ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL PROPENSITIES.—EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED.

1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural propensities, such as the appetites, the love of esteem, of power, &c., I would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly explained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting this subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed necessary. When any physical power operates upon any of the organs of sense, or when any thought is present in the Intelligence, the state of the Sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called a sensation or emotion. When any feeling arises impelling the Will to seek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion, this impulsive state of the Sensibility is called a desire. When the Will concurs with the desire, a complex state of mind results, called a wish. Wish is distinguished from Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the action of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, constitutes a wish morally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction, and the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the desire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds true in regard to the action of all the propensities. The excitement of the propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, constitutes desire—a feeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities. The action of the Will in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, constitutes a complex state of mind morally right or wrong.