Chapter II · The History of Carthage from the first Punic War to its destruction. (continued 2)

The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.

The March after the Battle of the Rhone.—The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;739 P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a [pg 201] hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.

At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.

Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to [pg 202] the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen740 of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.

Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.

Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.

The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux741 of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place. Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the [pg 203] Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,742 Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.

The Passage of the Alps.—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.743 When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the [pg 204] loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.

After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.

At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains744 watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such [pg 205] pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.

They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.

Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days' rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by [pg 206] good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock,745 which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.

Hannibal enters Italy.—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.746 It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.

His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for [pg 207] action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin747 refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.

The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.748

Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus.—The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.749 Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy, [pg 208] but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.

Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward, viz. the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.

After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops [pg 209] over it. Two ill omens750 had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.

Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on751 the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses' feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.

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The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.

It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.

Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the only refuge he then had left.

Battle of the Trebia.—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.752 From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.

This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated, [pg 211] and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.

These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.

This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or [pg 212] one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.

They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that [pg 213] of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.

In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;753 for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,754 defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.

Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.755 For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.

The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,756 whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of [pg 214] all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.

Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.757 He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.

A.M. 3788. A. Rom. 532.

At Rome, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius had been appointed consuls.758 Hannibal having advice that the latter was advanced already as far as Arretium, a town of Tuscany, resolved to go and engage him as soon as possible. Two ways being shown him, he chose the shortest, though the most troublesome, nay, almost impassable, by reason of a fen which he was forced to go through. Here the army suffered incredible hardships. During four days and three nights they marched halfway up the leg in water, and, consequently, could not get a moment's sleep. Hannibal himself, who rode upon the only elephant he had left, could hardly get through. His long want of sleep, and the thick vapours which exhaled from that marshy place, together with the unhealthiness of the season, cost him one of his eyes.

Battle of Thrasymenus.759—Hannibal being thus got, almost [pg 215] unexpectedly, out of this dangerous situation, and having refreshed his troops, marched and pitched his camp between Arretium and Fesulæ, in the richest and most fruitful part of Tuscany. His first endeavours were, to discover the disposition of Flaminius, in order that he might take advantage of his weak side, which, according to Polybius, ought to be the chief study of a general. He was told, that Flaminius was greatly conceited of his own merit, bold, enterprising, rash, and fond of glory. To plunge him the deeper into these excesses, to which he was naturally prone,760 he inflamed his impetuous spirit, by laying waste and burning the whole country in his sight.

Flaminius was not of a temper to continue inactive in his camp, even if Hannibal had lain still. But when he saw the territories of his allies laid waste before his eyes, he thought it would reflect dishonour upon him, should he suffer Hannibal to ransack Italy without control, and even advance to the very walls of Rome without meeting any resistance. He rejected with scorn the prudent counsels of those who advised him to wait the arrival of his colleague, and to be satisfied, for the present, with putting a stop to the devastation of the enemy.

In the mean time, Hannibal was still advancing towards Rome, having Cortona on the left hand, and the lake Thrasymenus on his right. When he saw that the consul followed close after him, with design to give him battle, in order to stop him in his march; having observed that the ground was convenient for an engagement, he thought only of making preparations for it. The lake Thrasymenus and the mountains of Cortona form a very narrow defile, which leads into a large valley, lined on both sides with hills of a considerable height, and closed, at the outlet, by a steep hill of difficult access. On this hill, Hannibal, after having crossed the valley, came and encamped with the main body of his army; posting his light-armed infantry in ambuscade upon the hills on the right, and part of his cavalry behind those on the left, as far almost as the entrance of the defile, through which Flaminius was obliged to pass. Accordingly, this general, who followed him very eagerly with the resolution to fight him, being come to [pg 216] the defile near the lake, was forced to halt, because night was coming on; but he entered it the next morning at daybreak.

Hannibal having permitted him to advance, with all his forces, above half way through the valley, and seeing the Roman van-guard pretty near him, gave the signal for the battle, and commanded his troops to come out of their ambuscade, in order that he might attack the enemy at the same time from all quarters. The reader may guess at the consternation with which the Romans were seized.

They were not yet drawn up in order of battle, neither had they got their arms in readiness, when they found themselves attacked in front, in rear, and in flank. In a moment, all the ranks were put into disorder. Flaminius, alone undaunted in so universal a consternation, animates his soldiers both with his hand and voice, and exhorts them to cut themselves a passage with their swords through the midst of the enemy. But the tumult which reigned every where, the dreadful shouts of the enemy, and a fog that was risen, prevented his being seen or heard. However, when the Romans saw themselves surrounded on all sides, either by the enemy or the lake, the impossibility of saving their lives by flight roused their courage, and both parties began the fight with astonishing animosity. Their fury was so great, that not a soldier in either army perceived an earthquake which happened in that country, and buried whole cities in ruins. In this confusion, Flaminius being slain by one of the Insubrian Gauls, the Romans began to give ground, and at last fairly fled. Great numbers, endeavouring to save themselves, leaped into the lake; whilst others, directing their course towards the mountains, fell into the enemy's hands whom they strove to avoid. Six thousand only cut their way through the conquerors, and retreated to a place of safety; but the next day they were taken prisoners. In this battle fifteen thousand Romans were killed, and about ten thousand escaped to Rome by different roads. Hannibal sent back the Latins, who were allies of the Romans, into their own country, without demanding the least ransom. He commanded search to be made for the body of Flaminius, in order to give it burial; but it could not be found. He afterwards put his troops into quarters of refreshment, and solemnized the [pg 217] funerals of thirty of his chief officers who were killed in the battle. He lost in all but fifteen hundred men, most of whom were Gauls.

Immediately after, Hannibal despatched a courier to Carthage, with the news of his good success hitherto in Italy. This caused the greatest joy for the present, gave birth to the most promising hopes with regard to the future, and revived the courage of all the citizens. They now prepared, with incredible ardour, to send into Italy and Spain all necessary succours.

Rome, on the contrary, was filled with universal grief and alarm, as soon as the prætor had pronounced from the rostra the following words, “We have lost a great battle.” The senate, studious of nothing but the public welfare, thought that in so great a calamity and so imminent a danger, recourse must be had to extraordinary remedies. They therefore appointed Quintus Fabius dictator, a person as conspicuous for his wisdom as his birth. It was the custom at Rome, that the moment a dictator was nominated, all authority ceased, that of the tribunes of the people excepted. M. Minucius was appointed his general of horse. We are now in the second year of the war.

Hannibal's Conduct with respect to Fabius.761—Hannibal, after the battle of Thrasymenus, not thinking it yet proper to march directly to Rome, contented himself, in the mean time, with laying waste the country. He crossed Umbria and Picenum; and after ten days' march, arrived in the territory of Adria.762 He got a very considerable booty in this march. Out of his implacable enmity to the Romans, he commanded, that all who were able to bear arms, should be put to the sword; and meeting no obstacle any where, he advanced as far as Apulia; plundering the countries which lay in his way, and carrying desolation wherever he came, in order to compel the nations to disengage themselves from their alliance with the Romans; and to show all Italy, that Rome itself, now quite dispirited, yielded him the victory.

Fabius, followed by Minucius and four legions, had marched from Rome in quest of the enemy, but with a firm resolution [pg 218] not to let him take the least advantage, nor to advance one step till he had first reconnoitred every place; nor hazard a battle till he should be sure of success.

As soon as both armies were in sight, Hannibal, to terrify the Roman forces, offered them battle, by advancing almost to the very entrenchments of their camp. But finding every thing quiet there, he retired; blaming, in appearance, the cowardice of the enemy, whom he upbraided with having at last lost that valour so natural to their ancestors; but fretted inwardly, to find he had to do with a general of so different a disposition from Sempronius and Flaminius; and that the Romans, instructed by their defeat, had at last made choice of a commander capable of opposing Hannibal.

From this moment he perceived that the dictator would not be formidable to him by the boldness of his attacks, but by the prudence and regularity of his conduct, which might perplex and embarrass him very much. The only circumstance he now wanted to know, was, whether the new general had firmness enough to pursue steadily the plan he seemed to have laid down. He endeavoured, therefore, to shake his resolution by the different movements which he made, by laying waste the lands, plundering the cities, and burning the villages and towns. He, at one time, would raise his camp with the utmost precipitation; and, at another, stop short in some valley out of the common route, to try whether he could not surprise him in the plain. However, Fabius still kept his troops on the hills, but without losing sight of Hannibal; never approaching near enough to come to an engagement; nor yet keeping at such a distance, as might give him an opportunity of escaping him. He never suffered his soldiers to stir out of the camp, except to forage, nor ever on those occasions without a numerous convoy. If ever he engaged, it was only in slight skirmishes, and so very cautiously, that his troops had always the advantage. By this conduct he revived, by insensible degrees, the courage of the soldiers, which the loss of three battles had entirely damped; and enabled them to rely, as they had formerly done, on their valour and good fortune.

Hannibal, having got an immense booty in Campania, where he had resided a considerable time, left that country, in order [pg 219] that he might not consume the provisions he had laid up, and which he reserved for the winter season. Besides, he could no longer continue in a country of gardens and vineyards, which were more agreeable to the eye than useful for the subsistence of an army; a country where he would have been forced to take up his winter quarters among marshes, rocks, and sands; while the Romans would have drawn plentiful supplies from Capua, and the richest parts of Italy. He therefore resolved to settle elsewhere.

Fabius naturally supposed, that Hannibal would be obliged to return the same way he came, and that he might easily annoy him during his march. He began by throwing a considerable body of troops into Casilinum, and thereby securing that small town, situated on the Vulturnus, which separated the territories of Falernum from those of Capua: he afterwards detached four thousand men, to seize the only pass through which Hannibal could come out; and then, according to his usual custom, posted himself with the remainder of the army on the hills adjoining to the road.

The Carthaginians arrive, and encamp in the plain at the foot of the mountains. And now the crafty Carthaginian falls into the same snare he had laid for Flaminius at the defile of Thrasymenus; and it seemed impossible for him ever to extricate himself out of this difficulty, there being but one outlet, of which the Romans were possessed. Fabius, fancying himself sure of his prey, was only contriving how to seize it. He flattered himself, and not without the appearance of probability, with the hopes of putting an end to the war by this single battle. Nevertheless, he thought fit to defer the attack till the next day.

Hannibal perceived, that his own artifices were now employed against him.763 It is in such junctures as these, that a general has need of unusual presence of mind and fortitude, to view danger in its utmost extent, without being dismayed; and to find out sure and instant expedients without deliberating. Immediately, the Carthaginian general caused two thousand oxen to be got together, and ordered small bundles of vine-branches to be tied to their horns. Towards the dead of night, having commanded the branches to be set on fire, he caused [pg 220] the oxen to be driven with violence to the top of the hills where the Romans were encamped. As soon as these creatures felt the flame, the pain rendering them furious, they flew up and down on all sides, and set fire to the shrubs and bushes they met in their way. This squadron, of a new kind, was sustained by a good number of light-armed soldiers, who had orders to seize upon the summit of the mountain, and to charge the enemy, in case they should meet them. All things happened as Hannibal had foreseen. The Romans who guarded the defile, seeing the fires spread over the hills which were above them, and imagining that it was Hannibal making his escape by torch-light, quit their post, and run up to the mountains to oppose his passage. The main body of the army not knowing what to think of all this tumult, and Fabius himself not daring to stir, while it was dark, for fear of a surprise, wait for the return of the day. Hannibal seizes this opportunity, marches his troops and the spoils through the defile, which was now unguarded, and rescues his army out of a snare in which, had Fabius been but a little more vigorous, it would either have been destroyed, or at least very much weakened. It is glorious for a man to turn his very errors to his advantage, and make them subservient to his reputation.

The Carthaginian army returned to Apulia, still pursued and harassed by the Romans. The dictator, being obliged to take a journey to Rome on account of some religious ceremonies, earnestly entreated his general of horse, before his departure, not to fight during his absence. However, Minucius did not regard either his advice or his entreaties; but the very first opportunity he had, whilst part of Hannibal's troops were foraging, he charged the rest, and gained some advantage. He immediately sent advice of this to Rome, as if he had obtained a considerable victory. The news of this, with what had just before happened at the passage of the defile, raised complaints and murmurs against the slow and timorous circumspection of Fabius. In a word, matters were carried so far, that the Roman people gave his general of horse an equal authority with him; a thing unheard-of before. The dictator was upon the road when he received advice of this: for he had left Rome, in order that he might not be an eye-witness of what was contriving [pg 221] against him. His constancy, however, was not shaken. He was very sensible, that though his authority in the command was divided, yet his skill in the art of war was not so.764 This soon became manifest.

Minucius, grown arrogant at the advantage he had gained over his colleague, proposed that each should command a day alternately, or even a longer time. But Fabius rejected this proposal, as it would have exposed the whole army to danger whilst under the command of Minucius. He therefore chose to divide the troops, in order that it might be in his power to preserve, at least, that part which should fall to his share.

Hannibal, fully informed of all that passed in the Roman camp, was overjoyed to hear of this dissension between the two commanders. He therefore laid a snare for the rash Minucius, who accordingly plunged headlong into it; and engaged the enemy on an eminence, in which an ambuscade was concealed. But his troops being soon put into disorder, were just upon the point of being cut to pieces, when Fabius, alarmed by the sudden outcries of the wounded, called aloud to his soldiers: “Let us hasten to the assistance of Minucius: let us fly and snatch the victory from the enemy, and extort from our fellow-citizens a confession of their fault.” This succour was very seasonable, and compelled Hannibal to sound a retreat. The latter, as he was retiring, said, “That the cloud which had been long hovering on the summit of the mountain, had at last burst with a loud crack, and caused a mighty storm.” So important and seasonable a service done by the dictator, opened the eyes of Minucius. He accordingly acknowledged his error, returned immediately to his duty and obedience, and showed, that it is sometimes more glorious to know how to atone for a fault, than not to have committed it.

The state of Affairs in Spain.765—In the beginning of this campaign, Cn. Scipio, having suddenly attacked the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by Hamilcar, defeated it, and took twenty-five ships, with a great quantity of rich spoils. This victory made the Romans sensible, that they ought to be particularly attentive [pg 222] to the affairs of Spain, because Hannibal could draw considerable supplies both of men and money from that country. Accordingly, they sent a fleet thither, the command whereof was given to P. Scipio, who, after his arrival in Spain, having joined his brother, did the commonwealth very great service. Till that time the Romans had never ventured beyond the Ebro. They had been satisfied with having gained the friendship of the nations situated between that river and Italy, and confirming it by alliances: but under Publius, they crossed the Ebro, and carried their arms much further up into the country.

The circumstance which contributed most to promote their affairs, was, the treachery of a Spaniard in Saguntum. Hannibal had left there the children of the most distinguished families in Spain, whom he had taken as hostages. Abelox, for so this Spaniard was called, persuaded Bostar, the governor of the city, to send back these young men into their country, in order, by that means, to attach the inhabitants more firmly to the Carthaginian interest. He himself was charged with this commission. But he carried them to the Romans, who afterwards delivered them to their relations, and, by so acceptable a present, acquired their amity.

A.M. 3789. A. Rom. 533.

The Battle of Cannæ.766—The next spring, C. Terentius Varro and L. Æmilius Paulus were chosen consuls at Rome. In this campaign, which was the third of the second Punic war, the Romans did what had never been practised before, that is, they composed the army of eight legions, each consisting of five thousand men, exclusive of the allies. For, as we have already observed, the Romans never raised but four legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand foot, and three hundred horse.767 They never, except on the most important occasions, made them consist of five thousand of the one, and four hundred of the other. As for the troops of the allies, their infantry was equal to that of the legions, but they had three times as many horse. Each of the consuls had commonly half the troops of the allies, with two legions, in order for them to act separately; and it was very seldom that all [pg 223] these forces were used at the same time, and in the same expedition. Here the Romans had not only four, but eight legions, so important did the affair appear to them. The senate even thought fit, that the two consuls of the foregoing year, Servilius and Attilius, should serve in the army as proconsuls; but the latter could not go into the field, by reason of his great age.

Varro, at his setting out from Rome, had declared openly, that he would fall upon the enemy the very first opportunity, and put an end to the war; adding, that it would never be terminated, so long as men such as Fabius should be at the head of the Roman armies. An advantage which he gained over the Carthaginians, of whom near seventeen hundred were killed, greatly increased his boldness and arrogance. As for Hannibal, he considered this loss as a real advantage; being persuaded that it would serve as a bait to the consul's rashness, and prompt him on to a battles which he wanted extremely. It was afterwards known, that Hannibal was reduced to such a scarcity of provisions, that he could not possibly have subsisted ten days longer. The Spaniards were already meditating to leave him. So that there would have been an end of Hannibal and his army, if his good fortune had not thrown a Varro in in his way.

Both armies, having often removed from place to place, came in sight of each other near Cannæ, a little town in Apulia, situated on the river Aufidus. As Hannibal was encamped in a level open country, and his cavalry much superior to that of the Romans, Æmilius did not think proper to engage in such a place. He wished to draw the enemy into a spot, where the infantry might have the greatest share in the action. But his colleague, who was unexperienced, was of a contrary opinion. Such is the inconveniency of a divided command; jealousy, a disparity of tempers, or a diversity of views, seldom failing to create a dissension between the two generals.

The troops on each side were, for some time, contented with slight skirmishes. But, at last, one day, when Varro had the command, (for the two consuls took it by turns,) preparations were made on both sides for battle. Æmilius had not been consulted; yet, though he extremely disapproved the conduct [pg 224] of his colleague, as it was not in his power to prevent it, he seconded him to the utmost.

Hannibal, after having made his soldiers observe, that, being superior in cavalry, they could not possibly have pitched upon a better spot for fighting, had it been left to their choice: “Return, then,” says he, “thanks to the gods for having brought the enemy hither, that you may triumph over them; and thank me also, for having reduced the Romans to a necessity of coming to an engagement. After three great successive victories, is not the remembrance of your own actions sufficient to inspire you with courage? By the former battles, you are become masters of the open country; but this will put you in possession of all the cities, and, I presume to say it, of all the riches and power of the Romans. It is not words that we want, but action. I trust in the gods, that you shall soon see my promises verified.”

The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Romans, including the allies, amounted to fourscore thousand foot, and a little above six thousand horse; and that of the Carthaginians consisted but of forty thousand foot, all well disciplined, and of ten thousand horse. Æmilius commanded the right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius, one of the consuls of the last year, was posted in the centre. Hannibal, who had the art of turning every incident to advantage, had posted himself, so as that the wind Vulturnus,768 which rises at certain stated times, should blow directly in the faces of the Romans during the fight, and cover them with dust; then keeping the river Aufidus on his left, and posting his cavalry in the wings, he formed his main body of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry, which he posted in the centre, with half the African heavy-armed foot on their right, and half on their left, on the same line with the cavalry. His army being thus drawn up, he put himself at the head of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry; and having drawn them out of the line, advanced to give battle, rounding his front as he drew nearer the enemy; and extending his flanks in the shape of a half moon, in order that he might leave no interval between his main body and the [pg 225] rest of the line, which consisted of the heavy-armed infantry, who had not moved from their posts.

The fight soon began, and the Roman legions that were in the wings, seeing their centre warmly attacked, advanced to charge the enemy in flank. Hannibal's main body, after a brave resistance, finding themselves furiously attacked on all sides, gave way, being overpowered by numbers; and retired through the interval they had left in the centre of the line. The Romans having pursued them thither with eager confusion, the two wings of the African infantry, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, wheeled about on a sudden towards that void space in which the Romans, who were already fatigued, had thrown themselves in disorder; and attacked them vigorously on both sides, without allowing them time to recover themselves, or leaving them ground to draw up. In the mean time, the two wings of the cavalry, having defeated those of the Romans, which were much inferior to them, and having left in the pursuit of the broken and scattered squadrons, only as many forces as were necessary to keep them from rallying, advanced and charged the rear of the Roman infantry, which being surrounded at once on every side by the enemy's horse and foot was all cut to pieces, after having fought with unparalleled bravery. Æmilius being covered with the wounds he had received in the fight, was afterwards killed by a body of the enemy to whom he was not known; and with him two quæstors; one and twenty military tribunes; many who had been either consuls or prætors; Servilius, one of the last year's consuls; Minucius, the late general of horse to Fabius; and fourscore senators. Above seventy thousand men fell in this battle;769 and the Carthaginians, so great was their fury,770 did not give over the slaughter, till Hannibal, in the very heat of it, called out to them several times; “Stop, soldiers, spare the vanquished.” Ten thousand men, who had been left to guard the camp, surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle. Varro the consul retired to Venusia, with only seventy horse; and about four thousand men escaped into the [pg 226] neighbouring cities. Thus Hannibal remained master of the field, he being chiefly indebted for this, as well as for his former victories, to the superiority of his cavalry over that of the Romans. He lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horse.

Maharbal, one of the Carthaginian generals, advised Hannibal to march without loss of time directly to Rome, promising him, that within five days they should sup in the Capitol. Hannibal answering, that it was an affair which required mature deliberation; “I see,” replies Maharbal, “that the gods have not endowed the same man with all talents. You, Hannibal, know how to conquer, but not to make the best use of a victory.”771

It is pretended that this delay saved Rome and the empire. Many authors, and among the rest Livy, charge Hannibal, on this occasion, as being guilty of a capital error. But others, more reserved, are not for condemning, without evident proofs, so renowned a general, who in the rest of his conduct was never wanting, either in prudence to make choice of the best expedients, or in readiness to put his designs in execution. They, besides, are inclined to judge favourably of him, from the authority, or at least the silence, of Polybius, who, speaking of the memorable consequences of this celebrated battle, says, that the Carthaginians were firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of Rome at the first assault; but then he does not mention how this could possibly have been effected, as that city was very populous, warlike, strongly fortified, and defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he any where give the least hint that such a project was feasible, or that Hannibal did wrong in not attempting to put it in execution.

And indeed, if we examine matters more narrowly, we shall find, that according to the common maxims of war it could not be undertaken. It is certain, that Hannibal's whole infantry, before the battle, amounted but to forty thousand men; and, as six thousand of these had been slain in the action, and doubtless, many more wounded and disabled, there could [pg 227] remain but six or seven and twenty thousand foot fit for service; now this number was not sufficient to invest so large a city as Rome, which had a river running through it; nor to attack it in form, because they had neither engines, ammunition, nor any other things necessary for carrying on a siege. For want of these, Hannibal, even after his victory at Thrasymenus, miscarried in his attempt upon Spoletum;772 and soon after the battle of Cannæ, was forced to raise the siege of a little city,773 of no note, and of no great strength. It cannot be denied, but that had he miscarried on the present occasion, nothing less could have been expected but that he must have been irrecoverably lost. However, to form a just judgment of this matter, a man ought to be a soldier, and a soldier, perhaps, of those times. This is an old dispute, on which none but those who are perfectly well skilled in the art of war should pretend to give their opinion.

Soon after the battle of Cannæ, Hannibal had despatched his brother Mago to Carthage, with the news of his victory, and at the same time to demand succours, in order that he might be enabled to put an end to the war.774 Mago, on his arrival, made, in full senate, a lofty speech, in which he extolled his brother's exploits, and displayed the great advantages he had gained over the Romans. And, to give a more lively idea of the greatness of the victory, by speaking in some measure to the eye, he poured out, in the middle of the senate, a bushel775 of gold rings, which had been taken from the fingers of such of the Roman nobility as had fallen in the battle of Cannæ. He concluded with demanding money, provisions, and fresh troops. All the spectators were struck with an extraordinary joy; upon which Imilcon, a great stickler for Hannibal, fancying he had now a fair opportunity to insult Hanno, the chief of the contrary faction, asked him, whether he was still dissatisfied with the war they were carrying on against the Romans, and was for having Hannibal delivered [pg 228] up to them? Hanno, without discovering the least emotion, replied, that he was still of the same mind; and that the victories of which they so much boasted (supposing them real) could not give him joy, but only in proportion as they should be made subservient to an advantageous peace: he then undertook to prove, that the mighty exploits, on which they insisted so much, were wholly chimerical and imaginary. “I have cut to pieces,” says he (continuing Mago's speech,) “the Roman armies: send me some troops.—What more could you ask had you been conquered? I have twice seized upon the enemy's camp, full (no doubt) of provisions of every kind.—Send me provisions and money.—Could you have talked otherwise had you lost your camp?” He then asked Mago, whether any of the Latin nations had come over to Hannibal, and whether the Romans had made him any proposals of peace? To this Mago answering in the negative: “I then perceive,” replied Hanno, “that we are no farther advanced, than when Hannibal first landed in Italy.” The inference he drew from hence was, that neither men nor money ought to be sent. But Hannibal's faction prevailing at that time, no regard was paid to Hanno's remonstrances, which were considered merely as the effect of prejudice and jealousy; and, accordingly, orders were given for levying, without delay, the supplies of men and money which Hannibal required. Mago set out immediately for Spain, to raise twenty-four thousand foot, and four thousand horse in that country; but these levies were afterwards stopped, and sent to another quarter; so eager was the contrary faction to oppose the designs of a general whom they utterly abhorred. While in Rome, a consul,776 who had fled, was thanked because he had not despaired of the commonwealth; at Carthage, people were almost angry with Hannibal, for being victorious. But Hanno could never forgive him the advantages he had gained in this war, because he had undertaken it in opposition to his counsel. Thus being more jealous for the honour of his own opinions than for the good of his country, and a greater enemy to the Carthaginian general than to the Romans, he did all that lay in his power to prevent future success, and to render of no avail that which had been already gained.

[pg 229]

Hannibal takes up his Winter Quarters in Capua.777—The battle of Cannæ subjected the most powerful nations of Italy to Hannibal, drew over to his interest Græcia Magna,778 with the city of Tarentum; and thus wrested from the Romans their most ancient allies, among whom the Capuans held the first rank. This city, by the fertility of its soil, its advantageous situation, and the blessings of a long peace, had risen to great wealth and power. Luxury, and a fondness for pleasure, (the usual attendants on wealth,) had corrupted the minds of all its citizens, who, from their natural inclination, were but too much inclined to voluptuousness and excess.

Hannibal779 made choice of this city for his winter quarters. Here it was that those soldiers, who had sustained the most grievous toils, and braved the most formidable dangers, were overthrown by abundance and a profusion of luxuries, into which they plunged with the greater eagerness, as they, till then, had been strangers to them. Their courage was so greatly enervated in this bewitching retirement, that all their after efforts were owing rather to the fame and splendour of their former victories than to their present strength. When Hannibal marched his forces out of the city, one would have taken them for other men, and the reverse of those who had so lately marched into it. Accustomed, during the winter season, to commodious lodgings, to ease and plenty, they were no longer able to bear hunger, thirst, long marches, watchings, and the other toils of war; not to mention that all obedience, all discipline, were entirely laid aside.

I only transcribe on this occasion from Livy. If we are to adopt his opinion on this subject, Hannibal's stay at Capua was a capital blemish in his conduct; and he pretends, that this general was guilty of an infinitely greater error, than when he neglected to march directly to Rome after the battle of [pg 230] Cannæ. For this delay,780 says Livy, might seem only to have retarded his victory; whereas this last misconduct rendered him absolutely incapable of ever defeating the enemy. In a word, as Marcellus observed judiciously afterwards, Capua was to the Carthaginians and their general, what Cannæ781 had been to the Romans. There their martial genius, their love of discipline, were lost: there their former fame, and their almost certain hopes of future glory, vanished at once. And, indeed, from thenceforth the affairs of Hannibal advanced to their decline by swift steps; fortune declared in favour of prudence, and victory seemed now reconciled to the Romans.

I know not whether Livy has just ground to impute all these fatal consequences to the delicious abode of Capua. If we examine carefully all the circumstances of this history, we shall scarce be able to persuade ourselves, that the little progress which was afterwards made by the arms of Hannibal, ought to be ascribed to his wintering at Capua. It might, indeed, have been one cause, but a very inconsiderable one: and the bravery with which the forces of Hannibal afterwards defeated the armies of consuls and prætors; the towns they took even in sight of the Romans; their maintaining their conquests so vigorously, and staying fourteen years after this in Italy, in spite of the Romans: all these circumstances may induce us to believe, that Livy lays too great a stress on the delights of Capua.

The real cause of the decline of Hannibal's affairs, was owing to his want of necessary recruits and succours from Carthage. After Mago's speech, the Carthaginian senate had judged it necessary,782 in order for the carrying on the conquests in Italy, to send thither a considerable reinforcement of Numidian horse, forty elephants, and a thousand talents; and to hire, in Spain, twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, to reinforce their armies in Spain and Italy. Nevertheless, Mago could obtain an order but for twelve thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse:783 and even when he [pg 231] was just going to march to Italy with this reinforcement, so much inferior to that which had been promised him, he was countermanded and sent to Spain. So that Hannibal, after these mighty promises, had neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor money sent him; but was left to depend upon his own personal resources. His army was now reduced to twenty-six thousand foot, and nine thousand horse. How could it be possible for him, with so inconsiderable an army, to seize, in an enemy's country, on all the advantageous posts; to awe his new allies; to preserve his old conquests and form new ones; and to keep the field, with advantage, against two armies of the Romans which were recruited every year? This was the true cause of the declension of Hannibal's affairs, and of the ruin of those of Carthage. Was the part where Polybius treated this subject extant, we doubtless should find, that he lays a greater stress on this cause, than on the luxurious delights of Capua.

A.M. 3790. A. Rom. 534.

Transactions relating to Spain and Sardinia.784—The two Scipios still continued in the command of Spain, and their arms were making a considerable progress there, when Asdrubal, who alone seemed able to cope with them, received orders from Carthage to march into Italy to the relief of his brother. Before he left Spain, he writ to the senate, to convince them of the absolute necessity of their sending a general in his stead, who was capable of making head against the Romans. Imilcon was therefore sent thither with an army; and Asdrubal set out upon his march with his, in order to go and join his brother. The news of his departure was no sooner known, than the greatest part of Spain was subjected by the Scipios. These two generals, animated by such signal success, resolved to prevent him, if possible, from leaving Spain. They considered the danger to which the Romans would be exposed, if, being scarce able to resist Hannibal alone, they should be attacked by the two brothers, at the head of two powerful armies. They therefore pursued Asdrubal, and, coming up with that general, forced him to fight against his inclination. Asdrubal was overcome; and, so far from being able to continue his march for Italy, he [pg 232] found that it would be impossible for him to continue with any safety in Spain.

The Carthaginians had no better success in Sardinia. Designing to take advantage of some rebellions which they had fomented in that country, they lost twelve thousand men in a battle fought against the Romans, who took a still greater number of prisoners, among whom were Asdrubal, surnamed Calvus, Hanno, and Mago,785 who were distinguished by their birth as well as military exploits.

A.M. 3791. A. Rom. 535.

The ill Success of Hannibal. The Sieges of Capua and Rome.786—From the time of Hannibal's abode in Capua, the Carthaginian affairs in Italy no longer supported their former reputation. M. Marcellus, first as prætor, and afterwards as consul, had contributed very much to this revolution. He harassed Hannibal's army on every occasion, seized upon his quarters, forced him to raise sieges, and even defeated him in several engagements; so that he was called the Sword of Rome, as Fabius had before been named its Buckler.

A.M. 3793. A. Rom 537.

But what most affected the Carthaginian general, was, to see Capua besieged by the Romans. In order, therefore, to preserve his reputation among his allies, by a vigorous support of those who held the chief rank as such, he flew to the relief of that city, brought forward his forces, attacked the Romans, and fought several battles to oblige them to raise the siege.

A.M. 3794. A. Rom. 538.

At last, seeing all his measures defeated, he marched hastily towards Rome, in order to make a powerful diversion. He was not without hope of being able, in case he could have an opportunity, in the first consternation, to storm some part of the city, of drawing the Roman generals with all their forces from the siege of Capua, to the relief of their capital; at least he flattered himself, that if, for the sake of continuing the siege, they should divide their forces, their weakness might then offer an occasion, either to the Capuans or himself, of engaging and defeating them. Rome was surprised, but not confounded. A proposal being made by one of the [pg 233] senators, to recall all the armies to succour Rome; Fabius787 declared, that it would be shameful in them to be terrified, and forced to change their measures upon every motion of Hannibal. They therefore contented themselves with only recalling part of the army, and one of the generals, Q. Fulvius the proconsul, from the siege. Hannibal, after making some devastations, drew up his army in order of battle before the city, and the consul did the same. Both sides were preparing to signalize themselves in a battle, of which Rome was to be the recompense, when a violent storm obliged them to separate. They were no sooner returned to their respective camps, than the face of the heavens grew calm and serene. The same incident happened frequently afterwards; insomuch that Hannibal, believing that there was something supernatural in the event, said, according to Livy, that sometimes788 his own will, and sometimes fortune, would not suffer him to take Rome.

But the circumstance which most surprised and intimidated him, was the news, that, whilst he lay encamped at one of the gates of Rome, the Romans had sent out recruits for the army in Spain at another gate; and that the ground, whereon his camp was pitched, had been sold, notwithstanding that circumstance, for its full value. So barefaced a contempt stung Hannibal to the quick; he, therefore, on the other side, put up to auction the shops of the goldsmiths round the Forum. After this bravado he retired, and, in his march, plundered the rich temple of the goddess Feronia.789

Capua, thus left to itself, held out but very little longer. After that such of its senators as had the chief hand in the revolt, and consequently could not expect any quarter from the Romans, had put themselves to a truly tragical death,790 the [pg 234] city surrendered at discretion. The success of this siege, which, by the happy consequences wherewith it was attended, proved decisive, and fully restored to the Romans their superiority over the Carthaginians; displayed, at the same time, how formidable the power of the Romans was,791 when they undertook to punish their perfidious allies; and the feeble protection which Hannibal could afford his friends at a time when they most wanted it.

A.M. 3793. A. Rom. 537.

The Defeat and Death of the two Scipios in Spain.792—The face of affairs was very much changed in Spain. The Carthaginians had three armies in that country; one commanded by Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo; the second by Asdrubal, son of Hamilcar; and a third under Mago, who had joined the first Asdrubal. The two Scipios, Cneus and Publius, were for dividing their forces, and attacking the enemy separately, which was the cause of their ruin. They agreed that Cneus, with a small number of Romans, and thirty thousand Celtiberians, should march against Asdrubal, the son of Hamilcar; whilst Publius, with the remainder of the forces, composed of Romans and the Italian allies, should advance against the other two generals.

Publius was vanquished first. To the two leaders whom he had to oppose, Masinissa, elate with the victories he had lately gained over Syphax, joined himself; and was to be soon followed by Indibilis, a powerful Spanish prince. The armies came to an engagement. The Romans, being thus attacked on all sides at once, made a brave resistance as long as they had their general at their head; but the moment he fell, the few troops which had escaped the slaughter, secured themselves by flight.

The three victorious armies marched immediately in quest of Cneus, in order to put an end to the war by his defeat. He [pg 235] was already more than half vanquished by the desertion of his allies, who all forsook him; and left to the Roman generals this important instruction;793 viz. never to let their own forces be exceeded in number by those of foreigners. He guessed that his brother was slain, and his army defeated, upon seeing such great bodies of the enemy arrive. He survived him but a short time, being killed in the engagement. These two great men were equally lamented by their citizens and allies; and Spain deeply felt their loss, because of the justice and moderation of their conduct.

These extensive countries seemed now inevitably lost; but the valour of L. Marcius,794 a private officer of the equestrian order, preserved them to the Romans. Shortly after this, the younger Scipio was sent thither, who severely revenged the death of his father and uncle, and restored the affairs of the Romans in Spain to their former flourishing condition.

A.M. 3798. A. Rom. 542.

The Defeat and Death of Asdrubal.795—One unforeseen defeat ruined all the measures, and blasted all the hopes of Hannibal with regard to Italy. The consuls of this year, which was the eleventh of the second Punic war, (for I pass over several events for brevity's sake,) were C. Claudius Nero, and M. Livius. The latter had, for his province, the Cisalpine Gaul, where he was to oppose Asdrubal, who, it was reported, was preparing to pass the Alps. The former commanded in the country of the Brutians, and in Lucania, that is, in the opposite extremity of Italy, and was there making head against Hannibal.

The passage of the Alps gave Asdrubal very little trouble, because his brother had cleared the way for him, and all the nations were disposed to receive him. Some time after this, he despatched couriers to Hannibal, but they were intercepted. Nero found by their letters, that Asdrubal was hastening to join his brother in Umbria. In a conjuncture of so important a [pg 236] nature as this, when the safety of Rome lay at stake, he thought himself at liberty to dispense with the established rules796 of his duty, for the welfare of his country. In consequence of this, it was his opinion, that such a bold and unexpected blow ought to be struck, as might be capable of striking terror into the enemy; by marching to join his colleague, in order that they might charge Asdrubal unexpectedly with their united forces. This design, if the several circumstances of it are thoroughly examined, should not be hastily charged with imprudence. To prevent the two brothers from joining their armies, was to save the state. Very little would be hazarded, even though Hannibal should be informed of the absence of the consul. From his army, which consisted of forty-two thousand men, he drew out but seven thousand for his own detachment, which indeed were the flower of his troops, but, at the same time, a very inconsiderable part of them. The rest remained in the camp, which was advantageously situated, and strongly fortified. Now could it be supposed that Hannibal would attack, and force a strong camp defended by thirty-five thousand men?

Nero set out without giving his soldiers the least notice of his design. When he had advanced so far, as that it might be communicated without any danger, he told them, that he was leading them to certain victory: that, in war, all things depended upon reputation; that the bare rumour of their arrival would disconcert all the measures of the Carthaginians; and that the whole honour of this battle would fall to them.

They marched with extraordinary diligence, and joined the other consul in the night, but did not pitch separate camps, the better to impose upon the enemy. The troops which were newly arrived joined those of Livius. The army of Porcius the prætor was encamped near that of the consul, and in the morning a council of war was held. Livius was of opinion, that it would be better to allow the troops some days to refresh themselves; but Nero besought him not to ruin, by delay, an enterprise to which despatch only could give success; and to take advantage of the error of the enemy, as well absent as present. This advice was complied with, and accordingly the signal for [pg 237] battle was given. Asdrubal, advancing to his foremost ranks, discovered, by several circumstances, that fresh troops were arrived; and he did not doubt but that they belonged to the other consul. This made him conjecture, that his brother had sustained a considerable loss, and, at the same time, fear, that he was come too late to his assistance.

After making these reflections, he caused a retreat to be sounded, and his army began to march in great disorder. Night overtaking him, and his guides deserting, he was uncertain what way to go. He marched at random, along the banks of the river Metaurus,797 and was preparing to cross it, when the three armies of the enemy came up with him. In this extremity, he saw it would be impossible for him to avoid coming to an engagement; and therefore did every thing which could be expected from the presence of mind and valour of a great captain. He seized an advantageous post, and drew up his forces on a narrow spot, which gave him an opportunity of posting his left wing (the weakest part of his army) in such a manner, that it could neither be attacked in front, nor charged in flank; and of giving to his main battle and right wing a greater depth than front. After this hasty disposition of his forces, he posted himself in the centre, and was the first to march to attack the enemy's left wing; well knowing that all was at stake, and that he must either conquer or die. The battle lasted a long time, and was obstinately disputed by both parties. Asdrubal, especially, signalized himself in this engagement, and added new glory to that he had already acquired by a series of shining actions. He led on his soldiers, trembling and quite dispirited, against an enemy superior to them both in numbers and resolution. He animated them by his words, supported them by his example, and, with entreaties and menaces, endeavoured to bring back those who fled; till, at last, seeing that victory declared for the Romans, and being unable to survive the loss of so many thousand men, who had quitted their country to follow his fortune, he rushed at once into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there died in a manner worthy the son of Hamilcar, and the brother of Hannibal.

This was the most bloody battle the Carthaginians had [pg 238] fought during this war: and, whether we consider the death of the general, or the slaughter made of the Carthaginian forces, it may be looked upon as a reprisal for the battle of Cannæ. The Carthaginians lost fifty-five thousand men,798 and six thousand were taken prisoners. The Romans lost eight thousand. These were so weary of killing, that some person telling Livius, that he might very easily cut to pieces a body of the enemy who were flying: “It is fit,” says he, “that some should survive, in order that they may carry the news of this defeat to the Carthaginians.”

Nero set out upon his march, on the very night which followed the engagement. Through every place where he passed, in his return, shouts of joy and loud acclamations welcomed him, instead of those fears and uneasiness which his coming had occasioned. He arrived in his camp the sixth day. Asdrubal's head being thrown into the camp of the Carthaginians, informed Hannibal of his brother's unhappy fate. Hannibal perceived, by this cruel stroke, the fortune of Carthage: “All is over,” says he,799 “I shall no longer send triumphant messages to Carthage. In losing Asdrubal, I have lost at once all my hope, all my good fortune.” He afterwards retired to the extremities of the country of the Brutians, where he assembled all his forces, who found it a very difficult matter to subsist there, as no provisions were sent them from Carthage.

A.M. 3799. A. Rom. 543.

Scipio conquers all Spain. Is appointed Consul, and sails into Africa. Hannibal is recalled.800—The fate of arms was not more propitious to the Carthaginians in Spain. The prudent vivacity of young Scipio had restored the Roman affairs in that country to their former flourishing state, as the courageous slowness of Fabius had before done in Italy. The three Carthaginian generals in Spain, Asdrubal son of Gisco, Hanno, and Mago, having been [pg 239] defeated with their numerous armies by the Romans in several engagements, Scipio at last possessed himself of Spain, and subjected it entirely to the Roman power. It was at this time that Masinissa, a very powerful African prince, went over to the Romans, and Syphax, on the contrary, to the Carthaginians.

A.M. 3800. A. Rom. 544.

Scipio, at his return to Rome, was declared consul, being then thirty years of age. He had P. Licinius Crassus for his colleague. Sicily was allotted to Scipio, with permission for him to cross into Africa, if he found it convenient. He set out with all imaginable expedition for his province; whilst his colleague was to command in the country whither Hannibal was retired.

The taking of New Carthage, where Scipio had displayed all the prudence, the courage, and capacity which could have been expected from the greatest generals, and the conquest of all Spain, were more than sufficient to immortalize his name: but he had considered these only as so many steps by which he was to climb to a nobler enterprise: this was the conquest of Africa. Accordingly, he crossed over thither, and made it the seat of the war.

The devastation of the country, the siege of Utica, one of the strongest cities of Africa; the entire defeat of the two armies under Syphax and Asdrubal, whose camp was burnt by Scipio; and afterwards the taking Syphax himself prisoner, who was the most powerful resource the Carthaginians had left; all these things forced them at last to turn their thoughts to peace. For this purpose they deputed thirty of their principal senators, who were selected from that powerful body at Carthage, called the council of the hundred. Being introduced into the Roman general's tent, they all threw themselves prostrate on the earth, (such was the custom of their country,) spoke to him in terms of great submission, accusing Hannibal as the author of all their calamities, and promising, in the name of the senate, an implicit obedience to whatever the Romans should please to ordain. Scipio answered, that though he was come into Africa not for peace, but conquest, he would however grant them a peace, upon condition that they should deliver up all the prisoners and deserters to the Romans; that they should recall their armies out of Italy and Gaul; should [pg 240] never set foot again in Spain; should retire out of all the islands between Italy and Africa; should deliver up all their ships, twenty excepted, to the victor; should give to the Romans five hundred thousand bushels of wheat, three hundred thousand of barley, and pay fifteen thousand talents: that in case they were pleased with these conditions, they then, he said, might send ambassadors to the senate. The Carthaginians feigned a compliance, but this was only to gain time, till Hannibal should be returned. A truce was then granted to the Carthaginians, who immediately sent deputies to Rome, and at the same time an express to Hannibal, to order his return into Africa.

A.M. 3802. A. Rom. 516.

He was then, as was observed before, in the extremity of Italy. Here he received the orders from Carthage, which he could not listen to without groans, and almost shedding tears; and was exasperated almost to madness, to see himself thus forced to quit his prey. Never banished man801 showed so much regret at leaving his native country, as Hannibal did in going out of that of an enemy. He often turned his eyes wishfully to Italy, accusing gods and men of his misfortunes, and calling down a thousand curses, says802 Livy, upon himself, for not having marched his soldiers directly to Rome, after the battle of Cannæ, whilst they were still reeking with the blood of its citizens.

At Rome, the senate, greatly dissatisfied with the excuses made by the Carthaginian deputies, in justification of their republic, and the ridiculous offer which they made, in its name, of adhering to the treaty of Lutatius; thought proper to refer the decision of the whole to Scipio, who, being on the spot, could best judge what conditions the welfare of the state required.

About the same time, Octavius the prætor sailing from Sicily into Africa with two hundred vessels of burden, was attacked near Carthage by a furious storm, which dispersed all his fleet. The citizens, not bearing to see so rich a prey escape them, [pg 241] demanded importunately that the Carthaginian fleet might sail out and seize it. The senate, after a faint resistance, complied. Asdrubal, sailing out of the harbour, seized the greatest part of the Roman ships, and brought them to Carthage, although the truce was still subsisting.

Scipio sent deputies to the Carthaginian senate, to complain of this, but they were little regarded. Hannibal's approach had revived their courage, and filled them with great hopes. The deputies were even in great danger of being ill treated by the populace. They therefore demanded a convoy, which was granted, and accordingly two ships of the republic attended them. But the magistrates, who were absolutely against peace, and determined to renew the war, gave private orders to Asdrubal, (who was with the fleet near Utica,) to attack the Roman galley when it should arrive in the river Bagrada near the Roman camp, where the convoy was ordered to leave them. He obeyed the order, and sent out two galleys against the ambassadors, who nevertheless made their escape, but with difficulty and danger.

This was a fresh subject for a war between the two nations, who now were more animated, or rather more exasperated, one against the other, than ever: the Romans, from a desire of taking vengeance for so black a perfidy; and the Carthaginians, from a persuasion that they were not now to expect a peace.

At the same time, Lælius and Fulvius, who carried the full powers with which the senate and people of Rome had invested Scipio, arrived in the camp, accompanied by the deputies of Carthage. As the Carthaginians had not only infringed the truce, but violated the law of nations, in the person of the Roman ambassadors, it might naturally be expected that they should order the Carthaginian deputies to be seized by way of reprisal. However, Scipio,803 more attentive to what was required by the Roman generosity, than by the perfidy of the Carthaginians, in order not to deviate from the principles and [pg 242] maxims of his own countrymen, nor his own character, dismissed the deputies, without offering them the least injury. So astonishing an instance of moderation, and at such a juncture, terrified the Carthaginians, and even put them to the blush; and made Hannibal himself entertain a still higher idea of a general, who, to the dishonourable practices of his enemies, opposed only a rectitude and greatness of soul, that was still more worthy of admiration than all his military virtues.

In the mean time, Hannibal, being strongly importuned by his fellow-citizens, advanced forward into the country; and arriving at Zama, which is five days' march from Carthage, he there pitched his camp. He thence sent out spies to observe the position of the Romans. Scipio having seized these, so far from punishing them, only commanded them to be led about the Roman camp, in order that they might take an exact survey of it, and then sent them back to Hannibal. The latter knew very well whence so noble an assurance flowed. After the strange reverses he had met with, he no longer expected that fortune would again be propitious. Whilst every one was exciting him to give battle, himself only meditated a peace. He flattered himself that the conditions of it would be more honourable, as he was at the head of an army, and as the fate of arms might still appear uncertain. He, therefore, sent to desire an interview with Scipio, which accordingly was agreed to, and the time and place fixed.

A.M. 3803. A. Rom. 547.

The Interview between Hannibal and Scipio in Africa, followed by a Battle.804—These two generals, who were not only the most illustrious of their own age, but worthy of being ranked with the most renowned princes and warriors that had ever lived, having met at the place appointed, continued for some time in a deep silence, as though they were astonished, and struck with a mutual admiration at the sight of each other. At last Hannibal spoke, and after having praised Scipio in the most artful and delicate manner, he gave a very lively description of the ravages of the war, and the calamities in which it had involved both the victors and the vanquished. He conjured him not to suffer himself to be dazzled by the splendour of his victories. He [pg 243] represented to him, that how successful soever he might have hitherto been, he ought, however, to be aware of the inconstancy of fortune: that without going far back for examples, he himself, who was then speaking to him, was a glaring proof of this: that Scipio was at that time what Hannibal had been at Thrasymenus and Cannæ: that he ought to make a better use of opportunity than himself had done, by consenting to a peace, now it was in his power to propose the conditions of it. He concluded with declaring, that the Carthaginians would willingly resign Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and all the islands between Africa and Italy, to the Romans: that they must be forced, since such was the will of the gods, to confine themselves to Africa; whilst they should see the Romans extending their conquests to the most remote regions, and obliging all nations to pay obedience to their laws.

Scipio answered in few words, but not with less dignity. He reproached the Carthaginians for their perfidy, in plundering the Roman galleys before the truce was expired. He imputed to them alone, and to their injustice, all the calamities with which the two wars had been attended. After thanking Hannibal for the admonition he had given him, with regard to the uncertainty of human events, he concluded with desiring him to prepare for battle, unless he chose rather to accept of the conditions that had been already proposed; to which (he observed) some others would be added, in order to punish the Carthaginians for their having violated the truce.