Chapter II · The History of Carthage from the first Punic War to its destruction.

The plan which I have laid down does not allow me to enter into an exact detail of the wars between Rome and Carthage; since that pertains rather to the Roman history, which I do not intend to touch upon, except transiently and occasionally. I shall therefore relate such facts only as may give the reader a just idea of the republic whose history lies before me; by confining myself to those particulars which relate chiefly to the Carthaginians, and to their most important transactions in Sicily, Spain, and Africa: a subject in itself sufficiently extensive.

I have already observed, that from the first Punic war to the ruin of Carthage, a hundred and eighteen years elapsed. This whole time may be divided into five parts or intervals.

I. The first Punic war lasted twenty-four years.

II. The interval betwixt the first and second Punic war is also twenty-four years.

III. The second Punic war took up seventeen years.

IV. The interval between the second and third is forty-nine years.

V. The third Punic war, terminated by the destruction of Carthage, continued but four years and some months.

Total: 118 years.

A.M. 3724. A. Carth. 566. A. Rom. 468. Ant. J.C. 280.

Article I. The first Punic War.—The first Punic war arose from the following cause. Some Campanian soldiers, in the service of Agathocles, the Sicilian tyrant, having entered as friends into Messina, soon after murdered part of the townsmen, drove out the rest, married their wives, seized their effects, and remained sole masters of that important city.660 They then assumed the name of Mamertines. In imitation of them, and by their assistance, a Roman legion treated in the same cruel manner the city of Rhegium, lying directly opposite to Messina, on the other side of the strait. These two perfidious cities, supporting one another, rendered themselves at length formidable to their neighbours; and especially Messina, which became very powerful, [pg 157] and gave great umbrage and uneasiness both to the Syracusans and Carthaginians, who possessed one part of Sicily. As soon as the Romans had got rid of the enemies they had so long contended with, and particularly of Pyrrhus, they began to think of punishing the crime of their citizens, who had settled themselves at Rhegium, in so cruel and treacherous a manner, nearly ten years before. Accordingly, they took the city, and killed, in the attack, the greatest part of the inhabitants, who, instigated by despair, had fought to the last gasp: three hundred only were left, who were carried to Rome, whipped, and then publicly beheaded in the forum. The view which the Romans had in making this bloody execution, was, to prove to their allies their own sincerity and innocence. Rhegium was immediately restored to its lawful possessors. The Mamertines, who were considerably weakened, as well by the ruin of their confederate city, as by the losses which they had sustained from the Syracusans, who had lately placed Hiero at their head, thought it time to provide for their own safety. But divisions arising among them, one part surrendered the citadel to the Carthaginians, whilst the other called in the Romans to their assistance, and resolved to put them in possession of their city.

The affair was debated in the Roman senate, where, being considered in all its lights, it appeared to have some difficulties.661 On one hand, it was thought base, and altogether unworthy of the Roman virtue, for them to undertake openly the defence of traitors, whose perfidy was exactly the same with that of the Rhegians, whom the Romans had recently punished with so exemplary a severity. On the other hand, it was of the utmost consequence to stop the progress of the Carthaginians, who, not satisfied with their conquests in Africa and Spain, had also made themselves masters of almost all the islands of the Sardinian and Hetrurian seas; and would certainly get all Sicily into their hands, if they should be suffered to possess themselves of Messina. From thence into Italy, the passage was very short; and it was in some manner to invite an enemy to come over, to leave the entrance open. These reasons, though [pg 158] so strong, could not prevail with the senate to declare in favour of the Mamertines; and accordingly, motives of honour and justice prevailed in this instance over those of interest and policy.

A.M. 3741. A. Carth. 583. A. Rom. 485. Ant. J.C. 263.

But the people were not so scrupulous; for, in an assembly held on this subject, it was resolved that the Mamertines should be assisted.662 The consul Appius Claudius immediately set forward with his army, and boldly crossed the strait, after he had, by an ingenious stratagem, eluded the vigilance of the Carthaginian general. The Carthaginians, partly by art and partly by force, were driven out of the citadel; and the city was surrendered immediately to the consul. The Carthaginians hanged their general, for having given up the citadel in so cowardly a manner, and prepared to besiege the town with all their forces. Hiero joined them with his own. But the consul, having defeated them separately, raised the siege, and laid waste at pleasure the neighbouring country, the enemy not daring to face him. This was the first expedition which the Romans made out of Italy.

It is doubted663 whether the motives which prompted the Romans to undertake this expedition, were very upright, and exactly conformable to the rules of strict justice. Be this as it may, their passage into Sicily, and the succour they gave to the inhabitants of Messina, may be said to have been the first step by which they ascended to that height of glory and grandeur which they afterwards attained.

A.M. 3743. A. Rom. 487.

Hiero, having reconciled himself to the Romans, and entered into an alliance with them, the Carthaginians bent all their thoughts on Sicily, and sent numerous armies thither.664 Agrigentum was their place of arms; which, being attacked by the Romans, was won by them, after they had besieged it seven months, and gained one battle.

Notwithstanding the advantage of this victory, and the conquest of so important a city, the Romans were sensible, that whilst the Carthaginians should continue masters at sea, the maritime places in the island would always side with them, [pg 159] and put it out of their power ever to drive them out of Sicily.665 Besides, they saw with reluctance Africa enjoy a profound tranquillity, at a time that Italy was infested by the frequent incursions of its enemies. They now first formed the design of having a fleet, and of disputing the empire of the sea with the Carthaginians. The undertaking was bold, and in outward appearance rash; but it evinces the courage and magnanimity of the Romans. They were not at that time possessed of a single vessel which they could call their own; and the ships which had transported their forces into Sicily had been borrowed of their neighbours. They were unexperienced in sea affairs, had no carpenters acquainted with the building of ships, and did not know even the shape of the Quinqueremes, or galleys with five benches of oars, in which the chief strength of fleets at that time consisted. But happily, the year before, one had been taken upon the coasts of Italy, which served them as a model. They therefore applied themselves with incredible industry and ardour to the building of ships in the same form; and in the mean time they got together a set of rowers, who were taught an exercise and discipline utterly unknown to them before, in the following manner. Benches were made, on the shore, in the same order and fashion with those of galleys. The rowers were seated on these benches, and taught, as if they had been furnished with oars, to throw themselves backwards with their arms drawn to their breasts; and then to throw their bodies and arms forward in one regular motion, the instant their commanding officer gave the signal. In two months, one hundred galleys of five benches of oars, and twenty of three benches, were built; and after some time had been spent in exercising the rowers on shipboard, the fleet put to sea, and went in quest of the enemy. The consul Duillius had the command of it.

A.M. 3745. A. Rom. 489.

The Romans coming up with the Carthaginians near the coast of Myle, they prepared for an engagement.666 As the Roman galleys, by their being clumsily and hastily built, were neither very nimble nor easy to work; this inconvenience was supplied by a machine invented [pg 160] for this occasion, and afterwards known by the name of the Corvus,667 (Crow, or Crane,) by the help of which they grappled the enemy's ships, boarded them, and immediately came to close engagement. The signal for fighting was given. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of a hundred and thirty sail, under the command of Hannibal.668 He himself was on board a galley of seven benches of oars, which had once belonged to Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians, thoroughly despising enemies who were utterly unacquainted with sea affairs, imagined that their very appearance would put them to flight, and therefore came forward boldly, with little expectation of fighting; but firmly imagining they should reap the spoils, which they had already devoured with their eyes. They were nevertheless a little surprised at the sight of the above-mentioned engines, raised on the prow of every one of the enemy's ships, and which were entirely new to them. But their astonishment increased, when they saw these engines drop down at once; and being thrown forcibly into their vessels, grapple them in spite of all resistance. This changed the form of the engagement, and obliged the Carthaginians to come to close engagement with their enemies, as though they had fought them on land. They were unable to sustain the attack of the Romans: a horrible slaughter ensued, and the Carthaginians lost fourscore vessels, among which was the admiral's galley, he himself escaping with difficulty in a small boat.

So considerable and unexpected a victory raised the courage of the Romans, and seemed to redouble their vigour for the continuance of the war. Extraordinary honours were bestowed on the consul Duillius, who was the first Roman that had a naval triumph decreed him. A rostral pillar was erected in his honour, with a noble inscription; which pillar is yet standing in Rome.669

During the two following years, the Romans grew still stronger at sea, by their success in several engagements.670 But these were considered by them only as essays preparatory to the great design they meditated of carrying the war into Africa, [pg 161] and of combating the Carthaginians in their own country. There was nothing the latter dreaded more; and to divert so dangerous a blow, they resolved to fight the enemy, whatever might be the consequence.

A.M. 3749. A. Rom. 493.

The Romans had elected M. Atilius Regulus, and L. Manlius, consuls for this year.671 Their fleet consisted of three hundred and thirty vessels, on board of which were one hundred and forty thousand men, each vessel having three hundred rowers, and a hundred and twenty soldiers. That of the Carthaginians, commanded by Hanno and Hamilcar, had twenty vessels more than the Romans, and a greater number of men in proportion. The two fleets came in sight of each other near Ecnomus in Sicily. No man could behold two such formidable navies, or be a spectator of the extraordinary preparations they made for fighting, without being under some concern, on seeing the danger which menaced two of the most powerful states in the world. As the courage on both sides was equal, and no great disparity in the forces, the fight was obstinate, and the victory long doubtful; but at last the Carthaginians were overcome. More than sixty of their ships were taken by the enemy, and thirty sunk. The Romans lost twenty-four, not one of which fell into the enemy's hands.

The fruit of this victory, as the Romans had designed it, was their sailing to Africa, after having refitted their ships, and provided them with all necessaries for carrying on a long war in a foreign country.672 They landed happily in Africa, and began the war by taking a town called Clypea, which had a commodious haven. From thence, after having sent an express to Rome, to give advice of their landing, and to receive orders from the senate, they overran the open country, in which they made terrible havoc; bringing away whole flocks of cattle, and twenty thousand prisoners.

A.M. 3750. A. Rom. 494.

The express returned in the mean time with the orders of the senate, who decreed, that Regulus should continue to command the armies in Africa, with the title of Proconsul; and that his colleague should [pg 162] return with a great part of the fleet and the forces; leaving Regulus only forty vessels, fifteen thousand foot, and five hundred horse. Their leaving the latter with so few ships and troops, was a visible renunciation of the advantages which might have been expected from this descent upon Africa.

The people at Rome depended greatly on the courage and abilities of Regulus; and the joy was universal, when it was known that he was continued in the command in Africa; he alone was afflicted on that account.673 When news was brought him of it, he wrote to Rome, and desired, in the strongest terms, that he might be appointed a successor. His chief reason was, that the death of the farmer who rented his grounds, having given one of his hirelings an opportunity of carrying off all the implements of tillage, his presence was necessary for taking care of his little spot of ground, (but seven acres,) which was all his family subsisted upon. But the senate undertook to have his lands cultivated at the public expense; to maintain his wife and children; and to indemnify him for the loss he had sustained by the robbery of his hireling. Thrice happy age! in which poverty was thus had in honour, and was united with the most rare and uncommon merit, and the highest employments of the state! Regulus thus freed from his domestic cares, bent his whole thoughts on discharging the duty of a general.

After taking several castles, he laid siege to Adis one of the strongest fortresses of the country.674 The Carthaginians, exasperated at seeing their enemies thus laying waste their lands at pleasure, at last took the field, and marched against them, to force them to raise the siege. With this view, they posted themselves on a hill, which overlooked the Roman camp, and was convenient for annoying the enemy; but, at the same time, by its situation, rendered one part of their army useless. For the strength of the Carthaginians lay chiefly in their horses and elephants, which are of no service but in plains. Regulus did not give them an opportunity of descending from the hill; but, in order to take advantage of this essential mistake of the Carthaginian generals, fell upon them in this post; and after meeting with a feeble resistance, [pg 163] put the enemy to flight, plundered their camp, and laid waste the adjacent country. Then, having taken Tunis,675 an important city, and which brought him near Carthage, he made his army encamp there.

The enemy were in the utmost alarm. All things had succeeded ill with them, their forces had been defeated by sea and land, and upwards of two hundred towns had surrendered to the conqueror. Besides, the Numidians made greater havoc in their territories than even the Romans. They expected every moment to see their capital besieged. And their affliction was increased by the concourse of peasants with their wives and children, who flocked from all parts to Carthage for safety: which gave them melancholy apprehensions of a famine in case of a siege. Regulus, afraid of having the glory of his victories torn from him by a successor, made some proposal of an accommodation to the vanquished enemy; but the conditions appeared so hard, that they could not listen to them. As he did not doubt his being soon master of Carthage, he would not abate any thing in his demands; but, by an infatuation which is almost inseparable from great and unexpected success, he treated them with haughtiness; and pretended, that every thing he suffered them to possess, ought to be esteemed a favour; adding this farther insult, “That they ought either to overcome like brave men, or learn to submit to the victor.”676 So harsh and disdainful a treatment only fired their resentment; [pg 164] and they resolved rather to die sword in hand, than to do any thing which might derogate from the dignity of Carthage.

Reduced to this fatal extremity, they received, in the happiest juncture, a reinforcement of auxiliary troops out of Greece, with Xanthippus the Lacedæmonian at their head, who had been educated in the discipline of Sparta, and learnt the art of war in that renowned and excellent school. When he had heard the circumstances of the last battle, which were told him at his request; had clearly discerned the occasion of its being lost; and perfectly informed himself in what the strength of Carthage consisted; he declared publicly, and repeated it often, in the hearing of the rest of the officers, that the misfortunes of the Carthaginians were owing entirely to the incapacity of their generals. These discourses came at last to the ear of the public council; the members of it were struck with them, and they requested him to attend them. He enforced his opinion with such strong and convincing reasons, that the oversights committed by the generals were visible to every one; and he proved as clearly, that, by a conduct opposite to the former, they would not only secure their dominions, but drive the enemy out of them. This speech revived the courage and hopes of the Carthaginians; and Xanthippus was entreated, and, in some measure, forced, to accept the command of the army. When the Carthaginians saw, in his exercising of their forces near the city, the manner in which he drew them up in order of battle, made them advance or retreat on the first signal, file off with order and expedition; in a word, perform all the evolutions and movements of the military art; they were struck with astonishment, and owned, that the ablest generals which Carthage had hitherto produced, knew nothing in comparison of Xanthippus.

The officers, soldiers, and every one, were lost in admiration; and, what is very uncommon, jealousy gave no alloy to it; the fear of the present danger, and the love of their country, stifling, without doubt, all other sentiments. The gloomy consternation, which had before seized the whole army, was succeeded by joy and alacrity. The soldiers were urgent to be led against the enemy, in the firm assurance (as they said) of [pg 165] being victorious under their new leader, and of obliterating the disgrace of former defeats. Xanthippus did not suffer their ardour to cool; and the sight of the enemy only inflamed it. When he had approached within little more than twelve hundred paces of them, he thought proper to call a council of war, in order to show respect to the Carthaginian generals, by consulting them. All unanimously deferred to his opinion; upon which it was resolved to give the enemy battle the following day.

The Carthaginian army was composed of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and about a hundred elephants. That of the Romans, as near as may be guessed from what goes before, (for Polybius does not mention their numbers here,) consisted of fifteen thousand foot and three hundred horse.

It must be a noble sight to see two armies like these before us, not overcharged with numbers, but composed of brave soldiers, and commanded by very able generals, engaged in battle. In those tumultuous fights, where two or three hundred thousand are engaged on both sides, confusion is inevitable; and it is difficult, amidst a thousand events, where chance generally seems to have a greater share than counsel, to discover the true merit of commanders, and the real causes of victory. But in such engagements as this before us, nothing escapes the curiosity of the reader; for he clearly sees the disposition of the two armies; imagines he almost hears the orders given out by the generals; follows all the movements of the army; can point out the faults committed on both sides; and is thereby qualified to determine, with certainty, the causes to which the victory or defeat is owing. The success of this battle, however inconsiderable it may appear from the small number of the combatants, was nevertheless to decide the fate of Carthage.

The disposition of both armies was as follows. Xanthippus drew up all his elephants in front. Behind these, at some distance, he placed the Carthaginian infantry in one body or phalanx. The foreign troops in the Carthaginian service were posted, one part of them on the right, between the phalanx and the horse; and the other, composed of light-armed soldiers, in platoons, at the head of the two wings of the cavalry.

[pg 166]

On the side of the Romans, as they apprehended the elephants most, Regulus, to provide against them, posted his light-armed soldiers, on a line, in the front of the legions. In the rear of these, he placed the cohorts one behind another, and the horse on the wings. In thus straitening the front of his main battle, to give it more depth, he indeed took a just precaution, says Polybius, against the elephants; but he did not provide for the inequality of his cavalry, which was much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy.

The two armies being thus drawn up, waited only for the signal. Xanthippus orders the elephants to advance, to break the ranks of the enemy; and commands the two wings of the cavalry to charge the Romans in flank. At the same time, the latter, clashing their arms, and shouting after the manner of their country, advance against the enemy. Their cavalry did not stand the onset long, being so much inferior to that of the Carthaginians. The infantry in the left wing, to avoid the attack of the elephants, and show how little they feared the mercenaries who formed the enemies' right wing, attacks it, puts it to flight, and pursues it to the camp. Those in the first ranks, who were opposed to the elephants, were broken and trodden under foot, after fighting valiantly; and the rest of the main body stood firm for some time, by reason of its great depth. But when the rear, being attacked by the enemy's cavalry, was obliged to face about and receive it; and those who had broken through the elephants, met the phalanx of the Carthaginians, which had not yet engaged, and which received them in good order, the Romans were routed on all sides, and entirely defeated. The greatest part of them were crushed to death by the enormous weight of the elephants: and the remainder, standing in the ranks, were shot through and through with arrows from the enemy's horse. Only a small number fled; and as they were in an open country, the horse and elephants killed a great part of them. Five hundred, or thereabouts, who went off with Regulus, were taken prisoners with him. The Carthaginians lost in this battle eight hundred mercenaries, who were opposed to the left wing of the Romans; and of the latter only two thousand escaped, who, by their pursuing the enemy's right wing, had drawn themselves out of [pg 167] the engagement. All the rest, Regulus and those taken with him excepted, were left dead in the field. The two thousand, who had escaped the slaughter, retired to Clypea, and were saved in an almost miraculous manner.

The Carthaginians, after having stripped the dead, entered Carthage in triumph, dragging after them the unfortunate Regulus, and five hundred prisoners. Their joy was so much the greater, as, but a very few days before, they had seen themselves upon the brink of ruin. The men and women, old and young people, crowded the temples, to return thanks to the immortal gods; and several days were devoted wholly to festivities and rejoicings.

Xanthippus, who had contributed so much to this happy change, had the wisdom to withdraw shortly after, from the apprehension lest his glory, which had hitherto been unsullied, might, after this first blaze, insensibly fade away, and leave him exposed to the darts of envy and calumny, which are always dangerous, but most in a foreign country, when a man stands alone, unsustained by friends and relations, and destitute of all support.

Polybius tells us, that Xanthippus's departure was related in a different manner, and promises to take notice of it in another place: but that part of his history has not come down to us. We read in Appian,677 that the Carthaginians, excited by a mean and detestable jealousy of Xanthippus's glory, and unable to bear the thoughts that they should stand indebted to Sparta for their safety; upon pretence of conducting him and his attendants back with honour to his own country, with a numerous convoy of ships, gave private orders to have them all put to death in their passage; as if with him they could have buried in the waves for ever the memory of his services, and their horrid ingratitude to him.678

[pg 168]

“This battle,” says Polybius,679 “though not so considerable as many others, may yet furnish very salutary instructions; which,” adds that author, “is the greatest benefit that can be reaped from the study of history.”

First, ought any man to put a great confidence in his good fortune, after he has considered the fate of Regulus? That general, insolent with victory, inexorable to the conquered, scarcely deigning to listen to them, saw himself a few days after vanquished by them, and made their prisoner. Hannibal suggested the same reflection to Scipio, when he exhorted him not to be dazzled with the success of his arms. Regulus, said he, would have been recorded as one of the most uncommon instances of valour and felicity, had he, after the victory obtained in this very country, granted our fathers the peace which they sued for. But putting no bounds to his ambition and the insolence of success, the greater his prosperity, the more ignominious was his fall.680

In the second place, the truth of the saying of Euripides is here seen in its full extent, “That one wise head is worth a great many hands.”681 A single man here changes the whole face of affairs. On one hand, he defeats troops which were thought invincible; on the other, he revives the courage of a city and an army, whom he had found in consternation and despair.

Such, as Polybius observes, is the use which ought to be made of the study of history. For there being two ways of [pg 169] acquiring improvement and instruction, first by one's own experience, and secondly by that of other men; it is much more wise and useful to improve by other men's miscarriages than by our own.

I return to Regulus, that I may here finish what relates to him; Polybius, to our great disappointment, taking no further notice of that general.682

A.M. 3755. A. Rom. 499.

After being kept some years in prison, he was sent to Rome to propose an exchange of prisoners.683 He had been obliged to take an oath, that he would return in case he proved unsuccessful. He then acquainted the senate with the subject of his voyage; and being invited by them to give his opinion freely, he answered, that he could no longer do it as a senator, having lost both this quality, and that of a Roman citizen, from the time that he had fallen into the hands of his enemies; but he did not refuse to offer his thoughts as a private person. This was a very delicate affair. Every one was touched with the misfortunes of so great a man. “He needed only,” says Cicero, “to have spoken one [pg 170] word, and it would have restored him to his liberty, his estate, his dignity, his wife, his children, and his country;” but that word appeared to him contrary to the honour and welfare of the state. He therefore plainly declared, that an exchange of prisoners ought not to be so much as thought of: that such an example would be of fatal consequence to the republic: that citizens who had so basely surrendered their arms to the enemy, were unworthy of the least compassion, and incapable of serving their country; that with regard to himself, as he was so far advanced in years, his death ought to be considered as nothing; whereas they had in their hands several Carthaginian generals, in the flower of their age, and capable of doing their country great services for many years. It was with difficulty that the senate complied with so generous and unexampled a counsel. The illustrious exile therefore left Rome, in order to return to Carthage, unmoved either with the deep affliction of his friends, or the tears of his wife and children, although he knew but too well the grievous torments which were prepared for him.684 And indeed, the moment his enemies saw him returned without having obtained the exchange of prisoners, they put him to every kind of torture their barbarous cruelty could invent. They imprisoned him for a long time in a dismal dungeon, whence (after cutting off his eye-lids) they drew him at once into the sun, when its beams darted the strongest heat. They next put him into a kind of chest stuck full of nails, whose points wounding him did not allow him a moment's ease either day or night. Lastly, after having been long tormented by being kept for ever awake in this dreadful torture, his merciless enemies nailed him to a cross, their usual punishment, and left him to expire on it. Such was the end of this great man. His enemies, by depriving him of some days, perhaps years, of life, brought eternal infamy on themselves.

The blow which the Romans had received in Africa did not discourage them.685 They made greater preparations than before, to retrieve their loss; and put to sea, the following campaign, three hundred and sixty vessels. The Carthaginians sailed out to meet them with two hundred; but were [pg 171] beaten in an engagement fought on the coasts of Sicily, and a hundred and fourteen of their ships were taken by the Romans. The latter sailed into Africa to take in the few soldiers who had escaped the pursuit of the enemy, after the defeat of Regulus; and had defended themselves vigorously in Clupea,686 where they had been unsuccessfully besieged.

Here again we are astonished that the Romans, after so considerable a victory, and with so large a fleet, should sail into Africa, only to bring from thence a small garrison; whereas they might have attempted the conquest of it, since Regulus, with much fewer forces, had almost completed it.

The Romans, on their return, were overtaken by a storm, which almost destroyed their whole fleet.687 The like misfortune befell them also the following year.688 However, they consoled themselves for this double loss, by a victory which they gained over Asdrubal, from whom they took near a hundred and forty elephants. This news being brought to Rome, filled the whole city with joy; not only because the strength of the enemy's army was considerably diminished by the loss of their elephants, but chiefly because this victory had inspired the land forces with fresh courage; who, since the defeat of Regulus, had not dared to venture upon an engagement; so great was the terror with which those formidable animals had filled the minds of all the soldiers. It was therefore judged proper to make a greater effort than ever, in order to finish, if possible, a war which had continued fourteen years. The two consuls set sail with a fleet of two hundred ships, and arriving in Sicily, formed the bold design of besieging Lilybæum. This was the strongest town which the Carthaginians possessed, and the loss of it would be attended with that of every part of the island and open to the Romans a free passage into Africa.

The reader will suppose, that the utmost ardour was shown, both in the assault and defence of the place.689 Imilcon was governor there, with ten thousand regular forces, exclusive of the inhabitants; and Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, soon brought him as many more from Carthage; he having, with [pg 172] the most intrepid courage, forced his way through the enemy's fleet, and arrived happily in the port.

The Romans had not lost any time. Having brought forward their engines, they beat down several towers with their battering rams; and gaining ground daily, they made such progress, as gave the besieged, who now were closely pressed, some fears. The governor saw plainly that there was no other way left to save the city, but by firing the engines of the besiegers. Having therefore prepared his forces for this enterprise, he sent them out at daybreak with torches in their hands, tow, and all kind of combustible matters; and at the same time attacked all the engines. The Romans exerted their utmost efforts to repel them, and the engagement was very bloody. Every man, assailant as well as defendant, stood to his post, and chose to die rather than quit it. At last, after a long resistance and dreadful slaughter, the besieged sounded a retreat, and left the Romans in possession of their works. This conflict being over, Hannibal embarked in the night, and concealing his departure from the enemy, sailed for Drepanum, where Adherbal commanded for the Carthaginians. Drepanum was advantageously situated; having a commodious port, and lying about a hundred and twenty furlongs from Lilybæum; and the Carthaginians had been always very desirous of preserving it.

The Romans, animated by their late success, renewed the attack with greater vigour than ever; the besieged not daring to make a second attempt to burn their machines, so much were they disheartened by the ill success of the former. But a furious wind rising suddenly, some mercenary soldiers represented to the governor, that now was the favourable opportunity for them to fire the engines of the besiegers, especially as the wind blew full against them; and they offered themselves for the enterprise. The offer was accepted, and accordingly they were furnished with every thing necessary. In a moment the fire caught all the engines; and the Romans could not possibly extinguish it, because the flames being spread instantly every where, the wind carried the sparks and smoke full in their eyes, so that they could not see where to apply [pg 173] relief; whereas their enemies saw clearly where to aim their strokes, and throw their fire. This accident made the Romans lose all hopes of being ever able to carry the place by force. They therefore turned the siege into a blockade; raised a strong line of contravallation round the town; and, dispersing their army in every part of the neighbourhood, resolved to effect by time, what they found themselves absolutely unable to perform any other way.

When the transactions of the siege of Lilybæum, and the loss of part of the forces, were known at Rome, the citizens, so far from desponding at this ill news, seemed to be fired with new vigour.690 Every man strove to be foremost in the muster roll; so that, in a very little time, an army of ten thousand men was raised, who, crossing the strait, marched by land to join the besiegers.

A.M. 3756. A. Rom. 500.

At the same time, P. Claudius Pulcher, the consul, formed a design of attacking Adherbal in Drepanum.691 He thought himself sure of surprising him, because, after the loss lately sustained by the Romans at Lilybæum, the enemy could not imagine that they would venture out again at sea. Flushed with these hopes, he sailed out with his fleet in the night, the better to conceal his design. But he had to do with an active general, whose vigilance he could not elude, and who did not even give him time to draw up his ships in line of battle, but fell vigorously upon him whilst his fleet was in disorder and confusion. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory. Of the Roman fleet, only thirty vessels got off, which being in company with the consul, fled with him, and got away in the best manner they could along the coast. All the rest, amounting to fourscore and thirteen, with the men on board them, were taken by the Carthaginians; a few soldiers excepted, who had escaped from the wreck of their vessels. This victory displayed as much the prudence and valour of Adherbal, as it reflected shame and ignominy on the Roman consul.

Junius, his colleague, was neither more prudent nor more fortunate than himself, but lost his whole fleet by his ill conduct.692 Endeavouring to atone for his misfortune by some [pg 174] considerable action, he held a secret correspondence with the inhabitants of Eryx,693 and by that means got the city surrendered to him. On the summit of the mountain stood the temple of Venus Erycina, which was certainly the most beautiful as well as the richest of all the Sicilian temples. The city stood a little below the summit of this mountain, and the only access to it was by a road very long and very rugged. Junius posted one part of his troops upon the top, and the remainder at the foot of the mountain, imagining that he now had nothing to fear; but Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, father of the famous Hannibal, found means to get into the city, which lay between the two camps of the enemy, and there fortified himself. From this advantageous post he harassed the Romans incessantly for two years. One can scarce conceive how it was possible for the Carthaginians to defend themselves, when thus attacked from both the summit and foot of the mountain; and unable to get provisions, but from a little port, which was the only one open to them. By such enterprises as these, the abilities and prudent courage of a general, are as well, or perhaps better discovered, than by the winning of a battle.

For five years, nothing memorable was performed on either side.694 The Romans had imagined that their land forces would alone be capable of finishing the siege of Lilybæum: but as they saw it protracted beyond their expectation, they returned to their first plan, and made extraordinary efforts to fit out a new fleet. The public treasury was at a low ebb; but this want was supplied by the zeal of individuals; so ardent was the love which the Romans bore their country. Every man, according to his circumstances, contributed to the common expense; and, upon public security, advanced money, without the least scruple, for an expedition on which the glory and safety of Rome depended. One man fitted out a ship at his own charge; another was equipped by the contributions of two or three; so that, in a very little time, two hundred were ready for sailing.

A.M. 3763. A. Rom. 507.

The command was given to Lutatius the consul, who immediately put to sea. [pg 175] The enemy's fleet had retired into Africa: the consul therefore easily seized upon all the advantageous posts in the neighbourhood of Lilybæum; and foreseeing that he should soon be forced to fight, he omitted no precautions to ensure success; and employed the interval in exercising his soldiers and seamen at sea.

He was soon informed that the Carthaginian fleet drew near, under the command of Hanno, who landed in a small island called Hiera, opposite to Drepanum. His design was to reach Eryx undiscovered by the Romans, in order to supply the army there; to reinforce his troops, and take Barca on board to assist him in the expected engagement. But the consul, suspecting his intention, was beforehand with him; and having assembled all his best forces, sailed for the small island Ægusa,695 which lay near the other. He acquainted his officers with the design he had of attacking the enemy on the morrow. Accordingly, at daybreak, he prepared to engage: unfortunately the wind was favourable for the enemy, which made him hesitate whether he should give him battle. But considering that the Carthaginian fleet, when unloaded of its provisions, would become lighter and more fit for action; and, besides, would be considerably strengthened by the forces and presence of Barca he came to a resolution at once; and, notwithstanding the foul weather, made directly to the enemy. The consul had choice forces, able seamen, and excellent ships, built after the model of a galley that had been lately taken from the enemy; and which was the completest in its kind that had ever been seen. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were destitute of all these advantages. As they had been the entire masters at sea for some years, and the Romans did not once dare to face them, they held them in the highest contempt, and looked upon themselves as invincible. On the first report of the enemy being in motion, the Carthaginians had put to sea a fleet fitted out in haste, as appeared from every circumstance of it: the soldiers and seamen being all mercenaries, newly levied, without the least experience, resolution, or zeal, since it was not for their own country they were going to fight. This soon appeared in the engagement. They could not sustain the first [pg 176] attack. Fifty of their vessels were sunk, and seventy taken, with their whole crews. The rest, favoured by a wind which rose very seasonably for them, made the best of their way to the little island from whence they had sailed. There were upwards of ten thousand taken prisoners. The consul sailed immediately for Lilybæum, and joined his forces to those of the besiegers.

When the news of this defeat arrived at Carthage, it occasioned so much the greater surprise and terror, as it was less expected. The senate, however, did not lose their courage, though they saw themselves quite unable to continue the war. As the Romans were now masters of the sea, it was not possible for the Carthaginians to send either provisions, or reinforcements, to the armies in Sicily. An express was therefore immediately despatched to Barca, the general there, empowering him to act as he should think proper. Barca, so long as he had room to entertain the least hopes, had done every thing that could be expected from the most intrepid courage and the most consummate wisdom. But having now no resource left, he sent a deputation to the consul, in order to treat about a peace. “Prudence,” says Polybius, “consists in knowing how to resist and yield at a seasonable juncture.” Lutatius was not insensible how tired the Romans were grown of a war, which had exhausted them both of men and money; and the dreadful consequences which had attended on Regulus's inexorable and imprudent obstinacy, were fresh in his memory. He therefore complied without difficulty, and dictated the following treaty.

There shall be peace between Rome and Carthage (in case the Roman people approve of it) on the following conditions: The Carthaginians shall evacuate all Sicily; shall no longer make war upon Hiero, the Syracusans, or their allies: They shall restore to the Romans, without ransom, all the prisoners which they have taken from them; and pay them, within twenty years, two thousand two hundred Euboic talents of silver.696 It is worth the reader's [pg 177] remarking, by the way, the simple, exact, and clear terms in which this treaty is expressed; that, in so short a compass, adjusts the interests of two powerful republics and their allies, both by sea and land.

When these conditions were brought to Rome, the people, not approving of them, sent ten commissioners to Sicily, to terminate the affair. These made no alteration as to the substance of the treaty;697 only shortening the time appointed for the payment, reducing it to ten years: a thousand talents were added to the sum that had been stipulated, which were to be paid immediately; and the Carthaginians were required to depart out of all the islands situated between Italy and Sicily. Sardinia was not comprehended in this treaty; but they gave it up by another treaty which was made some years afterwards.

A.M. 3763. A. Carth. 605. A. Rom. 507. Ant. J.C. 241.

Such was the conclusion of a war, one of the longest mentioned in history, since it continued twenty-four years without intermission. The obstinacy, in disputing for empire, was equal on either side: the same resolution, the same greatness of soul, in forming as well as in executing of projects, being conspicuous on both sides. The Carthaginians had the superiority in their acquaintance with naval affairs; in their skill in the construction of their vessels; the working of them; the experience and capacity of their pilots; the knowledge of coasts, shallows, roads, and winds; and in the inexhaustible fund of wealth, which furnished all the expenses of so long and obstinate a war. The Romans had none of these advantages; but their courage, zeal for the public good, love of their country, and a noble emulation of glory, supplied all other deficiencies. We are astonished to see a nation, so raw and inexperienced in naval affairs, not only making head against a people who were better skilled in them, and more powerful than any that had ever been before; but even gaining several victories over them at sea. No difficulties or calamities could discourage them. They certainly would not have thought of peace, in the circumstances under which the Carthaginians demanded it. One [pg 178] unfortunate campaign dispirits the latter; whereas the Romans are not shaken by a succession of them.

As to soldiers, there was no comparison between those of Rome and Carthage, the former being infinitely superior in point of courage. Among the generals who commanded in this war, Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was, doubtless, the most conspicuous for his bravery and prudence.

The Libyan War; or against the Mercenaries.698—The war which the Carthaginians waged against the Romans, was succeeded immediately by another,699 which, though of much shorter continuance, was infinitely more dangerous; as it was carried on in the very heart of the republic, and attended with such cruelty and barbarity, as is scarce to be paralleled in history; I mean the war which the Carthaginians were obliged to sustain against their mercenary troops, who had served under them in Sicily, and which is commonly called the African or Libyan war.700 It continued only three years and a half, but was a very bloody one. The occasion of it was this:

As soon as the treaty was concluded with the Romans,701 Hamilcar, having carried to Lilybæum the forces which were in Eryx, resigned his commission; and left to Gisgo, governor of the place, the care of transporting these forces into Africa. Gisgo, as though he had foreseen what would happen, did not ship them all off at once, but in small and separate parties, in order that those who came first might be paid off, and sent home, before the arrival of the rest. This conduct evinced great forecast and wisdom, but was not seconded equally at Carthage. As the republic had been exhausted by the expense of a long war, and the payment of near one hundred and thirty thousand pounds to the Romans on signing the peace, the forces were not paid off in proportion as they arrived; but it was thought proper to wait for the rest, in the hopes of obtaining from them (when they should be all together) a remission of some part of their arrears. This was the first oversight.

Here we discover the genius of a state composed of merchants, who know the full value of money, but are little [pg 179] acquainted with that of the services of soldiers; who bargain for blood, as though it were an article of trade, and always go to the cheapest market. In such a republic, when an exigency is once answered, the merit of services is no longer remembered.

These soldiers, most of whom came to Carthage, having been long accustomed to a licentious life, caused great disturbances in the city; to remedy which, it was proposed to their officers, to march them all to a little neighbouring town called Sicca, and there supply them with whatever was necessary for their subsistence, till the arrival of the rest of their companions; and that then they should all be paid off, and sent home. This was a second oversight.

A third was, the refusing to let them leave their baggage, their wives, and children in Carthage, as they desired; and the forcing them to remove these to Sicca; whereas, had they staid in Carthage, they would have been in a manner so many hostages.

Being all met together at Sicca, they began (having little else to do) to compute the arrears of their pay, which they made amount to much more than was really due to them. To this computation, they added the mighty promises which had been made them, at different times, as an encouragement for them to do their duty; and pretended that these likewise ought to be brought into the account. Hanno, who was then governor of Africa, and had been sent to them from the magistrates of Carthage, proposed to them to consent to some abatement of their arrears; and to content themselves with receiving a part, in consideration of the great distress to which the commonwealth was reduced, and its present unhappy circumstances. The reader will easily guess how such a proposal was received. Complaints, murmurs, seditious and insolent clamours, were every where heard. These troops being composed of different nations, who were strangers to one another's language, were incapable of hearing reason when they once mutinied. Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians; inhabitants of the Balearic isles; Greeks, the greatest part of them slaves or deserters, and a very great number of Africans, composed these mercenary forces. Transported with rage, they immediately [pg 180] break up, march towards Carthage, (being upwards of twenty thousand,) and encamp at Tunis, not far from that metropolis.

The Carthaginians discovered too late their error. There was no compliance, how grovelling soever, to which they did not stoop, to soothe these exasperated soldiers: who, on their side, practised every knavish art which could be thought of, in order to extort money from them. When one point was gained, they immediately had recourse to a new artifice, on which to ground some new demand. Was their pay settled beyond the agreement made with them, they still would be reimbursed for the losses which they pretended to have sustained, either by the death of their horses, by the excessive price which, at certain times, they had paid for bread-corn; and still insisted on the recompense which had been promised them. As nothing could be fixed, the Carthaginians, with great difficulty, prevailed on them to refer themselves to the opinion of some general who had commanded in Sicily. Accordingly they pitched upon Gisgo, who had always been very acceptable to them. This general harangued them in a mild and insinuating manner; recalled to their memories the long time they had been in the Carthaginian service; the considerable sums they had received from the republic; and granted almost all their demands.

The treaty was upon the point of being concluded, when two mutineers occasioned a tumult in every part of the camp. One of those was Spendius a Capuan, who had been a slave at Rome, and had fled to the Carthaginians. He was tall and bold. The fear he was under, of falling into the hands of his former master, by whom he was sure to be hanged, (as was the custom,) prompted him to break off the agreement. He was seconded by one Matho,702 who had been very active in forming the conspiracy. These two represented to the Africans, that the instant after their companions should be discharged and sent home, they, being thus left alone in their own country, [pg 181] would fall a sacrifice to the rage of the Carthaginians, who would take vengeance upon them for the common rebellion. This was sufficient to raise them to fury. They immediately made choice of Spendius and Matho for their chiefs. No remonstrances were heard; and whoever offered to make any, was immediately put to death. They ran to Gisgo's tent, plundered it of the money designed for the payment of the forces: dragged that general himself to prison, with all his attendants; after having treated them with the utmost indignities. All the cities of Africa, to whom they had sent deputies to exhort them to recover their liberty, came over to them, Utica and Hippacra excepted, which they therefore immediately besieged.

Carthage had never been before exposed to such imminent danger. The citizens individually drew each his subsistence from the rents or revenues of their lands, and the public expenses from the tribute paid by Africa. But all this was stopped at once; and (a much worse circumstance) was turned against them. They found themselves destitute of arms and forces, either for sea or land; of all necessary preparations either for the sustaining of a siege, or the equipping of a fleet; and, to complete their misfortunes, without any hopes of foreign assistance, either from their friends or allies.

They might, in some sense, impute to themselves the distress to which they were reduced. During the last war, they had treated the African nations with the utmost rigour, by imposing excessive tributes on them, in the exaction of which no allowance was made for poverty and extreme misery; and governors, such as Hanno, were treated with the greater respect, the more severe they had been in levying those tributes. So that no great efforts were necessary to prevail upon the Africans to engage in this rebellion. At the very first signal that was made, it broke out, and in a moment became general. The women, who had often, with the deepest affliction, seen their husbands and fathers dragged to prison for non-payment, were more exasperated than the men; and with pleasure gave up all their ornaments towards the expenses of the war; so that the chiefs of the rebels, after paying all they had promised the soldiers, found themselves still in the midst of plenty: an [pg 182] instructive lesson, says Polybius, to ministers, how a people should be treated; as it teaches them to look, not only to the present occasion, but to extend their views to futurity.

The Carthaginians, notwithstanding their present distress, did not despond, but made the most extraordinary efforts. The command of the army was given to Hanno. Troops were levied by land and sea; horse as well as foot. All citizens, capable of bearing arms, were mustered; mercenaries were invited from all parts; and all the ships which the republic had left were refitted.

The rebels discovered no less ardour. We related before, that they had formed the siege of the two only cities which refused to join them. Their army was now increased to seventy thousand men. After detachments had been drawn from it to carry on those sieges, they pitched their camp at Tunis; and thereby held Carthage in a kind of blockade, filling it with perpetual alarms, and frequently advancing up to its very walls by day as well as by night.

Hanno had marched to the relief of Utica, and gained a considerable advantage, which, had he made a proper use of it, might have proved decisive: but entering the city, and only diverting himself there, the mercenaries, who had retreated to a neighbouring hill covered with trees, hearing how careless the enemy were, poured down upon them; found the soldiers straggling in all parts; took and plundered the camp, and seized upon all the supplies that had been brought from Carthage for the relief of the besieged. Nor was this the only error committed by Hanno; and errors, in such critical junctures, are much the most fatal. Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was therefore appointed to succeed him. This general answered the idea which had been entertained of him; and his first success was the obliging the rebels to raise the siege of Utica. He then marched against their army which was encamped near Carthage; defeated part of it, and seized almost all their advantageous posts. These successes revived the courage of the Carthaginians.

The arrival of a young Numidian nobleman, Naravasus by name, who, out of esteem for the person and merit of Barca, joined him with two thousand Numidians, was of great service [pg 183] to that general. Animated by this reinforcement, he fell upon the rebels, who had cooped him up in a valley; killed ten thousand of them, and took four thousand prisoners. The young Numidian distinguished himself greatly in this battle. Barca took into his troops as many of the prisoners as were desirous of being enlisted, and gave the rest free liberty to go wherever they pleased, on condition that they should never take up arms any more against the Carthaginians; otherwise, that every man of them, if taken, should be put to death. This conduct proves the wisdom of that general. He thought this a better expedient than extreme severity. And indeed where a multitude of mutineers are concerned, the greatest part of whom have been drawn in by the persuasions of the most hotheaded, or through fear of the most furious, clemency seldom fails of being successful.

Spendius, the chief of the rebels, fearing that this affected lenity of Barca might occasion a defection among his troops, thought the only expedient left him to prevent it, would be, to strike some signal blow, which would deprive them of all hopes of being ever reconciled to the enemy. With this view, after having read to them some fictitious letters, by which advice was given him, of a secret design concerted betwixt some of their comrades and Gisgo for rescuing him out of prison, where he had been so long detained; he brought them to the barbarous resolution of murdering him and all the rest of the prisoners; and any man, who durst offer any milder counsel, was immediately sacrificed to their fury. Accordingly, this unfortunate general, and seven hundred prisoners who were confined with him, were brought out to the front of the camp, where Gisgo fell the first sacrifice, and afterwards all the rest. Their hands were cut off, their thighs broken, and their bodies, still breathing, were thrown into a hole. The Carthaginians sent a herald to demand their remains, in order to pay them the last sad office, but were refused; and the herald was further told, that whoever presumed to come upon the like errand, should meet with Gisgo's fate. And, indeed, the rebels immediately came to the unanimous resolution, of treating all such Carthaginians as should fall into their hands in the same barbarous manner; and decreed farther, that if any of their allies [pg 184] were taken, they should, after their hands were cut off, be sent back to Carthage. This bloody resolution was but too punctually executed.

The Carthaginians were now just beginning to breathe, as it were, and recover their spirits, when a number of unlucky accidents plunged them again into fresh dangers. A division arose among their generals; and the provisions, of which they were in extreme necessity, coming to them by sea, were all cast away in a storm. But the misfortune which they most keenly felt, was, the sudden defection of the two only cities which till then had preserved their allegiance, and in all times adhered inviolably to the commonwealth. These were Utica and Hippacra. These cities, without the least reason, or even so much as a pretence, went over at once to the rebels; and, transported with the like rage and fury, murdered the governor, with the garrison sent to their relief; and carried their inhumanity so far, as to refuse their dead bodies to the Carthaginians, who demanded them back in order for burial.

The rebels, animated by so much success, laid siege to Carthage, but were obliged immediately to raise it. They nevertheless continued the war. Having drawn together, into one body, all their own troops and those of the allies, (making upwards of fifty thousand men in all,) they watched the motions of Hamilcar's army, but carefully kept their own on the hills; and avoided coming down into the plains, because the enemy would there have had too great an advantage over them, on account of their elephants and cavalry. Hamilcar, more skilful in the art of war than they, never exposed himself to any of their attacks; but taking advantage of their oversights, often dispossessed them of their posts, if their soldiers straggled but ever so little; and harassed them a thousand ways. Such of them as fell into his hands, were thrown to wild beasts. At last, he surprised them at a time when they least expected it, and shut them up in a post which was so situated, that it was impossible for them to get out of it. Not daring to venture a battle, and being unable to get off, they began to fortify their camp, and surrounded it with ditches and intrenchments. But an enemy among themselves, and which was much more formidable, had reduced them to the greatest extremity: this was [pg 185] hunger, which was so raging, that they at last ate one another; Divine Providence, says Polybius, thus revenging upon themselves the barbarous cruelty they had exercised on others. They now had no resource left; and knew but too well the punishments which would be inflicted on them, in case they should fall alive into the hands of the enemy. After such bloody scenes as had been acted by them, they did not so much as think of peace, or of coming to an accommodation. They had sent to their forces encamped at Tunis for assistance, but with no success. In the mean time the famine increased daily. They had first eaten their prisoners, then their slaves; and now their fellow-citizens only were left. Their chiefs, now no longer able to resist the complaints and cries of the multitude, who threatened to massacre them if they did not surrender, went themselves to Hamilcar, after having obtained a safe conduct from him. The conditions of the treaty were, that the Carthaginians should select any ten of the rebels, to treat them as they should think fit, and that the rest should be dismissed with only one suit of clothes for each. When the treaty was signed, the chiefs themselves were arrested and detained by the Carthaginians, who plainly showed, on this occasion, that they did not pride themselves upon their good faith and sincerity. The rebels, hearing that their chiefs were seized, and knowing nothing of the convention, suspected that they were betrayed, and thereupon immediately took up arms. But Hamilcar, having surrounded them, brought forward his elephants; and either trod them all under foot, or cut them to pieces, they being upwards of forty thousand.

The consequence of this victory was, the reduction of almost all the cities of Africa, which immediately returned to their allegiance. Hamilcar, without loss of time, marched against Tunis, which, ever since the beginning of the war, had been the asylum of the rebels, and their place of arms. He invested it on one side, whilst Hannibal, who was joined in the command with him, besieged it on the other. Then advancing near the walls, and ordering crosses to be set up, he hung Spendius on one of them, and his companions who had been seized with him on the rest, where they all expired. Matho, the other chief, who commanded in the city, saw plainly by [pg 186] this what he himself might expect; and for that reason was much more attentive to his own defence. Perceiving that Hannibal, as being confident of success, was very negligent in all his motions, he made a sally, attacked his quarters, killed many of his men, took several prisoners, among whom was Hannibal himself, and plundered his camp. Then taking Spendius from the cross, he put Hannibal in his place, after having made him suffer inexpressible torments; and sacrificed round the body of Spendius thirty citizens of the first quality in Carthage, as so many victims of his vengeance. One would conclude, that there had been a mutual emulation betwixt the contending parties, which of them should outdo the other in acts of the most barbarous cruelty.

Barca being at that time at a distance, it was long before the news of his colleague's misfortune reached him; and besides, the road lying betwixt the two camps being impassable, it was impossible for him to advance hastily to his assistance. This disastrous accident caused a great consternation in Carthage. The reader may have observed, in the course of this war, a continual vicissitude of prosperity and adversity, of security and fear, of joy and grief; so various and inconstant were the events on either side.

In Carthage it was thought advisable to make one bold effort. Accordingly, all the youth capable of bearing arms were pressed into the service. Hanno was sent to join Hamilcar; and thirty senators were deputed to conjure those generals, in the name of the republic, to forget past quarrels, and sacrifice their resentments to their country's welfare. This was immediately complied with; they mutually embraced, and were reconciled sincerely to one another.

From this time, the Carthaginians were successful in all things; and Matho, who in every attempt after this came off with disadvantage, at last thought himself obliged to hazard a battle; and this was just what the Carthaginians wanted. The leaders on both sides animated their troops, as going to fight a battle which would for ever decide their fate. An engagement ensued. Victory was not long in suspense; for the rebels every where giving ground, the Africans were almost all slain, and the rest surrendered. Matho was taken alive [pg 187] and carried to Carthage. All Africa returned immediately to its allegiance, except the two perfidious cities which had lately revolted; however, they were soon forced to surrender at discretion.

And now the victorious army returned to Carthage, and was there received with shouts of joy, and the congratulations of the whole city. Matho and his soldiers, after having adorned the public triumph, were led to execution; and finished, by a painful and ignominious death, a life that had been polluted with the blackest treasons and unparalleled barbarities. Such was the conclusion of the war against the mercenaries, after having lasted three years and four months. It furnished, says Polybius, an ever-memorable lesson to all nations, not to employ in their armies a greater number of mercenaries than citizens; nor to rely, for the defence of their state, on a body of men who are not attached to it either by interest or affection.

I have hitherto purposely deferred taking notice of such transactions in Sardinia, as passed at the time I have been speaking of, and which were, in some measure, dependent on, and resulting from, the war waged in Africa against the mercenaries. They exhibit the same violent methods to promote rebellion; the same excesses of cruelty; as if the wind had carried the same spirit of discord and fury from Africa into Sardinia.

When the news was brought there of what Spendius and Matho were doing in Africa, the mercenaries in that island also shook off the yoke, in imitation of these incendiaries. They began by the murder of Bostar their general, and of all the Carthaginians under him. A successor was sent; but all the forces which he carried with him went over to the rebels; hung the general on a cross; and, throughout the whole island, put all the Carthaginians to the sword, after having made them suffer inexpressible torments. They then besieged all the cities one after another, and soon got possession of the whole country. But feuds arising between them and the natives, the mercenaries were driven entirely out of the island, and took refuge in Italy. Thus the Carthaginians lost Sardinia, an island of great importance to them, on account of its extent, its fertility, and the great number of its inhabitants.

[pg 188]

The Romans, ever since their treaty with the Carthaginians, had behaved towards them with great justice and moderation. A slight quarrel, on account of some Roman merchants who were seized at Carthage for having supplied the enemy with provisions, had embroiled them a little. But these merchants being restored on the first complaint made to the senate of Carthage; the Romans, who prided themselves upon their justice and generosity on all occasions, made the Carthaginians a return of their former friendship; served them to the utmost of their power; forbade their merchants to furnish any other nation with provisions; and even refused to listen to the proposals made by the Sardinian rebels, when invited by them to take possession of the island.

But these scruples and delicacy wore off by degrees; and Cæsar's advantageous testimony (in Sallust) of their honesty and plain-dealing, could not with any propriety be applied here:703 “Although,” says he, “in all the Punic wars, the Carthaginians, both in peace and during truces, had committed a number of detestable actions, the Romans could never (how inviting soever the opportunity might be) be prevailed upon to retaliate such usage; being more attentive to their own glory, than to the revenge they might have justly taken on such perfidious enemies.”

A.M. 3767. A. Carth. 609. A. Rom. 511. Ant. J.C. 237.

The mercenaries, who, as was observed, had retired into Italy, brought the Romans at last to the resolution of sailing over into Sardinia, to render themselves masters of it. The Carthaginians were deeply afflicted at the news, upon pretence that they had a more just title to Sardinia than the Romans; they therefore put themselves in a posture to take a speedy and just revenge on those who had excited the people of that island to take up arms against them. But the Romans, pretending that these preparations were made not against Sardinia but their state, declared war against the Carthaginians. The latter, quite exhausted in every respect, and scarce beginning to breathe, were in no condition to sustain a war. The [pg 189] necessity of the times was therefore to be complied with, and they were forced to yield to a more powerful rival. A fresh treaty was thereupon made, by which they gave up Sardinia to the Romans; and obliged themselves to a new payment of twelve hundred talents, to keep off the war with which they were menaced. This injustice of the Romans was the true cause of the second Punic war, as will appear in the sequel.

The second Punic War.704—The second Punic war, which I am now going to relate, is one of the most memorable recorded in history, and most worthy the attention of an inquisitive reader; whether we consider the boldness of the enterprises; the wisdom employed in the execution; the obstinate efforts of two rival nations, and the ready resources they found in their lowest ebb of fortune; the variety of uncommon events, and the uncertain issue of so long and bloody a war; or lastly, the assemblage of the most perfect models in every kind of merit; and the most instructive lessons that occur in history, either with regard to war, policy, or government. Never did two more powerful, or at least more warlike, states or nations make war against each other; and never had these in question seen themselves raised to a more exalted pitch of power and glory. Rome and Carthage were, doubtless, at that time, the two first states of the world. Having already tried their strength in the first Punic war, and thereby made an essay of each other's power, they knew perfectly well what either could do. In this second war, the fate of arms was so equally balanced, and the success so intermixed with vicissitudes and varieties, that that party triumphed which had been most in danger of being ruined. Great as the forces of these two nations were, it may almost be said, that their mutual hatred was still greater. The Romans, on one side, could not without indignation see the vanquished presuming to attack them; and the Carthaginians, on the other, were exasperated at the equally rapacious and harsh treatment which they pretended to have received from the victor.

The plan which I have laid down does not permit me to enter into an exact detail of this war, whereof Italy, Sicily, [pg 190] Spain, and Africa, were the several seats; and which has a still closer connection with the Roman history than with that I am now writing. I shall confine myself therefore, principally, to such transactions as relate to the Carthaginians: and endeavour, as far as I am able, to give my reader an idea of the genius and character of Hannibal, who perhaps was the greatest warrior that antiquity has to boast of.

The remote and more immediate Causes of the second Punic War.—Before I come to speak of the declaration of war betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians, I think it necessary to explain the true causes of it; and to point out by what steps this rupture, betwixt these two nations, was so long preparing, before it openly broke out.

That man would be grossly mistaken, says Polybius,705 who should look upon the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal as the true cause of the second Punic war. The regret of the Carthaginians for having so tamely given up Sicily, by the treaty which terminated the first Punic war; the injustice and violence of the Romans, who took advantage of the troubles excited in Africa, to dispossess the Carthaginians of Sardinia, and to impose a new tribute on them; and the success and conquests of the latter in Spain; these were the true causes of the violation of the treaty, as Livy706 (agreeing here with Polybius) insinuates in few words, in the beginning of his history of the second Punic war.

And indeed Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was highly exasperated on account of the last treaty, which the necessity of the times had compelled the Carthaginians to submit to; and he therefore meditated the design of taking just, though distant measures, for breaking it on the first favourable opportunity that should offer.

When the troubles of Africa were appeased, he was sent upon an expedition against the Numidians;707 in which, giving fresh proofs of his courage and abilities, his merit raised him to the command of the army which was to act in Spain. Hannibal, [pg 191] his son, at that time but nine years of age, begged with the utmost importunity to attend him on this occasion;708 and for that purpose employed all the soothing arts so common to children of his age, and which have so much power over a tender father. Hamilcar could not refuse him; and after having made him swear upon the altars, that he would declare himself an enemy to the Romans as soon as age would allow him to do it, he took his son with him.

Hamilcar possessed all the qualities which constitute the great general. To an invincible courage, and the most consummate prudence, he added a most engaging and insinuating behaviour. He subdued, in a very short time, the greatest part of the nations of Spain, either by the terror of his arms or his engaging conduct; and after enjoying the command there nine years, came to an end worthy his exalted character, dying gloriously in arms for the cause of his country.

A.M. 3776. A. Rom. 520.

The Carthaginians appointed Asdrubal, his son-in-law, to succeed him.709 This general, to strengthen his footing in the country, built a city, which, by the advantage of its situation, the commodiousness of its harbour, its fortifications, and opulence occasioned by its great commerce, became one of the most considerable cities in the world. It was called New Carthage, and is at this day known by the name of Carthagena.

From the several steps of these two great generals, it was easy to perceive that they were meditating some mighty design which they had always in view, and laid their schemes at a great distance for the putting it in execution. The Romans were sensible of this, and reproached themselves for their indolence and torpor, which had thrown them into a kind of lethargy; at a time that the enemy were rapidly pursuing their victories in Spain, which might one day be turned against them. They would have been very well pleased to attack them by open force, and to wrest their conquests out of their hands; but the fear of another (not less formidable) enemy, the Gauls, whom they expected shortly to see at their very gates, kept them from showing their resentment. They therefore had recourse to negotiations; and concluded a treaty [pg 192] with Asdrubal, in which, without taking any notice of the rest of Spain, they contented themselves with introducing an article, by which the Carthaginians were not allowed to make any conquests beyond the Iberus.

Asdrubal, in the mean time, still pushed on his conquests;710 still, however, taking care not to pass beyond the limits stipulated by the treaty; but by sparing no endeavours to win the chiefs of the several nations by a courteous and engaging behaviour, he furthered the interests of Carthage still more by persuasive methods than force of arms. But unhappily, after having governed Spain eight years, he was treacherously murdered by a Gaul, who took so barbarous a revenge for a private grudge he bore him.711

A.M. 3783. A. Rom. 530.

Three years before his death, he had written to Carthage, to desire that Hannibal, then twenty-two years of age, might be sent to him.712 The proposal met with some difficulty, as the senate was divided betwixt two powerful factions, which, from Hamilcar's time, had began to follow opposite views in the administration and affairs of the state. One faction was headed by Hanno, whose birth, merit, and zeal for the public welfare, gave him great influence in the public deliberations. This faction proposed, on every occasion, the concluding of a safe peace, and the preserving the conquests in Spain, as being preferable to the uncertain events of an expensive war, which they foresaw would one day occasion the ruin of Carthage. The other, called the Barcinian faction, because it supported the interests of Barca and his family, had, to the credit and influence which it had long enjoyed in the city, added the reputation which the signal exploits of Hamilcar and Asdrubal had given it; and declared openly for war. When therefore Asdrubal's demand came to be debated in the senate, Hanno represented the danger of sending so early into the field a young man, who already possessed all the haughtiness and imperious temper of his father; [pg 193] and who ought, therefore, rather to be kept a long time, and very carefully, under the eye of the magistrates and the power of the laws, that he might learn obedience, and a modesty which should teach him not to think himself superior to all other men. He concluded with saying, that he feared this spark, which was then kindling, would one day rise to a conflagration. His remonstrances were not heard, so that the Barcinian faction had the superiority, and Hannibal set out for Spain.

The moment of his arrival there, he drew upon himself the eyes of the whole army, who fancied they saw Hamilcar his father revive in him. He seemed to dart the same fire from his eyes; the same martial vigour displayed itself in the air of his countenance, with the same features and engaging carriage. But his personal qualities endeared him still more. He possessed almost every talent that constitutes the great man. His patience in labour was invincible, his temperance was surprising, his courage in the greatest dangers intrepid, and his presence of mind in the heat of battle admirable; and, a still more wonderful circumstance, his disposition and cast of mind were so flexible, that nature had formed him equally for commanding or obeying; so that it was doubtful whether he was dearer to the soldiers or the generals. He served three campaigns under Asdrubal.

A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.

Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.713 I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos714 that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.715

The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy [pg 194] had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,716 carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:717 a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.

The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.718 Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.

In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more [pg 195] secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.

News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.

During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage [pg 196] to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.

Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.719 Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity720 to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.

War proclaimed.—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.721 The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe, “I bring here,” says he, in a haughty tone, “either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.” The senate answering, that they left the choice to him: “I give you war then,” says he, unfolding his robe. “And we,” replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness, “as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness.” Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.

If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,722 lies upon the [pg 197] Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.

The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.

A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.

The Beginning of the Second Punic War.—When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.723 With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.

Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this [pg 198] expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,724 in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.725726 From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,727 were sixteen hundred furlongs.728 From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred furlongs.729 From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.730 From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.731 Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.732

Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass;733 of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;734 and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.

Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.735 His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country [pg 199] lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.

Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days' march from the mouth of the Rhone,736 attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.737 He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they passed the river738 the next day without the least opposition.

They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest [pg 200] of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.