Chapter IX · THE AUDIENCIA AND THE GOVERNOR: THE AD INTERIM RULE

The most extensive non-judicial activity in which the audiencia participated at any time was its assumption of the provisional government of the colony during vacancies in the governorship. Aside from the ten different occasions on which this was done, the audiencia very frequently assumed control of the government when the exigencies of defense and foreign conquest rendered necessary the temporary absence of the governor. This was true at irregular intervals during the administrations of Governors Pedro Bravo de Acuña (1602–1606), Juan de Silva (1609–1616), Juan Niño de Tavora (1626–1632), Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera (1635–1644) and Diego Fajardo (1644–1653). The administrations of these several governors were characterized by extensive military operations, largely in a foreign field, and the audiencia not only took over governmental affairs but it assumed the obligations of defense during their absence. On such occasions, of course, the tribunal retained its exercise of judicial functions.

Since the audiencias in Perú and New Spain assumed the government much earlier than did the audiencia in the Philippines, and as the laws authorizing the rule of the audiencia were promulgated first to meet conditions in those viceroyalties, it seems advisable to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the establishment and development of this practice there. Having done this, we shall proceed to a study of the ad interim rule of the Audiencia of Manila, noting particularly the causes of the success or failure of its administration and the effect of this practice upon the subsequent relations of the audiencia and the governor.

We may gather from these various citations taken from the early history of the audiencias of South America that these tribunals not only exercised the authority of governing ad interim, but that they had permanent governmental and administrative powers as well. It would seem, as Professor Moses has suggested, that the original purpose of the Spanish government had been to entrust the executive and administrative functions in the dependencies to the audiencia, and that the endowment of the viceroys and captains-general with extensive executive powers was an expedient to which Spain was obliged to turn after the breakdown of the audiencia as an administrative agency. The main fact to be emphasized in this connection is that during the period of the promulgation of the laws which we are now studying, the minor audiencias were exercising regular governmental powers.

Although the audiencia of 1528–1535 exercised the administrative functions above mentioned, Bancroft brings forth no evidence in support of the theory that it was ever the royal intention to entrust the institution of the audiencia permanently with administrative authority. He states that as early as 1530, three years after the establishment of the first tribunal in Mexico, the sovereigns had already decided to establish a viceroyalty. Although the audiencia was entrusted with the government for a few years, the above facts would seem to indicate that this was only a temporary arrangement. The audiencia’s chief attributes were judicial, and we have repeatedly noted that the principal object of its establishment, aside from the administration of justice, was to check the abuses of the captain-general.

In view of the fact that the next important law dealing with the question of the succession was not promulgated until 1600, a continuance of this survey of affairs in New Spain will not be necessary. The audiencia there did not again assume the government until 1612, and then only for a very short period. We have already noticed the conditions under which the Audiencia of Mexico was created, and the various occasions on which it assumed charge of the government. Though entrusted with the government upon its establishment, the example set by three years of its unsatisfactory rule convinced the Spanish monarch of the unwisdom of entrusting such governmental authority to the audiencia permanently. Therefore, a viceroy was sent out in 1535, and it was not until 1563 that the first law was promulgated which provided for the temporary government by the audiencia when there was a vacancy in the office of viceroy. This was thirteen years after such a law had been promulgated for Perú, and fourteen years after an audiencia had been created, with all the functions of government, at Santa Fé de Bogotá.

On the suppression of the audiencia in 1589, the administration of justice remained entirely in the hands of the lieutenant-governor and asesor. This position was first occupied by Rojas, and later by Morga, who succeeded to the same judicial duties and enjoyed the same prerogatives as had formerly belonged to the audiencia. In the absence of the tribunal, therefore, they assumed functions which elsewhere were carried out by the audiencia on the death of the governor or viceroy, partly because they had taken the place of the audiencia, and partly because they were lieutenants-governor. After the audiencia was re-established in 1598, Morga continued in charge of military affairs when the governor was absent or dead, while the audiencia administered the government, not by virtue of any laws relating especially to the Philippines, but seemingly because this was the general practice in all of Spain’s colonies. Morga’s defense of Manila against the Dutch in 1600 has been referred to in an earlier chapter.

Zúñiga, after describing the success of Oidor Almansa in putting down an insurrection of the Japanese, characterized the administration of affairs by the audiencia during this period as follows:

Vivero arrived in the colony on June 15, 1608. Vivero was the first of the military governors appointed from New Spain. Under this and succeeding arrangements, these governors exercised absolute control of military affairs, while the audiencia concerned itself solely with matters of government, the senior magistrate, of course, not participating in military affairs.

Corcuera presented a scheme of reform designed to remedy the evils resulting from the succession either of the audiencia or of an irresponsible military commander to the ad interim governorship. He recommended that the regularly appointed governor should be assisted by five commissioners, who should be military men, holding the respective commands of Fort Santiago, Cavite, the Port of Manila, Formosa, and the Parián. These were to be eligible in the order named in case of a vacancy. This plan, like so many of the schemes of the soldier governors, only took cognizance of the military side of the governor’s office. The marked tendency of these commanders was to continually underestimate the administrative and political phases of their positions. The plan of Corcuera was not adopted, however, and the viceroy continued to appoint temporary governors to succeed the audiencia when it assumed the government ad interim.

Governor Diego Fajardo, on July 10, 1651, wrote a letter to the king protesting against the policy of appointment which was then in force. He said:

As a result of the general dissatisfaction in the colony, which was reflected in the above letters, and in compliance with the repeated requests previously made for reform, the law of April 2, 1664, was proclaimed, and followed by the consulta of September 9, 1669, which has been already referred to. These laws still recognized the right of the Viceroy of New Spain to appoint governors temporarily, but these were no longer to be designated in advance from the residents of the Islands. While the senior magistrate was to have charge of military affairs, he was to seek the advice of such military officials as were stationed in the colony, “exercising very particular care and vigilance in all that pertains to military affairs, endeavoring to keep the presidios well stocked and provided with all the defenses necessary for whatever occasion may arise.” This, then, was a return to the practice which had prevailed prior to September 13, 1608, when the Viceroy of New Spain was first authorized to appoint a temporary governor in advance of the death of the incumbent. Although the audiencia assumed the government with partial legal justification from 1593 onward, the period from 1664 to 1719 may rightly be said to constitute the era of the audiencia’s authorized rule.

A great deal of dissatisfaction, both at the court and in the colony, had resulted from the audiencia’s assumption of the government at various times since 1664. We have already noted that the restoration of this authority to the audiencia was attended by the disgraceful quarrel between Coloma and Montemayor and the usurpation of Bónifaz in 1668. The Pardo controversy did not produce a favorable impression of the activities of the audiencia. Torralba’s dictatorship in the name of the audiencia from 1715 to 1717, conspicuous for the huge deficit in which it culminated, demonstrated the unfitness of the audiencia to be entrusted with the rule of the Islands.

Indeed, it may be said that the various experiments made by the monarchs during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries for the purpose of perfecting a system whereby the governorship could be satisfactorily filled ad interim had failed to demonstrate or develop any authority capable of maintaining harmony or decent government. Co-operation among the authorities of the colony was practically unknown. The royal disapproval was passed upon practically all the official acts of these interim administrations. The thirst for personal glory, and the desire for private gain invariably induced some official who was stronger than his contemporaries to assume control of affairs; thus the government of the colony was made repeatedly to subserve personal ends, and civil and political life was characterized by its strife and discord. The probabilities that the temporary administration of the audiencia would not be entirely successful had been recognized from the beginning, and in order to guard against its misrule the king had authorized the appointment of a temporary governor by the Viceroy of New Spain. It was unavoidable, however, that the audiencia should govern until the arrival of this official. For a time the alternative was tried of allowing the maestre de campo to assume the military command, but this resulted in such an incompetent rule that the former prerogatives of the audiencia were restored. Whether the audiencia was capable of governing successfully or not, it certainly had the power to make or mar the government of any other person or authority, whether he was regularly appointed by the king, or chosen temporarily by the viceroy.

The church, as represented by a succession of triumphant archbishops, had exercised the preponderance of power and authority throughout the forty years of strife, ending with the death of Governor Bustamante. We need not be concerned here with the various struggles and disagreements with governors and audiencias, but the fact remains that the church was the only institution existing during this period which was able to present a solid and united front to its enemies, or which manifested any symptoms of power, unity or royal approbation. The culmination of ecclesiastical power was virtually reached on October 11, 1719, when Governor Bustamante was murdered by emissaries of the church and Fray Francisco de la Cuesta, Archbishop of Manila, assumed the vacant governorship.

No further necessity for the observance of this law of succession arose until after the death of Governor Gaspar de la Torre, when, on August 15, 1745, the first envelope was opened in the presence of the audiencia. The post of archbishop being vacant at this time it became necessary to follow the directions prescribed by the second envelope. It was found that Fray Juan de Arrechedera, Bishop of Nueva Segovia, had been designated as the governor’s successor. The audiencia relinquished the control of affairs into his hands and he governed for a period of five years.

The prosecution of Dr. Santiago Orendaín occupied a large share of Espeleta’s attention during his administration. This controversy should be noted here because it illustrates the relations between the audiencia and an ecclesiastical governor. Orendaín had been the advisor (asesor) of Governor Arandía, and was held responsible for the repressive measures taken against the church during the administration of the latter. The rule of an unscrupulous prelate presented an excellent opportunity for revenge and Orendaín’s prosecution was unanimously demanded by the ecclesiastical element of the colony. The magistrates also welcomed the opportunity to retaliate upon a hitherto successful, but unpopular, rival. The fiscal brought action against Orendaín, who sought refuge in an Augustinian convent, whereupon the civil authorities forced an entrance into the asylum, seizing Orendaín and imprisoning him in Fort Santiago. The provisor of the ecclesiastical court excommunicated Magistrate Villacorta, who had exculpated Orendaín in his trial, but the ban was disregarded by the audiencia. A division over the question arose in the tribunal, and matters were assuming a threatening aspect, when the authorized appointment of Governor Rojo arrived. Espeleta gave up his office, and the first act of the new governor was to restore Orendaín to full favor as his counsellor. The affair of Dr. Orendaín illustrates a phase of Spanish colonial administration which is too characteristic to be left unnoticed here. Aside from the influence which Orendaín exercised over Governor Arandía, his persecution shows the measure of personal rancour which even a prelate might put into his administration, spending practically two years in the pursuit of revenge. In this he was supported by the audiencia. In this affair neither the church nor the audiencia were animated so much by motives of right and justice as they were influenced by personal feelings.

The rule of Archbishop Rojo from 1761 to 1764 was a notable one in the history of the Philippines. The principal event during his administration was the capture of Manila by the British. This furnished the occasion for the resistance of Oidor Simón de Anda y Salazar, in the name of the audiencia, both to the English and to the archbishop who had ordered his surrender. These events show the complete incapacity of an ecclesiastical governor of Rojo’s type and personality to fulfill the military requirements of his position. In the operations of Anda we note how a man of decisive action, energy, courage, and loyalty was able to force the issue and deprive the archbishop-governor of the executive functions which he had assumed legally, but which he was unable to dispense. This episode illustrates, furthermore, the general disregard of the laws which placed the governorship in the hands of a man who was unfit for its exercise, showing again that in the selection of a person to carry out the duties of governor the military side of the situation could not be disregarded.

A statement of the above facts aids in clarifying our view of Anda’s position. It certainly can be said that there was neither an audiencia nor a governor with sovereign powers in Manila; this lack furnished a reasonable basis for Anda’s claims. However clearly it was established that a vacancy existed in the governorship, his position would have been sufficiently tenable had it been based solely on the grounds that the archbishop had delegated him as lieutenant of the captain-general, with military powers. The archbishop-governor had granted him that title and those powers for the very purpose for which he had utilized them, namely, for the defense of the Islands against the British. In view of the support which was extended to Anda in his contention that he was governor and captain-general as long as the archbishop and the regularly constituted audiencia were prisoners, it is not easy to understand why it was necessary for him to justify himself by advancing the claim, first, that he was the audiencia, and, second, that he was the governor because he had the authority of the audiencia. The only accountable reason for this was probably the necessity of nullifying the commands of the archbishop which were being issued from the captured city. He may have felt that such measures were imperative in order to gain and retain the respect of the natives and provincial officials who were not under his immediate influence and who were consequently more independent and inclined to be insurrectionary and riotous. Yet, it is hardly possible that the legal arguments advanced in support of his claims were understood by this class.

It does not appear, moreover, that Anda was entirely justified in his argument by the laws. No doubt he was right in regarding himself as the audiencia, on the basis of the laws cited by him. However, the law did not at that time authorize the succession of the audiencia to a vacancy in the governorship. The cédulas of September 8, 1720, and of August 15, 1731, were still in force in the Philippines, and by virtue of these and by the special cédula promulgated in 1761 in favor of Rojo, an ecclesiastic was authorized to act as governor in case of a vacancy. According to law and precedent, the post vacated by the archbishop-governor should have been filled by the bishop of Nueva Segovia, and by the bishop of Cebú, respectively. It is true that neither of these ecclesiastics put forth any effort to maintain their legal rights, probably for the reason that they realized their incapacity to organize and conduct the defense of the Islands as well as Anda had done. The audiencia had not succeeded to the government since 1715; it had been forbidden to do so in 1720 and subsequently. It is therefore difficult to understand how Anda could have seriously advanced the claim that in his capacity as sole oidor he should succeed to the government.

It would seem that Anda was supported in his resistance to Archbishop Rojo and the British largely on grounds of expediency. This is clearly brought out in a letter which Fiscal Viana wrote to the king on October 30, 1762, stating his opinion that:

This argument savors of expediency and sound practicability rather than of interest in the legal quibble. Had Viana been convinced of the legality of Anda’s claims he would not subsequently have supported Ustáriz. Viana contended that neither the archbishop nor the audiencia enjoyed sovereign powers when they were prisoners. Anda, on the other hand, was in such a position that he could utilize his legal powers; he used them to good advantage and effectively, therefore he was entitled to recognition.

Considering the question in its broadest phases, it cannot be said that the audiencia administered the ad interim rule with a great degree of success. This method of filling vacancies in the governorship failed for a number of reasons. Owing to the divided composition of the tribunal, the rivalry and personal jealousy of the magistrates and the perpetual quarrels and struggles which arose as a consequence, the periods of its rule became wild scrambles for power in which the strongest survived and reaped all the benefits of office. By their example, the oidores stimulated others to wrong-doing, and in their efforts to secure advantages for themselves they oppressed the residents, Spanish and native, with the burden of their misrule. They did not scruple to indulge in dishonest practices whenever occasion offered; indeed, they went out of their way to seek such opportunities.

Perhaps the gravest defect of the rule of the audiencia lay in its failure as an executive, owing to the divided character of its composition. There was much jealousy, but neither unity nor centralized responsibility. In their governmental capacity the oidores frequently enacted measures and made recommendations of a statesmanlike character, although they did not always succeed in enforcing them. The magistrates were neither experienced legislators nor trained soldiers, and the latter defect seems to have been a cause of considerable dissatisfaction, especially among the military classes. These were naturally jealous of an assumption of military power by lawyers, whose commands they refused to obey. Nevertheless it must be conceded that such individual oidores as Morga, Alcaraz, Almansa and Anda acquitted themselves of their military duties with great credit when called upon.

The reform which gave the government to the churchmen was designed to obviate the defects expressed above. It was believed that a prelate would not be open to so many ventures of a questionable and mainly commercial character. Moreover, the archbishops in Mexico and elsewhere had fulfilled the duties of the executive on former occasions with a fair degree of success. The church was the most powerful, highly centralized and unified institution in the Philippines at the time when both the audiencia and the governorship were weakest. The ecclesiastical authority had repeatedly triumphed over the civil government, and the former gave promise of being able to control matters more effectively in the future than the audiencia had done in the past. The rule of the churchmen did not remedy matters, however, except that it produced harmony through the exercise of force. During the rule of the archbishops, with the exception of that of Rojo, the audiencia was so completely dominated by the ecclesiastical power that the tribunal could scarcely be considered a factor in the government.

There were various defects in the rule of the ecclesiastics. Of these, perhaps the most prominent was their failure to meet the military requirements of the position. Because of the natural incongruity existing between ecclesiastical and military duties, they were obliged to delegate the command of the troops to military leaders, who thus exercised an influence never realized by them during the rule of the audiencia. Archbishop Rojo was unwilling to trust the problem of defense to any other person, though unable to cope with the situation himself. Hence Anda forced his way to the front because he was fitted to command and Rojo was not. As administrators and executives the prelates were as efficient as any others, but they were never able to reconcile successfully the opposition of the civil, political, and commercial elements, who were displeased with the rule of an ecclesiastic. Surprising as it may seem, the government of a prelate was usually most unsatisfactory to the churchmen and religious authorities. If the prelate-governor were a friar, his rule was resented by the members of all the rival orders. If he were a secular priest, he was opposed by the friars of all the orders.

The failure of Rojo was enough to condemn the practice of permitting ecclesiastics to assume the government, but aside from that, there was a more significant and fundamental reason. The increasing political authority of the church at that time, both in the colonies and in the mother country, its widespread and almost irresistible dominance over temporal affairs, demanded a radical change of policy whereby this dangerous ecclesiastical power could be checked. The rule of Anda, though technically based on that law which gave the succession to the tribunal, was not a typical instance of the government of the audiencia, nor did that period present all the features of such a rule. The influence of the audiencia as a body was practically nil. Anda governed because he was a strong man, not because he was sole oidor or because he was lieutenant-governor. His government was virtually a dictatorship, based on military power, but, nevertheless, just and benevolent. His extra-judicial actions met with the king’s approval, because they were efficient.

History will show that the Audiencia of Manila assumed temporary charge of the government because the distance and isolation of the colony rendered such a course necessary and because it was thought that the audiencia was best fitted to assume control. The government by the audiencia in the Philippines was not an isolated incident, but was typical of the entire Spanish colonial empire. Owing to the conditions which we have noted, and judged by the standards which constitute good government, the rule of the audiencia was neither successful nor satisfactory. Its most far-reaching defect, as far as the relations of the audiencia and the governor were concerned, lay in the wholesale exercise of administrative and military functions by the magistrates of the audiencia. This impaired the quality of their services as impartial magistrates and contributed in most cases to an insatiable thirst for power. The magistrates were loath to surrender the exercise of these governmental activities on the accession of the succeeding governor, the audiencia displaying a marked tendency to continue in the exercise of administrative control. This, then, was a decided cause of strife and dissension between the audiencia and the governor.