THE CORRESPONDENCE OF JOHN JAY. (continued 6)

The gazettes will furnish you with our latest intelligence. That of New York announces the arrival of near three thousand Hessian troops, and the capture of the Trumbull frigate. Neither of these is a very agreeable circumstance. However, we must wait the course of events, and struggle, as well as we can, against adverse fortune. Our affairs to the southward wear no unpleasing aspect. And, although it is impossible, at this distance, to determine what effect European movements may have on American politics, our government acquires daily a firmness and stability, which will not easily be shaken.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT MORRIS.

JAMES LOVELL TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, August 15th, 1781.

Sir,

Herewith you will receive according to the resolution of Congress of the 10th, such information relative to the surrender of Pensacola, and the subsequent arrival of the garrison at New York, as I have been able to obtain, which you will make use of according to your discretion, and the spirit of the enclosed resolution.

I am, Sir, your friend and very humble servant,

JAMES LOVELL.

P. S. August 16th.—It appears to me not amiss to enclose to you a report of a committee on the 10th, as it stands negatived on the journals of Congress. J. L.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Ildefonso, September 20th, 1781.

Sir,

Your Excellency's favor of the 5th of July last, with the papers therewith enclosed, were delivered to me on the 29th ult. by Major Franks, whom the procrastination of the Minister still obliges me to detain.

The new commissions, with which Congress have honored me, argue a degree of confidence, which demands my warmest acknowledgments, and which, so far as it may be founded on an opinion of my zeal and integrity, they may be assured will not prove misplaced.

At the commencement of the present troubles, I determined to devote myself, during the continuance of them, to the service of my country, in any station in which she might think it proper to place me. This resolution, for the first time, now embarrasses me. I know it to be my duty, as a public servant, to be guided by my own judgment only in matters referred to my discretion, and in other cases faithfully to execute my instructions, without questioning the policy of them. But there is one among those which accompanies these commissions, which occasions sensations I never before experienced, and induced me to wish that my name had been omitted.

So far as personal pride and reluctance to humiliation may render their appointment contra-agreeable, I view it as a very unimportant circumstance, and should Congress, on any occasion, think it for the public good to place me in a station inferior and subordinate to the one I now hold, they will find me ready to descend from the one, and cheerfully undertake the duties of the other. My ambition will always be more gratified in being useful than conspicuous; for, in my opinion, the solid dignity of a man depends less on the height or extent of the sphere allotted to him, than on the manner in which he may fulfil the duties of it.

But, Sir, as an American, I feel an interest in the dignity of my country, which renders it difficult for me to reconcile myself to the idea of the sovereign independent States of America submitting, in the persons of their Ministers, to be absolutely governed by the advice and opinions of the servants of another sovereign, especially in a case of such national importance.

That gratitude and confidence are due to our allies, is not to be questioned, and that it will, probably, be in the power of France almost to dictate the terms of peace for us, is but too true. That such an extraordinary extent of confidence may stimulate our allies to the highest efforts of generous friendship in our favor is not to be denied, and that this instruction receives some appearance of policy from this consideration may be admitted.

I must, nevertheless, take the liberty of observing, that however our situation may in the opinion of Congress render it necessary to relax their demands on every side, and even to direct their Commissioners ultimately to concur (if nothing better could be done) in any peace or truce not subversive of our independence, which France determined to accede to, yet that this instruction, besides breathing a degree of complacency not quite republican, puts it out of the power of your Ministers to improve those chances and opportunities, which in the course of human affairs happens more or less frequently to all men. Nor is it clear, that America, thus casting herself into the arms of the King of France, will advance either her interest or reputation with that or other nations.

What the sentiments of my colleagues on this occasion may be, I do not as yet know, nor can I foresee how far the negotiation of the ensuing winter may call for the execution of this commission. Thus circumstanced, at such a distance from America, it would not be proper to decline this appointment. I will, therefore, do my best endeavors to fulfil the expectations of Congress on this subject, but, as for my own part, I think it improbable, that serious negotiations for peace will soon take place. I must entreat Congress to take an early opportunity of relieving me from a station, wherein, in character of their Minister, I must necessarily receive (and almost under the name of opinions) the directions of those on whom I really think no American Minister ought to be dependent, and to whom, in love for our country and zeal for her service, I am sure that my colleagues and myself are at least equal.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

P. S. I had an interview last evening with the Minister. Nothing was promised or denied. A person is to be named on Sunday to confer in earnest, as it is said, with me about the treaties. I do not despair, though having so many bills to pay, and no money, perplexes me extremely. The treasury of Spain is very low; much of the money for the expenses in this war costs them between thirty and forty per hundred, by mismanagement and want of credit. This ought not to be public. His Excellency still looks at your ships on the stocks, but I shall, without refusing, not consent to their changing masters. J. J.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Ildefonso, October 3d, 1781.

Sir,

My letter of the 25th of April last, by Mr Toscan, informed Congress, that on the 30th day of January preceding, I had the honor of receiving their letters of the 6th and 17th of October, 1780, the latter of which states particularly and ably the right of the United States to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, and enumerates the various reasons which induce them to decline relinquishing it.[30]

Among these reasons is the guarantee contained in the treaty with France. I hinted to Congress, that it was more than probable, that the contents of this interesting letter were well known to the French Court before it came to my hands. I am well persuaded, that this was the case. Shortly after receiving it, I took occasion to converse generally with the Ambassador on the subject of the Spanish pretensions to that navigation, and remarked, as it were inadvertently, how unreasonable it was for them to expect, that we should relinquish a territorial right, which both justice and the guarantee of France enabled us to retain. The thought did not appear new to him, but he strongly combated this construction of the treaty, and endeavored to explain it away by observing, that the guarantee could not comprehend claims, whose objects we had never possessed, &c. &c. I mention this only to show how improper it would have been for me to have communicated this part of your Excellency's letter to the Spanish Minister. It could have answered no good purpose, because, as France would have disputed this construction, Spain could with propriety have refused to admit the force of any argument drawn from it, and it might have done much mischief, not only by bringing on an unseasonable explanation between France and us, but also between Spain and France.

If I had given the Spanish Minister a copy of every other part of this letter, except those paragraphs which contain the reasoning in question, the omission might in future have been urged by France, who I verily believe has a copy of that whole letter, as an argument for my having yielded that point as not tenable; and though my opinion might not be of much consequence, it appeared to me most prudent to avoid doubts about it. For my own part I really did, and do think, that this guarantee does comprehend the navigation in question, though I also think, that no question should be raised about it at present. So circumstanced, I thought it most advisable to make no written communications of any parts or part of this letter, but from time to time to press every argument contained in it in the course of conversations with the Spanish Minister, except those drawn from the guarantee.

The Minister, however, did not at any time enter into the merits of these arguments, nor appear in the least affected by them. His answer to them all was, that the King of Spain must have the Gulf of Mexico to himself, that the maxims of policy adopted in the management of their colonies required it; and that he had hoped the friendly disposition shown by this Court towards us would have induced a compliance on the part of Congress.

As to a free port below the northern limits of West Florida, or anywhere else in the vicinity, the Minister sometimes wished certain regulations, some middle line might be devised, to reconcile the views of both parties, but he did not see how it could be done. The King had always been accustomed to consider the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of Mexico as a very important object to Spain, more so indeed than even Gibraltar, and he was persuaded, that his Majesty would never be prevailed upon to change his ideas on that subject. At other times he spoke clearly, and decidedly against it, saying, that it was their desire to exclude all nations from the Gulf, and that it made little or no difference, whether they admitted all nations or only one.

In my letter of the 25th of April last, I informed your Excellency, that on the 25th of March preceding, the Minister sent me word, that the money necessary to pay the bills due in April could not be advanced to me. The constant inconsistency I experienced between the Minister's promises and conduct often surprised, as well as embarrassed me. This last instance appeared to me to be really cruel; for if he had intended to withhold the necessary supplies, he ought to have given me notice of it, and not by keeping up my expectations to within a few days before the holders of the bills were to call upon me for their money, (and the bills of April amounted to eightynine thousand and eightythree dollars,) reduce me to such imminent danger of being obliged to protest them. Speaking on this subject with the French Ambassador, he intimated, that the Court expected I should have made them some further overtures respecting the Mississippi. I told him I had no authority to make any others than what I had already made. He replied, that the Minister believed I had. At that time I had received no letters, public or private, which gave me the least reason to suspect, that Congress had passed the resolution of the 15th of February last,[31] and it was not before the 18th of May, that a letter, I then received from Mr Lovell, enabled me to understand the reason of the Minister's belief. I then recalled to mind his frequent assurances of frankness, and of his speaking without reserve, often adding, that he was well informed of our affairs, and had minute information of what was passing at Philadelphia. There can be no doubt but that some copies of the President's letters to me have fallen into his hands, and that he supposed I had received others, though this was not in fact the case. Hence it appears, that the double miscarriage, if I may so call it, of these letters, had an unfavorable influence on our hopes of pecuniary aids, for it is highly probable, that in this instance they were so critically withheld on purpose to extort overtures from me, which the Minister, though mistaken, had reason to believe I was in a capacity to make.

Your Excellency will perceive from this, how important it is, that your letters, to and from your Ministers, be transmitted in a manner not subject to these inconveniences.

It was not, as I said before, until the 18th of May, that Mr Lovell's letter, enclosing a copy of the resolution of Congress of the 15th of February, reached me. It was brought to Cadiz by the Virginia, and it is remarkable, that none of the journals, or gazettes, nor the letter from Congress, which Mr Lovell gave me reason to expect, ever came to my hands. But as all the papers brought by the Virginia passed through the hands of the Governor of Cadiz, and afterwards through the Post Office, the suppression of some of them may be easily accounted for.

As Mr Lovell's letter did not appear to be official, nor the copy of the instruction of the 15th of February authenticated, I was much at a loss to determine how far it was to be considered as a measure finally concluded upon, and this difficulty was increased by another, viz. whether my having no letter on the subject from the President was to be imputed to the miscarriage of it, or to a reconsideration of the instruction in question; for I recollected, that resolutions had in some former instances been reconsidered, and either altered or repealed a few days after their date; for these reasons it appeared to me imprudent immediately to hazard overtures on the ground of this instruction.

The next day, the 19th of May, I thought it expedient to wait upon the Minister, and again renew the subject of our proposed treaty, expecting that if he was acquainted with the contents of my letter, something might drop from him in the course of conversation, which would lead me to judge of what he might, or might not know on that subject, and others connected with it.

He received me with more than usual cordiality. The conversation turned at first on the situation of the southern States, the late combat between the fleets in the Chesapeake, and General Greene's retreat. He appeared to apprehend much danger from what he called the delicate situation of our army there, and the blockade of the reinforcement intended for it, under the Marquis de la Fayette. I endeavored to remove such of his fears as appeared to be ill-founded, and (though without leaving room to suppose that the operations of Spain were indispensable to our safety,) represented to him the good policy and probable success of France and Spain's seriously turning their attention and force to the expulsion of the enemy from America. I then repeated what I had often before remarked to him, respecting the influence which the hesitations and delays of Spain in forming a treaty with us must naturally have on the hopes and fears of Britain. I announced to him formally the completion of our confederation by the accession of Maryland, and after dwelling on the advantages, which the States and their allies might expect from it, I endeavored to impress him with an opinion, that a cordial union between France, Spain, Holland, and America, supported by vigorous measures, would soon reduce the enemy to the necessity of listening to reasonable terms of peace.

The Count replied, generally, that he was very minutely informed of the state of our affairs. That the good dispositions of Congress towards Spain had not as yet been evinced in a manner the King expected, and that no one advantage had hitherto been proposed by America to Spain, to induce the latter to come into the measures we desired. That the views of Congress were such as would not permit his Majesty to form a treaty with the States, but that the King was an honest man, and I might again and again assure Congress, that he would never suffer them to be sacrificed to Britain, but on the contrary would with constancy maintain the friendship he had professed for them. That Britain had in vain attempted to deceive Spain; that Mr Cumberland had been sent here for that express purpose, but that, however possible it might be for Britain to vanquish, she would never be able to deceive Spain; that he wished Congress had been more disposed to oblige the King. He knew indeed that opposition in sentiments must necessarily prevail in public bodies, but that he hoped for the best. That I ought to preach to them forcibly, for that he thought a good preacher (un bon prédicateur,) would do much good, thereby intimating, as I understood it, that Congress were not sufficiently apprised of the importance of Spain, and the policy of complying with her demands.

To all this I briefly remarked, that his Excellency's knowledge of American affairs must convince him, that it was not in their power to give his Majesty other proofs of their attachment than what they had already done, and that if he alluded to the affair of the Mississippi, I could only add one remark to those which I had often made to him on that head, viz. that even if a desire of gratifying his Majesty should ever incline Congress to yield to him a point so essential to their interest, yet it still remained a question whether new delays and obstacles to a treaty would not arise to postpone it.

The Count smiled, said he always spoke frankly, and that whenever I should announce to him my having authority to yield that point, I might depend on his being explicit, and candid, but as matters stood at present, he could say nothing on that head. He then informed me, that M. Gardoqui would set out for America the beginning of June. He said it might be in my power to furnish some useful hints and observations relative to the objects and conduct of his mission, adding that he reposed full confidence in me, and wished that I would also consider whether there were any particular reasons which might render it advisable, either to hasten or retard his going.

I suspected there was too much meaning in all this to admit of my entering into these discussions without time for further reflection; and, therefore, without seeming to avoid it, I told the Count I was happy to hear, that M. Gardoqui was so near his departure. That I considered myself much honored by his requesting my remarks relative to it, and that I was sure Congress would draw agreeable conclusions from his mission. That I should write by him to Congress, and as they would expect to learn from me the precise character in which they were to receive, and consider him, it became necessary, that his Excellency should favor me with that information, as well to enable me to transmit the proper advices to Congress, as to make the remarks which he had done me the honor to request. That I conceived this to be the more indispensable, because if M. Gardoqui should carry no public testimonials from this Court to Congress, he could only be considered by them as a private gentleman, and all his intercourse with Congress would of consequence be subjected to all the inconveniences resulting from it.

This topic carried the conversation off the delicate ground to which the Count had led it. He admitted the propriety of my being exactly apprized of the nature of M. Gardoqui's commission, said that as yet it was not decided, and therefore for the present could only give me his opinion of what it would probably be.

He observed that circumstances did not render it proper, that he should go as Minister, though perhaps it might he proper to give him contingent powers. That it was the common practice, where Courts sent to each other persons charged with their affairs, in a character below that of Minister, to give no other credentials than a letter of advice from the Minister of the Court sending to the Minister of the Court receiving the person in question. That the same practice was about to be pursued by Spain towards Prussia, and had been observed in other instances; therefore, he believed the like method would be adopted in this case. That if it should be purposed to give M. Gardoqui a letter authenticating his being an agent of Spain, it would be either to the President, or the Secretary of Congress, and asked me which of the two would be the most proper.

Whether he really was uninformed on this point, or whether he asked the question merely to try my candor, cannot easily be determined. I told him honestly, that Congress had no Secretary or Minister of State for general purposes, nor for foreign affairs particularly, and that neither the President nor Secretary of Congress could regularly be considered in that light. That there was a committee of Congress, whose appointment came near to that of Secretary for foreign affairs, but that I had heard Congress were about establishing a more proper and regular mode of conducting the affairs committed to that committee, and had perhaps already done it. That therefore it was difficult for me to give his Excellency a clear and decided opinion on the subject, and the more so as the letters which I daily expected to receive from the President, and which probably contained exact information relative to this very matter, had not yet come to my hands. He seemed very well satisfied, and extended his civilities so far as to say, that if at any time the warmth of his temper had led him into any harshness of expression, he hoped I would forget it. I told him, and that was the fact, that I did not recollect any part of his behavior to me, which required that apology. He desired me to wait upon him again on the Wednesday next.

As to the instructions of the 15th of February, I had every reason to wish it had been a secret to the Ministry. The propriety of them is a subject without my province. To give decided opinions of the views and designs of Courts always appeared to me hazardous, especially as they often change, and as different men will often draw different conclusions from the same facts. This consideration has constantly induced me to state facts accurately and minutely to Congress, and leave them to judge for themselves, and be influenced only by their own opinions.

I could not forbear, however, seeing the danger to which the proviso contained in that instruction exposed me. I have no reason to flatter myself, that, more fortunate than others, the propriety and policy of my conduct will not be drawn, at least impliedly, into doubt. If I should, on a persuasion that this cession would be unalterably insisted upon by Spain, yield that point, I am certain that many little half-created doubts and questions would be cast into, and cultivated in America. If, on the other hand, I should be of opinion that this point could be gained, and the event prove otherwise, it would soon be whispered, what rich supplies and golden opportunities the United States had lost by my obstinacy.

I permitted my mind to dwell on these considerations, merely that I might, by the utmost degree of circumspection, endeavor to render the uprightness and propriety of my conduct as evident as possible.

My only difficulty arose from this single question. Whether I could prudently risk acting on a presumption, either that Spain did not already, or would not soon be acquainted with the contents of this instruction. If such a presumption had been admissible, I should, without the least hesitation, have played the game a little further, keeping this instruction in my hand as a trump card, to prevent a separate peace between Spain and Britain, in case such an event should otherwise prove inevitable. Had Spain been at peace with our enemies, and offered to acknowledge, guaranty, and fight for our independence, provided we would yield them this point, (as once seemed to be the case) I should, for my own part, have no more hesitation about it now than I had then. But Spain being now at war with Great Britain, to gain her own objects, she doubtless will prosecute it full as vigorously as if she fought for our objects. There was and is little reason to suppose that such a cession would render her exertions more vigorous, or her aids to us much more liberal. The effect, which an alliance between Spain and America would have on Britain and other nations, would certainly be in our favor, but whether more so than the free navigation of the Mississippi is less certain. The cession of this navigation will, in my opinion, render a future war with Spain unavoidable, and I shall look upon my subscribing to the one as fixing the certainty of the other.

I say I should have played this game a little further, if the presumption before mentioned had been admissible, because it has uniformly been my opinion, that if after sending me here Congress had constantly avoided all questions about the Mississippi, and appeared to consider that point as irrevocable, Spain would have endeavored to purchase it by money, or a free port, but as her hopes of a change in the opinion of Congress were excited, and kept alive by successive accounts of debates, and intended debates on that question, and as Congress by drawing bills without previous funds had painted their distress for want of money in very strong colors, Spain began to consider America as a petitioner, and treated her accordingly. But as by the intervention of Dr Franklin, our bills for near six months were safe, and as after this resolution of the 15th of February, there was reason to expect that the subject of it would not soon be resumed in Congress, I should, in case I could have depended on this instruction's being and remaining a secret, have thought it my duty to have given the United States a fair trial for the Mississippi, or at least for a free port near it. With this view I should have appeared to give myself no concern about the bills, applied for no aids, made no offers, and on all proper occasion have treated an alliance with Spain as an event, which, though wished for by us, was not essential to our safety, and as the price demanded for it appeared to us unreasonable, it was not probable we should agree. I think we should then have been courted in our turn, especially as the Minister was very desirous of having our men-of-war on the stocks, and that thus dealing with them on terms of equality, would have produced some concessions on their part, as inducements to greater ones on ours. I am persuaded in my own mind, that prudent self-respect is absolutely necessary to those nations, who would wish to be treated properly by this Court, and I have not the least doubt but that almost any spirit will prosper more here, than that of humility and compliance. I had no doubt but that this plan of conduct would have been perfectly consistent with that part of the instruction, which orders me to make every possible effort to obtain from his Catholic Majesty the use of the river aforesaid, &c. For whatever might have been, or may be, my private sentiments, they shall never in mere questions of policy influence me to deviate from those of Congress.

But on the other hand there being abundant circumstantial evidence to induce a firm persuasion, that the Ministry were well acquainted with the contents of this instruction, this plan would have been idle. The moment they saw that the cession of this navigation was made to depend upon their persevering to insist upon it, it became absurd to suppose, that they would cease to persevere. All that remained for me therefore to do was, in the next conference to break this subject as decently as possible, and in such a manner as would account for my not having mentioned this instruction at our last meeting.

On Wednesday evening, the 23d of May, I waited upon the Count agreeably to his appointment. The Count seemed a little hurried in his spirits, and behaved as if he wished I had not come. He asked me rather abruptly, if I had anything particular to communicate to him, and whether I had received any further letters. I told him I had received some private ones from L'Orient, but that none from the President of Congress had as yet, reached me, though I had reason to expect one by that opportunity, as well as by the vessel lately arrived at Cadiz. I informed him of my having received from Mr Harrison a copy of his memorial to the Governor of Cadiz, complaining that letters brought for him by the Virginia, from Philadelphia, had been stopped at the gates, on pretence, that they must agreeably to an ordinance for that purpose be put into the post office, and charged with the like postage as if brought from Spanish America. He said he had not yet received a copy of the memorial, but that there was such an ordinance, and that it was highly proper the admission of letters into the kingdom, especially in time of war, should be under the direction of government. That letters from North America rendered new regulations necessary, and that he would turn his thoughts to this subject, and do what should appear equitable. This was another proof of what I before suspected, and looked like an indirect apology for opening my letters.

It surprised me a little that he said nothing of the remarks he had desired me to make on M. Gardoqui's going to America, especially as he had appointed this meeting for that purpose. To give him further time, I started a new subject, and begged he would take the earliest opportunity of completing the business of the Dover cutter. Notwithstanding all that had before passed between us about this affair, he affected to be very ignorant of it, and asked me a number of questions. I recapitulated the circumstances of the capture, my several applications to him on the subject, his promise finally to order the prize to be appraised, and the value to be paid to the captors, the arrival of one of them at Madrid, &c. &c. He replied, with some degree of quickness and perplexity, that it was not a lawful prize, the crew not having authority to do what they did; that he had sent to the Canaries for particular information respecting the value, &c. that two of the packet boats had been taken; that he would pay some gratuity to the captors, and wished I would give him another state of the whole case in writing, to refresh his memory, which I promised to do, and have since done.

He then resumed the subject of the letter, which I expected from Congress. He expressed his regret at its not having arrived, said he was preparing instructions for M. Gardoqui, who would certainly depart in June, and that until I could give him precise information of the dispositions of Congress, he could not enter into any further conversations on the subject of the proposed treaty. I joined in regretting the miscarriage of my public letter, and the more so, as my private ones gave me reason to expect instructions, which would enable me to comply so far with his Majesty's views, as that I hoped no further delays would intervene to prevent a perfect union between Spain and the United States. That my correspondence had given me to understand that Congress viewed the speedy accomplishment of this union as very important to the common cause; and, therefore, if Spain would consent forthwith to come into it, in that case they would gratify his Majesty by ceding to him the navigation of the Mississippi, below their territories, on reasonable terms.

He replied, that he earnestly desired to see all difficulties on this point removed, but that the treaties subsisting between Spain and other nations, as well as the particular policy and determination of Spain, rendered it necessary that she should possess the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of Mexico. After a variety of other remarks of little importance, he made a very interesting observation, which will help us to account for the delays of the Court, viz. That all these affairs could with more facility be adjusted at a general peace than now, for that such a particular, and even secret treaty with us might then be made, as would be very convenient to both. That he nevertheless wished to know exactly the views and intentions of Congress, but that I must wait for the arrival of my letters, and that he would in the meantime finish M. Gardoqui's instructions, whose going to America, he did not doubt, would make a useful impression on the English Court. I was beginning to reply to what he said when he interrupted me, by mentioning his not having time at present to prolong the conference.

Throughout the whole of this conversation, the Count appeared much less cordial than in the preceding one; he seemed to want self-possession, and to that cause I ascribe his incautiously mentioning the general peace as the most proper season for completing our political connexions. I had, nevertheless, no reason to suspect that this change in his behavior arose from any cause more important than those variations in temper and feelings, which they, who are unaccustomed to govern themselves often experience from changes in the weather, in their health, from fatigue of business, or other such like accidental causes.

As I had not as yet received any letter from the President, either by the Virginia, or the vessel lately arrived at L'Orient, nor by Colonel Laurens, who, I was informed, had brought letters for me, I concluded it would be most prudent to wait ten days, or a fortnight, before I proceeded to act on the copy of my instruction received from Mr. Lovell, expecting that such other letters as might then have arrived in France or Spain for me, would reach me in the course of that interval, if at all. And I determined, in case I should receive none, to proceed, without further loss of time, to make a formal overture to the Minister for a treaty on the ground of this instruction. It happened, however, that the Minister was so occupied during the remaining time that the Court staid at Aranjues, by the expedition preparing to sail from Cadiz, under the Duke of Crillon, and other matters, that it was impossible to engage a moment of his attention to American affairs. The removal of the Court to Madrid necessarily consumed some time, and as soon as they were well settled there, I wrote the Count the following letter; none of the letters expected from America having come to my hands.

TO THE COUNT DE FLORIDA BLANCA.

Madrid, July 2d, 1781.

"Sir,

"When Congress were pleased to order me to Spain, with the commission of which I have had the honor of presenting a copy to your Excellency, I left my country with the most sanguine expectations, that the important objects of it would be speedily accomplished. The proofs they had received of his Majesty's friendship for them, the interests of a common cause, and the information they had received from persons whom they conceived in capacity to give it, all conspired to infuse these hopes.

"On my arrival, your Excellency gave me to understand, that the realising these expectations would turn on one point, and I have uniformly since been informed, that this point was the navigation of the Mississippi below the territories of the United States, in which Congress desired to retain a common right, but of which the maxims of policy adopted by his Majesty required the exclusive use.

"I have now the honor of informing your Excellency, that Congress, in order to manifest in the most striking manner the sincerity of their professions to his Majesty, and with a view that the common cause may immediately reap all the advantages naturally to be expected from a cordial and permanent union between France, Spain, and the United States, have authorised me to agree to such terms relative to the point in question, as to remove the difficulties to which it has hitherto given occasion.

"Permit me, therefore, to hope, that his Majesty will now be pleased to become the ally of the United States, and for that purpose authorise some person or persons to adjust with me the several points of compact necessary to form a union, which, by being founded on mutual interest, may be no less satisfactory than it certainly will be important to both countries.

"Your Excellency will oblige me exceedingly, by putting it in my power to give Congress early, explicit, and, let me add, agreeable information of his Majesty's pleasure and intentions on the subject of this letter.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

Although it was sufficiently evident, that the Court of France could not, for the reasons assigned in my letter to Congress, of the 6th of November, 1780, openly and warmly interpose their good offices to bring about this treaty, it nevertheless appeared to me most prudent, to behave on this occasion towards the Ambassador, as if I knew nothing of those reasons, and, therefore, sent him a copy of the aforegoing letter to the Minister, enclosed in one of which the following is a copy.

TO THE COUNT DE MONTMORIN.

"Madrid, July 2d, 1781.

"Sir,

"I have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency herewith enclosed, a copy of a letter I have this day written to his Excellency, the Count de Florida Blanca. I have thereby informed him of my being authorised to remove the objections hitherto made by the Court of Spain to a treaty of alliance with the United States, and again requested that the measures necessary for the purpose may now be taken.

"Permit me to request, that the favorable interposition of our kind and generous ally with his Catholic Majesty may be exerted to commence the proposed negotiation, and bring it to a speedy and happy conclusion.

"The confidence justly reposed by America in the amity and assurances of his Most Christian Majesty, forbid me to urge this request by any arguments, (persuasives being indelicate, when not warranted by doubts of inclination.) I am happy in reflecting, that his instructions on this subject are committed to the execution of a Minister, from whose attachment, as well as from whose talents and address, the American cause may expect to derive advantage.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

The instructions above alluded to are those, which Count de Vergennes, in his letter to me of the 13th of March, 1780, assures me should be sent to their Ambassador here. I must confess to Congress, that I very much doubt his ever having received any other instructions, than generally to favor the treaty, and to manage his interference in such a delicate manner, as, without alarming the pride of Spain, to give both parties reason to think themselves obliged.

The French Ambassador sent me no answer to this letter, which, in my opinion, gives a greater degree of probability to my conjectures. I must, nevertheless, do him the justice to say that I have great reason to believe him to be in sentiment, and with sincere attachment, a friend to our cause; and that he considers the honor and interest of France deeply concerned in the success and support of it.

On the 11th of July, having received no answer from the Minister, I waited upon him. He told me, he had received my letter, but that the short time the Court would remain at Madrid, and the multiplicity of business that he was obliged to despatch, would not admit of his attending to our affairs till after the arrival of the Court at St Ildefonso. He then informed me, that a vessel had arrived at Cadiz, which had brought despatches for me, and that his courier had brought them to Madrid. He then delivered me a number of letters, among which was one from his Excellency the President, of the 28th of May last.[32]

I need not observe, that all these letters bore evident marks of inspection, for that has uniformly been the case with almost every letter I have received.

I do not recollect to have ever received a letter that gave me more real pleasure. When I considered, that almost the whole time since I left America had afforded me little else than one continued series of painful perplexities and embarrassments, many of which I neither expected, nor ought to have met with; that I had been engaged in intricate and difficult negotiations, often at a loss to determine where the line of prudence was to be found, and constantly exposed by my particular situation to the danger of either injuring the dignity and interest of my country on the one hand, or trespassing on the overrated respectability and importance of this Court, on the other; I say, Sir, that on considering these things, the approbation of Congress gave me most singular and cordial satisfaction.

I was also happy to perceive from this letter, that the plan of my late letters to the Minister and French Ambassador, of the 2d of July, above recited, happens to correspond exactly with the views of Congress, respecting the manner of conducting this negotiation.

It appearing to me, that the communication I was directed to make to this Court could not be better made than in the very words of this letter, which seemed exceedingly well calculated for the purpose, I recited them in a letter, which I wrote two days afterwards to the Minister, viz.

TO THE COUNT DE FLORIDA BLANCA.

Madrid, July 13th, 1781.

"Sir,

"I have now the honor of communicating to your Excellency a copy of certain instructions I have just received from Congress, dated the 28th of May, 1781, and which were included in the despatches, which your Excellency was so obliging as to deliver to me the evening before the last, viz.

"It is their instruction, that you continue to acknowledge on all suitable occasions, the grateful impression made on these States by the friendly disposition manifested towards them by his Catholic Majesty, and particularly by the proofs given of it in the measures which he has taken, and which it is hoped he will further take for preserving their credit, and for aiding them with a supply of clothing for their army.

"You are also authorised and instructed to disavow in the most positive and explicit terms, any secret understanding or negotiation between the United States and Great Britain, to assure his Catholic Majesty that such insinuations have no other source than the insidious designs of the common enemy, and that as the United States have the highest confidence in the honor and good faith, both of his Most Christian and his Catholic Majesty, so it is their inviolable determination to take no step, which shall depart in the smallest degree from their engagements with either.'

"It gives me pleasure to observe that these instructions confirm, in the fullest manner, the assurances and professions I have heretofore made to your Excellency respecting the sentiments and dispositions of the United States, and I flatter myself that his Majesty will be pleased to consider the assurances they contain, as receiving unquestionable proofs of sincerity from the offer I have already made to confirm them by deeds, no less important to the interests than, I hope, consistent with the views and desires of his Majesty.

"I cannot omit this occasion of presenting my congratulations on the success of his Majesty's arms at Pensacola. This event cannot fail of being followed by important consequences to the common cause, and may perhaps induce the enemy to expect greater advantages from concluding a reasonable peace, than continuing to protract an unrighteous war.

"Having understood, shortly after receiving my letters from your Excellency, that the Court had also received despatches from Philadelphia, I presumed that the communication of any gazettes from thence, which indeed contain all the intelligence I have, would be useless, and therefore did not send them; but on considering that it was possible that the papers I had might be of later date than those which your Excellency might otherwise receive, I now take the liberty of enclosing two, which contain accounts somewhat interesting. If they should be new to your Excellency, I beg that their not being sooner sent will receive an apology from the abovementioned circumstance; and that your Excellency will remain assured of the perfect respect and consideration with which I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

I also took the earliest opportunity of mentioning to the Ambassador of France, that my letters from America gave me reason to believe that our union was daily growing more warm and intimate, and that Congress, in writing of their affairs here, had expressed themselves in the strongest terms of attachment to his Most Christian Majesty, and not only approved of my communicating freely and confidentially with his Ambassador here, but also directed me in express terms to endeavor, in the course of my negotiations, to include and promote the interests of France.

The Ambassador was much pleased. He told me his letters assured him that the best understanding subsisted between the French and American troops, and that much good might be expected from the increasing harmony and intercourse between the two countries.

The Court removed to St Ildefonso without the Minister's having either given any instructions to M. Gardoqui, answered my abovementioned letters, or taken the least notice of my late representations to them about the Dover cutter, &c.

The events of the campaign were as yet undecided, and little money in the treasury.

On the 21st of July the Minister wrote me the following note, in which there was ample field left open for procrastination.

Translation.

"The Count de Florida Blanca presents his compliments to Mr Jay, and has the honor of acquainting him, that he has duly received his two letters of the 2d and 13th instant. The short stay of the Court at Madrid allowing time only to despatch the most pressing business, the Count de Florida Blanca has not been able to take into consideration the points, which form the object of the abovementioned letters. He proposes therefore to do it at present, in order to render an account thereof to the King, and in the meanwhile he has the honor to repeat to Mr Jay the assurances of the most perfect esteem and consideration.

"St Ildefonso, July 21st, 1781."

On the 4th of August, I arrived here. I did not see the Minister till the 8th, he being, as I was told, from home. He had made no communications to the King. He had been sick; he had been busy, and was so still. I requested to be informed when it would be most convenient to him to confer with me on the subject of my late letters, and to give me such information relative to his Majesty's intentions, as he might be prepared to communicate to me. He answered, that he could not then fix a time, being exceedingly hurried by pressing business. He asked how long I proposed to stay, I told him till the Court removed. He then promised to take an early opportunity of conferring with me on the subject of our affairs, and promised to send me word when he should be ready to receive me.

I remained in this state of suspense and expectation until the 18th of August, when having been for a week past very much indisposed with a fever and dysentery, and fearing lest that circumstance might become a ground of delay, I wrote the Count word, "that my health would permit me to wait upon his Excellency at any time and place he might do me the honor to name." He replied two days afterwards, in a manner which indicated his supposing I had gone to Madrid and had returned. He must have known better, for none of my family had been absent from hence, and one or other of them were almost daily about the palace and gardens.

Translation.

"The Count de Florida Blanca is charmed to learn, that Mr Jay has sufficiently recovered from his last indisposition to make the journey from Madrid to this place, and thanks him for his attention in communicating it to him.

"The very pressing business with which he finds himself at present surrounded does not permit him to fix the day for a conference with Mr Jay, but the moment he shall be a little disengaged, he will have the honor to advise Mr Jay of it.

"St Ildefonso, August 20th, 1781."

On the 22d I sent him a note enclosing a newspaper, which contained an account of General Greene's operations, the capture of Fort Watson, &c.

The Count answered this note by another, expressing his thanks for the intelligence, but not a word of a conference.

On the 30th of August Major Franks arrived here with interesting despatches, of which I must not here take notice, lest I interrupt the thread of this letter, which I devote particularly to the affair of our negotiations for a treaty.

There was indeed among these despatches a very sensible letter from Mr R. Morris to me about money matters,[33] &c. excellently well calculated for being shown entire to the Minister.

I consulted with the French Ambassador on the propriety of giving the Minister a copy of it. He advised me to do it, and much commended the letter. As it might have suffered from being carelessly translated, I had it put into very good French.

I was very glad to see the Major. The nature of the despatches he brought being a secret occasioned speculation, and gave me an opportunity of drawing further advantages from his arrival. His accounts of American affairs were favorable to us, and the manner of his behavior and conversation has not done discredit to himself, nor prejudice to his country.

The Ambassador of France having assured me that the Minister had really been a good deal indisposed, I thought it would be best to write him a letter in a style somewhat adapted to his situation. He certainly appears to be fatigued, and worn down by business. He looks as I have seen some members of Congress look, after two years' attendance.

TO THE COUNT DE FLORIDA BLANCA.

"St Ildefonso, September 3d, 1781.

"Sir,

"When I consider that the delicate state of your Excellency's health demands a greater degree of leisure and relaxation, than the various business of your office will permit, it is with great reluctance, that I can prevail upon myself to remind your Excellency, that since our conference at Aranjues, the affairs of the United States at this Court have made no progress.

"The short residence of his Majesty at Madrid, I am persuaded, made it necessary to postpone the discussion of these affairs to this place; and since my arrival here on the 4th of August last, I have daily flattered myself with being enabled to communicate to Congress his Majesty's pleasure on the important subjects, which by their order I have had the honor of laying before your Excellency.

"It has also for some time past been my duty to have requested your Excellency's attention to some other objects, which, though of less public importance, are nevertheless interesting to individuals, as well as to the commercial intercourse of the two countries, but it did not appear to be consistent with the respect due to your Excellency to solicit your attention to new objects, while this former remained undespatched for want of time.

"It would give me great pleasure to have it in my power to regulate all my applications by your Excellency's convenience, and though I am happy to see the connexion between our two countries daily increasing, yet as that circumstance will naturally render necessary applications to government more frequent, I fear the duties of my situation will often press me to be troublesome to your Excellency.

"On Friday evening last I received some important despatches from Congress, which I shall do myself the honor of communicating at any time, which your Excellency may be pleased to name. The gentleman who brought them, will after passing on to Paris, return immediately to Philadelphia, and will with pleasure execute any orders which your Excellency may honor him with, for either of those places. His stay here will be but short. As soon as I can ascertain the day of his departure, your Excellency shall have immediate notice of it. As Congress will naturally expect to receive by him particular information respecting their affairs here, I cannot forbear expressing how anxious I am to make him the bearer of welcome tidings; and permit me to hope, that your Excellency's sensibility will suggest an apology for the solicitude which appears in this letter.

"I have the honor to be, with great respect, &c.

JOHN JAY."

On the 5th, I received the following answer, viz.

Translation.

"The Count de Florida Blanca has been much mortified not to be able to receive the visit of Mr Jay, not only on account of the too pressing business, which has engaged all his time, but also by reason of the indisposition he has suffered, and still suffers.

"Although he be not in a situation to engage in long and serious conferences for the reasons abovementioned, he will, nevertheless, be charmed to converse a moment with Mr Jay, one of those leisure evenings when there is no business with the King; in which case, Mr Jay may, if he thinks proper, bring with him the officer in question.

"Saturday, for instance, towards eight o'clock, the interview may take place."

Wednesday, the 5th of September.

Your Excellency will be pleased to observe, that the Minister in the above note intimates a desire that I should bring Major Franks with me. I thought it best to do so; but lest his presence should be a check upon business, and as it was natural to suppose, that the Count would begin by asking him questions about our affairs, I desired the Major to relate to him the impression made in America by that article in the capitulation of Pensacola, which permitted the garrison to go to New York. I also desired the Major to retire into the ante-chamber and leave me alone with the Minister, as soon as the latter should appear to have finished with him.

At the time appointed, viz. the evening of the 8th of September, we waited upon the Minister.

The Count received us very politely. He spoke much of his want of health, and how greatly it incapacitated him for business. He then asked the Major several questions about our military operations. The Major answered them clearly, and, in speaking of the proposed siege of New York, very naturally introduced an account of the surprise and apprehensions occasioned by the permission given to the Pensacola garrison to join that of New York. The Count confessed it was ill done; said it was very unexpected, and that they ought to have been sent to Europe; that the like should not happen in future, and that proper orders upon that subject should be despatched to their Generals. He then observed, that our fears were not altogether well founded, for that those troops were restrained by the capitulation from taking arms against the allies of Spain till exchanged, and could not operate against our troops without also operating against those of France, who were joined with them, and who, it was well known, were the allies of Spain. The Major replied, that it was feared that the enemy would attempt to evade this reasoning, by insisting that the French troops in America were only to be considered as auxiliaries to the United States, and that though that argument might be fallacious, yet, that in matters affecting America, the enemy had invariably neglected good faith, whenever they found it convenient.

The Count asked how long the Major would stay here. I told him, that I only detained him in expectation of being soon enabled by his Excellency to write something decisive by him to Congress on the subjects under his consideration. He said he hoped in the course of next week to enter into serious conferences with me on those subjects, and that he would give me notice of the day. He offered to give the Major letters to the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, and to do him any other services in his power. He then rose from his chair in a manner indicating indisposition, said he was unable to do business, and that M. Del Campo should inform me when it would be convenient for him that I should see him again. I expressed my regret at his illness, and gave him the French translation of Mr Morris's letter, adding, that I had intended to offer him some remarks on the subject of it. He said he would read it with pleasure. He spoke of Mr Morris's appointment, and after conversing a few minutes about the good consequences expected from it, and of the services done by that gentleman to Spain, in some business they had committed to his care, we parted.

Thus this conference ended as fruitless as the last.

Eight days elapsed. I heard nothing from the Minister. He was daily at Court, and every evening took his ride.

I repeatedly mentioned and complained of these delays to the French Ambassador. He regretted them, promised to speak to the Minister on the subject; but, I believe, did not. I appeared much dissatisfied, though not with him; and told him, that if Major Franks returned to America with no other intelligence than that of repeated delays, it was more than probable that Congress would be much hurt, as well as much disappointed. He had the same fears, and advised me to detain the Major.

It became in my opinion important, that the Minister, as well as the French Ambassador, should be seriously apprehensive of my dismissing the Major with letters, that would render Congress very little disposed to make sacrifices to this Court. The manner of doing this required some caution. I could think of nothing better than to prepare a letter to the Minister, and send the Ambassador a fair copy of my draft for his consideration and advice.

The following are copies of that letter, and of the one I sent with it to the Ambassador.

TO THE COUNT DE MONTMORIN.

"St Ildefonso, September 16th, 1781.

"Sir,

"The paper herewith enclosed is the draft of a letter, which I think of writing to his Excellency, the Count de Florida Blanca.

"The subject, as well as the occasion, demands that dexterous and delicate management, of which they only are capable, who possess an accurate judgment and much experience in affairs of this kind.

"I am happy, therefore, that on such occasions I can avoid the risk of committing errors, by recurring to your friendly advice. Without compliment, but with sincerity,

I am, Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY."

TO THE COUNT DE FLORIDA BLANCA.

"Whatever may be the issue of the American revolution, whether that country shall continue independent, or be doomed to reunite her power with that of Great Britain, the good will and affection of the people of North America cannot in either case be unimportant to their neighbors; nor will the impressions made upon their minds by the benefits or injuries, which they may receive from other nations in the course of their present struggles, ever cease to have a certain degree of influence on their future conduct.

"Various circumstances led Congress at an early period to suppose, that the Court of Spain had wisely and generously determined to take a decided part in their favor. The supplies granted to them by his Catholic Majesty, soon after the British armies became numerous in America, spoke this language in strong terms, and the assurances repeatedly given me by your Excellency, that his Majesty would firmly support their cause, and never consent to their being reduced to the subjection of Britain, left no room to doubt of his friendly disposition and intentions towards them.

"Many obvious considerations prompted Congress to desire, that an intimate connexion might speedily be established between the two countries by such treaties as would take from the enemy every prospect of success, and secure to Spain and the United States the permanent enjoyment of mutual advantages and reciprocal attachment. With this view Congress were pleased to send me to Spain, and the first letter I had the honor of receiving from your Excellency gave me reason to believe, that the object of my mission was not displeasing to his Majesty; unavoidable and long delays were, nevertheless, created by differences respecting a certain important right, which America wished to retain. So strong, however, was the reliance of Congress on his Majesty's assurances of support, and such was their disposition to render the proposed treaties consistent with his inclinations, that they have since agreed to remove the only obstacle, which seemed to prevent his Majesty from realising those assurances by substantial aids and an open declaration of his intentions.

"But unfortunately for America, and perhaps for the general cause, the delays in question have not ceased with the cause to which they were ascribed, and although the confidence reposed by Congress in his Majesty's assurances will not permit them to doubt of his determination to support their independence, yet the silent inattention, with which their offers to remove the former obstacle to a treaty have long laid unanswered, must appear to them as being very singular. Your Excellency has indeed repeatedly promised me to name a time when I should have an opportunity of conferring with you on that and other subjects submitted to your consideration, but it constantly happened that the expectations excited by these promises proved abortive.

"Knowing that Congress would expect to receive by the return of Major Franks particular information respecting their affairs here, I was anxious to send them some intelligence more welcome than I have reason to think a detail of delays and procrastination would be, in a season when they would be indulging the most flattering expectations from the measures they had taken to gratify his Majesty. For this reason I informed your Excellency, that I should detain Major Franks for the present, and your Excellency promised me on the 8th instant, that you would appoint some time in the ensuing week for entering into a serious conference about these matters, and that M. Del Campo should give me notice of it. That week, however, has passed away without having been witness to any such notice or conference.

"I think your Excellency will do me the justice to acknowledge that the utmost respect, delicacy, and patience, have been observed in all my transactions with your Excellency, and therefore I cannot forbear hinting that my constituents are at least entitled to that species of attention, which the most dignified sovereigns usually pay to the friendly propositions of such States, as solicit either their aid or alliance in a decent manner, viz. a candid answer.

"I am sensible that Spain possesses a higher degree on the scale of national importance than the United States, and I can readily admit, that the friendship of this Court is of more immediate consequence to America, than that of America to the Spanish empire. But as his Catholic Majesty and his Ministers doubtless extend their views beyond the present moment, it would ill become me to remark, how essential it is to the happiness of neighboring nations, that their conduct towards each other should be actuated by such passions and sentiments only, as naturally tend to establish and perpetuate harmony and good will between them. Most certain it is, that in whatever manner the negotiations between Spain and North America may terminate, various good or evil consequences will in future naturally and necessarily flow from it to both.

"There is good reason to believe, that the apparent indecision of Spain, relative to an open acknowledgment of the independence of the United States, has inspired other nations with doubts and conjectures unfavorable to the American cause, and on the other hand, it is more than probable that, if his Catholic Majesty would be pleased to declare to the world, that the United States were his allies, and that he had given his royal word to support their independence, Holland and many other nations would follow his example.

"On such an event, also, it might not be difficult to form a permanent alliance between France, Spain, the Dutch and the United States, and thereby not only prevent a separate peace between the Dutch and English, but effectually reduce the latter to reasonable terms of general pacification.

"The limits of a letter forbid my enlarging on these topics. The eyes of America, and indeed of all Europe, are turned towards Spain. It is in the power of his Catholic Majesty to increase his friends and humble his enemies. I will only add my most sincere wishes, that the annals of America may inform succeeding generations, that the wisdom, constancy, and generous protection of his Catholic Majesty, Charles the Third, and of his Minister, the Count de Florida Blanca, are to be ranked among the causes that insured success to a revolution, which posterity will consider as one of the most important and interesting events in modern history.

JOHN JAY."

The Ambassador called upon me in the evening to answer my letter.

He observed, that the delays of which I complained were not singular, but that others, and even himself, experienced the like. That he had reason to believe this Court were really disposed to treat with us, though the time when might be doubtful. That the remarks made in the draft of my intended letter were but too just; that he feared they would give offence; that at any rate, he thought I had better postpone it, and for the present write one less pointed, and more laconic. We had much conversation on the subject, unnecessary to repeat. It ended in my consenting to pursue his advice.

It is observable, that he did not offer to return me the draft of this letter, though I had agreed to suppress it.

The letter which, agreeable to the Ambassador's advice, I substituted in the place of the other, is in these words, viz.

St Ildefonso, September 17th, 1781.

"Sir,

"A reluctance to despatch Major Franks without transmitting by him to Congress the information they expect to receive, on the subject I have had the honor of submitting to your Excellency's consideration, has induced me hitherto to detain him, especially as I was encouraged to hope that your Excellency would have found leisure last week for entering into serious conference with me on those important points. The same reluctance prevails upon me to detain him another week, and I think it my duty to inform your Excellency that he will set out on Saturday next.

"I need not remark to your Excellency, that if the letter I may then write by him should not contain the desired intelligence, Congress will naturally be led to apprehend that their expectations of forming an intimate union with Spain were not well founded.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

On the 19th, I received the following answer.

Translation.

"The Count de Florida Blanca would have been charmed to have had it in his power to have a long conference with Mr Jay, if his ordinary indispositions had not prevented him; he will, therefore, have the honor to see him this evening about eight o'clock, if Mr Jay will give himself the trouble of waiting on him, either alone or with Major Franks, and in communicating to the King the result of their conference, he will endeavor to prevail on his Majesty to name some other person to confer with Mr Jay in case of need, in order to avoid, as much as possible, the embarrassments which Mr Jay has hitherto experienced.

Wednesday, 19th of September, 1781."

I waited upon the Count at the time appointed. The following is a copy of my notes of that conference.

Notes of a Conference held at St Ildefonso, on Wednesday Evening, the 19th of September, 1781, between his Excellency, the Count de Florida Blanca, and Mr Jay, agreeably to the appointment of the former.

The Count introduced the conference by asking for Major Franks, and why Mr Jay did not bring him with him. Mr Jay answered, that as Major Franks was not charged with the transaction of any business with his Excellency, and had, at a former interview, answered such questions relative to American affairs as the Count had thought proper to ask him, Mr Jay did not think his attendance on this occasion necessary, as he supposed his Excellency meant to enter at present into the discussion of the matters referred to in Mr Jay's last letter.

The Count then proceeded to enumerate the various obstacles arising from his ill health, the multiplicity of business, which had so long subjected Mr Jay to the delays he had hitherto experienced, and which, for his part, he could not but regret; that agreeable to his promise made to Mr. Jay soon after his arrival, and frequently afterwards repeated, he had attempted to commit to paper his sentiments on the various points on which the proposed treaties must turn, and although he had made some progress in it, he had, for the reasons abovementioned, been obliged to leave it imperfect; that daily experience convinced him that his official business was too extensive and various to admit of his application to other objects, especially as his indisposition often rendered it impracticable for him to pay a due attention to it; that he, therefore, conceived it necessary that some person, duly authorised to confer with Mr Jay on these subjects, should be appointed by his Majesty; that he intended on Sunday next to recommend this measure to the King, to whom he would at the same time communicate the copy of Mr Morris's letter to Mr Jay, which the latter had given him; that in order to the putting of this matter in proper train, it would be expedient for Mr Jay previously to commit to paper his ideas of the outlines of the proposed treaties, and particularly to state the propositions he might think proper to make relative thereto; that he had been informed, that the treaties between France and America had been preceded by the like measures; for that the American Commissioners had first offered a plan of propositions, and then M. Gerard was appointed to confer with them before those treaties were drawn into the state they now appear, and finally concluded. That the like proceedings were rendered particularly necessary in this case, by the variety and importance of the points necessary to be adjusted between Spain and America; that in forming political connexions between nations, constant regard must be had to their reciprocal interests, and care taken, by previous arrangements, to avoid the inconveniences which would result from any clashing of interest; that three great points presented themselves, as requiring great attention, in forming the proposed connexion between Spain and America.

1st. The aids requested by America, as stated in Mr Morris's letter, were very considerable; that it would be necessary, on the part of Spain to determine what pecuniary aids it might be in their power to grant either by loan or subsidy, as well as the time, place, and manner of payment; for that great punctuality was requisite in such transactions, as well that the royal engagements might be properly fulfilled, as that Congress might not be subjected to inconveniences and disappointments; that on the part of America, it must be ascertained what compensation they should make, as well as the time and manner of doing it; and that it might be well to consider how far such compensation might be made in ship timber, or other productions of that country; that a compensation would be indispensable, for that the King, being only the guardian of his dominions, would not think himself justifiable in dispensing with the just rights of his people.

2dly. That the commercial concerns of the two countries was another point, which would call for very accurate and important regulations. That so far as this commerce would respect the United States and old Spain, the difficulty would not be very great; for that such commerce being in a considerable degree permitted to other nations, America ought also to participate in the benefits of it. But with respect to the Spanish dominions in America, as all other nations were excluded from any direct commerce with any part of them, the United States could not reasonably expect to be on a better footing than other nations, and particularly the French, who were the near allies of Spain.

3dly. That with respect to the proposed treaty of alliance, Mr Jay must be sensible, that the several engagements, which would thereby be rendered necessary between the parties, the matters of boundary, and the navigation of the Mississippi, would give occasion to several important articles, which ought to be maturely considered and well digested. To this end, he wished that Mr Jay would immediately turn his thoughts on these subjects, and offer him such a set of propositions, as might become the basis of future conferences between him and the person whom he expected his Majesty would appoint.

The Count then took occasion to observe, that he had long wished Mr Jay had offered him such propositions, but that his Court had as yet received from Congress nothing but good words and fair assurances, and that though his Majesty had given them some little aids, yet they had discovered no disposition, by acts, to acknowledge them. Mr Jay reminded his Excellency of his having, at a very early day, undertaken to commit to paper the outlines of the proposed treaties, and that the constant expectations of his perfecting it, had restrained Mr Jay from offering anything of the like nature on the subject. That he could conceive of nothing in the power of Congress to do, which could more fully evidence their disposition to gratify his Majesty, than their having offered to recede from their claims to the navigation of the Mississippi, though the preservation of it was deemed of the highest importance to their constituents. The Count admitted the propriety of both these observations, and said he hoped that the delays, which had so long embarrassed Mr Jay, would soon be terminated.

Mr Jay expressed his anxiety to be enabled to communicate to Congress some decided intelligence, respecting the aids they might expect from this Court; to which the Count replied, that the sum requested was great, the expenses of the kingdom very extensive, and the means of obtaining the sums necessary to defray them subject to many difficulties; that he would, as he had before mentioned, communicate Mr Morris's letter to the King, and, until that was done, he could not be in capacity to say anything further on the subject; that as the appointment of a person to confer with Mr Jay would rest with his Majesty, he could not say who in particular it would be, but he hoped, and was persuaded that it would be some person well-intentioned towards America; that he was the more confirmed in this expectation, from the friendly disposition, which the King had early and constantly manifested towards that country; that he would again repeat what he had before told Mr Jay, viz. that the King, when acting in capacity of mediator for a peace, had refused to permit that country to be sacrificed; that since the rupture with Britain, tempting and advantageous offers had been made to him to withdraw his protection from America, and conclude a separate peace; that he had rejected these offers, and still continued determined to support the States; that this conduct ought to be viewed as extremely generous, as no political connexions or engagements did then, or do as yet subsist between the two countries. Mr Jay assured his Excellency that the magnanimity of this conduct had made a deep impression on the people of America; that nothing but want of opportunity would ever prevent their expressing it more strongly than by words, and that the sense they entertained of it, had greatly influenced the late measure they had taken to comply with his Majesty's desires. The Count then pressed Mr Jay again to send him the paper above mentioned before Sunday, adding that he sincerely wished nothing might be wanted to put the business in a proper train; that for his part, he had the best disposition towards America, as well as personal regard for Mr Jay, and, after adding some complimentary expressions relative to the character of the latter, he concluded.

I was a little surprised that the Count should expect to receive from me, in the course of three days, formal propositions on the several points stated in this conference. But it would not have been proper for me to desire further time.

On the 22d of September, I sent him the following letter and propositions.

"St Ildefonso, September 22d, 1781.

"Sir,

"I have the honor of transmitting, herewith enclosed, the propositions requested by your Excellency on Wednesday evening last.

"I have endeavored to render them as short and simple as possible, and I flatter myself that the unreserved frankness with which they are written will be no less agreeable to your Excellency, than I am sure it is consistent with the desire and disposition of my constituents.

"As the issue of this measure will in a great degree ascertain the expectations which Congress entertain from their negotiations here, and as they flatter themselves with receiving information on this subject by the return of Major Franks, they will doubtless excuse my detaining him another week, unless your Excellency should sooner be enabled to communicate to me his Majesty's pleasure relative to the proposed treaty.

"Permit me to entreat your Excellency, therefore, to enable me to transmit by him such intelligence to Congress, as may relieve them from their present distressing doubts and uncertainties.

"I sincerely hope it may be such as may make them happy in a prospect of soon seeing an intimate and lasting union established between France, Spain, and the United States, a union which, by being raised on the solid foundation of mutual interest and reciprocal advantages, may secure to each the blessings of uninterrupted tranquillity. This generous policy pervades the treaties already formed between his Most Christian Majesty and the United States, and I am happy in being persuaded, that the magnanimity of his Catholic Majesty's conduct towards my country, on this and other occasions, will furnish materials for some bright pages in the American annals.

"I have the honor to be, Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY."

Here follow the propositions alluded to, and sent enclosed in the preceding letter.

"St Ildefonso, September 22d, 1781.

"As the time allowed Mr Jay for offering such propositions, as may become the basis of the proposed treaty between his Catholic Majesty and the United States of North America, is very short, he should fear the consequences of haste and inaccuracy, if he were not persuaded that the candor, with which they will be received, will secure him from the inconveniences to which these circumstances might otherwise expose him.

"Mr Jay presumes that it is not expected he should offer a plan of a treaty drawn at length, but only general propositions, which may be so modified and enlarged, as on due consideration and discussion may appear expedient. With this view, he begs leave to present the following as the basis of a treaty of amity and alliance, viz.

PROPOSITIONS.

I.

"There shall forever subsist an inviolable and universal peace and friendship between his Catholic Majesty and the United States, and the subjects and citizens of both.

II.

"That every privilege, exemption, and favor, with respect to commerce, navigation, and personal rights, which now are, or hereafter may be granted, by either, to any the most favored nation, be also granted by them to each other.

III.

"That they mutually extend to the vessels, merchants, and inhabitants of each other, all that protection, which is usual and proper between friendly and allied nations.

IV.

"That the vessels, merchants, or other subjects of his Catholic Majesty, and the United States, shall not resort to, or be permitted (except in cases which humanity allows to distress,) to enter into any of those ports or dominions of the other, from which the most favored nation shall be excluded.

V.

"That the following commerce be prohibited, and declared contraband between the subjects of his Catholic Majesty and the United States, viz.

"All such as his Catholic Majesty may think proper to specify.

Remarks. "On this proposition Mr Jay can offer nothing, but an assurance of his being ready to concur in every reasonable regulation that may be proposed.

VI.

"The United States shall relinquish to his Catholic Majesty, and in future forbear to use, or attempt to use, the navigation of the river Mississippi from the thirtyfirst degree of north latitude, that is, from the point where it leaves the United States, down to the ocean.

Remarks. "The impression made upon the United States by the magnanimity of his Majesty's conduct towards them; the assistance they hope to receive from the further exertions of the same magnanimity; the deep wound which an alliance with so great a monarch would give to the hopes and efforts of the enemy; the strong support it would afford to their independence; the favorable influence which the example of such a King would have on other nations, and the many other great and extensive good consequences which would result at this interesting period from his Majesty's taking so noble and decided a part in their favor, have all conspired in prevailing upon Congress to offer to relinquish in his favor, the enjoyment of this territorial and national privilege, the importance of which, to their constituents, can only be estimated by the value they set upon his Majesty's friendship.

"By this proposition, the United States offer to forego all the advantages and conveniences, which nature has given to the country bordering on the upper parts of that river, by ceasing to export their own, and receiving in return the commodities of other countries by that only channel, thereby greatly reducing the value of that country, retarding its settlement, and diminishing the benefits which the United States would reap from its cultivation.

"Mr Jay thinks it his duty frankly to confess, that the difficulty of reconciling this measure to the feelings of their constituents, has appeared to Congress in a serious light, and they now expect to do it, only by placing in the opposite scale the gratitude due to his Catholic Majesty, and the great and various advantages, which the United States will derive from the acknowledgment and generous support of their independence by the Spanish monarchy, at a time when the vicissitudes, dangers, and difficulties of a distressing war, with a powerful, obstinate, and vindictive nation, renders the friendship and avowed protection of his Catholic Majesty in a very particular manner interesting to them. The offer of this proposition, therefore, being dictated by these expectations and this combination of circumstances, must necessarily be limited by the duration of them, and consequently, that if the acceptance of it should, together with the proposed alliance, be postponed to a general peace, the United States will cease to consider themselves bound by any propositions, or offers, which he may now make in their behalf.

"Nor can Mr Jay omit mentioning the hopes and expectations of Congress, that his Majesty's generosity and greatness of mind will prompt him to alleviate, as much as possible, the disadvantages to which this proposition subjects the United States, by either granting them a free port, under certain restrictions, in the vicinity, or by such other marks of his liberality and justice, as may give him additional claims to the affection and attachment of the United States.

VII.

"That his Catholic Majesty shall guaranty to the United States all their respective territories.

VIII.

"That the United States shall guaranty to his Catholic Majesty all his dominions in North America.

Lastly.

"As the aforegoing propositions appear to Mr Jay the most essential, he omits proposing those less and subordinate ones, which seem to follow of course. He therefore concludes this subject with a general offer and propositions to make and admit all such articles as, in the course of this negotiation, shall appear conducive to the great objects of the proposed treaty.

Remarks. "Nothing on Mr Jay's part shall be wanting to expedite the happy conclusion of this business, by adhering constantly to the dictates of candor, frankness, and unsuspecting confidence.

"He is ready to receive the treaty between the United States and his Christian Majesty, as a model for this, or with such alterations as, founded on the principles of reciprocity, may be more agreeable to his Catholic Majesty, it being his earnest desire to arrive at the important objects of his mission in any way his Majesty may be pleased to prefer.

"The subject of aids, either by subsidy or loan as may be most convenient to his Majesty, will require a particular convention, but as the manner, extent, and terms depend on his Majesty's pleasure, it is impossible for Mr Jay, without some knowledge of it, to offer propositions adapted thereto. All that he can at present say on that subject is, that Congress are ready to do everything in their power. He will not, however, endeavor to conceal their incapacity to do much in the way of compensation, while the enemy shall continue to make the United States the theatre of a desolating war, and the object of their predatory operations. But when those obstacles shall cease, it will be in their power, as well as their inclination, to make retribution, and render important services to his Majesty. Mr Jay will therefore continue to decline attempting to induce his Majesty to take any measures, however favorable to his country, by delusive promises, or rash engagements; but on the other hand, he is ready to enter into such reasonable ones, as he may have good reason to say shall be faithfully and punctually performed.

"A particular treaty regulating the conduct to be observed by his Catholic Majesty, and the United States, towards each other during the war, also appears to Mr Jay important to both; but as the proper plans and articles of such a treaty can only result from a free conference on the subject, he can upon this occasion only express his readiness to concur in every provision, which may be calculated to give energy and success to the operations and objects of both.

JOHN JAY."

Your Excellency will be pleased to observe, that among my remarks on the sixth proposition, I have limited the duration of the offer contained in it. I did this from a persuasion, that such limitation was not only just and reasonable in itself, but absolutely necessary to prevent this Court's continuing to delay a treaty to a general peace. Besides what the Minister dropped upon this head in his conference with me at Aranjues, I think it probable that they still wish to adhere to that idea. To me they appear desirous of avoiding the expense that the aids, which a treaty we should expect would render unavoidable, and which at present would not be very convenient for them. They wish to see our independence established, and yet not be among the first to subscribe a precedent, that may one day be turned against them. They wish not to exclude themselves, by any present engagements, from taking advantage of the chances and events of the war, not choosing on the one hand, that in case we sink, that we should be fastened to them by any particular ties, nor on the other hand, in case we survive the storm, to be so circumstanced as not to make the most of us. I think it is their design, therefore, to draw from us all such concessions as our present distress, and the hopes of aid may extort, and by protracting negotiations about the treaty, endeavor to avail themselves of these concessions at a future day, when our inducements to offer them shall have ceased. As this would evidently be unjust, I think the limitation in question can give them no offence, and I hope Congress will be pleased to communicate to me their sentiments on the subject.

I must also remark, that after what has passed, and considering how well they are acquainted with my instructions, it would not only have been useless, but absurd, to have made these propositions otherwise than agreeably to those instructions.

Congress may at first view be a little surprised at the extent of the fifth proposition, but when they compare it with the second, I am persuaded they will find it sufficiently restrained.

In forming these propositions, it was my determination to leave them so free from disputed, or disputable points, as that no plausible pretexts for delay should arise from the face of them. I am well apprised, nevertheless, that in the course of the negotiation, it will be impossible for me to prevent their practising as much procrastination as they may find convenient. Almost the only hope I have of their seriously doing business arises from their fearing, that the instruction respecting the Mississippi will be recalled the moment that either any very decided successes on our part in America may render a treaty with Spain of less importance to us, or a general treaty of peace give us different views and prospects.

These are my conjectures and opinions. Perhaps they may prove erroneous; as facts accompany them, Congress will be enabled to judge for themselves. I will add, that from everything I can hear, the King is honestly disposed to do us good, and were he alone to be consulted in this business, I believe it would soon be concluded.

On the 23d of September, the foregoing propositions were to be laid before the King. I heard nothing further from the Minister until the 27th, when he sent me the following note.

Translation.

"Although the last letter of Mr Jay, accompanied with a certain plan, was transmitted on Saturday in the evening to the Count de Florida Blanca, and although he could not inform himself of their contents until translated from the English, he nevertheless did not fail to render an account thereof to the King in his despatch of Sunday. His Majesty having then shown himself disposed to appoint some person to confer with Mr Jay, it is become necessary to prepare a suitable instruction, and present it to the King for his approbation. The Count de Florida Blanca flatters himself, that he shall be able to arrange this affair before the departure of the Count for the Escurial, and in the meanwhile, he has the honor to transmit to Mr Jay a passport for Major Franks.

"Thursday, September 27th, 1781."

I have been given to understand, though not officially, that M. Del Campo, the Minister's Secretary, is the person who will be appointed to confer with me, and though that gentleman is constantly about the Minister, yet it seems, that a set of formal instructions are to be prepared for him. When the Minister will be able to find either time or health to complete them is uncertain.

There is reason to believe, that still less progress would have been made in this affair, had Major Franks not have arrived. I regret his detention, but hope the reasons assigned for it will be deemed sufficient; I am perfectly satisfied with him.

Notwithstanding Congress had given me reason to expect, that the plan of drawing bills upon me had been laid aside, I have now bills to the amount of between seventy and eighty thousand dollars to pay, and no funds provided. What am I to do? Dr Franklin writes me, that so far from being able to give me further aids, he does not expect to have it in his power even to pay our salaries in future.

From the facts stated in this letter, Congress will perceive that this Court neither refuse nor promise to afford us further aid. Delay is their system; when it will cease I cannot conjecture, for that is a question which I doubt whether they themselves have as yet determined.

I am indebted largely to Mr Harrison for money advanced by him to distressed seamen. He ought to be paid, and it is so far from being in my power to do it, that I have been reduced to the mortifying necessity of desiring him for the present to hold his hand. A great many of this valuable class of people are confined in English gaols, without other means of obtaining their enlargement than by entering into the enemy's service. They complain bitterly of being neglected by their country, and I really think not without reason. Retaliation ought to be practised, and if we have not a sufficient number of marine officers and seamen in our power to make the objects of it, why would it be improper to substitute landsmen?

As to Portugal, I have more than once spoken to the Minister on the subject. He admits the justice of our being treated by that as by other neutral nations. He has promised to interfere in our behalf, but nothing efficacious has yet been done. To send an agent there, could do no harm, and might do good; I am therefore for it. The Ambassador of France thinks with me, that before that step is taken, it ought to be confidentially communicated to this Court, and I am persuaded difficulties will arise from it. I shall do my best.

M. Gardoqui's departure is uncertain. He is still attending the orders of the Court. I doubt his receiving them till the campaign closes, and perhaps not then.