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New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 2, May, 1915

Volume 2 — Italy's Evolution as Reflected in Her Press

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Italy has reached her present position through the development of a policy the steps of which have been brightly illuminated by the press of the Peninsula. The most important of these steps may be designated as follows:

First, the declaration of the Government to the German Ambassador at Rome on Aug. 1, 1914, that it did not regard the conflict begun by Austria-Hungary and Germany as a defensive war and hence not binding on it as a member of the Triple Alliance, and its subsequent declarations of "neutrality," of "armed neutrality," and of "a neutrality which is likely to be broken if the interests of the country demanded it."

Second, Premier Salandra's speech of Dec. 3 for "armed, alert neutrality," and the declaration in Parliament on Dec. 5 by Signor Giolitti showing that the declaration of Aug. 1 was merely a repetition of one conveyed to Austria in the Summer of 1913, when Austria had suggested that she aid Bulgaria in subduing Serbia.

Third, the arrival in Rome in December of the former German Imperial Chancellor, Prince von Bülow, as Extraordinary Ambassador to the Quirinal, for the purpose of keeping Italy neutral, and, when this seemed doubtful, to negotiate between Italy and Austria what territorial compensation the latter would render the former in order to perpetuate the neutrality of the Peninsula.

Aside from the influence of these official acts, which invited press comments, the Italian papers have paid keen attention to the conduct of the war, concerning which the Government could not, on account of its neutrality, offer an opinion. Among such incidents of conduct have been the British declaration of a protectorate over Egypt and the bombardment of the Dardanelles by the Franco-British fleet.

In order to weigh the full significance of the comments of the Italian papers on these subjects a word may be said concerning the status of the journals themselves:

The most conspicuous is the Idea Nazionale, a paper of Rome practically dedicated to intervention. Then comes the conservative and solid Corriere della Sera of Milan, whose Rome correspondent, Signor Torre, has peculiar facilities for learning the intentions of the Ministry. Both the Tribuna and the Giornale d'Italia are considered Government organs, but, while the former rarely comments with authority except on accomplished facts, the latter, although often voicing the unofficial and personal opinions of Premier Salandra, who is known to be privately in favor of intervention, also voices the sentiment of former Premier Giolitti, who is known to be for continued neutrality. The Stampa of Turin is a Giolitti organ.

The Osservatore Romano is the well-known Vatican organ, which naturally supports Austria, a Catholic country, where such support does not conflict too pointedly with the sentiments of Catholics in neutral countries. Other clerical papers with strong pro-German opinions and with German industrial backing are the Corriere d'Italia and the Popolo Romano. The Messaggero of Rome and the Secolo of Milan, influenced by important British and French interests, are for intervention at all costs. The Avanti is the Socialist organ.

CAUSES OF ITALY'S NEUTRALITY.

From the Corriere della Sera, Aug. 2, 1914:

Italy's decision to remain neutral is based on three causes:

1. The terms of the Triple Alliance call for Italy's participation in war only if Germany or Austria-Hungary is attacked by another power. The present war is not a defensive war, but one brought on by Austria-Hungary and Germany.

2. The spirit of the alliance demands that no warlike action be taken involving the three countries without full mutual discussion and agreement. Italy was not even consulted by Austria-Hungary and the course of events was brought to her knowledge only by news agency reports.

3. When Italy went to war with Turkey, Austria prevented her from acting with a free hand in the Adriatic and the Aegean, thereby prolonging the war at an enormous cost in men and money to Italy. Italy would be justified in acting in precisely the same manner now toward Austria-Hungary.

From Secolo, Sept. 3, 1914:

During the last few days we have assisted at a deplorable example of our Latin impressionability. The first German victories have made Italians waver, and Germany is taking advantage of the popular nervousness, and is working on public opinion in countless ways. Italy is invaded by Germans, who assert that Germany will issue victorious, and that her commercial and industrial activity will not be arrested. We are inundated with German letters, telegrams, newspapers, and private communications from German commercial houses, all asserting that Germany will win, and that Italy should keep neutral, to be on the winning side.

We are not of that opinion. We cannot lose sight of England. Germany knows that England represents her great final danger, hence the bitterness with which she speaks of England in all the above communications. England is not playing a game of bluff. She is not impotent by land, as Germany says, and may give Germany a mortal blow by sea. The war may possibly end in a titanic duel between England and Germany. In this case England will go through with the struggle calmly and grimly, smiling at difficulties and disregarding losses.

From the Corriere d'Italia, Sept. 17, 1914:

We do not know what Italy will do tomorrow, but we are of opinion that, in face of all eventualities, it is the elementary duty of patriotism not to trouble the calm expectancy of public opinion and not to mar the task of the Government, already difficult enough.

From the Messaggero, Sept. 18, 1914:

The Italian Nation is beginning to ask itself whether it ought to remain until the conclusion of peace in an attitude of resignation. It is necessary for us with clear vision to take our place in the fighting line. While the destinies of a new Europe are being decided on the battlefields of Champagne, Belgium, Galicia, and Hungary the Government is assuming a grave responsibility before the country in deciding to be disinterested in the struggle. The keen popular awakening which is manifested in demonstrations, meetings, and public discussions shows that growing preoccupation and varied uneasiness will not cease so long as the fate of the country is not decided at the right time by men who by temperament are best fitted to be interpreters of the soul and the interests of the nation.

From the Corriere della Sera, Oct. 4, 1914:

Many who now invoke a war of liberation complained at the beginning of August that Italy had not helped her allies. The declaration of neutrality then seemed the greatest act of wisdom performed by Italy for many years. Now, however, we must think of the future. Let us remember that the powers will only support our wishes when they have need of us. Gratitude and sympathy are mere phrases when the map of Europe is being redrawn. If Italy desire to safeguard her interests in the Adriatic she cannot postpone her decision till the last moment. Italy is isolated; the Triple Alliance treaty cannot defend her even if it be still in force. Italy and Austria, as Count Nigra and Prince Bülow said, must be allies or enemies. Can they remain allies after what has happened?

ITALY'S ARMED, ALERT NEUTRALITY.

From the Idea Nazionale, Dec. 3, 1914:

The day on which Italy will undertake to realize those aspirations she will find full and unconditional support. Great Britain is favorable to Italy gaining supremacy in the Adriatic, which is so necessary to her existence. If Great Britain needs Italy's support in Africa it will be only a matter of one or two army corps, and such an expedition, while having a great moral and political importance, would not diminish Italian military power in Europe.

From the Avanti, Dec. 4, 1914:

Premier Salandra's speech was Jesuitical. It contents the Jingoes by certain dubious phrases, while discontenting the Clerical and Conservative neutrals.

From the Corriere d'Italia, Dec. 4, 1914:

This much-applauded word, "aspirations," was not (in Signor Salandra's speech) meant to refer to any particular belligerent, and the Cabinet consequently has no program.

From the Stampa, Dec. 5, 1914:

Austria, before the war, disclaimed any intention of occupying Serbia, and her declaration cannot be disregarded by Italy, whose relations with Austria have been always conditional on the maintenance of the Balkan status quo, which Austria now threatens to alter. The Italian Government cannot ignore this condition, especially as during the Libyan war Austria menaced Italy, unless she desisted from bombarding the Albanian coast. Thus the Serbian situation may constitute a new factor.

From the Corriere della Sera, Jan. 31, 1915:

Italy's true policy is to come to a friendly agreement with the Slavs, which will guarantee their mutual interests. Italy wants a national settlement in the Balkan Peninsula, independent of the great powers. In no circumstances can Italy bind her lot to Austria-Hungary's policy.

BRITISH PROTECTORATE OVER EGYPT.

From the Idea Nazionale, Dec. 19, 1914:

The British Government's act merely sanctions a situation already existing in fact since 1882. In our governing circle it is not thought that the change of régime in Egypt will occasion, at least for the time being, any great modifications in public law in relation to the international statutes regulating the position of foreigners in Egypt.

From the Tribuna, Dec. 20, 1914:

The Mediterranean agreement, in which Italy, too, has taken part, implicitly recognized the actual status England had acquired in Egypt. Now the war has demonstrated the judicial incongruity of a Turkish province in which and for which the English had to carry out warlike operations against Turkey. The protectorate already existed in substance, and Great Britain might now even have proclaimed annexation.

From the Giornale d'Italia, Dec. 19, 1914:

Great Britain had for some months been preparing this event, which legally regulates a situation which has existed in fact. The present situation has been brought about without any disturbance, like everything that England does, in silence, neatly and without disturbing any one. Nobody can be astonished at Great Britain's declaration of a protectorate over Egypt.

THE DARDANELLES.

From the Giornale d'Italia, March 7, 1915:

It will be extremely difficult for Italy longer to remain neutral. The attack by the allied fleet on the Dardanelles has brought up three great problems affecting Italian interests. The first of these problems is the new rule to allow Russia access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles; the second concerns the equilibrium of the Balkans, and the third the partition of Asiatic Turkey, which affects the equilibrium of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is impossible for Italy to keep out of the solution of such problems unless she be satisfied to see not only the powers of the Triple Entente settle these affairs according to their interests, but also the small but audacious and resolute nation, Greece.

From the Messaggero, March 17, 1915:

The cession of the Trentino would be valueless if it implied the abandonment of Italian aspirations in Venetia Giulia, (land west of the Julian Alps,) in the Adriatic, and in Asia Minor, and submission to German policy. We cannot obtain by neutrality the territory we want, nor, if we renew the Triple Alliance, can we make an agreement with Great Britain for our security in the Mediterranean.

VON BUELOW'S WORK AND PLEA FOR INTERVENTION.

From the Corriere della Sera, Feb. 8, 1915:

Happily our aspirations in the Adriatic, our interests in the Central Mediterranean and in Northern Africa coincide admirably with the policy which it is easiest for us to pursue. Unless we profit with the utmost prudence, with the greatest circumspection, by the present rare opportunity which history offers us to set the finishing touches to our unification, to render our land and sea frontiers immeasurably more secure than they are, to harmonize our foreign with our domestic policy, we shall experience after the close of the war the darkest and most difficult days of our existence. The crisis through which we are passing is the gravest we have yet encountered. Let us make it a crisis of growth, not a symptom of irreparable senile decay.

From the Stampa, March 15, 1915:

There is surely no possibility of an Austro-Italian war without German intervention. If Italy attacks Austria, Germany will attack Italy; nor will Austria make concessions, for Austria, like Turkey, never changes her system, even when wrong.

From the Giornale d'Italia, March 19, 1915:

Italy either can obtain peacefully immediate and certain satisfaction of her sacred aspirations, together with the protection of her great and complex interests, or she can have recourse to the supreme test of arms. It is absurd to think that Italy, after seven months of preparation, when she is in an especially advantageous diplomatic and military position, will be satisfied with the Biblical mess of pottage or less—mere promises.

However negotiations go the great national interests must be protected at any costs. This is the firm will of the country and the duty of the Government. For fifty years Italy has made great sacrifices to be an element of peace in Europe. The equilibrium and peace of the Continent were broken through the fault of others against Italy's desire and without consulting her. Others have the responsibility for the present terrible crisis, but Italy would be unworthy if she did not issue with honor and advantage from the conflict. Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria are awaiting Italy's move and will follow suit. Thus Italian influence is great at this moment, which must be seized, as it is in her power to contribute to the formation of a new international combination.

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