BOOK V.

She hadde seyd, and torned the cours of hir resoun to some othre thinges to ben treted and to ben y-sped. Thanne seyde I, 'Certes, rightful is thyn amonestinge and ful digne by auctoritee. But that thou seidest whylom, that the questioun of the divyne 5 purviaunce is enlaced with many other questiouns, I understonde wel and proeve it by the same thing. But I axe yif that thou wenest that hap be any thing in any weys; and, yif thou wenest that hap be anything, what is it?' Thanne quod she, 'I haste me to yilden and assoilen to thee 10 the dette of my bihest, and to shewen and opnen the wey, by which wey thou mayst come ayein to thy contree. But al-be-it so that the thinges which that thou axest ben right profitable to knowe, yit ben they diverse somwhat fro the path of my purpos; and it is to douten that thou ne be maked wery by mis-weyes, so 15 that thou ne mayst nat suffyce to mesuren the right wey.' 'Ne doute thee ther-of nothing,' quod I. 'For, for to knowen thilke thinges to-gedere, in the whiche thinges I delyte me greetly, that shal ben to me in stede of reste; sin it is nat to douten of the thinges folwinge, whan every syde of thy disputacioun shal han 20 be stedefast to me by undoutous feith.' Thanne seyde she, 'That manere wol I don thee'; and bigan to speken right thus. 'Certes,' quod she, 'yif any wight diffinisshe hap in this manere, that is to seyn, that "hap is bitydinge y-brought forth by foolish moevinge and by no knettinge of 25 causes," I conferme that hap nis right naught in no wyse; and I deme al-outrely that hap nis, ne dwelleth but a voice, as who seith, but an ydel word, with-outen any significacioun of thing submitted to that vois. For what place mighte ben left, or dwellinge, to folye and to disordenaunce, sin that god ledeth and constreineth 30 alle thinges by ordre? For this sentence is verray and sooth, that "nothing ne hath his beinge of naught"; to the whiche sentence none of thise olde folk ne withseyde never; al-be-it so that they ne understoden ne meneden it naught by god, prince and beginnere of werkinge, but they casten [it] as a manere 35 foundement of subiect material, that is to seyn, of the nature of alle resoun. And yif that any thing is woxen or comen of no causes, than shal it seme that thilke thing is comen or woxen of naught; but yif this ne may nat ben don, thanne is it nat possible, that hap be any swich thing as I have diffinisshed a litel heer-biforn.' 40 'How shal it thanne be?' quod I. 'Nis ther thanne no-thing that by right may be cleped either "hap" or elles "aventure of fortune"; or is ther aught, al-be-it so that it is hid fro the peple, to which these wordes ben covenable?' 'Myn Aristotulis,' quod she, 'in the book of his Phisik, diffinissheth 45 this thing by short resoun, and neigh to the sothe.' 'In which manere?' quod I. 'As ofte,' quod she, 'as men doon any thing for grace of any other thing, and an-other thing than thilke thing that men entenden to don bitydeth by some causes, it is cleped "hap." 50 Right as a man dalf the erthe by cause of tilyinge of the feeld, and founde ther a gobet of gold bidolven, thanne wenen folk that it is bifalle by fortunous bitydinge. But, for sothe, it nis nat of naught, for it hath his propre causes; of whiche causes the cours unforeseyn and unwar semeth to han maked hap. For yif the 55 tilyere of the feld ne dolve nat in the erthe, and yif the hyder of the gold ne hadde hid the gold in thilke place, the gold ne hadde nat been founde. Thise ben thanne the causes of the abregginge of fortuit hap, the which abregginge of fortuit hap comth of causes encountringe and flowinge to-gidere to hem-self, and nat by the 60 entencioun of the doer. For neither the hyder of the gold ne the delver of the feeld ne understoden nat that the gold sholde han ben founde; but, as I sayde, it bitidde and ran to-gidere that he dalf ther-as that other hadde hid the gold. Now may I thus diffinisshe "hap." Hap is an unwar bitydinge of causes assembled 65 in thinges that ben don for som other thing. But thilke ordre, procedinge by an uneschuable bindinge to-gidere, which that descendeth fro the welle of purviaunce that ordeineth alle thinges in hir places and in hir tymes, maketh that the causes rennen and assemblen to-gidere.

Tigris and Eufrates resolven and springen of oo welle, in the cragges of the roche of the contree of Achemenie, ther-as the fleinge bataile ficcheth hir dartes, retorned in the brestes of hem that folwen hem. And sone after tho same riveres, Tigris and 5 Eufrates, unioinen and departen hir wateres. And yif they comen to-gideres, and ben assembled and cleped to-gidere into o cours, thanne moten thilke thinges fleten to-gidere which that the water of the entrechaunginge flood bringeth. The shippes and the stokkes arraced with the flood moten assemblen; and the wateres 10 y-medled wrappeth or implyeth many fortunel happes or maneres; the whiche wandringe happes, natheles, thilke declyninge lownesse of the erthe and the flowinge ordre of the slydinge water governeth. Right so Fortune, that semeth as that it fleteth with slaked or ungovernede brydles, it suffereth brydles, that is to seyn, to be 15 governed, and passeth by thilke lawe, that is to seyn, by thilke divyne ordenaunce.'

'This understonde I wel,' quod I, 'and I acorde wel that it is right as thou seyst. But I axe yif ther be any libertee of free wil in this ordre of causes that clyven thus to-gidere in hem-self; or elles I wolde witen yif that the destinal cheyne constreineth the 5 movinges of the corages of men?' 'Yis,' quod she; 'ther is libertee of free wil. Ne ther ne was nevere no nature of resoun that it ne hadde libertee of free wil. For every thing that may naturely usen resoun, it hath doom by which it decerneth and demeth every thing; thanne knoweth it, 10 by it-self, thinges that ben to fleen and thinges that ben to desiren. And thilke thing that any wight demeth to ben desired, that axeth or desireth he; and fleeth thilke thing that he troweth ben to fleen. Wherfore in alle thinges that resoun is, in hem also is libertee of willinge and of nillinge. But I ne ordeyne nat, as who 15 seyth, I ne graunte nat, that this libertee be evene-lyk in alle thinges. Forwhy in the sovereines devynes substaunces, that is to seyn, in spirits, Iugement is more cleer, and wil nat y-corumped, and might redy to speden thinges that ben desired. But the soules of men moten nedes be more free whan they loken hem in 20 the speculacioun or lokinge of the devyne thought, and lasse free whan they slyden in-to the bodies; and yit lasse free whan they ben gadered to-gidere and comprehended in erthely membres. But the laste servage is whan that they ben yeven to vyces, and han y-falle from the possessioun of hir propre resoun. For after 25 that they han cast awey hir eyen fro the light of the sovereyn soothfastnesse to lowe thinges and derke, anon they derken by the cloude of ignoraunce and ben troubled by felonous talents; to the whiche talents whan they aprochen and asenten, they hepen and encresen the servage which they han ioyned to hem-self; and 30 in this manere they ben caitifs fro hir propre libertee. The whiche thinges, nathelesse, the lokinge of the devyne purviaunce seeth, that alle thinges biholdeth and seeth fro eterne, and ordeineth hem everich in hir merites as they ben predestinat: and it is seyd in Greek, that "alle thinges he seeth and alle thinges he hereth."

Homer with the hony mouth, that is to seyn, Homer with the swete ditees, singeth, that the sonne is cleer by pure light; natheles yit ne may it nat, by the infirme light of his bemes, breken or percen the inwarde entrailes of the erthe, or elles of the see. So 5 ne seeth nat god, maker of the grete world: to him, that loketh alle thinges from an heigh, ne withstondeth nat no thinges by hevinesse of erthe; ne the night ne withstondeth nat to him by the blake cloudes. Thilke god seeth, in oo strok of thought, alle thinges that ben, or weren, or sholle comen; and thilke god, for 10 he loketh and seeth alle thinges alone, thou mayst seyn that he is the verray sonne.'

Thanne seyde I, 'now am I confounded by a more hard doute than I was.' 'What doute is that?' quod she. 'For certes, I coniecte now by whiche thinges thou art troubled.' 5 'It semeth,' quod I, 'to repugnen and to contrarien greetly, that god knoweth biforn alle thinges, and that ther is any freedom of libertee. For yif so be that god loketh alle thinges biforn, ne god ne may nat ben desseived in no manere, than mot it nedes been, that alle thinges bityden the whiche that the purviaunce of 10 god hath seyn biforn to comen. For which, yif that god knoweth biforn nat only the werkes of men, but also hir conseiles and hir willes, thanne ne shal ther be no libertee of arbitre; ne, certes, ther ne may be noon other dede, ne no wil, but thilke which that the divyne purviaunce, that may nat ben desseived, 15 hath feled biforn. For yif that they mighten wrythen awey in othre manere than they ben purveyed, than sholde ther be no stedefast prescience of thing to comen, but rather an uncertein opinioun; the whiche thing to trowen of god, I deme it felonye and unleveful. Ne I ne proeve nat thilke same resoun, as who 20 seyth, I ne alowe nat, or I ne preyse nat, thilke same resoun, by which that som men wenen that they mowen assoilen and unknitten the knotte of this questioun. For, certes, they seyn that thing nis nat to comen for that the purviaunce of god hath seyn it biforn that is to comen, but rather the contrarye, and that 25 is this: that, for that the thing is to comen, therfore ne may it nat ben hid fro the purviaunce of god; and in this manere this necessitee slydeth ayein in-to the contrarye partye: ne it ne bihoveth nat, nedes, that thinges bityden that ben purvyed, but it bihoveth, nedes, that thinges that ben to comen ben y-porveyed: 30 but as it were y-travailed, as who seyth, that thilke answere procedeth right as thogh men travaileden, or weren bisy to enqueren, the whiche thing is cause of the whiche thing:—as, whether the prescience is cause of the necessitee of thinges to comen, or elles that the necessitee of thinges to comen is cause of the purviaunce. 35 But I ne enforce me nat now to shewen it, that the bitydinge of thinges y-wist biforn is necessarie, how so or in what manere that the ordre of causes hath it-self; al-thogh that it ne seme nat that the prescience bringe in necessitee of bitydinge to thinges to comen. For certes, yif that any wight sitteth, it bihoveth by 40 necessitee that the opinioun be sooth of him that coniecteth that he sitteth; and ayeinward also is it of the contrarye: yif the opinioun be sooth of any wight for that he sitteth, it bihoveth by necessitee that he sitte. Thanne is heer necessitee in that oon and in that other: for in that oon is necessitee of sittinge, and, 45 certes, in that other is necessitee of sooth. But therfore ne sitteth nat a wight, for that the opinioun of the sittinge is sooth; but the opinioun is rather sooth, for that a wight sitteth biforn. And thus, al-thogh that the cause of the sooth cometh of that other syde (as who seyth, that al-thogh the cause of sooth comth 50 of the sitting, and nat of the trewe opinioun), algates yit is ther comune necessitee in that oon and in that other. Thus sheweth it, that I may make semblable skiles of the purviaunce of god and of thinges to comen. For althogh that, for that thinges ben to comen, ther-fore ben they purveyed, nat, certes, for that they 55 ben purveyed, ther-fore ne bityde they nat. Yit natheles, bihoveth it by necessitee, that either the thinges to comen ben y-purveyed of god, or elles that the thinges that ben purveyed of god bityden. And this thing only suffiseth y-nough to destroyen the freedom of oure arbitre, that is to seyn, of oure free wil. But 60 now, certes, sheweth it wel, how fer fro the sothe and how up-so-doun is this thing that we seyn, that the bitydinge of temporel thinges is cause of the eterne prescience. But for to wenen that god purvyeth the thinges to comen for they ben to comen, what other thing is it but for to wene that thilke thinges that bitidden 65 whylom ben causes of thilke soverein purvyaunce that is in god? And her-to I adde yit this thing: that, right as whan that I wot that a thing is, it bihoveth by necessitee that thilke selve thing be; and eek, whan I have knowe that any thing shal bityden, so byhoveth it by necessitee that thilke thing bityde:—so folweth it 70 thanne, that the bitydinge of the thing y-wist biforn ne may nat ben eschued. And at the laste, yif that any wight wene a thing to ben other weyes thanne it is, it is nat only unscience, but it is deceivable opinioun ful diverse and fer fro the sothe of science. Wherfore, yif any thing be so to comen, that the bitydinge of hit 75 ne be nat certein ne necessarie, who may weten biforn that thilke thing is to comen? For right as science ne may nat ben medled with falsnesse (as who seyth, that yif I wot a thing, it ne may nat be false that I ne wot it), right so thilke thing that is conceived by science ne may nat ben non other weys than as it is conceived. 80 For that is the cause why that science wanteth lesing (as who seyth, why that witinge ne receiveth nat lesinge of that it wot); for it bihoveth, by necessitee, that every thing be right as science comprehendeth it to be. What shal I thanne seyn? In whiche manere knoweth god biforn the thinges to comen, yif they ne be 85 nat certein? For yif that he deme that they ben to comen uneschewably, and so may be that it is possible that they ne shollen nat comen, god is deceived. But nat only to trowen that god is deceived, but for to speke it with mouth, it is a felonous sinne. But yif that god wot that, right so as thinges ben to 90 comen, so shullen they comen—so that he wite egaly, as who seyth, indifferently, that thinges mowen ben doon or elles nat y-doon—what is thilke prescience that ne comprehendeth no certein thing ne stable? Or elles what difference is ther bitwixe the prescience and thilke Iape-worthy divyninge of Tiresie the 95 divynour, that seyde: "Al that I seye," quod he, "either it shal be, or elles it ne shal nat be?" Or elles how mochel is worth the devyne prescience more than the opinioun of mankinde, yif so be that it demeth the thinges uncertein, as men doon; of the whiche domes of men the bitydinge nis nat certein? But yif so be that 100 non uncertein thing ne may ben in him that is right certein welle of alle thinges, thanne is the bitydinge certein of thilke thinges whiche he hath wist biforn fermely to comen. For which it folweth, that the freedom of the conseiles and of the werkes of mankind nis non, sin that the thoght of god, that seeth alle 105 thinges without errour of falsnesse, bindeth and constreineth hem to a bitydinge by necessitee. And yif this thing be ones y-graunted and received, that is to seyn, that ther nis no free wille, than sheweth it wel, how greet destruccioun and how grete damages ther folwen of thinges of mankinde. For in ydel ben 110 ther thanne purposed and bihight medes to gode folk, and peynes to badde folk, sin that no moevinge of free corage voluntarie ne hath nat deserved hem, that is to seyn, neither mede ne peyne; and it sholde seme thanne, that thilke thing is alderworst, which that is now demed for aldermost iust and most rightful, that is to seyn, 115 that shrewes ben punisshed, or elles that gode folk ben y-gerdoned: the whiche folk, sin that hir propre wil ne sent hem nat to that oon ne to that other, that is to seyn, neither to gode ne to harm, but constreineth hem certein necessitee of thinges to comen: thanne ne shollen ther nevere ben, ne nevere weren, vyce ne vertu, but it 120 sholde rather ben confusioun of alle desertes medled with-outen discrecioun. And yit ther folweth an-other inconvenient, of the whiche ther ne may ben thoght no more felonous ne more wikke; and that is this: that, so as the ordre of thinges is y-led and comth of the purviaunce of god, ne that no-thing nis leveful to 125 the conseiles of mankinde (as who seyth, that men han no power to doon no-thing, ne wilne no-thing), than folweth it, that oure vyces ben referred to the maker of alle good (as who seyth, than folweth it, that god oughte han the blame of oure vyces, sin he constreineth us by necessitee to doon vyces). Thanne is ther no resoun to hopen in 130 god, ne for to preyen to god; for what sholde any wight hopen to god, or why sholde he preyen to god, sin that the ordenaunce of destinee, which that ne may nat ben inclyned, knitteth and streineth alle thinges that men may desiren? Thanne sholde ther be doon awey thilke only allyaunce bitwixen god and men, that is to seyn, 135 to hopen and to preyen. But by the prys of rightwisnesse and of verray mekenesse we deserven the gerdoun of the divyne grace, which that is inestimable, that is to seyn, that it is so greet, that it ne may nat ben ful y-preysed. And this is only the manere, that is to seyn, hope and preyeres, for which it semeth that men mowen 140 speke with god, and by resoun of supplicacioun be conioined to thilke cleernesse, that nis nat aproched no rather or that men beseken it and impetren it. And yif men wene nat that hope ne preyeres ne han no strengthes, by the necessitee of thinges to comen y-received, what thing is ther thanne by whiche we mowen 145 ben conioined and clyven to thilke soverein prince of thinges? For which it bihoveth, by necessitee, that the linage of mankinde, as thou songe a litel her-biforn, be departed and unioined from his welle, and failen of his biginninge, that is to seyn, god.

What discordable cause hath to-rent and unioined the bindinge, or the alliaunce, of thinges, that is to seyn, the coniunccioun of god and man? Whiche god hath establisshed so greet bataile bitwixen thise two soothfast or verray thinges, that is to seyn, 5 bitwixen the purviaunce of god and free wil, that they ben singuler and devyded, ne that they ne wolen nat be medeled ne coupled to-gidere? But ther nis no discord to the verray thinges, but they clyven, certein, alwey to hem-self. But the thought of man, confounded and overthrowen by the dirke membres of the body, ne 10 may nat, by fyr of his derked looking, that is to seyn, by the vigour of his insighte, whyl the soule is in the body, knowe the thinne subtil knittinges of thinges. But wherfore enchaufeth it so, by so greet love, to finden thilke notes of sooth y-covered; that is to seyn, wherfore enchaufeth the thoght of man by so greet desyr to 15 knowen thilke notificacions that ben y-hid under the covertoures of sooth? Wot it aught thilke thing that it, anguissous, desireth to knowe? As who seith, nay; for no man travaileth for to witen thinges that he wot. And therfore the texte seith thus: but who travaileth to witen thinges y-knowe? And yif that he ne knoweth 20 hem nat, what seketh thilke blinde thoght? What is he that desireth any thing of which he wot right naught? As who seith, who so desireth any thing, nedes, somwhat he knoweth of it; or elles, he ne coude nat desire it. Or who may folwen thinges that ne ben nat y-wist? And thogh that he seke tho thinges, wher shal he 25 finde hem? What wight, that is al unconninge and ignoraunt, may knowen the forme that is y-founde? But whan the soule biholdeth and seeth the heye thoght, that is to seyn, god, than knoweth it to-gidere the somme and the singularitees, that is to seyn, the principles and everich by him-self. 30 But now, whyl the soule is hid in the cloude and in the derkenesse of the membres of the body, it ne hath nat al for-yeten it-self, but it with-holdeth the somme of thinges, and leseth the singularitees. Thanne, who-so that seeketh soothnesse, he nis in neither nother habite; for he noot nat al, ne he ne hath nat al 35 foryeten: but yit him remembreth the somme of thinges that he with-holdeth, and axeth conseil, and retreteth deepliche thinges y-seyn biforn, that is to seyn, the grete somme in his minde: so that he mowe adden the parties that he hath for-yeten to thilke that he hath with-holden.'

Thanne seide she: 'this is,' quod she, 'the olde question of the purviaunce of god; and Marcus Tullius, whan he devyded the divynaciouns, that is to seyn, in his book that he wroot of divynaciouns, he moevede gretly this questioun; and thou thy-self has y-sought 5 it mochel, and outrely, and longe; but yit ne hath it nat ben determined ne y-sped fermely and diligently of any of yow. And the cause of this derkenesse and of this difficultee is, for that the moevinge of the resoun of mankinde ne may nat moeven to (that is to seyn, applyen or ioinen to) the simplicitee of the devyne 10 prescience; the whiche simplicitee of the devyne prescience, yif that men mighten thinken it in any maner, that is to seyn, that yif men mighten thinken and comprehenden the thinges as god seeth hem, thanne ne sholde ther dwellen outrely no doute: the whiche resoun and cause of difficultee I shal assaye at the laste to shewe 15 and to speden, whan I have first y-spended and answered to tho resouns by which thou art y-moeved. For I axe why thou wenest that thilke resouns of hem that assoilen this questioun ne ben nat speedful y-nough ne sufficient: the whiche solucioun, or the whiche resoun, for that it demeth that the prescience nis nat cause 20 of necessitee to thinges to comen, than ne weneth it nat that freedom of wil be destorbed or y-let by prescience. For ne drawestow nat arguments from elles-where of the necessitee of thinges to-comen (as who seith, any other wey than thus) but that thilke thinges that the prescience wot biforn ne mowen nat unbityde? 25 That is to seyn, that they moten bityde. But thanne, yif that prescience ne putteth no necessitee to thinges to comen, as thou thy-self hast confessed it and biknowen a litel her-biforn, what cause or what is it (as who seith, ther may no cause be) by which that the endes voluntarie of thinges mighten be constreined to 30 certein bitydinge? For by grace of positioun, so that thou mowe the betere understonde this that folweth, I pose, per impossibile, that ther be no prescience. Thanne axe I,' quod she, 'in as mochel as apertieneth to that, sholden thanne thinges that comen of free wil ben constreined to bityden by necessitee?' 35 Boece. 'Nay,' quod I. 'Thanne ayeinward,' quod she, 'I suppose that ther be prescience, but that it ne putteth no necessitee to thinges; thanne trowe I, that thilke selve freedom of wil shal dwellen al hool and absolut and unbounden. But thou wolt seyn that, al-be-it so that 40 prescience nis nat cause of the necessitee of bitydinge to thinges to comen, algates yit it is a signe that the thinges ben to bityden by necessitee. By this manere thanne, al-thogh the prescience ne hadde never y-ben, yit algate or at the leeste weye it is certein thing, that the endes and bitydinges of thinges to comen sholden 45 ben necessarie. For every signe sheweth and signifyeth only what the thing is, but it ne maketh nat the thing that it signifyeth. For which it bihoveth first to shewen, that no-thing ne bitydeth that it ne bitydeth by necessitee, so that it may appere that the prescience is signe of this necessitee; or elles, yif ther nere no necessitee, 50 certes, thilke prescience ne mighte nat be signe of thing that nis nat. But certes, it is now certein that the proeve of this, y-sustened by stidefast resoun, ne shal nat ben lad ne proeved by signes ne by arguments y-taken fro with-oute, but by causes covenable and necessarie. But thou mayst seyn, how may it be 55 that the thinges ne bityden nat that ben y-purveyed to comen? But, certes, right as we trowen that tho thinges which that the purviance wot biforn to comen ne ben nat to bityden; but that ne sholden we nat demen; but rather, al-thogh that they shal bityden, yit ne have they no necessitee of hir kinde to bityden. 60 And this maystow lightly aperceiven by this that I shal seyn. For we seen many thinges whan they ben don biforn oure eyen, right as men seen the cartere worken in the torninge or atempringe or adressinge of hise cartes or charietes. And by this manere (as who seith, maystow understonde) of alle othere workmen. Is ther 65 thanne any necessitee, as who seith, in oure lokinge, that constreineth or compelleth any of thilke thinges to ben don so?' Boece. 'Nay,' quod I; 'for in ydel and in veyn were al the effect of craft, yif that alle thinges weren moeved by constreininge;' that is to seyn, by constreininge of oure eyen or of oure sight. 70 Philosophie. 'The thinges thanne,' quod she, 'that, whan men doon hem, ne han no necessitee that men doon hem, eek tho same thinges, first or they ben doon, they ben to comen with-oute necessitee. For-why ther ben somme thinges to bityden, of which the endes and the bitydinges of hem ben absolut and quit of alle 75 necessitee. For certes, I ne trowe nat that any man wolde seyn this: that tho thinges that men doon now, that they ne weren to bityden first or they weren y-doon; and thilke same thinges, al-thogh that men had y-wist hem biforn, yit they han free bitydinges. For right as science of thinges present ne bringeth in 80 no necessitee to thinges that men doon, right so the prescience of thinges to comen ne bringeth in no necessitee to thinges to bityden. But thou mayst seyn, that of thilke same it is y-douted, as whether that of thilke thinges that ne han non issues and bitydinges necessaries, yif ther-of may ben any prescience; for 85 certes, they semen to discorden. For thou wenest that, yif that thinges ben y-seyn biforn, that necessitee folweth hem; and yif necessitee faileth hem, they ne mighten nat ben wist biforn, and that no-thing ne may ben comprehended by science but certein; and yif tho thinges that ne han no certein bitydinges ben purveyed 90 as certein, it sholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat soothfastnesse of science. And thou wenest that it be diverse fro the hoolnesse of science that any man sholde deme a thing to ben other-weys thanne it is it-self. And the cause of this erroure is, that of alle the thinges that every wight hath y-knowe, they wenen that tho 95 thinges been y-knowe al-oonly by the strengthe and by the nature of the thinges that ben y-wist or y-knowe; and it is al the contrarie. For al that ever is y-knowe, it is rather comprehended and knowen, nat after his strengthe and his nature, but after the facultee, that is to seyn, the power and the nature, of hem that 100 knowen. And, for that this thing shal mowen shewen by a short ensaumple: the same roundnesse of a body, other-weys the sighte of the eye knoweth it, and other-weyes the touchinge. The lokinge, by castinge of his bemes, waiteth and seeth from afer al the body to-gidere, with-oute moevinge of it-self; but the touchinge 105 clyveth and conioineth to the rounde body, and moeveth aboute the environinge, and comprehendeth by parties the roundnesse. And the man him-self, other-weys wit biholdeth him, and other-weys imaginacioun, and other-weys resoun, and other-weys intelligence. For the wit comprehendeth withoute-forth the 110 figure of the body of the man that is establissed in the matere subiect; but the imaginacioun comprehendeth only the figure withoute the matere. Resoun surmounteth imaginacioun, and comprehendeth by universal lokinge the comune spece that is in the singuler peces. But the eye of intelligence is heyere; for 115 it surmounteth the environinge of the universitee, and looketh, over that, by pure subtilitee of thoght, thilke same simple forme of man that is perdurably in the divyne thoght. In whiche this oughte greetly to ben considered, that the heyeste strengthe to comprehenden thinges enbraseth and contieneth the lowere 120 strengthe; but the lowere strengthe ne aryseth nat in no manere to heyere strengthe. For wit ne may no-thing comprehende out of matere, ne the imaginacioun ne loketh nat the universels speces, ne resoun taketh nat the simple forme so as intelligence taketh it; but intelligence, that looketh al aboven, whan it hath 125 comprehended the forme, it knoweth and demeth alle the thinges that ben under that forme. But she knoweth hem in thilke manere in the whiche it comprehendeth thilke same simple forme that ne may never ben knowen to none of that other; that is to seyn, to none of tho three forseide thinges of the sowle. For it knoweth 130 the universitee of resoun, and the figure of the imaginacioun, and the sensible material conceived by wit; ne it ne useth nat nor of resoun ne of imaginacioun ne of wit withoute-forth; but it biholdeth alle thinges, so as I shal seye, by a strok of thought formely, withoute discours or collacioun. Certes resoun, whan it 135 looketh any-thing universel, it ne useth nat of imaginacioun, nor of witte, and algates yit it comprehendeth the thinges imaginable and sensible; for resoun is she that diffinisseth the universel of hir conseyte right thus:—man is a resonable two-foted beest. And how so that this knowinge is universel, yet nis ther no wight that 140 ne woot wel that a man is a thing imaginable and sensible; and this same considereth wel resoun; but that nis nat by imaginacioun nor by wit, but it looketh it by a resonable concepcioun. Also imaginacioun, al-be-it so that it taketh of wit the beginninges to seen and to formen the figures, algates, al-thogh that wit ne were 145 nat present, yit it environeth and comprehendeth alle thinges sensible; nat by resoun sensible of deminge, but by resoun imaginatif. Seestow nat thanne that alle the thinges, in knowinge, usen more of hir facultee or of hir power than they doon of the facultee or power of thinges that ben y-knowe? Ne that nis nat 150 wrong; for so as every Iugement is the dede or doinge of him that demeth, it bihoveth that every wight performe the werk and his entencioun, nat of foreine power, but of his propre power.

The Porche, that is to seyn, a gate of the town of Athenes ther-as philosophres hadden hir congregacioun to desputen, thilke Porche broughte som-tyme olde men, ful derke in hir sentences, that is to seyn, philosophres that highten Stoiciens, that wenden that images 5 and sensibilitees, that is to seyn, sensible imaginaciouns, or elles imaginaciouns of sensible thinges, weren empreinted in-to sowles fro bodies withoute-forth; as who seith, that thilke Stoiciens wenden that the sowle hadde ben naked of it-self, as a mirour or a clene parchemin, so that alle figures mosten first comen fro thinges fro 10 withoute-forth in-to sowles, and ben empreinted in-to sowles: Text: right as we ben wont som-tyme, by a swifte pointel, to ficchen lettres empreinted in the smothenesse or in the pleinnesse of the table of wex or in parchemin that ne hath no figure ne note in it. Glose. But now argueth Boece ayeins that opinioun, and seith 15 thus: But yif the thryvinge sowle ne unpleyteth no-thing, that is to seyn, ne doth no-thing, by his propre moevinges, but suffreth and lyth subgit to tho figures and to tho notes of bodies withoute-forth, and yildeth images ydel and veyn in the manere of a mirour, whennes thryveth thanne or whennes comth thilke knowinge in 20 our sowle, that discerneth and biholdeth alle thinges? And whennes is thilke strengthe that biholdeth the singuler thinges; or whennes is the strengthe that devydeth thinges y-knowe; and thilke strengthe that gadereth to-gidere the thinges devyded; and the strengthe that cheseth his entrechaunged wey? For som-tyme 25 it heveth up the heved, that is to seyn, that it heveth up the entencioun to right heye thinges; and som-tyme it descendeth in-to right lowe thinges. And whan it retorneth in-to him-self, it reproeveth and destroyeth the false thinges by the trewe thinges. Certes, this strengthe is cause more efficient, and mochel 30 more mighty to seen and to knowe thinges, than thilke cause that suffreth and receiveth the notes and the figures impressed in maner of matere. Algates the passioun, that is to seyn, the suffraunce or the wit, in the quike body, goth biforn, excitinge and moevinge the strengthes of the thought. Right so as whan that 35 cleernesse smyteth the eyen and moeveth hem to seen, or right so as vois or soun hurteleth to the eres and commoeveth hem to herkne, than is the strengthe of the thought y-moeved and excited, and clepeth forth, to semblable moevinges, the speces that it halt with-inne it-self; and addeth tho speces to the notes 40 and to the thinges withoute-forth, and medleth the images of thinges withoute-forth to tho formes y-hidde with-inne him-self.

But what yif that in bodies to ben feled, that is to seyn, in the takinge of knowelechinge of bodily thinges, and al-be-it so that the qualitees of bodies, that ben obiecte fro withoute-forth, moeven and entalenten the instruments of the wittes; and al-be-it so that 5 the passioun of the body, that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce, goth to-forn the strengthe of the workinge corage, the which passioun or suffraunce clepeth forth the dede of the thoght in him-self, and moeveth and exciteth in this mene whyle the formes that resten withinne-forth; and yif that, in sensible bodies, as I have 10 seyd, our corage nis nat y-taught or empreinted by passioun to knowe thise thinges, but demeth and knoweth, of his owne strengthe, the passioun or suffraunce subiect to the body: moche more thanne tho thinges that ben absolut and quite fro alle talents or affecciouns of bodies, as god or his aungeles, ne folwen nat in 15 discerninge thinges obiect fro withoute-forth, but they accomplisshen and speden the dede of hir thoght. By this resoun thanne ther comen many maner knowinges to dyverse and differinge substaunces. For the wit of the body, the whiche wit is naked and despoiled of alle other knowinges, thilke wit 20 comth to beestes that ne mowen nat moeven hem-self her and ther, as oystres and muscules, and other swiche shelle-fish of the see, that clyven and ben norisshed to roches. But the imaginacioun comth to remuable beestes, that semen to han talent to fleen or to desiren any thing. But resoun is al-only to the linage 25 of mankinde, right as intelligence is only [to] the devyne nature: of which it folweth, that thilke knowinge is more worth than thise othre, sin it knoweth by his propre nature nat only his subiect, as who seith, it ne knoweth nat al-only that apertieneth properly to his knowinge, but it knoweth the subiects of alle other knowinges. 30 But how shal it thanne be, yif that wit and imaginacioun stryven ayein resoninge, and seyn, that of thilke universel thing that resoun weneth to seen, that it nis right naught? For wit and imaginacioun seyn that that, that is sensible or imaginable, it ne may nat be universel. Thanne is either the Iugement of resoun 35 sooth, ne that ther nis nothing sensible; or elles, for that resoun wot wel that many thinges ben subiect to wit and to imaginacioun, thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn and false, which that loketh and comprehendeth that that is sensible and singuler as universel. And yif that resoun wolde answeren ayein to thise 40 two, that is to seyn, to witte and to imaginacioun, and seyn, that soothly she hir-self, that is to seyn, resoun, loketh and comprehendeth, by resoun of universalitee, bothe that that is sensible and that that is imaginable; and that thilke two, that is to seyn, wit and imaginacioun, ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhansen hem-self 45 to the knowinge of universalitee, for that the knowinge of hem ne may exceden ne surmounte the bodily figures: certes, of the knowinge of thinges, men oughten rather yeven credence to the more stedefast and to the more parfit Iugement. In this maner stryvinge thanne, we that han strengthe of resoninge and 50 of imagininge and of wit, that is to seyn, by resoun and by imaginacioun and by wit, we sholde rather preyse the cause of resoun; as who seith, than the cause of wit and of imaginacioun. Semblable thing is it, that the resoun of mankinde ne weneth nat that the devyne intelligence bi-holdeth or knoweth thinges to 55 comen, but right as the resoun of mankinde knoweth hem. For thou arguest and seyst thus: that yif it ne seme nat to men that some thinges han certein and necessarie bitydinges, they ne mowen nat ben wist biforn certeinly to bityden. And thanne nis ther no prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe that 60 prescience be in thise thinges, thanne is ther no-thing that it ne bitydeth by necessitee. But certes, yif we mighten han the Iugement of the devyne thoght, as we ben parsoneres of resoun, right so as we han demed that it behoveth that imaginacioun and wit be binethe resoun, right so wolde we demen that it were rightful 65 thing, that mannes resoun oughte to submitten it-self and to ben binethe the divyne thoght. For which, yif that we mowen, as who seith, that, yif that we mowen, I counseyle, that we enhanse us in-to the heighte of thilke sovereyn intelligence; for ther shal resoun wel seen that, that it ne may nat biholden in it-self. And 70 certes that is this, in what maner the prescience of god seeth alle thinges certeins and diffinisshed, al-thogh they ne han no certein issues or bitydinges; ne this is non opinioun, but it is rather the simplicitee of the sovereyn science, that nis nat enclosed nor y-shet within none boundes.

The beestes passen by the erthes by ful diverse figures. For som of hem han hir bodies straught and crepen in the dust, and drawen after hem a tras or a foruh y-continued; that is to seyn, as nadres or snakes. And other beestes, by the wandringe lightnesse 5 of hir winges, beten the windes, and over-swimmen the spaces of the longe eyr by moist fleeinge. And other beestes gladen hem-self to diggen hir tras or hir steppes in the erthe with hir goings or with hir feet, and to goon either by the grene feldes, or elles to walken under the wodes. And al-be-it so that thou seest that 10 they alle discorden by diverse formes, algates hir faces, enclined, hevieth hir dulle wittes. Only the linage of man heveth heyeste his heye heved, and stondeth light with his up-right body, and biholdeth the erthes under him. And, but-yif thou, erthely man, wexest yvel out of thy wit, this figure amonesteth thee, that axest 15 the hevene with thy righte visage, and hast areysed thy fore-heved, to beren up a-heigh thy corage; so that thy thoght ne be nat y-hevied ne put lowe under fote, sin that thy body is so heye areysed.

Therfor thanne, as I have shewed a litel her-biforn, that al thing that is y-wist nis nat knowen by his nature propre, but by the nature of hem that comprehenden it, lat us loke now, in as mochel as it is leveful to us, as who seith, lat us loke now as we 5 mowen, which that the estat is of the devyne substaunce; so that we mowen eek knowen what his science is. The commune Iugement of alle creatures resonables thanne is this: that god is eterne. Lat us considere thanne what is eternitee; for certes that shal shewen us to-gidere the devyne nature and the devyne science. 10 Eternitee, thanne, is parfit possessioun and al-togidere of lyf interminable; and that sheweth more cleerly by the comparisoun or the collacioun of temporel thinges. For al thing that liveth in tyme it is present, and procedeth fro preterits in-to futures, that is to seyn, fro tyme passed in-to tyme cominge; ne ther nis no-thing 15 establisshed in tyme that may enbracen to-gider al the space of his lyf. For certes, yit ne hath it taken the tyme of to-morwe, and it hath lost the tyme of yisterday. And certes, in the lyf of this day, ye ne liven no more but right as in the moevable and transitorie moment. Thanne thilke thing that suffreth temporel 20 condicioun, al-thogh that it never bigan to be, ne thogh it never cese for to be, as Aristotle demed of the world, and al-thogh that the lyf of it be strecched with infinitee of tyme, yit algates nis it no swich thing that men mighten trowen by right that it is eterne. For al-thogh that it comprehende and embrace the space 25 of lyf infinit, yit algates ne embraceth it nat the space of the lyf al-togider; for it ne hath nat the futures that ne ben nat yit, ne it ne hath no lenger the preterits that ben y-doon or y-passed. But thilke thing thanne, that hath and comprehendeth to-gider al the plentee of the lyf interminable, to whom ther ne faileth naught of 30 the future, and to whom ther nis naught of the preterit escaped nor y-passed, thilke same is y-witnessed and y-proeved by right to be eterne. And it bihoveth by necessitee that thilke thing be al-wey present to him-self, and compotent; as who seith, al-wey present to him-self, and so mighty that al be right at his plesaunce; 35 and that he have al present the infinitee of the moevable tyme. Wher-for som men trowen wrongfully that, whan they heren that it semede to Plato that this world ne hadde never beginninge of tyme, ne that it never shal han failinge, they wenen in this maner that this world be maked coeterne with his maker; as who 40 seith, they wene that this world and god ben maked togider eterne, and that is a wrongful weninge. For other thing is it to ben y-lad by lyf interminable, as Plato graunted to the world, and other thing is it to embrace to-gider al the present of the lyf interminable, the whiche thing it is cleer and manifest that it is propre to the 45 devyne thoght. Ne it ne sholde nat semen to us, that god is elder thanne thinges that ben y-maked by quantitee of tyme, but rather by the propretee of his simple nature. For this ilke infinit moevinge of temporel thinges folweth this presentarie estat of lyf unmoevable; 50 and so as it ne may nat countrefeten it ne feynen it ne be evenlyke to it for the inmoevabletee, that is to seyn, that is in the eternitee of god, it faileth and falleth in-to moevinge fro the simplicitee of the presence of god, and disencreseth in-to the infinit quantitee of future and of preterit: and so as it ne may nat han 55 to-gider al the plentee of the lyf, algates yit, for as moche as it ne ceseth never for to ben in som maner, it semeth som-del to us, that it folweth and resembleth thilke thing that it ne may nat atayne to ne fulfillen, and bindeth it-self to som maner presence of this litel and swifte moment: the which presence of this litel 60 and swifte moment, for that it bereth a maner image or lyknesse of the ay-dwellinge presence of god, it graunteth, to swiche maner thinges as it bitydeth to, that it semeth hem as thise thinges han y-ben, and ben. And, for that the presence of swich litel moment ne may nat 65 dwelle, ther-for it ravisshed and took the infinit wey of tyme, that is to seyn, by successioun; and by this maner is it y-doon, for that it sholde continue the lyf in goinge, of the whiche lyf it ne mighte nat enbrace the plentee in dwellinge. And for-thy, yif we wollen putten worthy names to thinges, and folwen Plato, lat us seye 70 thanne soothly, that god is eterne, and the world is perpetuel. Thanne, sin that every Iugement knoweth and comprehendeth by his owne nature thinges that ben subiect un-to him, ther is soothly to god, al-weys, an eterne and presentarie estat; and the science of him, that over-passeth al temporel moevement, dwelleth in the 75 simplicitee of his presence, and embraceth and considereth alle the infinit spaces of tymes, preterits and futures, and loketh, in his simple knowinge, alle thinges of preterit right as they weren y-doon presently right now. Yif thou wolt thanne thenken and avyse the prescience, by which it knoweth alle thinges, thou ne 80 shal nat demen it as prescience of thinges to comen, but thou shalt demen it more rightfully that it is science of presence or of instaunce, that never ne faileth. For which it nis nat y-cleped "previdence," but it sholde rather ben cleped "purviaunce," that is establisshed ful fer fro right lowe thinges, and biholdeth from 85 a-fer alle thinges, right as it were fro the heye heighte of thinges. Why axestow thanne, or why desputestow thanne, that thilke thinges ben doon by necessitee whiche that ben y-seyn and knowen by the devyne sighte, sin that, forsothe, men ne maken nat thilke thinges necessarie which that they seen ben y-doon in 90 hir sighte? For addeth thy biholdinge any necessitee to thilke thinges that thou biholdest presente?' 'Nay,' quod I. Philosophie. 'Certes, thanne, if men mighte maken any digne comparisoun or collacioun of the presence devyne and of the 95 presence of mankinde, right so as ye seen some thinges in this temporel present, right so seeth god alle thinges by his eterne present. Wher-fore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth nat the nature ne the propretee of thinges, but biholdeth swiche thinges present to him-ward as they shullen bityde to yow-ward in tyme 100 to comen. Ne it confoundeth nat the Iugement of thinges; but by o sighte of his thought, he knoweth the thinges to comen, as wel necessarie as nat necessarie. Right so as whan ye seen to-gider a man walken on the erthe and the sonne arysen in the hevene, al-be-it so that ye seen and biholden that oon and 105 that other to-gider, yit natheles ye demen and discernen that that oon is voluntarie and that other necessarie. Right so thanne the devyne lookinge, biholdinge alle thinges under him, ne troubleth nat the qualitee of thinges that ben certeinly present to him-ward; but, as to the condicioun of tyme, forsothe, they ben future. For 110 which it folweth, that this nis noon opinioun, but rather a stedefast knowinge, y-strengthed by soothnesse, that, whanne that god knoweth anything to be, he ne unwot nat that thilke thing wanteth necessitee to be; this is to seyn, that, whan that god knoweth any thing to bityde, he wot wel that it ne hath no necessitee to bityde. 115 And yif thou seyst heer, that thilke thing that god seeth to bityde, it ne may nat unbityde (as who seith, it mot bityde), and thilke thing that ne may nat unbityde it mot bityde by necessitee, and that thou streyne me by this name of necessitee: certes, I wol wel confessen and biknowe a thing of ful sad trouthe, but 120 unnethe shal ther any wight mowe seen it or come ther-to, but-yif that he be biholder of the devyne thoght. For I wol answeren thee thus: that thilke thing that is future, whan it is referred to the devyne knowinge, thanne is it necessarie; but certes, whan it is understonden in his owne kinde, men seen it is outrely free, 125 and absolut fro alle necessitee. For certes, ther ben two maneres of necessitee. That oon necessitee is simple, as thus: that it bihoveth by necessitee, that alle men be mortal or deedly. Another necessitee is conditionel, as thus: yif thou wost that a man walketh, it bihoveth by necessitee 130 that he walke. Thilke thing thanne that any wight hath y-knowe to be, it ne may ben non other weyes thanne he knoweth it to be. But this condicioun ne draweth nat with hir thilke necessitee simple. For certes, this necessitee conditionel, the propre nature of it ne maketh it nat, but the adieccioun of the condicioun 135 maketh it. For no necessitee ne constreyneth a man to gon, that goth by his propre wil; al-be-it so that, whan he goth, that it is necessarie that he goth. Right on this same maner thanne, yif that the purviaunce of god seeth any thing present, than mot thilke thing ben by necessitee, al-thogh that it ne have 140 no necessitee of his owne nature. But certes, the futures that bityden by freedom of arbitre, god seeth hem alle to-gider present. Thise thinges thanne, yif they ben referred to the devyne sighte, thanne ben they maked necessarie by the condicioun of the devyne knowinge. But certes, yif thilke thinges be considered 145 by hem-self, they ben absolut of necessitee, and ne forleten nat ne cesen nat of the libertee of hir owne nature. Thanne, certes, with-oute doute, alle the thinges shollen ben doon which that god wot biforn that they ben to comen. But som of hem comen and bityden of free arbitre or of free wille, that, al-be-it so that 150 they bityden, yit algates ne lese they nat hir propre nature in beinge; by the which first, or that they weren y-doon, they hadden power nat to han bitid.' Boece. 'What is this to seyn thanne,' quod I, 'that thinges ne ben nat necessarie by hir propre nature, so as they comen in alle 155 maneres in the lyknesse of necessitee by the condicioun of the devyne science?' Philosophie. 'This is the difference,' quod she; 'that tho thinges that I purposede thee a litel heer-biforn, that is to seyn, the sonne arysinge and the man walkinge, that, ther-whyles that 160 thilke thinges been y-doon, they ne mighte nat ben undoon; natheles, that oon of hem, or it was y-doon, it bihoved by necessitee that it was y-doon, but nat that other. Right so is it here, that the thinges that god hath present, with-oute doute they shollen been. But som of hem descendeth of the nature of 165 thinges, as the sonne arysinge; and som descendeth of the power of the doeres, as the man walkinge. Thanne seide I no wrong, that yif these thinges ben referred to the devyne knowinge, thanne ben they necessarie; and yif they ben considered by hem-self, thanne ben they absolut fro the bond of necessitee. Right so as 170 alle thinges that apereth or sheweth to the wittes, yif thou referre it to resoun, it is universel; and yif thou referre it or loke it to it-self, than is it singuler. But now, yif thou seyst thus, that yif it be in my power to chaunge my purpos, than shal I voide the purviaunce of god, whan that, peraventure, I shal han chaunged 175 the thinges that he knoweth biforn, thanne shal I answere thee thus. Certes, thou mayst wel chaunge thy purpos; but, for as mochel as the present soothnesse of the devyne purviaunce biholdeth that thou mayst chaunge thy purpos, and whether thou wolt chaunge it or no, and whiderward that thou torne it, thou ne 180 mayst nat eschuen the devyne prescience; right as thou ne mayst nat fleen the sighte of the presente eye, al-though that thou torne thy-self by thy free wil in-to dyverse acciouns. But thou mayst seyn ayein: "How shal it thanne be? Shal nat the devyne science be chaunged by my disposicioun, whan that I wol o thing 185 now, and now another? And thilke prescience, ne semeth it nat to entrechaunge stoundes of knowinge;"' as who seith, ne shal it nat seme to us, that the devyne prescience entrechaungeth hise dyverse stoundes of knowinge, so that it knowe sum-tyme o thing and sum-tyme the contrarie of that thing? 190 'No, forsothe,' quod I. Philosophie. 'For the devyne sighte renneth to-forn and seeth alle futures, and clepeth hem ayein, and retorneth hem to the presence of his propre knowinge; ne he ne entrechaungeth nat, so as thou wenest, the stoundes of forknowinge, as now this, now that; but 195 he ay-dwellinge comth biforn, and embraceth at o strook alle thy mutaciouns. And this presence to comprehenden and to seen alle thinges, god ne hath nat taken it of the bitydinge of thinges to come, but of his propre simplicitee. And her-by is assoiled thilke thing that thou puttest a litel her-biforn, that is to seyn, 200 that it is unworthy thing to seyn, that our futures yeven cause of the science of god. For certes, this strengthe of the devyne science, which that embraceth alle thinges by his presentarie knowinge, establissheth maner to alle thinges, and it ne oweth naught to latter thinges; and sin that these thinges ben thus, 205 that is to seyn, sin that necessitee nis nat in thinges by the devyne prescience, than is ther freedom of arbitre, that dwelleth hool and unwemmed to mortal men. Ne the lawes ne purposen nat wikkedly medes and peynes to the willinges of men that ben unbounden and quite of alle necessitee. And god, biholder and 210 for-witer of alle thinges, dwelleth above; and the present eternitee of his sighte renneth alwey with the dyverse qualitee of oure dedes, despensinge and ordeyninge medes to goode men, and torments to wikked men. Ne in ydel ne in veyn ne ben ther nat put in god hope and preyeres, that ne mowen nat ben unspeedful 215 ne with-oute effect, whan they ben rightful. Withstond thanne and eschue thou vyces; worshipe and love thou virtues; areys thy corage to rightful hopes; yilde thou humble preyeres a-heigh. Gret necessitee of prowesse and vertu is encharged and commaunded to yow, yif ye nil nat dissimulen; 220 sin that ye worken and doon, that is to seyn, your dedes or your workes, biforn the eyen of the Iuge that seeth and demeth alle thinges.' To whom be glorye and worshipe by infinit tymes. Amen.