Volume 2 — SPEECHES. (continued 3)

With respect to lands yet to be sold, they are open to the purchase alike of emigrants from the old states, and settlers in the new. As the latter have most generally supplied themselves with lands, the probability is, that the emigrants are more interested in the question of reduction than the settlers. At all events, there can be no peculiar right to such reduction existing in the new states. It is a question common to all, and to be decided in reference to the interest of the whole union.

Second. ‘Because the public debt being now paid, the public lands are entirely released from the pledge they were under to that object, and are free to receive a new and liberal destination, for the relief of the states in which they lie.’

The payment of the public debt is conceded to be near at hand; and it is admitted that the public lands, being liberated, may now receive a new and liberal destination. Such an appropriation of their proceeds is proposed by the bill reported by the committee of manufactures, and to which I shall hereafter more particularly call the attention of the senate. But it did not seem just to that committee, that this new and liberal destination of them should be restricted ‘for the relief of the states in which they lie,’ exclusively, but should extend to all the states indiscriminately, upon principles of equitable distribution.

Third. ‘Because nearly one hundred millions of acres of the land now in market are the refuse of sales and donations, through a long series of years, and are of very little actual value, and only fit to be given to settlers, or abandoned to the states in which they lie.’

According to an official statement, the total quantity of public land which has been surveyed up to the thirty-first of December last, was a little upwards of one hundred and sixty-two millions of acres. Of this, a large proportion, perhaps even more than the one hundred millions of acres stated in the land report, has been a long time in market. The entire quantity which has ever been sold by the United States, up to the same day, after deducting lands relinquished and lands reverted to the United States, according to an official statement, also, is twenty-five million two hundred forty-two thousand five hundred and ninety acres. Thus after the lapse of thirty-six years, during which the present land system has been in operation, a little more than twenty-five millions of acres have been sold, not averaging a million per annum, and upwards of one hundred millions of the surveyed lands remain to be sold. The argument of the report of the land committee assumes, that ‘nearly one hundred millions are the refuse of sales, and donations,’ are of very little actual value, and only fit to be given to settlers, or abandoned to the states in which they lie.

Mr. President, let us define as we go—let us analyze. What do the land committee mean by ‘refuse land?’ Do they mean worthless, inferior, rejected land, which nobody will buy at the present government price? Let us look at facts, and make them our guide. The government is constantly pressed by the new states to bring more and more lands into the market; to extinguish more Indian titles; to survey more. The new states themselves are probably urged to operate upon the general government by emigrants and settlers, who see still before them, in their progress west, other new lands which they desire. The general government yields to the solicitations. It throws more land into the market, and it is annually and daily preparing additional surveys of fresh lands. It has thrown and is preparing to throw open to purchasers already one hundred and sixty-two millions of acres. And now, because the capacity to purchase, in its nature limited by the growth of our population, is totally incompetent to absorb this immense quantity, the government is called upon, by some of the very persons who urged the exhibition of this vast amount to sale, to consider all that remains unsold as refuse! Twenty-five millions in thirty-six years only are sold, and all the rest is to be looked upon as refuse. Is this right? If there had been five hundred millions in market, there probably would not have been more or much more sold. But I deny the correctness of the conclusion that it is worthless because not sold. It is not sold, because there were not people to buy it. You must have gone to other countries, to other worlds, to the moon, and drawn from thence people to buy the prodigious quantity which you offered to sell.

Refuse land! A purchaser goes to a district of country and buys out of a township a section which strikes his fancy. He exhausts his money. Others might have preferred other sections. Other sections may even be better than his. He can with no more propriety be said to have ‘refused’ or rejected all the other sections, than a man who, attracted by the beauty, charms, and accomplishments of a particular lady, marries her, can be said to have rejected or refused all the rest of the sex.

Is it credible, that out of one hundred and fifty or one hundred and sixty millions of acres of land in a valley celebrated for its fertility, there are only about twenty-five millions of acres of good land, and that all the rest is refuse? Take the state of Illinois as an example. Of all the states in the union, that state probably contains the greatest proportion of rich, fertile lands; more than Ohio, more than Indiana, abounding as they both do in fine lands. Of the thirty-three millions and a half of public lands in Illinois, a little more only than two millions have been sold. Is the residue of thirty-one millions all refuse land? Who that is acquainted in the west can assert or believe it? No, sir; there is no such thing. The unsold lands are unsold because of the reasons already assigned. Doubtless there is much inferior land remaining, but a vast quantity of the best of lands also. For its timber, soil, water-power, grazing, minerals, almost all land possesses a certain value. If the lands unsold are refuse and worthless in the hands of the general government, why are they sought after with so much avidity? If in our hands they are good for nothing, what more would they be worth in the hands of the new states? ‘Only fit to be given to settlers!’ What settlers would thank you? what settlers would not scorn a gift of refuse, worthless land? If you mean to be generous, give them what is valuable; be manly in your generosity.

But let us examine a little closer this idea of refuse land. If there be any state in which it is to be found in large quantities, that state would be Ohio. It is the oldest of the new states. There the public lands have remained longer exposed in the market. But there we find only five millions and a half to be sold. And I hold in my hand an account of sales in the Zanesville district, one of the oldest in that state, made during the present year. It is in a paper, entitled the ‘Ohio Republican,’ published at Zanesville, the twenty-sixth of May, 1832. The article is headed ‘refuse land,’ and it states: ‘it has suited the interest of some to represent the lands of the United States which have remained in market for many years, as mere ‘refuse’ which cannot be sold; and to urge a rapid reduction of price, and the cession of the residue, in a short period, to the states in which they are situated. It is strongly urged against this plan, that it is a speculating project, which, by alienating a large quantity of land from the United States, will cause a great increase of price to actual settlers, in a few years; instead of their being able for ever, as it may be said is the case under the present system of land sales, to obtain a farm at a reasonable price. To show how far the lands unsold are from being worthless, we copy from the Gazette the following statement of recent sales in the Zanesville district, one of the oldest districts in the west. The sales at the Zanesville land-office, since the commencement of the present year, have been as follows; January, seven thousand one hundred and twenty dollars and eighty cents; February, eight thousand five hundred and forty-two dollars and sixty-seven cents; March, eleven thousand seven hundred and forty-four dollars and seventy-five cents; April, nine thousand two hundred and nine dollars and nineteen cents; and since the first of the present month about nine thousand dollars worth have been sold, more than half of which was in forty acre lots.’ And there cannot be a doubt that the act, passed at this session, authorizing sales of forty acres, will, from the desire to make additions to farms, and to settle young members of families, increase the sales very much, at least during this year.

A friend of mine in this city bought in Illinois, last fall, about two thousand acres of this refuse land, at the minimum price, for which he has lately refused six dollars per acre. An officer of this body, now in my eye, purchased a small tract of this same refuse land, of one hundred and sixty acres, at second or third hand, entered a few years ago, and which is now estimated at one thousand and nine hundred dollars. It is a business, a very profitable business, at which fortunes are made in the new states, to purchase these refuse lands, and, without improving them, to sell them at large advances.

Far from being discouraged by the fact of so much surveyed public land remaining unsold, we should rejoice that this bountiful resource, possessed by our country, remains in almost undiminished quantity, notwithstanding so many new and flourishing states have sprung up in the wilderness, and so many thousands of families have been accommodated. It might be otherwise, if the public land was dealt out by government with a sparing, grudging, griping hand. But they are liberally offered, in exhaustless quantities, and at moderate prices, enriching individuals, and tending to the rapid improvement of the country. The two important facts brought forward and emphatically dwelt on by the committee of manufactures, stand in their full force, unaffected by any thing stated in the report of the land committee. These facts must carry conviction to every unbiased mind, that will deliberately consider them. The first is, the rapid increase of the new states, far outstripping the old, averaging annually an increase of eight and a half per centum, and doubling of course in twelve years. One of these states, Illinois, full of refuse land, increasing at the rate of eighteen and a half per centum! Would this astonishing growth take place if the lands were too high, or all the good land sold? The other fact is, the vast increase in the annual sales—in 1830, rising of three millions. Since the report of the committee of manufactures, the returns have come in of the sales of last year, which had been estimated at three millions. They were, in fact, three million five hundred and sixty-six thousand one hundred and twenty-seven dollars and ninety-four cents! Their progressive increase baffles all calculation. Would this happen, if the price were too high?

It is argued, that the value of different townships and sections is various; and that it is, therefore, wrong to fix the same price for all. The variety in the quality, situation, and advantages, of different tracts, is no doubt great. After the adoption of any system of classification, there would still remain very great diversity in the tracts belonging to the same class. This is the law of nature. The presumption of inferiority, and of refuse land, founded upon the length of time that the land has been in market, is denied, for reasons already stated. The offer, at public auction, of all lands to the highest bidder, previous to their being sold at private sale, provides in some degree for the variety in the value, since each purchaser pushes the land up to the price which, according to his opinion, it ought to command. But if the price demanded by government is not too high for the good land, (and no one can believe it,) why not wait until that is sold, before any reduction in the price of the bad? And that will not be sold for many years to come. It would be quite as wrong to bring the price of good land down to the standard of the bad, as it is alleged to be, to carry the latter up to that of the former. Until the good land is sold there will be no purchasers of the bad; for, as has been stated in the report of the committee of manufactures, a discreet farmer would rather give a dollar and a quarter per acre for first-rate land, than accept refuse and worthless land as a present.

‘Fourth. Because the speedy extinction of the federal title within their limits is necessary to the independence of the new states, to their equality with the elder states; to the development of their resources; to the subjection of their soil to taxation, cultivation, and settlement, and to the proper enjoyment of their jurisdiction and sovereignty.’

All this is mere assertion and declamation. The general government, at a moderate price, is selling the public land as fast as it can find purchasers. The new states are populating with unexampled rapidity; their condition is now much more eligible than that of some of the old states. Ohio, I am sorry to be obliged to confess, is, in internal improvement and some other respects, fifty years in advance of her elder sister and neighbor, Kentucky. How have her growth and prosperity, her independence, her equality with the elder states, the development of her resources, the taxation, cultivation, and settlement of her soil, or the proper enjoyment of her jurisdiction and sovereignty, been affected or impaired by the federal title within her limits? The federal title! It has been a source of blessings and of bounties, but not one of real grievance. As to the exemption from taxation of the public lands, and the exemption for five years of those sold to individuals, if the public land belonged to the new states, would they tax it? And as to the latter exemption, it is paid for by the general government, as may be seen by reference to the compacts; and it is, moreover, beneficial to the new states themselves, by holding out a motive to emigrants to purchase and settle within their limits.

‘Sixth. Because the ramified machinery of the land-office department, and the ownership of so much soil, extends the patronage and authority of the general government into the heart and corners of the new states, and subjects their policy to the danger of a foreign and powerful influence.’

A foreign and powerful influence! The federal government a foreign government! And the exercise of a legitimate control over the national property, for the benefit of the whole people of the United States, a deprecated penetration into the heart and corners of the new states! As to the calamity of the land offices, which are held within them, I believe that is not regarded by the people of these states with quite as much horror as it is by the land committee. They justly consider that they ought to hold those offices themselves, and that no persons ought to be sent from the other foreign states of this union to fill them. And, if the number of the offices were increased, it would not be looked upon by them as a grievous addition to the calamity.

But what do the land committee mean by the authority of this foreign, federal government? Surely, they do not desire to get rid of the federal government. And yet the final settlement of the land question will have effected but little in expelling its authority from the bosoms of the new states. Its action will still remain in a thousand forms, and the heart and corners of the new states will still be invaded by post-offices and post-masters, and post-roads, and the Cumberland road, and various other modifications of its power.

‘Because the sum of four hundred and twenty-five millions of dollars, proposed to be drawn from the new states and territories, by the sale of their soil, at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, is unconscionable and impracticable—such as never can be paid—and the bare attempt to raise which, must drain, exhaust, and impoverish these states, and give birth to the feelings, which a sense of injustice and oppression never fail to excite, and the excitement of which should be so carefully avoided in a confederacy of free states.’

In another part of this report the committee say, speaking of the immense revenue alleged to be derivable from the public lands, ‘this ideal revenue is estimated at four hundred and twenty-five millions of dollars, for the lands now within the limits of the states and territories, and at one billion three hundred and sixty-three million five hundred and eighty-nine thousand six hundred and ninety-one dollars for the whole federal domain. Such chimerical calculations preclude the propriety of argumentative answers.’ Well, if these calculations are all chimerical, there is no danger, from the preservation of the existing land system, of draining, exhausting and impoverishing the new states, and of exciting them to rebellion.

The manufacturing committee did not state what the public lands would, in fact, produce. They could not state it. It is hardly a subject of approximate estimate. The committee stated what would be the proceeds, estimated by the minimum price of the public lands; what, at one half of that price; and added, that, although there might be much land that would never sell at one dollar and a quarter per acre, ‘as fresh lands are brought into market and exposed to sale at auction, many of them sell at prices exceeding one dollar and a quarter per acre.’ They concluded by remarking, that the least favorable view of regarding them, was to consider them a capital yielding an annuity of three millions of dollars at this time; that, in a few years, that annuity would probably be doubled, and that the capital might then be assumed as equal to one hundred millions of dollars.

Whatever may be the sum drawn from the sales of the public lands, it will be contributed, not by citizens of the states alone in which they are situated, but by emigrants from all the states. And it will be raised, not in a single year, but in a long series of years. It would have been impossible for the state of Ohio to have paid, in one year, the millions that have been raised in that state, by the sale of public lands; but in a period of upwards of thirty years, the payment has been made, not only without impoverishing, but with the constantly increasing prosperity of the state.

Such, Mr. President, are the reasons of the land committee, for the reduction of the price of the public lands. Some of them had been anticipated and refuted in the report of the manufacturing committee; and I hope that I have now shown the insolidity of the residue.

I will not dwell upon the consideration urged in that report, against any large reduction, founded upon its inevitable tendency to lessen the value of the landed property throughout the union, and that in the western states especially. That such would be the necessary consequence, no man can doubt, who will seriously reflect upon such a measure as that of throwing into market, immediately, upwards of one hundred and thirty millions of acres, and at no distant period upwards of two hundred millions more, at greatly reduced rates.

If the honorable chairman of the land committee, (Mr. King,) had relied upon his own sound practical sense, he would have presented a report far less objectionable than that which he has made. He has availed himself of another’s aid, and the hand of the senator from Missouri, (Mr. Benton,) is as visible in the composition, as if his name had been subscribed to the instrument. We hear again, in this paper, of that which we have so often heard repeated before in debate, by the senator from Missouri—the sentiments of Edmund Burke. And what was the state of things in England, to which those sentiments were applied?

England has too little land, and too many people. America has too much land, for the present population of the country, and wants people. The British crown had owned, for many generations, large bodies of land, preserved for game and forest, from which but small revenues were derived. It was proposed to sell out the crown lands, that they might be peopled and cultivated, and that the royal family should be placed on the civil list. Mr. Burke supported the proposition by convincing arguments. But what analogy is there between the crown lands of the British sovereign, and the public lands of the United States? Are they here locked up from the people, and, for the sake of their game or timber, excluded from sale? Are not they freely exposed in market, to all who want them, at moderate prices? The complaint is, that they are not sold fast enough, in other words, that people are not multiplied rapidly enough to buy them. Patience, gentlemen of the land committee, patience! The new states are daily rising in power and importance. Some of them are already great and flourishing members of the confederacy. And, if you will only acquiesce in the certain and quiet operation of the laws of God and man, the wilderness will quickly teem with people, and be filled with the monuments of civilization.

The report of the land committee proceeds to notice and to animadvert upon certain opinions of a late secretary of the treasury, contained in his annual report, and endeavors to connect them with some sentiments expressed in the report of the committee of manufactures. That report has before been the subject of repeated commentary in the senate, by the senator from Missouri, and of much misrepresentation and vituperation in the public press. Mr. Rush showed me the rough draft of that report, and I advised him to expunge the paragraphs in question, because I foresaw that they would be misrepresented, and that he would be exposed to unjust accusation. But knowing the purity of his intentions, believing in the soundness of the views which he presented, and confiding in the candor of a just public, he resolved to retain the paragraphs. I cannot suppose the senator from Missouri ignorant of what passed between Mr. Rush and me, and of his having, against my suggestions, retained the paragraphs in question, because these facts were all stated by Mr. Rush himself, in a letter addressed to a late member of the house of representatives, representing the district in which I reside, which letter, more than a year ago, was published in the western papers.

I shall say nothing in defence of myself, nothing to disprove the charge of my cherishing unfriendly feelings and sentiments towards any part of the west. If the public acts in which I have participated, if the uniform tenor of my whole life, will not refute such an imputation, nothing that I could here say would refute it.

But I will say something in defence of the opinions of my late patriotic and enlightened colleague, not here to speak for himself; and I will vindicate his official opinions from the erroneous glosses and interpretations which have been put upon them.

Mr. Rush, in an official report which will long remain a monument of his ability, was surveying, with a statesman’s eye, the condition of America. He was arguing in favor of the protective policy—the American system. He spoke of the limited vocations of our society, and the expediency of multiplying the means of increasing subsistence, comfort, and wealth. He noticed the great and the constant tendency of our fellow-citizens to the cultivation of the soil, the want of a market for their surplus produce, the inexpediency of all blindly rushing to the same universal employment, and the policy of dividing ourselves into various pursuits. He says:

‘The manner in which the remote lands of the United States are selling and settling, whilst it possibly may tend to increase more quickly the aggregate population of the country, and the mere means of subsistence, does not increase capital in the same proportion. * * * * Anything that may serve to hold back this tendency to diffusion from running too far and too long into an extreme, can scarcely prove otherwise than salutary * * * * If the population of these, (a majority of the states, including some western states,) not yet redundant in fact, though appearing to be so, under this legislative incitement to emigrate, remain fixed in more instances, as it probably would be by extending the motives to manufacturing labor, it is believed that the nation would gain in two ways: first, by the more rapid accumulation of capital, and next, by the gradual reduction of the excess of its agricultural population over that engaged in other vocations. It is not imagined that it ever would be practicable, even if it were desirable, to turn this stream of emigration aside; but resources, opened through the influence of the laws, in new fields of industry, to the inhabitants of the states already sufficiently peopled to enter upon them, might operate to lessen, in some degree, and usefully lessen, its absorbing force.’

Now, Mr. President, what is there in this view adverse to the west, or unfavorable to its interests? Mr. Rush is arguing on the tendency of the people to engage in agriculture, and the incitement to emigration produced by our laws. Does he propose to change those laws in that particular? Does he propose any new measure? So far from suggesting any alteration of the conditions on which the public lands are sold, he expressly says, that it is not desirable, if it were practicable, to turn this stream of emigration aside. Leaving all the laws in full force, and all the motives to emigration arising from fertile and cheap lands, untouched, he recommends the encouragement of a new branch of business, in which all the union, the west as well as the rest, is interested; thus presenting an option to population to engage in manufactures or in agriculture, at its own discretion. And does such an option afford just ground of complaint to any one? Is it not an advantage to all? Do the land committee desire (I am sure they do not) to create starvation in one part of the union, that emigrants may be forced into another? If they do not, they ought not to condemn a multiplication of human employments, by which, as its certain consequence, there will be an increase in the means of subsistence and comfort. The objection to Mr. Rush, then, is, that he looked at his whole country, and at all parts of it; and that, whilst he desired the prosperity and growth of the west to advance undisturbed, he wished to build up, on deep foundations, the welfare of all the people.

Mr. Rush knew that there were thousands of the poorer classes who never would emigrate; and that emigration, under the best auspices, was far from being unattended with evil. There are moral, physical, pecuniary obstacles to all emigration; and these will increase, as the good vacant lands of the west are removed, by intervening settlements further and further from society, as it is now located. It is, I believe, Dr. Johnson who pronounces, that of all vegetable and animal creation, man is the most difficult to be uprooted and transferred to a distant country; and he was right. Space itself, mountains, and seas, and rivers, are impediments. The want of pecuniary means, the expenses of the outfit, subsistence and transportation of a family, is no slight circumstance. When all these difficulties are overcome, (and how few, comparatively, can surmount them!) the greatest of all remains—that of being torn from one’s natal spot—separated, for ever, from the roof under which the companions of his childhood were sheltered, from the trees which have shaded him from summer’s heats, the spring from whose gushing fountain he has drunk in his youth, the tombs that hold the precious relic of his venerated ancestors!

But I have said, that the land committee had attempted to confound the sentiments of Mr. Rush with some of the reasoning employed by the committee of manufactures against the proposed reduction of the price of the public lands. What is that reasoning? Here it is; it will speak for itself; and without a single comment will demonstrate how different it is from that of the late secretary of the treasury, unexceptionable as that has been shown to be.

‘The greatest emigration, (says the manufacturing committee,) that is believed now to take place from any of the states, is from Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The effects of a material reduction in the price of the public lands, would be, first, to lessen the value of real estate in those three states; secondly, to diminish their interest in the public domain, as a common fund for the benefit of all the states; and, thirdly, to offer what would operate as a bounty to further emigration from those states, occasioning more and more lands, situated within them, to be thrown into the market, thereby not only lessening the value of their lands, but draining them, both of their population and labor.’

There are good men in different parts, but especially in the Atlantic portion, of the union, who have been induced to regard lightly this vast national property; who have been persuaded that the people of the west are dissatisfied with the administration of it; and who believe that it will, in the end, be lost to the nation, and that it is not worth present care and preservation. But these are radical mistakes. The great body of the west are satisfied, perfectly satisfied, with the general administration of the public lands. They would indeed like, and are entitled to, a more liberal expenditure among them of the proceeds of the sales. For this provision is made by the bill to which I will hereafter call the attention of the senate. But the great body of the west have not called for, and understand too well their real interest to desire, any essential change in the system of survey, sale, or price of the lands. There may be a few, stimulated by demagogues, who desire change; and what system is there, what government, what order of human society, in which a few do not desire change?

It is one of the admirable properties of the existing system, that it contains within itself and carries along principles of conservation and safety. In the progress of its operation, new states become identified with the old, in feeling, in thinking, and in interest. Now, Ohio is as sound as any old state in the union, in all her views relating to the public lands. She feels that her share in the exterior domain is much more important than would be an exclusive right to the few millions of acres left unsold, within her limits, accompanied by a virtual surrender of her interest in all the other public lands of the United States. And I have no doubt, that now, the people of the other new states, left to their own unbiased sense of equity and justice, would form the same judgment. They cannot believe that what they have not bought, what remains the property of themselves and all their brethren of the United States, in common, belongs to them exclusively. But if I am mistaken, if they have been deceived by erroneous impressions on their mind, made by artful men, as the sales proceed, and the land is exhausted, and their population increased, like the state of Ohio, they will feel that their true interest points to their remaining copartners in the whole national domain, instead of bringing forward an unfounded pretension to the inconsiderable remnant which will be then left in their own limits.

And now, Mr. President, I have to say something in respect to the particular plan brought forward by the committee of manufactures, for a temporary appropriation of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands.

The committee say that this fund is not wanted by the general government; that the peace of the country is not likely, from present appearances, to be speedily disturbed; and that the general government is absolutely embarrassed in providing against an enormous surplus in the treasury. While this is the condition of the federal government, the states are in want of, and can most beneficially use, that very surplus with which we do not know what to do. The powers of the general government are limited; those of the states are ample. If those limited powers authorized an application of the fund to some objects, perhaps there are some others, of more importance, to which the powers of the states would be more competent, or to which they may apply a more provident care.

But the government of the whole and of the parts, at last is but one government of the same people. In form they are two, in substance one. They both stand under the same solemn obligation to promote, by all the powers with which they are respectively intrusted, the happiness of the people; and the people, in their turn, owe respect and allegiance to both. Maintaining these relations, there should be mutual assistance to each other afforded by these two systems. When the states are full-handed, and the coffers of the general government are empty, the states should come to the relief of the general government, as many of them did, most promptly and patriotically, during the late war. When the conditions of the parties are reversed, as is now the case, the states wanting what is almost a burden to the general government, the duty of this government is to go to the relief of the states.

They were views like these which induced a majority of the committee to propose the plan of distribution, contained in the bill now under consideration. For one, however, I will again repeat the declaration, which I made early in the session, that I unite cordially with those who condemn the application of any principle of distribution among the several states, to surplus revenue derived from taxation. I think income derived from taxation stands upon ground totally distinct from that which is received from the public lands. Congress can prevent the accumulation, at least for any considerable time, of revenue from duties, by suitable legislation, lowering or augmenting the imposts; but it cannot stop the sales of the public lands, without the exercise of arbitrary and intolerable power. The powers of congress over the public lands are broader and more comprehensive, than those which they possess over taxation, and the money produced by it.

This brings me to consider, first, the power of congress to make the distribution. By the second part of the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, congress ‘have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States.’ The power of disposition is plenary, unrestrained, unqualified. It is not limited to a specified object or to a defined purpose, but left applicable to any object or purpose which the wisdom of congress shall deem fit, acting under its high responsibility.

The government purchased Louisiana and Florida. May it not apply the proceeds of lands within those countries, to any object which the good of the union may seem to indicate? If there be a restraint in the constitution, where is it, what is it?

The uniform practice of the government has conformed to the idea of its possessing full powers over the public lands. They have been freely granted, from time to time, to communities and individuals, for a great variety of purposes. To states for education, internal improvements, public buildings; to corporations for education; to the deaf and dumb; to the cultivators of the olive and the vine; to preëmptioners; to general Lafayette, and so forth.

The deeds from the ceding states, far from opposing, fully warrant the distribution. That of Virginia ceded the land as ‘a common fund for the use and benefit of such of the United States as have become, or shall become, members of the confederation or federal alliance of the said states, Virginia inclusive.’ The cession was for the benefit of all the states. It may be argued, that the fund must be retained in the common treasury, and thence paid out. But by the bill reported, it will come into the common treasury, and then the question, how it shall be subsequently applied for the use and benefit of such of the United States as compose the confederacy, is one of modus only. Whether the money is disbursed by the general government directly, or is paid out upon some equal and just principle, to the states, to be disbursed by them, cannot affect the right of distribution. If the general government retained the power of ultimate disbursement, it could execute it only by suitable agents; and what agency is more suitable than that of the states themselves? If the states expend the money, as the bill contemplates, the expenditure will, in effect, be a disbursement for the benefit of the whole, although the several states are organs of the expenditure; for the whole and all the parts are identical. And, whatever redounds to the benefit of all the parts, necessarily contributes, in the same measure, to the benefit of the whole. The great question should be, is the distribution upon equal and just principles? And this brings me to consider,

Secondly, the terms of the distribution proposed by the bill of the committee of manufactures. The bill proposes a division of the net proceeds of the sales of the public lands, among the several states composing the union, according to their federal representative population, as ascertained by the last census; and it provides for new states, that may hereafter be admitted into the union. The basis of the distribution, therefore, is derived from the constitution itself, which has adopted the same rule, in respect to representation and direct taxes. None could be more just and equitable.

But it has been contended in the land report, that the revolutionary states which did not cede their public lands, ought not to be allowed to come into the distribution. This objection does not apply to the purchases of Louisiana and Florida, because the consideration for them was paid out of the common treasury, and was consequently contributed by all the states. Nor has the objection any just foundation, when applied to the public lands derived from Virginia, and the other ceding states; because, by the terms of the deeds, the cessions were made for the use and benefit of all the states. The ceding states having made no exception of any state, what right has the general government to interpolate in the deeds, and now create an exception? The general government is a mere trustee, holding the domain in virtue of those deeds, according to the terms and conditions which they expressly describe; and it is bound to execute the trust accordingly. But how is the fund produced by the public lands now expended? It comes into the common treasury, and is disbursed for the common benefit, without exception of any state. The bill only proposes to substitute to that object, now no longer necessary, another and more useful common object. The general application of the fund will continue, under the operation of the bill, although the particular purposes may be varied.

The equity of the proposed distribution, as it respects the two classes of states, the old and the new, must be manifest to the senate. It proposes to assign to the new states, besides the five per centum stipulated for in their several compacts with the general government, the further sum of ten per centum upon the net proceeds. Assuming the proceeds of the last year, amounting to three millions five hundred and sixty-six thousand one hundred and twenty-seven dollars and ninety-four cents, as the basis of the calculation, I hold in my hand a paper which shows the sum that each of the seven new states would receive. They have complained of the exemption from taxation of the public lands sold by the general government for five years after the sale. If that exemption did not exist, and they were to exercise the power of taxing those lands, as the average increase of their population is only eight and a half per centum per annum, the additional revenue which they would raise, would be only eight and a half per centum per annum; that is to say, a state now collecting a revenue of one hundred thousand dollars per annum, would collect only one hundred and eight thousand five hundred, if it were to tax the lands recently sold. But by the bill under consideration, each of the seven new states will annually receive, as its distributive share, more than the whole amount of its annual revenue.

It may be thought, that to set apart ten per centum to the new states, in the first instance, is too great a proportion, and is unjust towards the old states. But it will be recollected that, as they populate much faster than the old states, and as the last census is to govern in the apportionment, they ought to receive more than the old states. If they receive too much at the commencement of the term, it may be neutralized by the end of it.

After the deduction shall have been made of the fifteen per centum allotted to the new states, the residue is to be divided among the twenty-four states, old and new, composing the union. What each of the states would receive, is shown by a table annexed to the report. Taking the proceeds of the last year as the standard, there must be added one sixth to what is set down in that table as the proportion of the several states.

If the power and the principle of the proposed distribution be satisfactory to the senate, I think the objects cannot fail to be equally so. They are education, internal improvements, and colonization, all great and beneficent objects, all national in their nature. No mind can be cultivated and improved; no work of internal improvement can be executed in any part of the union, nor any person of color transported from any of its ports, in which the whole union is not interested. The prosperity of the whole is an aggregate of the prosperity of the parts.

The states, each judging for itself, will select among the objects enumerated in the bill, that which comports best with its own policy. There is no compulsion in the choice. Some will prefer, perhaps, to apply the fund to the extinction of debt, now burdensome, created for internal improvement; some to new objects of internal improvement; others to education; and others again to colonization. It may be supposed possible that the states will divert the fund from the specified purposes. But against such a misapplication we have, in the first place, the security which arises out of their presumed good faith; and, in the second, the power to withhold subsequent, if there has been any abuse in previous appropriations.

It has been argued that the general government has no power in respect to colonization. Waiving that, as not being a question at this time, the real inquiry is, have the states themselves any such power? For it is to the states that the subject is referred. The evil of a free black population, is not restricted to particular states, but extends to and is felt by all. It is not, therefore, the slave question, but totally distinct from and unconnected with it. I have heretofore often expressed my perfect conviction, that the general government has no constitutional power which it can exercise in regard to African slavery. That conviction remains unchanged. The states in which slavery is tolerated, have exclusively in their own hands the entire regulation of the subject. But the slave states differ in opinion as to the expediency of African colonization. Several of them have signified their approbation of it. The legislature of Kentucky, I believe unanimously, recommended the encouragement of colonization to congress.

Should a war break out during the term of five years, that the operation of the bill is limited to, the fund is to be withdrawn and applied to the vigorous prosecution of the war. If there be no war, congress, at the end of the term, will be able to ascertain whether the money has been beneficially expended, and to judge of the propriety of continuing the distribution.

Three reports have been made, on this great subject of the public lands, during the present session of congress, besides that of the secretary of the treasury at its commencement—two in the senate and one in the house. All three of them agree, first, in the preservation of the control of the general government over the public lands; and, secondly, they concur in rejecting the plan of a cession of the public lands to the states in which they are situated, recommended by the secretary. The land committee of the senate propose an assignment of fifteen per centum of the net proceeds, besides the five per centum stipulated in the compacts, (making together twenty per centum,) to the new states, and nothing to the old.

The committee of manufactures of the senate, after an allotment of an additional sum of ten per centum to the new states, propose an equal distribution of the residue among all the states, old and new, upon equitable principles.

The senate’s land committee, besides the proposal of a distribution, restricted to the new states, recommends an immediate reduction of the price of ‘fresh lands,’ to a minimum of one dollar per acre, and to fifty cents per acre for lands which have been five years or upwards in market.

The land committee of the house is opposed to all distribution, general or partial, and recommends a reduction of the price to one dollar per acre.

And now, Mr. President, I have a few more words to say, and shall be done. We are admonished by all our reflections, and by existing signs, of the duty of communicating strength and energy to the glorious union which now encircles our favored country. Among the ties which bind us together, the public domain merits high consideration. And if we appropriate, for a limited time, the proceeds of that great resource, among the several states, for the important objects which have been enumerated, a new and powerful bond of affection and of interest will be added. The states will feel and recognise the operation of the general government, not merely in power and burdens, but in benefactions and blessings. And the general government in its turn will feel, from the expenditure of the money which it dispenses to the states, the benefits of moral and intellectual improvement of the people, of greater facility in social and commercial intercourse, and of the purification of the population of our country, themselves the best parental sources of national character, national union, and national greatness. Whatever may be the fate of the particular proposition now under consideration, I sincerely hope that the attention of the nation may be attracted to this most interesting subject; that it may justly appreciate the value of this immense national property; and that, preserving the regulation of it by the will of the whole, for the advantage of the whole, it may be transmitted, as a sacred and inestimable succession, to posterity, for its benefit and blessing for ages to come.

ON THE NORTHEASTERN BOUNDARY OF THE UNITED STATES.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 10, 1832.

[THE disputed question of the northeastern boundary of the United States, between the state of Maine and the British provinces, had been referred, in pursuance of an article of the treaty of Ghent, to the king of the Netherlands, for his opinion as to the true boundary line. That monarch having made his award, recommending the River St. John as the proper boundary line, (with some variations;) president Jackson communicated the decision to the senate, asking their advice thereon, as part of the treaty-making power. The subject being under discussion, (in secret session,) Mr. Clay made the following remarks, in which he shows that the advice asked of the senate was premature on the part of the president, with whom the responsibility should rest, until a treaty respecting the boundary should be concluded. This view of the matter was sustained by the subsequent course of the government, which resulted in the final settlement of this boundary question, concluded in 1842, by lord Ashburton and Mr. Webster, secretary of state, and afterwards confirmed by the senate.]

INTENDING to express, in a few words, my sentiments on this subject, I have thought I might as well embrace this occasion to do it. The president has called upon the senate for its advice, as to the award of the king of the Netherlands, respecting the northeastern boundary of the United States. This call upon the senate is made, not in its legislative character, but as a component part of the treaty-making power. If the senate, therefore, should give any advice on the matter, it must act in its executive capacity, and according to those rules which govern it when so acting. Among these, is that which requires the concurrence of two thirds of the senators present.

The language of the constitution, taken literally, would perhaps require a participation of the senate in the original formation of all treaties. The words are, ‘he, (the president,) shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties; provided two thirds of the senators present concur.’ In the early stages of his administration, general Washington endeavored to execute this part of the constitution according to its literal interpretation; but he soon found it impracticable, and abandoned it. The difficulty of consulting so large a body as to the instructions to be given to a foreign minister; the variety of propositions which may be interchanged in the progress of a negotiation, and the inconvenience of a perpetual recurrence to the senate for its opinion upon each of them, besides other considerations, rendered it altogether inexpedient to take the advice and consent of the senate previously to the conclusion of treaties. When concluded, president Washington thought the purport of the constitution would be satisfied by submitting them to the senate; as they could not be said to be made, in the language of the constitution, until the senate gave its constitutional concurrence to their becoming obligatory national compacts.

Accordingly, from an early period, in the first term of his administration, down to the present time, the settled and uniform practice of the executive government has been, to open negotiations with foreign powers, and to conclude such treaties as the president conceives the interests of this country demand. When so concluded, they are submitted to the senate for its constitutional advice and consent. And the extent of any agency which the senate exercises, in the formation of a treaty, is limited to proposing, as was done in the treaty of Mr. Jay, in 1794, amendments to the treaty. These become the subject of future negotiation.

To this established practice of the government, the present administration has hitherto, itself, conformed. And I presume it is not intended to change it, and to revive the impracticable course which general Washington was compelled to abandon, from experience.

What, then, are the circumstances of the case which the president has brought here for the consideration of the senate? In virtue of several treaties between the United States and Great Britain, on all of which treaties the senate had regularly acted and given its advice and consent, the disputed northeastern boundary was submitted to the decision of the king of the Netherlands, as the arbitrator between the two contracting parties, to decide the controversy. The king has pronounced his judgment, and communicated his award to each of the parties. Various questions have been started as to the validity of this instrument. Such as, whether it was intended as a decision binding the parties; whether it does not transcend the authority vested in the king, by the terms of the submission; whether it can be regarded as any thing more than the advice or recommendation of the king as to a suitable boundary, which either party is at liberty to adopt or not, at his discretion.

Whatever may be the real character of this royal act, no treaty, in consequence of it, has been concluded between the United States and Great Britain, as far as the senate is advised. It stands upon its own isolated ground. The president has asked the senate to advise him whether he shall sanction the award, and the report of the committee of foreign relations, now before us, recommends that the government of Great Britain be notified of the acquiescence in it by the government of the United States.

Now, Mr. President, it seems to me, that, in the present state of the transaction, there is nothing brought by the president to our consideration, on which the senate, as a part of the treaty-making or executive power, can constitutionally act. There is no treaty presented to us for our advice and consent, not even a negotiation proposed, nor, in short, any basis whatever for the action of the senate. If the award of the king of the Netherlands be binding, it derives its validity from the consent of the parties referring the question to him, and from his having decided the case, in conformity with the terms of the submission. If he has not decided it, or if in deciding it he has transcended the terms of the submission, it is not binding and obligatory. The president being the only constitutional organ of the people of the United States, in all communications with foreign powers, and moreover charged with the execution of the laws and treaties of the United States, is bound to notify the British government what are the executive views in relation to the award. If he tells that government that this does not hold itself bound by the award, a negotiation would probably take place between the parties. If, on the contrary, the president notifies the British government that the United States are bound by the award, he would have to come to congress for its legislative aid in carrying into effect the award. And should he so come, the question of the validity of the award would be as open to the examination of congress as it had been to the president. So, if any negotiation which may be opened with Great Britain, in relation to the award, should terminate in the conclusion of a treaty, the president would be bound to submit that treaty to the senate for its constitutional advice and consent. The president not having applied to congress for any act of legislation, and having submitted no treaty or national compact, in any form, to this body, I think there is nothing before us on which we can constitutionally act; and that any advice which, under these circumstances, we might offer to the president, would have no warrant or authority in the constitution of the United States. I cannot, therefore, consent to vote for the resolution reported by the committee of foreign relations, or to concur in the adoption of any other resolution which would imply the right of the senate to express any opinion on the matter in its present state and condition.

Whilst this is my deliberate judgment, I have no hesitation to offer to the president, if he would attach any consequence to them, my views and opinions, as a private citizen, on the whole matter of the northeastern boundary. At Ghent, Great Britain did not assert any right to the territory to which she subsequently set up a claim. She sought there to obtain by negotiation, and exchange of territory with the United States, a passage within her own jurisdiction from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to Quebec. The British commissioners were told by the American, on that occasion, that they had no power to cede away or exchange any part of the territory of Massachusetts, which then included Maine. As there were many parts of the long line of boundary between the United States and Great Britain unsettled and unmarked, it became necessary to have it correctly ascertained and defined. For this purpose several boards of commissioners were provided for by the treaty of Ghent, in the same manner as a similar board had been created by a previous treaty. Most of these boards have amicably and satisfactorily settled the questions respectively submitted to them. That to which was referred the boundary now in dispute could not agree. Before this board, Great Britain brought forward and claimed as her right, that which she had sought to obtain by negotiation only, at the conferences of Ghent. And the perseverance with which she has prosecuted her pretensions, and the apparent success with which they have been so far finally crowned, demonstrate that there never need be despair in any cause, however bad.

During my service in an executive department, it became my duty to examine into this claim asserted by Great Britain; and the result was a firm persuasion and a strong conviction that it was unfounded, and that the right to the disputed territory was in the state of Maine. It is true that, in the treaty of peace of 1783, owing to the imperfect knowledge possessed of the country through which the boundary runs, there is some defective description, but the intention of the parties I think is clear, and according to that intention the right is with Maine, and not in Great Britain. It is altogether unnecessary, upon this occasion, to proceed to state all the grounds and considerations which brought my mind to that conclusion. By doing so, I should be trespassing upon the senate too much.

The commissioners not having been able to settle the question, the casus fæderis, provided for in former treaties, arose, and it became necessary to submit the question to an arbiter. The king of the Netherlands was selected for that purpose, and we all know the subsequent events. The statements, arguments, and papers of the parties, were all prepared within the two countries respectively, and transmitted to Holland, where they were submitted to the king. In consenting to refer the question, the late administration was impelled by the duty of respecting the national faith, as pledged in solemn treaties. And although the king of the Netherlands, was not the first choice of either party, high confidence was reposed in his independence, and in his ability, and integrity, by the late president of the United States.

With respect to the conduct of the arbitration, on the part of our government, there are some circumstances I think deeply to be regretted. The plan adopted by the late administration was to have retained Mr. Hughes at the Hague, elevated him to the rank of minister plenipotentiary, and send out Mr. Preble as a public agent to be associated with him. I scarcely know any man so well qualified for such a service as Mr. Hughes. He had the benefit of much diplomatic experience, and he had been very successful in various negotiations which he had conducted. Commencing his career as secretary of the commission at Ghent, he subsequently had creditably represented his government at Stockholm, and at St. Petersburg, and at Copenhagen, on temporary missions; and he had been some time at the court of the Netherlands. Wherever he had been, he uniformly made good impressions, and conciliated the esteem and friendship of all whose acquaintance he formed. He was well versed in the language of the court of the Hague, and well acquainted with all the persons having access to, or surrounding the king. Of pleasing and winning manners, a general favorite, he was exactly such a person as was well fitted for the service. The rank of minister plenipotentiary was necessary to entitle him to approach the person of the king, according to established usage. It was a point of more importance that this government should have had such a representative at Holland, as the British government was there represented by an accomplished ambassador, (sir Charles Bagot,) well known here. Mr. Hughes, intimately acquainted with the corps diplomatique, with all the avenues of access to the king, and with all persons likely to influence the mind or judgment of the monarch or his ministers, would have been able to discover and avert the exercise of any undue influence, if any should be brought to bear upon the government of the Netherlands, in this delicate transaction.

It was among the early acts of this administration, to overturn the plan which had been thus resolved on by its predecessors, and, in place of Mr. Hughes, to send out Mr. Preble, in the sole charge of conducting a difficult arbitration. I have had only a limited acquaintance with this gentleman; but he was destitute of all diplomatic experience, had never been in the councils of the general government, and I understand could not either speak or write the language of the court to which he was sent, and where he was a total stranger. He was indeed a respectable lawyer in his own state, but of what avail would professional eminence be, where tact, insinuating manners, and thorough acquaintance with the persons of the court, were indispensable?

The result of an arbitration conducted under such auspices was to be feared. During its progress, and before the king’s decision, he was stripped, by the revolution in Belgium, of the better half of his dominions. Had he been monarch of Holland alone, I think I hazard nothing in saying, that, notwithstanding the confidence which Mr. Adams reposed in his personal character, he would not have been selected, with the concurrence of the late administration, as the sovereign arbiter. It was to an independent sovereign, one the extent of whose power and dominions placed him at the head of the second-rate states of the continent of Europe, that the controversy was submitted. It was not to the king of Holland, but to the king of Holland and Belgium, that the question was referred. It was to a monarch supposed to be unbiased, powerful, and independent, that the question was referred, and not to a sovereign, who, whilst he was arbitrating between Great Britain and the United States as to the territory of Maine, by the uncontrollable force of events found one half of his own dominions the subject of British arbitration or decision, in conjunction with the other allied powers.

By the loss of Belgium, the political character of the king was entirely changed, his identity altered, and he ceased to be that monarch, whose friendly arbitration had been solicited. Mr. Preble saw the matter in its true light, and expected to have been notified by the minister of foreign affairs of the king’s declining to proceed in the arbitration. But he said nothing, and did nothing, to produce that result. Had Mr. Hughes been there, he would, by a suggestion or a hint, not at all offensive, (such as, whether the critical condition of his own domestic affairs did not afford sufficient occupation for his majesty, without troubling himself with the concerns of foreign governments, in which his own subjects had no interest,) have prevailed on the king to give up the papers; or, at least, to suspend proceeding in the arbitration until he could receive fresh instructions from his own government, adapted to the great event which had happened.

But nothing was done at the Hague or at Washington to arrest or suspend the progress of the arbitration. We have neither seen nor heard of any instructions from our secretary of state, founded on the event just mentioned. A senator (now in my eye) informed me, that he had conversed with the late secretary of state about the revolt of Belgium, and asked him, if it would not put a stop to the arbitration. To which the secretary answered, that he supposed of course it would; and yet, as far as we know, he gave no instruction whatever in relation to that event!

Under all these circumstances, our surprise at the issue of the arbitration ought to be less than it otherwise would have been. If the king of the Netherlands had definitively decided the questions actually submitted to him, in consequence of the silent acquiescence of our government in the progress of the arbitration, the honor and faith of the nation might have bound us to submit to the decision, however unjust we deem it. But, Mr. President, I cannot concur with the committee of foreign relations, in considering the paper communicated by the king of Holland to the two governments as containing a decision. It seems to me to express only the opinion of that monarch, as to what he thinks might be a suitable boundary, and to operate as a recommendation to the parties to adopt it; but leaving them, at the same time, at full liberty to adopt it or not, at their discretion. So far from being a decision, the king professes his inability to decide the question submitted to him, for reasons which he states, and he does not decide it, according to the terms of the submission.

Nor can I concur with that committee in believing, that we shall be in danger of incurring the reproaches of the world for not submitting to such an award, if award it can be called. I am quite sure, that the chairman of the committee of foreign affairs, or the present secretary of state, would be fully competent to make out an argument in behalf of the rights of Maine, that would fully vindicate them, and vindicate the course of government, from all reproaches, founded on noncompliance with the advice and recommendation of the sovereign arbiter.

Entertaining these sentiments, as a private citizen, I have no hesitation in expressing my opinion that the American government, disregarding, and declining to be bound by, the award, ought to open a negotiation with Great Britain on the subject of this disputed boundary. I have no apprehensions that such a step would, necessarily, bring on war. Great Britain might have adopted one of two courses; either to proceed to occupy the territory which the sovereign arbiter thinks it would be suitable for her to possess, and signified her determination to do so; or, to communicate to our government her willingness to be governed by the advice of the arbiter, and inquired as to the intentions, on that subject, of this government. The former course would have been harsh, and might have involved the two countries in war. The latter was more respectful, and, having been adopted by Great Britain, it will be natural and easy to return an answer to the diplomatic note which has been received, stating the grounds and arguments which induce the American government to believe itself not bound by what has been done by the king of Holland. Such an answer would be preliminary to a negotiation, which would necessarily follow. It is desirable, undoubtedly, to have all controversies between nations settled, and amicably, if possible. But this is not the only question remaining to be decided between the two powers, and if that mutual respect and friendly disposition which, it is to be hoped, may predominate in the official intercourse between the two countries, should prevail, although the dispute, by the intervention of the Dutch king, has been somewhat complicated, we need not, I think, despair finally of some satisfactory arrangement.

These are my private views, Mr. President. But I think the president has come to the senate too soon, or come to it in a wrong character. As a part of the executive government, I think the senate has nothing to do with the question, in the present state of it. Holding this opinion, I shall vote against the resolution reported by the committee of foreign affairs, and I shall vote against any other resolution or proposition which may imply or assume a power in the senate of the United States to act in the case. The president, it seems to me, is invested, exclusively, with the power of deciding, in the first instance, whether any and what obligations, if any, have been created upon the American government, in consequence of the act of the king of the Netherlands; and whether it be expedient or not to open a negotiation with Great Britain. And I think he should be left to his constitutional responsibility, to pursue such a course as a sense of duty may prompt.

ON PRESIDENT JACKSON’S VETO OF THE BILL TO RECHARTER THE UNITED STATES BANK.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JULY 12, 1832.

[THE charter of the bank of the United States, incorporated in 1816, expired by its limitation, in 1836. An act extending the charter, having passed the senate, by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty, and the house of representatives, by a vote of one hundred and five to eighty-three, was returned to the senate on the tenth of July, 1832, by president Jackson, with his objections at length, against signing the bill, and less than two thirds voting for its passage, it was rejected. On the twelfth, the veto message being under consideration, Mr. Clay delivered his sentiments in the following words.]

I HAVE some observations to submit on this question, which I would not trespass on the senate in offering, but that it has some command of leisure, in consequence of the conference which has been agreed upon, in respect to the tariff.

A bill to recharter the bank, has recently passed congress, after much deliberation. In this body, we know that there are members enough who entertain no constitutional scruples, to make, with the vote by which the bill was passed, a majority of two thirds. In the house of representatives, also, it is believed, there is a like majority in favor of the bill. Notwithstanding this state of things, the president has rejected the bill, and transmitted to the senate an elaborate message, communicating at large his objections. The constitution requires that we should reconsider the bill, and that the question of its passage, the president’s objections notwithstanding, shall be taken by ays and noes. Respect to him, as well as the injunctions of the constitution, require that we should deliberately examine his reasons, and reconsider the question.

The veto is an extraordinary power, which, though tolerated by the constitution, was not expected, by the convention, to be used in ordinary cases. It was designed for instances of precipitate legislation, in unguarded moments. Thus restricted, and it has been thus restricted by all former presidents, it might not be mischievous. During Mr. Madison’s administration of eight years, there occurred but two or three cases of its exercise. During the last administration, I do not now recollect that it was once. In a period little upwards of three years, the present chief magistrate has employed the veto four times. We now hear quite frequently, in the progress of measures through congress, the statement that the president will veto them, urged as an objection to their passage.

The veto is hardly reconcilable with the genius of representative government. It is totally irreconcilable with it, if it is to be frequently employed in respect to the expediency of measures, as well as their constitutionality. It is a feature of our government, borrowed from a prerogative of the British king. And it is remarkable, that in England it has grown obsolete, not having been used for upwards of a century. At the commencement of the French revolution, in discussing the principles of their constitution, in national convention, the veto held a conspicuous figure. The gay, laughing population of Paris, bestowed on the king the appellation of monsieur Veto, and on the queen, that of madame Veto. The convention finally decreed, that if a measure rejected by the king, should obtain the sanction of two concurring legislatures, it should be a law, notwithstanding the veto. In the constitution of Kentucky, and perhaps in some other of the state constitutions, it is provided that if, after the rejection of a bill by the governor, it shall be passed by a majority of all the members elected to both houses, it shall become a law, notwithstanding the governor’s objections. As a coördinate branch of the government, the chief magistrate has great weight. If, after a respectful consideration of his objections urged against a bill, a majority of all the members elected to the legislature, shall still pass it, notwithstanding his official influence, and the force of his reasons, ought it not to become a law? Ought the opinion of one man to overrule that of a legislative body, twice deliberately expressed?

It cannot be imagined that the convention contemplated the application of the veto, to a question which has been so long, so often, and so thoroughly scrutinized, as that of the bank of the United States, by every department of the government, in almost every stage of its existence, and by the people, and by the state legislatures. Of all the controverted questions which have sprung up under our government, not one has been so fully investigated as that of its power to establish a bank of the United States. More than seventeen years ago, in January, 1815, Mr. Madison then said, in a message to the senate of the United States:

‘Waiving the question of the constitutional authority of the legislature to establish an incorporated bank, as being precluded, in my judgment, by repeated recognitions, under varied circumstances, of the validity of such an institution, in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.’

Mr. Madison, himself opposed to the first bank of the United States, yielded his own convictions to those of the nation, and all the departments of the government thus often expressed. Subsequently to this true but strong statement of the case, the present bank of the United States was established, and numerous other acts, of all the departments of government, manifesting their settled sense of the power, have been added to those which existed prior to the date of Mr. Madison’s message.

No question has been more generally discussed, within the last two years, by the people at large, and in state legislatures, than that of the bank. And this consideration of it has been prompted by the president himself. In his first message to congress, (in December, 1829,) he brought the subject to the view of that body and the nation, and expressly declared, that it could not, for the interest of all concerned, be ‘too soon’ settled. In each of his subsequent annual messages, in 1830 and 1831, he again invited the attention of congress to the subject. Thus, after an interval of two years, and after the intervention of the election of a new congress, the president deliberately renews the chartering of the bank of the United States. And yet his friends now declare the agitation of the question to be premature! It was not premature in 1829 to present the question, but it is premature in 1832 to consider and decide it!

After the president had directed public attention to this question, it became not only a topic of popular conversation, but was discussed in the press, and employed as a theme in popular elections. I was myself interrogated, on more occasions than one, to make a public expression of my sentiments; and a friend of mine in Kentucky, a candidate for the state legislature, told me nearly two years ago, that he was surprised, in an obscure part of his county, (the hills of Benson,) where there was but little occasion for banks, to find himself questioned on the stump, as to the recharter of the bank of the United States. It seemed as if a sort of general order had gone out, from head-quarters, to the partisans of the administration, every where, to agitate and make the most of the question. They have done so, and their condition now reminds me of the fable invented by Dr. Franklin, of the eagle and the cat, to demonstrate that Æsop had not exhausted invention, in the construction of his memorable fables. The eagle, you know, Mr. President, pounced from his lofty flight in the air upon a cat, taking it to be a pig. Having borne off his prize, he quickly felt most painfully the paws of the cat, thrust deeply into his sides and body. Whilst flying, he held a parley with the supposed pig, and proposed to let go his hold, if the other would let him alone. No, says puss, you brought me from yonder earth below, and I will hold fast to you until you carry me back—a condition to which the eagle readily assented.

The friends of the president, who have been for nearly three years agitating this question, now turn round upon their opponents, who have supposed the president quite serious and in earnest, in presenting it for public consideration, and charge them with prematurely agitating it. And that for electioneering purposes! The other side understands perfectly, the policy of preferring an unjust charge, in order to avoid a well-founded accusation.

If there be an electioneering motive in the matter, who have been actuated by it? Those who have taken the president at his word, and deliberated on a measure which he has repeatedly recommended to their consideration; or those who have resorted to all sorts of means to elude the question—by alternately coaxing and threatening the bank; by an extraordinary investigation into the administration of the bank; and by every species of postponement and procrastination, during the progress of the bill?

Notwithstanding all these dilatory expedients, a majority of congress, prompted by the will and the best interests of the nation, passed the bill. And I shall now proceed, with great respect and deference, to examine some of the objections to its becoming a law, contained in the president’s message, avoiding, as much as I can, a repetition of what gentlemen have said who preceded me.

The president thinks that the precedents, drawn from the proceedings of congress, as to the constitutional power to establish a bank, are neutralized, by there being two for and two against the authority. He supposes that one congress, in 1811, and another in 1815, decided against the power. Let us examine both of these cases. The house of representatives in 1811, passed the bill to recharter the bank, and, consequently, affirmed the power. The senate, during the same year, were divided, seventeen and seventeen, and the vice-president gave the casting vote. Of the seventeen who voted against the bank, we know from the declaration of the senator from Maryland, (general Smith,) now present, that he entertained no doubt whatever of the constitutional power of congress to establish a bank, and that he voted on totally distinct ground. Taking away his vote and adding it to the seventeen who voted for the bank, the number would have stood eighteen for, and sixteen against the power. But we know further, that Mr. Gaillard, Mr. Anderson, and Mr. Robinson, made a part of that sixteen; and that in 1815, all three of them voted for the bank. Take those three votes from the sixteen, and add them to the eighteen, and the vote of 1811, as to the question of constitutional power, would have been twenty-one and thirteen. And of these thirteen there might have been others still, who were not governed in their votes by any doubts of the power.

In regard to the congress of 1815, so far from their having entertained any scruples in respect to the power to establish a bank, they actually passed a bank bill, and thereby affirmed the power. It is true that, by the casting vote of the speaker of the house of representatives, (Mr. Cheves,) they rejected another bank bill, not on grounds of want of power, but upon considerations of expediency in the particular structure of that bank.

Both the adverse precedents therefore, relied upon in the message, operate directly against the argument which they were brought forward to maintain. Congress, by various other acts, in relation to the bank of the United States, has again and again sanctioned the power. And I believe it may be truly affirmed, that from the commencement of the government to this day, there has not been a congress opposed to the bank of the United States upon the distinct ground of a want of power to establish it.

And here, Mr. President, I must request the indulgence of the senate, whilst I express a few words in relation of myself.

I voted, in 1811, against the old bank of the United States, and I delivered on that occasion, a speech, in which, among other reasons, I assigned that of its being unconstitutional. My speech has been read to the senate, during the progress of this bill, but the reading of it excited no other regret than that it was read in such a wretched, bungling, mangling manner.20 During a long public life, (I mention the fact not as claiming any merit for it,) the only great question in which I have ever changed my opinion, is that of the bank of the United States. If the researches of the senator had carried him a little further, he would, by turning over a few more leaves of the same book from which he read my speech, have found that which I made in 1816, in support of the present bank. By the reasons assigned in it for the change of my opinion, I am ready to abide in the judgment of the present generation and of posterity. In 1816, being speaker of the house of representatives, it was perfectly in my power to have said nothing and done nothing, and thus have concealed the change of opinion which my mind had undergone. But I did not choose to remain silent and escape responsibility. I chose publicly to avow my actual conversion. The war and the fatal experience of its disastrous events, had changed me. Mr. Madison, governor Pleasants, and almost all the public men around me, my political friends, had changed their opinions from the same causes.

The power to establish a bank is deduced from that clause of the constitution which confers on congress all powers necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers. In 1811, I believed a bank of the United States not necessary, and that a safe reliance might be placed on the local banks, in the administration of the fiscal affairs of the government. The war taught us many lessons, and among others demonstrated the necessity of the bank of the United States, to the successful operations of the government. I will not trouble the senate with a perusal of my speech in 1816, but ask its permission to read a few extracts:

‘But how stood the case in 1816, when he was called upon to examine the powers of the general government to incorporate a national bank? A total change of circumstances was presented—events of the utmost magnitude had intervened.

‘A general suspension of specie payments had taken place, and this had led to a train of circumstances of the most alarming nature. He beheld, dispersed over the immense extent of the United States, about three hundred banking institutions, enjoying, in different degrees, the confidence of the public, shaken as to them all, under no direct control of the general government, and subject to no actual responsibility to the state authorities. These institutions were emitting the actual currency of the United States—a currency consisting of paper, on which they neither paid interest nor principal, whilst it was exchanged for the paper of the community, on which both were paid. We saw these institutions, in fact, exercising what had been considered, at all times, and in all countries, one of the highest attributes of sovereignty—the regulation of the current medium of the country. They were no longer competent to assist the treasury, in either of the great operations of collection, deposit or distribution of the public revenues. In fact, the paper which they emitted, and which the treasury, from the force of events, found itself constrained to receive, was constantly obstructing the operations of that department; for it would accumulate where it was not wanted, and could not be used where it was wanted, for the purposes of government, without a ruinous and arbitrary brokerage. Every man who paid to or received from the government, paid or received as much less than he ought to have done, as was the difference between the medium in which the payment was effected and specie. Taxes were no longer uniform. In New England, where specie payments had not been suspended, the people were called upon to pay larger contributions than where they were suspended. In Kentucky as much more was paid by the people, in their taxes, than was paid, for example, in the state of Ohio, as Kentucky paper was worth more than Ohio paper.

‘Considering, then, that the state of the currency was such that no thinking man could contemplate it without the most serious alarm; that it threatened general distress, if it did not ultimately lead to convulsion and subversion of the government; it appeared to him to be the duty of congress to apply a remedy, if a remedy could be devised. A national bank, with other auxiliary measures, was proposed as that remedy. Mr. Clay said he determined to examine the question with as little prejudice as possible, arising from his former opinion; he knew that the safest course to him, if he pursued a cold, calculating prudence, was to adhere to that opinion, right or wrong. He was perfectly aware that if he changed, or seemed to change it, he should expose himself to some censure; but, looking at the subject with the light shed upon it, by events happening since the commencement of the war, he could no longer doubt. * * * He preferred to the suggestions of the pride of consistency the evident interests of the community, and determined to throw himself upon their justice and candor.’

The interest which foreigners hold in the existing bank of the United States, is dwelt upon in the message as a serious objection to the recharter. But this interest is the result of the assignable nature of the stock; and if the objection be well founded, it applies to government stock, to the stock in local banks, in canal and other companies, created for internal improvements, and every species of money or movables in which foreigners may acquire an interest. The assignable character of the stock is a quality conferred not for the benefit of foreigners, but for that of our own citizens. And the fact of its being transferred to them is the effect of the balance of trade being against us—an evil, if it be one, which the American system will correct. All governments wanting capital, resort to foreign nations possessing it in superabundance, to obtain it. Sometimes the resort is even made by one to another belligerant nation. During our revolutionary war we obtained foreign capital (Dutch and French) to aid us. During the late war American stock was sent to Europe to sell; and if I am not misinformed, to Liverpool. The question does not depend upon the place whence the capital is obtained, but the advantageous use of it. The confidence of foreigners in our stocks, is a proof of the solidity of our credit. Foreigners have no voice in the administration of this bank; and if they buy its stock, they are obliged to submit to citizens of the United States to manage it. The senator from Tennessee, (Mr. White,) asks what would have been the condition of this country, if, during the late war, this bank had existed, with such an interest in it as foreigners now hold? I will tell him. We should have avoided many of the disasters of that war, perhaps those of Detroit and at this place. The government would have possessed ample means for its vigorous prosecution; and the interest of foreigners, British subjects especially, would have operated upon them, not upon us. Will it not be a serious evil to be obliged to remit in specie to foreigners the eight millions which they now have in this bank, instead of retaining that capital within the country to stimulate its industry and enterprise?

The president assigns in his message a conspicuous place to the alleged injurious operation of the bank on the interests of the western people. They ought to be much indebted to him for his kindness manifested towards them; although, I think, they have much reason to deprecate it. The people of all the west owe to this bank about thirty millions, which have been borrowed from it; and the president thinks that the payments for the interest, and other facilities which they derive from the operation of the bank, are so onerous as to produce ‘a drain of their currency, which no country can bear without inconvenience and occasional distress.’ His remedy is to compel them to pay the whole of the debt which they have contracted in a period short of four years. Now, Mr. President, if they cannot pay the interest without distress, how are they to pay the principal? If they cannot pay a part, how are they to pay the whole? Whether the payment of the interest be or be not a burden to them, is a question for themselves to decide, respecting which they might be disposed to dispense with the kindness of the president. If, instead of borrowing thirty millions from the bank, they had borrowed a like sum from a Girard, John Jacob Astor, or any other banker, what would they think of one who should come to them and say, ‘gentlemen of the west, it will ruin you to pay the interest on that debt, and therefore I will oblige you to pay the whole of the principal in less than four years.’ Would they not reply, ‘we know what we are about; mind your own business; we are satisfied that in ours we can make not only the interest on what we loan, but a fair profit besides.’

A great mistake exists about the western operation of the bank. It is not the bank, but the business, the commerce of the west, and the operations of government, that occasion the transfer, annually, of money from the west to the Atlantic states. What is the actual course of things? The business and commerce of the west are carried on with New Orleans, with the southern and southwestern states and with the Atlantic cities. We transport our dead or inanimate produce to New Orleans, and receive in return checks or drafts of the bank of the United States at a premium of a half per centum. We send by our drovers our live stock to the south and southwest, and receive similar checks in return. With these drafts or checks our merchants proceed to the Atlantic cities, and purchase domestic or foreign goods for western consumption. The lead and fur trade of Missouri and Illinois is also carried on principally through the bank of the United States. The government also transfers to places where it is wanted, through that bank, the sums accumulated at the different land-offices, for purchases of the public lands.

Now all these varied operations must go on; all these remittances must be made, bank of the United States or no bank. The bank does not create, but facilitates them. The bank is a mere vehicle; just as much so as the steamboat is the vehicle which transports our produce to the great mart of New Orleans, and not the grower of that produce. It is to confound cause and effect, to attribute to the bank the transfer of money from the west to the east. Annihilate the bank to-morrow, and similar transfers of capital, the same description of pecuniary operations, must be continued; not so well, it is true, but performed they must be, ill or well, under any state of circumstances.

The true questions are, how are they now performed? how were they conducted prior to the existence of the bank? how would they be after it ceased? I can tell you what was our condition before the bank was established; and, as I reason from the past to future experience, under analogous circumstances, I can venture to predict what it will probably be without the bank.

Before the establishment of the bank of the United States, the exchange business of the west was carried on by a premium, which was generally paid on all remittances to the east of two and a half per centum. The aggregate amount of all remittances, throughout the whole circle of the year, was very great, and instead of the sum then paid, we now pay half per centum, or nothing, if notes of the bank of the United States be used. Prior to the bank, we were without the capital of the thirty millions which that institution now supplies, stimulating our industry and invigorating our enterprise. In Kentucky we have no specie-paying bank, scarcely any currency other than that of paper of the bank of the United States and its branches.

How is the west to pay this enormous debt of thirty millions of dollars? It is impossible. It cannot be done. General distress, certain, wide-spread, inevitable ruin, must be the consequences of an attempt to enforce the payment. Depression in the value of all property, sheriffs’ sales and sacrifices, bankruptcy, must necessarily ensue, and, with them, relief laws, paper money, a prostration of the courts of justice, evils from which we have just emerged, must again, with all their train of afflictions, revisit our country. But it is argued by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. White,) that similar predictions were made, without being realized, from the downfall of the old bank of the United States. It is, however, to be recollected, that the old bank did not possess one third of the capital of the present; that it had but one office west of the mountains, whilst the present has nine; and that it had little or no debt due to it in that quarter, whilst the present bank has thirty millions. The war, too, which shortly followed the downfall of the old bank, and the suspension of specie payments, which soon followed the war, prevented the injury apprehended from the discontinuance of the old bank.