Part 1 — CHAPTER V

PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF LORDS

I. Composition

106. Qualifications and Number of Members.—A peer may be prevented from occupying a seat in the chamber by any one of several disqualifications. He must have attained the age of twenty-one; he must not be an alien; he must not be a bankrupt; he must not be under sentence for felony. On the other hand, a man who inherits a peerage cannot renounce the inheritance. Upon more than one occasion this rule has been a matter of political consequence, for its operation has sometimes meant that an able and ambitious commoner has been compelled to surrender his seat in the more important chamber and to assume a wholly undesired place in the upper house. In 1895 Mr. William W. Palmer, later Lord Selbourne, inheriting a peerage but desiring to continue for a time in the Commons, put this rule to a definite test by neglecting to apply for a writ of summons as a peer. The decision of the Commons, however, was that he was obligated to accept membership in the upper chamber, and hence to yield the place which he occupied in the lower.

The House of Lords numbers to-day 620 members. In earlier periods of its history it was a very much smaller body, and, indeed, its most notable growth has taken place within the past one hundred and fifty years. During the reign of Henry VII. there were never more than eighty members, the majority of whom were ecclesiastics. To the first parliament of Charles II. there were summoned 139 persons. At the death of William III. the roll of the upper chamber comprised 192 names. At the death of Queen Anne the number was 209: at that of George I. it was 216; at that of George II., 229; at that of George III., 339; at that of George IV., 396; at that of William IV., 456. Between 1830 and 1898 there were conferred 364 peerages—222 under Liberal ministries (covering, in the aggregate, forty years) and 142 under the Conservatives (covering twenty-seven years). More than one-half of the peerages of to-day have been created within the past fifty years, and of the remainder only an insignificant proportion can be termed ancient.

II. The Reform of the Lords: the Question prior to 1909

107. The Status of the Chamber.—As a law-making body the House of Lords antedates the House of Commons. At the beginning of the fourteenth century the theory was that the magnates assented to legislation while the Commons merely petitioned for it. In a statute of 1322, however, the legislative character of Parliament as a whole was effectively recognized, and at the same time the legislative parity of the commons with the magnates. Thenceforth, until very nearly the present day, the two chambers were legally co-ordinate and every act of legislation required the assent of both. It is true that during the course of the nineteenth century there was a remarkable growth of legislative preponderance on the part of the House of Commons, until, indeed, the point was reached where all important measures were first presented in that chamber and the Lords were very certain not to thwart the ultimate adoption of any project of which the nation as represented in the popular branch unmistakably approved. Yet upon numerous occasions bills, and sometimes—as in the case of Gladstone's Home Rule Bill in 1893—highly important ones, were defeated outright; and at all times the chamber imposed a check upon the lower house and exercised a powerful influence upon the actual course of legislative business. Under the provisions of the act of 1911, however, the status and the legislative functions of the House of Lords have been profoundly altered, and an adequate understanding of the workings of the British parliament to-day requires some review of the changes wrought by that remarkable piece of legislation.

109. Earlier Projects of Reform.—Projects for the reform of the Lords were not unknown before 1832, but it has been since that date, and, more particularly during the past half-century, that the reform question has been agitated most vigorously. Some of the notable proposals that have been made relate to the composition of the chamber, others to the powers and functions of it, and still others to both of these things. In respect to the composition of the body, the suggestions that have been brought forward have contemplated most commonly the reduction of the chamber's size, the dropping out of the ecclesiastical members, and the substitution, wholly or in part, of specially designated members in the stead of the members who at present sit by hereditary right. As early as 1834 it was advocated that the archbishops and bishops of the Established Church should "be relieved from their legislative and judicial duties," and this demand, arising principally from the Non-conformists, has been voiced repeatedly in later years. In 1835 the opposition of the peers to measures passed by the Commons incited a storm of popular disapproval of such proportions that more than one of the members of the chamber gloomily predicted the early demolition of the body, and throughout succeeding decades the idea took increasing hold, within the membership as well as without, that change was inevitable. In 1869 a bill of Lord Russell providing for the gradual infiltration of life peers was defeated on the third reading, and in the same year a project of Earl Grey, and in 1874 proposals of Lord Rosebery and Lord Inchiquin, came to naught. The rejection by the Lords of measures supported by Gladstone's government in 1881-1883 brought the chamber afresh into popular disfavor, and in 1884 Lord Rosebery introduced a motion "that a select committee be appointed to consider the best means of promoting the efficiency of this House," with the thought that there might be brought into the chamber representatives of the nation at large, and even of the laboring classes. The motion was rejected overwhelmingly, but in 1888 it was renewed, and in that year the Salisbury government introduced two reform bills, one providing for the gradual creation of fifty life peerages, to be conferred upon men of attainment in law, diplomacy, and administrative service, and the other (popularly known as the "Black Sheep Bill") providing for the discontinuance of writs of summons to undesirable members of the peerage. The bills, however, were withdrawn after their second reading and an attempt on the part of Lord Carnarvon, in 1889, to revive the second of them failed.

III. The Question of the Lords, 1909-1911

111. The Lords and Money Bills.—In November, 1909, the issue was reopened in an unexpected manner by the Lords' rejection of the Government's Finance Bill, in which were included far-reaching proposals of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd-George, respecting the readjustment of national taxation. This act of the upper chamber, while not contrary to positive law, contravened in so serious a manner long established custom that it was declared by those who opposed it to be in effect revolutionary. Certainly the result was to precipitate an alteration of first-rate importance in the constitution of the kingdom. The priority of the Commons within the domain of finance was established at an early period of parliamentary history; and priority, in time, was converted into thoroughgoing dominance. As early as 1407 Henry IV. recognized the principle that money grants should be initiated in the Commons, assented to by the Lords, and subsequently reported to the crown. This procedure was not always observed, but after the resumption by the two houses of their normal functions following the Restoration in 1660 the right of the commoners to take precedence in fiscal business was forcefully and continuously asserted. In 1671 the Commons resolved "that in all aids given to the king by the Commons, the rate or tax ought not to be altered by the Lords," and a resolution of 1678 reaffirmed that all bills granting supplies "ought to begin with the Commons." At no time did the Lords admit formally the validity of these principles; but, by refusing to consider fiscal measures originated in the upper chamber and to accept financial amendments there proposed, the Commons successfully enforced observance of them.

Meanwhile, March 14, there had been introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Rosebery an independent series of resolutions, as follows: (1) that a strong and efficient second chamber is not merely a part of the British constitution but is necessary to the well-being of the state and the balance of Parliament; (2) that such a chamber may best be obtained by the reform and reconstitution of the House of Lords; and (3) that a necessary preliminary to such a reform and reconstitution is the acceptance of the principle that the possession of a peerage should no longer of itself involve the right to sit and vote in the House. The first two of these resolutions were agreed to without division; the third, although vigorously opposed, was carried eventually by a vote of 175 to 17.

114. The Enactment of the Parliament Bill, 1911.—The appeal to the country, in December, yielded results all but exactly identical with those of the elections of the previous January. The Government secured a majority of 127, and in the new parliament, which met February 6, the Parliament Bill was reintroduced without alteration. On the ground that the measure had been submitted specifically to the people and had been approved by them, the ministry demanded its early enactment by the two houses. May 15 the bill passed its third reading in the Commons by a vote of 362 to 241. During the committee stage upwards of one thousand amendments were suggested. But the Government stood firm for the instrument as originally drawn and, while it accepted a few incidental changes, in the end it got essentially its own way.

Meanwhile, early in May, Lord Lansdowne introduced in the upper chamber a comprehensive bill which put in form for legislation the programme of reconstruction to which the more moderate elements in that chamber were ready, under the circumstances, to subscribe. The Lansdowne Reconstruction Bill proposed, at the outset, a reduction of the membership of the chamber to 350. Princes of the blood and the two archbishops should retain membership, but the number of bishops entitled to sit should be reduced to five, these to be chosen triennially by the whole body of higher prelates upon the principle of proportional representation. The remainder of the membership should comprise lords of parliament, as follows: (1) 100 elected from the peers possessing carefully stipulated qualifications, for a term of twelve years, on the principle of proportional representation, by the whole body of hereditary peers (including the Scotch and Irish), one-fourth of the number retiring triennially; (2) 120 members chosen by electoral colleges composed of members of the House of Commons divided for the purpose into local groups, each returning from three to twelve, under conditions of tenure similar to those prevailing in the first class; and (3) 100 appointed, from the peerage or outside, by the crown on nomination by the premier, with regard to the strength of parties in the House of Commons, and under the before-mentioned conditions of tenure. It was stipulated, further, that peers not sitting in the House of Lords should be eligible for election to the House of Commons, and that, except in event of the "indispensable" elevation of a cabinet minister or ex-minister to the peerage, it should be unlawful for the crown to confer the dignity of an hereditary peerage upon more than five persons during the course of any single year.

IV. The Parliament Act of 1911 and After

116. Provisions Relating to Other Public Bills.—The second fundamental stipulation is that any other public bill (except one to confirm a provisional order or one to extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years) which is passed by the House of Commons in three successive sessions, whether or not of the same parliament, and which, having been sent up to the House of Lords at least one month, in each case, before the end of the session, is rejected by that chamber in each of those sessions, shall, unless the House of Commons direct to the contrary, become an act of Parliament on the royal assent being signified thereto, notwithstanding the fact that the House of Lords has not consented to the bill. It is required that at least two years shall have elapsed between the date of the second reading of such a bill (i.e., the first real opportunity for its discussion) in the first of these sessions of the House of Commons and the final passage of the bill in the third of the sessions. To come within the provisions of this act the measure must be, at its initial and its final appearances, the "same bill;" that is, it must exhibit no alterations save such as are rendered necessary by the lapse of time. And a bill is to be construed to be "rejected" by the Lords if it is not passed, or if amendments are introduced to which the House of Commons does not agree, or which the House of Commons does not suggest to the House of Lords at the second or third passage of the bill.

117. Effects of the Act.—By the provisions which have been enumerated the co-ordinate and independent position which, in law if not in fact, the British upper chamber, as a legislative body, has occupied through the centuries has been effectually subverted. Within the domain of legislation, it is true, the Lords may yet exercise influence of no inconsiderable moment. To the chamber must be submitted every project of finance and of legislation which it is proposed to enact into law, and there is still nothing save a certain measure of custom to prevent the introduction of even the most important of non-financial measures first of all in that house. But a single presentation of any money bill fulfills the legal requirement and ensures that the measure will become law. For such a bill will not be presented until it has been passed by the Commons, and, emanating from the cabinet, it will not be introduced in that chamber until the assent of the executive is assured. The upper house is allowed one month in which to approve or to reject, but, so far as the enactment of the bill is concerned, the result is the same in any case. Upon ordinary legislation the House of Lords possesses still a veto—a veto, however, which is no longer absolute but only suspensive. The conditions which are required for the enactment of non-fiscal legislation without the concurrence of the Lords are not easy to bring about, but their realization is not at all an impossibility. By the repeated rejection of proposed measures the Lords may influence public sentiment or bring about otherwise a change of circumstances and thus compass the defeat of the original intent of the Commons, and this is the more possible since a minimum period of two years is required to elapse before a non-fiscal measure can be carried over the Lords' veto. But the continuity of political alignments and of legislative policy is normally such in Great Britain that the remarkable legislative precedence which has been accorded the Commons must mean in effect little less than absolute law-making authority.