SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE WILL.

We are now prepared to meet the question, To which of the relations above defined shall we refer the phenomena of the Will? If these phenomena are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever a particular antecedent (motive) is given, but one consequent (act of Will) is possible, and that consequent must arise. It cannot possibly but take place. If, on the other hand, these phenomena fall under the relation of Liberty, whenever any particular motive is present, either of two or more acts of Will is equally possible; and when any particular consequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other consequents might have arisen in its stead.

Before proceeding directly to argue the question before us, one consideration of a general nature demands a passing notice. It is this. The simple statement of the question, in the light of the above relations, settles it, and must settle it, in the judgment of all candid, uncommitted inquirers after the truth. Let any individual contemplate the action of his voluntary powers in the light of the relations of Liberty and Necessity as above defined, and he will spontaneously affirm the fact, that he is a free and not a necessary agent, and affirm it as absolutely as he affirms his own existence. Wherever he is, while he retains the consciousness of rational being, this conviction will and must be to him an omnipresent reality. To escape it, he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence.