence. Was the measure embraced by this bill all the defence proposed? No; but it was all proposed to be decided on at present, because it could be almost immediately accomplished. And who knew when this force might be wanted? He did not say it would be wanted to-day, to-morrow, or the next day; but possibly the return of Spring might bring an occasion for its service to repel an invader; and, where the risk was deemed even probable, procrastination in preparing for the worst would be the height of imprudence.

In regard to the utility of gunboats, gentlemen differed; and well and honestly they might, because their use had not in this country been sufficiently confirmed by experience. Mr. C. would, however, quote an instance or two in which they had been eminently useful, even in our own country. He had learnt, from a very correct source, that in the war between Great Britain and France, in 1760, when the American colonies took a part, there was an instance on record which proved that these gunboats were employed with success in the river St. Lawrence—that four gunboats, carrying one 18 pound cannon and 20 men each, did attack and capture a brig of 16 guns and 180 men, killing 60 or 70 men in the brig, while the gunboats lost but a single man, and received little or no other injury. If any gentleman doubted, Mr. C. would give the respectable authority of the Vice President of the United States for the fact. Mr. C. had understood he was an officer actually employed by the Colonial Government in that service. Another instance had been given to him by a naval gentleman of eminence, who was not now in the service of the United States, but who, he believed, if called upon, would do himself great honor. Mr. C. then read the statement made by that gentleman, to this effect: “In 1776, the Roebuck and Liverpool, two British frigates—one of them mounting 44 guns on two decks—lay in the river Delaware, below Philadelphia. A flotilla of American gunboats attacked them with spirit. The engagement was severe, and victory terminated in favor of the gunboats. One of the frigates (the Roebuck) was crippled and driven on shore, and would have been taken possession of, if the ammunition in the boats had held out. As it was, after the Roebuck floated off into deeper water, both frigates abandoned their station, and left the gunboats masters of the river.” It was probable that there might be some gentleman of the Revolution near him who might have known of the fact; if so, would it have no impression on the House? He presumed it would have a favorable impression, as it deservedly ought. He could cite other instances—he could say, that in the neighborhood of Gibraltar, at Algeziras, the Spanish gunboats had in many cases attacked British frigates, and sometimes 74-gun ships, and very much annoyed them. He knew of no instance of their capture, because it often happened, that a new wind springing up, carried the vessels out of the reach of their fire. It was also believed to be a fact, that the British naval commanders in the mouth of the Straits of Gibraltar had always been alarmed in moderate and calm weather when they saw the gunboats of Algeziras coming out to attack their ships of war. Engagements with them were not uncommon, and the boats frequently had the advantage, and captured merchant vessels under their convoy, and carried them off, in spite of all the efforts to save them which could be made by the men of war.

Mr. Southard was in hopes this bill would have met with very little opposition, especially when it was considered that it was but a part of a system of defence, of which the other parts would be decided in progression. Various objections had been made to the bill. Some gentlemen supposed that gunboats were altogether insufficient for defence, and that the scheme was merely ideal and visionary; and some had attempted to prove that gunboats had never been used. A gentleman from Massachusetts had just disproved this by circumstantial accounts of two engagements; one on the river St. Lawrence, and one in the river Delaware. In the last instance, about twelve gunboats engaged two British ships of war. Mr. S. would state, from good authority, that the reason why these vessels were not made a prize, was, that the gunboats were not supplied with a sufficient quantity of powder and ammunition. This statement and fact would go far to do away the impressions of those gentlemen who suppose that gunboats are of no efficiency as a defence, or that their utility was ideal. In the progress towards the passage of this bill, every day new difficulties had been discovered, and new objections raised to its passage. Some gentlemen told them if they passed this bill, and appropriated a sum of money sufficient for the object proposed by it, that they would not leave money in the Treasury adequate to the expense of building land batteries, &c. Another objection was, that if they appropriated money for building gunboats, fortifications, and batteries for the seaports, there would be no money left wherewith to provide arms for the militia. If these remarks were even correct, they possessed no weight, because gunboats, fortifications, and land batteries, and arming the militia, were but three several parts of one great system.

After these remarks, he would only state his own idea of what ought to be done. He thought they should first provide gunboats; secondly, erect fortifications and land batteries; thirdly, pass a law providing for arming the militia—for, unless men were armed, they could not prevent an enemy from landing, destroying, and laying waste the country. Mr. S. hoped everything would be done which was requisite for protection. Gentlemen had said that our resources were not sufficient to meet these objects. Mr. S. would observe that there was, in the Treasury, money sufficient to answer all these purposes; if not, the country had resources within itself, fully adequate to every measure of protection and defence. He would not go, as some gentlemen had, into calculations of dollars and cents. If the nation was embroiled in war, its expense would be incalculable. It was impossible to form even an idea of the enormous expense that would accrue from war. But, Mr. S. would withdraw all the money out of the Treasury; he would not leave a cent; he would even drain the blood from his own veins, if it were necessary, for the defence of his country. If the nation was involved in war, life, liberty, and property, every thing, was at stake; and all their energies should be exerted to repel the invader.

Mr. Key said he conceived he possessed the right to give his sentiments on this subject; and he felt it a duty to assign those reasons which would induce him to vote for the bill under consideration.

Mr. K. had no doubt but, in forming a general system of defence, some few frigates would be found necessary; but he strongly feared they could neither construct line of battle ships or frigates before it would be necessary to use them. Some gentlemen had asserted that the nation was at war; he would not combat this position, though it was not tenable. Some gentlemen said we were on the eve of war, with whom he thought. If they were engaged in war, it would not be upon any other part of the frontier than that accessible by water. Of course the most vulnerable points of the country were upon the seashore. He therefore thought that every species of defence competent to the protection of these points should be adopted, and of this description were fortifications and batteries, aided by gunboats; not that they composed the best possible means of defence, but the best that could be constructed within a given time.

There were, as far as Mr. K. knew, in modern times, but two instances, and but one that was remarkable, of the efficacy of gunboats as a part of a system. One case was the defence of Cadiz, when Nelson, with his whole fleet, anchored in the bay of Cadiz, and was repulsed, principally, he believed, by the instrumentality, but certainly by the assistance of gunboats. In case of attack, made on our ports, gunboats being locomotive, would, in such circumstances, be advantageous. Another case of the success of gunboats occurs in the bay of Gibraltar; they are there secured from attack, until, like spiders darting upon flies, they spring out in calm weather, and always capture their prey.

These gunboats took their origin in an early part of this century, when Gibraltar was surprised by the enemy. Gunboats were then introduced into the Gut of Gibraltar, and from the time that Britain captured Gibraltar, to the present day, such has been the effect of these boats, that the British were always obliged to send supplies and provisions to Gibraltar under convoy. He had mentioned this circumstance, to show that gunboats had acted offensively as well as defensively. If gentlemen, however, considered them as alone a sufficient defence for this country, they were most miserably mistaken; they were merely eligible as a means of defence in aid of fortifications. Mr. K. agreed with the gentleman who had yesterday said that these boats would be no protection against ships of war, with wind and tide in their favor, in Chesapeake Bay; but, as offensive weapons, they might be placed at points where they might lie in readiness till a proper time should arrive in which they could act with advantage. A number of frigates had been, for some time, lying in the Chesapeake. Mr. K. did religiously believe, if the nation had been in a state of war, (and a contrary situation alone had prevented the experiment being made,) that twelve gunboats, stationed at Norfolk, could have driven them away from their anchorage. And why did he believe so? Because they could have chosen their time, when the weather was calm, and large ships could not be worked. It was in this way that gunboats could greatly injure ships of war, and, if not destroy them, could injure them so much as to render them unmanageable. He did not conceive that gunboats should be considered as incapable of rendering essential services, because they had not hitherto driven the British squadron out of the Chesapeake, for the measures taken by the Executive had not warranted such a step. We are not at war, said he; when, by the shameless impressment of our seamen and other injuries, and when consummating her folly and wickedness by the attack on the Chesapeake, the English nation gave cause for war, we did not go to war. In his judgment, and he was reluctant to withhold praise where it was due, a much wiser course was taken; he meant the call upon that Government for reparation before a resort was had to war. Had they gone to war, on the spur of the occasion, they would have committed to the mercy of the British navy twenty millions of American property, afloat on the ocean; it would have fallen a sacrifice to the superior naval force of our opponents. If honorable reparation be made, the course which had been pursued would have been wise; at all events, whether reparation be made or not, time had been given to our citizens to save a great portion of their property. A measure of immediate war would have brought bankruptcy on our cities, and ruin on our citizens. It was well, for this reason, to put the event off as long as possible—the longer it was put off, the better we should be prepared for it when it did arrive.

Friday, December 11.

The Gunboat Bill.

Mr. Johnson said, although he should not pretend to propose measures of great national defence, he considered it a prudent exercise of his right as a member, to express his sentiments upon subjects proposed by others, upon which it became his duty to vote. He was in favor of the passage of the bill. He believed that they had arrived at a crisis; a crisis which had marked the maritime annals of Great Britain with the blood of American citizens; the period had arrived when this nation must receive a satisfaction for injuries inflicted, and a security from future wrong; or the sword must again be drawn to defend that liberty which was the boast of all, and which had cost so much. They had before them evidence sufficient to demonstrate the probability of war, an event which could not be long protracted but by an honorable accommodation. While America mourned the loss of her sons, she had wisely forborne to strike a blow which her wrongs had justified. New instructions had been despatched to our Minister at the Court of St. James since the outrage upon the Chesapeake, and a last appeal made to the reason and justice of that Government by whom they had been so much injured. The negotiation had terminated in England, and even now a special Minister was expected from Great Britain to attempt a settlement here. The door to reconciliation had not been closed, and he hoped it would not be barred so long as a real desire could be traced in Great Britain to make an honorable settlement of all important differences. But every thing they could hear or see proved the propriety of making preparations for the worst event. Our Government had been the injured party, and must have redress.

The conduct of the Administration had been arraigned. Mr. J. did not hesitate to approve the conduct of the Executive, and particularly in this late and important transaction, it had acted with prudence, wisdom, and firmness. If feeling had not been governed by prudence, the nation might have been in a state of actual war. Perhaps our wrongs might have justified it; but while there remained a hope for honorable peace, negotiation was the proper course. We fear no nation, but let the time for shedding human blood be protracted, when consistent with our safety. If our claims upon the justice of England should be disregarded, there would be time enough for human butchery. He looked around him, and saw many who had witnessed the calamities and miseries of the American Revolution. But if war could not be avoided, accumulated horrors would not induce the American people to endanger their independence. They would say, like the immortal Washington, the former victorious leader of their armies, “I will conquer or die with my countrymen.” Unanimity, in times of public exigency, was all-important; any other course than that which had been pursued by the Administration, might and would have created division; but if they should now be driven into war by the injustice of Great Britain, where was the man who would not be with them, who would not approve the conduct of the Administration, pronounce our cause just, and appeal to Heaven for victory.

As to the system of gunboats, which had involved such a wide range of discussion, and almost every national topic, he had no practical knowledge of their utility; but he could state the evidence he had of their utility to the full extent contended for. First, it was a system which had been recommended by the President, supported by the opinions of General Gates, Commodore Barron and Captain Tingey. He perceived that a very large majority of the Representatives of the seacoast, from Georgia to Maine, was in their favor. They are used by most of the powers of Europe, and particularly in the Mediterranean, for defence, and often for offence. They were considered particularly useful in the North of Europe and the Baltic, on account of moderate tides, shallow water, and narrow seas. He had also many examples of their practical utility. In the war between France and England and her colonies, a case had been cited of an attack and conflict in the river St. Lawrence, in the year 1763, between four American gunboats and a French vessel of war, carrying 16 guns and 180 men. The battle was obstinate; the French lost 60 or 70 men, the hull and rigging of the vessel were cut to pieces, while only one man was killed on board the gunboats. A battle had been mentioned by the same member, which happened in the Delaware during the Revolution, where two English frigates were attacked by gunboats, one of the frigates driven from our waters, and the other stranded, and would have been captured but for the want of powder. Again: the celebrated battle between the English navy and the French flotilla of gunboats off the port of Boulogne, in the British Channel. Lord Nelson was charged with the destruction of these gunboats, and made the attack for that express purpose. The first attack was made with thirty vessels of war of all sizes; he failed in the enterprise, and was obliged to retire. This great naval commander, not having satisfied himself or his nation by this attempt, ten days after returned to the assault, with more ships of the line, a larger number of frigates and brigs, and renewed the fight; after a very bloody battle and great loss, he was again repulsed. In fact, nothing did the English so much fear as these gunboats, properly managed. A few years ago, it would be recollected, Napoleon collected above one hundred thousand soldiers for the purpose of invading England. This created alarm and agitation in Great Britain, and this project the British Cabinet knew could not be effected without the aid of the French flotilla of gunboats at the port of Boulogne. The late Minister, Mr. Pitt, to divert the attention of Napoleon from this design, by British gold and British influence, created a new coalition upon the continent of Europe against France. For the moment, this coalition had its desired effect, and it is known to all how it had terminated. It had resulted in the conquest of the North, cost the lives of thousands, and inundated Europe with human blood.

Mr. Macon said it appeared to him that the only question at present discussed was, whether the number of boats authorized by this bill was the proper number. Some cases had been stated in which gunboats had been efficacious, and some in which they had not. Mr. M. did not mean to dispute their efficacy, but as gentlemen on the seacoast were divided on the subject, until gentlemen could better agree as to number and utility, so large a number ought not to be built.

There was another thing he should have been glad to have seen before he voted on this bill; he should have wished to have seen how these boats were to be manned. They might be told that people would volunteer their services on board of these boats. There must be some way in which they must be manned; unmanned, they would be perfectly useless. He did not like legislating in this detached way; it had been tried in former days; first passing one law, they must pass another to render it effectual. He wished to see some efficient method in which these boats should be manned; he could have wished that the whole system should go hand in hand. The President was authorized to man these boats. Was any authority given to draught sailors for the purpose, or how were they to be supplied? It was essential that this should be known. He should wish, and if he thought he could succeed he would make a motion to recommit the bill to a select committee for the purpose of making this provision. Suppose twenty boats were stationed at Norfolk, did they know that these boats could be manned? In his opinion, the bill should contain a regulation for manning them; every law should stand upon its own merits, and he should always protest against passing one law which would oblige them to pass another to carry it into effect. Let us, said he, see the whole system, and then let us vote upon it.

Mr. G. W. Campbell said it had not been his intention to speak on this subject. There was sufficient cause to induce him still to decline entering into the debate. His indisposition would certainly prevent him from examining the subject in that manner which its importance required; and he would therefore have persevered in his original intention of remaining silent, had not an attempt been made to make an impression on the public mind, that the friends of this measure were about to drain the Treasury of the United States for a system of defence that would prove inefficient—for a mere useless experiment. This might therefore require some explanation, that the motives of gentlemen who were about to vote for this system of defence should be known, as well as their objects. In the discussion of this subject, gentlemen had also gone into an examination of the utility of our Naval Establishment, and the expediency of increasing it at this time, which was in his opinion a distinct subject, that had little or no connection with the proposed measure. It would be time sufficient to examine that question when it came properly before the House. There had also been a very novel mode of argument introduced on this occasion, and it was the second time it had been used during the present session—that of gentlemen arguing against the expediency of a measure, while they declared their intention to vote for it. This was indeed a new method of legislating, and may be intended to answer a double purpose: it may perhaps enable gentlemen to say to those of their constituents opposed to this measure, (if such there are,) We were inimical to it; we exposed its weakness in the House, and showed its inefficiency—you cannot therefore blame us for its adoption. While, on the other hand, they might say to the friends of the measure, We have supported it by our votes, and are therefore entitled to your confidence on that ground. Mr. C. did not say that this was the object of gentlemen; but if it was not, it appeared to him difficult to ascertain what it could be. It would have appeared much more consistent for those gentlemen who seriously believed the system to be useless, to vote as well as speak against it; and it were to be wished that those who intended to vote for the bill before the House, had permitted it to pass without opposing it; but, as this course of argument had been pursued, he deemed it a duty he owed to his country, to those he had the honor to represent, and to himself, to express to the House (though in a very brief manner) some of the reasons which would induce him to vote for the bill. He did not pretend to possess much information on the subject of gunboats—he had therefore hitherto declined entering into the discussion, and waited to hear what might be advanced on the subject by those who had greater opportunities than himself of knowing their efficiency or inefficiency—but he had found those who had spoken on this subject were obliged, like himself, to depend on the information of others, and did not pretend to furnish the House with any practical knowledge on this subject. They must, therefore, form their opinions from the reasoning on the case, and such evidence as they were possessed of.

The first important inquiry would seem to be, whether the present state of our relations with foreign powers was such as required the adoption of effective measures for national defence. It appeared to be agreed by all that it was. No one denied the importance of the present crisis. It could not be denied by any gentleman who would reflect a moment on the repeated aggressions that have been committed on our commerce, the violated rights of our seamen, the insult offered to our national flag, and the murder of our fellow-citizens. These all go to prove, incontestable, the necessity of our putting the nation in a state of defence. The next inquiry was, of what nature ought our defensive preparations to be? It is clear, they ought to be calculated to meet and repel the attacks that we have a right to expect from those who are likely to become our enemies. Those attacks are to be expected on our coasts and seaport towns which are most exposed, and most vulnerable to a marauding enemy. The species of defence, therefore, that we ought to adopt, should certainly be such as was calculated to protect, as far as in our power, our coast, our harbors, and our seaport towns, from insult and ruin; unless, indeed, these are to be abandoned to the enemy on his first approach. We are then to determine whether we shall defend these or not.

Will the nation consent to expose to an enemy, without an effort to repel him until he has landed, the whole extent of your seacoast, all your seaport towns on the margin of the ocean? This would be a dangerous experiment, and he had supposed too wild a scheme to be advocated by any reflecting politician: though it seemed to be the favorite doctrine of some gentlemen in this House, who were opposed to every species of defence, except placing arms in the hands of the militia. It is true the foe might be repelled by your militia, and no doubt would be; but, what would the citizens of those towns and on your seacoast say? Would they not justly complain that you had neglected their interest, had deserted them in the day of danger, and left them to be pillaged and destroyed by an enemy, without one effort to protect them? They certainly would, and their complaints would be well founded. There were, however, he presumed, but very few willing to subscribe to this doctrine—though it had been advocated by some gentlemen in this House, who appeared opposed not only to ships of war and gunboats, but also to fortifications.

Taking it then as admitted, that the coast and seaport towns are to be defended against naval attacks, what were the means in their power best calculated to effect that object? On this point there was, as might be expected, some difference of opinion. Mr. C. believed it would not be contended by any gentleman that our coast and seaport towns could be effectually defended by fortifications alone. No man was so wild in his plans as to say so. The whole coast, from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico, cannot be fortified—some other mode of defence must therefore be resorted to. He apprehended also, it would not be contended that the naval force now in our possession, in addition to fortifications, was sufficient to afford effectual protection to our seaports. This had not been pretended; its inefficiency was too well known for a single individual to rely upon it. There was then no question on the point that they must acquire an additional floating force in aid of fortifications. What kind of addition was it in their power to make? There was but one alternative left them—either to build an additional number of ships of war sufficient for that object, or to resort to the system of gunboats. They had been very earnestly called upon by some gentlemen to make an addition to the navy and unite this with gunboats. This would probably be found impracticable at the present crisis. Mr. C. had expected that those gentlemen who wished to have reduced the number of gunboats proposed, and substitute a few frigates in their place, would have shown the practicability of building their frigates in sufficient time to answer the present exigency. If this could not be effected, the proposition was useless. Mr. C. said the building of a large navy was not consistent with the policy or interest of this country. If it were in their power to do so, it would be at war with the genius of their Government, the interests of the people, and the security of their liberties.

Mr. Quincy said he would not have risen now, but for an observation of the gentleman from Tennessee, as to speculative opinions. Mr. Q. had before not expressed his own opinion merely, but the opinion of men deeply interested and much experienced in this question. He could not boast of personal experience on the subject, but he had conversed with merchants and persons in naval employ, and he had found but one sentiment existed, that they might be useful, but not so much as to supersede the necessity of other modes. He recollected an observation made by a merchant deeply interested in the defence of our ports. When his opinion was asked of the efficiency of gunboats, he said, “you may have gunboats; but attempt to use them on our coasts, and you would soon not have a gun left on your boats.” Much better would it be that these guns should be rested on carriages, and those distributed along the sea coasts. He had no objection to gunboats when contemplated to be used in shoal and narrow waters; but he must express an opinion against their efficiency in deep and rough waters, not from his own experience, but because it appeared to be the opinion of men skilled in naval affairs; and because the great mass of men interested in the defence of the ports were averse to this mode of defence. He should not vote for the bill, because he should, by so doing, abandon the best interests of the country; and because, when so large a sum was appropriated, it would seem that land batteries were to be proportionably neglected.

Mr. Randolph said that so long as the details of the bill were under consideration, he had forborne to trouble the House with his sentiments, but now, on its final passage, he conceived himself entitled to express freely and fully his objections to it. His object was not to make proselytes, but to present to the House and to his country the grounds of his refusal to sanction the measure. When perhaps seventy or eighty speakers had repeatedly risen in its favor, it was surely reasonable that the few individuals opposed to it should be heard in their own behalf. He complained of the manner in which business had been conducted. Instead of a comprehensive system, the whole extent of which might be embraced by the House, measures had been laid before them piecemeal, and discussions of the most vague and unprofitable nature had grown out of them. So far from that general diffusion of information which was so desirable, they were totally destitute of any concerning the disjointed members which had been laid upon their table, and which he despaired ever seeing connected in one perfect whole. The deliberations which had arisen upon them defied analysis. It was a sort of Parthian warfare, in which the difficulty lay not in vanquishing the enemy, but in coming up with him. He had not proceeded (as was alleged) upon his own speculative opinion. Experiment had proved the inadequacy of this species of armament. When the President of the United States issued his proclamation, commanding the British ships of war to retire from our waters, the want of adequate force alone could justify a failure to carry that proclamation into effect. A consciousness of his incapacity to enforce obedience to it, was notoriously one of the causes why Congress had been convened. Whosoever denied this must have the hardihood to charge the President with being deficient in his duty, which he presumed gentlemen were not prepared to do; and surely it was his bounden duty to enforce respect for the authority of the nation on those by whom it had been treated with derision and contempt. The British force remaining within our jurisdiction, in defiance of the laws, were as much an invading foe as if they had taken possession of the Capitol. The miseries of war had been feelingly depicted.

Mr. R. was as strong an advocate for peace as any gentleman on that floor; provided it were a safe and honorable peace. To his apprehension the arguments which had been urged would justify submission to any extent. He would ask if it was the duty of the Chesapeake to submit for the sake of peace, or to have resisted to the utmost of her strength? She was no more called upon by her duty to resist that attack, than the nation was now called upon to repel the attack which had been made upon her sovereignty. The obligation to resist was in both cases the same. Was any person disposed to applaud as a preserver of peace the unfortunate man of whom he should say no more than that he was not more bound to return the broadside of the enemy than Government were to expel their ships from our harbors after commanding them to depart. Much as he cherished peace, Mr. R. would be sorry to see it preserved by such forbearance; and it was only the inability to execute that could reconcile it for a moment to the feelings of the nation. The proclamation ought not to have been issued, or it should have been enforced. Let it not be supposed that he was an advocate for defence by forty-four gun frigates. Since the existence of their navy the United States had lost two of their stoutest ships to an enemy, and in both instances without even a show of resistance. It was true that in one of these instances, the victor, as if in contempt, had thrown the worthless thing back upon our hands, instead of sending it where he wished it had gone—to Halifax, or to the bottom. An attempt to build a navy at this time would bring not relief but suffering. Mr. R. put little confidence in the regular navy, as it was called, which just sufficed to bait the war-trap, or in the gunboats. Like the contemptible insects to which they had been compared by their advocates, it was hoped that they would find shelter in their insignificance, but if they should prove instruments of annoyance, eventually they would be turned against ourselves. He wished to see the public treasure employed in putting arms into the hands of all who were capable of bearing them, and in providing heavy artillery, not in the erection of a naval force, which, whether great or small, unless it too could retreat beyond the mountains, must fall into the hands of the enemy. If they wanted a force that should combine strength with simplicity, ready at all times for the public protection, they had such a force amply in their power.

The question was put on the passage of the bill, and decided in the affirmative—yeas 111, nays 19.

Monday, December 14.

Daniel Clark, the Delegate from the Territory of Orleans, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Friday, December 18.

Embargo.

The following is the Message from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

The communications now made, showing the great and increasing dangers with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise, are threatened, on the high seas and elsewhere, from the belligerent powers of Europe, and it being of the greatest importance to keep in safety these essential resources, I deem it my duty to recommend the subject to the consideration of Congress, who will doubtless perceive all the advantage which may be expected from an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from the ports of the United States.

Their wisdom will also see the necessity of making every preparation for whatever events may grow out of the present crisis.

I ask a return of the letters of Messrs. Armstrong and Champagny, which it would be improper to make public.

TH. JEFFERSON.

Extract of a Letter from the Grand Judge, Minister of Justice, to the Imperial Attorney-General for the Council of Prizes.

Paris, September 18, 1807.

Sir: I have submitted to his Majesty, the Emperor and King, the doubts raised by his Excellency, the Minister of Marine and Colonies, on the extent of certain dispositions of the imperial decree of the 21st of November, 1806, which has declared the British Isles in a state of blockade.

The following are his Majesty’s intentions on the points in question:

1. May vessels of war, by virtue of the imperial decree of the 21st of November last, seize on board neutral vessels, either English property, or even all merchandise proceeding from the English manufactures or territory?

Answer.—His Majesty has intimated that, as he did not think proper to express any exception in his decree, there is no ground for making any in its execution in relation to any whomsoever, (à l’égard de qui que ce peut être.) His Majesty has postponed a decision on the question, whether armed French vessels ought to capture neutral vessels bound to or from England, even when they have no English merchandise on board.

REGNIER.

The Message, and documents accompanying it, were severally read.

Ordered, That the letters referred to in said Message be returned to the President of the United States, agreeably to his request.

On motion of Mr. Randolph, that the House do come to the following resolution:

Resolved, That an embargo be laid on all shipping, the property of citizens of the United States, now in port, or which shall hereafter arrive:

And the question being put, that the House do agree to the said resolution, and, upon the question thereupon, the yeas and nays being demanded by one-fifth of the members present, and debate arising, a motion was made by Mr. Macon, that the resolution do lie on the table; and it was resolved in the affirmative.

A message from the Senate, by Mr. Otis, their Secretary:

Mr. Speaker: The Senate have, in confidence, directed me to inform this honorable House that they have passed a bill, entitled “An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States,” in which bill they desire the concurrence of this House.

The said bill was received, read the third time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on this day.

On motion of Mr. Crowninshield,

Resolved, That this House will immediately resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole on the said bill.

The House accordingly resolved itself into the said committee; and, after some time spent therein, the Speaker resumed the chair, and Mr. Masters reported that the committee had had the said bill under consideration, but not having time to go through the same, had directed him to ask for leave to sit again.

Resolved, That this House will, to-morrow, again resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill, entitled “An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States.”

And then the House adjourned.

Monday, December 21.

The House met but transacted no legislative business.

The Embargo Act.

In secret session, the House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill from the Senate, entitled “An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States;” and, after some time spent therein, rose, and reported the bill, with several amendments; which were twice read, and, on the question severally put thereupon, agreed to by the House.

A motion being made, by Mr. Crowninshield, to amend the amendment reported by the Committee of the Whole, by striking out the words “letters of marque excepted,” and the word “retained,” in the tenth line of the amendment, and insert the word “relanded;” and the word “retained,” in the twelfth line, and insert the word “relanded:” Whereupon, it was resolved in the affirmative.

Ordered, That the said bill, with the amendments, be read a third time this day: Whereupon, the question was stated, that the bill sent from the Senate, “An act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States,” together with the amendments agreed to, do pass.

Whereupon, the question was stated that the said bill, with the amendments, do pass: it was resolved in the affirmative—yeas 82, nays 44, as follows:

Yeas.—Lemuel J. Alston, Willis Alston, jr., Ezekiel Bacon, David Bard, Joseph Barker, Burwell Bassett, John Blake, jr., Thomas Blount, John Boyle, Robert Brown, William A. Burwell, William Butler, Joseph Calhoun, George W. Campbell, Peter Carlton, John Chandler, Matthew Clay, John Clopton, Orchard Cook, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, John Dawson, Josiah Deane, Joseph Desha, Daniel M. Durell, William Findlay, James Fisk, Meshack Franklin, Francis Gardner, Peterson Goodwyn, Isaiah L. Green, John Heister, William Helms, David Holmes, Benjamin Howard, Daniel Ilsley, Richard M. Johnson, Walter Jones, Thomas Kenan, Nehemiah Knight, John Lambert, John Love, Robert Marion, William McCreery, John Montgomery, Nicholas R. Moore. Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, John Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Roger Nelson, Thomas Newbold, Thomas Newton, Wilson C. Nicholas, John Porter, John Pugh, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Matthias Richards, Samuel Riker, Lemuel Sawyer, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, Jedediah K. Smith, Henry Southard, Clement Storer, Peter Swart, John Taylor, David Thomas, Abram Trigg, George M. Troup, James I. Van Allen, Philip Van Cortlandt, Jesse Wharton, Robert Whitehill, Isaac Wilbour, Marmaduke Williams, Alexander Wilson, Richard Wynn, and James Witherell.

Nays.—Evan Alexander, William W. Bibb, William Blackledge, John Campbell, Epaphroditus Champion, Martin Chittenden, Howell Cobb, John Culpepper, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, jr., James Elliot, William Ely, Barent Gardenier, James M. Garnett, Charles Goldsborough, Edwin Gray, John Harris, William Hoge, James Holland, Robert Jenkins, James Kelly, Philip B. Key, William Kirkpatrick, Joseph Lewis, jr., Edward St. Loe Livermore, Matthew Lyon, Josiah Masters, William Milnor, Jonathan O. Mosely, Timothy Pitkin, jr., Josiah Quincy, John Randolph, John Rowan, John Russell, Dennis Smelt, Samuel Smith, Richard Stanford, William Stedman, Lewis B. Sturges, Samuel Taggart, Benjamin Tallmadge, Jabez Upham, Archibald Van Horn, and Killian K. Van Rensselaer.

Ordered, That the Clerk of this House do carry the said bill, as amended, to the Senate, and desire their concurrence.

The bill is as follows:

An Act laying an embargo on all ships and vessels in the ports and harbors of the United States.

Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That an embargo be and hereby is laid on all ships and vessels in the ports and places within the limits or jurisdiction of the United States, cleared or not cleared, bound to any foreign port or place; and that no clearance be furnished to any ship or vessel bound to such foreign port or place, except vessels under the immediate direction of the President of the United States; and that the President be authorized to give such instructions to the officers of the revenue, and of the navy and revenue cutters of the United States, as shall appear best adapted for carrying the same into full effect: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the departure of any foreign ship or vessel, either in ballast, or with the goods, wares, and merchandise, on board of such foreign ship or vessel, when notified of this act.

Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That during the continuance of this act, no registered or sea-letter vessel, having on board goods, wares, and merchandise, shall be allowed to depart from one port of the United States to another within the same, unless the master, owner, consignee, or factor of such vessel, shall first give bond with one or more sureties to the collector of the district from which she is bound to depart, in a sum of double the value of the vessel and cargo; that the said goods, wares, and merchandise shall be relanded in some port of the United States, dangers of the seas excepted; which bond, and also a certificate from the collector where the same may be relanded, shall, by the collectors respectively, be transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury. All armed vessels possessing public commissions from any foreign power are not to be considered as liable to the embargo laid by this act.

Tuesday, December 22.

Importation of Slaves.

Mr. Marion presented the petition of sundry merchants and others, in Charleston, South Carolina, stating that many vessels had cleared out from thence for the purpose of importing slaves, before the law was passed by Congress prohibiting the importation of slaves, and some had cleared out immediately after the passing of the law, and had been detained by accidents beyond the time limited by law; and praying that a law may be passed affording them relief.

The question being put on a motion made by Mr. Marion for a reference of this petition to the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures—

Mr. Masters said if there was any subject in favor of which a petition should not be referred, it was the slave trade. These petitioners knew when the prohibitory law would go into operation, and they were not entitled to relief by the laws of God or man.

The motion for reference was negatived—yeas 37, nays 39.

Thursday, December 31.

General Wilkinson.

Mr. Randolph then rose for the purpose of making a motion, and giving information to the House which he had just received. This was a duty which he owed, not only to himself, but to the enlightened and independent freeholders who gave him a seat on this floor, and to the country at large. Within a few days, information had been put into his possession, of a nature and on a subject which he deemed it proper for the constituted authority to inquire into. Had this information come earlier into his possession, he should not till now have delayed giving it publicity. He would first state certain facts, and those facts would be the ground of his motion, on which he should offer no argument. Mr. R. then read the following documents:

[TRANSLATION.]

New Orleans, January 20, 1796.

In the galley the Victoria, Bernardo Molina, Patron, there have been sent to Don Vincent Folch nine thousand six hundred and forty dollars; which sum, without making the least use of it, you will hold at my disposal, to deliver it at the moment that an order may be presented to you by the American General, Don James Wilkinson. God preserve you many years.

The BARON DE CARONDELET.

To Señor Don Tomas Portell.

I certify that the foregoing is a copy of its original to which I refer.

TOMAS PORTELL.

New Madrid, June 27, 1796.

Fort Washington, Sept. 22, 1796.

Ill health and many pressing engagements must be my apology for a short letter. I must refer you to my letter to the Baron for several particulars, and for a detail of my perils and abuses. I must beg leave to refer you to our friend Power, whom I find of youthful enterprise and fidelity. He certainly deserves well of the Court, and I don’t doubt but he will be rewarded.

What political crisis is the present! and how deeply interesting in its probable results, in all its tendencies! … and thereby must hope it may not be carried into execution. If it is, an entire reform in the police and military establishments of Louisiana will be found immediately indispensable to the security of the Mexican provinces. I beg you to write me fully on this question in cipher by Power, whose presence in Philadelphia is necessary, as well to clear his own character, attacked by Wayne, as to support the fact of the outrage recently offered to the Spanish Crown in his person, and to bring me either the person or the deposition of a man now under your command, who had been suborned by Wayne to bear false witness against me, and afterwards, for fear he should recant, bribed him to leave Kentucky. Power will give you the perfect of this infamous transaction, and I conjure you by all the ties of friendship and of policy to assist him on this occasion. If Spain does not resent the outrage offered to Power in the face of all Kentucky … My letter to the Baron will explain the motives which carry me to Philadelphia: from thence I will write again to you. Power will explain to you circumstances which justify the belief of the great treachery that has been practised with respect to the money lately sent me. For the love of God and friendship, enjoin great secrecy and caution in all our concerns. Never suffer my name to be written or spoken. The suspicion of Washington is wide awake. Beware of Bradford, the Fort Pitt refugee—he seeks to make peace—there are spies every where. We have a report here that you are appointed Governor of Louisiana. God grant it, as I presume the Baron will be promoted. I am your affectionate friend.

W.

Copy of a letter in cipher received from General Wilkinson. Natchez, February 6, 1797.

MANUEL GAYOSO DE LEMOS.

In a separate paper, he says what follows:

This will be delivered to you by Noland, who, you know, is a child of my own raising—true to his profession and firm in his attachments to Spain. I consider him a powerful instrument in your hands, should occasion offer—I will answer for his conduct. I am deeply interested in whatsoever concerns him, and I confidently recommend him to your warmest protection. I am, evidently, your affectionate

WILKINSON.

A copy.

MAN. GAYOSO DE LEMOS.

N. B.—Don Gayoso was then Governor of Natchez, and the same year was made Governor of Louisiana.

Mr. Randolph stated the following to be an extract of a letter signed “T. Power,” whose handwriting, he said, could be identified:

“On the 27th of the same month [October last] appeared in the Richmond Enquirer a certificate given by myself to General Wilkinson in New Orleans on the 16th of May preceding. Immediately on my getting sight of this piece, which was the same or the next day, I addressed a note to his Excellency General Wilkinson, [No. 3.] Of this I did not keep a copy, and therefore dare not vouch that it is an exact literal transcript of the original; but I will be bold to say that it is nearly (or, to make use of the General’s own language, substantially) the same.

“Between my repeated declarations to many of my friends and acquaintances (I must say it with a blush) and this certificate, there is a manifest contradiction. And between this same certificate and the deductions to be drawn from my declaration before the Richmond Court, there is an apparent inconsistency, which it is now my task to clear up and reconcile.

“During General Wilkinson’s residence in New Orleans, last winter, I used occasionally to visit him. A few days before he left New Orleans, I waited upon him one morning, and after some conversation on certain transactions that had taken place at a former period in the Western country, and on the delicate situation in which his conduct during the winter was likely to place him, he asked me if I had any objection to give him a certificate that might help him to silence that foul-mouthed Bradford, and refute the assertions of the editor of the Western World. I replied without hesitation that I had none, and would give him one with pleasure, provided he promised me it should not be published. On this he assured me that the only use he proposed to make of it was to lay it before the President, with the view to prove the falsehood of the charges circulated against him, vindicate his character, and secure the confidence of the Executive. This, if not exactly, is substantially what the General said. He then desired me to sit down and write the certificate. I observed that I might not make it out entirely to his satisfaction; and that, as he best knew the points he wished should be embraced in it, he had better make it out himself, and I would copy it. To this he agreed. Next morning, I waited on his Excellency, and he presented me the certificate, which I copied, as it has been published, with a few alterations. One—a very material one—is that, after these words: ‘Do most solemnly declare that I have at no time carried or delivered to Gen. James Wilkinson’—I erased the words, ‘either directly or indirectly,’ and declared to the General I could not insert those words. He did not insist, and contented himself with saying that he wished me to insert them if my conscience would allow it, but not otherwise. This is ingenuously exactly what passed between the General and myself at that time.

“Now let me with the same frankness and ingenuousness, without referring to any preceding or subsequent event, narrate the transaction of 1796, alluded to in my certificate, and concerning which I offered to give testimony in the federal circuit court in Richmond. It is the same that is the subject of the affidavits of Messrs. Derbigny and Mercier. That of the former gentleman is correct as to substance, for I actually did receive from Captain Don Thomas Portell, commandant of New Madrid, the sum of $9,640 for General Wilkinson, towards the latter end of June or beginning of July, 1796, which was packed up in the manner described by Mr. Derbigny, and when I was stopped and my boat searched on the Ohio by Lieutenant Steele, under the orders of General Anthony Wayne, I had other sums on board, but this was the only one I had received for General Wilkinson. On my arrival at Louisville, determined not to expose myself a second time to military insult, and fearful of being overtaken by Steele on his return, and of being again overhauled, I landed my cargo, purchased a horse, and proceeded by land to Cincinnati. As I passed through Lexington, I published in Stewart’s Kentucky Herald my affidavit concerning this outrage, supported by those of the spectators of the transaction, Welsh, White, and Sansom; preceded by a few strictures on this military piracy, signed Impartial. And I now take this opportunity of clearing General Wilkinson of the charge of being the author of it, as is asserted by Bradford, of New Orleans, and declare it was written by myself, and that excepting Captain Campbell Smith, no person ever saw it before it was put into the hands of the printer.