Volume 1 — SPEECHES, &c. (continued 2)

It is said, that the effect of the war at home, will be a change of those who administer the government, who will be replaced by others that will make a disgraceful peace. He did not believe it. Not a man in the nation could really doubt the sincerity with which those in power have sought, by all honorable and pacific means, to protect the interests of the country. When the people saw exercised towards both belligerents the utmost impartiality; witnessed the same equal terms tendered to both; and beheld the government successively embracing an accommodation with each, in exactly the same spirit of amity, he was fully persuaded, now that war was the only alternative left to us, by the injustice of one of the powers, that the support and confidence of the people would remain undiminished. He was one, however, who was prepared (and he would not believe that he was more so than any other member of the committee) to march on in the road of his duty, at all hazards. What! shall it be said, that our amor patriæ is located at these desks; that we pusillanimously cling to our seats here, rather than boldly vindicate the most inestimable rights of the country? Whilst the heroic Daviess, and his gallant associates, exposed to all the dangers of treacherous savage warfare, are sacrificing themselves for the good of their country, shall we shrink from our duty?

He concluded, by hoping that his remarks had tended to prove that the quantum of the force required was not too great, that in its nature it was free from the objections urged against it, and that the object of its application was one imperiously called for by the present peculiar crisis.

ON THE INCREASE OF THE NAVY.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 22, 1812.

[THE bill making provisions for the general repair and increase of the Navy, followed the preceding measure for augmenting the army. During Mr. Jefferson’s administration, the Navy had been unpopular with the democratic party, and the policy of reducing that branch of the national force had been pursued, in opposition to the former course, adopted by the administration of John Adams. Many of the democratic supporters of Mr. Madison’s administration, still adhered to the policy of Mr. Jefferson; while Mr. Clay, Mr. Cheves, and other members of that party, saw the importance of sustaining the navy, in prospect of war. Among the arguments in opposition to the bill, now introduced, it was insisted that the fitting out of naval armaments would require a pecuniary expenditure which the people were not prepared to meet. The bill contained a section, providing for new frigates, leaving a blank for the number. Mr. Cheves (of South Carolina) moved to fill the blank with ten. Mr. Rhea (of Tennessee) moved to strike out this section of the bill. In committee of the whole, a warm debate ensued. Mr. Clay, in the following speech sustained the proposition of Mr. Cheves, and the motion to strike out was rejected by a vote of fifty-two to forty-seven. An appropriation was made, and the Navy fitted out with despatch. The result is known by the naval victories, which, in less than two years, crowned this right arm of the nation with glory, and gave it an enduring popularity with the people.]

MR. CLAY (the speaker) rose to present his views on the bill before the committee. He said, as he did not precisely agree in opinion with any gentleman who had spoken, he should take the liberty of detaining the committee a few moments, while he offered to their attention some observations. He was highly gratified with the temper and ability with which the discussion had hitherto been conducted. It was honorable to the house, and, he trusted, would continue to be manifested on many future occasions.

On this interesting topic a diversity of opinion has existed, almost ever since the adoption of the present government. On the one hand, there appeared to him to have been attempts made to precipitate the nation into all the evils of naval extravagance, which had been productive of so much mischief in other countries; and, on the other, strongly feeling this mischief, there has existed an unreasonable prejudice against providing such a competent naval protection, for our commercial and maritime rights, as is demanded by their importance, and as the increased resources of the country amply justify.

The attention of congress has been invited to this subject by the president, in his message, delivered at the opening of the session. Indeed, had it been wholly neglected by the chief magistrate, from the critical situation of the country, and the nature of the rights proposed to be vindicated, it must have pressed itself upon our attention. But, said Mr. Clay, the president, in his message, observes: ‘your attention will, of course, be drawn to such provisions on the subject of our naval force, as may be required for the service to which it is best adapted. I submit to congress the seasonableness, also, of an authority to augment the stock of such materials as are imperishable in their nature, or may not, at once, be attainable?’ The president, by this recommendation, clearly intimates an opinion, that the naval force of this country is capable of producing effect; and the propriety of laying up imperishable materials, was no doubt suggested for the purpose of making additions to the navy, as convenience and exigences might direct.

It appeared to Mr. Clay a little extraordinary, that so much, as it seemed to him, unreasonable jealousy, should exist against the naval establishment. If, said he, we look back to the period of the formation of the constitution, it will be found that no such jealousy was then excited. In placing the physical force of the nation at the disposal of congress, the convention manifested much greater apprehension of abuse in the power given to raise armies, than in that to provide a navy. In reference to the navy, congress is put under no restrictions; but with respect to the army, that description of force which has been so often employed to subvert the liberties of mankind, they are subjected to limitations designed to prevent the abuse of this dangerous power. But it was not his intention to detain the committee, by a discussion on the comparative utility and safety of these two kinds of force. He would, however, be indulged in saying, that he thought gentlemen had wholly failed in maintaining the position they had assumed, that the fall of maritime powers was attributable to their navies. They have told you, indeed, that Carthage, Genoa, Venice, and other nations, had navies, and, notwithstanding, were finally destroyed. But have they shown, by a train of argument, that their overthrow was, in any degree, attributable to their maritime greatness? Have they attempted, even, to show that there exists in the nature of this power a necessary tendency to destroy the nation using it? Assertion is substituted for argument; inferences not authorized by historical facts are arbitrarily drawn; things wholly unconnected with each other are associated together; a very logical mode of reasoning, it must be admitted! In the same way he could demonstrate how idle and absurd our attachments are to freedom itself. He might say, for example, that Greece and Rome had forms of free government, and that they no longer exist; and, deducing their fall from their devotion to liberty, the conclusion, in favor of despotism, would very satisfactorily follow! He demanded what there is in the nature and construction of maritime power, to excite the fears that have been indulged? Do gentlemen really apprehend, that a body of seamen will abandon their proper element, and, placing themselves under an aspiring chief, will erect a throne to his ambition? Will they deign to listen to the voice of history, and learn how chimerical are their apprehensions?

But the source of alarm is in ourselves. Gentlemen fear, that if we provide a marine, it will produce collisions with foreign nations; plunge us into war, and ultimately overturn the constitution of the country. Sir, if you wish to avoid foreign collision, you had better abandon the ocean; surrender all your commerce; give up all your prosperity. It is the thing protected, not the instrument of protection, that involves you in war. Commerce engenders collision, collision war, and war, the argument supposes, leads to despotism. Would the counsels of that statesman be deemed wise, who would recommend that the nation should be unarmed; that the art of war, the martial spirit, and martial exercises, should be prohibited; who should declare, in the language of Othello, that the nation must bid farewell to the neighing steed, and the shrill trump, the spirit-stirring drum, the ear-piercing fife, and all the pride, pomp, and circumstance of glorious war; and that the great body of the people should be taught, that national happiness was to be found in perpetual peace alone? No, sir. And yet, every argument in favor of a power of protection on land, applies, in some degree, to a power of protection on the sea. Undoubtedly a commerce void of naval protection is more exposed to rapacity than a guarded commerce; and if we wish to invite the continuance of the old, or the enactment of new edicts, let us refrain from all exertion upon that element where we must operate, and where, in the end, they must be resisted.

For his part (Mr. Clay said) he did not allow himself to be alarmed by those apprehensions of maritime power, which appeared to agitate other gentlemen. In the nature of our government he beheld abundant security against abuse. He would be unwilling to tax the land to support the rights of the sea, and was for drawing from the sea itself, the resources with which its violated freedom should at all times be vindicated. Whilst this principle is adhered to, there will be no danger of running into the folly and extravagance which so much alarms gentlemen; and whenever it is abandoned—whenever congress shall lay burdensome taxes, to augment the navy beyond what may be authorized by the increased wealth, and demanded by the exigences, of the country, the people will interpose, and, removing their unworthy representatives, apply the appropriate corrective. Mr. Clay, then, could not see any just ground of dread in the nature of naval power. It was, on the contrary, free from the evils attendant upon standing armies. And the genius of our institutions—the great representative principle, in the practical enjoyment of which we are so eminently distinguished—afforded the best guarantee against the ambition and wasteful extravagance of government. What maritime strength is it expedient to provide for the United States? In considering this subject, three different degrees of naval power present themselves. In the first place, such a force as would be capable of contending with that which any other nation is able to bring on the ocean—a force that, boldly scouring every sea, would challenge to combat the fleets of other powers, however great. He admitted it was impossible at this time, perhaps it never would be desirable, for this country to establish so extensive a navy. Indeed, he should consider it as madness in the extreme in this government to attempt to provide a navy able to cope with the fleets of Great Britain, wherever they might be met.

The next species of naval power to which he would advert, is that which, without adventuring into distant seas, and keeping generally in our own harbors, and on our coasts, would be competent to beat off any squadron which might be attempted to be permanently stationed in our waters. His friends from South Carolina (Messrs. Cheves and Lowndes) had satisfactorily shown, that, to effect this object, a force equivalent only to one third of that which the maintenance of such a squadron must require, would be sufficient; that if, for example, England should determine to station permanently upon our coast a squadron of twelve ships of the line, it would require for this service thirty-six ships of the line; one third in port, repairing, one third on the passage, and one third on the station. But that is a force which it has been shown that even England, with her boasted navy, could not spare for the American service, whilst she is engaged in the present contest. Mr. Clay said, that he was desirous of seeing such a force as he had described; that is, twelve ships of the line and fifteen or twenty frigates, provided for the United States; but he admitted that it was unattainable in the present situation of the finances of the country. He contended, however, that it was such as congress ought to set about providing; and he hoped, in less than ten years, to see it actually established. He was far from surveying the vast maritime power of Great Britain, with the desponding eye with which other gentlemen beheld it. He could not allow himself to be discouraged at a prospect of even her thousand ships. This country only required resolution, and a proper exertion of its immense resources, to command respect, and to vindicate every essential right. When we consider our remoteness from Europe, the expense, difficulty, and perils, to which any squadron would be exposed, while stationed off our coasts, he entertained no doubt that the force to which he referred, would insure the command of our own seas. Such a force would avail itself of our extensive sea-board and numerous harbors, every where affording asylums to which it could safely retire from a superior fleet, or from which it could issue, for the purpose of annoyance. To the opinion of his colleague (Mr. M’Kee), who appeared to think that it was in vain for us to make any struggle on the ocean, he would oppose the sentiments of his distinguished connection, the heroic Daviess, who fell in the battle of Tippecanoe. [Here Mr. Clay read certain parts of a work, written by colonel Daviess, in which the author attempts to show, that, as the aggressions upon our commerce were not committed by fleets, but by single vessels, they could, in the same manner, be best retaliated; that the force of about twenty or thirty frigates, would be capable of inflicting great injury on English commerce, by picking up stragglers, cutting off convoys, and seizing upon every moment of supineness; and that such a force, with our seaports and harbors well fortified, and aided by privateers, would be really formidable, and would annoy the British navy and commerce, just as the French army was assailed in Egypt, the Persian army in Scythia, and the Roman army in Parthia.]

The third description of force, worthy of consideration, is, that which would be able to prevent any single vessel, of whatever metal, from endangering our whole coasting trade, blocking up our harbors, and laying under contribution our cities—a force competent to punish the insolence of the commander of any single ship, and to preserve in our own jurisdiction, the inviolability of our peace and our laws. A force of this kind is entirely within the compass of our means, at this time. Is there a reflecting man in the nation, who would not charge congress with a culpable neglect of its duty, if, for the want of such a force, a single ship were to bombard one of our cities! Would not every honorable member of the committee inflict on himself the bitterest reproaches, if, by failing to make an inconsiderable addition to our little gallant navy, a single British vessel should place New York under contribution! Yes, sir, when the city is in flames, its wretched inhabitants begin to repent of their neglect, in not providing engines and water-buckets. If, said Mr. Clay, we are not able to meet the wolves of the forest, shall we put up with the barking impudence of every petty cur that trips across our way? Because we cannot guard against every possible danger, shall we provide against none? He hoped not. He had hardly expected that the instructing but humiliating lesson, was so soon to be forgotten, which was taught us in the murder of Pierce, the attack on the Chesapeake, and the insult offered in the very harbor of Charleston, which the brave old fellow who commanded the fort in vain endeavored to chastise. It was a rule with Mr. Clay, when acting either in a public or private character, to attempt nothing more than what there existed a prospect of accomplishing. He was therefore not in favor of entering into any mad projects on this subject, but for deliberately and resolutely pursuing what he believed to be within the power of government. Gentlemen refer to the period of 1798, and we are reminded of the principles maintained by the opposition at that time. He had no doubt of the correctness of that opposition. The naval schemes of that day were premature, not warranted by the resources of the country, and were contemplated for an unnecessary war, into which the nation was about to be plunged. He always admired and approved the zeal and ability with which that opposition was conducted, by the distinguished gentleman now at the head of the treasury. But the state of things is totally altered. What was folly in 1798, may be wisdom now. At that time, we had a revenue only of about six millions. Our revenue now, upon a supposition that commerce is restored, is about sixteen millions. The population of the country, too, is greatly increased, nearly doubled, and the wealth of the nation is perhaps tripled. Whilst our ability to construct a navy is thus enhanced, the necessary maritime protection is proportionably augmented. Independent of the extension of our commerce, since the year 1798, we have had an addition of more than five hundred miles to our coast, from the bay of Perdido to the mouth of the Sabine—a weak and defenceless accession, requiring, more than any other part of our maritime frontier, the protecting arm of government.

The groundless imputation, that those who were friendly to a navy, were espousing a principle inimical to freedom, should not terrify him. He was not ashamed when in such company as the illustrious author of the notes on Virginia, whose opinion on the subject of a navy, contained in that work, contributed to the formation of his own. But the principle of a navy, Mr. Clay contended, was no longer open to controversy. It was decided when Mr. Jefferson came into power. With all the prejudices against a navy, which are alleged by some to have been then brought into the administration, with many honest prejudices, he admitted, the rash attempt was not made to destroy the establishment. It was reduced to only what was supposed to be within the financial capacity of the country. If, ten years ago, when all those prejudices were to be combatted, even in time of peace, it was deemed proper, by the then administration, to retain in service ten frigates, he put it to the candor of gentlemen to say, if now, when we are on the eve of a war, and taking into view the actual growth of the country, and the acquisition of our coast on the Gulf of Mexico, we ought not to add to the establishment.

Mr. Clay said, he had hitherto alluded more particularly to the exposed situation of certain parts of the Atlantic frontier. Whilst he felt the deepest solicitude for the safety of New York, and other cities on the coast, he would be pardoned by the committee, for referring to the interests of that section of the union from which he came. If, said he, there be a point more than any other in the United States, demanding the aid of naval protection, that point is the mouth of the Mississippi. What is the population of the western country, dependent on this single outlet for its surplus productions? Kentucky, according to the last enumeration, has four hundred and six thousand five hundred and eleven; Tennessee, two hundred and sixty-one thousand seven hundred and twenty-seven; and Ohio, two hundred and thirty thousand seven hundred and sixty. And when the population of the western parts of Virginia, and Pennsylvania, and the territories which are drained by the Mississippi or its waters, is added, it will form an aggregate equal to about one fifth of the whole population of the United States, resting all their commercial hopes upon this solitary vent! The bulky articles of which their surplus productions consist, can be transported in no other way. They will not bear the expense of a carriage up the Ohio and Tennessee, and across the mountains, and the circuitous voyage of the lakes is out of the question. Whilst most other states have the option of numerous outlets, so that, if one be closed, resort can be had to others, this vast population has no alternative. Close the mouth of the Mississippi, and their export trade is annihilated. He called the attention of his western friends, especially his worthy Kentucky friends, (from whom he felt himself, with regret, constrained to differ on this occasion,) to the state of the public feeling in that quarter, whilst the navigation of the Mississippi was withheld by Spain; and to the still more recent period, when the right of depot was violated. The whole country was in commotion, and, at the nod of government, would have fallen on Baton Rouge and New Orleans, and punished the treachery of a perfidious government. Abandon all idea of protecting, by maritime force, the mouth of the Mississippi, and we shall have the recurrence of many similar scenes. We shall hold the inestimable right of the navigation of that river, by the most precarious tenure. The whole commerce of the Mississippi—a commerce that is destined to be the richest that was ever borne by a single stream—is placed at the mercy of a single ship, lying off the Balize! Again; the convulsions of the new world, still more, perhaps, than those of Europe, challenge our attention. Whether the ancient dynasty of Spain is still to be upheld or subverted, is extremely uncertain, if the bonds connecting the parent country with her colonies, are not for ever broken. What is to become of Cuba? Will it assert independence, or remain the province of some European power? In either case, the whole trade of the western country, which must pass almost within gunshot of the Moro Castle, is exposed to danger. It was not, however, of Cuba he was afraid. He wished her independent. But suppose England gets possession of that valuable island. With Cuba on the south, and Halifax on the north—and the consequent means of favoring or annoying commerce, of particular sections of the country—he asked, if the most sanguine amongst us would not tremble for the integrity of the union? If, along with Cuba, Great Britain should acquire East Florida, she will have the absolute command of the Gulf of Mexico. Can gentlemen, particularly gentlemen from the western country, contemplate such possible, nay, probable, events, without desiring to see at least the commencement of such a naval establishment as would effectually protect the Mississippi? He entreated them to turn their attention to the defenceless situation of the Orleans Territory, and to the nature of its population. It is known, that, whilst under the Spanish government, they experienced the benefit of naval security. Satisfy them, that, under the government of the United States, they will enjoy less protection, and you disclose the most fatal secret.

The general government receives annually, for the public lands, about six hundred thousand dollars. One of the sources whence the western people raise this sum, is the exportation of the surplus productions of that country. Shut up the Mississippi, and this source is, in a great measure, dried up. But suppose this government to look upon the occlusion of the Mississippi, without making an effort on that element, where alone it could be made successfully, to remove the blockading force, and, at the same time, to be vigorously pressing payment for the public lands; he shuddered at the consequences. Deep-rooted as he knew the affections of the western people to be to the union, (and he would not admit their patriotism to be surpassed by any other quarter of the country,) if such a state of things were to last any considerable time, he should seriously apprehend a withdrawal of their confidence. Nor, sir, could we derive any apology for the failure to afford this protection, from the want of the materials for naval architecture. On the contrary, all the articles entering into the construction of a navy—iron, hemp, timber, pitch—abound in the greatest quantities on the waters of the Mississippi. Kentucky alone, he had no doubt, raised hemp enough the last year for the whole consumption of the United States.

If, as he conceived, gentlemen had been unsuccessful in showing that the downfall of maritime nations was ascribable to their navies, they have been more fortunate in showing, by the instances to which they had referred, that, without a marine, no foreign commerce could exist to any extent. It is the appropriate, the natural (if the term may be allowed) connection of foreign commerce. The shepherd and his faithful dog, are not more necessary to guard the flocks, that browse and gambol on the neighboring mountain. He considered the prosperity of foreign commerce indissolubly allied to marine power. Neglect to provide the one, and you must abandon the other. Suppose the expected war with England is commenced, you enter and subjugate Canada, and she still refuses to do you justice; what other possible mode will remain to operate on the enemy, but upon that element where alone you can then come in contact with him? And if you do not prepare to protect there your own commerce, and to assail his, will he not sweep from the ocean every vessel bearing your flag, and destroy even the coasting trade? But, from the arguments of gentlemen, it would seem to be questioned, if foreign commerce is worth the kind of protection insisted upon. What is this foreign commerce, that has suddenly become so inconsiderable? It has, with very trifling aid from other sources, defrayed the expenses of government, ever since the adoption of the present constitution; maintained an expensive and successful war with the Indians; a war with the Barbary powers; a quasi war with France; sustained the charges of suppressing two insurrections, and extinguishing upwards of forty-six millions of the public debt. In revenue, it has, since the year 1789, yielded one hundred and ninety-one millions of dollars. During the first four years after the commencement of the present government, the revenue averaged only about two millions annually; during a subsequent period, of four years, it rose to an average of fifteen millions, annually, or became equivalent to a capital of two hundred and fifty millions of dollars, at an interest of six per centum per annum. And if our commerce is reëstablished, it will, in the course of time, net a sum for which we are scarcely furnished with figures, in arithmetic. Taking the average of the last nine years, (comprehending, of course, the season of the embargo,) our exports average upwards of thirty-seven millions of dollars, which is equivalent to a capital of more than six hundred millions of dollars, at six per centum interest; all of which must be lost in the event of a destruction of foreign commerce. In the abandonment of that commerce, is also involved the sacrifice of our brave tars, who have engaged in the pursuit, from which they derive subsistence and support, under the confidence that government would afford them that just protection which is due to all. They will be driven into foreign employment, for it is vain to expect that they will renounce their habits of life.

The spirit of commercial enterprise, so strongly depicted by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Mitchel), is diffused throughout the country. It is a passion as unconquerable as any with which nature has endowed us. You may attempt, indeed, to regulate, but you cannot destroy it. It exhibits itself as well on the waters of the western country, as on the waters and shores of the Atlantic. Mr. Clay had heard of a vessel, built at Pittsburg, having crossed the Atlantic and entered an European port (he believed that of Leghorn). The master of the vessel laid his papers before the proper custom-house officer, which, of course, stated the place of her departure. The officer boldly denied the existence of any such American port as Pittsburg, and threatened a seizure of the vessel, as being furnished with forged papers. The affrighted master procured a map of the United States, and, pointing out the Gulf of Mexico, took the officer to the mouth of the Mississippi, traced the course of the Mississippi more than a thousand miles, to the mouth of the Ohio, and conducting him still a thousand miles higher, to the junction of the Allegany and Monongahela,—there, he exclaimed, stands Pittsburg, the port from which I sailed! The custom-house officer, prior to the production of this evidence, would have as soon believed that the vessel had performed a voyage from the moon.

In delivering the sentiments he had expressed, Mr. Clay considered himself as conforming to a sacred constitutional duty. When the power to provide a navy was confided to congress, it must have been the intention of the convention to submit only to the discretion of that body, the period when that power should be exercised. That period had, in his opinion, arrived, at least for making a respectable beginning. And whilst he thus discharged what he conceived to be his duty, he derived great pleasure from the reflection, that he was supporting a measure calculated to impart additional strength to our happy union. Diversified as are the interests of its various parts, how admirably do they harmonize and blend together! We have only to make a proper use of the bounties spread before us, to render us prosperous and powerful. Such a navy as he had contended for, will form a new bond of connection between the states, concentrating their hopes, their interests, and their affections.

ON THE NEW ARMY BILL.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 8, 1813.

[ON the eighteenth of June, 1812, war was declared by congress against Great Britain, and the next session of congress commenced in November, 1812, when the president, in his annual message to the two houses, gave a sketch of the events which had transpired during the recess. The military operations on the frontier had resulted, at first, in a series of unexpected and disgraceful disasters to our arms. Amidst all discouragements, Mr. Clay was the leader, and the life and soul of the administration party in the house. His early biographer says of him: ‘he moved in majesty, for he moved in strength. No difficulties could weary or withstand his energies. Like the Carthagenian chief in the passage of the Alps, he kept his place in front of his comrades, putting aside, with a giant effort, every obstacle that opposed his progress, applauding the foremost of his followers, and rousing those who lingered, by words of encouragement or reproach, till he succeeded in putting them upon a moral eminence, from which they could look down upon the region where their prowess was to meet with its long expected reward.’

Among the first measures proposed at this session of congress, to raise the spirit of the nation, and retrieve the fortunes of war, made gloomy by the disasters upon the frontier, was a bill to increase the army, by raising twenty additional regiments. In support of this bill, and on the merits of the war, as well as in reply to the arguments of the opposition members, Mr. Clay addressed the committee of the whole house, in the following speech.]

MR. CLAY (the speaker) said he was gratified yesterday by the recommitment of this bill to a committee of the whole house, from two considerations; one, since it afforded him a slight relaxation from a most fatiguing situation; and the other, because it furnished him with an opportunity of presenting to the committee his sentiments, upon the important topics which had been mingled in the debate. He regretted, however, that the necessity under which the chairman had been placed, of putting the question,3 precluded the opportunity he had wished to enjoy, of rendering more acceptable to the committee any thing he might have to offer on the interesting points, on which it was his duty to touch. Unprepared, however, as he was, to speak on this day, of which he was the more sensible from the ill state of his health, he would solicit the attention of the committee for a few moments.

I was a little astonished, I confess, said Mr. Clay, when I found this bill permitted to pass silently through the committee of the whole, and not selected until the moment when the question was to be put for its third reading, as the subject on which gentlemen in the opposition chose to lay before the house their views of the interesting attitude in which the nation stands. It did appear to me, that the loan bill, which will soon come before us, would have afforded a much more proper occasion, it being more essential, as providing the ways and means for the prosecution of the war. But the gentlemen had the right of selection, and having exercised it, no matter how improperly, I am gratified, whatever I may think of the character of some part of the debate, at the latitude in which, for once, they have been indulged. I claim only, in return, of gentlemen on the other side of the house, and of the committee, a like indulgence in expressing my sentiments, with the same unrestrained freedom. Perhaps, in the course of the remarks, which I may feel myself called upon to make, gentlemen may apprehend, that they assume too harsh an aspect; but I have only now to say, that I shall speak of parties, measures, and things, as they strike my moral sense, protesting against the imputation of any intention, on my part, to wound the feelings of any gentlemen.

Considering the situation in which this country is now placed—a state of actual war with one of the most powerful nations on the earth—it may not be useless to take a view of the past, and of the various parties which have at different times appeared in this country, and to attend to the manner by which we have been driven from a peaceful posture, to our present warlike attitude. Such an inquiry may assist in guiding us to that result, an honorable peace, which must be the sincere desire of every friend to America. The course of that opposition, by which the administration of the government had been unremittingly impeded for the last twelve years, was singular, and, I believe, unexampled in the history of any country. It has been alike the duty and the interest of the administration to preserve peace. It was their duty, because it is necessary to the growth of an infant people, to their genius, and to their habits. It was their interest, because a change of the condition of the nation, brings along with it a danger of the loss of the affections of the people. The administration has not been forgetful of these solemn obligations. No art has been left unessayed, no experiment, promising a favorable result, left untried, to maintain the peaceful relations of the country. When, some six or seven years ago, the affairs of the nation assumed a threatening aspect, a partial non-importation was adopted. As they grew more alarming, an embargo was imposed. It would have accomplished its purpose, but it was sacrificed upon the altar of conciliation. Vain and fruitless attempt to propitiate! Then came along non-intercourse; and a general non-importation followed in the train. In the mean time, any indications of a return to the public law and the path of justice, on the part of either belligerent, are seized upon with avidity by the administration. The arrangement with Mr. Erskine is concluded. It is first applauded, and then censured by the opposition. No matter with what unfeigned sincerity, with what real effort, the administration cultivates peace, the opposition insists, that it alone is culpable for every breach that is made between the two countries. Because the president thought proper, in accepting the proffered reparation for the attack on a national vessel, to intimate, that it would have better comported with the justice of the king (and who does not think so?) to punish the offending officer, the opposition, entering into the royal feelings, sees, in that imaginary insult, abundant cause for rejecting Mr. Erskine’s arrangement. On another occasion, you cannot have forgotten the hypocritical ingenuity which they displayed, to divest Mr. Jackson’s correspondence of a premeditated insult to this country. If gentlemen would only reserve for their own government, half the sensibility which is indulged for that of Great Britain, they would find much less to condemn. Restriction after restriction has been tried; negotiation has been resorted to, until further negotiation would have been disgraceful. Whilst these peaceful experiments are undergoing a trial, what is the conduct of the opposition? They are the champions of war—the proud—the spirited—the sole repository of the nation’s honor—the men of exclusive vigor and energy. The administration, on the contrary, is weak, feeble, and pusillanimous—‘incapable of being kicked into a war.’ The maxim, ‘not a cent for tribute, millions for defence,’ is loudly proclaimed. Is the administration for negotiation? The opposition is tired, sick, disgusted with negotiation. They want to draw the sword, and avenge the nation’s wrongs. When, however, foreign nations, perhaps emboldened by the very opposition here made, refuse to listen to the amicable appeals, which have been repeated and reiterated by the administration, to their justice and to their interest—when, in fact, war with one of them has become identified with our independence and our sovereignty, and to abstain from it was no longer possible, behold the opposition veering round and becoming the friends of peace and commerce. They tell you of the calamities of war, its tragical events, the squandering away of your resources, the waste of the public treasure, and the spilling of innocent blood. ‘Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras dire.’ They tell you, that honor is an illusion! Now, we see them exhibiting the terrific forms of the roaring king of the forest. Now, the meekness and humility of the lamb! They are for war and no restrictions, when the administration is for peace. They are for peace and restrictions, when the administration is for war. You find them, sir, tacking with every gale, displaying the colors of every party, and of all nations, steady only in one unalterable purpose—to steer, if possible, into the haven of power.

During all this time, the parasites of opposition do not fail, by cunning sarcasm, or sly inuendo, to throw out the idea of French influence, which is known to be false, which ought to be met in one manner only, and that is by the lie direct. The administration of this country devoted to foreign influence! The administration of this country subservient to France! Great God! what a charge! how is it so influenced? By what ligament, on what basis, on what possible foundation does it rest? Is it similarity of language? No! we speak different tongues, we speak the English language. On the resemblance of our laws? No! the sources of our jurisprudence spring from another and a different country. On commercial intercourse? No! we have comparatively none with France. Is it from the correspondence in the genius of the two governments? No! here alone is the liberty of man secure from the inexorable despotism, which, every where else, tramples it under foot. Where, then, is the ground of such an influence? But, sir, I am insulting you by arguing on such a subject. Yet, preposterous and ridiculous as the insinuation is, it is propagated with so much industry, that there are persons found foolish and credulous enough to believe it. You will, no doubt, think it incredible, (but I have nevertheless been told it is a fact,) that an honorable member of this house, now in my eye, recently lost his election by the circulation of a silly story in his district, that he was the first cousin of the emperor Napoleon. The proof of the charge rested on the statement of facts, which was undoubtedly true. The gentleman in question, it was alleged, had married a connection of the lady of the President of the United States, who was the intimate friend of Thomas Jefferson, late President of the United States, who some years ago, was in the habit of wearing red French breeches. Now, taking these premises as established, you, Mr. Chairman, are too good a logician not to see that the conclusion necessarily follows!

Throughout the period he had been speaking of, the opposition has been distinguished, amidst all its veerings and changes, by another inflexible feature—the application to Bonaparte of every vile and opprobious epithet our language, copious as it is in terms of vituperation, affords. He has been compared to every hideous monster, and beast, from that mentioned in the Revelations, down to the most insignificant quadruped. He has been called the scourge of mankind, the destroyer of Europe, the great robber, the infidel, the modern Attila, and heaven knows by what other names. Really, gentlemen remind me of an obscure lady, in a city not very far off, who also took it into her head, in conversation with an accomplished French gentleman, to talk of the affairs of Europe. She, too, spoke of the destruction of the balance of power; stormed and raged about the insatiable ambition of the emperor; called him the curse of mankind, the destroyer of Europe. The Frenchman listened to her with perfect patience, and when she had ceased, said to her, with ineffable politeness, ‘madame, it would give my master, the emperor, infinite pain, if he knew how hardly you thought of him.’ Sir, gentlemen appear to me to forget, that they stand on American soil; that they are not in the British house of commons, but in the chamber of the house of representatives of the United States; that we have nothing to do with the affairs of Europe, the partition of territory and sovereignty there, except so far as these things affect the interests of our own country. Gentlemen transform themselves into the Burkes, Chathams, and Pitts, of another country, and forgetting, from honest zeal, the interests of America, engage with European sensibility in the discussion of European interests. If gentlemen ask me, whether I do not view with regret and horror the concentration of such vast power in the hands of Bonaparte, I reply, that I do. I regret to see the emperor of China holding such immense sway over the fortunes of millions of our species. I regret to see Great Britain possessing so uncontrolled a command over all the waters of our globe. If I had the ability to distribute among the nations of Europe their several portions of power and of sovereignty, I would say, that Holland should be resuscitated, and given the weight she enjoyed in the days of her De Witts. I would confine France within her natural boundaries, the Alps, Pyrenees, and the Rhine, and make her a secondary naval power only. I would abridge the British maritime power, raise Prussia and Austria to their original condition, and preserve the integrity of the empire of Russia. But these are speculations. I look at the political transactions of Europe, with the single exception of their possible bearing upon us, as I do at the history of other countries, or other times. I do not survey them with half the interest that I do the movements in South America. Our political relation with them is much less important than it is supposed to be. I have no fears of French or English subjugation. If we are united we are too powerful for the mightiest nation in Europe, or all Europe combined. If we are separated and torn asunder, we shall become an easy prey to the weakest of them. In the latter dreadful contingency, our country will not be worth preserving.

Next to the notice which the opposition has found itself called upon to bestow upon the French emperor, a distinguished citizen of Virginia, formerly president of the United States, has never for a moment failed to receive their kindest and most respectful attention. An honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Quincy,) of whom I am sorry to say, it becomes necessary for me, in the course of my remarks, to take some notice, has alluded to him in a remarkable manner. Neither his retirement from public office, his eminent services, nor his advanced age, can exempt this patriot from the coarse assaults of party malevolence. No, sir, in 1801, he snatched from the rude hand of usurpation the violated constitution of his country, and that is his crime. He preserved that instrument, in form, and substance, and spirit, a precious inheritance for generations to come, and for this he can never be forgiven. How vain and impotent is party rage, directed against such a man! He is not more elevated by his lofty residence, upon the summit of his own favorite mountain, than he is lifted, by the serenity of his mind, and the consciousness of a well-spent life, above the malignant passions and bitter feelings of the day. No! his own beloved Monticello is not more moved by the storms that beat against its sides, than is this illustrious man, by the howlings of the whole British pack, set loose from the Essex kennel! When the gentleman to whom I have been compelled to allude, shall have mingled his dust with that of his abused ancestors, when he shall have been consigned to oblivion, or, if he lives at all, shall live only in the treasonable annals of a certain junto, the name of Jefferson will be hailed with gratitude, his memory honored and cherished as the second founder of the liberties of the people, and the period of his administration will be looked back to, as one of the happiest and brightest epochs of American history4—an oasis in the midst of a sandy desert. But I beg the gentleman’s pardon; he has indeed secured to himself a more imperishable fame than I had supposed; I think it was about four years ago that he submitted to the house of representatives, an initiative proposition for an impeachment of Mr. Jefferson. The house condescended to consider it. The gentleman debated it with his usual temper, moderation, and urbanity. The house decided upon it in the most solemn manner, and, although the gentleman had some how obtained a second, the final vote stood, one for, and one hundred and seventeen against the proposition!

In one respect there is a remarkable difference between the administration and the opposition; it is in a sacred regard for personal liberty. When out of power, my political friends condemned the surrender of Jonathan Robbins; they opposed the violation of the freedom of the press, in the sedition law; they opposed the more insidious attack upon the freedom of the person, under the imposing garb of an alien law. The party now in opposition, then in power, advocated the sacrifice of the unhappy Robbins, and passed those two laws. True to our principles, we are now struggling for the liberty of our seamen against foreign oppression. True to theirs, they oppose a war undertaken for this object. They have indeed lately affected a tender solicitude for the liberties of the people, and talk of the danger of standing armies, and the burden of taxes. But it must be evident to you, Mr. Chairman, that they speak in a foreign idiom. Their brogue evinces that it is not their vernacular tongue. What! the opposition, who, in 1798 and 1799, could raise a useless army to fight an enemy three thousand miles distant from us, alarmed at the existence of one raised for a known and specified object—the attack of the adjoining provinces of the enemy. What! the gentleman from Massachusetts, who assisted by his vote to raise the army of twenty-five thousand, alarmed at the danger of our liberties from this very army!

But, sir, I must speak of another subject, which I never think of but with feelings of the deepest awe. The gentleman from Massachusetts, in imitation of some of his predecessors of 1799, has entertained us with a picture of cabinet plots, presidential plots, and all sorts of plots, which have been engendered by the diseased state of the gentleman’s imagination. I wish, sir, that another plot, of a much more serious and alarming character—a plot that aims at the dismemberment of our union—had only the same imaginary existence. But no man, who has paid any attention to the tone of certain prints, and to transactions in a particular quarter of the union, for several years past, can doubt the existence of such a plot. It was far, very far from my intention to charge the opposition with such a design. No, I believe them generally incapable of it. But I cannot say as much for some, who have been unworthily associated with them in the quarter of the union to which I have referred. The gentleman cannot have forgotten his own sentiment, uttered even on the floor of this house, ‘peaceably if we can, FORCIBLY if we must,’ nearly at the very time Henry’s mission to Boston was undertaken. The flagitiousness of that embassy had been attempted to be concealed, by directing the public attention to the price which, the gentleman says, was given for the disclosure. As if any price could change the atrociousness of the attempt on the part of Great Britain, or could extenuate, in the slightest degree, the offence of those citizens, who entertained and deliberated upon a proposition so infamous and unnatural! There was a most remarkable coincidence between some of the things which that man states, and certain events in the quarter alluded to. In the contingency of war with Great Britain, it will be recollected, that the neutrality and eventual separation of that section of the union was to be brought about. How, sir, has it happened, since the declaration of war, that British officers in Canada have asserted to American officers, that this very neutrality would take place? That they have so asserted can be established beyond controversy. The project is not brought forward openly, with a direct avowal of the intention. No, the stock of good sense and patriotism in that portion of the country is too great to be undisguisedly encountered. It is assailed from the masked batteries of friendship, of peace and commerce, on the one side, and by the groundless imputation of opposite propensities, on the other. The affections of the people, there, are gradually to be undermined. The project is suggested or withdrawn; the diabolical dramatis personæ, in this criminal tragedy, make their appearance or exit, as the audience, to whom they address themselves, applaud, or condemn. I was astonished, sir, in reading lately a letter, or pretended letter, published in a prominent print in that quarter, and written, not in the fervor of party zeal, but coolly and dispassionately, to find that the writer affected to reason about a separation, and attempted to demonstrate its advantages to the different portions of the union; deploring the existence now of what he terms prejudices against it, but hoping for the arrival of the period when they shall be eradicated. But, sir, I will quit this unpleasant subject; I will turn from one, whom no sense of decency or propriety could restrain from soiling the carpet on which he treads,5 to gentlemen, who have not forgotten what is due to themselves, to the place in which we are assembled, or to those by whom they are opposed. The gentlemen from North Carolina (Mr. Pearson), from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin), and from New York (Mr. Bleeker), have, with their usual decorum, contended that the war would not have been declared, had it not been for the duplicity of France, in withholding an authentic instrument, repealing the decrees of Berlin and Milan; that upon the exhibition of such an instrument, the revocation of the orders in council took place; that this main cause of the war, but for which it would not have been declared, being removed, the administration ought to seek for the restoration of peace; and that, upon its sincerely doing so, terms compatible with the honor and interest of this country might be obtained. It is my purpose, said Mr. Clay, to examine, first, into the circumstances under which the war was declared; secondly, into the causes of continuing it; and, lastly, into the means which have been taken, or ought to be taken, to procure peace; but, sir, I am really so exhausted, that, little as I am in the habit of asking of the house an indulgence of this kind, I feel I must trespass on their goodness.

[Here Mr. Clay sat down. Mr. Newton moved, that the committee rise, report progress, and ask leave to sit again, which was done. On the next day he proceeded.]

I am sensible, Mr. Chairman, that some part of the debate, to which this bill has given rise, has been attended by circumstances much to be regretted, not usual in this house, and of which it is to be hoped, there will be no repetition. The gentleman from Boston had so absolved himself from every rule of decorum and propriety, had so outraged all decency, that I have found it impossible to suppress the feelings excited on the occasion. His colleague, whom I have the honor to follow, (Mr. Wheaton,) whatever else he might not have proved, in his very learned, ingenious, and original exposition of the powers of this government—an exposition in which he has sought, where nobody before him has, and nobody after him will look, for a grant of our powers, I mean the preamble to the constitution—has clearly shown, to the satisfaction of all who heard him, that the power of defensive war is conferred. I claim the benefit of a similar principle, in behalf of my political friends, against the gentlemen from Boston. I demand only the exercise of the right of repulsion. No one is more anxious than I am to preserve the dignity and the freedom of debate; no member is more responsible for its abuse, and, if, on this occasion, its just limits have been violated, let him, who has been the unprovoked aggressor, appropriate to himself, exclusively, the consequences.

I omitted yesterday, sir, when speaking of a delicate and painful subject, to notice a powerful engine which the conspirators against the integrity of the union employ, to effect their nefarious purposes; I mean southern influence. The true friend to his country, knowing that our constitution was the work of compromise, in which interests apparently conflicting were attempted to be reconciled, aims to extinguish or allay prejudices. But this patriotic exertion does not suit the views of those, who are urged on by diabolical ambition. They find it convenient, to imagine the existence of certain improper influences, and to propagate with their utmost industry a belief of them. Hence the idea of southern preponderance, Virginia influence, the yoking of the respectable yeomanry of the north with negro slaves to the car of southern nabobs. If Virginia really cherished a reprehensible ambition, an aim to monopolize the chief magistracy of the country, how was such a purpose to be accomplished? Virginia, alone, cannot elect a president, whose elevation depends upon a plurality of electoral votes, and a consequent concurrence of many states. Would Vermont, disinterested Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, independent Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, all consent to become the tools of inordinate ambition? But the present incumbent was designated to the office before his predecessor had retired. How? By public sentiment; public sentiment, which grew out of his known virtues, his illustrious services, and his distinguished abilities. Would the gentleman crush this public sentiment?—is he prepared to admit, that he would arrest the progress of opinion?

The war was declared, because Great Britain arrogated to herself the pretension of regulating our foreign trade, under the delusive name of retaliatory orders in council—a pretension by which she undertook to proclaim to American enterprise, ‘thus far shalt thou go, and no further’—orders which she refused to revoke, after the alleged cause of their enactment had ceased; because she persisted in the practice of impressing American seamen; because she had instigated the Indians to commit hostilities against us; and because she refused indemnity for her past injuries upon our commerce. I throw out of the question other wrongs. The war in fact was announced, on our part, to meet the war which she was waging on her part. So undeniable were the causes of the war, so powerfully did they address themselves to the feelings of the whole American people, that when the bill was pending before this house, gentlemen in the opposition, although provoked to debate, would not, or could not, utter one syllable against it. It is true, they wrapped themselves up in sullen silence, pretending they did not choose to debate such a question in secret session. Whilst speaking of the proceedings on that occasion, I beg to be permitted to advert to another fact which transpired; an important fact, material for the nation to know, and which I have often regretted had not been spread upon our journals. My honorable colleague (Mr. M’Kee) moved, in committee of the whole, to comprehend France in the war; and when the question was taken upon the proposition, there appeared but ten votes in support of it, of whom, seven belonged to this side of the house, and three only to the other! It is said, that we were inveigled into the war by the perfidy of France; and that, had she furnished the document in time, which was first published in England, in May last, it would have been prevented. I will concede to gentlemen, every thing they ask about the injustice of France towards this country. I wish to God, that our ability was equal to our disposition, to make her feel the sense that we entertain of that injustice. The manner of the publication of the paper in question, was, undoubtedly, extremely exceptionable. But I maintain, that, had it made its appearance earlier, it would not have had the effect supposed; and the proof lies in the unequivocal declarations of the British government. I will trouble you, sir, with going no further back than to the letters of the British minister, addressed to the secretary of state, just before the expiration of his diplomatic functions. It will be recollected by the committee, that he exhibited to this government a despatch, from lord Castlereagh, in which the principle was distinctly avowed, that, to produce the effect of a repeal of the orders in council, the French decrees must be absolutely and entirely revoked as to all the world, and not as to America alone. A copy of that despatch was demanded of him, and he very awkwardly evaded it. But on the tenth of June, after the bill declaring war had actually passed this house, and was pending before the senate, (and which, I have no doubt, was known to him,) in a letter to Mr. Monroe, he says: ‘I have no hesitation, sir, in saying, that Great Britain, as the case has hitherto stood, never did, nor never could, engage, without the greatest injustice to herself and her allies, as well as to other neutral nations, to repeal her orders as affecting America alone, leaving them in force against other states, upon condition that France would except, singly and specially, America from the operation of her decrees.’ On the fourteenth of the same month, the bill still pending before the senate, he repeats: ‘I will now say, that I feel entirely authorized to assure you, that if you can, at any time, produce a full and unconditional repeal of the French decrees, as you have a right to demand it, in your character of a neutral nation, and that it be disengaged from any question concerning our maritime rights, we shall be ready to meet you with a revocation of the orders in council. Previously to your producing such an instrument, which I am sorry to see you regard as unnecessary, you cannot expect of us to give up our orders in council.’ Thus, sir, you see, that the British government would not be content with a repeal of the French decrees, as to us only. But the French paper in question was such a repeal. It could not, therefore, satisfy the British government. It could not, therefore, have induced that government, had it been earlier promulgated, to repeal the orders in council. It could not, therefore, have averted the war. The withholding of it did not occasion the war, and the promulgation of it would not have prevented the war. But gentlemen have contended, that, in point of fact, it did produce a repeal of the orders in council. This I deny. After it made its appearance in England, it was declared by one of the British ministry, in parliament, not to be satisfactory. And all the world knows, that the repeal of the orders in council resulted from the inquiry, reluctantly acceded to by the ministry, into the effect upon their manufacturing establishments, of our non-importation law, or to the warlike attitude assumed by this government, or to both. But it is said, that the orders in council are withdrawn, no matter from what cause; and that having been the sole motive for declaring the war, the relations of peace ought to be restored. This brings me to the examination of the grounds for continuing the present hostilities between this country and Great Britain.

I am far from acknowledging, that, had the orders in council been repealed, as they have been, before the war was declared, the declaration of hostilities would of course have been prevented. In a body so numerous as this is, from which the declaration emanated, it is impossible to say, with any degree of certainty, what would have been the effect of such a repeal. Each member must answer for himself. As to myself, I have no hesitation in saying, that I have always considered the impressment of American seamen as much the most serious aggression. But, sir, how have those orders at last been repealed? Great Britain, it is true, has intimated a willingness to suspend their practical operation, but she still arrogates to herself the right to revive them upon certain contingences, of which she constitutes herself the sole judge. She waives the temporary use of the rod, but she suspends it in terrorem over our heads. Supposing it to be conceded to gentlemen, that such a repeal of the orders in council as took place on the twenty-third of June last, exceptionable as it is, being known before the war was proclaimed, would have prevented it; does it follow that it ought to induce us to lay down our arms, without the redress of any other injury of which we complain? Does it follow, in all cases, that that which would in the first instance have prevented would also terminate the war? By no means. It requires a strong and powerful effort in a nation, prone to peace as this is, to burst through its habits, and encounter the difficulties and privations of war. Such a nation ought but seldom to embark in a belligerent contest; but when it does, it should be for obvious and essential rights alone, and should firmly resolve to extort, at all hazards, their recognition. The war of the revolution is an example of a war begun for one object and prosecuted for another. It was waged, in its commencement, against the right asserted by the parent country to tax the colonies. Then, no one thought of absolute independence. The idea of independence was repelled. But the British government would have relinquished the principle of taxation. The founders of our liberties saw, however, that there was no security short of independence, and they achieved that independence. When nations are engaged in war, those rights in controversy, which are not acknowledged by the treaty of peace, are abandoned. And who is prepared to say, that American seamen shall be surrendered as victims to the British principle of impressment? And, sir, what is this principle? She contends, that she has a right to the services of her own subjects; and that, in the exercise of this right, she may lawfully impress them, even although she finds them in American vessels, upon the high seas, without her jurisdiction. Now I deny that she has any right, beyond her jurisdiction, to come on board our vessels, upon the high seas, for any other purpose, than in the pursuit of enemies, or their goods, or goods contraband of war. But she further contends, that her subjects cannot renounce their allegiance to her, and contract a new obligation to other sovereigns. I do not mean to go into the general question of the right of expatriation. If, as is contended, all nations deny it, all nations at the same time admit and practice the right of naturalization. Great Britain herself does this. Great Britain, in the very case of foreign seamen, imposes, perhaps, fewer restraints upon naturalization than any other nation. Then, if subjects cannot break their original allegiance, they may, according to universal usage, contract a new allegiance. What is the effect of this double obligation? Undoubtedly, that the sovereign, having possession of the subject, would have the right to the services of the subject. If he return within the jurisdiction of his primitive sovereign he may resume his right to his services, of which the subject, by his own act, could not divest himself. But his primitive sovereign can have no right to go in quest of him, out of his own jurisdiction, into the jurisdiction of another sovereign, or upon the high seas, where there exists either no jurisdiction, or it is possessed by the nation owning the ship navigating them. But, sir, this discussion is altogether useless. It is not to the British principle, objectionable as it is, that we are alone to look; it is to her practice; no matter what guise she puts on. It is in vain to assert the inviolability of the obligation of allegiance. It is in vain to set up the plea of necessity, and to allege that she cannot exist, without the impressment of HER seamen. The naked truth is, she comes, by her press-gangs, on board of our vessels, seizes OUR native as well as naturalized seamen, and drags them into her service. It is the case, then, of the assertion of an erroneous principle, and of a practice not conformable to the asserted principle—a principle, which, if it were theoretically right, must be for ever practically wrong—a practice which can obtain countenance from no principle whatever, and to submit to which, on our part, would betray the most abject degradation. We are told, by gentlemen in the opposition, that government has not done all that was incumbent on it to do, to avoid just cause of complaint on the part of Great Britain; that, in particular, the certificates of protection, authorized by the act of 1796, are fraudulently used. Sir, government has done too much in granting those paper protections. I can never think of them without being shocked. They resemble the passes which the master grants to his negro slave—‘let the bearer, Mungo, pass and repass without molestation.’ What do they imply? That Great Britain has a right to seize all who are not provided with them. From their very nature, they must be liable to abuse on both sides. If Great Britain desires a mark, by which she can know her own subjects, let her give them an ear mark. The colors that float from the mast-head should be the credentials of our seamen. There is no safety to us, and the gentlemen have shown it, but in the rule, that all who sail under the flag (not being enemies) are protected by the flag. It is impossible, that this country should ever abandon the gallant tars, who have won for us such splendid trophies. Let me suppose that the genius of Columbia should visit one of them in his oppressor’s prison, and attempt to reconcile him to his forlorn and wretched condition. She would say to him, in the language of gentlemen on the other side, ‘Great Britain intends you no harm; she did not mean to impress you, but one of her own subjects; having taken you by mistake, I will remonstrate, and try to prevail upon her, by peaceable means, to release you; but I cannot, my son, fight for you.’ If he did not consider this mere mockery, the poor tar would address her judgment, and say, ‘you owe me, my country, protection; I owe you, in return, obedience. I am no British subject, I am a native of old Massachusetts, where lived my aged father, my wife, my children. I have faithfully discharged my duty Will you refuse to do yours?’ Appealing to her passions, he would continue: ‘I lost this eye in fighting under Truxton, with the Insurgente; I got this scar before Tripoli; I broke this leg on board the Constitution, when the Guerriere struck.’ If she remained still unmoved, he would break out, in the accents of mingled distress and despair,

Hard, hard is my fate! once I freedom enjoyed,

Was as happy as happy could be!

Oh! how hard is my fate, how galling these chains!6

I will not imagine the dreadful catastrophe to which he would be driven, by an abandonment of him to his oppressor. It will not be, it cannot be, that his country will refuse him protection.

It is said, that Great Britain has been always willing to make a satisfactory arrangement of the subject of impressment; and that Mr. King had nearly concluded one, prior to his departure from that country. Let us hear what that minister says, upon his return to America. In his letter, dated at New York, in July, 1803, after giving an account of his attempt to form an arrangement for the protection of our seamen, and his interviews to this end with lords Hawkesbury and St. Vincent; and stating, that, when he had supposed the terms of a convention were agreed upon, a new pretension was set up, (the mare clausum,) he concludes: ‘I regret to have been unable to put this business on a satisfactory footing, knowing, as I do, its very great importance to both parties; but I flatter myself that I have not misjudged the interests of our own country, in refusing to sanction a principle, that might be productive of more extensive evils than those it was our aim to prevent.’ The sequel of his negotiation on this affair, is more fully given in the recent conversation between Mr. Russell and lord Castlereagh, communicated to congress during its present session. Lord Castlereagh says to Mr. Russell:

‘Indeed, there has evidently been much misapprehension on this subject; an erroneous belief entertained, that an arrangement, in regard to it, has been nearer an accomplishment than the facts will warrant. Even our friends in congress, I mean those who are opposed to going to war with us, have been so confident in this mistake, that they have ascribed the failure of such an arrangement solely to the misconduct of the American government. This error probably originated with Mr. King; for, being much esteemed here, and always well received by the persons in power, he seems to have misconstrued their readiness to listen to his representations, and their warm professions of a disposition to remove the complaints of America, in relation to impressment, into a supposed conviction, on their part, of the propriety of adopting the plan which he had proposed. But lord St. Vincent, whom he might have thought he had brought over to his opinions, appears never for a moment to have ceased to regard all arrangement on the subject to be attended with formidable if not insurmountable obstacles. This is obvious, from a letter which his lordship addressed to sir William Scott, at the time.’ Here lord Castlereagh read a letter, contained in the records before him, in which lord St. Vincent states to sir William Scott, the zeal with which Mr. King had assailed him, on this subject of impressment; confesses his own perplexity, and total incompetency to discover any practical project, for the safe discontinuance of that practice, and asks for counsel and advice. ‘Thus you see,’ proceeded lord Castlereagh, ‘that the confidence of Mr. King, on this subject, was entirely unfounded.’

Thus it is apparent, that at no time has the enemy been willing to place this subject on a satisfactory footing. I will speak hereafter of the overtures made by the administration since the war.

The honorable gentleman from New York (Mr. Bleeker), in the very sensible speech with which he favored the committee, made one observation, which did not comport with his usual liberal and enlarged views. It was, that those who are most interested against the practice of impressment, did not desire a continuance of the war, on account of it; whilst those (the southern and western members) who had no interest in it, were the zealous advocates of American seamen. It was a provincial sentiment, unworthy of that gentleman. It was one which, in a change of condition, he would not express, because I know he could not feel it. Does not that gentleman feel for the unhappy victims of the tomahawk, in the western wilds, although his quarter of the union may be exempted from similar barbarities? I am sure he does. If there be a description of rights, which, more than any other, should unite all parties in all quarters of the union, it is unquestionably the rights of the person. No matter what his vocation; whether he seeks subsistence amidst the dangers of the deep, or draws them from the bowels of the earth, or from the humblest occupations of mechanic life; whenever the sacred rights of an American freeman are assailed, all hearts ought to unite, and every arm should be braced, to vindicate his cause.

The gentleman from Delaware sees in Canada no object worthy of conquest. According to him, it is a cold, sterile, and inhospitable region. And yet, such are the allurements which it offers, that the same gentleman apprehends that, if it be annexed to the United States, already too much weakened by an extension of territory, the people of New England will rush over the line and depopulate that section of the union! That gentleman considers it honest to hold Canada as a kind of hostage, to regard it as a sort of bond, for the good behavior of the enemy. But he will not enforce the bond. The actual conquest of that country would, according to him, make no impression upon the enemy; and yet the very apprehension only, of such a conquest, would at all times have a powerful operation upon him! Other gentlemen consider the invasion of that country as wicked and unjustifiable. Its inhabitants are represented as harmless and unoffending; as connected with those of the bordering states by a thousand tender ties, interchanging acts of kindness, and all the offices of good neighborhood. Canada, said Mr. Clay, innocent! Canada unoffending! Is it not in Canada, that the tomahawk of the savage has been moulded into its death-like form? Has it not been from Canadian magazines, Malden and others, that those supplies have been issued, which nourish and continue the Indian hostilities—supplies which have enabled the savage hordes to butcher the garrison of Chicago, and to commit other horrible excesses and murders? Was it not by the joint coöperation of Canadians and Indians, that a remote American fort, Michilimackinac, was assailed and reduced, while in ignorance of a state of war? But, sir, how soon have the opposition changed their tone! When the administration was striving, by the operation of peaceful measures, to bring Great Britain back to a sense of justice, they were for old-fashioned war. And, now they have got old-fashioned war, their sensibilities are cruelly shocked, and all their sympathies lavished upon the harmless inhabitants of the adjoining provinces. What does a state of war present? The united energies of one people arrayed against the combined energies of another; a conflict in which each party aims to inflict all the injury it can, by sea and land, upon the territories, property, and citizens of the other; subject only to the rules of mitigated war, practiced by civilized nations. The gentleman would not touch the continental provinces of the enemy, nor, I presume, for the same reason, her possessions in the West Indies. The same humane spirit would spare the seamen and soldiers of the enemy. The sacred person of his majesty must not be attacked; for the learned gentlemen, on the other side, are quite familiar with the maxim, that the king can do no wrong. Indeed, sir, I know of no person on whom we may make war, upon the principles of the honorable gentlemen, but Mr. Stephen, the celebrated author of the orders in council, or the board of admiralty, who authorize and regulate the practice of impressment!

The disasters of the war admonish us, we are told, of the necessity of terminating the contest. If our achievements by land have been less splendid than those of our intrepid seamen by water, it is not because the American soldier is less brave. On the one element, organization, discipline, and a thorough knowledge of their duties, exist, on the part of the officers and their men. On the other, almost every thing is yet to be acquired. We have, however, the consolation, that our country abounds with the richest materials, and that in no instance, when engaged in action, have our arms been tarnished. At Brownstown and at Queenstown, the valor of veterans was displayed, and acts of the noblest heroism were performed. It is true, that the disgrace of Detroit remains to be wiped off. That is a subject on which I cannot trust my feelings; it is not fitting I should speak. But this much I will say, it was an event which no human foresight could have anticipated, and for which the administration cannot be justly censured. It was the parent of all the misfortunes we have experienced on land. But for it, the Indian war would have been, in a great measure, prevented or terminated; the ascendency on lake Erie acquired, and the war pushed on, perhaps, to Montreal. With the exception of that event, the war, even upon the land, has been attended by a series of the most brilliant exploits, which, whatever interest they may inspire on this side of the mountains, have given the greatest pleasure on the other. The expedition, under the command of governor Edwards and colonel Russell, to lake Pioria, on the Illinois, was completely successful. So was that of captain Craig, who, it is said, ascended that river still higher. General Hopkins destroyed the prophet’s town. We have just received intelligence of the gallant enterprise of colonel Campbell. In short, sir, the Indian towns have been swept from the mouth to the source of the Wabash; and a hostile country has been penetrated far beyond the most daring incursions of any campaign, during the former Indian war. Never was more cool, deliberate bravery displayed, than that by Newman’s party, from Georgia. And the capture of the Detroit, and the destruction of the Caledonia, (whether placed to a maritime or land account,) for judgment, skill, and courage, on the part of lieutenant Elliot, have never been surpassed.

It is alleged, that the elections in England are in favor of the ministry, and that those in this country are against the war. If, in such a cause, (saying nothing of the impurity of their elections,) the people of that country have rallied round their government, it affords a salutary lesson to the people here; who, at all hazards, ought to support theirs, struggling as it is to maintain our just rights. But the people here have not been false to themselves; a great majority approve the war, as is evinced by the recent reëlection of the chief magistrate. Suppose it were even true, that an entire section of the union were opposed to the war; that section being a minority, is the will of the majority to be relinquished? In that section the real strength of the opposition had been greatly exaggerated. Vermont has, by two successive expressions of her opinion, approved the declaration of war. In New Hampshire, parties are so nearly equipoised, that out of thirty or thirty-five thousand votes those who approved and are for supporting it, lost the election by only one thousand or one thousand five hundred. In Massachusetts alone have they obtained any considerable accession. If we come to New York, we shall find that other and local causes have influenced her elections.

What cause, Mr. Chairman, which existed for declaring the war, has been removed? We sought indemnity for the past, and security for the future. The orders in council are suspended, not revoked; no compensation for spoliations; Indian hostilities, which were before secretly instigated, are now openly encouraged; and the practice of impressment unremittingly persevered in and insisted upon. Yet the administration has given the strongest demonstrations of its love of peace. On the twenty-ninth of June, less than ten days after the declaration of war, the secretary of state writes to Mr. Russell, authorizing him to agree to an armistice, upon two conditions only, and what are they? That the orders in council should be repealed, and the practice of impressing American seamen cease, those already impressed being released. The proposition was for nothing more than a real truce; that the war should in fact cease on both sides. Again, on the twenty-seventh of July, one month later, anticipating a possible objection to these terms, reasonable as they are, Mr. Monroe empowers Mr. Russell to stipulate in general terms for an armistice, having only an informal understanding on these points. In return, the enemy is offered a prohibition of the employment of his seamen in our service, thus removing entirely all pretext for the practice of impressment. The very proposition which the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Pitkin) contends ought to be made, has been made. How are these pacific advances met by the other party? Rejected, as absolutely inadmissible; cavils are indulged about the inadequacy of Mr. Russell’s powers, and the want of an act of congress is intimated. And yet the constant usage of nations, I believe, is, where the legislation of one party is necessary to carry into effect a given stipulation, to leave it to the contracting party to provide the requisite laws. If he fail to do so, it is a breach of good faith, and becomes the subject of subsequent remonstrance by the injured party. When Mr. Russell renews the overture, in what was intended as a more agreeable form to the British government, lord Castlereagh is not content with a simple rejection, but clothes it in the language of insult. Afterwards, in conversation with Mr. Russell, the moderation of our government is misinterpreted, and made the occasion of a sneer, that we are tired of the war. The proposition of admiral Warren is submitted in a spirit not more pacific. He is instructed, he tells us, to propose, that the government of the United States shall instantly recall their letters of marque and reprisal against British ships, together with all orders and instructions for any acts of hostility whatever, against the territories of his majesty, or the persons or property of his subjects. That small affair being settled, he is further authorized to arrange as to the revocation of the laws which interdict the commerce and ships of war of his majesty from the harbors and waters of the United States. This messenger of peace comes with one qualified concession in his pocket, not made to the justice of our demands, and is fully empowered to receive our homage, a contrite retraction of all our measures adopted against his master! And, in default, he does not fail to assure us, the orders in council are to be forthwith revived. The administration, still anxious to terminate the war, suppresses the indignation which such a proposal ought to have created, and, in its answer, concludes by informing admiral Warren, ‘that if there be no objection to an accommodation of the difference relating to impressment, in the mode proposed, other than the suspension of the British claim to impressment during the armistice, there can be none to proceeding, without the armistice, to an immediate discussion and arrangement of an article on that subject.’ Thus it has left the door of negotiation unclosed, and it remains to be seen, if the enemy will accept the invitation tendered to him. The honorable gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Pearson) supposes, that if congress would pass a law, prohibiting the employment of British seamen in our service, upon condition of a like prohibition on their part, and repeal the act of non-importation, peace would immediately follow. Sir, I have no doubt, if such a law were to pass, with all the requisite solemnities, and the repeal to take place, lord Castlereagh would laugh at our simplicity. No, sir, the administration has erred in the steps which it has taken to restore peace, but its error has been, not in doing too little, but in betraying too great a solicitude for that event. An honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war. My plan would be, to call out the ample resources of the country, give them a judicious direction, prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, strike wherever we can reach the enemy, at sea or on land, and negotiate the terms of a peace at Quebec or at Halifax. We are told, that England is a proud and lofty nation, which, disdaining to wait for danger, meets it half way. Haughty as she is, we once triumphed over her, and, if we do not listen to the counsels of timidity and despair, we shall again prevail. In such a cause, with the aid of Providence, we must come out crowned with success, but if we fail, let us fail like men, lash ourselves to our gallant tars, and expire together in one common struggle, fighting for FREE TRADE AND SEAMEN’S RIGHTS.

ON HIS RETURN FROM GHENT.

AT LEXINGTON, KENTUCKY, OCTOBER 7, 1815

[IN the following brief speech, delivered at a public dinner, given to him by his fellow-citizens of Lexington, Kentucky, after his return from the negotiation of a treaty of peace, at Ghent, Mr. Clay takes a summary view of the results of the war with Great Britain, and the benefits which the United States, as a nation, had gained by that contest with a gigantic foe, triumphant at last in all her European wars. His allusions to the discussions at Ghent, and the proud and dignified attitude assumed and maintained by our commissioners, on that occasion, will be read with interest, while his views of the bright prospects opened to our country by the peace, have been verified by subsequent national prosperity, particularly when the measures of public policy advocated and recommended by Mr. Clay have been adopted.

The sixth toast was:

‘Our able negotiators at Ghent. Their talents for diplomacy have kept pace with the valor of our arms, in ‘demonstrating’ to the enemy, that these states will be free.’

This toast was received with loud and repeated cheering. After it had subsided Mr. Clay addressed the assembly as follows.

I FEEL myself called on, by the sentiment just expressed, to return my thanks, in behalf of my colleagues and myself. I do not, and am quite sure they do not, feel, that, in the service alluded to, they are at all entitled to the compliment which has been paid them. We could not do otherwise than reject the demand made by the other party; and if our labors finally terminated in an honorable peace, it was owing to causes on this side of the Atlantic, and not to any exertion of ours. Whatever diversity of opinion may have existed as to the declaration of the war, there are some points on which all may look back with proud satisfaction. The first relates to the time of the conclusion of the peace. Had it been made immediately after the treaty of Paris, we should have retired humiliated from the contest, believing that we had escaped the severe chastisement with which we were threatened, and that we owed to the generosity and magnanimity of the enemy, what we were incapable of commanding by our arms. That magnanimity would have been the theme of every tongue, and of every press, abroad and at home. We should have retired, unconscious of our own strength, and unconscious of the utter inability of the enemy, with his whole undivided force, to make any serious impression upon us. Our military character, then in the lowest state of degradation, would have been unretrieved. Fortunately for us, Great Britain chose to try the issue of the last campaign. And the issue of the last campaign has demonstrated, in the repulse before Baltimore, the retreat from Plattsburgh, the hard-fought action on the Niagara frontier, and in that most glorious day, the eighth of January, that we have always possessed the finest elements of military composition, and that a proper use of them, only, was necessary, to insure for the army and militia a fame as imperishable as that which the navy had previously acquired.

Another point which appears to me to afford the highest consolation is, that we fought the most powerful nation, perhaps, in existence, single-handed and alone, without any sort of alliance. More than thirty years has Great Britain been maturing her physical means, which she had rendered as efficacious as possible, by skill, by discipline, and by actual service. Proudly boasting of the conquest of Europe, she vainly flattered herself with the easy conquest of America also. Her veterans were put to flight or defeated, while all Europe—I mean the governments of Europe—was gazing with cold indifference, or sentiments of positive hatred of us, upon the arduous contest. Hereafter no monarch can assert claims of gratitude upon us, for assistance rendered in the hour of danger.

There is another view of which the subject of the war is fairly susceptible. From the moment that Great Britain came forward at Ghent with her extravagant demands, the war totally changed its character. It became, as it were, a new war. It was no longer an American war, prosecuted for redress of British aggressions upon American rights, but became a British war, prosecuted for objects of British ambition, to be accompanied by American sacrifices. And what were those demands? Here, in the immediate neighborhood of a sister state and territories, which were to be made in part the victims, they must have been felt, and their enormity justly appreciated. They consisted of the erection of a barrier between Canada and the United States, to be formed by cutting off from Ohio and some of the territories a country more extensive than Great Britain, containing thousands of freemen, who were to be abandoned to their fate, and creating a new power, totally unknown upon the continent of America; of the dismantling of our fortresses, and naval power on the lakes, with the surrender of the military occupation of those waters to the enemy, and of an arrondissement for two British provinces. These demands, boldly asserted, and one of them declared to be a sine qua non, were finally relinquished. Taking this view of the subject, if there be loss of reputation by either party, in the terms of peace, who has sustained it?

The effects of the war are highly satisfactory. Abroad, our character, which at the time of its declaration was in the lowest state of degradation, is raised to the highest point of elevation. It is impossible for any American to visit Europe, without being sensible of this agreeable change, in the personal attentions which he receives, in the praises which are bestowed on our past exertions, and the predictions which are made as to our future prospects. At home, a government, which, at its formation, was apprehended by its best friends, and pronounced by its enemies to be incapable of standing the shock, is found to answer all the purposes of its institution. In spite of the errors which have been committed (and errors have undoubtedly been committed), aided by the spirit and patriotism of the people, it is demonstrated to be as competent to the objects of effective war, as it has been before proved to be to the concerns of a season of peace. Government has thus acquired strength and confidence. Our prospects for the future, are of the brightest kind. With every reason to count on the permanence of peace, it remains only for the government to determine upon military and naval establishments adapted to the growth and extension of our country and its rising importance, keeping in view a gradual but not burdensome increase of the navy; to provide for the payment of the interest, and the redemption of the public debt, and for the current expenses of government. For all these objects, the existing sources of the revenue promise not only to be abundantly sufficient, but will probably leave ample scope to the exercise of the judgment of congress, in selecting for repeal, modification, or abolition, those which may be found most oppressive, inconvenient, or unproductive.

[The eighteenth and last toast was, ‘our guest, HENRY CLAY. We welcome his return to that country, whose rights and interests he has so ably maintained, at home and abroad.’]

My friends, I must again thank you for your kind and affectionate attention. My reception has been more like that of a brother, than a common friend or acquaintance, and I am utterly incapable of finding words to express my gratitude. My situation is like that of a Swedish gentleman, at a dinner given in England, by the Society of Friends of Foreigners in Distress. A toast having been given complimentary to his country, it was expected, as is usual on such occasions, that he would rise and address the company. The gentleman, not understanding the English language, rose under great embarrassment, and said, ‘sir, I wish you to consider me A Foreigner in Distress.’ I wish you, gentlemen, to consider me a Friend in distress.

ON THE UNITED STATES BANK QUESTION.

ADDRESS TO HIS CONSTITUENTS AT LEXINGTON, JUNE 3, 1816

[MR. CLAY here explains to the electors of the congressional district of Kentucky which he represented, the grounds of his change of opinion on the subject of a national bank. We have seen, by his speech delivered in the senate of the United States, in 1811, that he had opposed the renewal of the charter of the first bank of the United States, and now, in 1816, he had advocated the bill brought in by Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, for incorporating a similar institution, which bill passed both houses of congress, and received the signature of president Madison.7 A perusal of the following address will, it is believed, satisfy all candid persons of the sincerity and patriotism of Mr. Clay, on both occasions. As one of his biographers remarks, ‘there is no other instance, in the whole history of his life, where he has changed his opinions, on an important subject. His ingenuousness is evinced by his having changed once, but his firmness by his having done so but once. And what was it that wrought this single revolution in his sentiments? A mighty event, whose consequences could be learned only from experience—the occurrence of a war with Great Britain, which changed, not only his views of the policy of a bank, but those of almost every other leading politician in the country.’]