C. RAEDER’S PART IN THE CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES.

(1) Instigation of the Navy to Violate the Rules of Warfare. Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which conflicted with his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of conquest. Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in a long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German Naval War Staff and dated 15 October 1939, only a few weeks after the war started (UK-65). The memorandum, which concerns the intensification of the war at sea, reads in part as follows:

“I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.

“Our naval strategy will have to employ all the military means at our disposal as expeditiously as possible. Military success can be most confidently expected if we attack British sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness; the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and exports from Britain. We should try to consider the requirements. It is desirable to base all military measures taken on existing International Law; however measures which are considered necessary from a military point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing International Law. In principle therefore, any means of warfare which is effective in breaking enemy resistance should be used on some legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare.

“The supreme War Council will have to decide what measures of military and legal nature are to be taken. Once it has been decided to conduct economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfilment of military requirements, this decision is to be adhered to under all circumstances and under no circumstances may such a decision for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been made, be dropped or released under political pressure from neutral powers; that is what happened in the World War to our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be turned down. Even threats of further countries, including the U. S. coming into the war, which can be expected with certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon. The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end. The economic effect of such military measures on our own war economy must be fully recognized and compensated through immediate re-orientation of German war economy and the re-drafting of the respective agreements with neutral states; for this, strong political and economic pressure must be employed if necessary.” (UK-65)

Those comments of Raeder are revealing and show that as an active member of the inner councils of the Nazi state up to 1943, Raeder must share responsibility for the many war crimes committed by his confederates and underlings in the course of their wars.

(2) The Navy’s Crimes at Sea. Apart from this over-all responsibility of Raeder, certain war crimes were essentially initiated or ordered through the naval chain of command by Raeder himself.

(a) Attacks on neutral shipping. The minutes of a meeting between Hitler and Raeder on 30 December 1939 read in part as follows:

“The Chief of Naval War Staff requests that full power be given to the Naval War Staff in making any intensification suited to the situation and to the means of war. The Fuehrer fundamentally agrees to the sinking without warning of Greek ships in the American prohibited area in which the fiction of mine danger can be upheld, e.g., the Bristol Channel.” (C-27)

At this time Greek ships also were neutral. This is another demonstration that Raeder was a man without principle.

This incitement to crime was a typical group effort, since a directive effectuating those naval views was issued on 30 December 1939 by the OKW, and signed by Jodl (C-12). This directive reads:

“On the 30th of December 1939, according to a report of Ob.d.M., the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces decided that:

“(1) Greek merchant ships in the area around England declared by U.S.A. to be a barred zone are to be treated as enemy vessels.

“(2) In the Bristol Channel, all shipping may be attacked without warning—where the impression of a mining incident can be created.

“Both measures are authorized to come into effect immediately.” (C-12)

A pencilled note at the foot of this directive reads:

“Add to (1) Attack must be carried out without being seen. The denial of the sinking of these steamships in case the expected protests are made must be possible.” (C-12)

Another example of the callous attitude of Raeder’s Navy towards neutral shipping is found in an entry in Jodl’s diary for 16 June 1942 (1807-PS). This extract reads as follows:

“The operational staff of the Navy (SKL) applied on the 29th May for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The SKL considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (a) because defense measures are still incomplete; (b) because there is the possibility of achieving surprise; and (c) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.” (1807-PS).

This was a plan for a kind of Brazilian “Pearl Harbor,” although war did not in fact break out between Germany and Brazil until the 22 August 1942.

Raeder also caused the Navy to participate in war crimes ordered by other conspirators. A single example will suffice.

(b) The order to shoot commandos. On 28 October 1942 the head of the Operations Division of the Naval War Staff promulgated to naval commands Hitler’s order of 18 October 1942 requiring the shooting of commandos. The effect of this order was to deny the protection of the Geneva Convention to captured commandos. The document dated 28 October 1942 reads:

“Enclosed please find a Fuehrer Order regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units.

“This order must not be distributed in writing by Flotilla leaders, Section Commanders or officers of this rank.

“After verbal distribution to subordinate sections the above authorities must hand this order over to the next highest section which is responsible for its confiscation and destruction.” (C-179).

It will be difficult to conceive of clearer evidence than this, that Raeder appreciated the wrongfulness of Hitler’s commando order.

One example will show that this order was executed by the German Navy during the period when Raeder was its Commander.

A certain commando operation of December 1942 had as its objective an attack on shipping in Bordeaux harbor. The Wehrmacht account of this incident states that six of the ten participants in that commando raid were arrested, and that all were shot on 23 March 1943 (UK-57). On this particular occasion the Navy under Raeder had implemented Hitler’s order much more expeditiously. This fact appears in extracts from the war diary of Admiral Bachmann, who was the German Flag Officer in charge of Western France (C-176). The entry for 10 December 1942 reads:

“About 1015. Telephone call from personal representative of the Officer-in-charge of the Security Service in Paris, SS Obersturmfuehrer Dr. Schmidt to Flag Officer-in-charge’s Flag Lieutenant, requesting postponement of the shooting, as interrogation had not been concluded. After consultation with the Chief of Operations Staff the Security Service had been directed to get approval direct from Headquarters.

“1820. Security Service, Bordeaux, requested Security Service authorities at Fuehrer’s headquarters to postpone the shooting for three days. Interrogations continued for the time being.” (C-176)

The entry for the next day, 11 December 1942, reads:

“Shooting of the two prisoners was carried out by a unit (strength 1/16) belonging to the naval officer in charge Bordeaux, in the presence of an officer of the Security Service, Bordeaux, on order of the Fuehrer.” (C-176)

A note in green pencil in the margin opposite this entry reads:

“Security Service should have done this. Phone Flag Officer in Charge in future cases.” (C-176)

This provision for “future cases” was in fact an order that commandos should be handed over to the Security Service to be shot.

It is therefore evident from Admiral Bachmann’s war diary (C-176) that the first two men to be shot from the Bordeaux operation were actually put to death by a naval firing party on 11 December 1942.

The Naval War Staff had this comment to make upon that shooting:

“The Naval Commander, West France, reports that during the course of the day explosives with magnets to stick on, mapping material dealing with the mouth of the Gironde, aerial photographs of the port installations at Bordeaux, camouflage material and food and water for several days were found. Attempts to salvage the canoe were unsuccessful. The Naval Commander, West France, has ordered that both soldiers be shot immediately for attempted sabotage, if their interrogation, which has begun, confirms what has so far been discovered. Their execution has, however, been postponed in order to obtain more information.

“According to a Wehrmacht report, both soldiers have meanwhile been shot. The measure would be in accordance with the Fuehrer’s special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform.” (D-658)

That last sentence shows clearly that the Naval High Command under Raeder accepted allegiance to the Nazi conspiracy as of greater importance than any question of moral principle or professional honor. The shooting of commandos was not an act of war, but simple murder.

D. RAEDER’S ASSISTANCE TO THE CONSPIRACY THROUGH HIS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

Raeder was not just a military puppet carrying out political orders. Before the Nazis came to power he had worked actively to rebuild the German Navy behind the back of the Reichstag. When the Nazis seized power, he unreservedly joined forces with them. He was the prime mover in transferring the loyalty of the German Navy to the Nazi Party. He himself was as much a member of the inner councils of the Nazis as any other defendant. He accepted membership in their main political advisory bodies.

He was well aware of the designs of the Nazis and assisted in their realization not only as a military technician, but also as a mendacious politician. And he furthered brutal methods of warfare. And yet of all the conspirators Raeder was one of the first to fall from his high position. It is true that the extension of the war beyond the boundaries of Poland came as a disappointment to him. His vision of a Nazi Armada mastering the Atlantic reckoned without Ribbentrop’s diplomacy and Hitler’s ideas of strategy.

In a memorandum dated 10 January 1943, just before his retirement, entitled, “The Importance of German Surface Forces for the War by powers signatory to the Three Power Pact,” Raeder stated:

“It was planned by the leaders of the National Socialist Reich to give the German Navy by 1944/45 such a strength that it would be possible to strike at the British vital arteries in the Atlantic with sufficient ships, fighting power and range.

“In 1939, the war having begun five years earlier, the construction of these forces was still in its initial stages.” (C-161).

This memorandum shows how completely Raeder was cheated in his ambitious plans by miscalculation as to when his high seas fleet would be required. Raeder made a great effort to recover some of his lost glory with his attack on Norway. He made many efforts to liven up the war at sea, both at the expense of neutrals and also of the customs and laws of the sea. His further schemes, however, were disregarded by his fellow conspirators, and in January 1943 he retired, and thereafter was a leader in name only.

The record, in Raeder’s handwriting, of his interview with Hitler on 6 January 1943, which led to Raeder’s retirement, states in part:

“If the Fuehrer was anxious to demonstrate that the parting was of the friendliest and wished that the name Raeder should continue to be associated with the Navy, particularly abroad, it would perhaps be possible to make an appointment to General Inspector, giving appropriate publicity in the press, etc. But a new C. in C. Navy with full responsibility for this office must be appointed. The position of General Inspector, or whatever it was decided to call it, must be purely nominal.

“Hitler accepted this suggestion with alacrity. The General Inspector could perhaps carry out special tasks for him, make tours of inspection, etc. The name of Raeder was still to be associated with the Navy. After C. in C. Navy had repeated his request, the Fuehrer definitely agreed to 30th January as his release date. He would like to think over the details.” (D-655)

This was Raeder’s twilight, different from the period of his ascendancy in 1939, when on 12 March he spoke on the occasion of the German Heroes’ Day (D-653). In that speech, during the celebration of “freedom to rearm,” Raeder stated, in the presence of Hitler and representatives of the Party and Armed Forces:

“* * * National Socialism, which originates from the spirit of the German fighting soldier, has been chosen by the German people as its ideology. The German people follow the symbols of its regeneration with the same great love and fanatical passion. The German people has had practical experience of National Socialism and it has not been imposed, as so many outside critics believe. The Fuehrer has shown his people that in the National Socialist racial community lies the greatest and invincible sources of strength, whose dynamic power ensures not only peace at home, but also enables to make use of all the Nation’s creative powers.” (D-653).

After eulogies of Hitler, Raeder continued as follows:

“This is the reason for the clear and unsparing summons to fight Bolshevism and international Jewry, whose race-destroying activities we have sufficiently experienced on our own people. Therefore, the alliance with all similar-minded Nations who, like Germany, are not willing to allow their strength, dedicated to construction and peaceful work at home, to be disrupted by alien ideologies as by parasites of a foreign race. * * * If later on we instruct in the technical handling of weapons, this task demands that the young soldier should also be taught National Socialist ideology and the problems of life. This part of the task, which becomes for us both a duty of honor and a demand which cannot be refused, can and will be carried out if we stand shoulder to shoulder and in sincere comradeship to the Party and its organization. The armed forces and the Party thus became more and more united in attitude and spirit.”

* * * * * *

“Germany is the protector of all Germans within and beyond our frontiers. The shots fired at Almeria are proof of that.” (D-653)

(The reference is to the bombardment of the Spanish town of Almeria, carried out by a German naval squadron on 31 May 1937 during the course of the Spanish Civil War.) After further panegyries on the Fuehrer and his leadership, Raeder hinted of what was to come:

“They all planted into a younger generation the great tradition of death for a holy cause, knowing that their blood will lead the way towards the freedom of their dreams.” (D-653)

That speech of Raeder’s illustrates his deep personal involvement in the Nazi conspiracy. There is the mixture of heroics and fatalism that led millions of Germans to slaughter. There are boasts of the violence used on the people of Almeria. There is the lip service to peace by a man who planned conquest. “Armed forces and party have become more and more united in attitude and spirit”—there is the authentic Nazi voice. There is the assertion of racialism. Finally, there is the anti-Semitic gesture, Raeder’s contribution to the outlook that produced Belsen. Imbued with these ideas, he became an active participant on both the political and military level in the Nazi conspiracy to wage wars of aggression and to wage them ruthlessly.

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ERICH RAEDER

DocumentDescriptionVol.Page

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6.I5

International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H); Appendix A.I29, 67

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Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court.

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*386-PSNotes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25)III295

*498-PSTop Secret Fuehrer Order for killing of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA 501)III416

*503-PSLetter signed by Jodl, 19 October 1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation of his commando order of the day before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542)III426

*798-PSHitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29)III581

*1807-PSExtract from Jodl Diary, 16 June 1942, concerning attack on Brazilian sea and air forces. (GB 227)IV377

*2031-PSDecree establishing a Secret Cabinet Council, 4 February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 112. (GB 217)IV654

2098-PSDecree relating to Status of Supreme Commanders of Army and Navy, 25 February 1938. 1938 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 215. (GB 206)IV725

*2194-PSTop secret letter from Ministry for Economy and Labor, Saxony, to Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia, enclosing copy of 1938 Secret Defense Law of 4 September 1938. (USA 36)IV843

2879-PSExtracts from The Archives.V542

*2888-PSCertificate of positions held by Raeder, 14 November 1945. (USA 13)V553

*3260-PS“Churchill Sank the Athenia”, published in Voelkischer Beobachter, 23 October 1939. (GB 218)V1008

*C-12OKW directive, signed Jodl, 20 December 1939, concerning conduct of U-Boat warfare on Merchant shipping against England. (GB 226)VI818

*C-21Extracts from file on Intensification of U-boat warfare. (GB 194)VI825

*C-23Unsigned documents found in official Navy files containing notes year by year from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of the German Navy, and dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA 49)VI827

*C-27Minutes of Meeting between C-in-C Navy and the Fuehrer. (GB 225)VI829

*C-29Directive of 31 January 1933 by Raeder for German Navy to support the armament industry. (USA 46)VI830

C-32Survey report of German Naval Armament after conference with Chief of “A” Section, 9 September 1933. (USA 50)VI833

*C-38Letter, 13 June 1941, requesting decision on action against enemy submarines and Order to attack Soviet submarines, 15 June 1941. (GB 223)VI855

*C-64Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB 86)VI884

*C-66Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81)VI887

*C-105Extract from German Naval War Diary, 21 December 1940, p. 252. (GB 455)VI913

*C-115Naval deception and camouflage in invasion of Norway taken from file of naval operation orders for operation “Weseruebung”. (GB 90)VI914

C-116Extract from German Naval file, 9 August 1941, concerning Order to blockade Norwegian ships.VI915

C-117Extract from German Naval file, 13 July 1941, concerning preparations for laying of minefield near the Bosphorus.VI915

*C-120Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 for “Fall Weiss”, operation against Poland. (GB 41)VI916

*C-122Extract from Naval War Diary. Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October 1939. (GB 82)VI928

C-124Secret letter, 29 September 1941, concerning future of St. Petersburg.VI931

*C-126Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” and directions for secret mobilization. (GB 45)VI932

*C-135Extract from history of war organization and of the scheme for mobilization. (GB 213)VI946

*C-141Order for concealed armament of E-boats, 10 February 1932, signed by Raeder. (USA 47)VI955

*C-152Extract from Naval War Staff files, 18 March 1941, concerning audience of C-in-C of Navy with Hitler on 18 March 1941. (GB 122)VI966

*C-155Memorandum, 11 June 1940, signed by Raeder. (GB 214)VI969

*C-156Concealed Rearmament under Leadership of Government of Reich, from “Fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919-1935”. (USA 41)VI970

*C-161Memo by Raeder, 10 January 1943, entitled: Importance of German Surface forces for conducting of war by powers signatory to Three Power Pact. (GB 230)VI976

*C-166Order from Command Office of Navy, 12 March 1934, signed in draft by Groos, concerning preparation of auxiliary cruisers. (USA 48)VI977

*C-170File of Russo-German relations found in OKM files covering period 25 August 1939 to 22 June 1941. (USA 136)VI977

*C-176Extracts from War Diary of Admiral Bachmann, concerning shooting of commandos in Bordeaux. (GB 228)VI1011

C-179Hitler’s second decree, 18 October 1942, regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units. (USA 543)VI1014

*C-189Conversation with the Fuehrer in June 1934 on occasion of resignation of Commanding Officer of “Karlsruhe”. (USA 44)VI1017

*C-190Memorandum of conversation with Hitler on financing Naval rearmament and assembling six submarines, 2 November 1934. (USA 45)VI1018

*C-191Demands by defendant Doenitz on sinking of merchant ships, 22 September 1939. (GB 193)VI1018

*D-448Announcement of birthday celebration of Doenitz in Voelkischer Beobachter, 25 April 1942. (GB 216)VII58

*D-481Law regarding the swearing in of officials and soldiers of Armed Forces, 20 August 1934. 1934 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part I, p. 785. (GB 215)VII66

*D-638Affidavit of Doenitz concerning sinking of Athenia, 17 November 1945. (GB 220)VII114

*D-653Raeder speech, 12 March 1939, published in The Archive, March 1939, pp. 1841-1846. (GB 232)VII153

*D-654Affidavit of Adolf Schmidt, 9 August 1945. (GB 219)VII156

*D-655Raeder interview with Hitler on 6 January 1943. (GB 231)VII158

*D-658Extract from SKL War Diary, 9 December 1942. (GB 229)VII164

D-659Extract from War Diary of Chief of U-boats, 27 September 1939. (GB 221)VII164

*D-662War Diary of Commanding Officer of U-boat U-30. (GB 222)VII169

*D-663Operation Order “Atlantic” No. 56 for U-boats in Atlantic, 7 October 1943. (GB 200)VII170

*EC-177Minutes of second session of Working Committee of the Reich Defense held on 26 April 1933. (USA 390)VII328

*L-79Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims”. (USA 27)VII847

*UK-57Keitel directives, 4 January 1944 and 21 April 1944, concerning counteraction to Kharkov show trial. (GB 164)VIII539

*UK-65Report by Raeder to Hitler, 16 October 1939, and memorandum regarding intensified naval war against England, 15 October 1939. (GB 224)VIII545

Statement IThe Laconia Case and German Submarine Warfare, by Karl Doenitz, Nurnberg, 7 and 19 October 1945.VIII657

Statement VIIThe Development of German Naval Policy—1933-1939, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, fall 1945.VIII684

Statement VIIIThe Breakthrough in the Channel Early in 1942, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, 30 August 1945.VIII701

Statement IXMy Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, fall 1945.VIII707