7. THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES (continued 3)

“(Signed) Bogislav v. Bonin

“Colonel” (3718-PS)

Finally an affidavit (3717-PS) by Heusinger, who was a Generalleutnant in the German Army, and who from 1940 to 1944 was Chief of the Operations Section at OKH, states as follows:

“1. From the beginning of the war in 1939 until autumn 1940 I was Ia of the Operations Section of the OKH, and from autumn 1940 until 20 July 1944 I was chief of that section.

“When Hitler took over supreme command of the Army, he gave to the chief of the General Staff of the Army the function of advising him on all operational matters in the Russian theater.

“This made the chief of the General Staff of the Army responsible for all matters in the operational areas in the east, while the OKW was responsible for all matters outside the operational areas, for instance, all troops (security units, SS units, police) stationed in the Reichscommissariates.

“All police and SS units in the Reichscommissariates were also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. When it was necessary to transfer such units into operational areas, this had to be done by order of the chief of the OKW. On the other hand, corresponding transfers from the front to the rear were ordered by the OKW with the concurrence of the chief of the General Staff of the Army.

“The high SS and police leaders normally had command of operations against partisans. If stronger army units were committed together with the SS and police units within operational areas, a high commander of the army could be designated commander of the operation.

“During anti-partisan operations within operational areas all forces committed for these operations were under the command of the respective commander-in-chief of the army group.

“2. Directives as to the manner and methods of carrying on counter-partisan operations were issued by the OKW (Keitel) to the OKH upon orders from Hitler and after consultation with Himmler. The OKH was responsible merely for the transmission of these orders to army groups, for instance such orders as those concerning the treatment to be accorded to commissars and communists, those concerning the manner of prosecuting by courts martial army personnel who had committed offenses against the population, as well as those establishing the basic principles governing reprisals against the inhabitants.

“3. The detailed working out of all matters involving the treatment of the local populace as well as anti-partisan warfare in operational areas, in pursuance of orders from the OKW, was the responsibility of the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.

“4. It had always been my personal opinion that the treatment of the civilian population and the methods of anti-partisan warfare in operational areas presented the highest political and military leaders with a welcomed opportunity of carrying out their plans, namely the systematic extermination of Slavism and Jewry. Entirely independent of this, I always regarded these cruel methods as military insanity, because they only helped to make combat against the enemy unnecessarily more difficult.

“(Signed) Heusinger

“Generalleutnant.” (3717-PS)

(At this point, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski was called upon for oral testimony. His testimony on direct examination was substantially to the same effect as his affidavit 3712-PS.)

(c) Responsibility of the Group for War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment. The foregoing evidence against the General Staff and High Command Group is such that no German soldier can view it with anything but shame. The German High Command developed and applied a policy of terror against commandos and paratroopers, in violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, on the Western Front. On the Eastern Front it descended to savagery. In advance of the attack against the Soviet Union, the High Command ordered the troops to take “ruthless action”, left it to the discretion of any officer to decide whether suspected civilians should be immediately shot, and empowered any officer with the powers of a Battalion Commander to take “collective despotic measures” against localities. Offenses committed against civilians by German soldiers, however, were not required to be prosecuted, and prosecution was suggested only where desirable in order to maintain discipline and security from a military standpoint.

Soon after the invasion of the Soviet Union, German troops were told by the OKW that “a human life in unsettled countries frequently counts for nothing” and were encouraged to observe a punitive ratio of 50 to 100 Communists for one German soldier. German troops were told that they were to take “revenge on sub-human Jewry” and that they were not merely soldiers but “bearers of ruthless national ideology and avengers of bestialities”. The High Command and the chief lieutenants of Himmler jointly planned the establishment of the Einsatzgruppen, the behavior of which has been shown in detail. These groups when in operational areas were under the command of the German Army, and German soldiers joined in their savagery. The Einsatzgruppen were completely dependent upon the Armed Forces for supplies with which to carry out their atrocities. The practices employed against the civilian population and against partisans were well known to all high ranking German officers on the Eastern Front. No doubt some of them disapproved of what was going on. Nonetheless, the full support of the military leaders continued to be given to these activities.

The record is clear that the General Staff and High Command Group, including the defendants, who were members of the Group and numerous other members ordered, directed, and participated in war crimes and crimes against humanity as specified in counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment.

C. Conclusion.

The world must bear in mind that the German High Command is not an evanescent thing, the creature of a decade of unrest, or a school of thought or tradition which is shattered or utterly discredited. The German High Command and military tradition have in the past achieved victory and survived defeat. They have met with triumph and disaster, and have survived through a singular durability not unmixed with stupidity. An eminent American statesman and diplomat, Mr. Sumner Welles, has written (“The Time for Decision”, 1944, pp. 261-262) that:

“* * * the authority to which the German people have so often and so disastrously responded was not in reality the German Emperor of yesterday, or the Hitler of to-day, but the German General Staff.

“It will be said that this insistence that the German General Staff has been the driving force in German policy is a dangerous oversimplification. I am not disposed to minimize the importance of other factors in German history. They all have their place. But I am convinced that each of them has played its part only in so far as it was permitted to do so by the real master of the German race, namely, German militarism, personified in, and channelled through, the German General Staff.”

* * * * * *

“Whether their ostensible ruler is the Kaiser, or Hindenburg, or Adolf Hitler, the continuing loyalty of the bulk of the population is given to that military force controlled and guided by the German General Staff. To the German people, the army to-day, as in the past, is the instrument by which German domination will be brought about. Generations of Germans may pass. The nation may undergo defeat after defeat. But if the rest of the world permits it, the German General Staff will continue making its plans for the future.”

The German General Staff and High Command is indicted not now at the bar of history, but on specific charges of crimes against International Law and the dictates of the conscience of mankind as embodied in the Charter. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that of a group of men with great powers for good or ill who chose the latter; who deliberately set out to arm Germany to the point where the German will could be imposed on the rest of the world; and who gladly joined with the most evil forces at work in Germany. “Hitler produced the results which all of us warmly desired”, Blomberg and Blaskowitz say, and that is obviously the truth. The converse is no less clear; the military leaders furnished Hitler with the means and might which were necessary to his mere survival, to say nothing of the accomplishment of those purposes which seem to the world so ludicrously impossible in 1932 and so fearfully imminent in 1942.

It was said above that the German militarists were inept as well as persistent. Helpless as Hitler would have been without them, he succeeded in mastering them. The generals and the Nazis were allies in 1933. But it was not enough for the Nazis that the generals should be voluntary allies; Hitler wanted them permanently and completely under his control. Devoid of political skill or principle, the generals lacked the mentality or morality to resist. On the day of the death of President Hindenburg in August 1934, the German officers swore a new oath. Their previous oath had been to the Fatherland; now it was to a man, Adolf Hitler. It was not until 18 days later that the law requiring this change was passed. A year later the Nazi emblem became part of their uniform and the Nazi flag their standard. By a clever process of infiltration into key positions, Hitler seized control of the entire military machine.

No doubt these generals will ask what they could have done about it. It will be said that they were helpless, and that to protect their jobs and families and their own lives they had to follow Hitler’s decisions. No doubt this became true. But the generals were a key factor in Hitler’s rise to complete power and a partner in his criminal aggressive designs. It is always difficult and dangerous to withdraw from a criminal conspiracy. Never has it been suggested that a conspirator may claim mercy on the ground that his fellow-conspirators threatened him with harm should he withdraw from the plot.

In many respects the spectacle which the German General Staff and High Command group presents today is the most degrading of all the groups and organizations charged in the Indictment. The bearers of a tradition not devoid of valour and honour, they emerge from this war stained both by criminality and ineptitude. Attracted by the militaristic and aggressive Nazi policies, the German generals found themselves drawn into adventures of a scope they had not foreseen. From crimes in which almost all of them participated willingly and approvingly were born others in which they participated because they were too ineffective to alter the governing Nazi policies, and because they had to continue collaboration to save their own skins.

Having joined the partnership, the General Staff and High Command group planned and carried through manifold acts of aggression which turned Europe into a charnel-house, and caused the Armed Forces to be used for foul practices foully executed of terror, pillage, murder and wholesale slaughter. Let no one be heard to say that the military uniform shall be their cloak, or that they may find sanctuary by pleading membership in the profession to which they are an eternal disgrace.

LEGAL REFERENCES AND LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE GENERAL STAFF AND HIGH COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES

DocumentDescriptionVol.Page

Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 9.I6

International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Section IV (H); Appendix B.I29, 72

3737-PSHague Convention of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, Articles 4, 23.VI590, 594

3738-PSGeneva Convention of 1929 relative to treatment of Prisoners of War, Articles 2,3.VI600

————

Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was referred to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court.

————

375-PSCase Green with wider implications, report of Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe General Staff, 25 August 1938. (USA 84)III280

*386-PSNotes on a conference with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, 5 November 1937, signed by Hitler’s adjutant, Hossbach, and dated 10 November 1937. (USA 25)III295

*388-PSFile of papers on Case Green (the plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia), kept by Schmundt, Hitler’s adjutant, April-October 1938. (USA 26)III305

*444-PSOriginal Directive No. 18 from Fuehrer’s Headquarters signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, 12 November 1940, concerning plans for prosecution of war in Mediterranean Area and occupation of Greece. (GB 116)III403

*446-PSTop Secret Fuehrer Order No. 21 signed by Hitler and initialled by Jodl, Warlimont and Keitel, 18 December 1940, concerning the Invasion of Russia (case Barbarossa). (USA 31)III407

447-PSTop Secret Operational Order to Order No. 21, signed by Keitel, 13 March 1941, concerning Directives for special areas. (USA 135)III409

*498-PSTop Secret Fuehrer Order for killing of commandos, 18 October 1942. (USA 501)III416

*503-PSLetter signed by Jodl, 19 October 1942, concerning Hitler’s explanation of his commando order of the day before (Document 498-PS). (USA 542)III426

*506-PSDraft of top secret letter, 22 June 1944, initialled by Warlimont, concerning enemy agents. (USA 549)III430

*508-PSOKW correspondence, November 1942, about shooting of British glider troops in Norway. (USA 545)III430

*509-PSTelegram to OKW, 7 November 1943, reporting “special treatment” for three British commandos. (USA 547)III433

*512-PSTeletype from Army Commander in Norway, 13 December 1942, concerning interrogation of saboteurs before shooting; and memorandum in reply from OKW, 14 December 1942. (USA 546)III433

*526-PSTop secret notice, 10 May 1943, concerning saboteurs captured and shot in Norway. (USA 502)III434

*531-PSOKW memorandum, 23 June 1944, citing inquiry from Supreme Command West about treatment of paratroopers. (USA 550)III435

*537-PSOrder signed by Keitel, 30 July 1944, concerning treatment of members of foreign “Military Missions”, captured together with partisans. (USA 553)III439

551-PSOrder signed by Keitel, 26 June 1944, concerning treatment of Commando participants. (USA 551)III440

*728-PSLetter of Foreign Office to Chief of Supreme Command of Armed Forces, 20 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators. (GB 152)III526

729-PSHandwritten note initialled Keitel, 14 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators.III529

730-PSDraft of letter to Foreign Office, attention Ambassador Ritter, 15 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy aviators.III530

731-PSMemorandum initialled by Jodl, 22 May, concerning measures to be taken against Anglo-American air crews in special instances.III531

732-PSLetter from Feske to Keitel, 19 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators.III532

733-PSTelephone memorandum, 26 June 1944, concerning treatment of terror aviators.III533

*735-PSMinutes of meeting, 6 June 1944, to fix the cases in which the application of Lynch Law against Allied airmen would be justified. (GB 151)III533

737-PSConference Notes, 4 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators.III536

*740-PSLetter from Warlimont, 30 June 1944, concerning treatment of enemy terror aviators. (GB 153)III537

741-PSSecret memorandum, 5 July 1944, concerning terror aviators.III538

*789-PSSpeech of the Fuehrer at a conference, 23 November 1939, to which all Supreme Commanders were ordered. (USA 23)III572

*798-PSHitler’s speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29)III581

*872-PSMemorandum of Discussion between the Fuehrer and the OKW, concerning case “Barbarossa” and “Sonnenblume” (African operation). (USA 134)III626

*1061-PSOfficial report of Stroop, SS and Police Leader of Warsaw, on destruction of Warsaw Ghetto, 1943. (USA 275)III718

*1279-PSMinutes of meeting concerning treatment of members of foreign “Military Missions” captured with partisan groups and draft of order, 7 July 1944 pertaining thereto. (USA 552)III857

*1541-PSDirective No. 20, Operation Marita, 13 December 1940. (GB 117)IV101

*1746-PSConference between German and Bulgarian Generals, 8 February 1941; speech by Hitler to German High Command on situation in Yugoslavia, 27 March 1941; plan for invasion of Yugoslavia, 28 March 1941. (GB 120)IV272

*1775-PSPropositions to Hitler by OKW, 14 February 1938. (USA 73)IV357

*1780-PSExcerpts from diary kept by General Jodl, January 1937 to August 1939. (USA 72)IV360

1786-PSExcerpt of 14 March 1943 of War Diary of the Deputy Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. (USA 561)IV369

*1809-PSEntries from Jodl’s diary, February 1940 to May 1940. (GB 88)IV377

*1816-PSStenographic report of the meeting on The Jewish Question, under the Chairmanship of Fieldmarshal Goering, 12 November 1938. (USA 261)IV425

*1919-PSHimmler’s speech to SS Gruppenfuehrers, 4 October 1943. (USA 170)IV558

*2261-PSDirective from Blomberg to Supreme Commanders of Army, Navy and Air Forces, 24 June 1935; accompanied by copy of Reich Defense Law of 21 May 1935 and copy of Decision of Reich Cabinet of 12 May 1935 on the Council for defense of the Reich. (USA 24)IV934

*2327-PSTwo top secret memoranda, 14 June 1939, concerning operation “Fall Weiss”. (USA 539)IV1035

*2385-PSAffidavit of George S. Messersmith, 30 August 1945. (USA 68)V23

*2610-PSAffidavit of Frederick W. Roche, Major, U. S. Army, 7 November 1945. (USA 548)V330

*2802-PSGerman Foreign Office notes of conference on 13 March 1939 between Hitler and Monsignor Tiso, Prime Minister of Slovakia. (USA 117)V443

*3012-PSOrder signed Christiansen, 19 March 1943, to all group leaders of Security Service, and record of telephone conversation signed by Stapj, 11 March 1943. (USA 190)V731

3040-PSSecret order of Reichsfuehrer SS, 20 February 1942, concerning commitment of manpower from the East. (USA 207)V744

*3702-PSAffidavit of Colonel-General Franz Halder, 7 November 1945. (USA 531)VI411

*3703-PSAffidavit of Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA 532)VI413

*3704-PSAffidavit of Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg, 7 November 1945. (USA 536)VI414

*3705-PSAffidavit of Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, 7 November 1945. (USA 535)VI415

*3706-PSAffidavit of Colonel-General Johannes Blaskowitz, 10 November 1945. (USA 537)VI417

*3707-PSAffidavit of Colonel-General Franz Halder, 13 November 1945. (USA 533)VI419

*3708-PSAffidavit of Colonel Bernd von Brauchitsch, 20 November 1945. (USA 534)VI419

*3710-PSAffidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 26 November 1945. (USA 557)VI420

*3711-PSAffidavit of Captain Wilhelm Scheidt, 26 November 1945. (USA 558)VI424

3712-PSAffidavit of General von dem Bach, 27 November 1945.VI425

*3713-PSAffidavit of General Roettiger, 8 December 1945. (USA 559)VI429

3714-PSAffidavit of General Roettiger, 28 November 1945. (USA 560)VI430

*3715-PSAffidavit of Major General Rode, 30 November 1945. (USA 562)VI431

*3716-PSAffidavit of Major General Rode, 30 November 1945. (USA 563)VI433

*3717-PSAffidavit of General Heusinger, 1 December 1945. (USA 564)VI434

*3718-PSAffidavit of Colonel v. Bonin, 1 December 1945. (USA 565)VI435

*3739-PSMemo on General Staff and High Command and affidavit thereto. (USA 778)VI624

*3868-PSAffidavit of Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess, 5 April 1946, concerning execution of 3,000,000 people at Auschwitz Extermination Center. (USA 819)VI787

*C-5Memorandum to Supreme Command of the Navy by Doenitz, 9 October 1939, concerning base in Norway. (GB 83)VI815

*C-23Unsigned documents found in official Navy files containing notes year by year from 1927 to 1940 on reconstruction of the German Navy, and dated 18 February 1938, 8 March 1938, September 1938. (USA 49)VI827

*C-35Entry in Naval War Diary, January 1941, p. 401. (USA 132)VI852

*C-50Covering letters and Order of 13 May 1941, signed by Keitel on ruthless treatment of civilians in the USSR for offenses committed by them. (USA 554; GB 162)VI871

*C-63Keitel order on preparation for “Weseruebung”, 27 January 1940. (GB 87)VI883

C-64Raeder’s report, 12 December 1939, on meeting of Naval Staff with Fuehrer. (GB 86)VI884

*C-65Notes of Rosenberg to Raeder concerning visit of Quisling. (GB 85)VI885

*C-66Memorandum from Raeder to Assman, 10 January 1944, concerning “Barbarossa” and “Weseruebung”. (GB 81)VI887

*C-78Schmundt’s Order of 9 June 1941, convening conference on Barbarossa on 14 June. (USA 139)VI909

*C-102Document signed by Hitler relating to operation “Otto”, 11 March 1938. (USA 74)VI911

*C-102Directives for Armed Forces 1939-40 for “Fall Weiss”, operation against Poland. (GB 41)VI916

*C-122Extract from Naval War Diary. Questionnaire on Norway bases, 3 October 1939. (GB 82)VI928

*C-126Preliminary Time Table for “Fall Weiss” and directions for secret mobilization. (GB 45)VI932

*C-136OKW Order on preparations for war, 21 October 1938, signed by Hitler and initialled by Keitel. (USA 104)VI947

*C-138Supplement of 17 December 1938, signed by Keitel, to 21 October Order of the OKW. (USA 105)VI950

*C-139Directive for operation “Schulung” signed by Blomberg, 2 May 1935. (USA 53)VI951

*C-142Intention of the Army High Command and Orders, signed by Brauchitsch. (USA 538)VI956

*C-148Keitel Order, 16 September 1941, subject: Communist Insurrection in Occupied Territories. (USA 555)VI961

C-156Concealed Rearmament under Leadership of Government of Reich, from “Fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919-1935”. (USA 41)VI970

*C-159Order for Rhineland occupation signed by Blomberg, 2 March 1936. (USA 54)VI974

*C-167Report of meeting between Raeder and Hitler, 18 March 1941. (GB 122)VI977

*C-174Hitler Order for operation “Weseruebung”, 1 March 1940. (GB 89)VI1003

*C-178Order of Navy concerning treatment of saboteurs, 11 February 1943. (USA 544)VI1012

*C-179Hitler’s second decree, 18 October 1942, regarding annihilation of terror and sabotage units. (USA 543)VI1014

*C-182Directive No. 2 from Supreme Commander Armed Forces, initialled Jodl, 11 March 1938. (USA 77)VI1017

*D-39Telegrams relating to activities against partisans in Italy. (GB 275)VI1023

*D-411Letters of 26 and 28 November 1941, enclosing orders concerning protection of troops against Partisans and sabotage. (USA 556)VII49

*D-569File of circulars from Reichsfuehrer SS, the OKW, Inspector of Concentration Camps, Chief of Security Police and SD, dating from 29 October 1941 through 22 February 1944, relative to procedure in cases of unnatural death of Soviet PW, execution of Soviet PW, etc. (GB 277)VII74

D-730Statement of PW Walther Grosche, 11 December 1945. (GB 279)VII177

*D-731Statement of PW Ernst Walde, 13 December 1945. (GB 278)VII183

*D-762Order of Hitler, 30 July 1944, concerning combatting of “terrorists” and “saboteurs” in Occupied Territories. (GB 298)VII221

*D-763Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, regarding penal jurisdiction of non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 300)VII222

*D-764Circular of OKW, 18 August 1944, concerning combatting of “terrorists” and “saboteurs” in Occupied Territories and jurisdiction relative thereto. (GB 299)VII223

*D-765Directives of OKW, 2 September 1944, regarding offenses by non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 302)VII225

*D-766Circular of OKW, 4 September 1944, regarding offenses by non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 301)VII226

*D-767Memorandum, 13 September 1944, on offenses by non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 303)VII228

*D-769Telegram signed by Gen. Christiansen, 21 September 1940, relative to application of capital punishment in connection with Railway strike in Holland. (GB 304)VII229

D-770Circular, 24 September 1944, on offenses of non-German civilians in Occupied Territories. (GB 305)VII229

*D-774Directive of Chief of OKW to German Foreign Office at Salzburg, on treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers, 14 June 1944. (GB 307)VII231

*D-775Draft of directive, 14 June 1944, from OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe”, regarding treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 308)VII232

*D-776Draft of directive of Chief of OKW, 15 June 1944, to German Foreign Office at Salzburg, concerning treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 309)VII233

*D-777Draft of directive, 15 June 1944, from OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe” concerning treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 310)VII234

*D-778Notes, 18 June 1944, concerning treatment of Anglo-American “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 311)VII235

*D-779Letter from Reichsmarschall to Chief of OKW, 19 August 1944, regarding treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 312)VII235

*D-780Draft of communication from Ambassador Ritter, Salzburg, to Chief of OKW, 20 June 1944, on treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 313)VII236

*D-781Note of OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe”, 23 June 1944, regarding treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 314)VII239

D-782Note from German Foreign Office, Salzburg, 25 June 1944, to OKW. (GB 315)VII239

*D-783Note of a telephone communication, 26 June 1944, with regard to treatment of “Terrorist”-aviators. (GB 316)VII240

*D-784Note from Operation Staff of OKW signed Warlimont, 30 June 1944, concerning treatment of Allied “Terrorist”-flyers. (GB 317)VII240

*D-785Note from OKW to Supreme Commander of “Luftwaffe”, 4 July 1944, concerning “Terror”-flyers. (GB 318)VII241

*D-786Note, 5 July 1944, on “Terror”-flyers. (GB 319)VII242

*L-43Air Force “Organizational Study 1950”, 2 May 1938. (GB 29) (See Chart No. 10.)VII788

*L-51Affidavit of Adolf Zutter, 2 August 1945. (USA 521)VII798

*L-52Memorandum and Directives for conduct of war in the West, 9 October 1939. (USA 540)VII800

*L-79Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, “Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims”. (USA 27)VII847

L-166Minutes of conference on Fighter Aircraft with Reichsmarshal on 15 and 16 May 1944.VII911

*L-172“The Strategic Position at the Beginning of the 5th Year of War”, a lecture delivered by Jodl on 7 November 1943 at Munich to Reich and Gauleiters. (USA 34)VII920

L-180Report by SS Brigade Commander Stahlecker to Himmler, “Action Group A”, 15 October 1941. (USA 276)VII978

*L-323Entry in Naval War Diary concerning operation “Weseruebung”. (USA 541)VII1106

*R-95Army Order signed by von Brauchitsch, 30 March 1941, concerning deployment instructions for “Action 25” and supplementary instruction for action “Marita”. (GB 127)VIII70

*R-102Report on activities of The Task Forces of SIPO and SD in USSR, 1-31 October 1941, (USA 470)VIII96

R-118Drafts of letters and memoranda of General Staff of Armed Forces concerning treatment of enemy fliers.VIII127

*R-135Letter to Rosenberg enclosing secret reports from Kube on German atrocities in the East, 18 June 1943, found in Himmler’s personal files. (USA 289)VIII205

*TC-54-BVon Brauchitsch appeal to the people of Danzig, from Documents of German Politics, Part VII, p. 596. (GB 73)VIII410

*UK-66Report of British War Crimes Section of Allied Force Headquarters on German reprisals for partisan activity in Italy. (GB 274)VIII572

UK-81Letters of 26 November and 28 October 1941, with enclosed orders on protection of troops against Partisans and Sabotage and conduct of troops in Eastern Territories.VIII582

Affidavit AAffidavit of Erwin Lahousen, 21 January 1946, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 30 November and 1 December 1945.VIII587

Affidavit BAffidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, 20 November 1945, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 3 January 1946.VIII596

Affidavit DAffidavit of Walter Schellenberg, 23 January 1946, substantially the same as his testimony on direct examination before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg 4 January 1946.VIII622

Affidavit HAffidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November 1945.VIII643

Affidavit IAffidavit of Leopold Buerkner, 22 January 1946.VIII647

Affidavit JAffidavit of Erhard Milch, 23 January 1946.VIII653

Statement IIIThe Origin of the Directives of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 15 September 1945.VIII669

Statement IVThe Position and Powers of the Chief of the OKW, by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 9 October 1945.VIII672

Statement VNotes Concerning Actions of German Armed Forces During the War and in Occupied Territory, by Wilhelm Keitel, Nurnberg, 19 October 1945.VIII678

Statement IXMy Relationship to Adolf Hitler and to the Party, by Erich Raeder, Moscow, fall 1945.VIII707

Chart No. 7Organization of the Wehrmacht 1938-1945. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)VIII776

*Chart No. 101938 Proposals for Luftwaffe Expansion 1938-1950. (L-43; GB 29)VIII779