Volume 1 — SPEECHES, &c. (continued 5)

‘They have intermixed with their troops soldiers of ours, whom they had taken prisoners, carrying away the officers in chains, to garrisons where it is impossible to preserve health for a year; they have left others to die in their prisons, of hunger and misery, and others they have forced to hard labor on the public works. They have exultingly put to death our bearers of flags of truce, and have been guilty of the blackest atrocities to our chiefs, after they had surrendered, as well as to other principal characters, in disregard of the humanity with which we treated prisoners; as a proof of it, witness the deputy Mutes of Potosi, the captain-general Pumacagua, general Augulo, and his brother commandant Munecas, and other partisan chiefs, who were shot in cold blood after having been prisoners for several days.

‘They took a brutal pleasure in cropping the ears of the natives of the town of Ville-Grande, and sending a basket full of them as presents to the head-quarters. They afterwards burnt that town, and set fire to thirty other populous towns of Peru, and, worse than the worst of savages, shutting the inhabitants up in the houses before setting them on fire, that they might be burnt alive.

‘They have not only been cruel and unsparing in their mode of murder, but they have been void of all morality and public decency, causing aged ecclesiastics and women to be lashed to a gun, and publicly flogged, with the abomination of first having them stripped, and their nakedness exposed to shame, in the presence of their troops.

‘They established an inquisitorial system in all these punishments; they have seized on peaceable inhabitants, and transported them across the sea, to be judged for suspected crimes, and they have put a great number of citizens to death every where, without accusation or the form of a trial.

‘They have invented a crime of unexampled horror, in poisoning our water and provisions, when they were conquered by general Pineto at Lapaz; and, in return for the kindness with which we treated them, after they had surrendered at discretion, they had the barbarity to blow up the head-quarters, under which they had constructed a mine, and prepared a train, beforehand.

‘He has branded us with the stigma of rebels, the moment he returned to Madrid; he refused to listen to our complaints, or to receive our supplications; and, as an act of extreme favor, he offered us pardon. He confirmed the viceroys, governors, and generals whom he found actually glutted with carnage. He declared us guilty of a high misdemeanor, for having dared to frame a constitution for our own government, free from the control of a deified, absolute, and tyrannical power, under which we had groaned three centuries; a measure that could be offensive only to a prince, an enemy to justice and beneficence, and consequently unworthy to rule over us.

‘He then undertook, with the aid of his ministers, to equip large military armaments, to be directed against us. He caused numerous armies to be sent out, to consummate the work of devastation, fire, and plunder.

‘He has sent his generals, with certain decrees of pardon, which they publish to deceive the ignorant, and induce them to facilitate their entrance into towns, whilst at the same time he has given them other secret instructions, authorizing them, as soon as they could get possession of a place, to hang, burn, confiscate, and sack; to encourage private assassinations, and to commit every species of injury in their power, against the deluded beings who had confided in his pretended pardon. It is in the name of Ferdinand of Bourbon, that the heads of patriot officers, prisoners, are fixed up in the highways, that they beat and stoned to death a commandant of light troops, and that, after having killed colonel Camugo, in the same manner, by the hands of the indecent Centeno, they cut off his head, and sent it as a present to general Pazuela, telling him it was a miracle of the virgin of the Carmelites.’

In the establishment of the independence of Spanish America, the United States have the deepest interest. I have no hesitation in asserting my firm belief, that there is no question in the foreign policy of this country, which has ever arisen, or which I can conceive as ever occurring, in the decision of which we have had or can have so much at stake. This interest concerns our politics, our commerce, our navigation. There cannot be a doubt that Spanish America, once independent, whatever may be the form of the governments established in its several parts, these governments will be animated by an American feeling, and guided by an American policy. They will obey the laws of the system of the new world, of which they will compose a part, in contradistinction to that of Europe. Without the influence of that vortex in Europe, the balance of power between its several parts, the preservation of which has so often drenched Europe in blood, America is sufficiently remote to contemplate the new wars which are to afflict that quarter of the globe, as a calm if not a cold and indifferent spectator. In relation to those wars, the several parts of America will generally stand neutral. And as, during the period when they rage, it will be important that a liberal system of neutrality should be adopted and observed, all America will be interested in maintaining and enforcing such a system. The independence of Spanish America, then, is an interest of primary consideration. Next to that, and highly important in itself, is the consideration of the nature of their governments. That is a question, however, for themselves. They will, no doubt, adopt those kinds of governments which are best suited to their condition, best calculated for their happiness. Anxious as I am that they should be free governments, we have no right to prescribe for them. They are, and ought to be, the sole judges for themselves. I am strongly inclined to believe that they will in most, if not all parts of their country, establish free governments. We are their great example. Of us they constantly speak as of brothers, having a similar origin. They adopt our principles, copy our institutions, and, in many instances, employ the very language and sentiments of our revolutionary papers.

‘Having, then, been thus impelled by the Spaniards and their king, we have calculated all the consequences, and have constituted ourselves independent, prepared to exercise the right of nature to defend ourselves against the ravages of tyranny, at the risk of our honor, our lives, and fortune. We have sworn to the only King we acknowledge, the supreme judge of the world, that we will not abandon the cause of justice; that we will not suffer the country which he has given us, to be buried in ruins, and inundated with blood, by the hands of the executioner,’ &c.

But it is sometimes said, that they are too ignorant and too superstitious to admit of the existence of free government. This charge of ignorance is often urged by persons themselves actually ignorant of the real condition of that people. I deny the alleged fact of ignorance; I deny the inference from that fact, if it were true, that they want capacity for free government; and I refuse assent to the further conclusion, if the fact were true, and the inference just, that we are to be indifferent to their fate. All the writers of the most established authority, Depons, Humboldt, and others, concur in assigning to the people of Spanish America great quickness, genius, and particular aptitude for the acquisition of the exact sciences, and others which they have been allowed to cultivate. In astronomy, geology, mineralogy, chemistry, botany, and so forth, they are allowed to make distinguished proficiency. They justly boast of their Abzate, Velasques, and Gama, and other illustrious contributors to science. They have nine universities, and in the city of Mexico, it is affirmed by Humboldt, that there are more solid scientific establishments than in any city even of North America. I would refer to the message of the supreme director of La Plata, which I shall hereafter have occasion to use for another purpose, as a model of fine composition of a state paper, challenging a comparison with any, the most celebrated, that ever issued from the pens of Jefferson or Madison. Gentlemen will egregiously err, if they form their opinions of the present moral condition of Spanish America, from what it was under the debasing system of Spain. The eight years’ revolution in which it has been engaged, has already produced a powerful effect. Education has been attended to, and genius developed.

‘As soon as the project of the revolution arose on the shores of La Plata, genius and talent exhibited their influence; the capacity of the people became manifest, and the means of acquiring knowledge were soon made the favorite pursuit of the youth. As far as the wants or the inevitable interruption of affairs has allowed, every thing has been done to disseminate useful information. The liberty of the press has indeed met with some occasional checks; but in Buenos Ayres alone, as many periodical works weekly issue from the press as in Spain and Portugal put together.’

The fact is not therefore true, that the imputed ignorance exists; but, if it do, I repeat, I dispute the inference. It is the doctrine of thrones, that man is too ignorant to govern himself. Their partisans assert his incapacity, in reference to all nations; if they cannot command universal assent to the proposition, it is then demanded as to particular nations; and our pride and our presumption too often make converts of us. I contend, that it is to arraign the dispositions of Providence himself, to suppose that he has created beings incapable of governing themselves, and to be trampled on by kings. Self-government is the natural government of man, and for proof, I refer to the aborigines of our own land. Were I to speculate in hypotheses unfavorable to human liberty, my speculations should be founded rather upon the vices, refinements, or density of population. Crowded together in compact masses, even if they were philosophers, the contagion of the passions is communicated and caught, and the effect too often, I admit, is the overthrow of liberty. Dispersed over such an immense space as that on which the people of Spanish America are spread, their physical, and I believe also their moral condition, both favor their liberty.

With regard to their superstition, they worship the same God with us. Their prayers are offered up in their temples to the same Redeemer, whose intercession we expect to save us. Nor is there any thing in the Catholic religion unfavorable to freedom. All religions united with government, are more or less inimical to liberty. All, separated from government, are compatible with liberty. If the people of Spanish America have not already gone as far in religious toleration as we have, the difference in their condition from ours should not be forgotten. Every thing is progressive; and, in time, I hope to see them imitating, in this respect, our example. But grant that the people of Spanish America are ignorant, and incompetent for free government, to whom is that ignorance to be ascribed? Is it not to the execrable system of Spain, which she seeks again to establish and to perpetuate? So far from chilling our hearts, it ought to increase our solicitude for our unfortunate brethren. It ought to animate us to desire the redemption of the minds and the bodies of unborn millions, from the brutifying effects of a system, whose tendency is to stifle the faculties of the soul, and to degrade man to the level of beasts. I would invoke the spirits of our departed fathers. Was it for yourselves only that you nobly fought? No, no! It was the chains that were forging for your posterity, that made you fly to arms, and, scattering the elements of these chains to the winds, you transmitted to us the rich inheritance of liberty.

The exports of Spanish America (exclusive of those of the islands) are estimated in the valuable little work of M. Torres, deserving to be better known, at about eighty-one millions of dollars. Of these, more than three fourths consist of the precious metals. The residue are cocoa, coffee, cochineal, sugar, and some other articles. No nation ever offered richer commodities in exchange. It is of no material consequence, that we produce but little that Spanish America wants. Commerce, as it actually exists in the hands of maritime states, is no longer confined to a mere barter, between any two states, of their respective productions. It renders tributary to its interests the commodities of all quarters of the world; so that a rich American cargo, or the contents of an American commercial warehouse, present you with whatever is rare or valuable, in every part of the globe. Commerce is not to be judged by its results in transactions with one nation only. Unfavorable balances existing with one state, are made up by contrary balances with other states, and its true value should be tested by the totality of its operations. Our greatest trade, that with Great Britain, judged by the amount of what we sell for her consumption, and what we buy of her for ours, would be pronounced ruinous. But the unfavorable balance is covered by the profits of trade with other nations. We may safely trust to the daring enterprise of our merchants. The precious metals are in South America, and they will command the articles wanted in South America, which will purchase them. Our navigation will be benefited by the transportation, and our country will realize the mercantile profits. Already the item in our exports of American manufactures is respectable. They go chiefly to the West Indies and to Spanish America. This item is constantly augmenting. And I would again, as I have on another occasion, ask gentlemen to elevate themselves to the actual importance and greatness of our republic; to reflect, like true American statesmen, that we are not legislating for the present day only; and to contemplate this country in its march to true greatness, when millions and millions will be added to our population, and when the increased productive industry will furnish an infinite variety of fabrics for foreign consumption, in order to supply our own wants. The distribution of the precious metals has hitherto been principally made through the circuitous channel of Cadiz. No one can foresee all the effects which will result from a direct distribution of them from the mines which produce them. One of these effects will probably be, to give us the entire command of the Indian trade. The advantage we have on the map of the world over Europe, in that respect, is prodigious. Again, if England, persisting in her colonial monopoly, continues to occlude her ports in the West Indies to us, and we should, as I contend we ought, meet her system by a countervailing measure, Venezuela, New Granada, and other parts of Spanish America, would afford us all we get from the British West Indies. I confess that I despair, for the present, of adopting that salutary measure. It was proposed at the last session, and postponed. During the present session, it has been again proposed, and, I fear, will be again, postponed. I see, and I own it with infinite regret, a tone and a feeling in the councils of the country, infinitely below that which belongs to the country. It is, perhaps, the moral consequence of the exertions of the late war. We are alarmed at dangers, we know not what; by spectres conjured up by our own vivid imaginations.

The West India bill is brought up. We shrug our shoulders, talk of restrictions, non-intercourse, embargo, commercial warfare, make long faces, and—postpone the bill. The time will however come, must come, when this country will not submit to a commerce with the British colonies, upon the terms which England alone prescribes. And, I repeat, when it arrives, Spanish America will afford us an ample substitute. Then, as to our navigation; gentlemen should recollect, that if reasoning from past experience were safe for the future, our great commercial rival will be in war a greater number of years than she will be in peace. Whenever she shall be at war, and we are in peace, our navigation being free from the risks and insurance incident to war, we shall engross almost the whole transportation of the Spanish American commerce. For I do not believe that that country will ever have a considerable marine. Mexico, the most populous part of it, has but two ports, La Vera Cruz and Acapulca, and neither of them very good. Spanish America has not the elements to construct a marine. It wants, and must always want, hardy seamen. I do not believe, that, in the present improved state of navigation, any nation so far south will ever make a figure as a maritime power. If Carthage and Rome, in ancient times, and some other states of a later period, occasionally made great exertions on the water, it must be recollected that they were principally on a small theatre, and in a totally different state of the art of navigation, or when there was no competition from northern states.

I am aware that, in opposition to the interest, which I have been endeavoring to manifest, that this country has in the independence of Spanish America, it is contended that we shall find that country a great rival in agricultural productions. There is something so narrow, and selfish, and grovelling, in this argument, if founded in fact, something so unworthy the magnanimity of a great and a generous people, that I confess I have scarcely patience to notice it. But it is not true to any extent. Of the eighty odd millions of exports, only about one million and a half consist of an article which can come into competition with us, and that is cotton. The tobacco which Spain derives from her colonies, is chiefly produced in her islands. Bread stuffs can nowhere be raised and brought to market in any amount materially affecting us. The table-lands of Mexico, owing to their elevation, are, it is true, well adapted to the culture of grain; but the expense and difficulty of getting it to the Gulf of Mexico, and the action of the intense heat at La Vera Cruz, the only port of exportation, must always prevent Mexico from being an alarming competitor. Spanish America is capable of producing articles so much more valuable than those which we raise, that it is not probable they will abandon a more profitable for a less advantageous culture, to come into competition with us. The West India islands are well adapted to the raising of cotton; and yet the more valuable culture of coffee and sugar is constantly preferred. Again, Providence has so ordered it, that, with regard to countries producing articles apparently similar, there is some peculiarity, resulting from climate, or from some other cause, that gives to each an appropriate place in the general wants and consumption of mankind. The southern part of the continent, La Plata and Chili, is too remote to rival us.

The immense country watered by the Mississippi and its branches, has a peculiar interest, which I trust I shall be excused for noticing. Having but the single vent of New Orleans for all the surplus produce of their industry, it is quite evident that they would have a greater security for enjoying the advantages of that outlet, if the independence of Mexico upon any European power were effected. Such a power, owning at the same time Cuba, the great key of the Gulf of Mexico, and all the shores of that gulf, with the exception of the portion between the Perdido and the Rio del Norte, must have a powerful command over our interests. Spain, it is true, is not a dangerous neighbor at present, but, in the vicissitudes of states, her power may be again resuscitated.

Having shown that the cause of the patriots is just, and that we have a great interest in its successful issue, I will next inquire what course of policy it becomes us to adopt. I have already declared it to be one of strict and impartial neutrality. It is not necessary for their interests, it is not expedient for our own, that we should take part in the war. All they demand of us is a just neutrality. It is compatible with this pacific policy, it is required by it, that we should recognize any established government, if there be any established government in Spanish America. Recognition alone, without aid, is no just cause of war. With aid, it is; not because of the recognition, but because of the aid; as aid, without recognition, is cause of war. The truth of these propositions I will maintain upon principle, by the practice of other states, and by the usage of our own. There is no common tribunal among nations, to pronounce upon the fact of the sovereignty of a new state. Each power does and must judge for itself. It is an attribute of sovereignty so to judge. A nation, in exerting this incontestable right, in pronouncing upon the independence, in fact, of a new state, takes no part in the war. It gives neither men, nor ships, nor money. It merely pronounces that, in so far as it may be necessary to institute any relations, or to support any intercourse, with the new power, that power is capable of maintaining those relations, and authorizing that intercourse. Martens and other publicists lay down these principles.

When the United Provinces formerly severed themselves from Spain, it was about eighty years before their independence was finally recognized by Spain. Before that recognition, the United Provinces had been received by all the rest of Europe, into the family of nations. It is true, that a war broke out between Philip and Elizabeth, but it proceeded from the aid which she determined to give, and did give, to Holland. In no instance, I believe, can it be shown, from the authentic history, that Spain made war upon any power, on the sole ground that such power had acknowledged the independence of the United Provinces.

In the case of our own revolution, it was not until after France had given us aid, and had determined to enter into a treaty of alliance with us—a treaty by which she guarantied our independence that England declared war. Holland also was charged by England with favoring our cause, and deviating from the line of strict neutrality. And, when it was perceived that she was, moreover, about to enter into a treaty with us, England declared war. Even if it were shown that a proud, haughty, and powerful nation like England, had made war upon other provinces, on the ground of a mere recognition, the single example could not alter the public law, or shake the strength of a clear principle.

But what has been our uniform practice? We have constantly proceeded on the principle, that the government de facto is that we can alone notice. Whatever form of government any society of people adopts, whoever they acknowledge as their sovereign, we consider that government or that sovereign as the one to be acknowledged by us. We have invariably abstained from assuming a right to decide in favor of the sovereign de jure, and against the sovereign de facto. That is a question for the nation in which it arises to determine. And, so far as we are concerned, the sovereign de facto is the sovereign de jure. Our own revolution stands on the basis of the right of a people to change their rulers. I do not maintain that every immature revolution, every usurper, before his power is consolidated, is to be acknowledged by us; but that as soon as stability and order are maintained, no matter by whom, we always have considered, and ought to consider, the actual as the true government. General Washington, Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, all, while they were respectively presidents, acted on these principles.

In the case of the French republic, general Washington did not wait until some of the crowned heads of Europe should set him the example of acknowledging it, but accredited a minister at once. And it is remarkable, that he was received before the government of the republic was considered as established. It will be found in Marshall’s Life of Washington, that, when it was understood that a minister from the French republic was about to present himself, president Washington submitted a number of questions to his cabinet for their consideration and advice, one of which was, whether, upon the reception of the minister, he should be notified that America would suspend the execution of the treaties between the two countries, until France had an established government. General Washington did not stop to inquire whether the descendants of St. Louis were to be considered as the legitimate sovereigns of France, and if the revolution was to be regarded as unauthorized resistance to their sway. He saw France, in fact, under the government of those who had subverted the throne of the Bourbons, and he acknowledged, the actual government. During Mr. Jefferson’s and Mr. Madison’s administrations, when the cortes of Spain and Joseph Bonaparte respectively contended for the crown, those enlightened statesmen said, we will receive a minister from neither party; settle the question between yourselves, and we will acknowledge the party that prevails. We have nothing to do with your feuds; whoever all Spain acknowledges as her sovereign, is the only sovereign with whom we can maintain any relations. Mr. Jefferson, it is understood, considered whether he should not receive a minister from both parties, and finally decided against it, because of the inconveniences to this country, which might result from the double representation of another power. As soon as the French armies were expelled from the peninsula, Mr. Madison, still acting on the principle of the government de facto, received the present minister from Spain. During all the phases of the French government, republic, directory, consuls, consul for life, emperor, king, emperor again, king, our government has uniformly received the minister.

If, then, there be an established government in Spanish America, deserving to rank among the nations, we are morally and politically bound to acknowledge it, unless we renounce all the principles which ought to guide, and which hitherto have guided our councils. I shall now undertake to show, that the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata possess such a government. Its limits, extending from the south Atlantic ocean to the Pacific, embrace a territory equal to that of the United States, certainly equal to it exclusive of Louisiana. Its population is about three millions, more than equal to ours at the commencement of our revolution. That population is a hardy, enterprising, and gallant population. The establishments of Montevideo and Buenos Ayres have, during different periods of their history, been attacked by the French, Dutch, Danes, Portuguese, English, and Spanish; and such is the martial character of the people, that, in every instance, the attack has been repulsed. In 1807, general Whitlocke, commanding a powerful English army, was admitted, under the guise of a friend, into Buenos Ayres, and, as soon as he was supposed to have demonstrated inimical designs, he was driven by the native and unaided force of Buenos Ayres from the country. Buenos Ayres has, during now nearly eight years, been, in point of fact, in the enjoyment of self-government. The capital, containing more than sixty thousand inhabitants, has never been once lost. As early as 1811, the regency of old Spain made war upon Buenos Ayres, and the consequence subsequently was, the capture of a Spanish army in Montevideo, equal to that of Burgoyne. This government has now, in excellent discipline, three well-appointed armies, with the most abundant material of war; the army of Chili, the army of Peru, and the army of Buenos Ayres. The first, under San Martin, has conquered Chili; the second is penetrating in a northwestern direction from Buenos Ayres, into the vice-royalty of Peru; and, according to the last accounts, had reduced the ancient seat of empire of the incas. The third remains at Buenos Ayres to oppose any force which Spain may send against it. To show the condition of the country in July last, I again call the attention of the committee to the message of the supreme director, delivered to the congress of the United Provinces. It is a paper of the same authentic character with the speech of the king of England on opening his parliament, or the message of the president of the United States at the commencement of congress.

‘The army of this capital was organized at the same time with those of the Andes and of the interior; the regular force has been nearly doubled; the militia has made great progress in military discipline; our slave population has been formed into battalions, and taught the military art as far as is consistent with their condition. The capital is under no apprehension that an army of ten thousand men can shake its liberties, and should the peninsularians send against us thrice that number, ample provision has been made to receive them.

‘Our navy has been fostered in all its branches. The scarcity of means under which we labored until now, has not prevented us from undertaking very considerable operations, with respect to the national vessels; all of them have been repaired, and others have been purchased and armed, for the defence of our coasts and rivers; provisions have been made, should necessity require it, for arming many more, so that the enemy will not find himself secure from our reprisals, even upon the ocean.

‘Our military force, at every point which it occupies, seems to be animated with the same spirit; its tactics are uniform, and have undergone a rapid improvement from the science of experience, which it has borrowed from warlike nations.

‘Our arsenals have been replenished with arms, and a sufficient store of cannon and munitions of war have been provided, to maintain the contest for many years; and this, after having supplied articles of every description to those districts, which have not as yet come into the union, but whose connection with us has been only intercepted by reason of our past misfortunes.

‘Our legions daily receive considerable augmentations from new levies; all our preparations have been made, as though we were about to enter upon the contest anew. Until now, the vastness of our resources was unknown to us, and our enemies may contemplate, with deep mortification and despair, the present flourishing state of these provinces after so many devastations.

‘While thus occupied in providing for our safety within, and preparing for assaults from without, other objects of solid interest have not been neglected, and which hitherto were thought to oppose insurmountable obstacles.

‘Our system of finance had hitherto been on a footing entirely inadequate to the unfailing supply of our wants, and still more to the liquidation of the immense debt which had been contracted in former years. An unremitted application to this object has enabled me to create the means of satisfying the creditors of the state who had already abandoned their debts as lost, as well as to devise a fixed mode, by which the taxes may be made to fall equally and indirectly on the whole mass of our population. It is not the least merit of this operation, that it has been effected in despite of the writings by which it was attacked, and which are but little creditable to the intelligence and good intentions of their authors. At no other period have the public exigences been so punctually supplied, nor have more important works been undertaken.

‘The people, moreover, have been relieved from many burdens, which being partial, or confined to particular classes, had occasioned vexation and disgust. Other vexations, scarcely less grievous, will by degrees be also suppressed, avoiding as far as possible a recurrence to loans, which have drawn after them the most fatal consequences to states. Should we, however, be compelled to resort to such expedients, the lenders will not see themselves in danger of losing their advances.

‘Many undertakings have been set on foot for the advancement of the general prosperity. Such has been the reëstablishing of the college, heretofore named San Carlos, but hereafter to be called the Union of the South, as a point designated for the dissemination of learning to the youth of every part of the state, on the most extensive scale, for the attainment of which object the government is at the present moment engaged in putting in practice every possible diligence. It will not be long before these nurseries will flourish, in which the liberal and exact sciences will be cultivated, in which the hearts of those young men will be formed, who are destined at some future day to add new splendor to our country.

‘Such has been the establishment of a military depot on the frontier, with its spacious magazine, a necessary measure to guard us from future dangers, a work which does more honor to the prudent foresight of our country, as it was undertaken in the moment of its prosperous fortunes, a measure which must give more occasion for reflection to our enemies than they can impose upon us by their boastings.

‘Fellow citizens, we owe our unhappy reverses and calamities to the depraving system of our ancient metropolis, which, in condemning us to the obscurity and opprobrium of the most degraded destiny, has sown with thorns the path that conducts us to liberty. Tell that metropolis that even she may glory in your works! Already have you cleared all the rocks, escaped every danger, and conducted these provinces to the flourishing condition in which we now behold them. Let the enemies of your name contemplate with despair the energies of your virtues, and let the nations acknowledge that you already appertain to their illustrious rank. Let us felicitate ourselves on the blessings we have already obtained, and let us show to the world that we have learned to profit by the experience of our past misfortunes.’

There is a spirit of bold confidence running through this fine state paper, which nothing but conscious strength could communicate. Their armies, their magazines, their finances, are on the most solid and respectable footing. And, amidst all the cares of war, and those incident to the consolidation of their new institutions, leisure is found to promote the interests of science, and the education of the rising generation. It is true, the first part of the message portrays scenes of difficulty and commotion, the usual attendants upon revolution. The very avowal of their troubles manifests, however, that they are subdued. And what state, passing through the agitation of a great revolution, is free from them? We had our tories, our intrigues, our factions. More than once were the affections of the country, and the confidence of our councils, attempted to be shaken in the great father of our liberties. Not a Spanish bayonet remains within the immense extent of the territories of the La Plata, to contest the authority of the actual government. It is free, it is independent, it is sovereign. It manages the interests of the society that submits to its sway. It is capable of maintaining the relations between that society and other nations.

Are we not bound, then, upon our own principles, to acknowledge this new republic? If we do not, who will? Are we to expect that kings will set us the example of acknowledging the only republic on earth, except our own? We receive, promptly receive, a minister, from whatever king sends us one. From the great powers and the little powers, we accredit ministers. We do more: we hasten to reciprocate the compliment; and, anxious to manifest our gratitude for royal civility, we send for a minister (as in the case of Sweden and the Netherlands) of the lowest grade, one of the highest rank recognized by our laws. We are the natural head of the American family. I would not intermeddle in the affairs of Europe. We wisely keep aloof from their broils. I would not even intermeddle in those of other parts of America, further than to exert the incontestable rights appertaining to us as a free, sovereign, and independent power; and I contend, that the accrediting of a minister from the new republic is such a right. We are bound to receive their minister, if we mean to be really neutral. If the royal belligerent is represented and heard at our government, the republican belligerent ought also to be heard. Otherwise, one party will be in the condition of the poor patriots, who were tried ex-parte the other day, in the supreme court, without counsel, without friends. Give Mr. Onis his conge, or receive the republican minister. Unless you do so, your neutrality is nominal.

I will next proceed to inquire into the consequences of a recognition of the new republic. Will it involve us in war with Spain? I have shown, I trust successfully shown, that there is no just cause of war to Spain. Being no cause of war, we have no right to expect that war will ensue. If Spain, without cause, will make war, she may make it whether we do or do not acknowledge the republic. But she will not, because she cannot, make war against us. I call the attention of the committee to a report of the minister of the Hacienda to the king of Spain, presented about eight months ago. A more beggarly account of empty boxes was never rendered. The picture of Mr. Dallas, sketched in his celebrated report during the last war, may be contemplated without emotion, after surveying that of Mr. Gary. The expenses of the current year required eight hundred and thirty million two hundred and sixty-seven thousand eight hundred and twenty-nine reals, and the deficit of the income is represented as two hundred and thirty-three million one hundred and forty thousand nine hundred and thirty-two reals. This, besides an immense mass of unliquidated debt, which the minister acknowledges the utter inability of the country to pay, although bound in honor to redeem it. He states, that the vassals of the king are totally unable to submit to any new taxes, and the country is without credit, so as to render anticipation by loans wholly impracticable. Mr. Gary appears to be a virtuous man, who exhibits frankly the naked truth; and yet such a minister acknowledges, that the decorum due to one single family, that of a monarch, does not admit, in this critical condition of his country, any reduction of the enormous sum of upwards of fifty-six millions of reals, set apart to defray the expenses of that family! He states that a foreign war would be the greatest of all calamities, and one which, being unable to provide for it, they ought to employ every possible means to avert. He proposed some inconsiderable contribution from the clergy, and the whole body was instantly in an uproar. Indeed, I have no doubt that, surrounded as Mr. Gary is by corruption, by intrigue, and folly, and imbecility, he will be compelled to retire, if he has not already been dismissed, from a post for which he has too much integrity. It has been now about four years since the restoration of Ferdinand; and if, during that period, the whole energies of the monarchy have been directed, unsuccessfully, against the weakest and most vulnerable of all the American possessions, Venezuela, how is it possible for Spain to encounter the difficulties of a new war with this country? Morillo has been sent out with one of the finest armies that has ever left the shores of Europe—consisting of ten thousand men, chosen from all the veterans who have fought in the peninsula. It has subsequently been reinforced with about three thousand more. And yet, during the last summer, it was reduced, by the sword and the climate, to about four thousand effective men. And Venezuela, containing a population of only about one million, of which near two thirds are persons of color, remains unsubdued. The little island of Margaritta, whose population is less than twenty thousand inhabitants—a population fighting for liberty, with more than Roman valor—has compelled that army to retire upon the main. Spain, by the late accounts, appeared to be deliberating upon the necessity of resorting to that measure of conscription, for which Bonaparte has been so much abused. The effect of a war with this country would be, to insure success, beyond all doubt, to the cause of American independence. Those parts even, over which Spain has some prospect of maintaining her dominions, would probably be put in jeopardy. Such a war would be attended with the immediate and certain loss of Florida. Commanding the Gulf of Mexico, as we should be enabled to do by our navy, blockading the port of Havana, the port of La Vera Cruz, and the coast of Terra Firma, and throwing munitions of war into Mexico, Cuba would be menaced, Mexico emancipated, and Morillo’s army, deprived of supplies, now drawn principally from this country through the Havana, compelled to surrender. The war, I verily believe, would be terminated in less than two years, supposing no other power to interpose.

Will the allies interfere? If, by the exertion of an unquestionable attribute of a sovereign power, we should give no just cause of war to Spain herself, how can it be pretended that we should furnish even a specious pretext to the allies for making war upon us? On what ground could they attempt to justify a rupture with us, for the exercise of a right which we hold in common with them, and with every other independent state? But we have a surer guarantee against their hostility, in their interests. That all the allies, who have any foreign commerce, have an interest in the independence of Spanish America, is perfectly evident. On what ground, I ask, is it likely, then, that they would support Spain, in opposition to their own decided interests? To crush the spirit of revolt, and prevent the progress of free principles? Nations, like individuals, do not sensibly feel, and seldom act upon dangers which are remote either in time or place. Of Spanish America, but little is known by the great body of the population of Europe. Even in this country, the most astonishing ignorance prevails respecting it. Those European statesmen who are acquainted with the country, will reflect, that, tossed by a great revolution, it will most probably constitute four or five several nations, and that the ultimate modification of all their various governments is by no means absolutely certain. But I entertain no doubt that the principle of cohesion among the allies is gone. It was annihilated in the memorable battle of Waterloo. When the question was, whether one should engross all, a common danger united all. How long was it, even with a clear perception of that danger, before an effective coalition could be formed? How often did one power stand by, unmoved and indifferent to the fate of its neighbor, although the destruction of that neighbor removed the only barrier to an attack upon itself? No; the consummation of the cause of the allies was, and all history and all experience will prove it, the destruction of the alliance. The principle is totally changed. It is no longer a common struggle against the colossal power of Bonaparte, but it has become a common scramble for the spoils of his empire. There may, indeed, be one or two points on which a common interest still exists, such as the convenience of subsisting their armies on the vitals of poor suffering France. But as for action, for new enterprises, there is no principle of unity, there can be no accordance of interests, or of views, among them.

What is the condition in which Europe is left after all its efforts? It is divided into two great powers, one having the undisputed command of the land, the other of the water. Paris is transferred to St. Petersburgh, and the navies of Europe are at the bottom of the sea, or concentrated in the ports of England. Russia—that huge land animal—awing by the dread of her vast power all continental Europe, is seeking to encompass the Porte; and, constituting herself the kraken of the ocean, is anxious to lave her enormous sides in the more genial waters of the Mediterranean. It is said, I know, that she has indicated a disposition to take part with Spain. No such thing. She has sold some old worm-eaten, decayed fir-built ships to Spain, but the crews which navigate them are to return from the port of delivery, and the bonus she is to get, I believe to be the island of Minorca, in conformity with the cardinal point of her policy. France is greatly interested in whatever would extend her commerce, and regenerate her marine, and consequently, more than any other power of Europe, England alone excepted, is concerned in the independence of Spanish America. I do not despair of France, so long as France has a legislative body collected from all its parts, the great repository of its wishes and its will. Already has that body manifested a spirit of considerable independence. And those who, conversant with French history, know what magnanimous stands have been made by the parliaments, bodies of limited extent, against the royal prerogative, will be able to appreciate justly the moral force of such a legislative body. Whilst it exists, the true interests of France will be cherished and pursued on points of foreign policy, in opposition to the pride and interests of the Bourbon family, if the actual dynasty, impelled by this pride, should seek to subserve these interests.

England finds that, after all her exertions, she is every where despised on the continent; her maratime power viewed with jealousy; her commerce subjected to the most onerous restrictions; selfishness imputed to all her policy. All the accounts from France represent that every party, Bonapartists, Jacobins, royalists, moderes, ultras, all burn with indignation towards England, and pant for an opportunity to avenge themselves on the power to whom they ascribe all their disasters.

[Here Mr. Clay read a part of a letter which he had just received from an intelligent friend at Paris, and which composed only a small portion of the mass of evidence to the same effect, which had come under his notice.]

It is impossible, that with powers, between whom so much cordial dislike, so much incongruity exists, there can be any union or concert. Whilst the free principles of the French revolution remained, those principles which were so alarming to the stability of thrones, there never was any successful or cordial union; coalition after coalition, wanting the spirit of union, was swept away by the overwhelming power of France. It was not until those principles were abandoned, and Bonaparte had erected on their ruins his stupendous fabric of universal empire; nor, indeed, until after the frosts of heaven favored the cause of Europe, that an effective coalition was formed. No, the complaisance inspired in the allies from unexpected if not undeserved success, may keep them nominally together; but for all purposes of united and combined action, the alliance is gone; and I do not believe in the chimera of their crusading against the independence of a country, whose liberation would essentially promote all their respective interests.

But the question of the interposition of the allies, in the event of our recognizing the new republic, resolves itself into a question, whether England, in such event, would make war upon us; if it can be shown that England would not, it results, either that the other allies would not, or that, if they should, in which case England would most probably support the cause of America, it would be a war without the maratime ability to maintain it. I contend, that England is alike restrained by her honor and by her interests from waging war against us, and consequently against Spanish America, also, for an acknowledgment of the independence of the new state. England encouraged and fomented the revolt of the colonies as early as June, 1797. Sir Thomas Picton, governor of Trinidad, in virtue of orders from the British minister of foreign affairs, issued a proclamation, in which he expressly assures the inhabitants of Terra Firma, that the British government will aid in establishing their independence.

‘With regard to the hope you entertain of raising the spirits of those persons with whom you are in correspondence, towards encouraging the inhabitants to resist the oppressive authority of their government, I have little more to say than that they may be certain, that whenever they are in that disposition, they may receive at your hands all the succors to be expected from his Britannic majesty, be it with forces or with arms and ammunition to any extent; with the assurance that the views of his Britannic majesty go no further than to secure to them their independence,’ and so forth.

In the prosecution of the same object, Great Britain defrayed the expenses of the famous expedition of Miranda. England, in 1811, when she was in the most intimate relations with Spain, then struggling against the French power, assumed the attitude of a mediator between the colonies and the peninsula. The terms, on which she conceived her mediation could alone be effectual, were rejected by the cortes, at the lowest state of the Spanish power. Among these terms, England required for the colonies a perfect freedom of commerce, allowing only some degree of preference to Spain; that the appointments of viceroys and governors should be made indiscriminately from Spanish Americans and Spaniards; and that the interior government, and every branch of public administration, should be intrusted to the cabildo, or municipalities, and so forth. If Spain, when Spain was almost reduced to the island of St. Leon, then rejected those conditions, will she now consent to them, amounting, as they do, substantially, to the independence of Spanish America? If England, devoted as she was at that time to the cause of the peninsula, even then thought those terms due to the colonies, will she now, when no particular motive exists for cherishing the Spanish power, and after the ingratitude with which Spain has treated her, think that the colonies ought to submit to less favorable conditions? And would not England stand disgraced in the eyes of the whole world, if, after having abetted and excited a revolution, she should now attempt to reduce the colonies to unconditional submission, or should make war upon us for acknowledging that independence which she herself sought to establish?

No guarantee for the conduct of nations or individuals ought to be stronger than that which honor imposes; but for those who put no confidence in its obligations, I have an argument to urge of more conclusive force. It is founded upon the interests of England. Excluded almost as she is from the continent, the commerce of America, South and North, is worth to her more than the commerce of the residue of the world. That to all Spanish America has been alone estimated at fifteen millions sterling. Its aggregate value to Spanish America and the United States may be fairly stated at upwards of one hundred thousand dollars. The effect of a war with the two countries would be, to divest England of this great interest, at a moment when she is anxiously engaged in repairing the ravages of the European war. Looking to the present moment only, and merely to the interests of commerce, England is concerned more than even this country, in the success of the cause of independence in Spanish America. The reduction of the Spanish power in America has been the constant and favorite aim of her policy for two centuries; she must blot out her whole history, reverse the maxims of all her illustrious statesmen, extinguish the spirit of commerce which animates, directs, and controls all her movements, before she can render herself accessary to the subjugation of Spanish America. No commercial advantages which Spain may offer by treaty, can possess the security for her trade, which independence would communicate. The one would be most probably of limited duration, and liable to violation from policy, from interest, or from caprice. The other would be as permanent as independence. That I do not mistake the views of the British cabinet, the recent proclamation of the prince regent I think proves. The committee will remark, that the document does not describe the patriots as rebels, or insurgents, but, using a term which I have no doubt has been well weighed, it declares the existence of a ‘state of warfare.’ And with regard to English subjects, who are in the armies of Spain, although they entered the service without restriction as to their military duties, it requires that they shall not take part against the colonies. The subjects of England freely supply the patriots with arms and ammunition, and an honorable friend of mine (Colonel Johnson) has just received a letter from one of the West India islands, stating the arrival there from England of the skeletons of three regiments, with many of the men to fill them, destined to aid the patriots. In the Quarterly Review of November last, a journal devoted to the ministry, and a work of the highest authority, as it respects their views, the policy of neutrality is declared and supported as the true policy of England; and that, even if the United States were to take part in the war; and Spain is expressly notified, that she cannot and must not expect aid from England.

‘In arguing, therefore, for the advantage of a strict neutrality, we must enter an early protest against any imputations of hostility to the cause of genuine freedom, or of any passion for despotism and the inquisition. We are no more the panegyrists of legitimate authority in all times, circumstances, and situations, than we are advocates for revolution in the abstract,’ and so forth. ‘But it has been plausibly asserted, that, by abstaining from interference in the affairs of South America, we are surrendering to the United States all the advantages which might be secured to ourselves from this revolution; that we are assisting to increase the trade and power of a nation which alone can ever be the maritime rival of England. It appears to us extremely doubtful, whether any advantage, commercial or political, can be lost to England by a neutral conduct; it must be observed, that the United States themselves, have given every public proof of their intention to pursue the same line of policy. But admitting that this conduct is nothing more than a decent pretext; or admitting, still further, that they will afford to the independents direct and open assistance, our view of the case would remain precisely the same,’ and so forth. ‘To persevere in force, unaided, is to miscalculate her (Spain’s) own resources, even to infatuation. To expect the aid of an ally in such a cause would, if that ally were England, be to suppose this country as forgetful of its own past history as of its immediate interests and duties. Far better would it be for Spain, instead of calling for our aid, to profit by our experience; and to substitute, ere it be too late, for efforts like those by which the North American colonies were lost to this country, the conciliatory measures by which they might have been retained.’

In the case of the struggle between Spain and her colonies, England, for once, at least, has manifested a degree of wisdom highly deserving our imitation, but unfortunately the very reverse of her course has been pursued by us. She has so conducted, by operating upon the hopes of the two parties, as to keep on the best terms with both; to enjoy all the advantages of the rich commerce of both. We have, by a neutrality bill containing unprecedented features, and still more by a late executive measure, to say the least of it, of doubtful constitutional character, contrived to dissatisfy both parties. We have the confidence neither of Spain nor the colonies.

It remains for me to defend the proposition which I meant to submit, from an objection which I have heard intimated, that it interferes with the duties assigned to the executive branch. On this subject I feel the greatest solicitude; for no man, more than myself, respects the preservation of the independence of the several departments of government, in the constitutional orbits which are prescribed to them. It is my favorite maxim, that each, acting within its proper sphere, should move with its constitutional independence, and under its constitutional responsibility, without influence from any other. I am perfectly aware that the constitution of the United States—and I admit the proposition in its broadest sense—confides to the executive the reception and the deputation of ministers. But, in relation to the latter operation, congress has concurrent will, in the power of providing for the payment of their salaries. The instrument nowhere says or implies that the executive act of sending a minister to a foreign country, shall precede the legislative act which provides for the payment of his salary. And, in point of fact, our statutory code is full of examples of legislative action prior to executive action, both in relation to the deputation of agents abroad, and to the subject matter of treaties. Perhaps the act of sending a minister abroad, and the act of providing for the allowance of his salary, ought to be simultaneous; but if, in the order of precedence, there be more reason on the one side than on the other, I think it is in favor of the priority of the legislative act, as the safer depository of power. When a minister is sent abroad, although the legislature may be disposed to think his mission useless; although, if previously consulted, they would have said they would not consent to pay such a minister; the duty is delicate and painful to refuse to pay the salary promised to him whom the executive has even unnecessarily sent abroad. I can illustrate my idea by the existing missions to Sweden and to the Netherlands. I have no hesitation in saying, that if we had not ministers of the first grade there, and if the legislature were asked, prior to sending them, whether it would consent to pay ministers of that grade, I would not, and I believe congress would not, consent to pay them.

If it be urged that, by avowing our willingness, in a legislative act, to pay a minister not yet sent, and whom the president may think it improper to send abroad, we operate upon the president by all the force of our opinion; it may be retorted, that when we are called upon to pay any minister, sent under similar circumstances, we are operated upon by all the force of the president’s opinion. The true theory of our government, at least, supposes that each of the two departments, acting on its proper constitutional responsibility, will decide according to its best judgment, under all the circumstances of the case. If we make the previous appropriation, we act upon our constitutional responsibility, and the president afterwards will proceed upon his. And so if he makes the previous appointment. We have the right, after a minister is sent abroad, and we are called upon to pay him, and we ought, to deliberate upon the propriety of his mission; we may and ought to grant or withhold his salary. If this power of deliberation is conceded subsequently to the deputation of the minister, it must exist prior to that deputation. Whenever we deliberate, we deliberate under our constitutional responsibility. Pass the amendment I propose, and it will be passed under that responsibility. Then the president, when he deliberates on the propriety of the mission, will act under his constitutional responsibility. Each branch of government, moving in its proper sphere, will act with as much freedom from the influence of the other, as is practically attainable.

There is great reason, from the peculiar character of the American government, for a perfect understanding between the legislative and executive branches, in relation to the acknowledgment of a new power. Every where else the power of declaring war resides with the executive. Here it is deposited with the legislature. If, contrary to my opinion, there be even a risk that the acknowledgment of a new state may lead to war, it is advisable that the step should not be taken without a previous knowledge of the will of the war-making branch. I am disposed to give to the president all the confidence which he must derive from the unequivocal expression of our will. This expression I know may be given in the form of an abstract resolution, declaratory of that will; but I prefer at this time proposing an act of practical legislation. And if I have been so fortunate as to communicate to the committee, in any thing like that degree of strength in which I entertain them, the convictions that the cause of the patriots is just; that the character of the war, as waged by Spain, should induce us to wish them success; that we have a great interest in that success; that this interest, as well as our neutral attitude, requires us to acknowledge any established government in Spanish America; that the United Provinces of the river Plate is such a government; that we may safely acknowledge its independence, without danger of war from Spain, from the allies, or from England; and that, without unconstitutional interference with the executive power, with peculiar fitness, we may express, in an act of appropriation, our sentiments, leaving him to the exercise of a just and responsible discretion; I hope the committee will adopt the proposition which I have now the honor of presenting to them, after a respectful tender of my acknowledgments for their attention and kindness, during, I fear, the tedious period I have been so unprofitably trespassing upon their patience.

EMANCIPATION OF SOUTH AMERICA.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MARCH 28, 1818.

[THE house having again resolved itself into a committee of the whole on the general appropriation bill, to which Mr. Clay had moved an amendment, which was still pending, to introduce an appropriation for a mission to Buenos Ayres (as stated in the last foregoing speech), Mr. Clay said, that as no other gentleman appeared disposed to address the chair, he would avail himself of this opportunity of making some remarks in reply to the opponents of his motion. The members who had spoken against the measure were Messrs. Lowndes, of South Carolina, Forsyth, of Georgia, Smith, of Maryland, Smyth and H. Nelson, of Virginia, and Poindexter, of Mississippi; while those who supported it were Messrs. Robertson, of Louisiana, Holmes, of Massachusetts, Floyd and Tucker, of Virginia, and R. M. Johnson, of Kentucky. The amendment was rejected by a vote of one hundred and fifteen to forty-five; a result which was reversed in 1820.]

The first objection which I think it incumbent on me to notice is that of my friend from South Carolina (Mr. Lowndes), who opposed the form of the proposition, as being made on a general appropriation bill, on which he appeared to think nothing ought to be engrafted which was likely to give rise to a difference between the two branches of the legislature. If the gentleman himself had always acted on this principle, his objection would be entitled to more weight; but, the item in the appropriation bill next following this, and reported by the gentleman himself, is infinitely more objectionable—which is, an appropriation of thirty thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of three commissioners, appointed, or proposed to be paid, in an unconstitutional form. It cannot be expected that a general appropriation bill will ever pass without some disputable clauses, and in case of a difference between the two houses (a difference which we have no right to anticipate in this instance), which cannot be compromised as to any article, the obvious course is, to omit such article altogether, retaining all the others; and, in a case of this character, relative to brevet pay, which has occurred during the present session, such has been the ground the gentleman himself has taken in a conference with the senate, of which he is a manager.

The gentleman from South Carolina, has professed to concur with me in a great many of his general propositions; and neither he nor any other gentleman has disagreed with me, that the mere recognition of the independence of the provinces is no cause of war with Spain, except the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith), to whom I recommend, without intending disrespect to him, to confine himself to the operation of commerce, rather than undertake to expound questions of public law; for I can assure the gentleman, that, although he may make some figure, with his practical knowledge, in the one case, he will not in the other. No man, except the gentleman from Maryland, has had what I should call the hardihood to contend, that, on the ground of principle and mere public law, the exercise of the right of recognizing another power is cause of war. But though the gentleman from South Carolina admitted, that the recognition would be no cause of war, and that it was not likely to lead to a war with Spain, we find him, shortly after, getting into a war with Spain, how, I do not see, and by some means, which he did not deign to discover to us, getting us into a war with England also. Having satisfied himself, by this course of reasoning, the gentleman has discovered, that the finances of Spain are in a most favorable condition. On this part of the subject, it is not necessary for me to say any thing after what the committee has heard from the eloquent gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Holmes), whose voice, in a period infinitely more critical in our affairs than the present, has been heard with so much delight from the east in support of the rights and honor of the country. He has clearly shown, that there is no parallel between the state of Spain and of this country—the one of a country whose resources are completely impoverished and exhausted; the other of a country whose resources are almost untouched. But, I would ask of the gentleman from South Carolina, if he can conceive that a state, in the condition of Spain, whose minister of the treasury admits that the people have no longer the means of paying new taxes—a nation with an immense mass of floating debt, and totally without credit—can feel any anxiety to engage in a war with a nation like this, whose situation is, in every possible view, directly the reverse? I ask, if an annual revenue, equal only to five eighths of the annual expenditure, exhibits a financial ability to enter upon a new war, when, too, the situation of Spain is altogether unlike that of the United States and England, whose credit, resting upon a solid basis, enables them to supply, by loans, any deficit in the income?

Notwithstanding the diversity of sentiment which has been displayed during the debate, I am happy to find that, with one exception, every member has done justice to the struggle in the south, and admitted it to be entitled to the favor of the best feelings of the human heart. Even my honorable friend near me (Mr. Nelson) has made a speech on our side, and we should not have found out, if he had not told us, that he would vote against us. Although his speech has been distinguished by his accustomed eloquence, I should be glad to agree on a cartel with the gentlemen on the other side of the house, to give them his speech for his vote. The gentleman says his heart is with us, that he ardently desires the independence of the south. Will he excuse me for telling him, that if he will give himself up to the honest feelings of his heart, he will have a much surer guide than by trusting to his head, to which, however, I am far from offering any disparagement?

But, sir, it seems that a division of the republican party is about to be made by the proposition. Who is to furnish, in this respect, the correct criterion—whose conduct is to be the standard of orthodoxy? What has been the great principle of the party to which the gentleman from Virginia refers, from the first existence of the government to the present day? An attachment to liberty, a devotion to the great cause of humanity, of freedom, of self-government, and of equal rights. If there is to be a division, as the gentleman says; if he is going to leave us, who are following the old track, he may, in his new connections, find a great variety of company, which, perhaps, may indemnify him for the loss of his old friends. What is the great principle that has distinguished parties in all ages, and under all governments—democrats and federalists, whigs and tories, plebeians and patricians? The one, distrustful of human nature, appreciates less the influence of reason and of good dispositions, and appeals more to physical force; the other party, confiding in human nature, relies much upon moral power, and applies to force as an auxiliary only to the operations of reason. All the modifications and denominations of political parties and sects may be traced to this fundamental distinction. It is that which separated the two great parties in this country. If there is to be a division in the republican party, I glory that I, at least, am found among those who are anxious for the advancement of human rights and of human liberty; and the honorable gentleman who spoke of appealing to the public sentiment, will find, when he does so, or I am much mistaken, that public sentiment is also on the side of public liberty and of human happiness.

But the gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that the constitution has wisely confided to the executive branch of the government, the administration of the foreign interests of the country. Has the honorable gentleman attempted to show, though his proposition be generally true, and will never be controverted by me, that we also have not our participation in the administration of the foreign concerns of the country, when we are called upon, in our legislative capacity, to defray the expenses of foreign missions, or to regulate commerce? I stated, when up before, and I have listened in vain for an answer to the argument, that no part of the constitution says which shall have the precedence, the act of making the appropriation for paying a minister, or the act of sending one. I have contended, and now repeat, that either the acts of deputing and of paying a minister should be simultaneous, or, if either has the preference, the act of appropriating his pay should precede the sending of a minister. I challenge gentlemen to show me any thing in the constitution which directs that a minister shall be sent before his payment is provided for. I repeat, what I said the other day, that, by sending a minister abroad, during the recess, to nations between whom and us no such relations existed as to justify incurring the expense, the legislative opinion is forestalled, or unduly biased. I appeal to the practice of the government, and refer to various acts of congress for cases of appropriations, without the previous deputation of the agent abroad, and without the preliminary of a message from the president, asking for them.

[MR. CLAY here quoted the act, authorizing the establishment of certain consulates in the Mediterranean, and affixing salaries thereto, in consequence of which the president had subsequently appointed consuls, who had been receiving their salaries to this day.]

From these it appears that congress has constantly pursued the great principle of the theory of the constitution, for which I now contend—that each department of the government must act within its own sphere, independently, and on its own responsibility. It is a little extraordinary, indeed, after the doctrine which was maintained the other day, of a sweeping right in congress to appropriate money to any object, that it should now be contended that congress has no right to appropriate money to a particular object. The gentleman’s (Mr. Lowndes’s) doctrine is broad, comprehending every case; but, when proposed to be exemplified in any specific case, it does not apply. My theory of the constitution, on this particular subject, is, that congress has the right of appropriating money for foreign missions, the president the power to use it. The president having the power, I am willing to say to him, ‘here is the money, which we alone have a right to appropriate, which will enable you to carry your power into effect, if it seems expedient to you.’ Both being before him, the power and the means of executing it, the president would judge, on his own responsibility, whether or not it was expedient to exercise it. In this course, each department of the government would act independently, without influence from, and without interference with, the other. I have stated cases, from the statute-book, to show, that, in instances where no foreign agent has been appointed, but only a possibility of their being appointed, appropriations have been made for paying them. Even in the case of the subject matter of negotiation (a right much more important than that of sending an agent), an appropriation of money has preceded the negotiation of a treaty—thus, in the third volume of the new edition of the laws, page twenty-seven, a case of an appropriation of twenty-five thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars to defray the expense of such treaties as the president of the United States might deem proper to make with certain Indian tribes. An act, which has been lately referred to, appropriating two millions for the purchase of Florida, is a case still more strongly in point, as contemplating a treaty, not with a savage, but a civilized power. In this case there may have been, though I believe there was not, an executive message, recommending the appropriation; but I take upon myself to assert, that, in almost all the cases I have quoted, there was no previous executive intimation that the appropriation of the money was necessary to the object; but congress has taken up the subject, and authorized these appropriations, without any official call from the executive to do so.

With regard to the general condition of the provinces now in revolt against the parent country, I will not take up much of the time of the house. Gentlemen are, however, much mistaken as to many of the points of their history, geography, commerce, and produce, which have been touched upon. Gentlemen have supposed there would be from those countries a considerable competition of the same products which we export. I venture to say, that, in regard to Mexico, there can be no such competition; that the table-lands are at such a distance from the seashore, and the difficulty of reaching it is so great, as to make the transportation to La Vera Cruz too expensive to be borne, and the heat so intense as to destroy the bread-stuffs as soon as they arrive. With respect to New Grenada, the gentleman from Maryland is entirely mistaken. It is the elevation of Mexico, principally, which enables it to produce bread-stuffs; but New Granada, lying nearly under the line, cannot produce them. The productions of New Granada for exportation are, the precious metals, (of which, of gold, particularly, a greater portion is to be found than in any of the provinces, except Mexico,) sugar, coffee, cocoa, and some other articles of a similar character. Of Venezuela, the principal productions are coffee, cocoa, indigo, and some sugar. Sugar is also produced in all the Guianas—French, Spanish, and Dutch. The interior of the provinces of La Plata may be productive of bread stuffs, but they are too remote to come into competition with us in the West India market, the voyages to the United States generally occupying from fifty to sixty days, and some times as long as ninety days. By deducting from that number the average passage from the United States to the West Indies, the length of the usual passage between Buenos Ayres and the West Indies will be found, and will show that, in the supply of the West India market with bread-stuffs, the provinces can never come seriously into competition with us. And in regard to Chili, productive as it may be, does the gentleman from Maryland suppose that vessels are going to double Cape Horn and come into competition with us in the West Indies? It is impossible. But I feel a reluctance at pursuing the discussion of this part of the question; because I am sure these are considerations on which the house cannot act, being entirely unworthy of the subject. We may as well stop all our intercourse with England, with France, or with the Baltic, whose products are in many respects the same as ours, as to act on the present occasion, under the influence of any such considerations. It is too selfish, too mean a principle for this body to act on, to refuse its sympathy for the patriots of the south, because some little advantage of a commercial nature may be retained to us from their remaining in the present condition, which, however, I totally deny. Three fourths of the productions of the Spanish provinces are the precious metals, and the greater part of the residue not of the same character as the staple productions of our soil. But it seems that a pamphlet has recently been published on this subject to which gentlemen have referred. Now permit me to express a distrust of all pamphlets of this kind, unless we know their source. It may, for aught I know, if not composed at the instance of the Spanish minister, have been written by some merchant who has a privilege of trading to Lima under royal license; for such do exist, as I am informed, and some of them procured under the agency of a celebrated person by the name of Sarmiento, of whom perhaps the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) can give the house some information. To gentlemen thus privileged to trade with the Spanish provinces under royal authority, the effect of a recognition of the independence of the provinces would be, to deprive them of that monopoly. The reputed author of the pamphlet in question, if I understand correctly, is one who has been, if he is not now, deeply engaged in the trade, and I will venture to say, that many of his statements are incorrect. In relation to the trade of Mexico, I happen to possess the Royal Gazette of Mexico of 1804, showing what was the trade of that province in 1803; from which it appears that, without making allowance for the trade from the Philippine Islands to Acapulco, the imports into the port of Vera Cruz were in that year twenty-two millions in value, exclusive of contraband, the amount of which was very considerable. Among these articles were many which the United States could supply as well, if not on better terms, than they could be supplied from any other quarter; for example, brandy and spirits, paper, iron, implements for agriculture and the mines; wax, spices, naval stores, salt fish, butter, provisions; these articles amounting in the whole to one seventh part of the whole import trade to Mexico. With regard to the independence of that country, which gentlemen seemed to think improbable, I rejoice that I am able to congratulate the house, that we have this morning intelligence that Mina yet lives, and the patriot flag is still unfurled, and the cause infinitely more prosperous than ever. This intelligence I am in hopes will prove true, notwithstanding the particular accounts of his death, which, there is so much of fabrication and falsehood in the Spanish practice, are not entitled to credit, unless corroborated by other information. Articles are manufactured in one province to produce effect on other provinces, and in this country; and I am, therefore, disposed to think, that the details respecting the capture and execution of Mina, are too minute to be true, and were made up to produce an effect here.

With regard to the general value of the trade of a country, it is to be determined by the quantum of its population, and its character, its productions, and the extent and character of the territory; and, applying these criteria to Spanish America, no nation offers higher inducements to commercial enterprise. Washed on the one side by the Pacific, on the other by the south Atlantic; standing between Africa and Europe on the one hand, and Asia on the other; lying along side of the United States; her commerce must, when free from the restraints of despotism, be immensely important; particularly when it is recollected how great a proportion of the precious metals it produces; for that nation which can command the precious metals, may be said to command almost the resources of the world. For one moment, imagine the mines of the south locked up from Great Britain for two years, what would be the effect on her paper system? Bankruptcy, explosion, revolution. Even if the supply which we get abroad of the precious metals was cut off for any length of time, I ask if the effect on our paper system would not be, not perhaps equally as fatal as to England, yet one of the greatest calamities which could befall this country. The revenue of Spain, in Mexico alone, was, in 1809, twenty millions of dollars, and in the other provinces in about the same proportion, taking into view their population, independent of the immense contributions annually paid to the clergy. When you look at the resources of the country, and the extent of its population, recollecting that it is double our own; that its consumption of foreign articles, under a free commerce would be proportionably great; that it yields a large revenue under the most abominable system, under which nearly three fourths of the population are unclad, and almost naked as from the hands of nature, because absolutely deprived of the means of clothing themselves, what may not be the condition of this country, under the operation of a different system, which would let industry develope its resources in all possible forms? Such a neighbor cannot but be a valuable acquisition in a commercial point of view.

Gentlemen have denied the fact of the existence of the independence of Buenos Ayres at as early a date as I have assigned to it. The gentleman from South Carolina, who is well informed on the subject, has not, I think, exhibited his usual candor on this part of it. When the gentleman talked of the upper provinces being out of the possession of the patriots as late as 1815, he ought to have gone back and told the house what was the actual state of the fact, with which I am sure the gentleman is very well acquainted. In 1811, the government of Buenos Ayres had been in possession of every foot of the territory of the vice-royalty. The war has been raging from 1811 to 1814 in those interior provinces, bordering on Lima, which have been as often as three times conquered by the enemy, and as often recovered, and from which the enemy is now finally expelled. Is this at all remarkable during the progress of such a revolution? During the different periods of our war of independence, the British had possession of different parts of our country; as late as 1780, the whole of the southern states were in their possession; and at an earlier date they had possession of the great northern capitals. There is, in regard to Buenos Ayres, a distinguishing trait, which does not exist in the history of our revolution. That is, that from 1810 to the present day, the capital of the republic of La Plata has been invariably in the possession of the patriot government. Gentlemen must admit that when, in 1814, she captured at Montevideo an army as large as Burgoyne’s captured at Saratoga, they were then in possession of independence. If they have been since 1810 in the enjoyment of self-government, it is, indeed, not very material under what name or under what form. The fact of their independence is all that is necessary to be established. In reply to the argument of the gentleman from South Carolina, derived from his having been unable to find out the number of the provinces, this arose from the circumstance that, thirty-six years ago, the vice-royalty had been a captain-generalship; that it extended then only to Tucuman, whilst of late and at present the government extends to Desaguedera, in about the sixteenth degree of south latitude. There are other reasons why there is some confusion in the number of the provinces, as stated by different writers; there is, in the first place, a territorial division of the country; then a judicial; and next a military division; and the provinces have been stated at ten, thirteen, or twenty, according to the denominations used. This, however, with the gentleman from South Carolina, I regard as a fact of no sort of consequence.

I will pass over the report lately made to the house by the department of state, respecting the state of South America, with only one remark—that it appears to me to exhibit evidence of an adroit and experienced diplomatist, negotiating, or rather conferring on a subject with a young and inexperienced minister, from a young and inexperienced republic. From the manner in which this report was communicated, after a call for information so long made, and after a lapse of two months from the last date in the correspondence on the subject, I was mortified at hearing the report read. Why talk of the mode of recognition? Why make objections to the form of the commission? If the minister has not a formal power, why not tell him to send back for one? Why ask of him to enumerate the particular states whose independence he wished acknowledged? Suppose the French minister had asked of Franklin what number of states he represented? Thirteen, if you please, Franklin would have replied. But Mr. Franklin, will you tell me if Pennsylvania, whose capital is in possession of the British, be one of them? What would Dr. Franklin have said? It would have comported better with the frankness of the American character, and of American diplomacy, if the secretary, avoiding cavils about the form of the commission, had said to the minister of Buenos Ayres, ‘at the present moment we do not intend to recognise you, or to receive or to send a minister to you.’

But among the charges which gentlemen have industriously brought together, the house has been told of factions prevailing in Buenos Ayres. Do not factions exist every where? Are they not to be found in the best regulated and most firmly established governments? Respecting the Carreras, public information is abused; they were supposed to have had improper views, designs hostile to the existing government, and it became necessary to deprive them of the power of doing mischief. And what is the fact respecting the alleged arrest of American citizens? Buenos Ayres has been organizing an army to attack Chili. Carrera arrives at the river La Plata with some North Americans; he had before defeated the revolution in Chili, by withholding his coöperation; the government of Buenos Ayres therefore said to him, we do not want your resources; our own army is operating; if you carry yours there, it may produce dissension, and cause the loss of liberty; you shall not go. On his opposing this course, what was done which has called forth the sympathy of gentlemen? He and those who attended him from this country were put in confinement, but only long enough to permit the operations of the Buenos Ayrean army to go on; they were then permitted to go, or made their escape to Montevideo, and afterwards where they pleased. With respect to the conduct of that government, I would only recall the attention of gentlemen to the orders which have lately emanated from it, for the regulation of privateers, which has displayed a solicitude to guard against irregularity, and to respect the rights of neutrals, not inferior to that ever shown by any government, which has on any occasion attempted to regulate this licentious mode of warfare.

The honorable gentleman from Georgia commenced his remarks the other day by an animadversion which he might well have spared, when he told us, that even the prayers of the chaplain of this house had been offered up in behalf of the patriots. And was it reprehensible, that an American chaplain, whose cheeks are furrowed by age, and his head as white as snow, who has a thousand times, during our own revolution, implored the smiles of heaven on our exertions, should indulge in the pious and patriotic feelings flowing from his recollections of our own revolution? Ought he to be subject to animadversion for so doing, in a place where he cannot be heard? Ought he to be subject to animadversion for soliciting the favor of heaven on the same cause as that in which we fought, the good fight, and conquered our independence? I trust not.

But the gentleman from Georgia, it appears, can see no parallel between our revolution and that of the Spanish provinces. Their revolution, in its commencement, did not aim at complete independence, neither did ours. Such is the loyalty of the Creole character, that, although groaning under three hundred years of tyranny and oppression, they have been unwilling to cast off their allegiance to that throne, which has been the throne of their ancestors. But, looking forward to a redress of wrongs, rather than a change of government, they gradually, and perhaps at first unintentionally, entered into a revolution. I have it from those who have been actively engaged in our revolution, from that venerable man (chancellor Wythe), whose memory I shall ever cherish with filial regard, that, a very short time before our declaration of independence, it would have been impossible to have got a majority of congress to declare it. Look at the language of our petitions of that day, carrying our loyalty to the foot of the throne, and avowing our anxiety to remain under the crown of our ancestors; independence was then not even remotely suggested as our object.

The present state of facts, and not what has passed and gone in South America, must be consulted. At the present moment, the patriots of the south are fighting for liberty and independence; for precisely what we fought. But their revolution, the gentleman told the house, was stained by scenes which had not occurred in ours. If so, it was because execrable outrages had been committed upon them by troops of the mother country, which were not upon us. Can it be believed, if the slaves had been let loose upon us in the south, as they have been let loose in Venezuela; if quarters had been refused; capitulations violated; that general Washington, at the head of the armies of the United States, would not have resorted to retribution? Retaliation is sometimes mercy, mercy to both parties. The only means by which the coward soul that indulges in such enormities can be reached, is to show to him that they will be visited by severe but just retribution. There are traits in the history of this revolution, which show what deep root liberty has taken in South America. I will state an instance. The only hope of a wealthy and reputable family was charged, at the head of a small force, with the care of the magazine of the army. He saw that it was impossible to defend it. ‘Go,’ said he to his companions in arms, ‘I alone am sufficient for its defence.’ The assailants approached; he applied a match and blew up the magazine, with himself, scattering death and destruction on his enemy. There is another instance of the intrepidity of a female of the patriot party. A lady in New Granada had given information to the patriot forces, of plans and instructions by which the capitol might be invaded. She was put upon the rack to divulge her accomplices. She bore the torture with the greatest fortitude, and died exclaiming, ‘you shall not hear it from my mouth; I will die, and may those live who can free my country.’

But the house has been asked, and asked with a triumph worthy of a better cause, why recognise this republic? Where is the use of it? And is it possible that gentlemen can see no use in recognising this republic? For what did this republic fight? To be admitted into the family of nations. Tell the nations of the world, says Pueyrredon, in his speech, that we already belong to their illustrious rank. What would be the powerful consequences of a recognition of their claim? I ask my honorable friend before me (general Bloomfield), the highest sanction of whose judgment in favor of my proposition, I fondly anticipate, with what anxious solicitude, during our revolution, he and his glorious compatriots turned their eyes to Europe and asked to be recognised, I ask him, the patriot of ’76, how the heart rebounded with joy, on the information that France had recognised us. The moral influence of such a recognition, on the patriot of the south, will be irresistible. He will derive assurance from it, of his not having fought in vain. In the constitution of our natures there is a point, to which adversity may pursue us, without perhaps any worse effect than that of exciting new energy to meet it. Having reached that point, if no gleam of comfort breaks through the gloom, we sink beneath the pressure, yielding reluctantly to our fate, and in hopeless despair lose all stimulus to exertion. And is there not reason to fear such a fate to the patriots of La Plata? Already enjoying independence for eight years, their ministers are yet spurned from the courts of Europe, and rejected by the government of a sister republic. Contrast this conduct of ours with our conduct in other respects. No matter whence the minister comes, be it from a despotic power, we receive him; and even now, the gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Smith) would have us send a minister to Constantinople, to beg a passage through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea, that, I suppose, we might get some hemp and bread-stuffs there, of which we ourselves produce none; he, who can see no advantage to the country from opening to its commerce the measureless resources of South America, would send a minister to Constantinople for a little trade. Nay, I have seen a project in the newspapers, and I should not be surprised, after what we have already seen, at its being carried into effect, for sending a minister to the porte. Yes, sir, from Constantinople, or from the Brazils; from Turk or christian; from black or white; from the dey of Algiers or the bey of Tunis; from the devil himself, if he wore a crown, we should receive a minister. We even paid the expenses of the minister of his sublime highness, the bey of Tunis, and thought ourselves highly honored by his visit. But, let the minister come from a poor republic, like that of La Plata, and we turn our back on him. The brilliant costumes of the ministers of the royal governments are seen glistening in the circles of our drawing-rooms, and their splendid equipages rolling through the avenues of the metropolis; but the unaccredited minister of the republic, if he visit our president or secretary of state at all, must do it incognito, lest the eye of don Onis should be offended by so unseemly a sight! I hope the gentleman from South Carolina, who is so capable of estimating the effect of moral causes, will see some use in recognising the independence of La Plata. I appeal to the powerful effect of moral causes, manifested in the case of the French revolution, when, by their influence, that nation swept from about her the armies of the combined powers, by which she was environed, and rose up, the colossal power of Europe. There is an example of the effect of moral power. All the patriots ask, all they want at our hands, is, to be recognised as, what they have been for the last eight years, an independent power.