Volume 1 / Part 1 — PART I.
Reading edition
OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES.
SECTION I.
OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEAS CONVEYABLE BY ART.
Chapter I.—Introductory.
page
§ 1. Public opinion no criterion of excellence, except after long periods of time. 1
§ 2. And therefore obstinate when once formed. 4
§ 3. The author's reasons for opposing it in particular instances. 5
§ 4. But only on points capable of demonstration. 5
§ 5. The author's partiality to modern works excusable. 6
Chapter II.—Definition of Greatness in Art.
§ 1. Distinction between the painter's intellectual power and technical knowledge. 8
§ 2. Painting, as such, is nothing more than language. 8
§ 3. "Painter," a term corresponding to "versifier." 9
§ 4. Example in a painting of E. Landseer's. 9
§ 5. Difficulty of fixing an exact limit between language and thought. 9
§ 6. Distinction between decorative and expressive language. 10
§ 7. Instance in the Dutch and early Italian schools. 10
§ 8. Yet there are certain ideas belonging to language itself. 11
§ 9. The definition. 12
Chapter III.—Of Ideas of Power.
§ 1. What classes of ideas are conveyable by art. 13
§ 2. Ideas of power vary much in relative dignity. 13
§ 3. But are received from whatever has been the subject of power. The meaning of the word "excellence." 14
§ 4. What is necessary to the distinguishing of excellence. 15
§ 5. The pleasure attendant on conquering difficulties is right. 16
Chapter IV.—Of Ideas of Imitation.
§ 1. False use of the term "imitation" by many writers on art. 17
§ 2. Real meaning of the term. 18
§ 3. What is requisite to the sense of imitation. 18
§ 4. The pleasure resulting from imitation the most contemptible that can be derived from art. 19
§ 5. Imitation is only of contemptible subjects. 19
§ 6. Imitation is contemptible because it is easy. 20
§ 7. Recapitulation. 20
Chapter V.—Of Ideas of Truth.
§ 1. Meaning of the word "truth" as applied to art. 21
§ 2. First difference between truth and imitation. 21
§ 3. Second difference. 21
§ 4. Third difference. 22
§ 5. No accurate truths necessary to imitation. 22
§ 6. Ideas of truth are inconsistent with ideas of imitation. 24
Chapter VI.—Of Ideas of Beauty.
§ 1. Definition of the term "beautiful." 26
§ 2. Definition of the term "taste." 26
§ 3. Distinction between taste and judgment. 27
§ 4. How far beauty may become intellectual. 27
§ 5. The high rank and function of ideas of beauty. 28
§ 6. Meaning of the term "ideal beauty." 28
Chapter VII.—Of Ideas of Relation.
§ 1. General meaning of the term. 29
§ 2. ideas are to be comprehended under it. 29
§ 3. The exceeding nobility of these ideas. 30
§ 4. Why no subdivision of so extensive a class is necessary. 31
SECTION II.
OF POWER.
Chapter I.—General Principles respecting Ideas of Power.
§ 1. No necessity for detailed study of ideas of imitation. 32
§ 2. Nor for separate study of ideas of power. 32
§ 3. Except under one particular form. 33
§ 4. There are two modes of receiving ideas of power, commonly inconsistent. 33
§ 5. First reason of the inconsistency. 33
§ 6. Second reason for the inconsistency. 34
§ 7. The sensation of power ought not to be sought in imperfect art. 34
§ 8. Instances in pictures of modern artists. 35
§ 9. Connection between ideas of power and modes of execution. 35
Chapter II.—Of Ideas of Power, as they are dependent upon Execution.
§ 1. Meaning of the term "execution." 36
§ 2. The first quality of execution is truth. 36
§ 3. The second, simplicity. 36
§ 4. The third, mystery. 37
§ 5. The fourth, inadequacy; and the fifth, decision. 37
§ 6. The sixth, velocity. 37
§ 7. Strangeness an illegitimate source of pleasure in execution. 37
§ 8. Yet even the legitimate sources of pleasure in execution are inconsistent with each other. 38
§ 9. And fondness for ideas of power leads to the adoption of the lowest. 39
§ 10. Therefore perilous. 40
§ 11. Recapitulation. 40
Chapter III.—Of the Sublime.
§ 1. Sublimity is the effect upon the mind of anything above it. 41
§ 2. Burke's theory of the nature of the sublime incorrect, and why. 41
§ 3. Danger is sublime, but not the fear of it. 42
§ 4. The highest beauty is sublime. 42
§ 5. And generally whatever elevates the mind. 42
§ 6. The former division of the subject is therefore sufficient. 42