Note 67 — Chapter XXXVIII · TIMÆUS AND KRITIAS.

Ueberweg, in a learned Dissertation, Ueber die Platonische Weltseele (pp. 52-53), seeks to establish a greater distinction between the Phædrus, Phædon, and Timæus, in respect to the way in which Plato affirms the separate substantiality of Ideas, than the language of the dialogues warrants. He contends that the separate substantiality of the Platonic Ideas is more peremptorily affirmed in the Timæus than in the Phædrus. But this will not be found borne out if we look at Phædrus, p. 247, where the affirmation is quite as peremptory as that in the Timæus; correlating too, as it does in the Timæus, with Νοῦς as the contemplating subject. Indeed the point may be said to be affirmed more positively in the Phædrus, because the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος is assigned to the Ideas, while in the Timæus all τόπος or local existence is denied to them (p. 52 B-C). Sensible objects are presented in the Phædrus as faint resemblances of the archetypal Ideas (p. 250 C), just as they are in the Timæus: on the other hand, τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν τοῦ νοητοῦ occurs in the Timæus (p. 51 A), equivalent to τὸ μετέχειν, which Ueberweg states to be discontinued.