Volume 2 — CHAPTER XIII INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSION TO VOLUME III.[63] (continued 2)

1. The composite divisions of three regiments of the 17th Corps under De Witte took up the fortified position at Khou-kha[91] on the morning of March 3.

2. A force of seven battalions under Colonel Zapolski was sent to Hu-shih-tai station.

3. The 10th Rifle Regiment was concentrated at siding No. 97.

4. Eighteen battalions of the 1st Siberians came up as a reserve to these on March 3.

The concentration which I had ordered of the units of the 2nd Army on the right bank of the Hun was taking place extremely slowly. Indeed, some regiments which had already assembled had been sent back to the left bank. When I reached Mukden on the 3rd, I impressed on Kaulbars the necessity of not losing any time, and told him to attack the following day, but gave him a free hand as to the direction of attack. He did not carry out the order, owing to the concentration of his army on the right bank not having been completed. Meanwhile, in the early hours of March 4, the important hamlet of Ssu-hu-chia-pu was evacuated by the 2nd Army, and at the same time Ivanoff withdrew the 15th Division from the position behind the Hun and the right flank of the 3rd Army, which he had been told to defend, without fighting. The latter thus became exposed. A brigade of the 5th Siberians and nine sotnias of cavalry, which had remained on the right bank near Tung-chen-tzu, were moved across to the left.

During March 4, which was thus lost to us for offensive operations, Nogi continued his turning movement, which was now becoming enveloping and dangerous. Accordingly, after discussing the matter with Kaulbars, I ordered him on the 5th to concentrate sufficient troops for the purpose, and to attack the enemy’s left, and I again emphasized the fact that our main chance of success lay in the rapidity and energy with which he struck. In an order of the 2nd Army of March 5, a force of forty-nine battalions was organized to make the attack under the command of Gerngross. Here again the concentration was too slow, and the right column only moved out from the line Sha-ho-tzu–Khou-kha about 2 p.m. Its right flank might have been strengthened by a brigade of the 41st Division with Zapolski’s column, and the left flank by sixteen battalions of the 25th Division. We therefore might have contained the enemy on the Yang-hsin-tun–Hsiao-sha-ho-tzu line with a force under Tserpitski, and have attacked with a mass of seventy-seven battalions.

Kaulbars, alarmed at Tserpitski’s exaggerated reports as to the nature of the attacks made on his left by some three divisions, moved a brigade from Gerngross’s force behind the left flank, sent another on to the left bank of the river, and stopped Gerngross’s attack till such time as the result of Tserpitski’s action should be known. The net result of these proceedings, of the late commencement of the operations, and of their half-hearted nature, was that, although we met with no opposition, on the 5th we moved our right only on to the line Pao-ta-tun–Fang-hsin-tun–San-chia-fen; and so another day was lost. In accordance with my orders for energetic action, the advance of the right was continued on the 6th, but it was carried out with less men than on the previous day (thirty-three battalions), without energy or cohesion, and met with determined opposition at the village of Liu-chia-kan. Then, before the whole of Gerngross’s force had become engaged, Kaulbars stopped the advance, and gave orders to take up the defensive. That day we got possession only of Tsuang-fang-chih. In short, notwithstanding the great strength of the 2nd Army, with its reinforcements of more than fifty battalions, on March 4, 5, and 6—the three most important days—we moved our right only a few miles forward, and took to defensive measures even on the western front.

Owing to the ill success of the operations of the 2nd Army on March 5, I issued orders to all the armies to send back their divisional baggage along their respective lines of communication towards the north of Mukden. On the 5th the Japanese began a series of attacks on our northern and western fronts. On the left flank of our west front they were everywhere repulsed by Tserpitski and Hershelman, whose forces amounted to forty-nine battalions. In the centre of the western front they won a partial success, on March 7 compelling units of the 25th Division to retire temporarily from Wu-kuan-tun. But on the northern front, which was the most dangerous for us, they won great successes, on the 7th and 8th getting possession of several villages. From there they repeatedly attacked our northern force of twenty-five battalions under Launits, which was holding the line Ta-heng-tun–San-tai-tzu–Kung-chia-tun. At the same time their columns moved still farther to the north, and threatened Hu-shih-tai station. To protect this, I despatched a force of six battalions of the 4th Siberians to Tsu-erh-tun under Colonel Borisoff. To secure our retirement to Tieh-ling, in case we should not succeed in beating off Nogi’s army, on the evening of March 7 I gave orders to the 1st and 3rd Armies, who were too far forward, to retire early on the 8th to our fortified positions south of Mukden—at Fu-liang and Fu-shun. With their retirement and the concentration of the whole of the 2nd Army on the right bank it became possible to allot forty-eight battalions from the 1st and 3rd Armies to operate against Nogi, and to collect seventeen battalions into the reserve of the 2nd Army. Of these reinforcements, General Artamonoff’s force of ten battalions alone arrived under my command on the 8th.

Third Phase.

Having failed in our attempts to stop Nogi’s army, which was moving round our right flank, first on the line from Sha-ling-pu to the old railway embankment, and then on the line of the Hsin-min-tun main road, I decided to try once more to block it on the line Ku-san-tun–Tsu-erh-tun, and, if a favourable opportunity occurred, to assume the offensive from this line. On the 9th we had the following troops available for the purpose:

1. Borisoff’s column of 6 battalions holding the villages of Tung-chan-tzu, Ku-san-tun, and Hsia-hsin-tun.

2. Artamonoff’s column of 9 battalions[92] at Tsu-erh-tun.

3. Hershelman’s column of 14 battalions, sent from the reserve of the 2nd Army to that place. Total, 29 battalions.

On March 9 I ordered Lieutenant-General Muiloff, to whom was given the command of these troops, to co-operate with Launits’ force in an attack on the village of Hei-ni-tun. The operation was carried out in a disjointed manner, without careful reconnaissance, and without any arrangement for co-operation having been made with Launits; a bad storm and clouds of sand also impeded us, and the attack failed. The Japanese continued their advance to the north-west. Thus, by the 9th, the enemy was still not driven back on the side where they were most dangerous; part of the village of San-tai-tzu, taken from us in the early hours of that day, remained in their hands. The situation, indeed, appeared critical, for we received news on the same evening of the Japanese advance to the Hun Ho against the section Fu-liang–Hsiao-fang-shen, which was held by weak units of the 1st Army, 4th and 2nd Siberians. Indeed, if we delayed the withdrawal on Tieh-ling longer there was great danger that some of our most advanced forces in the south and south-west might be cut off. Therefore orders were given that same evening for a retirement to Tieh-ling early on the 10th, and for this operation roads were allotted as follows: The 2nd Army was to proceed along both sides of the railway and west of the Mandarin road; the 3rd Army along the Mandarin road and others to the east of it, as far as the Fu-liang–Hsi-chui-chen–Hui-san–Shu-lin-tzu road; the 1st Army along the latter, and the roads to the east of it.

Meanwhile the enemy had on the 9th broken through the 1st Army near Chiu-tien, driving back part of the 4th Siberians from this point to Leng-hua-chi. The officer commanding the 2nd Siberians (next to them) did nothing but merely hold his position on the River Hun at Hsiao-fang-chen, and the enemy spread out along the valley Hsiao-hsi-chua–Hu-shan-pu. The attempt made to drive them back at night by the Tsaritsin Regiment failed.

During the early morning of the 10th our position became yet worse; on the right flank the Japanese drove back Borisoff’s force to Hsiao-kou-tzu and opposite San-tai-tzu, and penetrated as far as the grove of the Imperial tombs. On the east large bodies of them appeared in sight of the Mandarin road. One was opposite Levestam’s force, while another began shelling the Mandarin road near Ta-wa from the heights near Hsin-chia-kou. The orders given on March 5 for the baggage to be sent back in good time had not been carried out, and part of the impedimenta of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which was stretching along the road near Mukden early on the 10th, blocked the passage of the 5th and 6th Siberians and 17th Corps. On this morning also the Japanese, who had broken through near Chiu-tien on the 9th, began to press our left flank under Meyendorff. The troops sent as reinforcements did not act together, and were driven back north-west. By 10 a.m. Meyendorff was in full retreat—not north-east, but north-west towards the Mandarin road, which he crossed between Ta-wa and Pu-ho. The 6th Siberians now began to retire prematurely, and by so doing exposed the right of the 1st Corps and the left of the 17th. This unnecessarily sudden retirement of more than forty battalions under Meyendorff and Soboleff placed the 17th Corps and the 5th Siberians in a difficult position. Instead of fronting south, they had to front south-east. After a hot fight this force, consisting of thirty battalions, was also obliged to move to the rear prematurely. They did not go to Ta-wa, but west and south of the Mandarin road. This opened out a way for the enemy to that road, and also to the railway north—further on the portion between Mukden and Wen-ken-tun. By seizing this section about 2 p.m., before the rearguards or even the tail of the main body had passed Wa-tzu, they took our troops in flank. We had evacuated the village of San-tai-tzu prematurely, and it was quickly occupied by the Japanese. Between Wa-tzu and this village there is a defile, less than three miles long, through which a large part of the 2nd Army had to force its way under attack from both sides. Portions of the rearguards under Hanenfeld and Sollogub, which tried to get round to the east of it, were captured or destroyed.

I instructed General Dembovski to organize the defence of the Mandarin road at Ta-wa, and for that purpose to utilize the troops retiring along it. By 10 a.m. the distance between the portions of the enemy on the west and east of the railway was only seven miles. It was vital to stop any further contraction of the area of retirement of the 2nd Army. This might be done by blocking the Japanese advance to the railway from the west and north-west. As I was more anxious about the latter direction than any other, I moved out the eighteen battalions under Zarubaeff, which had joined my reserve from the 1st Army, on to the line Ma-kou-chia-tzu–Yang-tzu-tun, and ten battalions of the 72nd Division on the front Tung-shan-tzu–Hsiao-hsin-tun. The first force covered the railway between Hu-shih-tai and San-tai-tzu, and the second barred the enemy’s advance and supported the right flank of Artamonoff’s column. As a reserve to these troops, in case of pressure from the east, a brigade of the 1st Siberian Division was left near Hu-shih-tai station. By 4 p.m. the state of affairs on the Mandarin road became worse, as, immediately after General Levestam’s force had retired behind Pu-ho, Dembovski also abandoned his positions near Ta-wa, and moved off to the west. The fighting ceased as darkness came on. The last of the 2nd Army to fall back were portions of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Rifle Regiments under Lieutenant-Colonel Korniloff; they broke through near Wa-tzu in the pitch dark, though hemmed in by the enemy on three sides.

We continued to retire during the night, covered by the rearguard under Muiloff and that of Zarubaeff’s column. On the 11th several units of the 1st and 3rd Armies collected at the village of Yi-lu; but the greater part of the 3rd Army fell back direct on Tieh-ling. Bilderling was unable to carry out his proposal of remaining on the River Yi-lu till the 12th, and, having taken command of Shileiko’s force, after slight opposition retired northwards from Yi-lu village. By doing this he placed the rearguards of the 2nd Army that were still south of this point in a very precarious position. The main bodies of all the armies began on the 11th to occupy a position eight miles south of Tieh-ling on the Fan Ho. The 2nd Army took up a line to the west and the first one to the east of the Mandarin road, the 3rd remaining in reserve. Everything possible was done to restore order amongst the troops, transport, and parks. On the 13th the enemy’s advanced troops reached our positions, and on the 14th they attacked, directing their main effort on the line between the sections held by the 2nd Siberians and 72nd Division. All their attacks were repulsed with great loss, and many hundreds of dead were left in front of our position. Our losses were 900.

The two-weeks battle had badly disorganized several units, especially those of the 2nd and 3rd Armies. The men who had got separated from their own units and attached to others had to be sorted out and restored, baggage, transport, and parks had to be separated, and ammunition replenished. To carry this out made it essential that we should not be in direct touch with the enemy—that there should be some space between us. For this reason, and on account of the turning movement against our right flank along the River Liao, discovered by the cavalry, I decided not to accept battle at Tieh-ling, but to order a general retirement of all the armies on the 14th to the Hsi-ping-kai position, which was the best one between Tieh-ling and the River Sungari. The 1st and 2nd Armies began to move out of Tieh-ling on March 16, and by the 22nd were on the heights of Hsi-ping-kai.

CONCLUSIONS UPON THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN[93]

Both the nearness of the events related above and our ignorance about the enemy make it impossible for any detailed and absolutely impartial judgment to be formed upon the reasons for our defeat in this great battle. The records that have been collected so far, however, are sufficient to throw light upon a few facts—upon certain of our dispositions that did not correspond to the requirements of the case. Those made by the commander of the 2nd Army, to which force was entrusted the duty of stopping Nogi’s turning movement towards our rear, are of particular interest, and certain of them which had a very important bearing on the issue of the operations are now described.

General Kaulbars made neither a sufficient nor a clever use of his cavalry. This fact, coupled with the unfortunate selection of its leaders, was the reason why the mounted branch did such bad work,[94] and behaved in a manner that can hardly be called “devoted” during the Mukden operations. In the instructions given on March 1 to Grekoff’s cavalry to operate against Nogi, the object to be attained was plainly set forth, but how it was to be attained was not clearly defined. The execution of its most important task was also made the more difficult by the fact that Grekoff’s force was, on the same day as the orders were issued, split up into two almost equal groups, of which the eastern was found to be fighting Oku instead of Nogi. To rectify this, the cavalry under Pavloff was ordered on the same day by Kaulbars to undertake a special task against the turning columns, but on the 2nd the order was changed, and eight of Pavloff’s sotnias were put under the command of Launits, who was operating against Oku. No touch was maintained between their different groups, and the greater part of the mounted forces clung to the infantry, and did practically no fighting (the losses suffered by this Arm during the twenty-three days’ operations in February and March were quite insignificant). Yet most of our regiments were quite capable of performing the most difficult tasks of war. The action of the infantry of the 2nd Army on the positions which they had taken up was completely passive. They did not try to get into touch with the enemy to ascertain their strength and dispositions (by taking prisoners), or to occupy advanced posts where these would be advantageous. The reconnoitring patrols of this army also did but little work. The consequence of such unsatisfactory performance of their duties by the cavalry and advanced infantry units of the 2nd Army was that information of the enemy was so meagre that the appearance of a great mass of Nogi’s army on and to the east of the Hsin-min-tun road came as a complete surprise to Kaulbars.

Owing to the appearance of large hostile bodies near Ka-liao-ma, I had on February 28 already ordered him[95] to take immediate steps to ascertain their exact strength, the direction in which they were moving, and their intentions. I repeated this order[96] on March 2, instructing him to find out their strength and dispositions more accurately if possible, and to frame some plan of action. I pointed out the necessity for energetic steps to ascertain the whereabouts of Nogi’s main body—whether it was opposite Sha-ling-pu, or whether it was executing a wider turning movement. On the morning of March 5 I for the third time[97] asked Kaulbars to find out where Nogi’s left flank was. Not one of these orders was carried out, with the result that I had inadequate and incorrect information upon which to form a decision as to the strength and whereabouts of the enemy operating on the right bank of the Hun. Tserpitski’s alarmist reports to the effect that more than three divisions were opposed to him made the fog worse. Kaulbars, who had been ordered to stop Nogi’s flanking movement, on the strength of incorrect information, all the time turned his chief attention towards the western front to Oku, whom he took for Nogi. The latter, owing to the 2nd Army’s inaction on March 3, 4, 5 and 6, was made a present of four days in which to complete his sweeping movement to the north-east,[98] and Kaulbars continued to see danger only on the west, paying insufficient attention to what was happening on the Hsin-min-tun road, north-west of Mukden. On March 1 he conceived a most complicated “castling” manœuvre, which he endeavoured to carry out when in direct touch with the enemy. The Composite Rifle Corps was ordered to cross from the right bank of the Hun on to the left, and the 8th Corps from the left to the right. The Rifle regiments crossed over the river, and by so doing evacuated the most important section near Chang-tan, but the 8th Corps was unable to get across. The enemy at once took advantage of this, and, rapidly throwing their 8th Division forward along the right bank of the river, drove back the relatively weak force of ours still on that side. Kaulbars, moreover, stopped the movement on Sha-ling-pu (of the Composite Division under Golembatovski), which had already been started, and by so doing deprived us of the possibility of checking the heads of the enemy’s columns on March 2. Finally, the 5th Rifle Brigade under Churin—which was moving by my orders to operate against Nogi—was stopped on March 3 by Kaulbars in the valley on the right bank of the Hun, and found itself among the troops opposing Oku.

After weakening Topornin by sixteen battalions, Kaulbars, on reaching his force, countermanded the advance on Sha-ling-pu, which had been begun on the morning of the 3rd, and suddenly withdrew thirty-two battalions to Mukden without fighting. This made our position distinctly worse. He took no steps to establish and maintain touch with Birger’s brigade on the Hsin-min-tun road, and never informed the latter of the order to retire he had given to Topornin on the 3rd. In telling Launits on the morning of March 3 of his decision (to withdraw Topornin’s force to Mukden), he stated that “Grekoff’s column and Birger’s brigade are probably cut off from Mukden,” but he made no attempt to help Birger. And yet up to 2 p.m. on the 3rd Birger’s brigade was not even engaged. Our attempt to retake Ssu-hu-chia-pu on March 4 was stopped by Launits, owing to the receipt of orders from Kaulbars not to attack if it was likely to be a costly operation. Kaulbars did nothing that day, although he had under his command 119 battalions[99] on the right bank of the Hun, and although I had ordered him to assume the offensive. Moreover, he did not even know the whereabouts of the troops under him. Although he had 113 battalions under his command on the right bank on March 5, he again did nothing. He did not carry out my orders to attack the enemy’s left energetically, and permitted these troops, which were at Khou-kha—next to Gerngross’s force—to deploy very slowly, and stopped their advance before they had got in touch with the enemy. Moreover, yielding to the preconceived idea of the main danger lying in the west, he moved sixteen splendid battalions of the 10th Corps from Gerngross’s force, operating towards Hsin-min-tun, on to the left flank of the army. Yet again on the 6th, although he had 116 battalions on the right bank, he effected scarcely anything, for our active operations towards Hsin-min-tun were conducted with an insufficient force, and therefore failed.

The result of his dispositions from March 2 to 5 was that on the 6th we did not have a single battalion of the 2nd Army operating against Nogi, whereas we should have had forty.[100] All ninety-six battalions of the 2nd Army were on that day distributed on the defensive against Oku. This distribution of troops, which in no way met either the general requirements or the definite task given to Kaulbars—to stop Nogi’s army—constituted one of the main reasons of the failure of our operations at Mukden.

On the 2nd and 3rd the following troops were given to Kaulbars from my reserve for his operations against Nogi:

Battalions.

16th Corps… 24

1st Siberians… 18

De Witte’s column (3rd Army)…15

Zapolski’s column … 4

—

Total…61

Moreover, sixteen battalions of the 10th Corps (2nd Army) were by my orders concentrated opposite Sha-ling-pu on the 2nd, and on the 7th the 10th Rifle Regiment and two battalions of the 4th Siberians were sent from my reserve to join Kaulbars’ army—i.e., he was given in all eighty-one battalions, of which sixty-five had not previously belonged to the 2nd Army. Of these, as transpired later, as many as thirty-five battalions did not take part, or only took very little part, in any fighting up to the 10th—i.e.:

Battalions.

1st Siberians… 13

De Witte’s column…13

2nd Brigade, 9th Division … 8

10th Rifle Brigade … 2

—

Total…35

These units either occupied defensive positions, and merely watched the Japanese making a flank march past them,[101] or were moved for no reason from one place to another (2nd Brigade of the 9th Division). Their losses from the 3rd to 9th were trifling.

On the 4th, when I ordered Kaulbars to “move every available man on to the right flank near the Hsin-min-tun road,” the reverse was done. Two regiments (Tambov and Zamost) were moved from the right bank of the river on to the left; the 2nd Brigade of the 9th Division was ordered to move away from the Hsin-min-tun road, and crossed from Huang-ku-tun to Liu-kou-tun, and the Primorsk Dragoons from an important position on this road were sent to the rear to Hu-shih-tai.[102] On March 5 we were able to collect more than 100 battalions for operations against Nogi, 70 being concentrated by my instructions. But although Kaulbars had received orders to send an army corps on to the right bank of the Hun to engage Nogi, he not only did not carry out the order, but lost five days (March 2 to 6), and thus allowed the turning movement to develop so far that part of the force I had collected (25th Division) was on the 7th operating, not against Nogi, but against Oku’s left flank. Moreover, as he had on the 5th also weakened the force collected by me to act against Nogi by sending 16 battalions to the left flank of the 2nd Army, the result of these dispositions and our inaction during these five days was that on the 7th only 37 battalions operated against Nogi instead of 100. The loss of time, and the weakness of the force that actually opposed Nogi, were largely contributory to our failure.

Having so far employed only a very small part of the troops entrusted to him for offensive operations, on the 7th Kaulbars definitely and finally assumed the defensive. He did not even seize the opportunity of the repulses suffered by the enemy at Wu-kuan-tun and against Tserpitski’s force to attack. On the 7th, 8th, and 9th, with 140 battalions at his disposal, he assumed a passive rôle everywhere. While allowing a great confusion of units, he did not take proper steps, which he was quite able to do, to re-establish the corps, divisional and brigade organization, and on the 8th he did not take advantage of the possibility of forming a reserve from the entire 10th Corps, which would have enabled him to re-establish the organization of the other corps. On the 4th he removed Generals Muiloff, Topornin, and Kutnevich from the command of their corps for no reason, and as he did not replace them by other officers, the staffs of these corps were headless. The employment of the reserves in the 2nd Army was neither carried out by arrangement, nor in accordance with the actual necessities of the situation, so that there were instances of reserves being sent up when not required (Gerngross on March 8). In spite of my order, which he received on the 5th, to send back the baggage and transport to the north, Kaulbars only obeyed this instruction in regard to Tserpitski’s and Gerngross’s columns on the 9th, and thus made our retirement, especially that of our rearguards, most difficult. He failed to observe the appearance or concentration of the enemy on the northern front, and took no steps to avert this danger. The concentration of our forces on this side was carried out under my own orders. Had it not been for this, the enemy would have seized the village of San-tai-tzu and the grove of the Imperial tombs on the 7th.

One occasion when Kaulbars did issue orders that met the case was when he ordered Launits to attack the enemy on March 10 at Hei-ni-tun so as to assist the retirement, and he got together a strong force for this purpose. But then, when these troops were on the point of commencing the attack, he went to Launits and countermanded it, without even informing me of this most important change in his previous dispositions. Yet, had this attack been only partially successful, it would have greatly relieved the situation. Right up to March 13 not one of the arrangements made by him was fully carried out, and it is clear that he did not even then in the least appreciate the conditions. In addition to wasting time, extending his front, and acting only on the defensive, he did not realize the danger of Nogi’s appearance at such a moment north of Mukden, nor of his movement round our flank. In a letter to me of August 11, he wrote that on March 8 and 9, “although we had been retiring for a week, circumstances were going very well for us, as, the further the enemy moved northwards, the nearer they were getting to their Poltava.”

From the above it can be seen that Kaulbars’ dispositions, his inaction, and his misunderstanding of the whole situation, could not lead the 2nd Army to Poltava. On the contrary, on March 8 and 9, 1905, it was nearly a case of Tsushima.

It only remains for me to conclude with a few pages out of the short report on the war which I submitted to His Majesty the Emperor.

“Of the many causes contributing to the disastrous issue to the Battle of Mukden, I will only mention the following:

“1. The fall of Port Arthur liberated Nogi’s army, the whole of which took part in the battle. The formation of the new divisions in Japan was completed at the same time, and, judging by the prisoners we captured, two of these also took part in the battle. The immediate making good of wastage in their ranks presented no particular difficulty to the enemy, owing to the relative proximity of Japan to the theatre of war, and the resultant ease with which she was able to transport her troops by sea. Judging by the muster rolls found on the dead and wounded, the effective strength of their companies was between 200 and 250 rifles, and all casualties were at once replaced.

“The liberation of Nogi’s army and the landing of troops in Northern Korea compelled us to increase the force detailed for the defence of the Primorsk district and Vladivostok, and the appearance of bodies of Japanese cavalry, together with artillery and numerous bands of Hun-huses in Mongolia, coupled with the raids on the railway, which were becoming more frequent, necessitated steps being taken to increase the railway guard along its 1,350 miles’ length in Manchuria.

“These two measures took fourteen battalions and twenty-four sotnias from the field army, and also a large number of the 80,000 reservists then being sent to the front as drafts.

“All these things combined enabled the Japanese at the battle of Mukden to be as strong as, if not stronger than, we were in the number of rifles.

“2. The tardy discovery by our cavalry of the enemy’s movement round our right flank, when ‘strong columns of Japanese infantry’ had already appeared at Ka-liao-ma.

“3. The complete lack of energy displayed by the officer in command of the 2nd Army in repulsing Nogi’s force which was moving round us, with the result that we lost seven most important days (March 1 to 8).

“4. His complete ignorance of the strength and whereabouts of the enemy moving round his right. The lack of information and the inaccuracy of what was received rendered some of my own dispositions not only unnecessary, but wrong. As a particular instance, I may mention that I only knew for certain when it was too late that the enemy were not making (as had been reported) a wider turning movement on both banks of the Liao towards Tieh-ling.

“5. The lack of energy displayed by senior officers of the 3rd Army on March 10 in overcoming the difficulties of the retirement. Their passive attitude with regard to the enemy’s movements towards the Mandarin road—illustrated by the diversion of the various columns (on encountering the enemy) towards the west on to the line of retirement of the 2nd Army, instead of forcing back the enemy away from the Mandarin road.

“The inaction of the 55th Division of the 6th Siberians was remarkable. The commander of this unit, who only had this one division under his command, decided to place it directly under the officer in command of the 1st Corps. Having done so, he rode away from his division to Ta-wa village. When he reached the railway on the morning of the 11th, he was unable to inform me where his division[103] was!

“6. The failure of the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Armies to carry out the orders I had given some days before the retirement began to send back the baggage and transport northwards. It was the disorder and panic which occurred amongst these auxiliary services on the retirement that caused the loss of so many guns and limbers, and ammunition and baggage waggons.

“7. The inertia displayed by the officers commanding the 2nd Siberian Division and the 2nd Siberians, when an attempt was made to prevent the enemy breaking through near Chiu-tien, and when later they spread north of the Mandarin road. Besides the twenty-four battalions of the 1st Corps and the 4th Siberians, which did remain on the right flank of the 1st Army, the 55th Division might have been used in this operation. But the officer commanding the 2nd Siberians received the enemy’s advance passively, merely throwing back his right flank, and thus presenting the enemy with an opening for their advance on to the Mandarin road.

“8. Nevertheless, I consider that I myself am the person principally responsible for our defeat, for the following reasons:

“(a) I did not sufficiently insist on the concentration of as large a general reserve as possible before the operations commenced.

“(b) I weakened myself just before an important battle by a brigade of infantry and a Cossack division (believing General Chichagoff’s reports). If I had not sent one brigade of the 16th Corps for duty on the communications, and had insisted on the 1st Siberians being sent back from the 1st Army at full strength, I should have had two full corps available for operations against Nogi’s turning movement.

“(c) I did not take adequate measures to prevent the confusion of units. Indeed, during the battle I was myself compelled to contribute to the disintegration of corps.

“(d) I should have made a better appreciation of the respective spirit of both sides, as well as of the characteristics and qualifications of the commanders, and I should have exercised more caution in my decisions. Although the operations of the 2nd Army from March 2 to 7 failed in their object, my firm belief in ultimate victory resulted in my ordering a general retirement later than I ought to have done. I should have abandoned all hope of the 2nd Army defeating the enemy a day sooner than I did; the retirement would then have been effected in complete order.

“(e) When convinced of Kaulbars’ inertia and passive tactics, I should have taken command of the troops on the right bank of the Hun personally. On March 9 I should similarly have taken command of Muiloff’s force, and acted as a corps commander.”

In my letters of March 31 and May 13, 1905, to His Majesty the Emperor, I reviewed generally the factors which made the war extraordinarily difficult for us.[104]

Has the army survived its Tsushima? No; it went through nothing nearly so bad as that. We fought hard everywhere, and we inflicted greater losses on the enemy than they on us. We were weaker in numbers than they were, and we retired. Even the Mukden reverse owes its reputation as a decisive Japanese victory to the impressions of our own correspondents, who were with the baggage and in rear. Can one say that the Russian land forces were defeated, when in the first important battles (at Liao-yang and on the Sha Ho) we only put into action a fourteenth part of our armed forces, and at Mukden, at a time when the Japanese had already put forth their greatest efforts, we had less than a sixth of our force? Nor must it be forgotten that we fought against a nation of 50,000,000 martial and ardent souls, who, hand in hand with their Emperor, were able to grasp victory by fearing no sacrifice. To defeat such a foe in such a distant theatre of war, great and continued efforts were required of the whole of our country as well as of the army. In the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we waged great wars with such leaders as Charles XII. and Napoleon. In these we also experienced defeat, but in the end we issued absolute victors. In the eighteenth century, between defeat at Narva and victory at Poltava nine years elapsed; in the nineteenth, between defeat at Austerlitz and our entry into Paris there was also nine years’ interval.

The events which happened in the Far East in 1904–05 can, owing to their historical importance and their significance for Russia and the whole world, be placed alongside those through which Russia passed in the early years of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the struggle with Charles XII. and Napoleon the Russian people was at one with the Tsar, and bravely bore all trials and sacrifices, strengthening and improving the army, treating it with kindness, believing in it, wishing it well, and profoundly respecting it for its gallant deeds. The people realized the necessity for success, hesitated at no sacrifice, and were not troubled by the time required to gain it, and the harmonious efforts of Tsar and people gave us complete victory. The way to victory is in the present day by the same road which our ancestors followed in the early years of the last two centuries.

If mighty Russia, headed by the Tsar, had been permeated by a brave and single-minded desire to defeat the Japanese, and had not stinted the sacrifices and time necessary to preserve Russia’s integrity and dignity, our glorious army, supported by the trust of its ruler and a united people, would have fought until the enemy had been vanquished.

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