Story of the "Eye-Witness" (continued 2)

As the attackers surged forward they were met by our frontal fire, and since they were moving diagonally across part of our front they were also attacked on the flank by artillery, rifles, and machine guns. Though their casualties before they reached our line must have been enormous, such was their resolution and the momentum of the mass that in spite of the splendid resistance of our troops they succeeded in breaking through our line in three places near the road. They penetrated some distance into the woods behind our trenches, but were counter-attacked again, enfiladed by machine guns and driven back to their line of trenches, a certain portion of which they succeeded in holding, in spite of our efforts to expel them.

What their total losses must have been during this advance may be gauged to some extent from the fact that the number of dead left in the woods behind our line alone amounted to 700.

A simultaneous effort made to the south, a part of the same operation although not carried out by the Guard Corps, failed entirely, for when the attacking infantry massed in the woods close to our line, our guns opened on them with such effect that they did not push the assault home.

As generally happens in operations in wooded country, the fighting to a great extent was carried on at close quarters. It was most desperate and confused. Scattered bodies of the enemy who had penetrated into the woods in the rear of our position could neither go backward nor forward, and were nearly all killed or captured.

The portion of the line to the southeast of Ypres held by us was heavily shelled, but did not undergo any very serious infantry attack. That occupied by the French, however, was both bombarded and fiercely assaulted. On the rest of our front, save for the usual bombardment, all was comparatively quiet.

On the right one of our trenches was mined and then abandoned. As soon as it was occupied by the enemy the charges were fired and several Germans were blown to pieces.

Thursday, Nov. 12, was marked by a partial lull in the fighting all along our line. To the north a German force which had crossed the Yser and intrenched on the left bank was annihilated by a night attack with the bayonet, executed by the French. Slightly to the south the enemy was forced back for three-quarters of a mile. Immediately on our left the French were strongly attacked and driven back a short distance, our extreme left having to conform to this movement. Our allies soon recovered the ground they had lost, however, and this enabled us to advance also.

To the southeast of Ypres the enemy's snipers were very active. On our centre and right the enemy's bombardment was maintained, but nothing worthy of special note occurred.

The fact that on this day the advance against our line in front of Ypres was not pushed home after such an effort as that of Wednesday tends to show that for the moment the attacking troops had had enough.

Although the failure of this great attack by the Guard Corps to accomplish their object cannot be described as a decisive event, it possibly marks the culmination if not the close of the second stage in the attempt to capture Ypres, arid it is not without significance. It has also a dramatic interest of its own. Having once definitely failed to achieve this object by means of the sheer weight of numbers, and having done their best to wear us down, the Germans brought in fresh picked troops to carry the Ypres salient by an assault from the north, the south and the east. That the Guard Corps should have been selected to act against the eastern edge of the salient may be taken as proof of the necessity felt by the Germans to gain this point in the line.

Their dogged perseverance in pursuance of their objective claims whole-hearted admiration. The failure of one great attack, heralded as it was by an impassioned appeal to the troops made in the presence of the Emperor himself, but carried out by partially trained men, has been only the signal for another desperate effort in which the place of honor was assigned to the corps d'élite of the German Army.

It must be admitted that the Guard Corps has retained that reputation for courage and contempt of death which it earned in 1870, when Emperor William I., after the battle of Gravelotte, wrote: "My Guard has found its grave in front of St. Privat," and the swarms of men who came up bravely to the British rifles in the woods around Ypres repeated the tactics of forty-four years ago when their dense columns, toiling up the slopes of St. Privat, melted away under the fire of the French.

That the Germans are cunning fighters, and well up in all the tricks of the trade, has frequently been pointed out. For instance, they often succeed in ascertaining what regiment or brigade is opposed to them, and because of their knowledge of English, they are able to employ the information to some purpose. On a recent occasion, having by some means discovered the name of the commander of the company holding the trench they were attacking, they called him by name, asking if Captain —— was there. Fortunately the pronunciation of the spokesman was somewhat defective, and their curiosity was rewarded by discovering that both the officer in question and his men were very much there.

There have been reports from so many different quarters of the enemy having been seen wearing British and French uniforms that it is impossible to doubt their truth. One absolutely authentic case occurred during the fighting near Ypres. A man dressed in a uniform closely resembling that of a British staff officer suddenly appeared near our trenches and walked along the line. He asked if many casualties had been suffered, stated that the situation was serious, and that a general retirement had been ordered. A similar visit having been reported by several men in different trenches, orders were issued that this strange officer was to be detained if seen again. Unluckily he did not make another appearance.

The following remarks taken from the diary of a German soldier are published not because there is reason to believe they are justified with regard to the conduct of German officers but because of their interest as a human document. Under date of Nov. 2 this German soldier wrote:

Previous to noon we were sent out in a regular storm of bullets on the order of the Major. These gentlemen, the officers, send their men forward in a most ridiculous way. They themselves remain far behind, safely under cover. Our leadership is really scandalous. Enormous losses on our side are partly from the fire of our own people, for our leaders neither know where the enemy lies nor where our own troops are, so that we often are fired on by our own men. It is a marvel to me that we have got on as far as we have done.

Our Captain fell, as did also all our section leaders and a large number of our men. Moreover, no purpose was served by this advance, for we remained the rest of the day under cover; we could go neither forward nor back, nor even shoot.

The trench we had taken was not occupied by us. The English naturally took it back at night. That was the sole result. Then when the enemy had intrenched themselves another attack was made, costing us many lives and fifty prisoners. It is simply ridiculous, this leadership. If only I had known it before! My opinion of German officers has changed.

An Adjutant shouted to us from a trench far to the rear to cut down a hedge in front of us. Bullets were whistling round from in front and from behind. The gentleman himself, of course, remained behind.

The Fourth Company has now no leaders but a couple of non-coms. When will my turn come! I hope to goodness I shall get home again.

In the trenches shells and shrapnel burst without ceasing. In the evening we get a cup of rice and one-third of an apple per man. Let us hope peace will soon come. Such a war is really too awful. The English shoot like mad. If no reinforcements come up, especially heavy artillery, we shall have a poor lookout and must retire.

The first day I went quietly into the fight with an indifference which astonished me. Today, for the first time, in advancing, when my comrades on the right and left were falling, I felt rather nervous. But I lost that feeling again soon. One becomes horribly indifferent.

I picked up a piece of bread by chance. Thank God! At least I have something to eat.

There are about 70,000 English who must be attacked from all four sides and destroyed. However, they defend themselves obstinately.

XII.

Attacked by 750,000 Germans.

[Official Summary, Dated Dec. 3.]

Col. E.D. Swinton of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the British Expeditionary Force in France and Belgium, in a narrative dated Nov. 26, gives a general review of the development of the situation of the force for six weeks preceding that date.

There has recently been a lull in the active operations, he says. No progress has been made by either side, and yet there has come about an important modification comprising a readjustment in the scope of the part played by the British Army as a whole. He explains the movement from the River Aisne to the Belgian frontier to prolong the left flank of the French Army, and says that in attempting this the British force was compelled to assume responsibility for a very extended section of the front. He points out, as did Field Marshal Sir John French, Commander in Chief of the British forces, that the British held only one-twelfth of the line, so that the greater share of the common task of opposing the enemy fell and still falls to the French, while the Belgians played an almost vital part.

With the fall of Antwerp the Germans made every effort to push forward a besieging force toward the west and hastened to bring up a new army corps which had been hastily raised and trained, their object being to drive the Allies out of Belgium and break through to Dunkirk and Calais. Altogether they had a quarter of a million of fresh men. Eventually the Germans had north of La Bassée about fourteen corps and eight cavalry divisions, that is, "a force of three-quarters of a million of men with which to attempt to drive the Allies into the sea. In addition, there was immensely powerful armament and heavy siege artillery, which also had been brought up from around Antwerp."

The official eye-witness tells of the blows delivered by the Germans at Nieuport, Dixmude, and Ypres, where "at first the Allies were greatly outnumbered." For a whole month the British army around Ypres succeeded in holding its ground against repeated onslaughts made by vastly superior forces. The writer goes into details of the German attacks and describes how they were frustrated by the Allies.

The British force, says Col. Swinton, which consisted all along of the same units, had "to withstand an almost continuous bombardment and to meet one desperate assault after another, each carried out by fresh units from the large numbers which the Germans were devoting to the operation." Finally the French came to their assistance, and "never was help more welcome; for by then our small local reserves had again and again been thrown into the fight in the execution of counter-attacks, and our men were exhausted by the incessant fighting."

The British front now has been considerably shortened and in addition has been reinforced, while a lull in the activity has enabled the British to readjust their forces, strengthen their positions, and bring up reserves. There has, therefore, "been a great general improvement in the conditions under which we are carrying on the fight". Of the fighting which preceded this reorganization the writer says it is due solely to the resource, initiative, and endurance of the regimental officers and men that success has lain with the British. He continues:

"As the struggle swayed backward and forward through wood and hamlet, the fighting assumed a most confused and desperate character. The units became inextricably mixed, and in many cases, in order to strengthen some threatened point or to fill a gap in the line, the officers had to collect and throw into the fight what men they could, regardless of the units to which they belonged. Our casualties have been severe; but we have been fighting a battle, and a battle implies casualties, and, heavy as they have been, it must be remembered that they have not been suffered in vain.

"The duty of the French, Belgians, and British in the western theatre of operations has been to act as a containing force; in other words, to hold on to and to keep occupied as many of the enemy as possible while the Russians were attacking in the east. In this we have succeeded in playing our part, and by our resistance have contributed materially toward the success of the campaign. Moreover, our losses have not impaired our fighting efficiency. The troops have required only a slight respite in order to be able to continue the action with as much determination as ever. They are physically fit and well fed and have suffered merely from the fatigue which is inseparable from a protracted struggle such as they have been through. The severest handling by the enemy has never had more than a temporary effect on their spirits, which they have soon recovered, owing to the years of discipline and training to which the officers and men have been accustomed.

"The value of such preparation is as noticeable on the side of the enemy as on our own. The phenomenal losses suffered by the Germans' new formations have been remarked, and they were in part due to their lack of training. Moreover, though at the first onset these formations advanced to the attack as gravely as their active corps, they have not by any means, shown the same recuperative powers. The Twenty-seventh Corps, for instance, which is a new formation composed principally of men with from only seven to twelve weeks' training, has not yet recovered from its first encounter with the British infantry around Becelaere, to the northeast of Ypres, a month ago. On the other hand, the Guards Corps, in spite of having suffered severely in Belgium, of having been thrown headlong across the Oise River at Guise and of having lost large numbers on the plains of Compiègne and on the banks of the Aisne River, advanced against Ypres on the 11th of November as bravely as they did on the 20th of August."

The Allies, continues Col. Swinton, have made great sacrifices to defend against tremendous odds a line that could only be maintained by making these sacrifices; but the fact that the situation has been relieved is no reason for assuming that the enemy has abandoned his intention of pressing through to the sea. The writer points out that the Germans continue to attack with great courage, but little abated by failure, and, while they have not succeeded in gaining the Straits of Dover, they have been enabled to consolidate their position on the western front and retain all but a small portion of Belgium.

"As well as they have fought, however," continues the narrative, "it is doubtful if their achievements are commensurate with their losses, which recently have been largely due to a lack of training and a comparative lack of discipline of the improvised units they put in the field."

Col. Swinton concludes with the statement that, as the war is going to be one of exhaustion, after the regular armies of the belligerents have done their work it will be upon the raw material of the countries concerned that final success will depend.

XIII.

The Lull in November.

[Dated Nov. 29.]

General inactivity is recorded along the English front, with the Germans pressing the attack in one quarter against the Indian troops, who have been extending their trenches in an endeavor to get in close quarters with the enemy. There has been some shelling of the rear of our front line south of the Lys, but this form of annoyance diminishes daily along the whole front. Sniping, however, is carried on almost incessantly. There seems to be little doubt that the Germans are employing civilians, either willingly or unwillingly, to dig trenches; some civilians have been seen and shot while engaged in this work.

While it is necessary to accept the evidence of all prisoners with caution, there is a change in the views expressed by some officers captured recently which appears to be genuine. They admit the failure of the German strategy and profess to take a gloomy view of the future. At the same time it must be confessed that as yet there is no sign that their view is that generally held by the enemy, nor has there been any definite indication of a lack of morale among the German troops.

The highways of Northern France are crowded with men responding to the various mobilization orders issued by the French Government.

Thousands of such troops were encountered in the course of a short automobile trip. The strange procession includes a curious mixture of types. A considerable proportion of these new drafts are composed of middle-aged men of good physique and likely young men from the countryside.

The change within the last few days of what may be termed the atmosphere of the battlefield has been marked. The noise of the cannonading has now decreased to such an extent that for hours at a time nothing is heard but the infrequent boom of one of the heavy guns of the Allies, the occasional rattle of machine guns, and the intermittent fire of snipers on either side. So far as the use of explosives is concerned, the greatest activity is found in local attacks with hand grenades and short-range howitzers. The enemy has practically ceased his efforts to break through the line by assaults, and he is now devoting his energies to the same type of siege operations which have been familiar to the Allies since the beginning of the battle of the Aisne.

Subterranean life is the general rule in the neighborhood of the firing line. Even those men not actually engaged in fighting live in underground quarters. Some of these quarters, called "funk-holes" are quite elaborate and comfortable and contain many conveniences not found in the trenches on the firing line. They communicate with the firing line by zigzag approach trenches which make enfilading impossible.

Attacks are made on the firing line trenches by blind saps, which are constructed by a special earth borer. When this secret tunnel reaches the enemy's trench, an assault is delivered amid a shower of hand grenades. The stormers endeavor to burst their way through the opening and then try to work along the trench. Machine guns are quickly brought up to repel a counter attack. Most of this fighting takes place at such close range that the guns on either side cannot be fired at the enemy's infantry without great risk of hitting their own men. Bombs have come to take the place of artillery, and they are being used in enormous quantities.

The short-range howitzers are of three types, and those used by the Germans have come to be termed the "Jack Johnson" of close attack. The smaller bombs and grenades thrown by hand, although local in action, are very unpleasant, particularly between the inclosed space of a trench. These grenades are thrown continuously by both sides, and every trench assault is first preceded and then accompanied by showers of these murderous missiles. This kind of fighting is very deadly, and owing to the difficulty of observation it is at times somewhat blind. This difficulty has in a measure been decreased, however, by the use of the hyperscope, an instrument which works very much like the periscope on a submarine. It permits an observer to look out over the top of a parapet without raising his head above the protection of the trench.