NINTH CONGRESS.—SECOND SESSION. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Monday, December 1, 1806.

This being the day appointed by the constitution for the annual meeting of Congress, the following members of the House of Representatives appeared, and took their seats, to wit:

From New Hampshire—Silas Betton, Caleb Ellis, David Hough, Samuel Tenney, and Thomas W. Thompson.

From Massachusetts—Joseph Barker, Barnabas Bidwell, John Chandler, Orchard Cook, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, William Ely, Isaiah L. Green, Seth Hastings, Jeremiah Nelson, Josiah Quincy, Ebenezer Seaver, William Stedman, Samuel Taggart, and Joseph B. Varnum.

From Vermont—Martin Chittenden, James Elliot, James Fisk, and Gideon Olin.

From Rhode Island—Nehemiah Knight, and Joseph Stanton.

From Connecticut—Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, jr., Jonathan O. Mosely, Timothy Pitkin, jr., Lewis B. Sturges, and Benjamin Tallmadge.

From New York—John Blake, jr., Silas Halsey, John Russell, Peter Sailly, Thomas Sammons, Martin G. Schuneman, Philip Van Cortlandt, and Killian K. Van Rensselaer.

From New Jersey—Ezra Darby, Ebenezer Elmer, John Lambert, James Sloan, and Henry Southard.

From Pennsylvania—Isaac Anderson, David Bard, Robert Brown, Joseph Clay, Frederick Conrad, William Findlay, John Hamilton, James Kelly, John Pugh, John Rea, Jacob Richards, John Smilie, Samuel Smith, John Whitehill, and Robert Whitehill.

From Delaware—James M. Broom.

From Maryland—Charles Goldsborough, Patrick Magruder, William McCreery, Nicholas R. Moore, and Roger Nelson.

From Virginia—Burwell Bassett, John Claiborne, John Clopton, John Dawson, John W. Eppes, James M. Garnett, Peterson Goodwyn, David Holmes, Walter Jones, Joseph Lewis, jr., Thomas Newton, jr., and John Randolph.

From North Carolina—Willis Alston, jr., Thomas Kenan, Duncan MacFarland, Nathaniel Macon, Speaker, Richard Stanford, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

From South Carolina—William Butler, Robert Marion, Thomas Moore, and David R. Williams.

From Georgia—Peter Early, and David Meriwether.

From Ohio—Jeremiah Morrow.

From Kentucky—George M. Bedinger, John Boyle, and Thomas Sanford.

From Tennessee—George W. Campbell, and John Rhea.

Delegate from the Mississippi Territory—William Lattimore.

Two new members, to wit: from Connecticut Theodore Dwight, returned to serve in this House, as a member for the said State, in the room of John Cotton Smith, who has resigned his seat; and, from Virginia, William A. Burwell, returned to serve in this House, as a member for the said State, in the room of Christopher Clark, who has resigned his seat, appeared, produced their credentials, were qualified, and took their seats in the House.

Daniel Clark, returned to serve as a delegate from the Orleans Territory of the United States, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

And a quorum, consisting of a majority of the whole number, being present, a message was sent to the Senate to inform them that a quorum of the House is assembled, and ready to proceed to business.

A message from the Senate informed the House, that a quorum of the Senate is assembled, and ready to proceed to business.

Mr. Dawson and Mr. George W. Campbell were appointed a committee, on the part of the House, jointly with such committee as may be appointed on the part of the Senate, to wait on the President of the United States, and inform him that a quorum of the two Houses is assembled, and ready to receive any communications he may be pleased to make to them.

A message from the Senate informed the House that the Senate have appointed a committee on their part for the same purpose.

Tuesday, December 2.

Several other members, to wit: from New York, Henry W. Livingston, and Uri Tracy; from Maryland, John Campbell; from Virginia, John Morrow, Thomas M. Randolph, John Smith, Philip R. Thompson, and Alexander Wilson; from North Carolina, James Holland; and from South Carolina, Elias Earle, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

A Message was received from the President of the United States. [For which, see Senate proceedings of this date, ante, page 485.]

Wednesday, December 3.

Several other members, to wit: from New York, Josiah Masters and David Thomas; from Maryland, Leonard Covington; and from South Carolina, Levi Casey, appeared and took their seats in the House.

Another new member, to wit, Edward Lloyd, from Maryland, returned to serve in this House as a member for the said State, in the room of Joseph H. Nicholson, who has resigned his seat, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Monday, December 15.

Two other members, to wit: George Clinton, junior, from New York, and William Dickson, from Tennessee, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

Coast Survey.

Mr. Dana, of Connecticut.—In 1802, an act was passed, authorizing a survey of Long Island Sound. In pursuance of that act, the Secretary of the Treasury caused a survey to be taken by two men, who appear to have been, what the act intended, intelligent and proper persons. And there has since been published a chart of the Sound, handsomely executed, on a large scale, which must, I presume, be regarded as convenient and valuable by those concerned in that branch of navigation.

At the last session of Congress, an act was passed for another survey. It made provision for surveying the coast of North Carolina between Cape Hatteras and Cape Fear, with the shoals lying off or between those capes. I understand that measures have been taken for executing this act, but that the vessel employed in the service, and all the papers respecting the survey which had been made, had been lost near Ocracoke Inlet, in one of the desolating storms experienced on the coast in the course of the present year.

The surveys, which have thus been authorized, were perhaps of the most urgent necessity; but other surveys of the coast are desirable. What has already been done may be regarded as introductory to a general survey of the coasts of the United States under authority of the Government. With a correct chart of every part of the coast, our seamen would no longer be under the necessity of relying on the imperfect or erroneous accounts given of our coasts by foreign navigators. I hope the lives of our seamen, the interest of our merchants, and the benefits to the revenue, will be regarded as affording ample compensation for making a complete survey of the coasts of the United States at the public expense.

The information which may be obtained will also be useful in designating portions of territorial sea to be regarded as the maritime precincts of the United States, within which, of course, the navigation ought to be free from the belligerent searches and seizures.

It is proposed to extend the survey to the distance of twenty leagues from the shore. This distance is mentioned with a view to the second article of the treaty with Great Britain in 1783, which describes our boundaries as “comprehending all islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States.”

The resolution, which I propose for the consideration of the House, is expressed in these words:

Resolved, That the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures be instructed to inquire into the expediency of making provision for a survey of the coasts of the United States, designating the several islands, with the shoals and roads or places of anchorage within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States.

Wednesday, December 17.

Two other members, to wit: Peleg Wadsworth, from Massachusetts, and Daniel C. Verplanck, from New York, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

Thursday, December 18.

Another member, to wit, Andrew Gregg, from Pennsylvania, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Importation of Slaves.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the bill prohibiting the importation of slaves.

Mr. Bidwell observed, that there were strong objections against the forfeiture of persons of color imported into the United States. As the bill stood, the forfeiture was to be followed by a sale of these persons, as property, as slaves. On this point there was a great diversity in the laws and habits of the respective States; to avoid an interference with which, it appeared to him most advisable to do away the forfeiture, leaving their disposition to the provisions of the laws of the several States. If this part of the section should be struck out, those laws would operate on this point.

There would, he said, be a serious difficulty in adopting the principle of forfeiture accompanied with a sale. In some of the States, the idea of such a species of property was excluded by their constitutions; in those States there could be no such thing as a slave. It was true, that the constitutions and laws of such States did not go the length of interfering with the laws of other States, where slavery was permitted. If fugitives from them sought an asylum in the State of Massachusetts, for instance, they were faithfully restored, under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Neither did the laws of Massachusetts interfere with travellers passing through it with slaves; but so far as it respected persons coming to reside in the State, they were manumitted, as a matter of course.[44] He believed that no contract for their sale within the State would be of any validity; nor did he believe any power had been given to the United States to render such sale valid. If there were such a power, its tendency would be to introduce into that State persons contrary to its laws. If such a sale were valid, it would interfere with those laws; and if not valid, it would be a perfect nullity, and the provision be thus altogether inoperative. It was admitted that there was no probability of such an importation into States where slavery was not allowed; yet such a thing might take place, and Congress ought not to legislate under the idea that it would not take place.

Mr. Early observed, that this motion could only be viewed as an old thing offered in a new shape, intended to have the same effect as the motion offered the preceding day declaring persons of color imported into the United States free. He thought it betrayed great inconsistency. Those who advocated it had yesterday supported an amendment which, by declaring all such persons free, went directly to interfere with the laws of States where slavery was permitted; to-day they gravely maintained the inexpediency of any such interference whatever. The great difficulty insisted upon was, that the operation of this law in States where slavery was not permitted, would contravene the existing laws by forfeiting the imported slaves. But this difficulty had no solidity in it—it was altogether ideal, as from the nature of things the case of an importation in such States could not occur; at all events, it was among the most improbable events in nature.

Mr. Bidwell moved to strike out all that part of the fourth section which related to the forfeiture of negroes.

Mr. Early asked, what substitute was intended.

Mr. Bidwell replied, that he should move that the committee rise, and that the bill be recommitted.

Mr. Quincy, of Massachusetts.—I am opposed to the motion of my colleague, (Mr. Bidwell,) to strike out the forfeiture. The United States ought to retain the control of them. What is to be done with them, is another question. But for the United States to divest the old owners of their right, and provide no means for their protection afterwards, appears to me cruel and dangerous. They are helpless, ignorant of our laws, and of our language and manners. How are they to be supported? If imported into the South, they will be slaves; if into the North, vagabonds. My colleague ought to show what is to be done with them. I am not prepared with a plan, but I should suppose that they might be disposed of in service, in such States as would admit them, at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury. If forfeited to the United States, we can, by a general provision, do what we please with them. And I have no doubt that what we do will be both prudent and humane.

Mr. D. R. Williams.—I agree with the gentleman from Massachusetts, who spoke last, that the amendment ought not to be adopted. It is incumbent on the gentleman who introduced it, (Mr. Bidwell,) to tell us what is to be done with these negroes, if they are not to be forfeited. I say, it is his duty to inform us how they are to be disposed of. Give up the idea of forfeiture, and I challenge the gentleman to invent fines, penalties, or punishments of any sort, sufficient to restrain the slave trade. The same identical persons will break this law who have broken the act of 1794. And who are these persons? They are the gentleman’s own countrymen; they are the people of Rhode Island, who are concerned in this business. You cannot stop the trade by penalties. I have myself seen a ship of more than three hundred tons, the George Washington, sold for five dollars. Nobody would bid. The gentleman over the way shakes his head; he acknowledges the truth of my remarks on his countrymen.

Mr. Bidwell knew nothing of the New England men being concerned in this trade. He lived in the interior of the country, and had little acquaintance with mercantile men. If they were concerned, he was willing that they should be punished by fine and penalties, and to any extent; but he was still opposed to a forfeiture of the negroes generally by a law of Congress. The States may determine, perhaps, whether it shall be done.

Mr. Quincy, of Massachusetts.—I think I now understand the plan of my colleague, (Mr. Bidwell,) and I like it less than before. It is “to leave them to the operation of the laws of the respective States.” This is only another form of expression of leaving them to be slaves. It is leaving the title of these persons according to the laws of the State into which they are imported. Is the gentleman sure this will not be an encouragement? It certainly will be, if the importer can find means to evade the penalty of the act; for there he has all the advantage of a market enhanced by our ineffectual attempt to prohibit. If he relies upon the penalty, I have no doubt it will be evaded. Persons without responsibility will be made captains of these ships, or other means devised to escape the penalty, and as his property is, by this amendment, secured to the owner, great profits will result from the traffic.

Mr. Early.—I did suppose that the United States would pass a law themselves, as soon as they had the power, to prohibit the slave trade effectually. But the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Bidwell) proposes that Congress shall relinquish all the credit of this measure, and resign it up to the States. This, I hope and trust, Congress will never agree to.

If the amendment prevails, I tell you that slaves will continue to be imported as heretofore. I tell the gentleman from Massachusetts, what every man in the Southern States knows already, that slaves will continue to be imported, unless you forfeit them. You cannot get hold of the ships employed in this traffic. Besides, slaves will be brought into Georgia from East Florida. They will be brought into the Mississippi Territory from the bay of Mobile. You cannot inflict any other penalty, or devise any other adequate means of prevention, than a forfeiture of the Africans in whose possession they may be found after importation. I tell you this is the only effectual method. I implore Congress to look seriously on this subject. I implore them, if they do any thing, to pass a law which will not disgrace themselves.

Mr. Pitkin, of Connecticut.—Mr. Chairman, I rise, sir, for the purpose of making a motion, which, I trust, will supersede the one now before the committee. It is, that the committee should rise, and that the bill before them be referred to a select committee. Under this motion, I presume it will be in order to state my reasons, generally, without being confined to the question of amending the fourth section of the bill, which is now before the committee.

As the persons thus brought into the country contrary to law, are to be “forfeited,” they are to be proceeded with, as appears by a subsequent section of the bill, “in the manner prescribed by the act, entitled, ‘An act to regulate the collection of duties on imposts and tonnage.’”

What, sir, is this process? They are to be seized by the revenue officers as goods, wares, and merchandise, imported contrary to law. They are to be libelled in the federal courts, are to be condemned, and then sold to the highest bidder by an officer of the court at public auction, and one-half of the avails, at least, is to be paid into the Treasury of the United States. This, sir, is a proposition, this is a mode of proceeding against those persons, to which I cannot bring my mind to consent, unless absolute necessity should require it. What, sir, shall we, in a law made for the express purpose of preventing the slave trade, declare that these unfortunate blacks, brought into this country, not only against their own will, but against the express provisions of the law itself, shall be sold as slaves for the benefit of the United States, and the price of their slavery be lodged in the public coffers? I trust not, sir; I believe some other mode may be devised to prevent the slave trade. While I am unwilling to give my assent to this mode of disposing of them, I am free to confess that I feel the force of the remarks made by the Southern gentleman, that, unless some care should be taken of them after they are landed, the property, and perhaps the lives of those who live in States where slavery is permitted, would be insecure. And here, sir, I would suggest, whether, instead of selling those unfortunate beings as slaves, provision might not be made, that they should be disposed of for a term of years; say seven, eight, or ten years, until they should be able to support themselves, and at the end of the term they should be free. If Congress have power to prohibit their importation, they certainly have power to say, that the imported shall have no right or claim whatever in them; and also to declare what shall be their state and condition when imported. Indeed, sir, Congress have already determined this principle in May, 1800. They passed an act, in addition to an act, entitled “An act to prohibit the carrying on the slave trade from the United States, with any foreign place or country.”

Mr. Early.—In answer to the gentleman from Connecticut, I will acknowledge that there is an inconsistency in this bill. But it seems very wonderful that the gentleman has at last found it out. I offered an amendment, a short time since, in order to obviate this inconsistency; but, unless I am much mistaken, that very gentleman voted against it.

In the name of all the friends of this bill, I offer my most grateful acknowledgments to the gentleman for proving, in the most incontestable manner, the absolute necessity of that very provision in the bill which he opposes. He has shown, most undeniably, that you must forfeit the negroes, that you cannot possibly get at the vessel or the captain, to operate on them. In the name of common sense, I ask you, then, what can you find to operate on, but the negroes imported? and yet, with these truths staring them in the face, gentlemen are opposed to the measure. I wish the gentleman from Connecticut, from the immensity of the resources which he has displayed on this subject, would tell us what, beside the negroes, can be found for the law to operate upon.

I am willing that the committee rise, but not for the purpose mentioned. The gentleman moves you to rise, and refer the bill to a select committee; and for what? To determine the principle of the bill; not to specify the detail. What can the select committee report? Unless instructions are given them, they must report the same bill, and then you will be just where you are now.

The question being taken on the committee’s rising, it was carried—ayes 72.

Mr. Pitkin hoped they would not have leave to sit again.

Mr. Sloan.—Notwithstanding the very high respect I entertain for the gentleman who reported this bill, I think it is easier to make an entire new one, than to undertake to amend this, so that it will answer.

The question being taken on the committee having leave to sit again, it was lost—ayes 45, noes 57.

The bill was then recommitted to a committee of seven, consisting of Messrs. Early, T. M. Randolph, Kelly, J. Campbell, Kenan, Cocke, and Van Rensselaer.

Friday, December 19.

Another member, to wit, Abram Trigg, from Virginia, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Monday, December 22.

Manhattan Company.

Mr. Clinton presented a petition from the President and Directors of the Manhattan Company in New York. The petition states that the law which directs that custom-house bonds shall be exclusively deposited in the United States Bank, affects their interests very injuriously; that the monthly deposits at New York amount, on an average, to $250,000. That the merchants dealing at the Manhattan Bank, make in Manhattan notes large payments on account of custom-house bonds into the United States Bank, which, by means of their notes; draws largely on the Manhattan Bank for specie; that, by these and similar means, the United States Bank regulates the discount, and contracts the business of all the other banking institutions in the city. That the reasons which once existed for giving the United States Bank a preference, have since ceased, by the sale of the public stock. But the stockholders in the United States Bank are now almost entirely foreigners, which circumstance is favorable to the erection of foreign influence in this country, and ought to excite alarm.

Mr. Quincy was personally indifferent whether the petition was referred to the Committee of Ways and Means, but, as the subject manifestly affected the revenue, it was proper to refer it to that committee. It was a question very material to the revenue, whether the custom-house bonds should be deposited in the United States Bank. The contrary supposition implies that all banks are solid and secure.

Mr. Crowninshield conceived that the subject of the petition had no more relation to the Committee of Ways and Means than to that of Commerce and Manufactures, or any other standing committee of the House. Its object was, to procure relief against an injurious monopoly, possessed by a particular banking company. It neither proposed to give or take away one shilling of the public money. The Committee of Ways and Means were already pressed with a great deal of matter. Mr. C. did not wish to trouble the House with the United States Bank, but more than sixteen years they had enjoyed an exclusive monopoly, which has been very injurious to all other banking institutions, as has been very properly detailed in the petition. He meant to propose a plan for equalizing the benefits of the deposits. This is a subject which deeply interested the constituents of his colleague, (Mr. Quincy.) The merchants of Boston cannot procure any large sums except from the United States Bank, which controls all the other banks in that town.

The Speaker informed Mr. Crowninshield that it was improper to speak of any gentleman’s district.

Mr. Quincy observed, that all subjects relating to the revenue properly belonged to the Committee of Ways and Means. The present subject deeply implicates the revenue, because it all depends upon being safely deposited. His colleagues seemed to have a great fellow-feeling for the Committee of Ways and Means, and appeared to be anxious lest they should be pressed with too much business; but that committee had sufficient time to consider all the business referred to them.

The question being taken on referring the petition to the Committee of Ways and Means, it was lost—ayes 32. It was then referred to a select committee of nine.

Tuesday, December 23.

Another member, to wit, Edwin Gray, from Virginia, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Friday, December 26.

Another member, to wit, Matthew Clay, from Virginia, appeared and took his seat in the House; and another new member, to wit, Dennis Smelt, from Georgia, returned to serve in this House, as a member for the said State, in the room of Joseph Bryan, who has resigned his seat, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Monday, December 29.

Several other members, to wit, from Massachusetts, Phanuel Bishop; from New York, Gurdon S. Mumford and Nathan Williams, from New Jersey, William Helms; from Kentucky, John Fowler; and the Delegate from the Indiana Territory, Benjamin Parke, appeared, and took their seats in the House.

Importation of Slaves.

On motion of Mr. Early, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for the prohibition of the slave trade.

Mr. Bidwell.—It appears to me that all the objections which have been urged against the amendment under consideration, may be reduced to two. 1. That a forfeiture is necessary to deprive the importers of every motive to introduce any slaves into the country, and thus render the prohibition completely effectual. 2. That if the slaves are emancipated and turned loose in the Southern States, they will be a destructive nuisance to the people of those States. Neither of these objections is, in my apprehension, well founded. If the motion to strike out prevails, another amendment may be made, declaring that the importer has no right to the slaves, which he introduces. This will be a declaration conformable to the state of things, and in exact accordance with the laws of nature and of nations. It is not in order to offer an amendment now, but if the present motion prevails, I design to propose an amendment to this effect. This will answer the purpose completely, and remove from the importer every temptation to engage in this traffic. The idea of forfeiture proceeds wholly on a false principle. It implies that the importer has a right to the slaves. But an amendment like that which I have suggested will declare the fact as it is; it will be conformable to truth. But if the section passes as it now is, with the clause of forfeiture retained, we recognize in our statute book a false principle, which neither the constitution nor the laws of the United States have ever authorized, to wit: that a property may be had in human beings. The constitution and laws have always left the disposition of slaves to the States, and hitherto have never recognized the principle of slavery.

But if we do not forfeit the negroes, the question is asked again and again, with an air of triumph, what is to be done with them? For my part I had rather strike out the section, and do nothing at all, than retain the forfeiture. If we do nothing we shall not increase the evil. They will then be left to the States to dispose of according to the State laws. This will not increase the evil. I am, however, willing to agree to any practicable mode of disposing of them. But at any rate, I am for striking out the forfeiture, and opposed to disgracing our statute book with a recognition of the principle of slavery.

Mr. Quincy.—Since there is so general an agreement as to the end, I wish it were possible we could unite more perfectly as to the means. Those in favor of forfeiture are anxious for nothing so much as to prohibit totally the importation of slaves. Indeed, it is for this very reason they are in favor of it, because they assert, and to my mind on unquestionable ground, that this is your only effectual means of prohibition. They are also anxious that if they are brought they should not be made slaves in their part of the country. As to their being made free in the Southern States, that is out of the question. The policy of those States, the first duty of self-preservation, forbid it.

The argument of my colleague is, “forfeiture implies a right, vested in importers. Now it is disgraceful to the United States to admit such an implication. The importer has no right. He could acquire none. These persons are free by the law of nature—as free as any of us. The African prince who sold them was a usurper. The purchasers in Africa were trespassers against the law of nature. They cannot acquire any right of property in these persons, and it is shameful for the United States, by forfeiture, to admit it.” Sir, the conclusions of the gentleman are perfectly correct—his principles are solid. No man in this House denies either. Refer this question between the African prince and his subjects, and between the African and his importer, to five hundred juries in New England, and five hundred times a verdict would coincide with the principles and reasonings of my colleague. But the misfortune is, that, notwithstanding all these true and unquestionable principles, the African prince, at this day, does, and, after our law passes, will sell his subjects. To all practical purposes, a title is acquired in them, and they are passed, like other property, from one to another, in their native country. But this is not the worst. A title in this description of persons is not only allowed in Africa, but is, and must be, after your law passes, in a large section of your own country. The gentlemen from that part of the United States tell you that they cannot be allowed to be free among them. The first law, self-preservation, forbids it.

Now this is that real, practical state of things to which I invite gentlemen to look, and on which they ought to legislate.

I ask concerning it, how ought we to reason? What is our duty?

First. Do all you can to prohibit. Next, if you fail in this—if, in spite of your laws and their penalties, this description of persons be brought into the United States, then place yourselves in such a situation as may enable you best to meliorate the condition of this unhappy class of men, consistent with self-preservation, and with the deep stake which an important section of the country has in the policy which you adopt.

On both accounts forfeit. First, because it is the best means of prohibition. The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Early) declares it is the only means by which you can do it effectually. The argument he used on this point, on a former day, is to my mind conclusive. From the situation of the Southern States, particularly Georgia, you can only prevent the traffic by taking away the inducement to purchase. And this can only be done by making the right of every purchaser be forfeited as a penalty. Next, if contrary to your laws they be imported, they are thrown on the humanity of the United States. They are brought here by our citizens, and it is the duty of the National Government to reserve the control of them, so as to be certain that the best is done for the amelioration of their condition that our own safety permits. On this account, forfeit. It is only as a commercial regulation that the National Government can get this control. If we do not take that title in these persons into the United States, which the laws of some States recognize, in those States they are slaves—they must be slaves. Those States can never permit them to be any thing else. This can only be done by forfeiture. The character of your policy will depend upon what you do with them after the forfeiture. Gentlemen reason as if those persons were inevitably to be sold under the hammer. Certainly this is not the necessary consequence. Are they not after forfeiture at your control? May you not do with them what is best for human beings in that condition in which these miserable creatures are, when they first arrive in this country, naked, helpless, ignorant of our language, our climate, our laws, our character, and our manners? Are you afraid to trust the National Government, and yet, by refusing to forfeit, will you throw them under the control of the States, all of whom may, and some of them will, and must, make them slaves?

But the great objection to forfeiture is, “it admits a title.” I answer, first, this does not necessarily follow. All the effect of forfeiture is, that whatever title can be acquired in the cargo shall be vested in the United States. If the argument of the gentleman be correct, and the species of cargo be such as that, from the nature of the thing, no title can be acquired in it, then nothing can vest in the United States; and the only operation of forfeiture is to divest the importer’s color of title by the appropriate commercial term—perhaps the only term we can use effectual to this purpose, and which does not interfere with the rights of the States. Grant that these persons have all the rights of man; will not these rights be as valid against the United States as against the importer; and by taking all color of title out of the importer, do we not place the United States in the best possible situation to give efficiency to the rights of man, in respect to the persons so imported?

But, next, let us agree that forfeiture does admit a species of title, lost on one side and acquired on the other; such as we cannot prevent being recognized in those States where these importations will most frequently take place; I ask, which is best, and which most humane? Admit a title, gain it for the United States, and then make these miserable creatures free, under such circumstances, and in such time, as their condition into which they are forced permits, or deny the possibility of acquiring a title, and leave them to be slaves? But my colleague (Mr. Bidwell) has a sovereign specific for this. He says, “We do not make them slaves, we only leave them to the laws of the respective States.” But I ask, if the laws of all the States may, and those of some of the States do, and necessarily will make them slaves, “by leaving them to the operation of the laws of these States,” do we not as absolutely make them slaves as though we voted them to be such in this House? To my mind, when we have the power, if we fail to secure to ourselves the means of giving them their freedom, under proper modifications, we have an agency in making them slaves. To me it seems that the amendment proposed, striking out the forfeiture, will defeat the very end its advocates have in view. Really, sir, I fear it will happen to the honorable mover of the amendment (Mr. Bidwell) as it happened to another celebrated asserter of African rights—I mean the renowned Knight of La Mancha. We all recollect that while that worthy knight was, with all the real honesty in the world, descanting on the moral fitness of things on the eternal, unalienable, imprescriptible rights of man!—that during all that time he was exercising himself and instructing others on these themes—the very persons he had undertaken to deliver—the great African Princess Micomicona, Queen of the great African Kingdom Micomicon, with her father, her mother, her brothers, her sisters, in short her whole family, were left in absolute and irretrievable slavery; their fetters not knocked off, nor their shackles lightened, nor one ray of light thrown in upon their prison. And yet the good knight, with all possible self-complacency, astride of his theories, was couching his lance, scouring the plain, the mirror of philanthropic chivalry, the very cream of the milk of human kindness!

Now, I say, sir, a little more practicable good, and a little less theoretic impulse. Reason and legislate according to the actual state of this description of persons. Place yourselves so as to do the best possible for their good. They are thrown on your mercy. Do not trust to others. You can be most certain this power will not be abused in your own hands. Forfeit—because this is the technical word for getting the control of them, and the only certain way of making them secure of your humanity. But what shall be done with them? That is a subsequent consideration. It is enough for me to know that this House can never do any thing with them which humanity and self-preservation do not dictate. Gentlemen will not pretend that these Africans have more rights by nature than our children. And yet, in every parish, poor children are bound out, without their consent, until they are of age, and of capacity to take care of themselves. These Africans are as helpless, ignorant, and incompetent as such children, and the wisdom of the National Legislature certainly can, and I have no doubt will, devise means to make them useful members of society, without any infringement of the rights of man.

Mr. Macon, (the Speaker.)—I still consider this a commercial question. The laws of nations have nothing more to do with it than the laws of the Turks or the Hindoos. We derive our powers of legislation not from the laws of nations, but from the constitution. If this is not a commercial question, I would thank the gentleman to show what part of the constitution gives us any right to legislate on this subject. It is in vain to talk of turning these creatures loose to cut our throats.

Suppose we leave them as the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Bidwell) has suggested, what will become of them? They will be smuggled in and made slaves. All the arguments which I have yet heard have served to confirm the opinion that a forfeiture is the only effectual mode of prohibition; and though our sincerity has been doubted with an if, yet I believe every member in this House is solicitous to put a complete stop to this nefarious traffic.

Wednesday, December 31.

Importation of Slaves.

The House proceeded to consider the amendments reported by the Committee of the Whole on the twenty-ninth instant, to the bill to prohibit the importation or bringing of slaves into the United States, or the territories thereof, after the 31st of December.

Mr. Sloan was decidedly opposed to the amendment. He was aware that some might charge him with departing from his well-known peaceable principles, in contending for so sanguinary a punishment as death. But many crimes inferior to this were punished with death, and he thought that there ought to be a proportion in these things. Mr. S. stated the hardships of the Africans, and the cruel circumstances attending their importation, and insisted on the magnitude of the crime at considerable length.

After some conversation between Mr. Smilie and the Speaker, on a point of order, Mr. Dana called for a division of the question. The question was accordingly divided, the first being on striking out of the bill so much as inflicts the punishment of death.

Mr. Ely was against striking out. He deemed the crime in question as one of the most heinous kind, and one which ought to be punished capitally. But his principal reason for advocating so severe a punishment was, that he thought it the most effectual method of putting a stop to the trade. The other provisions of the bill were, in his opinion, not sufficient. If the punishment of death was inflicted, he presumed no persons would venture to engage in the trade, and run the risk of being punished, especially, as the traffic is one of the most uncertain and perilous kinds. It is said, if you punish with such severity, none will inform; but will any one venture to run the risk under this impression? Mr. E. thought not. Besides, this is the most humane punishment, because it will most effectually prevent the accumulation of miseries that result from the trade. It will, also, remove all the difficulties on the subject of forfeiture, by preventing the introduction of slaves.

Mr. Tallmadge said he considered the question before the House to be, whether we should strike out that part of the section which attaches the crime of felony to this nefarious traffic, and, of course, annexes to it the punishment of death. He trusted the House would not consent to strike out that clause of the bill, the retention of which should receive his hearty support.

Since I have had the honor of a seat in this House, I can scarcely recollect an instance in which the members seem so generally to agree in the principles of a bill, and yet differ so widely as to its details. There seems to be great unanimity respecting the atrocity of the crime, but a wide difference of opinion as to the measures necessary to prevent it. To me, it is matter of surprise as well as of regret, that gentlemen, who appear so ardently engaged to prevent the introduction of slaves into our country, should not be willing to unite with us in providing for it an adequate punishment. The evils which may be expected to result from this commerce, if persisted in, will fall on the Southern States; and the Eastern and Middle States are accused of carrying it on. If this be the fact, and gentlemen are sincere in their declarations, why will they not unite with us to mete out that punishment which, on their own statements, will fall exclusively on those who are concerned in this execrable traffic from the Northern States?

Mr. Mosely.—The only objection which has been made against this section of the bill, as it was originally introduced, is, that the severity of the penalty as there prescribed, would probably prevent the law from being carried into execution.

I entirely agree in the justice of the general remark, that it is the certainty, more than the severity, of the punishment, which tends to prevent the commission of crimes; that when the penalty is excessive or disproportioned to the offence, it will naturally create a repugnance to the law, and render its execution odious.

But I would ask, in the first place, what punishment can be considered as too severe to be inflicted on this inhuman and murderous traffic? Viewed in all its consequences, there is hardly to be found, I apprehend, in the whole catalogue of crimes, one attended with more accumulated guilt. I have, indeed, sir, heard no gentleman suggest any thing in palliation of this offence, or deny that it is justly deserving of death. Why, then, are we to presume that the law would not be enforced? The gentlemen from the South assure us that they, and the people whom they represent, are sincerely solicitous to prevent the further importation of slaves into this country, and they will cheerfully and cordially co-operate in the most effectual measures for that purpose. Will they, then, from motives of tenderness to the persons employed in importing them, be unwilling to subject those persons to the punishment they justly merit?

Sir, there is one circumstance worthy of attention, which I think must obviate every objection of this sort. Who are the people engaged in this business? We have been repeatedly told, and told with an air of some triumph, by gentlemen from the South, that it is not their citizens; that they have no concern in this nefarious traffic; that it is the people from the Northern States who import these negroes into the Southern States, and thereby seduce their citizens to become their purchasers. If this be the fact, are we to believe that they will entertain any particular feelings of partiality or passion towards this class of people, or that they will not feel a just degree of indignation towards them, and be disposed to subject them to the most exemplary punishment? And as it respects the great body of the people in the Northern States, at least, I will presume to say, of the State which I have the honor to represent, should any of their citizens be convicted upon this law, so far from charging their Southern brethren with cruelty or severity in hanging them, they would acknowledge the favor with gratitude. When we consider the character of the persons engaged in this traffic, that they are the most hardened and abandoned of the human species, and that it is extremely lucrative, can we suppose that any penalty short of death will deter them from it? I shall be very glad if even this will have the effect.

Mr. Lloyd.—Though this traffic is sanctioned by the Constitution and laws of the United States, I regard it with hatred and abhorrence, and conceive it to be of the highest importance that we take means to put a complete stop to its further continuance. But, in my opinion, the punishment of death is not best calculated to accomplish this object. Besides, it is not proportional to the crime. This subject has not, I conceive, been fairly argued. Very few of the negroes brought into this country are kidnapped and stolen away. Look at the condition of the people of Africa. Three-fourths of those brought into this country are slaves originally, either by descent or conquest. It is a fact that slavery prevails extensively in Africa. Those taken in conquest are disposed of and sent abroad on account of the vindictive spirit of those people. Such is their thirst for revenge, that this is absolutely necessary for the safety of the conqueror. Of course, all the arguments urged on the ground of the slaves being kidnapped and carried away from a state of freedom, are fallacious.

Mr. Olin.—I would ask gentlemen if they would not as soon be willing to be brought to the halter as to be made slaves for life? If they would, and I trust they would, man-stealing is a crime as bad as murder, and ought to be punished as heavy. I was at first against the punishment of death; but I own that gentlemen have convinced me by their arguments, and I am now the other way. I am persuaded that gentlemen will think there is nothing dishonorable in this changing one’s mind.

Mr. Early.—I formerly thought that the decision on this question was not a matter of any great importance; but as it seems now to be considered as a prelude to an attack on subsequent parts of the bill, it appears to me now important that the subject be well understood and rightly decided.

What are you told? You are now told that a forfeiture is unnecessary, and that to inflict the punishment of death is the only way to stop this trade. I consider this as an old attack revived in a new form. I hope the House will pardon me for undertaking to assign reasons for the bill as reported.

I should like to know how the fear of death will operate on a man who is bound with his slaves to a country where he knows the punishment will not be enforced. He will be bound to a country where the people see slaves every hour of their lives; where there is no such abhorrence of the crime of importing them, and where no man dare inform. My word for it, I pledge it to-day, and I wish it may be recollected; no man in the Southern section of the Union will dare inform. It would cost him more than his life is worth. No man would risk it when it led to the punishment of death, when it was not for an offence which nature revolts at. They do not consider it as a crime.

The gentleman (Mr. Smilie) has said that, in the Southern States, slavery is felt and acknowledged to be a great evil, and that therefore we will execute a severe law to prevent an increase of this evil. Permit me to tell the gentleman of a small distinction in this case. A large majority of the people in the Southern States do not consider slavery as a crime. They do not believe it immoral to hold human flesh in bondage. Many deprecate slavery as an evil; as a political evil; but not as a crime. Reflecting men apprehend, at some future day, evils, incalculable evils, from it; but it is a fact that few, very few, consider it as a crime.

It is best to be candid on this subject. If they considered the holding of men in slavery as a crime, they would necessarily accuse themselves, a thing which human nature revolts at. I will tell the truth. A large majority of people in the Southern States do not consider slavery as even an evil. Let the gentleman go and travel in that quarter of the Union; let him go from neighborhood to neighborhood, and he will find that this is the fact.

Mr. Holland.—In the Southern States slavery is generally considered as a political evil, and in that point of view nearly all are disposed to stop the trade for the future. But have capital punishments been usually inflicted on offences merely political? I believe not. Fine and imprisonment are the common punishments in such cases. The people of the South do not generally consider slavery as a moral offence. The importer might say to the informer that he had done no worse, nor even so bad as he. It is true that I have these slaves from Africa; but I have transported them from one master to another. I am not guilty of holding human beings in bondage. But you are. You have hundreds on your plantations in this miserable condition. By your purchases you tempt traders to increase the evil. You and your ancestors have introduced this calamity into the country, and you are continuing, you are augmenting it. The importer might hold the same language to the jury and the judge who try him. He might tell them that they were even more guilty than he. Under such circumstances the law inflicting death would not be executed. But if you punish by fine and imprisonment only, you will find the people of the South willing and ready to execute the law.

Mr. Dwight.—We are all happily agreed in the great object of the bill—the prevention of the importation of slaves into the United States. Unfortunately, we are not so well agreed in the means to effect this object. It is not, however, at all strange that men should differ about the best mode to accomplish so important a purpose; and especially men in the circumstances in which we are placed. Those of us who come from the Northern and Eastern States, where slavery exists not at all, or but in a slight degree, would naturally view this subject in a very different light from gentlemen who represent the Southern States, where slavery always has existed, and that to a great extent. As great a degree of unanimity as is possible is of much importance, both for the purpose of effectually preventing this inhuman traffic, and for the honor and reputation of our country.

The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Early) has informed us repeatedly that a law making this a capital offence cannot be executed in the Southern States; that the importation of slaves has so long been familiar to them, that a great majority of the people consider it not as an aggravated crime, and a large portion of them as no crime at all; that if we make such an offence capital; if we make the consequence of importing a cargo of slaves to be the loss of life, no man will ever be prosecuted for it, because no man will dare inform. All the gentlemen, sir, from the Southern States, who have spoken on this subject, have told us that they earnestly wish effectually to prevent the slave trade in future. I am disposed to credit them fully. Indeed, I cannot conceive that they should not sincerely and fervently wish to prevent a traffic, which, if persisted in, must in all human probability, first or last, bring upon them and their families the most tremendous calamities. If, then, they view the subject in this light, if they are sincere in making these declarations, there is not only no danger that the law will not be executed, but they will unite to a man to execute the law; the whole community will inform; a regard to their own lives, and the lives of their posterity, will drive them to it. And if, sir, in the rigid execution of this statute, its penalties fall upon men from the Eastern States, who are profligate enough to engage in this inhuman trade, I most heartily concur with my colleague in saying, let the law have its full force, let it fall with all its force upon the offender; let him die.

The question being taken by yeas and nays, on striking out so much of the first section as inflicts the punishment of death on owners and masters of vessels employed in the slave trade, it was carried—yeas 63, nays 53, as follows:

Yeas.—Willis Alston, jun., John Archer, Joseph Barker, Burwell Bassett, Silas Betton, John Boyle, William A. Burwell, William Butler, George W. Campbell, Martin Chittenden, John Claiborne, Joseph Clay, George Clinton, jun., John Clopton, Orchard Cook, Ezra Darby, John Dawson, William Dickson, Peter Early, James Elliot, Caleb Ellis, Ebenezer Elmer, James Fisk, Isaiah L. Green, William Helms, James Holland, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, Thomas Kenan, Nehemiah Knight, Edward Lloyd, Patrick Magruder, Robert Marion, William McCreery, David Meriwether, Nicholas R. Moore, Thomas Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Gurdon S. Mumford, Thomas Newton, jun., John Randolph, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Peter Sailly, Thomas Sanford, Martin G. Schuneman, Dennis Smelt, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Henry Southard, Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, Samuel Taggart, Samuel Tenney, Uri Tracy, Abram Trigg, Daniel C. Verplanck, Robert Whitehill, Eliphalet Wickes, Nathan Williams, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynns.

Nays.—Evan Alexander, Isaac Anderson, David Bard, George M. Bedinger, Barnabas Bidwell, John Blake, jun., Thomas Blount, James M. Broom, Robert Brown, Levi Casey, John Chandler, Matthew Clay, Frederick Conrad, Leonard Covington, Richard Cutts, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, junior, Theodore Dwight, Elias Earle, William Ely, John W. Eppes, William Findlay, John Fowler, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Silas Halsey, Seth Hastings, David Hough, John Lambert, Duncan McFarland, Josiah Masters, John Morrow, Jonathan O. Mosely, Jeremiah Nelson, Gideon Olin, John Porter, John Pugh, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Russell, Thomas Sammons, Ebenezer Seaver, James Sloan, John Smilie, Benjamin Tallmadge, David Thomas, Thomas W. Thompson, Philip Van Cortlandt, Joseph B. Varnum, Peleg Wadsworth, John Whitehill, David R. Williams, Marmaduke Williams, and Alexander Wilson.

The question on inserting, in lieu of what was stricken out, a clause prescribing imprisonment for not more than ten, nor less than five years, was carried without a division.

The amendments to the second and third sections were read and agreed to, when, after several unsuccessful attempts to adjourn, the further consideration of the subject was postponed till Friday—ayes 71—to which day the House adjourned.

Monday, January 5, 1807.

Another member, to wit, Matthew Walton, from Kentucky, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Wednesday, January 7.

Salt Duty.

Mr. J. Randolph, from the Committee of Ways and Means, to whom was referred, on the third ultimo, so much of the President’s Message as relates “to a suppression of the duties on salt, to a continuation of the Mediterranean fund, and to the state of our revenues,” presented a bill repealing the acts laying duties on salt, and continuing in force, for a further time, the first section of the act, entitled “An act further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary Powers;” which was read twice, and committed to a Committee of the Whole on Friday next.

Friday, January 9.

Another member, to wit, Matthew Lyon, from Kentucky, appeared, and took his seat in the House.

Monday, January 12.

Duties on Salt.

Mr. J. Randolph moved that the House resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill for “repealing the acts laying duties on salt, and continuing in force the first section of an act, entitled an act further to protect the commerce and seamen of the United States against the Barbary Powers.”[45]

Tuesday, January 20.

Suspension of the Anti-slavery of the Ordinance of ’87 in Indiana.

The Speaker laid before the House a letter from William Henry Harrison, Governor of the Indiana Territory, enclosing certain resolutions passed by the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the said Territory, relative to a suspension, for a certain period, of the sixth article of compact between the United States and the Territories and States north-west of the river Ohio, made on the thirteenth of July, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven; which were read, as follows:

Resolved, unanimously, by the Legislative Council and House of Representatives of the Indiana Territory, That a suspension of the sixth article of compact between the United States and the Territories and States north-west of the river Ohio, passed the 13th day of July, 1787, for the term of ten years, would be highly advantageous to the said Territory, and meet the approbation of at least nine-tenths of the good citizens of the same.

Resolved, unanimously, That the abstract question of liberty and slavery is not considered as involved in a suspension of the said article, inasmuch as the number of slaves in the United States would not be augmented by the measure.

Resolved, unanimously, That the suspension of the said article would be equally advantageous to the Territory, to the States from whence the negroes would be brought, and to the negroes themselves.

To the Territory, because of its situation with regard to the other States; it must be settled by emigrants from those in which slavery is tolerated, or for many years remain in its present situation, its citizens deprived of the greater part of their political rights, and, indeed, of all those which distinguish the American from the citizens and subjects of other governments.

The States which are overburdened with negroes would be benefited by their citizens having an opportunity of disposing of the negroes which they cannot comfortably support, or of removing with them to a country abounding with all the necessaries of life; and the negro himself would exchange a scanty pittance of the coarsest food for a plentiful and nourishing diet, and a situation which admits not the most distant prospect of emancipation, for one which presents no considerable obstacle to his wishes.

Resolved, unanimously, That the citizens of this part of the former North-western Territory consider themselves as having claims upon the indulgence of Congress in regard to a suspension of the said article, because at the time of the adoption of the ordinance of 1787 slavery was tolerated, and slaves generally possessed by the citizens then inhabiting the country, amounting to at least one-half the present population of Indiana, and because the said ordinance was passed in Congress when the said citizens were not represented in that body, without their being consulted, and without their knowledge and approbation.

Resolved, unanimously, That, from the situation, soil, climate, and productions of the Territory, it is not believed that the number of slaves would ever bear such proportion to the white population, as to endanger the internal peace and prosperity of the country.

Resolved, unanimously, That copies of these resolutions be delivered to the Governor of this Territory, to be by him forwarded to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, with a request that they will lay the same before the Senate and House of Representatives, over which they respectively preside.

Resolved, unanimously, That a copy of these resolutions be delivered to the delegate to Congress from this Territory, and that he be, and he hereby is, instructed to use his best endeavors to obtain a suspension of the said article.

The resolutions were referred to Mr. Parke, Mr. Masters, Mr. Rhea of Tennessee, Mr. Sanford, Mr. Alston, Mr. Jeremiah Morrow, and Mr. Trigg, to examine and report their opinion thereupon to the House.

Monday, January 26.

Another new member, to wit, William W. Bibb, from Georgia, returned to serve as a member for the said State, in the place of Thomas Spalding, who has resigned his seat, appeared, produced his credentials, was qualified, and took his seat in the House.

Suspension of the Habeas Corpus.

A message was received from the Senate, by Mr. Samuel Smith, as follows:

Mr. Speaker: I am directed by the Senate of the United States to deliver to this House a confidential message, in writing.

The House being cleared of all persons except the members and the Clerk, Mr. Smith delivered to the Speaker the following communication in writing:

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives:

The Senate have passed a bill suspending for three months the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in certain cases, which they think expedient to communicate to you in confidence, and to request your concurrence therein, as speedily as the emergency of the case shall in your judgment require.

Mr. Smith, also, delivered in the bill referred to in the said communication, and then withdrew.

The bill was read as follows:

A Bill suspending the writ of Habeas Corpus for three months, in certain cases.

Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That in all cases, where any person or persons, charged on oath with treason, misprision of treason, or other high crime or misdemeanor, endangering the peace, safety, or neutrality of the United States, have been or shall be arrested or imprisoned, by virtue of any warrant or authority of the President of the United States, or from the Chief Executive Magistrate of any State or Territorial Government, or from any person acting under the direction or authority of the President of the United States, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be, and the same hereby is suspended, for and during the term of three months from and after the passage of this act, and no longer.

Mr. P. R. Thompson moved that the message and the bill received from the Senate ought not to be kept secret, and that the doors be opened.

Mr. Burwell and Mr. Smilie spoke in support of the motion.

Mr. Early thought that a previous order should be taken to remove the injunction of secrecy. To open the doors and admit strangers to hear the debate, and yet continue the injunction of secrecy on members, would present a singular spectacle.

Mr. J. Randolph said they could not be bound to secrecy except by their own vote. If there was any charm by which they could be bound, except their own act, he wished it might be dissolved.

Mr. G. W. Campbell hoped the usual course would be pursued; read the bill a second time, and then refer it to a Committee of the Whole.

Mr. Alston thought the question, whether the bill should pass to a second reading, first in order.

The Speaker decided that the motion to open the doors was in order, and the question on that motion must first be taken.

The yeas and nays being demanded by one-fifth of the members present, they were ordered to be taken.

The question then was put on the motion, That the message and bill received from the Senate ought not to be kept secret, and that the doors be now opened; and resolved in the affirmative—yeas 123, nays 3.

Mr. Eppes moved that the bill be rejected.[46] This motion was afterwards withdrawn to give place to another motion, but with the idea of renewing it again.

Mr. Burwell said he was unacquainted with the particular reasons which had induced the Senate to pass this bill. None had been assigned when the bill was communicated, and no additional documents presented. He could, therefore, only be governed by that information which the House had received; and he believed that it would justify the motion before the House. The President, in his Message of the 22d, says, “on the whole, the fugitives from Ohio and their associates from Cumberland, or other places in that quarter, cannot threaten serious danger to the city of New Orleans.” If that be the case, upon what ground shall we suspend the writ of habeas corpus? Can any person imagine the United States are in danger, after this declaration of the President, who unquestionably possesses more correct information than any other person can be supposed to have. In another part of the Message, we are informed—

“That the persons arrested at New Orleans have been embarked for some of the Atlantic ports, probably on the consideration that an impartial trial could not be expected during the present agitations of New Orleans, and that that city was not as yet a safe place of confinement. As soon as these persons shall arrive, they will be delivered to the custody of the law, and left to such course of trial, both as to place and process, as its functionaries may direct; the presence of the highest judicial authorities to be assembled at this place within a few days, the means of pursuing a sounder course of proceedings here than elsewhere, and the Executive means, should the judges have occasion to use them, render it equally desirable, for the criminals as for the public, that being already removed from the place where they were apprehended, the first regular arrest should take place here, and the course of proceedings receive here its proper direction.”

The President evidently holds out the idea, that the correct and proper mode of proceeding can be had under the existing laws of the United States. These persons may be transferred from the military to the civil authority, and be proceeded against according to law. Those, therefore, who fear the escape of the traitors already apprehended, and would, by this measure, obviate the difficulty, must perceive that consequence would not ensue. Mr. B. said he should consider the suspension of the habeas corpus as holding out an idea of danger and alarm, which was highly improper, inasmuch as it did not exist. It is true, this conspiracy was once formidable, extensive, and threatening; but it has been dissipated by the vigilance of Government. He would ask gentlemen, if they seriously believed the danger sufficiently great to justify the suspension of this most important right of the citizen, to proclaim the country in peril, and to adopt a measure so pregnant with mischief, by which the innocent and guilty will be involved in one common destruction? He said this was not the first instance of the kind since the formation of the Federal Government; there had been already two insurrections in the United States, both of which had defied the authority of Congress, and menaced the Union with dissolution. Notwithstanding one of them justified the calling out of fifteen thousand men, and the expenditure of one million of dollars, he had not heard of a proposition to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. What, then, will be said of us, if now, when the danger is over, firm in the attachment of the people to the Union, with ample resources to encounter any difficulties which may occur, we resort to a measure so harsh in its nature, oppressive in its operation, and ruinous as a precedent? While, in former times, it was thought unsafe to suspend this most important and valuable part of the constitution, he would ask, whether the necessity at the present time could be considered greater? With regard to those persons who may be implicated in the conspiracy, if the writ of habeas corpus be not suspended, what will be the consequence? When apprehended, they will be brought before a court of justice, who will decide whether there is any evidence that will justify their commitment for further prosecution. From the communication of the Executive, it appeared there was sufficient evidence to authorize their commitment. Several months would elapse before their final trial, which would give time to collect evidence, and if this shall be sufficient, they would not fail to receive the punishment merited by their crimes and inflicted by the laws of their country.

Mr. B. said he could conceive no injury that would result on this score; and, indeed, if some persons should elude justice, it would not endanger society so materially as to come within the terms of the constitution. He observed, it appeared to him the commencement of an insurrection was the only time when the writ of habeas corpus ought to be suspended; when the seizure of the ringleaders, by dismaying the inferior agents, would enable the Government, without the effusion of blood, to suppress it. But it was manifest that, at this moment, every thing intended by the conspirators was effected, or they were in the hands of the civil authority; there was, therefore, no good reason to take this precautionary step with that view; while on the one hand, it would unavoidably produce unnecessary alarm, and much inconvenience to the citizens of the United States. Nothing but the most imperious necessity would excuse us in confining to the Executive, or any person under him, the power of seizing and confining a citizen, upon bare suspicion, for three months, without responsibility, for the abuse of such unlimited discretion. Mr. B. said he could judge from what he had already seen, that men, who are perfectly innocent, would be doomed to feel the severity of confinement, and undergo the infamy of the dungeon. What reparation can be made to those who shall thus suffer? The people of the United States would have just reason to reproach their representatives with wantonly sacrificing their dearest interests, when, from the facts presented to this House, it seems the country was perfectly safe, and the conspiracy nearly annihilated. Under these circumstances, there can be no apology for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and violating the constitution, which declares “the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety may require it.”

Mr. B. said he hoped he had shown that, admitting the two cases specified in the constitution existed, they were not accompanied with such symptoms of calamity as rendered the passage of the bill expedient.

What, in another point of light, would be the effect of passing such a law? Would it not establish a dangerous precedent? A corrupt and vicious Administration, under the sanction and example of this law, might harass and destroy the best men of the country. It would only be necessary to excite artificial commotions, circulate exaggerated rumors of danger, and then follows the repetition of this law, by which every obnoxious person, however honest, is surrendered to the vindictive resentment of the Government. It will not be a sufficient answer, that this power will not be abused by the President of the United States. He, Mr. B. believed, would not abuse it, but it would be impossible to restrain all those who are under him. Besides, he would not consent to advocate a principle bad, in itself, because it will not, probably, be abused. For these reasons, Mr. B. said, he should vote to reject the bill.

Mr. Elliot said that he regretted the motion to reject the bill had been made, because, considering the subject of very great importance, he thought it most proper that it should take the usual course of business, that the bill should be read a second time, and referred to a Committee of the Whole, for the purposes of deliberation and discussion.

Called upon, however, said Mr. E., to answer to the question, Shall the bill be rejected? I must answer that question in the affirmative, as I should deem it my duty to advocate its rejection in any form which it might assume, and in any stage of its progress; and I deem it equally my duty, on the present occasion, to express my sentiments upon the subject. It is, indeed, difficult for me, consistently with the sincere and high respect which I entertain for the source from whence this measure originated, to express, in decorous terms, the hostility which I feel to the proposition. I am therefore disposed to consider it as an original proposition here; as a motion in this body to suspend, for a limited time, the privileges attached to the writ of habeas corpus. And, in this point of view, I am prepared to say that it is the most extraordinary proposition that has ever been presented for our consideration and adoption. Sir, what is the language of our constitution upon this subject? “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety shall require it.” Have we a right to suspend it in any and every case of invasion and rebellion? So far from it, that we are under a constitutional interdiction to act, unless the existing invasion or rebellion, in our sober judgment, threatens the first principles of the national compact, and the constitution itself. In other words, we can only act in this case with a view to national self-preservation. We can suspend the writ of habeas corpus only in a case of extreme emergency; that alone is salus populi which will justify this lex suprema. And is this a crisis of such awful moment? Is it necessary, at this time, to constitute a dictatorship, to save the people from themselves, and to take care that the Republic shall receive no detriment? What is the proposition? To create a single Dictator, as in ancient Rome, in whom all power shall be vested for a time? No; to create one great Dictator, and a multitude, an army of subaltern and petty despots; to invest, not only the President of the United States, but the Governors of States and Territories, and, indeed, all persons deriving civil or military authority from the supreme Executive, with unlimited and irresponsible power over the personal liberty of your citizens. Is this one of those great crises that require a suspension, a temporary prostration of the constitution itself? Does the stately superstructure of our Republic thus tremble to its centre, and totter towards its fall? Common sense must give a negative answer to these questions. What are the facts? Is it, indeed, a case of rebellion? We are officially informed that rebellion has reared its hydra front in the peaceful valleys of the West. But we are also informed by the Executive that treason has no prospect of success; that “the fugitives from the Ohio, and their associates from Cumberland, cannot threaten serious danger even to the city of New Orleans.” Not a single city, still less a Territory or a State, is considered in danger; and the Executive, not only possesses all the information which has been communicated to us, but much more, for we are informed that the communication has been made under the reservation contained in the resolution requesting it, and of course all the facts in the knowledge of the Executive, which are decided to be improper for disclosure at this time, have been kept back. And the Executive, possessing all this information, assures us that the public safety is not endangered. Can we, under these circumstances, consent to the investiture of dictatorial powers in that department of the Government which thus assures us that all is safe? It would be contrary to the spirit of the constitution.

But we shall be told that the constitution has contemplated cases of this kind, and, in reference to them, invested us with unlimited discretion. When any gentleman shall advance such a position, we, who advocate the rejection of the bill, will meet him upon that ground, and put the point at issue. We contend that the framers of the constitution never contemplated the exercise of such a power, under circumstances like the present; and that the constitution itself, instead of authorizing, has prohibited such discretion, unless in an extreme case. And can any member lay his hand upon his heart and say, that the present is a case of that description? He who cannot do this must, with us, consider the proposed measure as unconstitutional.

Let us pay a little attention to the nature and character of the writ of habeas corpus. It has its origin in Great Britain, and is there considered in two great points of view, as it respects the monarch, and as it respects the subject. As it respects the monarch, it is one of the jura prerogativa, a writ of prerogative; but it is not considered as calculated to increase the power of the king, or the splendor of the throne; in its origin and true character it is viewed as a prerogative, exercised by the king, or those authorities to whom his judicial powers are supposed to be delegated, only for the purpose of securing the constitutional rights of the subject, and restraining the invasion of those rights. As it respects the subject, it is a writ of right, and is emphatically called, by English writers, a writ of liberty.

By the provisions of the famous statute of Charles II., which has even been called a second magna charta, its privileges are guarantied to all British subjects at all times. An eminent English author, and the most popular writer upon subjects of legal science, considers its suspension as the suspension of liberty itself; declares that the measure ought never to be resorted to but in cases of extreme emergency; and says that the nation then parts with its freedom for a short and limited time, only to resume and secure it for ever. Hence, he compares the suspension of the habeas corpus act in Great Britain to the dictatorship of the Roman Republic.

But objectionable as the bill upon the table is in point of principle, it is, if possible, still more objectionable in point of detail. It invests with the power of violating the first principles of civil and political liberty, not only the supreme Executive, and the Executives of individual States and Territories, but all civil and military officers who may derive any authority whatever from the Chief Magistrate. And it extends the operation of the suspension of the privileges of the habeas corpus, not only to persons guilty or suspected of treason, or misprision of treason, but, to those who may be accused of any other crime or misdemeanor, tending to endanger the “peace, safety, or neutrality,” of the United States! What a vast and almost illimitable field of power is here opened, in which Executive discretion may wander at large and uncontrolled! A vast and dangerous scene of power, indeed! It gives the power of dispensing with the ordinary operation of the laws to a host of those little great men, who are attached to every Government under heaven. I wish not to reflect upon any of those subordinate officers who may be employed by the Government of my country.

But no one will doubt that, in times of alarm and danger, many men will be clothed with the functions of office, who are incompetent to the discreet exercise of such boundless discretion. I can never wish to see such persons invested with the means of aiming at the heads of their private enemies, or other innocent and unoffending citizens, the thunderbolts of public indignation, or scorching them with the lightning of public suspicion. Says the poet:

Let us again ask for evidence of the necessity of this measure? Certainly none can be produced, for we are informed, from the first authority, that if the present be not a time of profound peace, it is far from being a period of public danger. The leader of this petty rebellion has been called the modern Catiline. Undoubtedly, he possesses many of the qualities which a celebrated ancient historian ascribes to the Catiline of Rome: his genius, his address, his activity, his profligacy; but he is destitute of his means and resources. He wants that power of doing mischief which the Roman conspirator possessed. So far is he from being able to make war upon his country, that he cannot take possession of a single city. He is rapidly hastening to the same fate, although he may not meet it in the same manner. Already is he “damn’d to everlasting fame,” or rather, damned to everlasting infamy. Already is he a fugitive. Already a price is set upon his head. In the papers of this morning, we see that the Governor of Orleans has offered a reward for his apprehension. We cannot but detest the traitor, but we can have no fears of the consequences of the treason.

Mr. E. concluded, by expressing a hope that the bill would meet a decided vote of rejection.

Mr. Eppes.—When I feel a decided hostility to a principle, it is not material to me in what form I meet it. Decidedly opposed to the principle of this bill, I shall vote against it in all its stages, and cannot but hope that the motion of my colleague to reject it will prevail. By this bill, we are called upon to exercise one of the most important powers vested in Congress by the Constitution of the United States. A power which suspends the personal rights of your citizens, which places their liberty wholly under the will, not of the Executive Magistrate only, but of his inferior officers. Of the importance of this power, of the caution which ought to be employed in its exercise, the words of the constitution afford irresistible evidence. The words of the constitution are: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.” The wording of this clause of the constitution deserves peculiar attention. It is not in every case of invasion, nor in every case of rebellion, that the exercise of this power by Congress can be justified under the words of the constitution. The words of the constitution confine the exercise of this power exclusively to cases of rebellion or invasion, where the public safety requires it. In carrying into effect most of the important powers of Congress, something is left for the exercise of its discretion. We raise armies when, in our opinion, armies are necessary. We may call forth the militia to suppress insurrection or repel invasion, when we consider this measure necessary. But we can only suspend the privilege of the habeas corpus, “when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.” Well, indeed, may this caution have been used as to the exercise of this important power. It is in a free country the most tremendous power which can be placed in the hands of a legislative body. It suspends, at once, the chartered rights of the community, and places even those who pass the act under military despotism. The constitution, however, having vested this power in Congress, and a branch of the Legislature having thought its exercise necessary, it remains for us to inquire whether the present situation of our country authorizes, on our part, a resort to this extraordinary measure.

The inquiry is confined within very narrow limits. The power can only be exercised under the constitution, “when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.” Our country is not invaded. We have only, therefore, to inquire whether there exists in this country a rebellion, and whether the public safety requires a suspension of the habeas corpus. Of the existence of the rebellion or combination against the authority of the United States there can be no doubt, as we have on our table a detailed account of its origin and progress. I shall confine my observations solely to the latter part; whether the public safety requires a suspension of the habeas corpus for its suppression. In the communication now on our table, from the Executive, we have been informed that the militia of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and of the Mississippi and Orleans Territories, have been ordered out. That General Wilkinson was at Orleans, on the 10th of December, with his troops from the Sabine, which from other information we know to consist of one thousand effective men. These are resources of the nation now in active operation. What is the force of the conspirators? By the same documents, we are informed that “some boats, accounts vary from five to double or treble that number, and persons, differently estimated from one to three hundred, had passed the falls of the Ohio to rendezvous at the mouth of Cumberland river, with others expected down that river.” From the same document it appears that the force which comes down Cumberland river amounts to two boats, in one of which is Aaron Burr. From this statement, it appears that the largest calculation as to the actual force of the conspirators, is three hundred. But when we know the propensity of human nature to magnify accounts of this kind, we may fairly infer that the whole force does not exceed one hundred and fifty men. To oppose which, we have one thousand regular troops, and the militia of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and of the Mississippi and Orleans Territories. Is there a man present who believes, on this statement, that the public safety requires a suspension of the habeas corpus? This Government has now been in operation thirty years; during this whole period, our political charter, whatever it may have sustained, has never been suspended. Never, under this Government, has personal liberty been held at the will of a single individual. Shall we, in the full tide of prosperity, possessed of the confidence of the nation, with a revenue of fifteen millions of dollars, and six hundred thousand freemen, able and ready to bear arms in defence of their country, believe its safety endangered by a collection of men which the militia of any one county in our country would be amply sufficient to subdue? Shall we, sir, suspend the chartered rights of the community for the suppression of a few desperadoes; of a small banditti already surrounded by your troops; pressed from above by your militia; met below by your regulars, and without a chance of escape, but by abandoning their boats, and seeking safety in the woods? I consider the means at present in operation amply sufficient for the suppression of this combination. If additional means were necessary, I should be willing to vote as many additional bayonets as shall be necessary for every traitor. I cannot, however, bring myself to believe that this country is placed in such a dreadful situation as to authorize me to suspend the personal rights of the citizen, and to give him, in lieu of a free constitution, the Executive will for his charter. I consider the provision in the constitution for suspending the habeas corpus as designed only for occasions of great national danger. Like the power of creating a Dictator in ancient Rome, it prostrates the rights of your citizens and endangers public liberty. Like that it may, on some very extraordinary occasions, prove salutary, but like that, it ought never to be resorted to but in cases of absolute necessity; or, to use the emphatic language of the constitution, “when the public safety requires it.” Believing that the public safety is not endangered, and that the discussion of this question is calculated to alarm the public mind at a time when no real danger exists, I shall vote for the rejection of the bill in its present stage.

Mr. Varnum said if he was of opinion with the gentlemen from Vermont and Virginia, he should vote for the rejection of this bill; but he entertained a different opinion, and, unless he heard something to change it, he should vote differently from them. He did not believe the constitution restricted the power of the Government to suspend the privilege of the habeas corpus in cases where the country was shaken to its centre. There were no expressions in it to justify this inference. Its terms are: “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except when, in cases of invasion or rebellion, the public safety shall require it.” Will gentlemen deny that there exists in the United States at present a rebellion? I presume not, said Mr. V., it is too notorious to admit of doubt. Will they deny that the conspiracy has been formed with deliberation, and has existed for a long time? Is it not evident that it has become very extensive? If, then, this is the case, and the head of the conspiracy has said that he is aided by a foreign power; if this is true, are we justified in considering the country in a perfect state of safety, until it is brought to a close? I conceive not. I consider the country, in a degree, in a state of insecurity; and if so, the power is vested in the Congress of the United States, under the constitution, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. I am also apprehensive that we shall not be able to trace the conspiracy to its source without such a suspension. We have had an instance in which the head of the conspiracy has been brought before a court of justice, and where nothing has been brought against him. It is not my wish to insinuate that any court or public functionary is contemplated by this conspiracy; yet it is possible that this may be the case, and the very existence of the country may depend on tracing it to its source. I am not disposed to advocate sanguinary punishments, but I think they ought to be exemplary in regard to the chiefs of the conspiracy; for which purpose we ought to adopt those measures which will lead to a full discovery of those concerned in it. I am sensible that the Government of the United States has not hitherto resorted to this measure; but I know a particular State of the Union who did consider the measure necessary, in the case of an insurrection which occurred within her limits; and I think it very doubtful whether that insurrection would have so happily closed, if it had not been for her suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Have we had any insurrection or rebellion in the United States like this? We have had one insurrection in Massachusetts, but whence did it arise? Not from a design to subvert the Government, but from the burden of taxes; taxes which, perhaps, exceeded those laid in any country since the formation of society. I do not mean, by these observations, by any means to justify that insurrection, and, I believe, from the circumstances with which I am acquainted, that the insurrection which took place in Pennsylvania did not go to the subversion of the Government. But let us look at this conspiracy. While the nation, from one extreme to the other, enjoys a degree of prosperity and happiness unparalleled in any other nation, and not a single individual within our limits has any reason to complain of oppression, an insurrection is fomented, subversive of the Government and destructive of the rights of the people. It appears to me that this insurrection is the most aggravating of all insurrections which history gives us an account of. There is not the least oppression or the least pressure of circumstances, to induce any individual to rise up against the Government of this country; and it consequently betrays the greatest turpitude of mind in those who either lead or unite in it. For these reasons, I think it ought to be traced to its source, and I think it very doubtful whether this can be effected without, in the first instance, suspending the habeas corpus. Will gentlemen say that any innocent man will have a finger laid upon him, should this law pass? No; there is no probability of it; it is scarcely possible. But, even if it be possible, if the public good requires the suspension of the privilege, every man attached to the Government and to the liberty he enjoys, will be surely willing to submit to this inconvenience for a time, in order to secure the public happiness. The suspension only applies to particular crimes, the liberties of the people will not therefore be touched. I do think a great responsibility will rest on this branch of the Legislature, in case they refuse to pass this act. Suppose the head of this conspiracy shall be taken in a district of country where no evidence exists of the crime charged to him, and he shall consequently be set at liberty by the tribunals of justice; where will the responsibility rest, but upon this branch of the Legislature? It is too great for me, as an individual member, to bear. I shall, therefore, vote for this bill, under the impression that it will not have the injurious effects that some gentlemen seem to apprehend; and that it will only more effectually consign the guilty into the hands of justice.

Mr. R. Nelson.—As the motion to reject the bill meets my most hearty approbation, and as I consider it involving a great national question, I cannot reconcile it to my duty to give a silent vote on it. I shall, however, in order to avoid an unnecessary consumption of the time of the House, offer my remarks in as concise a compass as possible. I shall first consider the nature of the writ of habeas corpus; afterwards examine its effects, not only on the individual, but on the community at large; taking into view the mode of proceeding under it, to show, as I conceive, that no danger can ensue, on the refusal to pass this bill.

What is a writ of habeas corpus? It is a writ directing a certain person in custody to be brought before a tribunal of justice, to inquire into the legality of his confinement. If the judge is of opinion that the confinement is illegal, the person will of course be discharged; if, on the contrary, from the evidence, he shall be of opinion that there is sufficient grounds to suspect that he is guilty of offence, he will not be discharged. Now, to me, it appears that this is a proper and necessary power to be vested in our judges, and that a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is, in all cases, improper. If a man is taken up, and is denied an examination before a judge or a court, he may, although innocent in this case, continue to suffer confinement. This, in my opinion, is dangerous to the liberty of the citizen. He may be taken up on vague suspicion, and may not have his case examined for months, or even for years. Would not this bear hard upon the rights of the citizen?