Chapter XXVIII · The Road to Autonomy

Oh be ye not dismayed

Though ye stumbled and ye strayed.

Kipling—A Song of the English.

He who points out a wrong without being prepared to suggest a remedy presumes upon the patience of his neighbor without good and sufficient cause. Up to this point the wrong has been unfolded, with such ability as was vouchsafed the narrator, “from Genesis to Revelations,” so to speak; also his own attitude as an eye-witness, and its evolution from the Mosaic doctrine of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, to the more Christian doctrines of the New Testament. Let us now consider the remedy.

In the course of our travels with the army in the earlier chapters of this book, we first followed its northern advance, from Manila over the great central plain drained by the Rio Grande and crossed by the railroad connecting Manila Bay with Lingayen Gulf; its further advance from the northern borders of the plain over the mountains of Central Luzon; and its march from the central mountains to the northern sea, at the extreme northern end of the archipelago. We thus saw in detail the military conquest and occupation of that part of Luzon lying north of the Pasig River. Before leaving that part of the subject, the way the provinces thus occupied were grouped into military districts was indicated. Following the lines of the military occupation, it was shown that Northern Luzon was naturally and conveniently susceptible of division into four groups of provinces, which groups might ultimately be evolved into self-governing commonwealths—States of a Philippine Federal Union, as follows:

Name of State Area (sq. m.) Population

Cavite 8,500 700,000

Camarines 7,000 600,000

Total 15,500 1,300,000

To recapitulate: All of Luzon except Manila and the vicinity can at once be divided into the six groups of provinces above mentioned—“territories,” having what we are accustomed in the United States to call a “territorial form of government,” and intended to be made states later. Luzon is about the size of Cuba (a little over 40,000 sq. miles), is twice as thickly populated (nearly 4,000,000 to Cuba’s 2,000,000), and is not cursed with a negro question, as Cuba is.

The above totals, be it remembered, are only round numbers, but they get us “out of the woods” so to speak, and away from a lot of unpronounceable names. They show you how to handle Luzon as if it were about the size of Ohio—which it is. And, as has already been made clear in the earlier part of this volume, Luzon “is” the Philippines, in a very suggestive sense of the phrase, since it contains half the land area of the archipelago (outside of the Mohammedan island of Mindanao), and half the total population of the whole archipelago, besides being eight or ten times as large as any other island of the group except Mindanao; and it also contains the city which is the capital and chief port of the archipelago, and has been the seat of government for over three hundred years—Manila. And Manila is eight or ten times as large as any other town in the archipelago.

The smaller islands lying between Luzon and Mindanao could easily be disposed of governmentally by being attached to the jurisdiction of one of the said six islands.

If the inhabitants of these regions were told by a man whom they liked and would believe, as they would Curry, that they were to have autonomous governments like one of the Western Territories of the United States, at the very earliest possible moment, and urged to get ready for it, they could and would, under his guidance. We would get a co-operation from those people we do not now get and never will get, so long as we keep them in uncertainty as to what we are going to do with them. If next year we should formally disclaim intention to retain the islands permanently, and set to work to create autonomous Territories destined ultimately to be States of a Federated Philippine Republic, whenever fit, we would soon see the way out of this tangle, and behold the beginning of the end of it.

Whenever the twelve territorial governments should be gotten into smooth working order under elected native governors, the Philippine archipelago would then be nearly ready for independence, so far as its internal affairs are concerned. The danger of their being annexed on the first pretext by some one of the great land-grabbing powers should be met by our guaranteeing them their independence, as we do Cuba, until they could be protected by neutralization treaties, such as protect Belgium and Switzerland to-day, as explained in the chapter which follows this. Powers not specifically granted to the several states-in-embryo should of course, until the final grant of independence, be reserved to the central government at Manila. Manila and Rizal province would be available at almost any time as a thirteenth state. So that when the twelve states above suggested had shown themselves capable of local self-government, Manila and Rizal province might be added to make the final one of thirteen original states of a Philippine Republic.

Any American who has seen a Filipino pueblo transformed, as if by magic, from listless apathy to a state of buzzing and busy enthusiasm suggestive of a bee-hive, by preparations for some church fiesta, or for the coming of some dignitary from Manila, has seen something analogous to what would happen if the Filipino body politic should suddenly be electrified by a promise of independence under some such programme as the above. A generous rivalry would at once ensue all over the archipelago in each of the twelve prospective states. Each would seek to be the first to be recommended by American authority as ready for statehood. I do not believe the annals of national experience contain any analogy where every member of a given community has rallied to a common cause more completely than the whole Filipino people would rally to such a prospective programme of independence. The unanimity would be as absolute as the kind we saw among the American people at the outbreak of the Spanish War, when Congress one fine morning placed fifty millions of dollars at the disposal of President McKinley by a unanimous vote.

I especially invite attention to the fact that the above programme throws away nothing that has been done by us in the Islands in the last twelve years in the way of organization. It simply takes it and builds upon it. Congress should not attempt to work out the details from this end of the line. We should send men out there from here to work them out, with local co-operation from the leading Filipinos. Men animated by the idea of working out a programme under which the living may hope to see the independence of their country, should be sent out to take the place of the men now there who are irrevocably committed to the programme of indefinite retention with undeclared intention, which holds out no hope to the living. It is not wise to arrange the details of the programme by act of Congress without a year or two of study of the situation by such men on the ground. An act of Congress which goes into details before getting the recommendations of such men will inevitably set up a lot of straw men easy for the other side to knock down. All you need is a program, sanctioned by Congress, containing a promise of independence, and men sent out to the islands to work out the program. They would report back from time to time, and the Congress by whose authority they went out would have no hesitation in being guided by their recommendations. If unpatriotic greed for office among the Filipinos, or other opposition animated by evil motives, should block the game, your Americans so sent out would have to recommend the calling of a halt. This ever-present shadow in the background would in turn throw the shadow of ostracism over all demagogues.

Meantime the Filipinos should be given a Senate, or upper house, in which, the thirteen prospective “states” should be represented by two men, the bill therefor to be framed out there, and sent back here to Congress for approval. This would give them under the plan here suggested, as soon as the Americans sent out should so recommend, a Senate of twenty-six members. At present, if the native Assembly, or lower house, does not pass the annual appropriations necessary to run the government, the appropriation act of the preceding year again becomes law. At present, the upper house is the Philippine Commission. By withholding its consent, it can prevent any legislation whatsoever. So, at present, the Assembly is little more than a debating society. All questions as to appropriations, veto of legislation, and other details, in the event the Filipinos are given a Senate also, should be left to be fixed in the bill recommended by the men sent out to work out the program of promise.

On March 20, 1912, Honorable W. A. Jones, the distinguished veteran Congressman from Virginia, who is Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill entitled “A bill to establish a qualified independence for the Philippines, and to fix the date when such qualified independence shall become absolute and complete.” The greater part of what precedes this paragraph of this chapter was written prior to March 20, 1912. Mr. Jones’s bill works out the details of the independence problem in a manner somewhat different from the plan I suggest, but that does not make me any the less heartily in favor of the principle which his bill embodies. The supreme virtue of the Jones bill is that it promises Independence at a fixed date, July 4, 1921. It ends the cruel uncertainty, so unjust to both the Filipinos and to the Americans in the Philippines, that is contained in the present program of indefinite retention with undeclared intention. Five years ago, in the North American Review for January 18, and June 21, 1907, the writer hereof expressed the belief that an earlier date was feasible, thus:

As Mr. Jones’s bill allows four years more of time, I believe it to be absolutely safe.

Governor Curry, the Congressman from New Mexico hereinabove mentioned, who spent eight years in the Philippines, agrees with the fundamental principle of the Jones bill, that as to making a definite promise of Independence within a few years, and does not consider 1921 too early.

My own judgment is that the best policy, if a policy is to be declared at all, is to declare the intention of the United States to hold the islands indefinitely, until the people shall show themselves fit for self-government, under a gradually increasing popular government, when their relation to the United States, either of statehood, or of quasi-independence, like the colony of Australia or Canada, can be declared after mutual conference.

The policy which Mr. Jones has favored for the last twelve years is almost as well known to the Filipinos as are the views of Mr. Taft himself.

In conclusion, the writer desires to say, with especial emphasis, that the suggestions outlining the plan which forms the bulk of this chapter are presented in a spirit of entire deference to the views of any one else who may have considered this great subject carefully, especially to the views of Mr. Jones, whose bill is so entirely right in principle. The one supreme need of the situation is a definite legislative declaration which shall make clear to all concerned—to the Filipino demagogue and the American grafter, as well as to the great body of the good people of both races out there—that the governing of a remote and alien people is to have no permanent place in the purposes of our national life; and that we do bona fide intend to give the Filipinos their independence at a date in the future which will interest the living, by extending to the living the hope to see the independence of their country. And the Jones Bill does that.