Volume 1 — LIFE OF HENRY CLAY. (continued 3)

Mr. Clay had the pleasure of seeing the bill, as advocated by him, pass the house, on the fourteenth of January, 1813, by a vote of seventy-seven to forty-two. On the sixteenth (having passed the senate,) it received the signature of the president; and thus was taken another and very important step in carrying out that system of manly and bold resistance devised and introduced by him, and which was destined to redress all our grievances and restore our violated rights.

On the eighteenth of February, congress proceeded to ascertain the result of an election for president and vice president, which was as follows. For president, James Madison, one hundred and twenty-eight, De Witt Clinton, eighty-nine. For vice president, Elbridge Gerry, one hundred and thirty-one, Jared Ingersoll, eighty-six. Thus the re-election of Mr. Madison furnished undoubted evidence that the people, from whom there is no appeal, sustained the measures of war.

On the twenty-fourth of May, Mr. Clay was elected speaker to the house again, over Mr. Pitkin, by a majority of thirty-five, and whenever an opportunity was afforded him, he mingled in the discussions that were almost constantly agitating the house, in reference to prosecuting the war. At the commencement of this, the first session of the thirteenth congress, he called the attention of the house to that portion of the president’s message which describes the manner in which the British had been waging war: which characterized it as ‘adding to the savage fury of it on one frontier, a system of plunder and conflagration on the other, equally forbidden by respect for national character, and by the established rules of civilized warfare.’ In a few pertinent remarks, he adverted to this description embodied by the message, censuring somewhat severely the nation guilty of such enormities, and said, ‘if they should be found to be as public report had stated them, they called for the indignation of all christendom, and ought to be embodied in an authentic document which might perpetuate them on the page of history.’ An investigation instituted on a motion of Mr. Clay, in reference to these, developed the astounding fact that the most barbaric outrages were committed repeatedly, on American prisoners, by the savage allies of the British, with their approval. The indignation of the house was aroused to a high pitch, on learning the truth of the report, which took immediate measures for causing to be laid before it every instance of such flagrant violation of the rules of warfare recognized by all civilized nations.

War had now become the settled policy and regular business of the nation; a business which though at first she performed rather bunglingly, was now despatched in a more workmanlike manner. The plough, the spade, and the various implements of husbandry and mechanism, had become partially forgotten, by the familiarity which had been effected with the musket and the sword, so that greater skill was manifested in the use of the latter, which resulted in greater success than accompanied the first attempts at their use. York, the capital of Upper Canada, had fallen into our hands, and five naval victories had been achieved. Indecision and timidity had to a great extent disappeared, and a spirit of indomitable determination had been made to take their place, mainly through the irresistible influence of Mr. Clay’s eloquent appeals. These were all-powerful, agitating the whole nation, paralyzing opposition, and organizing and arraying the talent, influence, and means of all classes, to do battle to death, if necessary, in defence of our precious liberties. A noble and enthusiastic feeling was diffused throughout the country. Public opinion was far and wide aroused in favor of the war, and its majestic roar shook down the unconsecrated temples of treason, and bared their secrets to the light of heaven. Patriot answered aloud to patriot—the sentinels of freedom caught up the watchword—from town to town the signal fires flashed free, and all things proclaimed that the spirit of the country was up for glory.

Both the friends and foes of Mr. Clay agree that at this period the control he had acquired was almost unlimited. In the house it was probably equal to that which he had acquired a few years previous in the legislature of Kentucky. This was always exercised in the spirit of the greatest liberality, and in such a manner as to promote the public interests. Towards the close of 1813, negotiations for peace commenced, at the suggestion of Alexander, the emperor of Russia, who proffered his mediation between the two belligerent nations. On the part of the United States, his proffer was favorably received, and a willingness manifested to accede to it, accompanied with expressions of regret that the commercial interests of Russia should be infringed or endangered in any way by her collision with Great Britain. This was first formally made at Washington, by the Russian minister, M. Daschkoff, as early as March of the same year, and eagerly embraced by the president. It had, however, several months previous, been hinted to Mr. Adams, our minister at St. Petersburg, by the emperor himself, who manifested great desire that hostilities should cease. On the part of Great Britain his pacific proposition was rejected, who alleged that the peculiar nature of her domestic and naval regulations rendered incompatible its acceptance, but declared her perfect willingness to treat with the American envoys, either at London, or Paris, or indeed at any convenient place selected by the two powers. This proposal was accepted, and the preliminary steps taken to accomplish the object proposed. Messrs. Albert Gallatin and James A. Bayard were selected as two of the commissioners for the United States, and directed to repair without delay and join Mr. J. Q. Adams, at St. Petersburg, there to await the further action of government.

A short time after, a proposal from the English ministry to negotiate with us at Gottingen was accepted, and Messrs. Clay and Jonathan Russell were selected commissioners, who, in connection with the three in Russia, were invested with full power to treat with lord Gambier, Henry Goulborne, and William Adamos, commissioners on the part of the British government.

Although Gottingen had been first agreed upon as the city where to conduct the negotiation, subsequently it was determined that Ghent should be the place. The sixth of August, 1814, found the plenipotentiaries of both nations (except Mr. Gallatin, who joined them soon after,) at the latter city, ready to proceed with their legitimate business. They commenced by a mutual interchange of kind feeling, evincing a disposition to approach the subject in the true spirit of conciliation, and to frame their stipulations so as to subserve the interests of the powers they represented. In consequence of the proximity of the British ministers to their government, they enjoyed a superior advantage over the American commissioners, of which they availed themselves freely, for whenever they received from the latter a note of any importance, it was directly sent to London, where its contents were carefully scrutinized by the English ministry, who prepared and sent back an answer containing instructions, which were to govern their actions in relation to it. This mode of procedure adopted by them, greatly retarded the negotiation, while the remoteness of the American negotiators from their government, made it impossible for them to resort to a similar method. The plan which they adopted on receiving a communication from the former, was to consider its contents deliberately, and with great circumspection; after which it was committed to the care of one of their number deputed to prepare an answer. This underwent a rigid examination, when each member considered it in private, making such alterations as he deemed proper. Afterwards they all assembled and subjected them to a thorough scrutiny, which terminated in their adoption or rejection. Their proceedings in detail were never reported, so that it is impossible to state to what extent they were influenced by each member of the diplomacy, but it is matter of general credence that Mr. Clay, in their joint colloquial meetings, bore a prominent part and exercised a controlling power over the character of the stipulations. It is understood that Mr. Gallatin drew up more official communications than any one of his associates, that Mr. Adams ranked next, and Mr. Clay next. The various papers prepared by these gentlemen during the period of their negotiation, which continued about five months, furnish some of the finest specimens of English composition. For purity of diction, terseness of style, happy illustration, and logical construction, they will not suffer in comparison with the best political disquisitions in the English language.

The favorable indications which appeared at the commencement of the negotiation, soon gave place to those of a different character. The tone of the British commissioners, in laying the foundation of the treaty, soon became so dictatorial as almost to preclude the possibility of proceeding with it. In enumerating the various subjects which they designed to review and determine, besides the seizure of mariners from merchantmen on the high seas, boundary line, and the privileges heretofore enjoyed by the United States in carrying on their fisheries within the limits of British jurisdiction, they declared as a sine qua non to the completion of the treaty, that it must embrace provisions for rendering pacific the various Indian tribes within our borders, for settling their boundaries by a specific treaty with Great Britain, and that the right to purchase their lands without her consent must be unconditionally ceded. On such grounds the American commissioners unhesitatingly and unanimously refused to advance. The overbearing and haughty pretensions and arbitrary demands thus set up and insisted on at the very outset, seemed to interpose an insurmountable barrier towards effecting an amicable and honorable arrangement with our foe. Not only did she by prescription unadvised with us, exhibit an intention to have it all in her own way, but she avowed her design to obtain the control of certain islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, over which our right of jurisdiction had not been questioned up to that time, and to cause us to agree not to keep any naval force on the lakes, nor garrison soldiers on their eastern shores. The thought of submitting for a moment to such obnoxious exactions and requisitions could not be tolerated, and the American commissioners peremptorily informed them that negotiation under such circumstances was entirely out of the question, and that an unqualified abandonment of the objectionable portion of their demands must be complied with, before their consent to proceed another step in the business could be obtained. They saw it was requisite to be thus decided, in order to put an early and effectual stop to such unwarrantable assumptions and encroachments, which, if quietly submitted to, they clearly foresaw (by their maintaining a right to ‘vary and regulate their demands,’) would be indefinitely extended. In their first despatches to Washington, therefore, instead of holding out any encouragement of success, they stated that there was no ‘hope of peace.’ Immediately after their arrival, they were spread before the people by the public journalists, whose indignation was greatly augmented, on becoming acquainted with treatment ostensibly given for the purpose of consummating a treaty of peace on grounds of mutual reciprocity, but which in reality recognized the nation with whom it was to be effected, as enslaved rather than free. The demands of England were characterized as ‘arrogant, insulting to the United States, meriting instantaneous rejection, and demanding the united exertions of every citizen of these states, in the vigorous prosecution of the war until it shall be terminated in a just and honorable peace.’

The publication of their despatches was not anticipated by our commissioners, and great was their astonishment on perusing them in the newspapers at Ghent. Their fears were excited lest it should have an unfavorable bearing on the negotiations, if it did not put an abrupt period to them. The English negotiators maintained a guarded silence on the subject. Mr. Clay being solicitous to ascertain their opinions in relation thereto, addressed them, beginning with lord Gambier, whom he accosted by saying, ‘you perceive, my lord, that our government has published our despatches, and that now the whole world knows what we are doing here.’ ‘Yes,’ said he, ‘I have seen it with infinite surprise, and the proceeding is without example in the civilized world.’ ‘Why, my lord,’ said Mr. Clay, mildly, ‘you must recollect that at the time of the publication of those despatches, our government had every reason to suppose, from the nature of the pretensions and demands which yours brought forward, that our negotiation would not terminate successfully, and that the publication would not find us here together. I am quite sure that if our government had anticipated the present favorable aspect of our deliberations, the publication of the despatches would not have been ordered. Then your lordship must also recollect, that if, as you truly asserted, the publication of despatches pending a negotiation is not according to the custom of European diplomacy, our government is organized on principles totally different from those on which European governments are constituted. With us, the business in which we are here engaged is the people’s business. We are their servants, and they have a right to know how their business is going on. The publication, therefore, was to give the people information of what ultimately affected them.’

Although unable to controvert this explanation by Mr. Clay, of the reasons for publishing the official papers relative to the negotiation, he expressed himself not perfectly satisfied with it, and his opinion was concurred in by his colleagues. However, the injurious consequences apprehended from their publication were not experienced, and the business of the treaty proceeded as if it had not been made.

Mr. Clay reciprocated an act of kindness of Mr. Goulborne, who had sent him a British periodical containing an account of the taking of Washington by the arms of his nation, by sending to him some American papers which he had recently received, describing a splendid victory won on lake Champlain or lake Erie, by the navy of his country over that of the British.

After the receipt of such unpleasant intelligence from Ghent, it was resolved that redoubled energy should be put forth in pushing forward the war, which caused the noble feats of our gallant navy and army to be greatly multiplied. At Plattsburgh, Chippewa, and many other places, victory perched upon our banner. The hearts of our hardy sailors gathered fresh strength, whose successful attempts in annoying the enemy by capturing his trading vessels, caused the most bitter lamentations throughout his realm, and underwriters to advance their rates of insurance between England and Ireland from three-fourths of one to five per cent. The determined spirit thus evinced by us, Great Britain correctly attributed to the arbitrarily assumptive course which she attempted to pursue in conducting the negotiations at Ghent; a spirit which she had the sagacity to discover would never brook the slightest shade of vassalage, or permit the acceptance of dishonorable terms, and also the wisdom to avert the destructive consequences which her varied and wide-spread interests would certainly sustain from the aggressions of those actuated by it, in speedily removing the causes by which it was aroused. A recession was immediately made, not only by the British ministers, who reduced their sine qua non so as to require only the effection of Indian pacification, but by the public journalists in both England and her provinces. They spoke in more respectful terms of the United States, and abated to a good extent their domineering attempts. Still some of the objectionable terms proposed at first as the basis of an arrangement, were adhered to. The cession of such a portion of our territory as should secure a permanent and safe communication to England between Quebec and Halifax, was required pertinaciously. The American commissioners assumed the responsibility, at the risk of breaking off the negotiation, of rejecting such terms, and indeed all that did not come within the limit of their instructions, by informing the English commissioners, that it was perfectly fruitless, besides a waste of time, to bring forward and attempt to connect with the treaty, subjects respecting which they were not empowered to negotiate; subjects which were many of them foreign to their purpose, had no natural relation to it, and which if desirable might be definitely settled by subsequent negotiation, without being made a party to their present proposed arrangement. They affirmed that they had ‘no relation to the subsisting differences between the two countries; they are inconsistent with acknowledged principles of public law; they are founded neither on reciprocity nor on any of the usual bases of negotiation, neither on that of the uti possidetis or of status ante bellum; they would inflict the most vital injury on the United States by dismembering their territory, by arresting their natural growth and increase of population, and by leaving their northern and western frontiers equally exposed to British invasion and Indian aggression; they are above all dishonorable to the United States, in demanding from them to abandon territory and a portion of their citizens, to admit a foreign interference in their domestic concerns, and to cease to exercise their natural rights on their own shores and in their own waters. A treaty concluded on such terms would be but an armistice. It cannot be supposed that America would long submit to conditions so injurious and degrading. It is impossible, in the natural course of events, that she should not, at the first favorable opportunity, recur to arms for the recovery of her territory, of her rights, and her honor. Instead of settling existing difficulties, such a peace would only create new causes of war, sow the seeds of permanent hatred, and lay the foundation of hostilities for an indefinite period. It is not necessary to refer such demands to the American government for its instruction. They will be only a fit subject of deliberation when it becomes necessary to decide upon the expediency of an absolute surrender of national independence.’

There was no mistaking the meaning of such language, respectful but pungent, expressing perspicuously the true principles of diplomatic action. Although it was self-evident that the spirit which dictated such sentiments as that communication contained, would not allow any truckling or swerving, still the British negotiators appeared determined to persevere until they accomplished what from the very commencement seemed to be to them a favorite feature in the treaty, viz: the exposure of our whole northern frontier to the mercy of their nation. She found that the Indian hordes could be advantageously employed by her, indeed she had already employed them to such an extent as to give, so far as she was concerned, a most truculent aspect to the war; hence the invincible determination manifested by her legalized commissioners, to have the treaty so framed as to secure to her their absolute control. This disposition was regarded by the American commissioners with feelings not only of regret, but of horror, who protested against ‘the employment of savages, whose known rule of warfare is the indiscriminate torture and butchery of women, children, and prisoners,’ as constituting ‘a departure from the principles of humanity observed between all civilized and christian nations even in war.’ They stated that instead of endeavoring to effect that control, it would be much more comportable with the dignity and grandeur of the British nation to abandon forever the barbarous practice, and to stipulate with America to that purpose in case of waging any future war with her. They would not recede an inch from the ground which they had taken, in relation to the Indians and northern frontier. After directing their combined diplomatic artillery against them for the space of several weeks incessantly, to drive them from it, but without the slightest success, the British diplomatists finally abandoned it. Soon after the American commissioners proposed to guaranty the pacification of the Indians when the treaty should be ratified, and expressed their unaltered determination to treat upon no subjects respecting which they had received no instructions. To this their opponents acceded, and the negotiation proceeded, the American commissioners dictating nearly all the terms, and finally issued in the production of a treaty, on the twenty-fourth of December, 1814.

Throughout the negotiation the utmost unanimity prevailed among our ministers, and never was there a difference of opinion, except in one instance. This related to certain fishery privileges, and the navigation of the Mississippi river.

In a treaty of peace concluded in 1783, between Great Britain and the United States, it was stipulated that the latter should enjoy the liberty of taking fish of every kind on all the banks of Newfoundland, Grand Bank, gulf of St. Lawrence, and in all other places where the inhabitants of both countries had been accustomed to fish—that the same should be enjoyed on all the coasts, bays and creeks of his Britannic majesty’s dominions in America; that she should have full permission to dry and cure fish in the unsettled bays, &c. of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as they should remain unsettled, but that after they were settled, such permission must be sanctioned by their occupants; and also that the Mississippi river should be open forever to the navigation of both nations, from its mouth to its source. The latter stipulation was included in a treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in 1794.

The United States, anticipating that the subjects of the fisheries and navigation of the Mississippi would be brought forward by the British government, had directed the secretary of state, Mr. Monroe, to give her commissioners special instructions relative to them. He accordingly authorized them, in case she should require the United States to relinquish her fishing privileges, to treat the requisition as it deserved. They were given to understand that these privileges must not be brought into the discussion, and that, if insisted on, their negotiations must terminate. He instructed them not to grant to Great Britain the right to navigate any river within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

At an early stage of the negotiation, it had been intimated to the American commissioners by the British, that the privilege in question would not be renewed, unless the United States offered something to Great Britain which should be deemed an ample equivalent. The subject of this equivalent caused the difference of opinions to which allusion has been made. Mr. Adams contended that no equivalent could or ought to be demanded for the right of fishing stipulated in the treaty of 1783. He did not believe with his colleagues, that the article in that treaty, relating to this right, expired at the commencement of the war, but contended that it had survived the war, and that therefore it was absurd to treat concerning the renewal of a right, of which they were then in the legitimate possession. The great importance of preserving this right unabridged was felt by all. Mr. Gallatin went so far as to propose to permit Great Britain to exercise the right of navigating the Mississippi as an equivalent for that of fishing in the waters within her jurisdiction. After a warm debate, Messrs. Adams, Gallatin and Bayard declared themselves in favor of doing so, and Messrs. Clay and Russell opposed. Mr. Clay then affirmed, that his signature should not be appended to a treaty including such a proposition, who was joined soon after by Mr. Bayard, and consequently it was not included. A most animated discussion ensued, in which Mr. Clay demonstrated the impolicy of extending such a privilege to Great Britain, contended that America ought to come out of the war in the unimpaired possession of all the rights and privileges which she enjoyed prior to its commencement, and that the right of discussing the question of the fisheries did not come within the purview of their instructions. In regard to the navigation of the Mississippi, a mere glance at its unlimited connections and dependencies, the vast advantage which an easy access to them would confer, rendered no deliberation requisite in deciding upon granting a right to it to Great Britain. It would be almost tantamount to placing in her hands a tube communicating with the very vitals of the republic, through which she could suck its life blood; it would give her unbounded facilities for employing against us the numerous tribes of Indians at the north west, of which she would doubtless with avidity avail herself, and greatly to our detriment, and thus jeopard the great and growing interests of the whole west. As it respected the right which she imagined she possessed in virtue of the treaties of 1783 and 1794, Mr. Clay contended that the grounds upon which it was based were supposititious, and that therefore it could not be valid; that at the dates of those treaties, it was supposed that the law of nations would entitle her to the right, inasmuch as it was believed that her dominions bordered on the Upper Mississippi, and that this supposed bordering of her territory on the river, was the principal reason adduced in stipulating for the right of its navigation; that now since it was certainly determined and known, that such was not the fact, she possessed no natural grounds on which to found the right; that Spain at the date of those treaties owned the entire western bank of the river from its mouth to its source, and consequently possessed an equal interest with the United States in its navigation, who could not, therefore, convey to a third party that interest, or any portion of it, unsanctioned by the former; that in 1803, by purchase, the United States became possessed of the entire Spanish interest, which placed her upon different grounds from those on which she stood in 1783 and 1794. Besides, Mr. Clay argued, what connection is there between the fishing privilege, and the right of navigating the Mississippi? The treaties showed none, their nature none. Why select as the equivalent for the privilege, the Mississippi? Why not barter the Potomac, or the Hudson for it? There was something calculated to excite suspicion in this attempt of our powerful enemy to introduce her invincible navy to the ‘father of rivers.’ It looked like feeling for the purse-strings of the nation. He would as soon yield a portion of her blood-bought territory, as this noblest of her streams, to become the resort of the British lion, where he might make his permanent lair, and eventually place his huge paw upon the crest of her eagle. Though as anxious as his colleagues possibly could be for the preservation of their fishing privileges, he could not consent to effect it by a purchase so expensive as that proposed. Thus Mr. Clay remained immovably determined to act in accordance with his convictions of duty in consulting the interests of that nation which he represented. The value of those interests, undoubtedly secured by the decided position which he assumed and maintained, is of such magnitude as to be inappreciable; they constitute a corner stone of the temple of liberty, destined to abide as long as she shall make it her abode.

Subsequently to the British ministers’ becoming acquainted with the conclusion of the American commissioners, respecting the exchange, they, in a counter project of a treaty, submitted to the latter, proposed among other articles one to renew the right of navigation in question, without any equivalent. After much deliberation this was rejected. Finally, it was mutually agreed by both parties to refrain from inserting any article in the treaty, relating either to the fisheries or the navigation of the Mississippi. Thus the pride of the west and the glory of America was suffered to roll his majestic tide in beauty and grandeur to the ocean, unburthened by foreign vessels and unfettered by regal sway.

Several years afterwards, Mr. Clay became involved in an unpleasant controversy between Messrs. Russell and Adams, which originated from something connected with their negotiations at Ghent. On the day next subsequent to the signing of the treaty, the commissioners drew up a sketch of their discussions in relation to the difference of opinion among them, concerning complying with the demands of the British commissioners, which represented the offer of the navigation of the Mississippi as made by a majority of the American plenipotentiaries. At the same time, Mr. Russell communicated to Mr. Monroe the fact of his being in the minority in that offer, and declared his intention of submitting his reasons for disagreeing with his associates, at a future convenient period, which he subsequently carried into effect. These papers were deposited among the documents of the nation, where they remained till 1822, when they were placed before the house of representatives, at its request, by the president, together with a private communication from Mr. Russell, purporting to be a duplicate of one found among the private papers of the president. A statement was made by each of these letters, between which there was a discrepancy, which caused Mr. Adams to reprimand Mr. Russell severely, through the medium of the press. Mr. Clay addressed a letter to Mr. Russell designed to be private, in which he signified his acquiescence in the reprimand, and also gave a concise statement of their debates connected with their disagreement. It appeared that Mr. Adams was laboring under the impression that Mr. Clay coincided with him in construing the treaties of 1783 and 1794, or that part of them referring to the fisheries and Mississippi, from the fact of his signature being attached to the communication of the American to the British commissioners, embodying the views of the former in relation to them. Mr. Clay corrected that impression by declaring that he had not concurred with him. He stated that his object in advising the insertion of the words ‘a majority,’ in the despatch to the secretary of state, was to announce to his government the fact of a division among them, and with the view of concealing it from the power with whom they were treating, he appended his signature to the communication. The dispute was maintained some time between Messrs. Russell and Mr. Adams, and with great acrimony, but no impeachment of Mr. Clay’s conduct or motives was attempted by either. Both awarded to him the honor of having acted well his part, in bringing to so felicitous a consummation the treaty of peace.

Immediately after the close of the negotiation, Mr. Clay repaired to Paris, having resolved not to visit England until he learned the ratification of the treaty. At the request of Mr. Crawford, our minister at Paris, he took lodgings in his hotel, where he found an invitation to a ball, given by Mr. Hottinguer, the American banker, in honor of the conclusion of the treaty. There he was introduced to the celebrated madame de Stael, and had a pleasant interview with her.

She informed him that she had recently visited England, and had openly espoused the cause of the United States there, remarking that the British were greatly exasperated against them, and entertained serious intentions of despatching the duke of Wellington at the head of their armies, for the purpose of inflicting proper, and as they thought well merited chastisement upon them. He politely thanked her for the interest she had manifested in behalf of his country, at the same time expressing his regret that England had not carried out her intentions. ‘Why?’ said she. ‘Because, madame, if he had beaten us, we should only have been in the condition of Europe, without disgrace. But if we had been so fortunate as to defeat him, we should have greatly added to the renown of our arms.’

He afterwards met her at a select coterie at her own dwelling, where he found the marshals of France, duke of Wellington, and many other persons of rank. On introducing Mr. Clay to the duke, madame de Stael repeated the above anecdote. He replied promptly and gracefully, that had he been so fortunate in the execution of such a commission as to triumph over a foe evincing as much bravery as the Americans had, he should regard it as a greater honor than the most brilliant victory he had ever achieved.

Mr. Clay tarried at the French metropolis two months, during which time news of the glorious victory at New Orleans was communicated to him, whereupon he was heard to remark, ‘now I can go to England without mortification.’ He expressed, however, much chagrin at the reported flight of a body of Kentucky militia from the field of battle on that occasion, but declared his belief, from a personal acquaintance with their bravery, that it must be false.

Soon after, he went to England, where the treaty had been ratified formally, a few days previous to his leaving Paris. In England he received the most marked attention, and formed many valuable acquaintances, which subsequently proved a source of pleasure and profit to him. He won the esteem of lord Castlereagh, who treated him with particular politeness, offering to present him to the prince regent, which Mr. Clay civilly declined, in consequence of his unwillingness to submit to the courtly formalities of such an introduction.

Several days had elapsed, when he was informed by his host that an individual desired to speak with him. Mr. Clay requested that he might be admitted, who accordingly was, who proved to be a person splendidly dressed, and, refusing to be seated at Mr. Clay’s request, announced himself as the first waiter of my lord Castlereagh! ‘Indeed!’ replied Mr. Clay, ‘what is your pleasure with me?’ ‘Why, if your excellency pleases,’ said the man, ‘it is usual for a foreign minister when he is presented to lord Castlereagh to make to his first waiter a present, or pay the customary stipend;’ at the same time presenting him with a catalogue of names of foreign ministers, with the amount that each had paid him placed opposite his name.

Mr. Clay, believing it a vile attempt to extort money from him, endeavored to get rid of him in the easiest way possible, by saying that he was not the minister to England; that Mr. Adams, who was, would probably soon arrive from Paris, who would doubtless comply with the custom of the country in that respect. The servant, not being inclined to release him so easily, quickly replied, that it was immaterial whether he was a resident or special minister. Mr. Clay thought finally that the most effectual way to release himself, was to comply with his demand, and presented him a small sum.

While he was at London the battle of Waterloo was fought, and he witnessed the public rejoicings on account of its favorable termination to the British. He was one day dining at lord Castlereagh’s house in company with many of the nobility, when the conversation turned on the late victory, and the whereabouts of Napoleon, as it was not known where he had gone. Some intimated that he had sailed for America. ‘If he goes there,’ said lord Liverpool to Mr. Clay, ‘will he not give you much trouble?’ ‘None whatever,’ instantly replied Mr. Clay, ‘we shall be glad to receive such a distinguished, though unfortunate exile, and we shall soon make a good democrat of him.’

During his residence in England, Mr. Clay passed his time very agreeably, and laid the foundation for many grateful reminiscences. By the late sir James Mackintosh he was delightfully entertained. He embraced the opportunity of renewing his intimacy with lord Gambier, whose amiable qualities and piety had secured Mr. Clay’s strong attachment. With him he spent a week, visiting with him during that time several places of interest, one of which was the residence of a descendant of William Penn.

In September, 1815, he embarked for New York, where, on his arrival, he and Mr. Gallatin were complimented with a public dinner.

In every transaction of a public character in which Mr. Clay had any agency, he almost invariably rendered himself conspicuous; but in no one did he gather greener laurels, or make a longer stride towards immortal fame, than in that of the negotiation at Ghent. Rumor had preceded him, trumpeting his honors—the faithful and scrupulously jealous manner in which he had almost sleeplessly watched over the interests of his country, and crushed with the strength of a giant the incipient risings of a disposition to destroy or abridge her natural or conventional rights; and when he approached her shores, she opened wide her arms to receive him. In Kentucky, warm, noble-hearted Kentucky, his reception was like that of a dutiful and affectionate son in the long and passionate embrace of a beloved mother. She welcomed him with a tenderness that would hardly allow the winds of heaven to visit him with gentle rudeness. Enthusiastic rejoicings were enkindled, and spontaneous outpourings of grateful feeling were lavished upon him like rain. He had even been re-elected to congress while he was still in Europe, and unanimously. A doubt having arisen touching the legality of this election, a new one was commenced, which resulted as at first.

At the commencement of the next session, the house again called him to preside over its deliberations, where he soon became engaged in directing successfully the affairs of the nation. As a matter in course, the new treaty was brought forward at an early stage, out of which the federalists, and the opposers of the war in general, endeavored to obtain food for their carping, fault-finding appetites. Passing indifferently and silently by the great advantages which it secured to the United States, they sought, with an eagerness worthy of a better cause, to find some defective or weak point. If in this they were successful, although it might be so diminutive as to escape the detection of any except their microscopic vision when thus employed, it was ridiculously amusing to listen to their barkings, and howlings, and wranglings over it, often for hours; and the multitude and variety of hard names and scurrilous epithets which they would bandy about on such occasions, rendered it necessary for one to go beyond the English vocabulary if he desired to satisfy his curiosity respecting their location. But Mr. Clay soon brought to bear upon them the tremendous battery of his eloquence, which sent the whole yelping pack to their kennels, both in and out of congress. This he did on the twenty-ninth of January, 1816.

Said he, on that occasion, ‘I gave a vote for the declaration of war. I exerted all the little influence and talents I could command to make the war. The war was made. It is terminated; and I declare with perfect sincerity, if it had been permitted to me to lift the veil of futurity, and to have foreseen the precise series of events which has occurred, my vote would have been unchanged. We had been insulted, and outraged, and spoliated upon by nearly all Europe; by Great Britain, by France, Spain, Denmark, Naples, and, to cap the climax, by the little contemptible power of Algiers. We had submitted too long and too much. We had become the scorn of foreign powers, and the derision of our own citizens.’

These opposers laid no small emphasis upon the fact that no stipulation was contained in the treaty respecting the impressment of our seamen. He met this in a strain of lofty argument, whose pungency sank into their hearts like a spear. Said he, ‘one of the great causes of the war and of its continuance was the practice of impressment exercised by Great Britain; and if this claim had been admitted by necessary implication or express stipulation, the rights of our seamen would have been abandoned! It is with utter astonishment that I hear it has been contended in this country, that because our right of exemption from the practice had not been expressly secured in the treaty, it was therefore given up! It is impossible that such an argument can be advanced on this floor. No member who regarded his reputation would venture to advance such a doctrine.’

He concluded by stating the position in which the country ought to be speedily placed; advised the preservation of her present naval and military force; to make provision for the increase of the navy; to fortify her most defenceless points; to multiply military roads and canals; and to commence in earnest the great work of internal improvement. ‘I would see a chain of turnpike roads and canals from Passamaquoddy to New Orleans, and other similar roads intersecting the mountains, to facilitate intercourse between all parts of the country, and to bind and to connect us together. I would also effectually protect our manufactories. I would afford them protection not so much for the sake of the manufacturers themselves as for the general interest.’

Mr. Clay resumed his duties in the house by evincing the same far reaching anxiety for the welfare of his whole country, that he manifested when he resigned his station for a foreign mission. To his influence, in a great measure, the origin of the war was owing, its bold prosecution, and satisfactory termination. But besides the advantages which we reaped as the fruits of it, we realized many detrimental consequences incidental to it. An immense debt had been contracted; our commercial, manufacturing, and agricultural interests had been partially suspended, if not totally neglected; we found ourselves greatly in want of articles, the product of mechanical ingenuity, to supply which it was necessary to resort to foreign work-shops; this of course caused large exportations of specie, which seldom returned; the bank issues amounted to upwards of one hundred millions of dollars, while at the same time there was only about fifteen millions of specie in the country. These institutions had of course been obliged to suspend specie payment; distress and pressure every where abounded, and the well disposed and patriotic began seriously to look about them for measures of relief, and restoration to the country. The most judicious and reflecting in the nation, believed that the greatest source of distress was to be found in the deranged state of the currency. Indeed it was completely vitiated. The government paper, bearing interest at six per cent., the redemption of which it had guarantied by pledging the faith of the nation, was depreciated some twenty per cent., and doubt and distrust in money matters were prominent features of the condition of the country. Something must be done, it was obvious, to remove that doubt, and restore confidence, or general stagnation would invade every industrial department throughout the nation. At this period, the individual states presented the singular appearance of being engaged in doing what the constitution evidently intended should be performed by the general government, namely, in reality regulating the currency, through the banking institutions operating under their sanction. This they were executing in a most unfinancial-like manner, in many instances making their paper a legal tender, thus compelling the creditor to accept it or yield his claim.

In this state of things, it was imperiously demanded of congress to interpose the power vested in it by the constitution, and recover that control over the currency which it had suffered to be usurped by the states. The articles in that instrument granting congress the exclusive power of coining money, and prohibiting the states from doing it, and also from issuing bills of credit, rendered it apparent that the power of regulating the general currency was lodged with that body. This was the belief of the most able financiers of that time, and adopted by those of the present. Acting under the influence of this belief, Mr. Madison had at the opening of the session of 1815–16, recommended ‘the establishment of a national bank,’ which ‘he regarded as the best and perhaps the only adequate resource to relieve the country and the government from the present embarrassment. Authorized to issue notes which will be received in all payments to the United States, the circulation of its issues will be coëxtensive with the union, and there will exist a constant demand, leaving a just proportion to the annual amount of the duties and taxes to be collected, independent of the general circulation for commercial and social purposes. A national bank will therefore possess the means and the opportunity of supplying a circulating medium of equal use and value in every state and in every district of every state. Established by the authority of the United States, accredited by the government to the whole amount of its notes in circulation, and intrusted as the depository of the government with all the accumulations of the public treasure, the national bank, independent of its immediate capital, will enjoy every recommendation which can merit and secure the confidence of the public. Organized upon principles of responsibility, but of independence, the national bank will be retained within its legitimate sphere of action without just apprehensions from the misconduct of its directors, or from the encroachments of the government. Eminent in its resources, and in its example, the national bank will conciliate and lead the state banks in all that is necessary for the restoration of credit, public and private. And acting upon a compound capital, partly of stock, and partly of gold and silver, the national bank will be the ready instrument to enhance the value of the public securities, and to restore the currency of the national coin.’

Such were Mr. Madison’s views in relation to a national bank, which were immediately referred to the committee on the national currency; and on the eighth of January, 1816, the chairman of that committee, Mr. John C. Calhoun, of South Carolina, presented an able and elaborate report in relation thereto, advocating the immediate chartering of such a bank as the president had recommended, and detailed its prominent features. When the bill was brought forward for the action of the house, Mr. Clay unequivocally declared himself in favor of its provisions in a speech of great ability and argumentative force, although well knowing that he would thereby subject himself to the charge of inconsistency. He was charged with it by his political enemies, who magnified his departure from the position taken by him in 1811 in relation to the same bank, into a monstrous blemish in his political character; which, if correctly considered, is seen to constitute an ornament, instead. A careful contrast of the grounds on which, and the circumstances under which he then opposed that institution, with those on and under which he now advocated it, will, to any unprejudiced mind, forever exempt him from that charge. Such a contrast will clearly show, that the total change of circumstances which had taken place during the five years that had elapsed since he first examined the merits of that bank, and that wrought in the policy of the general government in that time, to say nothing of the experience received in prosecuting the war, of the utility of and necessity for such an establishment, not only disarmed and rendered invalid now, objections which then were both valid and weighty when directed against it, but absolutely converted them into arguments in its favor. At the time when it was proposed to renew the charter of the old United States bank, Mr. Clay did not think it so essential in accomplishing any of the objects definitely specified in the constitution, as to justify its establishment, on grounds purely constructive. It was supported, too, principally by the federal party, and on the ground that its agency was requisite in executing the financial concerns of government; which ground then was falsely assumed, inasmuch as the local banks of the several states had, in certain cases, been employed to perform that office, which they were successfully executing. They, therefore, being known to compass the specific object for which it was stated the charter of the bank was to be renewed, it was justly regarded by Mr. Clay as a matter of supererogation to renew it, and accordingly he opposed its renewal. In 1816, Mr. Clay supported the bank mainly on the ground of its necessity, to enable congress to exercise that ample and salutary supervision over the commercial and monetary interests of the country, which the constitution expressly gave it; and that, therefore, out of this very necessity, was fairly deducible its constitutionality, since it was absurd to suppose that the constitution would grant to congress a specified right, and at the same time withhold the only means by which it could exercise that right. A stormy and protracted discussion arose respecting the bank charter, during which Mr. Clay came again into collision with Mr. Randolph, causing unusual sensation in the house, and giving rise to apprehensions that something serious might grow out of it. Mr. Randolph animadverted somewhat harshly upon Mr. Clay’s custom of maintaining a uniform silence in his private intercourse respecting his change of opinion in regard to the expediency and constitutionality of a United States bank, using language that might admit of very offensive construction. When he ceased, Mr. Clay, with his usual self-possession and deliberation, rose, and in a few words declared that the offensive language needed explanation; that he should refrain from saying what he conceived himself bound to say, until Mr. Randolph should make it. Mr. Randolph rose, and made the explanation, which Mr. Clay pronounced unsatisfactory; and Mr. Randolph again explained, disavowing all intention to offer offence. During the altercation, an almost breathless stillness had been preserved in the house; a pin might be heard to fall in any part of it.

The bank bill passed the house by a vote of eighty to seventy-one, and the senate by a vote of twenty-two to twelve. On the tenth of April it became a law, went into operation in the early part of 1817, and more than justified the expectations of its friends, in regard to its influence for good upon the varied interests of the country.

During this session, Mr. Clay gave his support to a bill proposing a reduction of the direct tax laid upon the United States. He expressed himself in favor of a moderate land tax, and regarded the existing one as too high for a state of peace. He maintained that ‘in time of peace we should look to foreign importations as the chief source of revenue, and in war when they are cut off, that it was time enough to draw deeply on our internal resources.’ His plan was to make up for a still further decrease of the land tax, by an increase of the duties on imports.

It was deemed desirable to increase the pay of members of congress, which led to the framing and passage of the celebrated compensation bill. It was generally agreed among the members that their compensation (six dollars per day,) was not sufficient for their maintenance at Washington, and allow them to enjoy the society of their families. The principal question that arose respected the mode by which it should be increased. Some were in favor of a stipulated salary, and others of an increase of the per diem pay. On the sixth of March, colonel Richard M. Johnson, one of the committee to whom the business had been referred, reported a bill regulating the pay of members, by a salary of fifteen hundred dollars per session, for each member in congress, which passed both houses. Mr. Clay voted for this bill, but at the same time declaring his preference for the per diem rate. The passage of this bill proved particularly obnoxious to the demagogues, throughout the country, who exerted themselves incessantly to excite the passions of the people, evidently for the purpose of accumulating political capital. In no section of the union did the excitement rage to such an extent as in Kentucky. It seemed as though scarcely an individual in the whole state was friendly to it. The ambitious and designing demagogues and ultra federalists united in Kentucky their furious forces, with exultations of delight at what appeared to them the certain prospect of accomplishing the total overthrow of Mr. Clay. They had succeeded to such a degree in kindling a flame of indignation against the measure, that there were at least some grounds of danger. They had long been impotently watching for this opportunity, and now from their various places of concealment they rushed forth, bent upon accomplishing their purpose. After some consultation as to the mode they should adopt, it was finally determined that Mr. John Pope, an eloquent and influential gentleman, should take the field in opposition to Mr. Clay. Accordingly, he immediately commenced political operations in the approved style of the country, by riding about among the inhabitants, addressing them often, setting forth his own merits and claims, and decrying those of his rival. It was not until after being repeatedly importuned by his friends, that Mr. Clay would consent to take the field in person against Mr. Pope. He finally went forth for the first time in his life, to vindicate in person to his constituents, his public political acts.

It has been said that Mr. Clay was the first Kentuckian who preserved dignity and independence of character on an electioneering tour. It was customary at that day in Kentucky, for any one who solicited an office in the gift of the people, to clothe himself in tattered garments, and in the attitude and with the tone of a menial, to go around among them and thus ask it at their hands. Mr. Clay’s exalted sense of dignity and honor would not permit him to conform to this degrading custom, and he visited his constituents attired just as he would go to his seat in congress. He appealed to the people, expressing his entire willingness to be governed by their will, as he was in duty bound, and that he would vote for the repeal of the offensive law, if they instructed him to do so. He corrected their erroneous impressions, and occasionally made those happy and effective appeals to their hearts, which he knew so well how to direct, and he soon found himself almost entirely reinstated in their affections. Mr. Pope, perceiving that he was fast losing ground, made a desperate effort at regaining it, by challenging his rival to meet him on a designated day and discuss their respective claims to the suffrage of the people. It was unhesitatingly accepted. They met according to appointment, and in the presence of an immense assemblage, fought their battle of argument, which resulted in the signal defeat of Mr. Pope. Mr. Clay was re-elected by a large majority. The compensation bill was among the first subjects considered by congress after it convened again, which was repealed. The per diem allowance was finally increased to eight dollars per day.

During the canvass, Mr. Clay met an old hunter who had previously been his devoted friend, but now opposed him on the ground of the compensation bill. ‘Have you a good rifle, my friend?’ asked Mr. Clay. ‘Yes.’ ‘Does it ever flash?’ ‘Once only.’ ‘What did you do with it, throw it away?’ ‘No, I picked the flint, tried it again, and brought down the game.’ ‘Have I ever flashed but on the compensation bill?’ ‘No.’ ‘Will you throw me away?’ ‘No! no!’ quickly replied the hunter, nearly overwhelmed by his enthusiastic feelings, ‘I will pick the flint and try you again!’ Ever afterwards he was the unwavering friend of Mr. Clay.

An Irish barber residing at Lexington, had always given Mr. Clay his vote, and on all occasions when he was a candidate for office, electioneered warmly for him. His ardent temperament and unrestrained passions frequently involved him in scrapes and difficulties, out of which Mr. Clay had generally succeeded in extricating him. While the canvass was progressing, after the compensation bill, the barber did not evince his usual zeal and animation, on the contrary seemed to be indifferent as to the result of the election. To all inquiries for whom he designed to vote he answered evasively. He was accosted a few days previous to the election, by a gentleman for whom he entertained the most profound regard, with the question, ‘for whom, Jerry, do you mean to vote?’ Regarding his interrogator with an earnest, shrewd look, he replied, ‘Faix, an’ sure, docthur, I mane to vote for the man who can’t put more nor one hand into the threasury.’ Mr. Pope, the opponent of Mr. Clay, had the misfortune to lose an arm in early life, and this circumstance, while it gave pertinence to the Irishman’s reply, indicated for whom he intended to vote. A few days subsequent to the election, the barber met Mr. Clay in Lexington, and approaching him, burst into tears, saying that he had wronged him, and manifested bitter regret for his ingratitude. ‘My poor dear wife,’ said he, ‘got round me, blubbering, and was after vexing herself and me too. She tould me that I was too bad, too bad, to desart like a base spalpleen, me ould frind. “Niver’s the time, Jerry, dear, when you got in jail or any bad fixin’, niver’s the time he didn’t come to you an’ hilp you out. Och! bad luck to you, for not giving him your vote.”’ The barber was ever after true to Mr. Clay.

In all matters of public importance brought before the house, whenever it was compatible with his station, Mr. Clay interested himself, concerning which his manifestation of regard for the welfare of his country was characterized by unusual uniformity. There was nothing fitful or erratic about his zeal; it burned with a steady, certain light, revealing the secrets of his very soul, in relation to his public intentions and desires. Defeat could not diminish, nor opposition extinguish it; always irrepressible, conflicting circumstances only rendered it more intense. No measures passed through his hands without bearing its impress, and so deep as to appear a part of the same. But there were periods of extraordinary interest, when it blazed with more than meteoric brilliancy—when it constituted the aurora borealis of the political horizon, seen and admired by the whole universe. One of these periods we now approach—a period which reflects the highest honor on his character, for philanthropy and benevolence, and which caused his memory to be enshrined in the hearts of millions remote from the field of his fame—the period of the struggles of the Spanish colonies in South America, to become independent of the mother country. These he contemplated with as much anxiety and solicitude for their result, as though he had been an actual participator in them.

Happily for America, the allotment of Providence introduced Mr. Clay to the stage of public action at one of the most critical times in her history, when just such influence as he could exert was imperiously demanded. The din of the revolution had hardly died away, and the blood with which it was achieved scarcely dried up, when he first came forward in the defence of his country’s rights. The spirit of ‘seventy-six’ had indeed felled the tall trees of tyranny, and plucked up the rank weeds of oppression, and planted the germ of liberty. But the little band of men inhaling that spirit, who had arrayed around the place of the precious deposit a rampart of iron hearts, after irrigating and enriching it with their blood, had either sunk down to an enviable rest in the sacred soil, or with diminished energy, and flagging zeal still maintained their posts. Their pristine strength, however, the storm of war had swept away, and though they still stretched out their scar-covered arms to shield it from invasion, their feeble efforts were hardly sufficient to the task. Dangers were numerous, boding disaster in case the vigilance of that veteran band should slumber. The enemies of freedom, though beaten back, had retired with their weapons in their hands, and from their secret lurking places looked forth, ready to avail themselves of the first favorable moment to sally forth and nip it in the bud. Such were the circumstances, when Mr. Clay joined that weak and diminished company of watchers. He found the tree of liberty a strong and vigorous plant, unfolding its beautiful leaves, but needing great care and culture. There was much foreign rubbish to be removed which retarded its growth. A glance at its situation determined his course. Nothing within the compass of his ability necessary to hasten on its progress towards maturity, was wanting. Morning, noon and night found him pouring the dew of his diligence upon it in copious effusions. Under its genial influences the trunk shot upward stately and strong, and the wide-spreading branches soon bent beneath large clusters of delicious fruit. The taste of that fruit caused the heart of the nation to bound with gladness, and her good and great men to desire that the inhabitants of the whole world might partake of it. Not a few of them gave utterance to that desire in words that burned with benevolence, but none spoke louder or with more effect than Mr. Clay. His voice infused courage into the hearts of those who were toiling to plant a similar tree on the fertile pampas of South America. Its thunder-tones reverberated among the lofty heights of the Andes, and rang through the halls of the incas. The hunter heard them, and departed for the battle-field to seek a nobler quarry. The gauchios left his lasso on the plain and buckled on his armor. From rank to rank of their embattled hosts they pealed, and nerved their arms to deal the liberating blows.

The first public expression of Mr. Clay’s feelings in relation to South American independence, was made in connection with a proposition to reduce the direct taxes of the United States, which he thought too high for a state of peace. The aspect of our foreign relations at that time was peculiarly amicable, although, from a report that the Spanish minister had made an informal demand for a portion of Florida, seemed to indicate that a rupture with Spain was by no means improbable, and he expressed himself in favor of husbanding our means as much as practicable, in anticipation of such an event. At the same time, he hinted the propriety of assisting her colonial dependents in their endeavors to establish a free government. His remarks caused Mr. Randolph to express his sentiments concerning the same subject, which among other things charged Mr. Clay with entertaining a desire for conquest, indeed as being influenced by unworthy motives. He said he was not ‘going a tilting for the liberties of South America.’ She came not to our aid; let us mind our own business, and not tax our people for the liberties of the people of Spanish America. He declared that her inhabitants were incapable of appreciating or enjoying liberty. He thought Mr. Clay had imbibed the war-spirit of Europe. ‘The honorable gentleman has been sent on a late occasion to Europe; he had been near the field of Waterloo, and he was apprehensive had snuffed the carnage and caught the infection.’ He intimated that Mr. Clay advocated an increase of the army for the purpose of marching them to the scene of action. ‘What! increase our standing army in time of peace on the suggestion that we are to go on a crusade to South America?’ Mr. Clay denied having made the most remote suggestions to that effect,—that his remarks were incapable of being so construed. ‘Do I not understand the gentleman?’—‘I am sorry I do not. I labor under two great misfortunes—I can never understand the honorable speaker, and he can never understand me.’ Such being the case, Mr. Randolph remarked, he should be under the necessity of abandoning the argument with him, since it would be impossible to proceed.

Mr. Clay again alluded to the same subject a few days after, in a most feeling manner. A bill was brought forward to prohibit ‘our citizens from selling vessels of war to subjects of a foreign power,’ which he vigorously opposed because of its evident bearing upon the belligerent state of South America. He said it was impossible to conceal the true character of that bill. ‘Bestow upon it what denomination you will, disguise it as you may, it will be understood by the world as a law to discountenance any aid being given to the South American patriots, now in a state of revolution against the parent country. With respect to the nature of that struggle, I have not now for the first time to express my opinion and wishes. I wish them independence. It is the first step towards improving their condition. Let them have a free government, if they are capable of enjoying it. At any rate let them have independence. Yes, from the inmost recesses of my soul I wish them independence. In this I may be accused of imprudence in the utterance of my feelings on this occasion. I care not, when the independence, the happiness, the liberty of a whole people is at stake, and that people our neighbors, our brethren occupying a portion of the same continent, imitating our example, and participating of the same sympathies with ourselves.’

During the following month an attempt was made to appropriate and pledge the bonus paid by the United States bank into the public treasury, as a permanent fund to be employed in constructing works of internal improvement. Mr. Clay gave his hearty concurrence to this measure, declaring his belief that ‘there were no two subjects which could engage the attention of the national legislature, more worthy of its deliberate consideration, than those of internal improvements and domestic manufactures.’ A bill was passed constituting such fund, but the president vetoed it on alleged constitutional grounds.

Mr. Clay’s remarks caused great interest to be felt in behalf of South American liberty, and during the summer following, the president appointed three commissioners, Messrs. Rodney, Graham, and Bland, to proceed to South America, and examine her political, civil and social condition as preliminary to rendering them any assistance. Mr. Clay regarded the appointment as impolitic, and when a bill came before the house in March 1818, providing for the support of government, objected to having it embrace a clause appropriating thirty thousand dollars for their compensation, for constitutional reasons. For it he proposed to substitute an amendment, appropriating eighteen thousand dollars as the outfit and one year’s salary of a minister from the United States to the Independent Provinces of the river La Plata in South America. He accompanied the presentation of the amendment with a speech of great power, evincing great geographical and historical knowledge, and setting forth clearly the condition of the people. The amendment, however, was not adopted.

Many members of prominence differed with Mr. Clay, for whose opinions he expressed his respect, and regretted that his own convictions of expediency and duty led him to take a different view of the subject. He directly avowed that considerations of liberty and humanity had no little weight with him in advocating their cause, but at the same time his belief, that the adoption of the measure under consideration, while it would add to the renown of the republic, would render material assistance to those who were greatly in need of it. He vindicated himself from the charge which had been made, that he was desirous of fomenting a war between the states and Spain. He indulged in animating anticipations of the number and importance of the governments which might be formed in those vast, fertile, and beautiful provinces. To attempts at proving the movements of the colonists as rebellious, opposing the lawful government of Spain, he replied by clearly showing that if that power had possessed a legal claim to their allegiance, she had forfeited it by withholding that protection requisite to entitle her to it, and that consequently the people of Spanish America were contending for nothing more than their legal and natural rights. ‘But’ said Mr. Clay, ‘I take a broader, bolder position. I maintain that an oppressed people are authorized, whenever they can, to rise and break their fetters. This was the great principle of the English revolution. It was the great principle of our own. We must therefore pass sentence of condemnation upon the founders of our liberty, say that they were rebels and traitors, and that we are at this moment legislating without competent powers, before we can condemn the course of Spanish America.’ He contended that if we were justified in our attempts at independence, much more was she, who had writhed beneath the scourge of oppression so long, so much longer than we; that if they were worthy of success, if they were entitled to succeed from the justness of their cause, then surely we ought to wish it, especially when we consider the barbarous character of the war. He maintained that we were deeply interested, in recognizing their independence. Even then our commerce with those provinces was considerable, and would greatly increase after they should become permanently settled as free and independent nations. The act would attach them to us, nay, it would bind them to us by relations as intimate as those of kindred; they would become our powerful allies. Mr. Clay said he took this ground, not because he desired to force our principles where they were not wished, but simply from feelings of sympathy. We knew by experience how sweet it was to receive that when we were in circumstances that tried men’s souls. There could be no danger, nor objection to stretch out towards their people the hand of friendly sympathy, to present to those abused and oppressed communities an expression of our good will, to make them a tender of those great principles which we have adopted as the basis of our institutions. Their ignorance and inability had been brought forward, by those opposing the measure, as completely incapacitating them for self-government. These, he contended, had been greatly magnified, but admitting them to be as unqualifying as they had been represented to be, the fact ought rather to increase our pity for them, and to urge us to seek the more earnestly, by all reasonable and just means within our reach, their liberation from that detestable system which chained them to such a servile state. He ridiculed the idea that recognition could be made a just pretext for war. ‘Recognition’ said he, ‘without aid is no just cause of war; with aid, it is not because of the recognition, but because of the aid, as aid without recognition is cause of war.’ Mr. Clay’s efforts were not successful at this time; no minister was despatched to South America; the friendly mission was deferred until 1821, when he submitted, on the tenth of February, a resolution to the house, ‘declaring that the house of representatives participated with the people of the United States in the deep interest which they felt for the success of the Spanish provinces of South America, which were struggling to establish their liberty and independence, and that it would give its constitutional support to the president of the United States, whenever he might deem it expedient to recognize the sovereignty and independence of those provinces.’

On this resolution, a warm and protracted debate ensued, which was finally adopted, by a vote of eighty-seven to sixty-eight, and Mr. Clay was appointed chairman of a committee to communicate to the president the action of the house.

On the eighth day of March, 1822, the president transmitted to the house of representatives a message recommending the recognition, which Mr. Clay had so long struggled for. On the twenty-eighth the vote of recognition was taken, when it appeared that there was but one dissenting voice.

Thus at last were the noble and generous efforts of the patriot statesman crowned with success as complete as they had been persevering. Years had elapsed between their commencement and glorious consummation; years of toil, anxiety, and hope, but now the harvest time had come. The president and congress, from vehemently opposing his views in relation to their independence, by his persuasive arguments were brought over to them, who officially stretched out the hand of the nation, to clasp with friendly pressure those of the infant republics of the south. As a matter of course, the act was denounced as one of folly and fraught with danger, by the personal and political enemies of Mr. Clay, but the truly philanthropic, throughout the land, regarded it with approbation, and described it as just what the greatest free nation on the globe should do towards those who were worthy of it. It was applauded throughout the world, but particularly by those towards whom it was directed, with enthusiastic expressions of gratitude. The supreme congress of Mexico voted him the thanks of the nation, for his zeal and efficient labors in their behalf.

During the struggle, his speeches were frequently read at the head of the patriot army, and the effect was always to increase their intrepidity and valor. The name of Clay became associated with every thing dear and valuable in freedom, and was pronounced by both officer and soldier with reverence; and many were the epistolary notices which he received, of the high estimation in which his services were held, by that suffering, but successfully struggling people. The following is a specimen.

BOGOTA, 21st November, 1827.

SIR,—I cannot omit availing myself of the opportunity afforded me by the departure of colonel Watts, chargé d’affaires of the United States, of taking the liberty to address your excellency. This desire has long been entertained by me, for the purpose of expressing my admiration of your excellency’s brilliant talents and ardent love of liberty. All America, Colombia, and myself, owe your excellency our purest gratitude, for the incomparable services you have rendered to us, by sustaining our course with a sublime enthusiasm. Accept, therefore, this sincere and cordial testimony, which I hasten to offer to your excellency and to the government of the United States, who have so greatly contributed to the emancipation of your southern brethren.

‘I have the honor to offer to your excellency my distinguished consideration.

‘Your excellency’s obedient servant,

‘BOLIVAR.’

To the above, Mr. Clay replied, of which the following is an extract.

WASHINGTON, 27th October, 1828.

‘SIR,—It is very gratifying to me to be assured directly by your excellency, that the course which the government of the United States took on this memorable occasion, and my humble efforts, have excited the gratitude and commanded the approbation of your excellency. I am persuaded that I do not misinterpret the feelings of the people of the United States, as I certainly express my own, in saying that the interest which was inspired in this country by the arduous struggles of South America, arose principally from the hope that along with its independence would be established free institutions, insuring all the blessings of civil liberty. To the accomplishing of that object we still anxiously look. We are aware that great difficulties oppose it, among which not the least is that which arises out of the existence of a large military force, raised for the purpose of resisting the power of Spain. Standing armies, organized with the most patriotic intentions, are dangerous instruments. They devour the substance, debauch the morals, and too often destroy the liberties of a people. Nothing can be more perilous or unwise, than to retain them after the necessity has ceased which led to their formation, especially if their numbers are disproportioned to the revenues of the state.

‘But notwithstanding all these difficulties, we had fondly cherished and still indulge the hope that South America would add a new triumph to the cause of human liberty, and that Providence would bless her as he had her northern sister, with the genius of some great and virtuous man, to conduct her securely through all her trials. We had even flattered ourselves that we beheld that genius in your excellency. But I should be unworthy the consideration with which your excellency honors me, and deviate from the frankness which I have ever endeavored to practice, if I did not on this occasion state that ambitious designs have been attributed by your enemies, to your excellency, which have created in my mind great solicitude. They have cited late events in Colombia as proofs of these designs. But slow in the withdrawal of confidence which I have once given, I have been most unwilling to credit the unfavorable accounts which have from time to time reached me.

‘I cannot allow myself to believe that your excellency will abandon the bright and glorious path which lies plainly before you, for the bloody road passing over the liberties of the human race, on which the vulgar crowd of tyrants and military despots have so often trodden. I will not doubt that your excellency will in due time render a satisfactory explanation to Colombia, and to the world, of the parts of your public conduct which have excited any distrust, and that preferring the true glory of our immortal Washington to the ignoble fame of the destroyers of liberty, you have formed the patriotic resolution of ultimately placing the freedom of Colombia upon a firm and sure foundation. That your efforts to that end may be crowned with complete success, I most fervently pray.

‘I request that your excellency will accept assurances of my sincere wishes for your happiness and prosperity.

‘H. CLAY.’

His magnanimity, his disinterestedness, and his philanthropy, stand out in bold relief, in the above extract from his appeal to Bolivar. It evinces the same spirit of kind regard for the welfare of the South American republics which he invariably manifested towards that of his own. Its tone, the nature of its sentiments, and its more than open frankness, utterly preclude the belief that selfishness had any agency in its dictation. It exhibits him, cherishing as strong a desire that the happy institutions, immunities, and privileges of liberty should be established and enjoyed in them, as he felt in supporting and perpetuating those of his own. No one can rise up from its perusal and candidly question the purity of his motives, nor charge him with an overweening ambition. In short, no one unblinded by prejudice can fail of beholding in it, his generous, uncalculating attitude.

During Mr. Madison’s administration, Mr. Clay was twice offered a seat in his cabinet by him, or the mission to Russia. The president reposed in him most unbounded confidence, and correctly appreciated his preëminent abilities. At the breaking out of hostilities, Mr. Madison selected him as commander-in-chief of the army. But Mr. Clay, thinking that he could render his country more efficient service in her public councils, declined all attempts at removing him from them, though he well knew that he did so at the expense of his private interests. These, however, never appear to have entered into or influenced in the least his calculations. ‘My country first, myself afterwards,’ is legibly written on every part of his public career.

After the accomplishment of his desires in relation to South America, he again reverted to his favorite policy; favorite, because he saw its intimate connection with the growth and prosperity of his country, as calculated to develope her vast resources, and to pour into her lap the blessings of a virtuous and free people. The formation of Mr. Clay’s attachment to internal improvements and domestic manufactures, is coeval with his entrance into congress; and when matters demanding immediate attention had been disposed of, he would bring them forward, and labor to make the conviction of their importance sink deep into the heart of the nation. When Mr. Madison returned, with his objections, the bill appropriating the bonus of the United States bank for purposes of internal improvements, Mr. Clay expressed his astonishment. He had confidently calculated on its receiving the signature of the president; for he had particularly invited the attention of congress, in his message, ‘to the expediency of exercising their existing powers, and where necessary, of resorting to the prescribed mode of enlarging them, in order to effectuate a comprehensive system of roads and canals, such as will have the effect of drawing more closely together every part of our country, by promoting intercourse and improvements, and by increasing the share of every part in the common stock of national prosperity.’ Mr. Clay had heard, through the medium of uncertain rumor, that Mr. Madison designed to veto the bill, whereupon he sent him a communication, requesting him, if he entertained any constitutional scruples about signing it to let the whole matter rest and pass over to his successor for action. The president, however, took a different view of the subject, and on the third of March, returned the bill. On the following day, Mr. Monroe was inducted into his office, who, it was conjectured, prior to seeing Mr. Madison’s veto-message, had prepared his inaugural address in such a manner as to recommend, in strong terms, the policy of promoting internal improvements, but that, on reading Mr. Madison’s objections to the bill, he changed his opinion. It was thought he was led to do so partly from fear, and partly from a desire to conform his views with those of his predecessor. Subsequently he stated that a careful investigation had conducted him to the conclusion, that the power of making internal improvements was not vested in congress, and that to clothe that body with it, an amendment of the constitution was requisite. Opposition such as this policy had encountered, from so exalted a source as that of three chief magistrates, (Messrs. Jefferson, Madison and Monroe,) would have appalled a mind of ordinary strength and perseverance; but Mr. Clay was one who never formed an opinion with precipitancy, but only when, by the most diligent inquiry, he had established a foundation for it in reason and philosophy. Erected upon this basis, he would adhere to it, though confronted by the combined opposition of the world. A compromise of principle he was a stranger to. Nothing disheartened, therefore, by the magnitude of the obstacles opposed to his progress in advocating his favorite measures, by those high in authority, he seemed to gather fresh energy from every new one that he encountered. In March, 1818, a resolution was submitted to the house, declaring that congress had power to construct military post-roads and canals, and also to appropriate money for that object. The opposition to this presented a formidable array of strength, and brought forward every objection that political ingenuity could devise. Mr. Clay did not deem it advisable to consume the time of the house in examining in detail any except those denominated constitutional. His whole aim, therefore, was to prove that the power alleged in the resolution, was derivable from the constitution; and this he accomplished in the most convincing manner. In construing this instrument, he observed the same rules which governed his action in relation to the bank bill of 1816. He maintained that every power, which appeared necessary and proper, to secure the lawful exercise of constitutional rights, was fairly impliable, and that this necessity and propriety must be determined by the discretion of those who exercised it, ‘under all the responsibility of a solemn oath,’ and the knowledge that they were the subjects of those laws that they passed, and that they were amenable to the people, who held in reserve the right to resist tyrannic usurpation. Mr. Clay argued that the power to establish post-roads, expressly specified in the constitution, involved the power to construct them. This position he illustrated with the clearness of demonstration, by referring to that clause which gives congress the power of making war, and employing the resources of the country in prosecuting it. He declared that, from the same provision, the power of transporting those means was derived by implication; and that therefore, to secure such transportation, congress might legally construct military roads, &c. His adversaries, compelled to yield before his powerful reasoning, fell back, and intrenched themselves behind the concession that peculiar emergencies might justify the exercise of the power in question. From this he drove them, by proving that this concession contained the admission that the constitution conveyed ‘the power; and,’ said Mr. Clay, ‘we may safely appeal to the judgment of the candid and enlightened to decide between the wisdom of these two constructions, of which one requires you to wait for the exercise of your power until the arrival of an emergency, which may not allow you to exert it, and the other, without denying the power if you can exercise it during the emergency, claims the right of providing beforehand against the emergency.’ They finally fortified themselves behind the position, that it was not requisite for the general government to construct such works, because individual enterprise would do it as soon as sectional interests should demand their construction. Here he hemmed in and captured them. His motion was adopted by a vote of ninety to seventy-five. It was a triumph, and a signal one, over opposition that had been accumulating and strengthening during two previous administrations; and which in the then existing one, was directed against him with all the violence and impetuosity that reserved energies could impart to it. It must have been a moment of proud satisfaction to the indefatigable statesman, as he beheld the last vestige of opposition disappear beneath his feet, and himself the sole occupant of the place on which he had so happily succeeded in founding a basis for that noble, incomparably noble system, fraught with every good and every immunity which a virtuous people could desire. This system has since been erected so much under his supervision, and through his direct instrumentality, as to give him the title of ‘its father.’

Mr. Clay advocated the policy of carrying forward the construction of the Cumberland road, as rapidly as possible, and exerted himself from time to time, to procure appropriations for that purpose; with what earnestness, we may learn from his own language, declaring that ‘he had to beg, entreat, and supplicate congress, session after session, to grant the necessary appropriations to complete the road.’ Said he, ‘I have myself toiled until my powers have been exhausted and prostrated to prevail on you to make the grant.’ A monument of stone has been erected on the road, surmounted by the genius of liberty, and bearing as an inscription, the name of ‘Henry Clay.’ The importance of this road to the public may be learned from some remarks made by Mr. Clay, on the occasion of a dinner given him by the mechanics of Wheeling, Virginia, in which he declared the great interest that work had awakened in his breast, and expressed his ardent desire that it might be prosecuted to a speedy completion. He said that a few years since, he and his family had employed the whole or greater part of a day, in travelling the distance of about nine miles, from Uniontown to Freeman’s on Laurel Hill, which now, since the construction of the Cumberland road over the mountains, could be accomplished, together with seventy more, in the same time. He considered its importance so great to the union, that he would not consent to give it up to the keeping of the several states through which it passed.

Mr. Clay’s latest congressional efforts in behalf of internal improvements, were made on the sixteenth of January, 1824, when he made a speech before the house, on a bill authorizing the president to cause certain surveys and estimates of roads and canals to be made. Mr. Monroe and a strong party of supporters assumed the ground, that congress had no control over the post roads, other than to use such as had been established by the states individually, and that their construction and repair (and consequent alteration and closure) did not belong to the general government. To this doctrine Mr. Clay replied, by saying, ‘is it possible that this construction of the constitution can be correct—a construction which allows a law of the United States, enacted for the good of the whole, to be obstructed or defeated in its operations by a county court in any one of the twenty-four sovereignties? Suppose a state, no longer having occasion to use a post-road for its own separate and peculiar purposes, withdraws all care and attention from its preservation. Can the state be compelled to repair it? No! Then may not the general government repair this road, which is abandoned by the state power? And may it not protect and defend that which it has thus repaired, and which there is no longer an interest or inclination in the state to protect and defend? Is it contended that a road may exist in the statute book, which the state will not, and the general government cannot repair and improve? What sort of an account should we render to the people of the United States, of the execution of the high trust committed to us for their benefit, if we were to tell them, that we had failed to execute it because a state would not make a road for us? The same clause of the constitution which authorizes congress to establish post roads, authorizes it also to establish post offices. Will it be contended that congress, in the exercise of the power to establish post offices, can do no more than adopt or designate some preëxisting office, enacted and kept in repair by state authority? There is none such. It may then fix, build, create and repair offices of its own, and its power over the post roads, is by the constitution equally extensive.’ Mr. Barbour, of Virginia, was among the most vigorous assailants of the policy advocated by Mr. Clay. He contended, that if it were carried out, an encroachment on the rights of the states would be the inevitable consequence; that their jurisdiction would be abridged. He was answered in such a manner as to show that there was no ground of alarm to be apprehended from that source; that all the control which the general government sought to exercise, related simply to constructing and preserving the road, and the maintenance of the necessary measures of its defence, and that all illegal acts committed upon it would be left for adjudication by the state through which it passed. Mr. Clay contended that the general government derived the right of constructing canals, from the specified rights of making war and regulating domestic and foreign commerce. His reasoning was clear and conclusive, and when the final vote was taken, the majority was much greater than the most sanguine supporters of the measure had anticipated, showing a great increase since 1818, when he discussed the same subject. The opposition were now prostrated, indeed they had on this occasion brought out their whole strength, and many were heard to say, that if defeated now, they should regard the policy of internal improvements permanently settled. Many, therefore, who had formerly opposed it, on witnessing Mr. Clay’s complete triumph, adopted his views, and came over to his aid.

It has always been a prominent principle with Mr. Clay, in his legislative career, to give a judicious direction to his exertions, so that if they were successful, his country would be benefited, but if unsuccessful, that she should not sustain any harm. In this one feature of his action, is seen, as in a mirror, the purity of his patriotism. His exertions, as directed towards the subject of internal improvements, have been productive of incalculable benefit to the nation, and to individuals. They have awakened, and employed, and given an impetus to an amount of enterprise unmeasured, the salutary effects of which, every hill and vale of our vast country has felt. And the sea has felt them too; the sails of commerce have been multiplied by them, and foreign shores have groaned beneath the burdens of rich freights, which they have heaped upon them. But who, in imagination, even, can enumerate the number and the depth of the new channels of enterprise which they are destined yet to create, where industry may roll her golden tide, and build by their sides the abodes of a mighty, free, and happy people. Through the long vista of years to come, it needs no prophetic ken to look, and read, on many a monument of adamant, interspersed among them, in characters of imperishable fame, inscribed the name of HENRY CLAY.

Near the commencement of 1817, efforts were made by the friends of the free colored population in the United States, to ameliorate their condition. For this purpose, a meeting was convened at Washington, on the twenty-first of December, 1816, over which Mr. Clay was called to preside. On taking the chair, he stated the object of the meeting to be, to consider the propriety and practicability of colonizing the free people of color of the United States, and of forming an association relative to that object. In regard to the various schemes of colonization which had been suggested, that appeared the most feasible, which contemplated some portion of the coast of Africa. There, he said, ample provision might be made for the colony itself, and it might be rendered instrumental in introducing into that extensive portion of the globe, the arts of civilization and christianity. He said there was a peculiar and moral fitness in restoring them to the land of their fathers. He went on to state, that he had understood it constituted no part of the object of the meeting to touch or agitate in the slightest degree, a delicate question connected with another portion of the colored population of our country. It was not proposed to deliberate on or consider at all, any question of emancipation, or that was connected with the abolition of slavery. It was upon that condition alone, he was sure that many gentlemen from the south and west, whom he saw present, had attended, or could be expected to coöperate. The meeting resulted in the formation of the Colonization Society, of which Bushrod Washington was chosen president.

In March previous, Mr. Clay expressed his views relative to holding congressional caucuses, for the purpose of making nominations. He thought them not compatible with the nature of the powers delegated to them by the people, as calculated to meet their disapprobation, and establish a precedent which might prove dangerous to their liberties.

When congress adjourned, in March, 1817, the house unanimously voted Mr. Clay their thanks, for the ability and impartiality with which he had presided over their deliberations, and the correctness of his decisions on all questions referred to the chair. He replied in an apposite and beautiful manner, saying that next to the approbation of one’s own conscience, and one’s own country, was that of the immediate representatives of the people. He spoke of the difficulties of legislation; said there were three periods that might be denominated difficult; the first was that which immediately preceded a state of war; the second was that which existed during its continuance; and the third was that which immediately succeeded it. The last was the one through which they had just passed—the most difficult of the three, when every thing pertaining to the general and state governments was unsettled, and when disorganization to a greater or less extent prevailed; when the task of supplying deficiences, strengthening weaknesses, and correcting abuses, was by no means light or pleasant. He congratulated them on the efficient manner in which they had discharged that task, to which the records of the house bore ample testimony. He closed by tendering them his thanks, for the flattering expression of good feeling with which they had honored him, presuming that it was prompted more by a spirit of kindness, than by a sense of justice to him, as he was sure he did not merit it, and by pledging their united efforts, as an offering to their common country, in advancing their best interests.