Book 16 — APPENDIX. (continued 3)

“Had the dictates of his vigorous mind and enterprising spirit been duly listened to within, the defence would have been more active and more brilliant.”

SECTION 5. (Extracts.) Lord Wellington to lord Liverpool.

“January 9, 1812.

“From the accounts which I have received of the place (Tarifa) it appears to me quite impossible to defend it, when the enemy will be equipped to attack it. The utmost that can be done is to hold the island contiguous to Tarifa; for which object colonel Skerrett’s detachment does not appear to be necessary. I don’t believe that the enemy will be able to obtain possession of the island, without which the town will be entirely useless to them, and, indeed, if they had the island as well as the town, I doubt their being able to retain these possessions, adverting to the means of attacking them with which general Ballesteros might be supplied by the garrison of Gibraltar, unless they should keep a force in the field in their neighbourhood to protect them.”

Lord Wellington to major-general Cooke.

“February 1, 1812.

“Sir,—I have omitted to answer your letters of the 27th December and of the 7th January, relating to the correspondence which you had had, with the governor of Gibraltar, upon the conditional orders, which you had given colonel Skerrett to withdraw from Tarifa, because I conclude that you referred that correspondence to the secretary of state with whom alone it rests to decide whether it was your duty to recal colonel Skerrett, and whether you performed that duty at a proper period, and under circumstances which rendered it expedient that you should give colonel Skerrett the orders in question. From the report of colonel Skerrett and Lord Proby, and other information which I had received respecting Tarifa, I concurred in the orders that you gave to colonel Skerrett, and my opinion on that subject is not at all changed by what has occurred since. We have a right to expect that his majesty’s officers and troops will perform their duty upon every occasion; but we have no right to expect that comparatively a small number would be able to hold the town of Tarifa, commanded as it is at short distances, and enfiladed in every direction, and unprovided with artillery and the walls scarcely cannon proof. The enemy, however, retired with disgrace infinitely to the honour of the brave troops who defended Tarifa, and it is useless to renew the discussion. It is necessary, however, that you should now come to an understanding with general Campbell regarding the troops which have been detached from Cadiz and this army under colonel Skerrett.”

Ditto to Ditto.

“February 25, 1812.

“I have already, in my letter of the 1st instant, stated to you my opinion regarding Tarifa, I do not think that captain Smith’s letter throws new light upon the subject. The island appears still to be the principal point to defend, and the easiest to be defended at a small expense and risk of loss. Whether the town and the hill of Santa Catalina can be made subservient to the defence of the island depends upon circumstances upon which it would be possible to decide only by having a local knowledge of the place. It is very clear to me, however, that the enemy will not attack Tarifa in this spring, and that you will not be called upon to furnish troops to garrison that place so soon as you expect. If you should be called upon either by the Spanish government or by the governor of Gibraltar you must decide the question according to the suggestions which I made to you in my despatch of the 15th instant. If you should send a detachment from Cadiz at the desire of the Spanish government for purposes connected with the operations of general Ballesteros, I conceive that the governor of Gibraltar has nothing to say to such detachments, if you should send one to Tarifa at the desire of the governor of Gibraltar, or of the Spanish government, it is better not to discuss the question whether the detachment shall or shall not obey the orders of the governor of Gibraltar. He has occupied Tarifa permanently, and he is about to improve the defences of the place which he conceives to be under his orders; but, according to all the rules of his majesty’s service, the senior officer should command the whole. I have nothing to say to the division of the command of the island and town of Tarifa, which I conclude has been settled by the governor of Gibraltar.”

Extract from the notes of an officer engaged in the siege.

“Though the duke of Wellington yielded to the opinions and wishes of general Cooke, colonel Skerrett, and lord Proby, yet his characteristic and never failing sagacity seems to have suggested to him a fear or a fancy, that part of the case was kept concealed. A local knowledge was necessary, not only to judge of the relation and reciprocal defences and capabilities of the town and island, but to estimate the vast importance of the post, the necessity in fact of its possession. It was my impression then, and it amounts to conviction now, that the island, particularly during the winter, half fortified as it was, and totally destitute of shelter from bombardment or from weather, could not have been maintained against an enemy in possession of the town, the suburb, and the neighbouring heights. But even if it had, by means of British bravery, resolution, and resource, been provisioned and defended, still the original and principal objects of its occupation would have been altogether frustrated, namely, the command and embarkation of supplies for Cadiz and the fostering of the patriotic flame. It is demonstrable that, had the duke of Dalmatia once become possessor of the old walls of Tarifa, every city, village, fort, and watch-tower on the Andalusian coast, would soon have displayed the banner of king Joseph, and the struggle in the south of Spain was over.”

General Campbell to lord Liverpool.

“Gibraltar, April 2, 1812.

“My Lord,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship’s letter of the 8th of February last, and I beg leave to refer your lordship to the documents herewith, particularly to the report of captain Smith, royal engineers, which I trust will prove that the defence of the town of Tarifa was not taken up on slight grounds, and that the detachment from Cadiz under the orders of colonel Skerrett, together with the troops from hence which formed the garrison of the town, were never in any danger of being cut off, as their retreat would have been covered by the castle of the Guzmans, the redoubt of Santa Catalina, and the island; the two first of these points being connected by a field-work, and the whole mounting twenty-nine pieces of cannon and mortars exclusively of what remained in the town: the enemy’s batteries being completely kept in check during such an operation by the island and the castle of the Guzmans. My lord, colonel Skerrett stood alone in his opinion respecting this post, and in direct opposition to my own and that of captain Smith, royal engineers, who is considered by his corps as an officer of first-rate professional abilities. Major-general Cooke must therefore have acted on the reports of the colonel when he authorised him to abandon his post, for the major-general was unacquainted with its resources: besides, my lord, I had a right to expect that troops sent to that point to assist in its defence should not be withdrawn without my consent. Had the place been lost, my lord, by such misrepresentation, it would have been attributed to any other than the real cause, and the odium would have been fixed upon me, as having taken up the position; I am happy, however, that its capability has been proved whilst it remained under my orders, and that by interposing my authority the valuable possession of Tarifa has been saved from the grasp of the enemy. I was besides deeply concerned in the fate of the place; a great quantity of military stores and provision having been embarked on that service by my authority, from a conviction that they were fully protected by this additional force.

“After the execution of a service, my lord, from which I concluded I was entitled to some consideration, it is no small mortification for me to find that my conduct should be deemed questionable; but I flatter myself that if the government of his royal highness the prince regent will do me the justice to read the annexed papers, they will perceive that if I had done less his majesty’s arms must have been dishonoured. In regard to the assumption of command on that occasion, I have only to observe that, considering the post of Tarifa as a dependency of Gibraltar, having occupied it exclusively for these two years past, and that a commandant and staff were appointed from my recommendation, with salaries annexed, and this with the approbation of both governments, these circumstances, added to what I have seen on similar occasions, put it past a doubt in my mind, and colonel Skerrett having applied to me for ‘precise orders,’ shows that he was aware that such was the case. If, my lord, I ever had a right to exercise an authority over the post of Tarifa from what I have stated, the entry of troops from another quarter, unless actually commanded by an officer senior to myself, could not, according to the custom of our service, deprive me of it; and I have heard that the case has been referred to lord Wellington, who was of the same opinion. This, however, I only take the liberty to advance in justification of my conduct, and not in opposition to the opinion formed by the government of his royal highness the prince regent. I trust, therefore, I shall be excused in the eyes of government in declaring, without reserve, that if I had not retained the command the place would not now be in our possession, and the wants of our enemies would have been completely supplied by its affording a free communication with the states of Barbary. I have the honour to report that I have made the necessary communication with major-general Cooke, in consequence of its being the wish of government that Tarifa shall be occupied by troops from Cadiz. The major-general informs me, in answer thereto, that he has communicated with lord Wellington, as he has not received orders to that effect, nor has he the means at present to make the detachment required, and your lordship is aware that I have it not in my power to reinforce that post in case of need.” &c. &c.————P.S. “Should your lordship wish any further information with respect to that post, it will be found on referring to my report made after I had visited Tarifa, where commodore Penrose and colonel sir Charles Holloway, royal engineers, accompanied me.”

Extract from captain C. F. Smith’s report.

“Tarifa, December 14, 1811.

“I do not hesitate to declare that I place the utmost reliance on the resources of the place, and consider them as such as ought to make a good and ultimately successful defence.”

Ditto ditto.

“December 24, 1811.

“My opinion respecting the defences of this post is unalterable, and must ever remain so,—that till the island is more independent in itself, there is a necessity of fairly defending the town as an outwork.”

No. VII. STORMING OF CIUDAD RODRIGO AND BADAJOS.

[The anonymous extracts are taken from the memoirs and journals of officers engaged in, or eye-witnesses of the action described. The Roman characters mark different sources of information.]

SECTION 1.—CIUDAD RODRIGO. A.

“The duke of Wellington, standing on the top of some ruins of the convent of Francisco, pointed out to colonel Colborne and to major Napier,[2] commanding the storming-party of the light division, the spot where the small breach was. Having done this, he said, ‘Now do you understand exactly the way you are to take so as to arrive at the breach without noise or confusion?’ He was answered, ‘Yes, perfectly.’ Some one of the staff then said to major Napier, ‘Why don’t you load?’ He answered, ‘No, if we can’t do the business without loading we shall not do it at all.’ The duke of Wellington immediately said, ‘Leave him alone.’

————“The caçadores under colonel Elder were to carry hay-bags to throw into the ditch, but the signal of attack having been given, and the fire commencing at the great breach, the stormers would not wait for the hay-bags, which, from some confusion in the orders delivered, had not yet arrived; but from no fault of colonel Elder or his gallant regiment; they were always ready for and equal to any thing they were ordered to do.

“The troops jumped into the ditch; the ‘fausse braye’ was faced with stone, so as to form a perpendicular wall about the centre of the ditch; it was scaled, and the foot of the breach was attained. Lieutenant Gurwood had gone too far to his left with the forlorn hope, and missed the entrance of the breach; he was struck down with a wound on the head, but sprang up again, and joined major Napier, captain Jones 52d regt., Mitchell 95th, Ferguson 43d, and some other officers, who at the head of the stormers were all going up the breach together.”

————“Colonel Colborne, although very badly wounded in the shoulder, formed the fifty-second on the top of the rampart, and led them against the enemy.”

“The great breach was so strongly barricaded, so fiercely defended, that the third division had not carried it, and were still bravely exerting every effort to force their way through the obstacles when colonel M‘Leod of the forty-third poured a heavy flank fire upon the enemy defending it.”

FOOTNOTE:

B.

“The third division having commenced firing, we were obliged to hurry to the attack. The forlorn hope led, we advanced rapidly across the glacis and descended into the ditch near the ravelin, under a heavy fire. We found the forlorn hope placing ladders against the face of the work, and our party turned towards them, when the engineer officer called out, ‘You are wrong, this is the way to the breach, or the fausse braye which leads to the breach you are to attack.’”

————“We ascended the breach of the fausse braye, and then the breach of the body of the place, without the aid of ladders.”

————“We were for a short time on the breach before we forced the entrance. A gun was stretched across the entrance, but did not impede our march. Near it some of the enemy were bayonetted, amongst the number some deserters, who were found in arms defending the breach.”

————“Major Napier was wounded at the moment when the men were checked by the heavy fire and determined resistance of the enemy about two-thirds up the ascent. It was then that the soldiers, forgetting they were not loaded, as the major had not permitted them, snapped all their firelocks.”

————“No individual could claim being the first that entered the breach; it was a simultaneous rush of about twenty or thirty. The forlorn hope was thrown in some degree behind, being engaged in fixing ladders against the face of the work, which they mistook for the point of attack.

“Upon carrying the breach, the parties moved as before directed by major Napier; that is, the fifty-second to the left, the forty-third to the right. The forty-third cleared the ramparts to the right, and drove the enemy from the places they attempted to defend, until it arrived near the great breach at a spot where the enemy’s defences were overlooked. At this time the great breach had not been carried, and was powerfully defended by the enemy. The houses being on it were loop-holed, and a deep trench lined with musketry bearing directly upon it; the flanks of the breach were cut off, and the descent into the town from the ramparts at the top of it appeared considerable, so as to render it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to force it without some other aid than a front attack.”

————“The moment the light division storming-party arrived at the spot described, they opened a heavy enfilading fire of musketry upon the trench, which was the main defence of the great breach, and drove the enemy from it with the aid of the storming-party of the third division that now entered. I was wounded at this time, and retired a short way back on the rampart, when I saw the first explosion on the rampart near the great breach. It was in my opinion next to impossible, as I have said before, to force the great breach by a front attack as long as the enemy held their defences, but the moment the light division turned their defences the breach was instantly carried.”

Abstract of the journal of general Harvey, Portuguese service.

“I stood on rising ground and watched the progress of the attack. The great breach was attacked first. At the top of it the third division opened their fire heavily, and it was returned heavily, but there was a distressing pause. The small breach was carried first, and there was one considerable explosion and two or three smaller ones on the ramparts.”

SECTION 2. BADAJOS.—ASSAULT OF PICURINA. C.

“An engineer officer, who led the attack, told me, two days after, ‘that the place never would have been taken had it not been for the intelligence of these men (a detachment from the light division) in absolutely walking round the fort, and finding out the gate, which was literally beaten down by them, and they entered at the point of the bayonet. Lieutenant Nixon of the fifty-second was shot through the body by a Frenchman a yard or two inside the gate.’”

D. ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.

“For the descent of the light and fourth division into the ditch only five ladders were placed, and those five ladders were close to each other. The advance (or storming-party) of the eighth division preceded that of the fourth division, and I believe that no part of the fourth division was up in time to suffer from the first great explosion, and the storming-party only had entered when that explosion took place; but observe that although the advance of the light division preceded the advance of the fourth division, I only mean by that, that the head of the light division entered the ditch sooner than the head of the fourth division, for the main bodies of the two divisions joined at the ladders, and were descending into the ditch at the same time.

“I consider that the centre breach at Badajos was never seriously attacked. I was not at the centre breach on the night of the assault, therefore I cannot positively assert what took place there. But there were not bodies of dead and wounded at the centre or curtain breach in the morning to indicate such an attack having been made upon it, and being in the curtain it was far retired from the troops, and the approach to it was made extremely difficult by deep cuts, and I think it passed unobserved except by a straggling few.”

————“I consider that ‘chevaux de frise’ were placed upon the summit of the centre breach during the assault. I was there at day-break. The approach to it was extremely difficult, both from the difficulty of finding it, and from the deep holes that were before it, which to my recollection resembled the holes you see in a clay-field, where they make bricks. Another great obstruction was the fire from the faces and flanks of the two bastions, which crossed before the curtain.”

Extract from a memoir by captain Barney, Chasseurs Britanniques, acting engineer at the siege.

“The explosion of the ‘Bariques foudroyantes’ resembled ‘fougasses,’ and I expected the bastion would have crumbled to pieces. At this moment I perceived one person in the midst of fire, who had gained the top of the breach in the face of the bastion, he seemed impelling himself forward towards the enemy in an offensive position when he sank down, apparently destroyed by the fire. On examining this breach at day-light I found a Portuguese grenadier, whom I suppose to be the person, as he lay dead the foremost on this breach.”

————“Twice the bugles sounded to retire from the breaches. The fire diminished, and passing along the glacis of the ravelin I hastened to the attack of general Picton, and found but two ladders, one only just long enough to reach the embrasure, and the other with several of the upper rounds destroyed. The castle was full of men, and had the enemy thrown shells among them, I do not think it could have been kept possession of. Major Burgh came to ascertain the result of the attack, and the reserves were ordered up. On coming down from the castle I met general Picton, and told him the castle was full of men, but they had not advanced into the town. He immediately ordered sorties to be made to clear the breach, and a good look-out to be kept towards Christoval.”————“Passing in front of the battery where lord Wellington was, I went on the right bank of the inundation till I could cross, and going towards the breach, I was overtaken by the prince of Orange, carrying an order for colonel Barnard to occupy the breach. The enemy’s fire had ceased, yet none of the storming-party knew whether we were successful or not. I told the prince I was just come from the castle, which was occupied in force. As we approached the breach the stench of burnt hair and scorched flesh was horrible, and on the crest of the glacis the dead and wounded lay in such numbers it was impossible to pass without treading on them.”

“Here I also found but three ladders, one broken so as to render it useless. On arriving at the curtain-breach, some men of the light division assisted me in removing from the top the chevaux de frise of sword-blades and pikes.”

Extract from a memoir on the escalade of St. Vincent, by captain Edward P. Hopkins, fourth regiment.

“The column halted a few yards from a breast-work surmounted with a stockade and a ‘chevaux de frise’ concealing a guard-house on the covered way, and at this moment a most awful explosion took place, followed by the most tremendous peals of musketry. ‘That is at the breaches,’ was the whisper amongst our soldiers, and their anxiety to be led forward was intense, but their firmness and obedience were equally conspicuous. The moon now appeared. We could hear the French soldiers talking in the guard-house, and their officers were visiting the sentries. The engineer officer who preceded the column, said, ‘now is the time;’ the column instantly moved to the face of the gateway. It was only at this moment that the sentry observed us, and fired his alarm-shot, which was followed by musketry. The two companies of Portuguese carrying the scaling-ladders threw them down, and deaf to the voices of their officers, made off. This occurrence did not in the least shake the zeal and steadiness of our men, who occupied immediately the space left, and shouldering the ladders moved on. We could not force the gate open, but the breast-work was instantly crowded, and the impediments cut away sufficiently to allow of two men entering abreast.”————“The engineer officer was by this time killed. We had no other assistance from that corps, and the loss was most severely felt at this early period of the attack.”

————“The troops were now fast filling the ditch; they had several ladders, and I shall never forget the momentary disappointment amongst the men when they found that the ladders were too short.”————“The enemy took advantage of this to annoy us in every way, rolling down beams of wood, fire-balls, &c. together with an enfilading fire.

“We observed near us an embrasure unfurnished of artillery, its place being occupied by a gabion filled with earth. A ladder was instantly placed under its mouth, and also one at each side. This allowed three persons to ascend at once, but only one at a time could enter in at the embrasure. The first several attempts were met with instant death. The ladders were even now too short, and it was necessary for one person to assist the other by hoisting him up the embrasure.” “Some shots were fired from a building in the town, and colonel Piper was sent with a party to dislodge the enemy, while general Walker, at the head of his brigade, attempted to clear the rampart to the right,” &c. &c.

“The enemy retired from the building on our approach, and colonel Piper did not return to the ramparts, but moved into the body of the town. Could we have divested our minds of the real situation of the town it might have been imagined that the inhabitants were preparing for some grand fête, as all the houses in the streets and squares were brilliantly illuminated, from the top to the first floor, with numerous lamps. This illumination scene was truly remarkable, not a living creature to be seen, but a continual low buz and whisper around us, and we now and then perceived a small lattice gently open and re-shut, as if more closely to observe the singular scene of a small English party perambulating the town in good order, the bugleman at the head blowing his instrument. Some of our men and officers now fell wounded; at first we did not know where the shots came from, but soon observed they were from the sills of the doors. We soon arrived at a large church facing some grand houses, in a sort of square. The party here drew up, and it was at first proposed to take possession of this church, but that idea was abandoned. We made several prisoners leading some mules laden with loose ball-cartridges in large wicker baskets, which they stated they were conveying from the magazines to the breaches. After securing the prisoners, ammunition, &c., we moved from the square with the intention of forcing our way upon the ramparts. We went up a small street towards them, but met with such opposition as obliged us to retire with loss. We again found ourselves in the square. There an English soldier came up to us who had been confined in the jail, probably a deserter. He said our troops had attacked the castle, and had failed, but that the French troops had afterwards evacuated it. At this period rapid changes took place. Several French officers came into the square; the town belonged to the English; the great Wellington was victorious. A scene of sad confusion now took place; several French officers of rank, their wives, and children, ran into the square in a state of frenzy, holding little caskets containing their jewels and valuables, and their children in their arms. The situation of these females was dreadful; they implored our protection, and I believe this party escaped the plunder and pillage which was now unfortunately in progress. The scene that now commenced surpassed all that can be imagined; drunkenness, cruelty, and debauchery, the loss of many lives, and great destruction of property, was one boon for our victory. The officers had lost all command of their men in the town; those who had got drunk and had satisfied themselves with plunder congregated in small parties and fired down the streets. I saw an English soldier pass through the middle of the street with a French knapsack on his back; he received a shot through his hand from some of the drunkards at the top of the street; he merely turned round and said, damn them, I suppose they took me for a Frenchman. An officer of the Brunswickers, who was contending with a soldier for the possession of a canary bird, was shot dead by one of these insane drunkards. Groups of soldiers were seen in all places, and could we have forgotten the distressing part of the scene, never was there a more complete masquerade. Some dressed as monks, some as friars, some in court-dresses, many carrying furniture, cloth, provisions, money, plate from the churches; the military chest was even got at by the soldiers.”

No. VIII. SECTION 1. ENGLISH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND MARMONT’S OPERATIONS.

Colonel Le Mesurier, commandant of Almeida, to brigadier-general Trant.

“Almeida, March 28, 1812.

“When I took possession of the fortress ten days since, I found not a single gun in a state for working; either owing to the want of side-arms or the ill assortment of shot and ammunition, not a single platform was laid down, and scarcely a single embrasure opened in any part of the newly repaired fronts. My powder was partly in an outwork, partly in two buildings scarcely weather-proof, only one front of my covered way pallisaded, and the face of one of my ravelins without any revêtement whatever; the revêtement throughout the whole of the nearly repaired fronts not being more than one-third or one-fourth of its former height. Many of these defects have been remedied; we have platforms and embrasures throughout the new fronts, the guns posted with their proper side-arms and shot-piles, and with a proper assortment of ammunition in the caissons; the bulk of our powder and ordnance-cartridge being distributed in bomb proofs; we have formed a respectable entrenchment on the top of the breach of the mined ravelin, which it is proposed to arm with pallisades, but the almost total want of transport has prevented our being able to complete more than two fronts and a half of our covert way with those essential defences. From this sketch you will collect that, though the fortress is not to be walked into, it is yet far from being secure from the consequences of a resolute assault, particularly if the garrison be composed of raw and unsteady troops.”

Extract from a memoir of general Trant.

“Now it so happened that on this same night Marmont had marched from Sabugal in order to attack me in Guarda; he had at the least five thousand infantry, some reports made his force seven thousand, and he had five or six hundred cavalry. My distrust of the militia with regard to the execution of precautions such as I had now adopted, had induced me at all times to have a drummer at my bed-room-door, in readiness to beat to arms; and this was most fortunately the case on the night of the 13th April, 1812, for the very first intimation I received of the enemy being near at hand was given me by my own servant, on bringing me my coffee at daybreak of the 14th. He said such was the report in the street, and that the soldiers were assembling at the alarm rendezvous in the town. I instantly beat to arms, and the beat being as instantly taken up by every drummer who heard it, Marmont, who at that very moment was with his cavalry at the very entrance of the town (quite open on the Sabugal side more than elsewhere), retired. He had cut off the outposts without their firing a shot, and, had he only dashed headlong into the town, must have captured Wilson’s and my militia divisions without losing probably a single man. I was myself the first out of the town, and he was not then four hundred yards from it, retiring at a slow pace. I lost no time in forming my troops in position, and sent my few dragoons in observation. When at a couple of miles distant Marmont drew up fronting Guarda, and it turned out, as I inferred, that he expected infantry.”

Lord Wellington to sir N. Trant.

“Castello Branco, April 17, 1812.

“Dear Sir,—I arrived here about two hours ago. Marshal Beresford received your letter of the 13th upon the road, and I received that of the 12th from general Bacellar this morning. We shall move on as soon as the troops come up: it would appear that the French are collecting more force upon the Agueda and Coa. You should take care of yourselves on Guarda if they should collect two divisions at or in the neighbourhood of Sabugal: Guarda is the most treacherous position in the country, although very necessary to hold. I should prefer to see an advanced guard upon it, and the main body on the Mondego behind. Have you saved my magazines at Celerico? I enclose a letter for the commissary there and one for don Carlos d’Espagna. Pray forward both; the former is to order forward fresh supplies to Celerico. Shew this letter to general Bacellar: I don’t write to him as I have no Portuguese with me.” &c. &c.

“Wellington.”

Ditto to ditto.

“Pedrogao, April 1812.

“Dear Sir,—I have received your letter of the 15th, and you will see by mine of the 17th, written as soon as I knew that your division and that of general Wilson were on Guarda, that I expected what happened, and that I wished you to withdraw from that position. In fact, troops ought not to be put in a strong position in which they can be turned if they have not an easy retreat from it; and if you advert to that principle in war, and look at the position of Guarda, you will agree with me that it is the most treacherous position in Portugal. I can only say that, as Marmont attacked you, I am delighted that you have got off so well; which circumstance I attribute to your early decision not to hold the position, and to the good dispositions which you made for the retreat from it.

“As to your plan to surprise Marmont at Sabugal, you did not attempt to put it in execution, and it is useless to say any thing about it. I would observe, however, upon one of your principles, viz. that the magnitude of the object would justify the attempt, that in war, particularly in our situation and with such troops as we, and you in particular, command, nothing is so bad as failure and defeat. You could not have succeeded in that attempt, and you would have lost your division and that of general Wilson. I give you my opinion very freely upon your plans and operations as you have written me upon them, begging you at the same time to believe that I feel for the difficulty of your situation, and that I am perfectly satisfied that both you and general Wilson did every thing that officers should do with such circumstances, and that I attribute to you the safety of the two divisions. I shall be at Sabugal to-morrow or the next day; and I hope to see you before we shall again be more distant from each other.” &c. &c.

“Wellington.”

SECTION 2. FRENCH PAPERS RELATING TO SOULT’S AND MARMONT’S OPERATIONS.

Translated. Extracts from Soult’s intercepted despatches.

“Seville, April 14, 1812.

“I enclose copies of a letter from the duke of Ragusa, dated 22d February, and another from general Foy, dated Velvis de Jara, 28th February, which announced positively that three divisions of infantry and one division of cavalry of the army of Portugal would join me if Badajos was attacked; but those divisions, fifteen days afterwards, marched into Old Castile at the moment when they knew that all the English army was moving upon Badajos, and at the instant when I, in virtue of your highness’s (Berthier’s) orders, had sent five regiments of infantry and two of cavalry, and my skeleton regiments to Talavera. It is certain that if those three divisions had remained in the valley of the Tagus the enemy would not have attacked Badajos, where they could have been fought to advantage.

“The contrary has arrived. I have been left to my own forces, which have been reduced by fifteen thousand men, as I have stated above, and not even a military demonstration has been made, much less succour, because the attack on Beira could not influence the siege, and did not.”——“Badajos fell by a ‘coup de fortune,’ because it was not in human foresight to think that five thousand men defending the breach successfully, would suffer a surprise on a point where no attack was directed, and when I was within a few marches with twenty-four thousand men strongly organized.

“If I had received your highness’s letter when I was before the English, I might, although unaided by M. Marmont and numerically inferior, have given battle to save Badajos; but I should probably have been wrong, and I should have lost the force I left in Andalusia, where not only Seville was invested and my communications cut, but a general insurrection was commencing. Happily I heard in time of the fall of Badajos; but I have not even yet opened my communications with New Castile, Grenada, or Malaga. I have, however, prepared in time to deliver a great battle on my own ground—Andalusia.

“The emperor, of course, cannot foresee all things, and in his orders naturally meant that his generals should act with discretion on such occasions; hence if Marmont had only made demonstrations on Beira with a part of his army, and had crossed the Tagus to unite with my troops, the siege would have been raised before the breach was practicable. Marmont had nothing before him, and he knew Wellington had passed the Guadiana and commenced the siege: I say that all the English army had passed the Guadiana, and this was its disposition.

“General Graham commanding the first corps of observation had the sixth and seventh divisions of infantry and Cotton’s cavalry two thousand five hundred strong, with thirty guns. This corps pushed my right wing to Granja and Azagua at the ‘debouche’ of Fuente Ovejuna, while Hill, with the second and third divisions, twelve hundred cavalry under Erskine, and twelve guns, moved on my extreme right in the direction of La Lerena from Belendenzer.

“Wellington carried on the siege in person, having the fourth division, part of the third division, a Portuguese corps; and I am assured he has also two or three thousand Spaniards, which made round the place eighteen thousand men.

“The fifth division remained at first on the right bank of the Tagus with a brigade of cavalry; but they were also called up and came to Elvas on the 4th or 5th of April. The best accounts gave Wellington thirty thousand men, and some make him as high as forty thousand, at the moment when I was before him at Villalba; and if the army of Portugal had joined me with twenty-five thousand men, Badajos would have been saved or retaken: and a great victory would throw the English back into their lines. I was not strong enough alone; and besides the loss I should have suffered, I could not have got back in time to save my troops in Andalusia.

“The English did not hide their knowledge that Marmont was gathering in Leon; but they knew he had no battering-train, and that the wasted state of the country would not permit him to penetrate far into Portugal. So measured, indeed, were their operations, that it is to be supposed they had intercepted some despatch which explained the system of operation and the irresolution of Marmont.

“Your highness tells me I ‘should not have left Hill after his last movement in December on Estremadura, nor have permitted him to take my magazines:’ I say he has taken nothing from me. The advanced guard at Merida lived from day to day on what was sent to them from La Lerena. I know not if some of this has fallen into his hands; but it can be but little. But at this period Wellington wished to besiege Badajos, and only suspended it because of the rain, which would not let him move his artillery, and because three divisions of the army of Portugal were in the valley of the Tagus. If they had remained the siege would not have been undertaken, and Marmont knew this; for on the 22d February he wrote to me to say that, independent of those three divisions under Foy, which he destined to send to the aid of Badajos, he himself would act so as to surmount the difficulties which the state of his munitions opposed to his resolution to defeat the enemy’s projects.

“If your highness looks at the states of the 14th April, you will see that I had not, as you suppose by your letter of 19th February, forty thousand men; I had only thirty-five thousand, including the garrison of Badajos, out of which I had brought with me twenty-four thousand, the rest being employed before Cadiz at Seville, in Grenada and Murcia, and against Ballesteros. You must consider that fifteen days before the English passed the Guadiana I had sent five regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and many skeletons upon Talavera, in all fifteen thousand men; and since two years I have sent many other skeleton regiments to France, being more than fifteen thousand men changing their destination or worn out, without having yet received the troops from the interior destined for my army, although these are borne on the states: besides which, I have four thousand men unfit for the field, who ought to go to France, but I am forced to employ them in the posts. Ballesteros has, besides the army of Murcia, ten thousand men; and in Murcia the Spaniards are strong, because the fugitives from Valencia had joined two divisions which had not been engaged there, and thus, including the garrisons of Alicant and Carthagena, they had fifteen thousand men. Suchet’s operations have certainly produced great results, but for the moment have hurt me, because all who fly from him come back upon my left flank at a moment when I have only three battalions and four hundred cavalry to oppose them at Grenada only. I have sent my brother there in haste to support them. The English, Portuguese, and Spanish at Cadiz, Gibraltar, and on the ocean could also at any time descend with ten or twelve thousand men on any part of my line, and I want at least as many to oppose them and guard my posts. I may therefore be accused of having carried too many men to the relief of Badajos; and that army was not strong enough, though excellent in quality.

“I cannot hold twenty thousand men, as your highness desires, on the Guadiana, unless I am reinforced, especially since the fall of Badajos; but as soon as I know the English have repassed that river, all my right under d’Erlon, i.e. nine regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, and twelve guns, shall march into the interior of Estremadura, and occupy Medellin, Villafranca, and even Merida, and, if possible, hold in check the garrison of Badajos and the English corps left in Alemtejo, and so prevent any grand movement up the valley of the Tagus against Madrid.

“Since my return here the demonstrations of the English appear directed to invade Andalusia so far as to have obliged me to unfurnish many points, and even in a manner raise the siege of Cadiz, Graham has come to Llerena, and Cotton to Berlanga, where we had an affair and lost sixty men.” “I have ordered d’Erlon to repass the Guadalquivir and come to me to fight the English if they advance; if not, he shall go on again, and I think the English general will not commit the fault of entering the mountains, though he says he will!”

No. IX. SECTION 1.

SUMMARY OF THE FORCE OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE ARMY AT DIFFERENT PERIODS, EXCLUSIVE OF DRUMMERS AND ARTILLERY-MEN.

October 1, 1811.—Cavalry.

Present. Sick. Command. Prisoners. Total.

British 3571 1114 947 298 5930

Portuguese 1373 256 1140 — 2769

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Total Cavalry 4944 1370 2087 298 8699

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Infantry.

British 29530 17974 2663 1684 51851

Portuguese 23689 6009 1707 75 31480

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Total Infantry 53219 23983 4370 1759 83331

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

General Total, including serjeants, 58263 sabres and bayonets in the field.

January 8, 1812.—Cavalry.

British 4949 841 741 — 6531

Portuguese 613 43 275 — 391

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Total Cavalry 5562 884 1016 — 7462

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Infantry.

British 30222 11414 2827 — 14463

Portuguese 20455 4849 2360 51 27715

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Total Infantry 50677 16263 5187 51 72178

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

General Total, including sergeants, 56239 sabres and bayonets in the field.

Note. The abuses and desertions in the Portuguese cavalry had been so great that one division was suppressed.

April 5, 1812.—Cavalry.

Present. Sick. Command. Prisoners. Total.

British 4299 564 755 3 6048

Portuguese 347 9 492 — 808

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Total Cavalry 4646 573 1247 3 6896

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Infantry.

British 26897 11452 2779 2 40703

Portuguese 20224 5532 1507 18 27281

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Total Infantry 47121 16984 4286 20 67984

——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Sabres and bayonets 51767

Field artillery-men 1980

Gunners in the batteries 900

———

General Total 54647

———

Note. The heavy German cavalry were in the rear at Estremos, and two Portuguese regiments were in Abrantes.

TROOPS EMPLOYED AT THE SIEGE OF BADAJOS, APRIL, 1812.

British.

Light division 2679

Third division 2882

Fourth division 2579

Fifth division 2896

—— 11036

Portuguese.

Hamilton’s division 4685

Light division 858

Third division 976

Fourth division 2384

Fifth division 1845

—— 10748

———

Total 21,784

———

ALLIED COVERING CORPS IN APRIL, 1812.

Cavalry under general Hill.—Left Wing.

British 783

Portuguese 347

—— 1130

Infantry ditto.

British 6156

Portuguese 2385

—— 8541

———

Total under general Hill 9671

———

Cavalry under general Graham.—Right Wing.

British 3517

Portuguese —

——— 3517

Infantry ditto.

British 10154

Portuguese 5896

——— 16050

———

Total under general Graham 19567

———

General Total of the covering army, exclusive of the artillery-men and the heavy German cavalry, who remained in the rear at Estremos, 29238 sabres and bayonets.

SECTION 2.

SUMMARY OF THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT BADAJOS, 1812.

ASSAULT.

British Loss.

Killed. Wounded.

Generals – 5

Staff 1 11

Officers. Soldiers.

Artillery 2 20

Engineers 5 5

— —

Total 7 25

— —

Light division.—Line.

Officers. Soldiers. Total.

43d 18 329 347 } 670

52d 18 305 323 }

95th, 1st bat. 14 179 193

95th, 3d bat. 8 56 64

— —— ——

Total 58 849 927

— —— ——

Third division.

5th 4 41 45 }

45th 14 83 97 }

74th 7 47 54 }

77th 3 10 13 } 490

83d 8 62 70 }

88th 10 135 145 }

94th 2 154 173 }

— —— ——

48 442 490

— —— ——

Fourth division.

Officers. Soldiers. Total.

7th 17 163 180

23rd 17 134 151

27th 15 170 185

40th 16 124 140

48th 19 154 173

— —— ——

84 745 829

— —— ——

Fifth division.

1st 2 – 2

4th 17 213 230

9th – – –

30th 6 126 132

38th 5 37 42

44th 9 95 104

— —— ——

39 471 510

— —— ——

60th[3] 4 30 34

Brunswick Oels[3] 2 33 35

FOOTNOTE:

Total British loss at the assault.

Officers. Sergeants. Soldiers. Total.

51 40 560 killed }

213 153 1983 wounded } 3022

– 1 21 missing }

Total Portuguese loss at the assault.

8 6 141 killed }

45 32 468 wounded } 730

– – 30 missing }

—— —— —— ——

Grand Total 317 232 3203 3752

—— —— —— ——

British loss during the whole siege.

Officers. Sergeants. Soldiers. Total.

60 45 715 killed }

251 178 2578 wounded } 3860

– 1 32 missing }

Portuguese loss during the whole siege.

12 6 137 killed }

55 38 687 wounded } 965

– – 30 missing }

—— —— —— ——

General Total 378 268 4179 4825

—— —— —— ——

SECTION 3.—SUMMARY OF THE FRENCH FORCE IN SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS, EXTRACTED FROM THE IMPERIAL MUSTER-ROLLS

Under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective.

Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Pris. Men. Horses.

August 1811 262,276 37,669 50,502 10,869 41,452 00 354,418 35,348

Reinforcements train 13,190

in March 17,361 3,929 81 ” 981 00 18,423 3,929

Total 279,637 41,598 50,583 10,869 42,433 00 372,841 52,467

January 1812 258,156 41,049 22,805 5,434 42,056 00 324,933 42,348

April 1812 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,314 33,504 ” 286,440 40,161

Reserve at Bayonne 4,038 157 36 35 865 ” 4,939 192

Total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 ” 291,379 40,653

Observation.—In September 1811 an army of reserve, consisting of two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, in all 20,287 under arms, was formed for the armée du midi.

1st August, 1811.

Under arms. Detached. Effective.

Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.

1,195 }

Armée du Midi 50,597 10,008 32,043 5,359 11,836 94,508 — } 4,608

3,413 }

3,236 }

du centre 16,540 3,729 391 64 1,781 18,712 — } 3,793

557 }

6,692 }

de Portugal 38,392 5,826 7,901 3,100 10,424 56,733 — } 8,926

2,334 }

3,667 }

d’Aragon 45,102 5,718 1,397 388 5,458 51,957 — } 6,106

2,439 }

3,531 }

du Nord 88,092 11,020 7,617 1,805 6,654 102,413 — } 12,825

4,294 }

1,268 }

de Catalogne 23,553 1,368 1,153 153 5,305 30,095 — } 1,521

253 }

35,348 }

Total 262,270 37,669 50,502 10,869 41,452 354,418 — } 48,538

13,190 }

Reinforcements 17,361 3,929 81 ” 981 18,423 3,929

39,277 }

General total 279,637 41,598 50,583 10,869 42,433 372,841 — } 52,467

13,190 }

STATE OF THE IMPERIAL GUARDS.

15th August, 1811.

Under arms. Detached. Effective.

Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.

12,797 3,193 3,944 14 1,189 17,613 3,179

STATE OF THE GARRISON OF BADAJOS.

16th May, 1811.—Fifth battalion.

2,887 239 361 ” 380 3,725 239

1st March, 1812.

4,893 44 ” ” 478 5,034 44

STATE OF THE GARRISON OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

15th December, 1811.

1,764 19 ” ” 130 1,956 19

Return of numbers, by armies, 1st October, 1811.

Under arms. Detached. Absent. Effective.

Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Pris. Men. Horses.

9,251 }

Armée du Midi 66,912 11,757 7,539 2,232 13,398 ” 88,033 —— } 12,644

train 3,393 }

5,196 }

du centre 19,125 6,262 511 84 1,685 ” 21,321 —— } 5,749

553 }

6,909 }

de Portugal 50,167 11,662 1,283 858 10,012 ” 61,462 —— } 11,615

4,706 }

3,322 }

d’Aragon 28,966 5,303 6,583 308 4,424 ” 39,953 —— } 5,282

1,960 }

6,769 }

du Nord 87,913 10,821 6,201 1,069 9,414 ” 10,528 —— } 10,955

4,186 }

1,150 }

de Catalogne 26,954 1,365 993 168 11,186 ” 39,241 —— } 1,439

289 }

Total 280,017 47,270 23,110 4,717 50,119 ” 353,538 37,684

Reinforcements 9,232 689 1,226 10,458 516

General Total 289,249 47,959 23,110 4,717 51,345 ” 363,996 38,200

15th April, 1812.

Under arms. Detached. Effective.

Men. Horses. Men. Horses. Hosp. Men. Horses.

Armée du Midi 55,797 11,014 2,498 70 6,065 64,360 11,714

du centre 19,148 3,293 144 51 624 19,916 4,044

de Portugal 56,937 8,108 4,394 2,278 7,706 69,037 10,386

d’Aragon 14,786 3,269 2,695 658 1,467 18,948 8,927

de l’Ebre 16,830 1,873 21 6 3,425 20,276 1,879

de Catalogne 28,924 1,259 1,163 49 5,540 35,627 1,308

du Nord 48,232 7,074 1,309 72 8,677 58,276 7,213

Total 240,654 36,590 12,224 3,814 33,534 286,440 40,461

Reserve a Bayonne 4,038 157 36 35 865 4,939 192

Grand total 244,692 36,747 12,260 3,849 34,369 291,379 40,653

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Ditto of the French. 8vo. price 4s.

Ditto of the Italian. 8vo. price 4s.

Ditto of the Spanish. 8vo. price 4s.

Printed verbatim from a Harmonical Grammar of the principal ancient and modern languages. Each language is treated upon a uniform plan, and analyzed on new and simple principles; short and comprehensive rules are given, for attaining a just pronunciation, for determining the gender, and inflecting the noun and verb; together with a Syntax and Prosody, fully exemplified, and a classed vocabulary of the most useful and necessary words.

The EXPECTATIONS FORMED by the ASSYRIANS, that a GREAT DELIVERER WOULD APPEAR, about the Time of our Lord’s Advent, demonstrated. 8vo. price 10s. boards.

And all the other Works of the same Author.

MOMENTS OF IDLENESS;

OR,

A PEEP INTO THE WORLD WE CALL “OURS.”

“Il y en a qui ne font rien,—il y en a d’autres qui font des riens.”

In 1 vol. foolscap 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 7s.

“Will prove a pleasant source of mental employment at a leisure hour.”——Monthly Review.

“The author is clever and thinks, which is what very few people actually achieve.”——New Monthly Magazine.

“He is worth any man’s perusal (we have read him every bit); and, besides many striking reflections, gives numerous evidences of a benevolent and social disposition.”——True Sun.

“This is a very remarkable volume, and it is one of great merit; and he who devotes to it his ‘Moments of Idleness’ will be idle no longer, or then it will be his own fault. We have seldom met, indeed, with a volume containing so many and such substantial materials for thinking, in so small a compass, and combining at the same time so much intellectual employment with so much literary amusement.”——Liverpool Chronicle.

WALTER;

OR,

A WORD MORE TO THE WISE.

BY THE AUTHOR OF “MOMENTS OF IDLENESS.”

In 1 vol. foolscap 8vo. neatly bound in cloth, price 7s.

A TREATISE

ON THE

GAME OF WHIST,

BY THE LATE

ADMIRAL CHARLES BURNEY,

Author of Voyages and Discoveries in the Pacific, &c.

Second Edition. 18mo. boards, price 2s.

“The kind of play recommended in this Treatise is on the most plain, and what the Author considers the most safe principles. I have limited my endeavours to the most necessary instructions, classing them as much as the subject enabled me, under separate heads, to facilitate their being rightly comprehended and easily remembered. For the greater encouragement of the learner, I have studied brevity; but not in a degree to have prevented my endeavouring more to make the principles of the game, and the rationality of them intelligible, than to furnish a young player with a set of rules to get by rote, that he might go blindly right.”