Chapter XIV · (continued 2)

From this point of view, the discordances of which nature offers us the spectacle are singularly weakened. The organized world as a whole becomes as the soil on which was to grow either man himself or a being who morally must resemble him. The animals, however distant they may be from our species, however hostile to it, have none the less been useful traveling companions, on whom consciousness has unloaded whatever encumbrances it was dragging along, and who have enabled it to rise, in man, to heights from which it sees an unlimited horizon open again before it.

Consciousness is distinct from the organism it animates, although it must undergo its vicissitudes. As the possible actions which a state of consciousness indicates are at every instant beginning to be carried out in the nervous centres, the brain underlies at every instant the motor indications of the state of consciousness; but the interdependency of consciousness and brain is limited to this; the destiny of consciousness is not bound up on that account with the destiny of cerebral matter. Finally, consciousness is essentially free; it is freedom itself; but it cannot pass through matter without settling on it, without adapting itself to it: this adaptation is what we call intellectuality; and the intellect, turning itself back towards active, that is to say, free, consciousness, naturally makes it enter into the conceptual forms into which it is accustomed to see matter fit. It will therefore always perceive freedom in the form of necessity; it will always neglect the part of novelty or of creation inherent in the free act; it will always substitute for action itself an imitation artificial, approximative, obtained by compounding the old with the old and the same with the same. Thus, to the eyes of a philosophy that attempts to reabsorb intellect in intuition, many difficulties vanish or become light. But such a doctrine does not only facilitate speculation; it gives us also more power to act and to live. For, with it, we feel ourselves no longer isolated in humanity, humanity no longer seems isolated in the nature that it dominates. As the smallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawn along with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materiality itself, so all organized beings, from the humblest to the highest, from the first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all places, as in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of the movement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All the living hold together, and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.

b. The "Dunkler Drang"[345]

Every glance at the world, to explain which is the task of the philosopher, confirms and proves that will to live, far from being an arbitrary hypostasis or an empty word, is the only true expression of its inmost nature. Everything presses and strives towards existence, if possible organized existence, i.e., life, and after that to the highest possible grade of it. In animal nature it then becomes apparent that will to live is the keynote of its being, its one unchangeable and unconditioned quality. Let anyone consider this universal desire for life, let him see the infinite willingness, facility, and exuberance with which the will to live pressed impetuously into existence under a million forms everywhere and at every moment, by means of fructification and of germs, nay, when these are wanting, by means of generatio aequivoca, seizing every opportunity, eagerly grasping for itself every material capable of life: and then again let him cast a glance at its fearful alarm and wild rebellion when in any particular phenomenon it must pass out of existence; especially when this takes place with distinct consciousness. Then it is precisely the same as if in this single phenomenon the whole world would be annihilated forever, and the whole being of this threatened living thing is at once transformed into the most desperate struggle against death and resistance to it. Look, for example, at the incredible anxiety of a man in danger of his life, the rapid and serious participation in this of every witness of it, and the boundless rejoicing at his deliverance. Look at the rigid terror with which a sentence of death is heard, the profound awe with which we regard the preparations for carrying it out, and the heartrending compassion which seizes us at the execution itself. We would then suppose there was something quite different in question than a few less years of an empty, sad existence, embittered by troubles of every kind, and always uncertain: we would rather be amazed that it was a matter of any consequence whether one attained a few years earlier to the place where after an ephemeral existence he has billions of years to be. In such phenomena, then, it becomes visible that I am right in declaring that the will to live is that which cannot be further explained, but lies at the foundation of all explanations, and that this, far from being an empty word, like the absolute, the infinite, the idea, and similar expressions, is the most real thing we know, nay, the kernel of reality itself.

But if now, abstracting for a while from this interpretation drawn from our inner being, we place ourselves as strangers over against nature, in order to comprehend it objectively, we find that from the grade of organized life upwards it has only one intention—that of the maintenance of the species. To this end it works, through the immense superfluity of germs, through the urgent vehemence of the sexual instinct, through its willingness to adapt itself to all circumstances and opportunities, even to the production of bastards, and through the instinctive maternal affection, the strength of which is so great that in many kinds of animals it even outweighs self-love, so that the mother sacrifices her life in order to preserve that of the young. The individual, on the contrary, has for nature only an indirect value, only so far as it is the means of maintaining the species. Apart from this, its existence is to nature a matter of indifference; indeed nature even leads it to destruction as soon as it has ceased to be useful for this end. Why the individual exists would thus be clear; but why does the species itself exist? That is a question which nature when considered merely objectively cannot answer. For in vain do we seek by contemplating her for an end of this restless striving, this ceaseless pressing into existence, this anxious care for the maintenance of the species. The strength and the time of the individuals are consumed in the effort to procure sustenance for themselves and their young, and are only just sufficient, sometimes even not sufficient, for this. The whole thing, when regarded thus purely objectively, and indeed as extraneous to us, looks as if nature was only concerned that of all her (Platonic) Ideas, i.e., permanent forms, none should be lost. For the individuals are fleeting as the water in the brook; and Ideas, on the contrary, are permanent, like its eddies: but the exhaustion of the water would also do away with the eddies. We would have to stop at this unintelligible view if nature were known to us only from without, thus were given us merely objectively, and we accepted it as it is comprehended by knowledge, and also as sprung from knowledge, i.e., in the sphere of the idea, and were therefore obliged to confine ourselves to this province in solving it. But the case is otherwise, and a glance at any rate is afforded us into the interior of nature; inasmuch as this is nothing else than our own inner being, which is precisely where nature, arrived at the highest grade to which its striving could work itself up, is now by the light of knowledge found directly in self-consciousness. Thus the subjective here gives the key for the exposition of the objective. In order to recognize, as something original and unconditioned, that exceedingly strong tendency of all animals and men to retain life and carry it on as long as possible—a tendency which was set forth above as characteristic of the subjective, or of the will—it is necessary to make clear to ourselves that this is by no means the result of any objective knowledge of the worth of life, but is independent of all knowledge; or, in other words, that those beings exhibit themselves, not as drawn from in front, but as impelled from behind.

If with this intention we first of all review the interminable series of animals, consider the infinite variety of their forms, as they exhibit themselves always differently modified according to their element and manner of life, and also ponder the inimitable ingenuity of their structure and mechanism, which is carried out with equal perfection in every individual; and finally, if we take into consideration the incredible expenditure of strength, dexterity, prudence, and activity which every animal has ceaselessly to make through its whole life; if, approaching the matter more closely, we contemplate the untiring diligence of wretched little ants, the marvellous and ingenious industry of the bees, or observe how a single burying-beetle (Necrophorus vespillo) buries a mole of forty times its own size in two days in order to deposit its eggs in it and insure nourishment for the future brood (Gleditsch, Physik. Bot. Oekon. Abhandl., III, 220), at the same time calling to mind how the life of most insects is nothing but ceaseless labour to prepare food and an abode for the future brood which will arise from their eggs, and which then, after they have consumed the food and passed through the chrysalis state, enter upon life merely to begin again from the beginning the same labour; then also how, like this, the life of the birds is for the most part taken up with their distant and laborious migrations, then with the building of their nests and the collection of food for their brood, which itself has to play the same rôle the following year; and so all work constantly for the future, which afterwards makes bankrupt—then we cannot avoid looking round for the reward of all this skill and trouble, for the end which these animals have before their eyes, which strive so ceaselessly—in short, we are driven to ask: What is the result? What is attained by the animal existence which demands such infinite preparation? And there is nothing to point to but the satisfaction of hunger and the sexual instinct, or in any case a little momentary comfort, as it falls to the lot of each animal individual, now and then in the intervals of its endless need and struggle. Take, for example, the mole, that unwearied worker. To dig with all its might with its enormous shovel claws is the occupation of its whole life; constant night surrounds it; its embryo eyes only make it avoid the light. It alone is truly an animal nocturnum; not cats, owls, and bats, who see by night. But what, now, does it attain by this life, full of trouble and devoid of pleasure? Food and the begetting of its kind; thus only the means of carrying on and beginning anew the same doleful course in new individuals. In such examples it becomes clear that there is no proportion between the cares and troubles of life and the results or gain of it. The consciousness of the world of perception gives a certain appearance of objective worth of existence to the life of those animals which can see, although in their case this consciousness is entirely subjective and limited to the influence of motives upon them. But the blind mole, with its perfect organization and ceaseless activity, limited to the alternation of insect larvae and hunger, makes the disproportion of the means to the end apparent.

Let us now add the consideration of the human race. The matter indeed becomes more complicated, and assumes a certain seriousness of aspect; but the fundamental character remains unaltered. Here also life presents itself by no means as a gift for enjoyment, but as a task, a drudgery to be performed; and in accordance with this we see, in great and small, universal need, ceaseless cares, constant pressure, endless strife, compulsory activity, with extreme exertion of all the powers of body and mind. Many millions, united into nations, strive for the common good, each individual on account of his own; but many thousands fall as a sacrifice for it. Now senseless delusions, now intriguing politics, incite them to wars with each other; then the sweat and the blood of the great multitude must flow, to carry out the ideas of individuals, or to expiate their faults. In peace industry and trade are active, inventions work miracles, seas are navigated, delicacies are collected from all ends of the world, the waves engulf thousands. All strive, some planning, others acting; the tumult is indescribable. But the ultimate aim of it all, what is it? To sustain ephemeral and tormented individuals through a short span of time in the most fortunate ease with endurable want and comparative freedom from pain, which, however, is at once attended with ennui; then the reproduction of this race and its striving. In this evident disproportion between the trouble and the reward, the will to live appears to us from this point of view, if taken objectively, as a fool, or subjectively, as a delusion, seized by which everything living works with the utmost exertion of its strength for something that is of no value. But when we consider it more closely, we shall find here also that it is rather a blind pressure, a tendency entirely without ground or motive.

The law of motivation only extends to the particular actions, not to willing as a whole and in general. It depends upon this, that if we conceive of the human race and its action as a whole and universally, it does not present itself to us, as when we contemplate the particular actions, as a play of puppets who are pulled after the ordinary manner by threads outside them; but from this point of view, as puppets that are set in motion by internal clockwork. For if, as we have done above, one compares the ceaseless, serious, and laborious striving of men with what they gain by it, nay, even with what they ever can gain, the disproportion we have pointed out becomes apparent, for one recognizes that that which is to be gained, taken as the motive power, is entirely insufficient for the explanation of that movement and that ceaseless striving. What, then, is a short postponement of death, a slight easing of misery or deferment of pain, a momentary stilling of desire, compared with such an abundant and certain victory over them all as death? What could such advantages accomplish taken as actual moving causes of a human race, innumerable because constantly renewed, which unceasingly moves, strives, struggles, grieves, writhes, and performs the whole tragi-comedy of the history of the world, nay, what says more than all, perseveres in such a mock-existence as long as each one possibly can? Clearly this is all inexplicable if we seek the moving causes outside the figures and conceive the human race as striving, in consequence of rational reflection, or something analogous to this (as moving threads), after those good things held out to it, the attainment of which would be a sufficient reward for its ceaseless cares and troubles. The matter being taken thus, everyone would rather have long ago said, "Le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle," and have gone out. But, on the contrary, everyone guards and defends his life, like a precious pledge entrusted to him under heavy responsibility, under infinite cares and abundant misery, even under which life is tolerable. The wherefore and the why, the reward for this, certainly he does not see; but he has accepted the worth of that pledge without seeing it, upon trust and faith, and does not know what it consists in. Hence I have said that these puppets are not pulled from without, but each bears in itself the clockwork from which its movements result. This is the will to live, manifesting itself as an untiring machine, an irrational tendency, which has not its sufficient reason in the external world. It holds the individuals firmly upon the scene, and is the primum mobile of their movements; while the external objects, the motives, only determine their direction in the particular case; otherwise the cause would not be at all suitable to the effect. For, as every manifestation of a force of nature has a cause, but the force of nature itself none, so every particular act of will has a motive, but the will in general has none: indeed at bottom these two are one and the same. The will, as that which is metaphysical, is everywhere the boundary-stone of every investigation, beyond which it cannot go. We often see a miserable figure, deformed and shrunk with age, want, and disease, implore our help from the bottom of his heart for the prolongation of an existence, the end of which would necessarily appear altogether desirable if it were an objective judgment that determined here. Thus instead of this it is the blind will, appearing as the tendency to life, the love of life, and the sense of life; it is the same which makes the plants grow. This sense of life may be compared to a rope which is stretched above the puppet show of the world of men, and on which the puppets hang by invisible threads, while apparently they are supported only by the ground beneath them (the objective value of life). But if the rope becomes weak the puppet sinks; if it breaks the puppet must fall, for the ground beneath it only seemed to support it: i.e., the weakening of that love of life shows itself as hypochondria, spleen, melancholy: its entire exhaustion as the inclination to suicide. And as with the persistence in life, so is it also with its action and movement. This is not something freely chosen; but while everyone would really gladly rest, want and ennui are the whips that keep the top spinning. Therefore everything is in continual strain and forced movement, and the course of the world goes on, to use an expression of Aristotle's (De coelo ii. 13), "ου φυσει, αλλα βια" (motu, non naturali sed molento). Men are only apparently drawn from in front; really they are pushed from behind; it is not life that tempts them on, but necessity that drives them forward. The law of motivation is, like all causality, merely the form of the phenomenon.

In all these considerations, then, it becomes clear to us that the will to live is not a consequence of the knowledge of life, is in no way a conclusio ex praemissis, and in general is nothing secondary. Rather, it is that which is first and unconditioned, the premiss of all premisses, and just on that account that from which philosophy must start, for the will to live does not appear in consequence of the world, but the world in consequence of the will to live.

III. INVESTIGATIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. Progress and Social Research

The problem of progress comes back finally to the problem of the ultimate good. If the world is getting better, measured by this ultimate standard, then there is progress. If it is growing worse, then there is retrogression. But in regard to the ultimate good there is no agreement. What is temporary gain may be ultimate loss. What is one man's evil may be, and often seems to be, another man's good. In the final analysis what seems evil may turn out to be good and what seems good may be an eventual evil. But this is a problem in philosophy which sociology is not bound to solve before it undertakes to describe society. It does not even need to discuss it. Sociology, just as any other natural science, accepts the current values of the community. The physician, like the social worker, assumes that health is a social value. With this as a datum his studies are directed to the discovery of the nature and causes of diseases, and to the invention of devices for curing them. There is just as much, and no more, reason for a sociologist to formulate a doctrine of social progress as there is for the physician to do so. Both are concerned with specific problems for which they are seeking specific remedies.

If there are social processes and predictable forms of change in society, then there are methods of human intervention in the processes of society, methods of controlling these processes in the interest of the ends of human life, methods of progress in other words. If there are no intelligible or describable social processes, then there may be progress, but there will be no sociology and no methods of progress. We can only hope and pray.

It is not impossible to formulate a definition of progress which does not assume the perfectibility of mankind, which does not regard progress as a necessity, and which does not assume to say with finality what has happened or is likely to happen to humanity as a whole.[346]

Progress may be considered as the addition to the sum of accumulated experience, tradition, and technical devices organized for social efficiency. This is at once a definition of progress and of civilization, in which civilization is the sum of social efficiencies and progress consists of the units (additions) of which it is composed. Defined in these terms, progress turns out to be a relative, local, temporal, and secular phenomenon. It is possible, theoretically at least, to compare one community with another with respect to their relative efficiency and their relative progress in efficiency, just as we can compare one institution with another in respect to its efficiency and progress. It is even possible to measure the progress of humanity in so far as humanity can be said to be organized for social action.

This is in fact the point of view which sociologists have adopted as soon as progress ceased to be, for sociology, a matter of definition and became a matter of observation and research. Score cards for neighborhoods and for rural communities have already been devised.[347]

2. Indices of Progress

A few years ago, Walter F. Willcox, in an article "A Statistician's Idea of Progress," sought to define certain indices of social progress which would make it possible to measure progress statistically. "If progress be merely a subjective term," he admitted, "statistics can throw no light upon it because all such ends as happiness, or self-realization, or social service are incapable of statistical measurement." Statistics works with indices, characteristics which are accessible to measurement but are "correlated with some deeper immeasurable characteristic." Mr. Willcox took as his indices of progress:

Certainly these indices, like uniformity, are mere temporary measures of progress, since diversity in the population is not per se an evil. It becomes so only when the diversities in the community are so great as to endanger its solidarity. Applying his indices to the United States, Mr. Willcox sums up the result as follows:

The net result is to indicate for the United States a rapid increase of population and probable increase in length of life, and increase in racial uniformity and perhaps in uniformity of other sorts connected with immigration, and at the same time a decrease in uniformity in the stability and social serviceability of family life. Some of these indications look towards progress, others look towards retrogression. As they cannot be reduced to any common denominator, the statistical method is unable to answer the question with which we started.[348]

The securing of indices which will measure satisfactorily even such social values as are generally accepted is difficult. The problem of giving each index in the series a value or weight in proportion to the value of all the others is still more difficult. This statement, at any rate, illustrates the procedure and the method.

The whole subject of numerical indices for the measurement of civilization and progress has recently been discussed in a little volume by Alfredo Niceforo,[349] professor in the School of Criminal Law at Rome. He proposes as indices of progress:

1. The increase in wealth and in the consumption of goods, and the diminution of the mortality rate. These are evidences of material progress.

2. The diffusion of culture, and "when it becomes possible to measure it," the productivity of men of genius. This is the measure of intellectual superiority.

3. Moral progress he would measure in terms of crime.

4. There remains the social and political organization, which he would measure in terms of the increase and decrease of individual liberty.

In all these attempts to measure the progress of the community the indices have invariably shown progression in some direction, retrogression in others.

From the point of view of social research the problem of progress is mainly one of getting devices that will measure all the different factors of progress and of estimating the relative value of different factors in the progress of the community.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. THE DEFINITION OF PROGRESS

(1) Dewey, John. "Progress," International Journal of Ethics, XXVI (1916), 311-22.

(2) Bury, J. B. The Idea of Progress. An inquiry into its origin and growth. London, 1921.

(3) Bryce, James. "What is Progress?" Atlantic Monthly, C (1907), 145-56.

(4) Todd, A. J. Theories of Social Progress. A critical attempt to formulate the conditions of human advance. New York, 1918.

(5) Woods, E. B. "Progress as a Sociological Concept," American Journal of Sociology, XII (1906-7), 779-821.

(6) Cooley, Charles H. The Social Process. Chap, xxvii, "The Sphere of Pecuniary Valuation," pp. 309-28. New York, 1918.

(7) Mackenzie, J. S. "The Idea of Progress," International Journal of Ethics, IX (1899), 195-213.

(8) Bergson, H. Creative Evolution. New York, 1911.

(9) Frobenius, L. Die Weltanschauung der Naturvölker. Weimar, 1899.

(10) Inge, W. R. The Idea of Progress. The Romanes Lecture, 1920. Oxford, 1920.

(11) Balfour, Arthur J. Arthur James Balfour, as Philosopher and Thinker. A collection of the more important and interesting passages in his non-political writings, speeches, and addresses, 1879-1912. Selected and arranged by Wilfrid M. Short. "Progress," pp. 413-35. London and New York, 1912.

(12) Carpenter, Edward. Civilization, Its Cause and Cure. And other essays. New and enlarged ed. London and New York, 1917.

(13) Nordau, Max S. The Interpretation of History. Translated from the German by M. A. Hamilton. Chap viii, "The Question of Progress." New York, 1911.

(14) Sorel, Georges. Les Illusions du progrès. 2d ed. Paris, 1911.

(15) Allier, R. "Pessimisme et civilisation," Revue Encyclopédique, V (1895), 70-73.

(16) Simmel, Georg. "Moral Deficiencies as Determining Intellectual Functions," International Journal of Ethics, III (1893), 490-507.

(17) Delvaille, Jules. Essai sur histoire de l'idée de progrès jusq'à la fin du 18ième siècle. Paris, 1910.

(18) Sergi, G. "Qualche idea sul progresso umano," Rivista italiana di sociologia, XVII (1893), 1-8.

(19) Barth, Paul. "Die Frage des sittlichen Fortschritts der Menschheit," Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, XXIII (1899), 75-116.

(20) Lankester, E. Ray. Degeneration. A chapter in Darwinism, and parthenogenesis. Humboldt Library of Science. New York. 18—.

(21) Lloyd, A.H. "The Case of Purpose against Fate in History," American Journal of Sociology, XVII (1911-12), 491-511.

(22) Case, Clarence M. "Religion and the Concept of Progress," Journal of Religion, I (1921), 160-73.

(23) Reclus, E. "The Progress of Mankind," Contemporary Review, LXX (1896), 761-83.

(24) Bushee, F. A. "Science and Social Progress," Popular Science Monthly, LXXIX (1911), 236-51.

(25) Jankelevitch, S. "Du Rôle des idées dans l'évolution des sociétés," Revue philosophique, LXVI (1908), 256-80.

II. HISTORY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY AND PROGRESS

(1) Condorcet, Marquis de. History of the Progress of the Human Mind. London, 1795.

(2) Comte, Auguste. The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte. (Translated from the French by Harriet Martineau) Book VI, chap, ii, vi. 2d ed. 2 vols. London, 1875-90.

(3) Caird, Edward. The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte. 2d ed. Glasgow and New York, 1893.

(4) Buckle, Henry Thomas. History of Civilization in England. 2 vols. From 2d London ed. New York, 1903.

(5) Condorcet, Marie J.A.C. Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain. 2 vols in one. Paris, 1902.

(6) Harris, George. Civilization Considered as a Science. In relation to its essence, its elements, and its end. London, 1861.

(7) Lamprecht, Karl. Alte und neue Richtungen in der Geschichtswissenschaft. Berlin, 1896.

(8) ——. "Individualität, Idee und sozialpsychische Kraft in der Geschichte," Jahrbücher für National-Ökonomie und Statistik, XIII (1897), 880-900.

(9) Barth, Paul. Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie. Erster Teil, "Einleitung und kritische Übersicht." Leipzig, 1897.

(10) Rickert, Heinrich. Die Grenzen der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung. Leipzig, 1902.

(11) Simmel, Georg. Die Problems der Geschichtsphilosophie. Eine erkenntnistheoretische Studie. 2d ed. Leipzig, 1905.

(12) Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation. 8th ed. New York and London, 1900.

(13) Letelier, Valentin. La Evoluçion de la historia. 2d ed. 2 vols. Santiago de Chile, 1900.

(14) Teggart, Frederick J. The Processes of History. New Haven, 1918.

(15) Znaniecki, Florian. Cultural Reality. Chicago, 1919.

(16) Hibben, J. G. "The Philosophical Aspects of Evolution," Philosophical Review, XIX (1910), 113-36.

(17) Bagehot, Walter. Physics and Politics. Or thoughts on the application of the principles of "natural selection" and "inheritance" to political society. Chap. vi, "Verifiable Progress Politically Considered," pp. 205-24. New York, 1906.

(18) Crawley, A. E. "The Unconscious Reason in Social Evolution," Sociological Review, VI (1913), 236-41.

(19) Froude, James A. "Essay on Progress," Short Studies on Great Subjects. 2d Ser. II, 245-79, 4 vols. New York, 1888-91.

(20) Morley, John. "Some Thoughts on Progress," Educational Review, XXIX (1905), 1-17.

III. EVOLUTION AND PROGRESS

(1) Spencer, Herbert. "Progress, Its Law and Cause," Westminster Review, LXVII (1857), 445-85. [Reprinted in Everyman's edition of his Essays, pp. 153-97. New York, 1866.]

(2) Federici, Romolo. Les Lois du Progrès. II, 32-35, 44, 127, 136, 146-47, 158 ff., 223, etc. 2 vols. Paris, 1888-91.

(3) Baldwin, James Mark. Development and Evolution. Including psychophysical evolution, evolution by orthoplasy, and the theory of genetic modes. New York, 1902.

(4) Adams, Brooks. The Law of Civilization and Decay. An essay on history. New York and London, 1903.

(5) Kidd, Benjamin. Principles of Western Civilization. London, 1902.

(6) ——. Social Evolution. New ed. New York and London, 1896.

(7) Müller-Lyer, F. Phasen der Kultur und Richtungslinien des Fortschritts. Soziologische Überblicke. München, 1908.

(8) McGee, W. J. "The Trend of Human Progress," American Anthropologist, N. S., I (1899), 401-47.

(9) Carver, Thomas N. Sociology and Social Progress. A handbook for students of sociology. Boston, 1905.

(10) Weber, L. Le Rythme du progrès. Étude sociologique. Paris, 1913.

(11) Baldwin, J. Mark. Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development. Chap. xiv. "Social Progress," pp. 537-50. New York, 1906.

(12) Kropotkin, P. Mutual Aid. A factor of evolution. London, 1902.

(13) Wallace, Alfred R. Social Environment and Moral Progress. London and New York, 1913.

(14) Freeman, R. Austin. Social Decay and Regeneration. With an introduction by Havelock Ellis. Boston, 1921.

IV. EUGENICS AND PROGRESS

(1) Galton, Francis, and others. "Eugenics, Its Scope and Aims," American Journal of Sociology, X (1904-5), 1-25.

(2) Saleeby, Caleb W. The Progress of Eugenics. London, 1914.

(3) Ellis, Havelock. The Problem of Race Regeneration. New York, 1911.

(4) Pearson, Karl. National Life from the Standpoint of Science. 2d ed. London, 1905.

(5) Saleeby, Caleb W. Methods of Race Regeneration. New York, 1911.

(6) Davenport, C. B. Heredity in Relation to Eugenics. New York, 1911.

(7) Demoor, Massart, et Vandervelde. L'Évolution régressive en biologie et en sociologie. Paris, 1897.

(8) Thomson, J. Arthur. "Eugenics and War," Eugenics Review, VII (1915-16), 1-14.

(9) Southard, E. E. "Eugenics vs. Cacogenics," Journal of Heredity, V (1914), 408-14.

(10) Conn, Herbert W. Social Heredity and Social Evolution. The other side of eugenics. Cincinnati, 1914.

(11) Popenoe, Paul, and Johnson, R. H. Applied Eugenics. New York, 1918.

(12) Kelsey, Carl. "Influence of Heredity and Environment upon Race Improvement," Annals of the American Academy, XXXIV (1909) 3-8.

(13) Ward, L. F. "Eugenics, Euthenics and Eudemics," American Journal of Sociology, XVIII (1912-13), 737-54.

V. PROGRESS AND THE MORAL ORDER

(1) Harrison, Frederic. Order and Progress. London, 1875.

(2) Hobhouse, Leonard T. Social Evolution and Political Theory. Chaps, i, ii, vii, pp. 1-39; 149-65. New York, 1911.

(3) ——. Morals in Evolution. A study in comparative ethics. 2 vols. New York, 1906.

(4) Alexander, Samuel. Moral Order and Progress. An analysis of ethical conceptions. 2d ed. London, 1891.

(5) Chapin, F. S. "Moral Progress," Popular Science Monthly, LXXXVI (1915), 467-71.

(6) Keller, Albert G. Societal Evolution. New York, 1915.

(7) Dellepiane, A. "Le Progrès et sa formule. La lutte pour le progrès," Revue Internationale de sociologie, XX (1912), 1-30.

(8) Burgess, Ernest W. The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution. Chicago, 1916.

(9) Ellwood, C. A. "The Educational Theory of Social Progress," Scientific Monthly, V (1917), 439-50.

(10) Bosanquet, Helen. "The Psychology of Social Progress," International Journal of Ethics, VII (1896-97), 265-81.

(11) Perry, Ralph Barton. The Moral Economy. Chap, iv, "The Moral Test of Progress," pp. 123-70. New York, 1909.

(12) Patten, S. N. "Theories of Progress," American Economic Review, II (1912), 61-68.

(13) Alexander, H. B. "The Belief in God and Immortality as Factors in Race Progress." Hibbert Journal, IX (1910-11), 169-87.

VI. UTOPIAS

(1) Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated into English by Benjamin Jowett. 2 vols. Oxford, 1908.

(2) More, Thomas. The "Utopia" of Sir Thomas More. Ralph Robinson's translation, with Roper's "Life of More" and some of his letters. London, 1910.

(3) Ideal Commonwealths. Comprising More's "Utopia," Bacon's "New Atlantis," Campanella's "City of the Sun," and Harrington's "Oceana," with introductions by Henry Morley. Rev. ed. New York, 1901.

(4) Kaufmann, Moritz. Utopias, or Schemes of Social Improvement. From Sir Thomas More to Karl Marx. London, 1879.

(5) Bacon, Francis. New Atlantis. Oxford, 1915.

(6) Campanella, Tommaso. La città di sole e aforasmi politici. Lanciana, Carabba, 19—.

(7) Andreä, Johann V. Christianopolis. An ideal state of the seventeenth century. Translated from the Latin by T. E. Held. New York, 1916.

(8) Harrington, James. The Oceana of James Harrington. London, 1700.

(9) Mandeville, Bernard de. Fable of the Bees. Or private vices, public benefits. Edinburgh, 1772. [First published in 1714.]

(10) Cabet, Étienne. Voyage en Icarie. 5th ed. Paris, 1848.

(11) Butler, Samuel. Erewhon: or over the Range. New York, 1917. [First published in 1872.]

(12) ——. Erewhon Revisited Twenty Years Later. New York, 1901.

(13) Lytton, Edward Bulwer. The Coming Race. London, 1871.

(14) Bellamy, Edward. Looking Backward, 2000-1887. Boston, 1898.

(15) Morris, William. News from Nowhere. Or an epoch of rest, being some chapters from a utopian romance. New York, 1910. [First published in 1891.]

(16) Hertzka, Theodor. Freeland. A social anticipation. New York, 1891.

(17) Wells, H. G. A Modern Utopia. New York, 1905.

(18) ——. New Worlds for Old. New York, 1908.

VII. PROGRESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE

(1) Crozier, John B. Civilization and Progress. 3d ed., pp. 366-440. London and New York, 1892.

(2) Obolensky, L. E. ["Self-Consciousness of Classes in Social Progress"] Voprosy filosofii i psichologuïi, VII (1896), 521-51. [Short review in Revue philosophique, XLIV (1897), 106.]

(3) Mallock, William H. Aristocracy and Evolution. A study of the rights, the origin, and the social functions of the wealthier classes. London, 1898.

(4) Tenney, E. P. Contrasts in Social Progress. New York, 1907.

(5) Hall, Arthur C. Crime in Its Relations to Social Progress. New York, 1902.

(6) Hughes, Charles E. Conditions of Progress in a Democratic Government. New Haven, 1910.

(7) Parmelee, Maurice. Poverty and Social Progress. Chaps. vi-vii. New York, 1916.

(8) George, Henry. Progress and Poverty. Book X, chap. iii. New York, 1899.

(9) Nasmyth, George. Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory. New York, 1916.

(10) Harris, George. Inequality and Progress. New York, 1897.

(11) Irving, L. "The Drama as a Factor in Social Progress," Fortnightly Review, CII (1914), 268-74.

(12) Salt, Henry S. Animal Rights Considered in Relation to Social Progress. New York, 1894.

(13) Delabarre, Frank A. "Civilisation and Its Effects on Morbidity and Mortality," Journal of Sociologic Medicine, XIX (1918), 220-23.

(14) Knopf, S. A. "The Effects of Civilisation on the Morbidity and Mortality of Tuberculosis," Journal of Sociologic Medicine, XX (1919), 5-15.

(15) Giddings, Franklin H. "The Ethics of Social Progress," in the collection Philanthropy and Social Progress. Seven essays ... delivered before the School of Applied Ethics at Plymouth, Mass., during the session of 1892. With introduction by Professor Henry C. Adams. New York and Boston, 1893.

(16) Morgan, Alexander. Education and Social Progress. Chaps. vi, ix-xxi. London and New York, 1916.

(17) Butterfield, K. L. Chapters in Rural Progress. Chicago, 1908.

(18) Robertson, John M. The Economics of Progress. New York, 1918.

(19) Willcox, Walter F. "A Statistician's Idea of Progress," International Journal of Ethics, XXIII (1913), 275-98.

(20) Zueblin, Charles. American Municipal Progress. Rev. ed. New York, 1916.

(21) Niceforo, Alfredo. Les Indices numérique de la civilisation et du progrès. Paris, 1921.

(22) Todd, A. J. Theories of Social Progress. Chap, vii, "The Criteria of Progress," pp. 113-53. New York, 1918.

TOPICS FOR WRITTEN THEMES

1. The History of the Concept of Progress

2. Popular Notions of Progress

3. The Natural History of Progress: Evolution of Physical and Mental Traits, Economic Progress, Moral Development, Intellectual Development, Social Evolution

4. Stages of Progress: Determined by Type of Control over Nature, Type of Social Organization, Type of Communication, etc.

5. Score Cards and Scales for Grading Communities and Neighborhoods

6. Progress as Wish-Fulfilment: an Analysis of Utopias

7. Criteria or Indices of Progress: Physical, Mental, Intellectual, Economic, Moral, Social, etc.

8. Progress as an Incident of the Cosmic Process

9. Providence versus Progress

10. Happiness as the Goal of Progress

11. Progress as Social Change

12. Progress as Social Evolution

13. Progress as Social Control

14. Progress and the Science of Eugenics

15. Progress and Socialization

16. Control through Eugenics, Education, and Legislation

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. What do you understand by progress?

2. How do you explain the fact that the notion of progress originated?

3. What is the relation of change to progress?

4. What is Spencer's law of evolution? Is it an adequate generalization? What is its value?

5. Why do we speak of "stages of progress"?

6. To what extent has progress been a result (a) of eugenics, (b) of tradition?

7. What do you understand by progress as (a) a historical process, and (b) increase in the content of civilization?

8. What is the relation of progress to happiness?

9. "We have confused rapidity of change with progress." Explain.

10. "Progress is not automatic." Elaborate your position with reference to this statement.

11. What is the relation of prevision to progress?

12. Do you believe that mankind can control and determine progress?

13. "Our expectations of limitless progress cannot depend upon the deliberate action of national governments." Contrast this statement of Balfour with the statement of Dewey.

14. "A community founded on argument would dissolve into its constituent elements." Discuss this statement.

15. What is Galton's conception of progress?

16. What would you say to the possibility or the impossibility of the suggestion of eugenics becoming a religious dogma as suggested by Galton?

17. What is the relation, as conceived by the eugenists, as between germ plasm and culture?

18. Is progress dependent upon change in human nature?

19. How are certain persistent traits of human nature related to progress?

20. What is meant by the statement that progress is in the mores?

21. What are the different types of progress analyzed by Bryce? Has advance in each of them been uniform in the last one thousand years?

22. Does war make for or against progress?

23. What is the relation of freedom to progress?

24. What place has the myth in progress?

25. To what extent is progress as a process of realizing values a matter of temperament, of optimism, and of pessimism?

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