V. THE PART IS DERIVED FROM THE WHOLE, THE IMPERFECT FROM THE PERFECT. (continued 6)

P. Do you wish me to conform for awhile to the language of the people, lest we should seem to depart too much from the popular mode of expression? wilt þou þan quod she þat I proche a litel to þe wordes of þe poeple so it seme nat to hem þat I be ouer moche departid as fro þe vsage of man kynde. B. As you please. as þou wolt quod I. P. Is everything profitable that is good? ¶ Demest 4184 þou nat quod she þat al þing þat profitiþ is good. B. Yes, certainly. ȝis quod I. P. That which exercises or corrects is profitable? certis þilk þing þat exercisiþ or corigiþ profitiþ. B. It is. I confesse it wel quod I. P. Therefore it is good? þan is it good quod she. B. Yes. whi nat quod I. P. This is the fortune of the virtuous who combat with adversity, or of those who, relinquishing vice, pursue the path of virtue? but þis is þe fortune [quod she] of 4188 hem þat eiþer ben put in vertue and batailen aȝeins aspre þinges. or ellys of hem þat eschewen and declinen fro vices and taken þe weye of vertue. B. It is. ¶ þis ne may nat I denye quod I P. The vulgar regard that prosperity which is bestowed as a reward on the good to be beneficial, and they believe those calamities by which the wicked are punished as the most miserable things that can be imagined. ¶ But what seist þou of þe myrye 4192 fortune þat is ȝeuen to good folk in gerdoun deuiniþ ouȝt þe poeples þat it is wicked. nay forsoþe quod I. but þei demen as it soþe is þat it is ryȝt good. ¶ And what seist þou of þat oþer fortune quod she. þat al þouȝ it 4196 be aspre and restreiniþ þe shrewes by ryȝtful tourment. weniþ ouȝt þe poeple þat it be good. nay quod I. ¶ But þe poeple demiþ þat it be most wrecched of alle þinges þat may ben þouȝt. But in following the popular opinion, let us beware of being involved in some new and incredible conse­quence. war now and loke wel quod she 4200 lest þat we in folwyng þe opynioun of poeple haue confessed and concluded þing þat is vnable to be wened to þe poeple. B. What is that? what is þat quod I P. We have decided that the fortune of the virtuous or of those growing up in virtue must needs be good—but that the fortune of the wicked must be most wretched. ¶ Certys quod she it folweþ or comeþ of þinges þat ben graunted þat alle 4204 fortune what so euer it be. of hem þat eyþer ben in possessioun of vertue. [or in the encres of vertu] or ellys in þe purchasynge of vertue. þat þilke fortune is good. ¶ And þat alle fortune is ryȝt wicked to hem þat 4208 dwellen in shrewednesse. as who seiþ. and þus weneþ nat þe poeple.

for whiche vlixes hadde ioie whan he saw poliphemus 4256 wepyng and blynde. Hercules is renowned for his many labours, so successfully overcome. ¶ Hercules is celebrable for hys hard[e] trauaile He overthrew the proud Centaurs; he dawntede þe proude Centauris half hors half man. he slew the Nemean lion and wore his skin as a trophy of his victory; and he rafte þe despoylynge fro þe cruel lyoun þat is to seyne he slouȝ þe lyoun and 4260 rafte hym hys skyn. he smote the Harpies with his arrows; he smot þe brids þat hyȝten arpijs [in þe palude of lyrne] wiþ certeyne arwes. he caried off the golden apples of the Hesperides, and killed the watchful dragon; he rauyssed[e] applis fro þe wakyng dragoun. and hys hand was þe more heuy for þe golde[ne] 4264 metal. he bound Cerberus with a threefold chain; He drouȝ Cerberus þe hound of helle by hys treble cheyne. he gave the body of proud Diomede as food for the tyrant’s horses; he ouer-comer as it is seid haþ put an vnmeke lorde fodre to hys cruel hors ¶ þis is to sein. þat hercules slouȝ diomedes and made his hors 4268 to etyn hym. he slew the serpent Hydra; and he hercules slouȝ Idra þe serpent and brend[e] þe venym. he caused Achelous to hide his blushing head within his banks; and achelaus þe flode defouled[e] in his forhede dreint[e] his shamefast visage in his strondes. þis is to sein þat achelaus couþe transfigure 4272 hym self in to dyuerse lykenesse. and as he fauȝt wiþ orcules at þe laste he turnid[e] hym in to a bole and hercules brak of oon of hys hornes. and achelaus for shame hidde hym in hys ryuer. he left Antæus dead upon the Lybian shore; ¶ And [he] hercules 4276 [* fol. 33 b.] *cast[e] adoun Antheus þe geaunt in þe strondes of libye. he appeased Evander’s wrath by killing Cacus; and kacus apaised[e] þe wraþþes of euander. þis is to sein þat hercules slouȝ þe Monstre kacus and apaised[e] wiþ þat deeþ þe wraþþe of euander. he slew the Erymanthean boar; ¶ And 4280 þe bristled[e] boor marked[e] wiþ scomes þe sholdres of hercules. þe whiche sholdres þe heye cercle of heuene sholde þreste. and bore the weight of Atlas upon his shoulders. and þe laste of his labours was þat he sustened[e] þe heuene vpon his nekke vnbowed. These labours justly raised him to the rank of a god. and he 4284 deserued[e] eftsones þe heuene to ben þe pris of his laste trauayle Go then, ye noble souls, and follow the path of this great example. ¶ Goþ now þan ȝe stronge men þere as þe heye weye of þe grete ensample ledeþ ȝou. ¶ O nice men whi nake ȝe ȝoure bakkes. as who seiþ. O ye slothful ones, wherefore do ye basely fly! ¶ O ȝe 4288 slowe and delicat men whi fley ȝe aduersites. and ne fyȝten nat aȝeins hem by vertue to wynnen þe mede of þe heuene. He who conquers earth doth gain the heavens. for þe erþe ouer-comen ȝeueþ þe sterres. ¶ þis is to seyne þat whan þat erþely lust is ouer-comen. 4292 a man is maked worþi to þe heuene.

If we define Chance to be an event produced by an unintelligent motion, and not by a chain or connection of causes, I should then affirm that Chance is nothing and an empty sound. þat hap is bytidynge y-brouȝt forþe by foelyshe moeuynge. and by no knyttyng of causes. ¶ I conferme þat hap nis ryȝt nauȝt in no wise. and I deme al 4320 outerly þat hap nis ne dwelliþ but a voys. ¶ As who seiþ. but an ydel worde wiþ outen any significacioun of þing summittid to þat vois. What room is there for folly and disorder where all things are restrained by order, through the ordinance of God? for what place myȝt[e] ben left or dwellynge to folie and to disordinaunce. syn þat 4324 god lediþ and streyniþ alle þinges by ordre. For it is a great truth that nothing can spring out of nothing. ¶ For þis sentence is verray and soþe þat no þinge ne haþ his beynge of nouȝt. to [the] whiche sentence none of þise olde folk ne wiþseide neuere al be it so þat þei ne 4328 vndirstoden ne moeueden it nauȝt by god prince and gynner of wirkyng. but þei casten as a manere foundement of subgit material. þat is to seyn of [the] nature of alle resoun. Now, if anything arises without the operation of a cause, it proceeds from nothing. and ȝif þat ony þinge is woxen or comen 4332 of no causes. þan shal it seme þat þilke þinge is comen or woxen of nouȝt. But if this is impossible, then there can be no such a thing as Chance, as we have defined it. but yif þis ne may nat ben don. þan is it nat possible þat þere haþ ben any swiche þing as I haue diffinissid a litel here byforne. B. Is there nothing, then, that may be called Chance or Fortune? ¶ How shal 4336 it þan ben quod I. nis þer þan no þing þat by ryȝt may be cleped eyþer happe or ellis auenture of fortune. Is there nothing (hid from the vulgar) to which these words may be applied? or is [* fol. 34.] þer ouȝt al *be it so þat it is hidd fro þe poeple to whiche þise wordes ben couenable.

A rational being possesses, then, the liberty of choosing and rejecting. ¶ wher-fore in alle þinges þat resoun is. in hem also is 4400 libertee of willyng and of nillynge. This liberty is not equal in all beings. ¶ But I ne ordeyne nat. as who seiþ. I ne graunte nat þat þis libertee be euene like in alle þinges. In heavenly substances, as spirits, &c., judgment is clear, and the will is incorruptible, and has a ready and efficacious power of doing things which are desired. forwhi in þe souereyns deuynes substaunces. [* fol. 34 b.] þat is to *seyn in spiritȝ ¶ Iugement is 4404 more clere and wil nat be corumped. and haþ myȝt redy to speden þinges þat ben desired. The souls of men must needs be more free when employed in the contemplation of the Divine Mind, and less so when they enter into a body, and still less free when enclosed and confined in earthly members; but the most extreme servitude is when they are given over to vice and wholly fallen from their proper reason. ¶ But þe soules of men moten nedes ben more free whan þei loken hem in þe speculacioun or lokynge of þe deuyne þouȝt. and 4408 lasse free whan þei sliden in to þe bodies. and ȝit lasse free whan þei ben gadred to-gidre and comprehendid in erþely membris. but þe last[e] seruage is whan þat þei ben ȝeuen to vices. and han yfalle fro þe possessioun of 4412 hire propre resoun For at once they are enveloped by the cloud of ignorance and are troubled by pernicious desires, by yielding to which they aid and increase that slavery which they brought upon themselves, and thus even under the liberty proper to them, they remain captives. ¶ For after þat þei han cast aweye hir eyen fro þe lyȝt of þe souereyn soþefastnesse to lowe þinges and dirke ¶ Anon þei dirken by þe cloude of ignoraunce and ben troubled by felonous talentȝ. to þe 4416 whiche talentȝ whan þei approchen and assenten. þei hepen and encresen þe seruage whiche þei han ioigned to hem self. and in þis manere þei ben caitifs fro hire propre libertee. Yet the eye of Providence, beholding all things from eternity, sees all this and disposes according to their merit all things as they are predestinated. þe whiche þinges naþeles þe lokynge of 4420 þe deuyne purueaunce seeþ þat alle þinges byholdeþ and seeþ fro eterne. and ordeyneþ hem eueryche in her merites. as þei ben prodestinat. He, as Homer says of the sun, sees and hears all things. and it is seid in grek. þat alle þinges he seeþ and alle þinges he hereþ. 4424

ÞAn seide I B. I am distracted by a more difficult doubt than ever. now am I confounded by a more harde doute þan I was. what doute is þat quod she. ¶ For certys I coniecte now by whiche þinges þou art troubled. God’s foreknowledge seems to me inconsistent with man’s free-will. It semeþ quod I to repugnen and to contrarien 4440 gretly þat god knoweþ byforn alle þinges. and þat þer is any fredom of liberte. For if God foresees all things, and cannot be deceived, then that which Providence hath foreseen must needs happen. for yif so be þat god lokeþ alle þinges byforn. ne god ne may nat ben desseiuid in no manere. þan mot it nedes ben þat alle 4444 þinges bytyden þe whiche þat þe purueaunce of god haþ sein byforn to comen. If God from eternity doth foreknow not only the works, but the designs and wills of men, there can be no liberty of will—nor can there be any other action or will than that which a Divine and infallible Providence hath foreseen. ¶ For whiche yif þat god knoweþ by-forn nat oonly þe werkes of men. but also hir conseils and hir willes. þan ne shal þer be no 4448 liberte of arbitre. ne certys þer ne may ben noon oþer dede ne no wille but þilke whiche þe deuyne purueaunce þat ne may nat ben desseiued haþ feled byforn For if things fall out contrary to such foreseeing, and are wrested another way, the prescience of God in regard to futurity would not be sure and unerring—it would be nothing but an uncertain opinion of them: but I take it to be impious and unlawful to believe this of God. ¶ For yif þat þei myȝten wryþen awey in oþer manere þan þei 4452 ben purueyed. þan ne sholde þer ben no stedfast prescience of þinge to comen but raþer an vncerteyn oppinioun. þe whiche þinge to trowen on god I deme it felonie and vnleueful. Nor do I approve of the reasoning made use of by some. For they say that a thing is not necessarily to happen because God hath foreseen it, but rather because it is to happen it cannot be hid from the divine Providence. ¶ Ne I ne proeue nat þilk 4456 same resoun. as who seiþ I ne allowe nat. or I ne preise nat þilke same resoun by whiche þat som men wenen þat þei mowen assoilen and vnknytten þe knot of þis questioun. ¶ For certys þei seyn þat þing nis nat to 4460 come for þat þe purueaunce of god haþ seyn it byforne. þat is to comen but raþer þe contrarie. ¶ And þat is þis þat for þat þe þing is to comen þat þerfore ne may it nat ben hyd fro þe purueaunce of god. 4464 [* fol. 35.] Now by this reason necessity appears to change sides. For it is not necessary that the things which are foreseen should happen, but it is necessary that the things which are to befall should be foreseen. *and in þis manere þis necessite slydiþ aȝein in to þe contrarie partie. ne it ne byhoueþ [nat] nedes þat þinges bytiden þat ben ypurueid. [but it by-houeth nedes / þat thinges þat ben to comyn ben yporueyid] but as it 4468 were ytrauailed. As if the question was, which was the cause of the other—prescience the cause of the necessity of future events, or the necessity the cause of the prescience of future events? as who seiþ. þat þilke answere procediþ ryȝt as þouȝ men trauailden or weren bysy to enqueren þe whiche þing is cause of whiche þinges. as wheþer þe prescience is cause of þe necessite of þinges to 4472 comen. or ellys þat þe necessite of þinges to comen is cause of þe purueaunce. But I will prove that, however the order of causes may stand, the event of things foreseen is necessary, although prescience doth not seem to impose a necessity upon future things to fall out. ¶ But I ne enforce me nat now to shewen it þat þe bytidyng of þinges y-wist byforn is necessarie. how so or in what manere þat þe ordre of 4476 causes haþ it self. al þouȝ þat it ne seme nat þat þe prescience brynge in necessite of bytydynge of þinges to comen. For if a man sit—the belief in the sitting is true; and, on the other hand, if the opinion is true of his sitting, he must needs sit. ¶ For certys yif þat any wyȝt sitteþ it byhoueþ by necessite þat þe oppinioun be soþe of hym 4480 þat coniectiþ þat he sitteþ. and aȝeinward. al so is it of þe contrarie. yif þe oppinioun be soþe of any wyȝt for þat he sitteþ it byhoueþ by necessite þat he sitte In both cases there is a necessity—in the latter that the person sits—in the former, that the opinion concerning the other is true. ¶ þan is here necessite in þat oon and in þat oþer. for in þat 4484 oon is necessite of sittynge. But the man does not sit because the opinion of his sitting is true, but the opinion is true because the action of his being seated was antecedent in time. and certys in þat oþer is necessite of soþe but þerfore ne sitteþ nat a wyȝt for þat þe oppinioun of sittyng is soþe. but þe oppinioun is raþer soþe for þat a wyȝt sitteþ by-forn. So that although the cause of truth arises from the sitting, there is a common necessity in both. and þus al 4488 þouȝ þat þe cause of soþe comeþ of [þe] syttyng. and nat of þe trewe oppinioun. Algates ȝitte is þer comune necessite in þat oon and in þat oþer. Thus may we reason concerning Providence and future events. ¶ þus sheweþ it þat I may make semblable skils of þe purueaunce of god 4492 and of þinges to come. For allowing things are foreseen because they are to happen, and that they do not befall because they are foreseen, it is necessary that future events should be foreseen of God, or if foreseen that they should happen; and this alone is sufficient to destroy all idea of free-will. ¶ For al þouȝ for þat þat þinges ben to comen. þer-fore ben þei purueid. nat certys for þei ben purueid. þer-fore ne bytide þei nat. ȝit naþeles byhoueþ it by necessite þat eiþer þe þinges to comen 4496 ben ypurueied of god. or ellys þat þe þinges þat ben purueied of god bitiden [.s.] by necessite. ¶ And þis þing oonly suffiseþ I-nouȝ to distroien þe fredome of oure arbitre. þat is to seyn of oure fre wille But it is preposterous to make the happening of temporal things the cause of eternal prescience, which we do in imagining that God foresees future events because they are to happen. ¶ But now 4500 [certes] sheweþ it wel how fer fro þe soþe and how vp so doun is þis þing þat we seyn þat þe bytidinge of temporel þinges is þe cause of þe eterne prescience. ¶ But forto wenen þat god purueiþ [the] þinges to comen. 4504 for þei ben to comen. what oþer þing is it but forto wene þat þilke þinges þat bitiden som tyme ben causes of þilke souereyne purueaunce þat is in god. And, moreover, when I know that anything exists, it is necessary for my belief that it should be. ¶ And her-to I adde ȝitte þis þing þat ryȝt as whan þat I woot 4508 þat o þing is it byhoueþ by necessite þat þilke self þing be. So also when I know that an event shall come to pass, it must needs happen. and eke þat whan I haue knowe þat any þinge shal bitiden so byhoueþ it by necessite þat þilk[e] same þing bytide. The event, therefore, of a thing foreseen must befall. so folweþ it þan þat þe bytydynge of þe 4512 þinge Iwist by-forn ne may nat ben eschewed. Lastly, if a person judge a thing to be different to what it is—this is not knowledge, but a false opinion of it, and far from the true knowledge. ¶ And at þe last[e] yif þat any wyȝt wene a þing to ben oþer weyes þan it is. it nys nat oonly vnscience. but it is deceiuable oppinioun ful diuerse and fer fro þe soþe of 4516 science. If, therefore, a thing be so to happen that the event of it is neither necessary nor certain, how can any one foresee what is to happen? ¶ wher-fore yif any þing be so to comen so þat þe bytydynge of it ne be nat certeyne ne necessarie. ¶ who may weten [byforn] þat þilke þing is to come.

For as pure knowledge has no element in it of falsehood, so what is comprehended by true knowledge cannot be otherwise than as comprehended. ¶ For ryȝt as science ne may nat be medelyd wiþ falsnesse. 4520 as who seiþ þat yif I woot a þing. it ne may nat be fals þat I ne woot it. ¶ Ryȝt so þilk þing þat is conceyued by science ne may [nat] ben noon oþer weyes þan [as] it is conceiued. Hence it is that true knowledge cannot err, because everything must precisely be what true knowledge perceives it to be. For þat is þe cause 4524 whi þat science wantiþ lesynge. as who seiþ. whi þat witynge ne receyueþ nat lesynge of þat it woot. ¶ For it byhoueþ by necessite þat euery þinge [be] ryȝt as science comprehendiþ it to be. What follows, then? How does God foreknow these uncertain contingencies? what shal I þan sein. ¶ In 4528 whiche manere knoweþ god byforn þe þinges to comen. ¶ yif þei ne be nat certeyne. For if he thinks that a thing will inevitably happen, which possibly may not, he is deceived—but this is sheer blasphemy. ¶ For yif þat he deme þat þei ben to comen vneschewably. and so may be þat [* fol. 35 b.] it is possible þat þei ne shullen *nat comen. god is 4532 desseiued. but nat only to trowen þat god is desseiued. but for to speke it wiþ mouþe it is a felonous synne. But if God discerns that just as things are to come they shall come; if he knows that they may or may not come, what sort of prescience is this, which comprehends nothing certain, nothing invariable? ¶ But yif þat god woot þat ryȝt so as þinges ben to comen. so shulle þei comen. so þat he wit[e] egaly. as 4536 who seiþ indifferently þat þinges mowen ben don or ellys nat don. what is þilke prescience þat ne comprehendiþ no certeyne þinge ne stable. Or how does divine prescience differ from human opinion, if He hath an uncertain judgment of things, whereof the events are uncertain and unfixed? or ellys what difference is þer bytwixe þe prescience. and þilke iape-worþi 4540 dyuynynge of Tiresie þe diuinour þat seide. ¶ Al þat I seie quod he eyþer it shal be. or ellys it ne shal nat be. Or ellis how moche is worþe þe diuyne prescience more þan þe oppinioun of mankynde yif so be þat it 4544 demeþ þe þinges vncerteyne as men don. of þe whiche domes of men þe bytydynge nis nat certeyne. But if there can be no uncertainty in his knowledge, who is the source of all certainty; the event of all things which he foreknows must be fixed and inevitable. ¶ But yif so be þat noon vncerteyne þinge may ben in hym þat is ryȝt certeyne welle of alle þinges. þan is þe 4548 bytydynge certeyne of þilke þinges whiche he haþ wist byforn fermely to comen. Whence it follows that men have no freedom in their designs and actions; because the Divine Mind, endowed with an infallible foresight, constrains and binds them to a certain event. For whiche it folweþ þat þe fredom of þe conseils and of þe werkes of mankynde nis non syn þat þe þouȝt of god seeþ alle þinges with outen 4552 errour of falsnesse byndeþ and constreiniþ hem to a bitidynge by necessite. and yif [this] þing be on-is grauntid and receyued. þat is to seyn. þat þer nis no fre wille. þan sheweþ it wel how gret distruccioun and 4556 how grete damages þer folwen of þinges of mankynde.

¶ For in ydel ben þer þan purposed and byhyȝt medes of goode folk. and peynes to badde folk. syn þat no moeuynge of free corage uoluntarie ne haþ nat deserued 4560 hem. þat is to seyn neiþer mede nor peyne. Rewards and punishments now deemed just and equitable, will be considered most unjust, when, it is allowed, that mankind are not prompted by any will of their own, to either virtue or vice, but in all their actions are impelled by a fatal necessity. ¶ And it sholde seme þan þat þilke þinge is alþer worste whiche þat is nowe demed. for alþer moste iuste and moste ryȝtful. þat is to seyn þat shrewes ben punyssed. or 4564 ellys þat good[e] folk ben ygerdoned. þe whiche folk syn þat þe propre wille [ne] sent hem nat to þat oon ne to þat oþer. þat is to seyn. neþer to good[e] ne to harme. but constreineþ hem certeyne necessite of þinges 4568 to comen. Nor would there be such things as virtue or vice, but such a medley of the one and the other as would be productive of the greatest confusion. ¶ þanne ne shollen þer neuer ben ne neuer weren vice ne vertue. but it sholde raþer ben confusioun of alle desertes medlid wiþoute discresioun. ¶ And ȝitte þer folweþ an oþer inconuenient of þe whiche þer 4572 ne may ben þouȝt ne more felonous ne more wikke. And from this it will follow—that since all order comes of Divine Providence, and that there is no freedom of the human will, that also our vices must be referred to the author of all good—which is a most impious opinion. and þat is þis þat so as þe ordre of þinges is yledd and comeþ of þe purueaunce of god. ne þat no þing nis leueful to þe conseils of mankynde. as who seiþ þat 4576 men han no power to done no þing. ne wilne no þing. þan folweþ it þat oure vices ben refferred to þe mak[er]e of alle good. as who seiþ þan folweþ it. þat god auȝt[e] han þe blame of oure vices. syn he constreiniþ by 4580 necessite to don vices. Then is it useless to hope for anything from God, or to pray to him. þan nis þer no resoun to han hopen in god. ne forto preien to god. For why should men do either, when all they can desire is irreversibly predestined? ¶ For what sholde any wyȝt hopen to god. or whi sholde he preien to god. syn þat þe ordenaunce of destine whiche þat ne 4584 may nat ben enclined. knytteþ and streiniþ alle þinges þat men may desiren. Hope and prayer being thus ineffectual, all intercourse is cut off between God and man. ¶ þan sholde þere be don awey þilke oonly alliaunce bytwixen god and men. þat is to seien to hopen and to preien. By reverent and humble supplication we earn divine grace, a most inestimable favour, and are able to associate with the Deity, and to unite ourselves to the inaccessible light. but by þe preis of ryȝtfulnesse 4588 and of veray mekenesse we deserue þe gerdoun of þe deuyne grace whiche þat is inestimable. þat is to sein þat it is so grete þat it ne may nat ben ful ypreised. and þis is oonly þe manere. þat is to seyen hope and 4592 prayeres. for whiche it semeþ þat [men] mowen speken wiþ god. and by resoun of supplicacioun ben conioigned to þilk clernesse þat nis nat approched no raþer or þat men byseken it and emprenten it. If men believe that hope and prayer have no power because of the necessity of future events, by what other way can we be united, and hold fast to the sovereign Lord of all things? And yif men 4596 ne wene [nat] þat [hope] ne preiers ne han no strengþes. by þe necessite of þinges to comen y-resceiued. what þing is þer þan by whiche we mowen be conioygned and clyuen to þilke souereyne prince of þinges. Wherefore mankind must be dissevered and disunited from the source of its existence, and shrink from its beginning. ¶ For 4600 whiche it byhoueþ by necessite þat þe lynage of mankynde [* fol. 36.] as *þou songe a litel here byforne ben departed and vnioyned from hys welle and faylen of hys bygynnynge. þat is to seien god. 4604

What Say what discordant cause looses the bonds of things? discordable cause haþ to-rent and vnioigned þe byndyng or þe alliaunce of þinges. þat is to seyne þe coniunccioun of god and of man. What power doth make these two great truths (i. e. Providence and Free-will) contend, which when separate are plain and clear, but united appear dark and perplexed? ¶ whiche god haþ establissed so grete bataile bitwixen þise two soþefast 4608 or verray þinges. þat is to sein bytwixen þe purueaunce of god and fre wille. þat þei ben synguler and diuided. ne þat þei ne wolen nat ben medeled ne coupled to-gidre. but þer nis no discorde to [tho] verray 4612 þinges. but þei cleuen certeyne al wey to hem self. The mind of man encumbered by the earthly body, can never, with her cloudy sight, discover the subtle and close bonds of things. but þe þouȝt of man confounded and ouerþrowen by þe dirke membris of þe body ne may nat by fir of his dirk[ed] lokynge. þat is to seyn by þe vigour of hys insyȝt while 4616 þe soule is in þe body knowen þe þinne subtil knyttynges of þinges. But why does man burn with ardour to learn the hidden notes of truth? ¶ But wherfore eschaufiþ it so by so grete loue to fynden þilke note[s] of soþe y-couered. (glosa) þat is to sein wherfore eschaufiþ þe þouȝt of man by so 4620 grete desir to knowen þilke notificaciouns þat ben yhidd vndir þe couertours of soþe. Why gropes he for he knows not what? None seek to know what is known. woot it ouȝt þilke þinges þat it anguissous desireþ to knowe. as who seiþ nay. ¶ For no man ne trauaileþ forto witen þinges þat he woot. 4624 and þerfore þe texte seiþ þus. ¶ [Glosa] Si enim anima ignorat istas subtiles connexiones. responde. vnde est quod desiderat scire cum nil ignotum possit desiderare. ¶ But who traua[i]leþ to wyten þinges y-knowe. If he knows them not, what does he so blindly seek? and yif 4628 þat he ne knoweþ hem nat. what sekiþ þilke blynde þouȝt. Who wishes for things he hath never known? what is he þat desireþ any þinge of whiche he woot ryȝt nat. as who seiþ who so desiriþ any þing nedis som what he knoweþ of it. or ellys he ne couþe 4632 nat desire it. or who may folwen þinges þat ne ben nat ywist Or if he seek, where shall he find them? Or if he find, how shall he be sure that he has found what he sought for? ¶ and þouȝ [þat] he seke þo þinges where shal he fynden hem. what wyȝt þat is al vnknowynge and ignoraunt may knowe þe forme þat is yfounde. The pure soul that sees the divine thought, knows all the secret chains of things. ¶ But 4636 whan þe soule byholdeþ and seeþ þe heye þouȝt. þat is to seyn god. þan knoweþ it to-gidre þe somme and þe singularites. þat is to seyn þe principles and eueryche by hym self. Yet, though now hidden in its fleshly members, it hath some remembrance of its pure state—it retains the sums of things, but has lost their particulars. ¶ But now while þe soule is hidd in þe 4640 cloude and in þe derknesse of þe membris of þe body. it ne haþ nat al forȝeten it selfe. but it wiþholdeþ þe somme of þinges and lesiþ þe singularites. He who seeks truth is not in either circumstance (i. e. seeking for what he knows or knows not), he knoweth not all things, nor hath he wholly forgotten all. þan who so þat sekeþ soþenesse. he nis in neiþer nouþir habit. for 4644 he not nat alle ne he ne haþ nat alle for-ȝeten. But he ponders on what he knows, that he may add those things that he hath forgotten to those that he retains. ¶ But ȝitte hym remembriþ þe somme of þinges þat he wiþholdeþ and axeþ counseil and tretiþ depelyche þinges ysein byforne. [Glosa] þat is to sein þe grete somme in 4648 hys mynde. [textus] so þat he mowe adden þe parties þat he haþ forȝeten. to þilke þat he haþ wiþholden.

Þanne seide P. This is the old objection against Providence, so ably handled by Cicero in his Book of Divination; and you yourself have anxiously discussed it. she. þis is quod she þe olde questioun of þe purueaunce of god. and marcus tulius whan he 4652 deuided[e] þe deuinaciouns. þat is to sein in hys booke þat he wroot of deuinaciouns. he moeued[e] gretly þis questioun. and þou þi self hast souȝt it mochel and outerly and long[e]. But neither of you have offered a satisfactory solution of the difficulty. but ȝit ne haþ it nat ben determined 4656 ne yspedd fermely and diligently of any of yow. The cause of this mystery is that the human understanding cannot conceive the simplicity of the divine prescience, for if it were possible to comprehend this, every difficulty would at once disappear. ¶ And þe cause of þis derkenesse and [of this] difficulte is for þat þe moeuynge of þe resoun of mankynde ne may nat moeuen to. þat is to sein applien or ioygnen to 4660 þe simplicite of þe deuyne prescience. ¶ þe whiche symplicite of þe deuyne prescience ȝif þat men [myhten thinken it in any manere / þat is to seyn / þat yif men] myȝte þinken and comprehenden þe þinges as god seeþ hem. 4664 þan ne sholde þer dwellen outerly no doute. I shall, therefore, try to explain and solve this difficult question. þe whiche resoun and cause of difficulte I shal assaie at þe laste to shewen and to speden. [* fol. 36 b.] ¶ whan I haue *firste [yspendyd / and] ansewered to þo resouns by whiche þou 4668 art ymoeued. I ask, then, why you do not approve the reasoning of such as think—that Prescience does not obstruct the liberty of the will, because it is not the necessitating cause of future events? ¶ For I axe whi þou wenest þat þilk[e] resouns of hem þat assoilen þis questioun ne ben nat spedeful ynouȝ ne sufficient þe whiche solucioun or þe whiche resoun for þat it demiþ þat þe prescience nis nat 4672 cause of necessite to þinges to comen. þan ne weneþ it nat þat fredom of wille be distourbed or ylett by prescience.

Do you draw an argument of the necessity of future events, from any other topic than this,—that those things which are foreknown must of necessity happen? for ne drawest þou nat argumentes from ellys where of þe necessite of þinges to comen. As who seiþ 4676 any oþer wey þan þus. but þat þilke þinge[s] þat þe prescience woot byforn [ne] mowen nat vnbitide. þat is to seyn þat þei moten bitide. If divine prescience imposes no necessity upon future things, must not the issue of things be voluntary, and man’s will free and unconstrained? ¶ But þan yif þat prescience ne putteþ no necessite to þinges to comen. as þou þi self 4680 hast confessed it and byknowen a litel herbyforne. ¶ what cause [or what] is it. as who seiþ þere may no cause be. by whiche þat þe endes (exitus) uoluntarie of þinges myȝten be constreyned to certeyne bitydyng. For argument sake let us suppose there is no prescience, would, then, the events which proceed from free-will alone be under the power of necessity? ¶ For 4684 by grace of possessioun. so þat þou mowe þe better vndirstonde þis þat folweþ. ¶ I pose (inpossibile) þat þer ne be no prescience. þan axe I quod she in as moche as apperteniþ to þat. sholde þan þinges þat 4688 comen of frewille ben constreined to bytiden by necessite. B. No. Boicius. nay quod I. P. Let us, then, admit Prescience, but that it imposes no necessity on what is to happen; the freedom of the will would still remain entire and absolute. þan aȝeinward quod she. I suppose þat þere be prescience but þat ne putteþ no necessite to þinges. þan trowe I þat þilk self fredom 4692 of wille shal dwellen al hool and absolut and vnbounden. But although Prescience, you may say, is not the necessary cause of future events, yet it is a sign that they shall necessarily happen, and hence it follows that, although there were no prescience, future events would still be an inevitable necessity. but þou wolt sein þat al be it so þat prescience nis nat cause of þe necessite of bitidynge to þinges to comen. ¶ Algates ȝitte it is a signe þat þe þinges ben 4696 to bytiden by necessite. by þis manere þan al þouȝ þe prescience ne hadde neuer yben. ȝit algate or at þe lest[e] wey. it is certeyne þing þat þe endys and þe bitydynges of þinges to comen sholde ben necessarie. 4700

The assertion that nothing happens but by necessity, must be proved by arguments drawn from causes connected and agreeing with this necessity, and not from signs or foreign causes. ¶ But certys it is nowe certeyne þat þe preue of þis 4708 susteniþ by stedfast resoun ne shal nat ben ladd ne proued by signes ne by argumentys ytaken fro wiþ oute. but by causes couenable and necessarie ¶ But þou mayst sein how may it be þat þe þinges ne bitiden nat 4712 þat ben ypurueyed to comen. but certys ryȝt as we trowen þat þo þinges whiche þat þe purueaunce woot byforn to comen. ne ben nat to bitiden. but [þat] ne sholde we nat demen. but raþer al þouȝ [þat] þei schal bitiden. 4716 ȝit ne haue þei no necessite of hire kynde to bitiden. and þis maist þou lyȝtly aperceyuen by þis þat I shal seyn. We see many things when they are done before our eyes; such as a charioteer driving his chariot, and other things of like nature. but we seen many þinges whan þei ben don byforn oure eyen ryȝt as men seen þe karter worken in þe 4720 tournynge and in attempryng or in adressyng of hys kartes or chariottes. ¶ and by þis manere as who seiþ mayst þou vnderstonde of alle manere oþir werkemen. Now, is there any necessity which compels these things to be done? ¶ Is þere þanne any necessite as who seiþ in oure lokynge 4724 [þat] constreineþ or compelliþ any of þilke þinges to ben don so. B. No. For if all things were moved by compulsion—the efforts of art would be vain and fruitless. b. nay quod I ¶ For in ydel and in veyne were alle þe effect of crafte yif þat alle þinges weren moeued by constreynynge. þat is to seyn by constreynynge 4728 of oure eyen or of oure syȝt. P. The things, then, which are done are under no necessity that they should be done; then first before they were done, they were under no necessity of coming to pass; wherefore some things happen, the event of which is unconstrained by necessity. P. þise þingus þan quod she þat whan men don hem ne han non necessite þat men don hem. eke þo same þinges first or þei be don. þei ben to comen wiþ out necessite. for whi 4732 þer ben somme þinges to bytide of whiche þe endys [* fol. 37.] and þe bitidynges of hem ben absolut *and quit of alle necessite. These things therefore, although foreknown, have free events: for as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity upon things which are now done, so neither does the foreknowledge of futurities necessitate the things which are to come. for certys I ne trowe nat þat any man wolde seyn þis. þat þo þinges þat men don now þat þei ne weren 4736 to bitiden. first or þei were ydon ¶ and þilk same þinges al þouȝ þat men hadden ywyst hem by-forn. ȝitte þei han fre bitidynges. for ryȝt as science of þinges present ne bryngeþ in no necessite to þinges 4740 [þat men doon // Ryht so the prescience of thinges to comen ne bryngeth in no necessite to thinges] to bytiden But you may doubt whether there can be any certain prescience of things, of which the event is not necessitated: for here there seems to be an evident contradiction. but þou mayst seyn þat of þilke same it is ydouted. as wheþer þat of þilke þinges þat ne han non endes and 4744 bytidynges necessaryes yif þer-of may ben any prescience

If things are foreknown, you may contend they must necessarily happen; and if their event is not necessary, they cannot be foreseen, because true knowledge can comprehend nothing but what is absolutely certain. ¶ For certys þei seme to discorde. for þou wenest þat yif þat þinges ben yseyn byforn þat necessite folweþ hem. and yif (et putas) necessite faileþ hem þei ne 4748 myȝten nat ben wist byforn. and þat no þinge ne may ben comprehendid by science but certeyne. And if things uncertain in their events are foreseen as certain, this knowledge is nothing more than a false opinion. and yif þo þinges þat ne han no certeyne bytidynges ben ypurueied as certeyn. For it is very remote from true knowledge to judge of things otherwise than they really are. it sholde ben dirkenesse of oppinioun nat 4752 soþefastnesse of science [and þou weenyst þat it be diuerse fro the hoolnesse of science / þat any man sholde deme a thing to ben oother weys thanne it is it self]. The cause of this error is that men imagine that their knowledge is wholly derived from the nature of the things known, whereas it is quite the reverse. and þe cause of þis errour is. þat of alle þe þinges þat euery 4756 wyȝt haþ yknowe. þei wenen þat þo þinges ben y-knowe al oonly by þe strengþe and by þe nature of þe þinges þat ben ywyst or yknowe. and it is al þe contrarie. for alle þat euere is yknowe. Things are not known from their inherent properties, but by the faculties of the observer. it is raþer comprehendid and 4760 yknowen nat after his strengeþ and hys nature. but after þe faculte þat is to seyn þe power and [the] nature of hem þat knowen. The roundness of a body affects the sight in one way, and the touch in another. and for þat þis shal mowe shewen by a short ensample þe same roundenes of a body .O. oþer 4764 weyes þe syȝt of þe eye knoweþ it. and oþer weyes þe touching. The eye, from afar, darts its rays upon the object, and by beholding it comprehends its form. þe lokynge by castynge of his bemes waiteþ and seeþ fro afer alle þe body to-gider wiþ oute mouynge of it self. But the object is not distinguished by the touch unless the hand comes in contact with it and feels it all round. but þe touchinge cliuiþ and conioigneþ to þe 4768 rounde body (orbi) and moueþ abouten þe environynge. and comprehendiþ by parties þe roundenesse.

in which this is chiefly to be considered, that the higher power of perception embraces the lower; but the inferior cannot attain to the energy of the superior: þilk same symple forme of man þat is perdurably in þe deuyne þouȝt. in whiche þis auȝt[e] gretely to ben considered þat þe heyest strengþe to comprehenden þinges 4784 enbraceþ and conteyneþ þe lower[e] strengþe [but the lowere strengthe ne arysith nat in no manere to heyere strengthe]. for the senses cannot go beyond the perception of matter; the imagination cannot comprehend existences in general, nor can the reason conceive the simple form. for wit ne may no þinge comprehende oute of matere. ne þe ymagynacioun ne lokeþ nat þe vniuerseles 4788 speces. ne resoun ne takeþ nat þe symple forme. so as intelligence takeþ it. But the Intelligence looking down (as from above) and having conceived the form, discerns all things that are below it, and comprehends what does not fall within the reach of the other faculties of the mind. but þe intelligence þat lokeþ al abouen whan it haþ comprehendid þe forme it knoweþ and demeþ alle þe þinges þat ben vndir þat forme. but 4792 she knoweþ hem vndir þilke manere in þe whiche it comprehendiþ þilke same symple forme þat ne may neuer be knowen to non of þat oþer. þat is to seyn to non of þo þre forseide strengþes of þe soule. Without the aid of those faculties Intelligence comprehends things formally (i. e. by beholding their simple forms) by one effort of mind. for it 4796 knoweþ þe vniuersite of resoun and þe figure of þe ymaginacioun. and þe sensible material conseiued. and þou wenest þat it be diuerse fro þe hoolnesse of science. þat any man sholde deme a þing to ben oþerweyes þan it is 4800 it self and þe cause of þis errour etc’. vt supra. by wit. Reason, without the aid of Imagination and Sense, in considering things in general, comprehends all imaginable and sensible things. ne it ne vseþ nat nor of resoun ne of ymaginacioun ne of wit wiþ oute forþe but it byholdeþ alle þinges so as I shal seye. by a strok of þouȝt formely wiþ oute discours 4804 or collacioun ¶ Certys resoun whan it lokeþ any þing vniuersel it ne vseþ nat of ymaginacioun nor of wit and algates ȝit [it] comprendiþ þe þinges ymaginable and sensible. For instance, reason defines her general conceptions thus:— [* fol. 37 b.] for resoun is she þat *diffinisseþ þe vniuersel 4808 of hir conseite ryȝt þus. Man is a rational two-footed animal, which, though it be a general idea, yet every one knows that man thus defined is perceived both by the imagination and the senses, notwithstanding that in this instance reason does not make use of imagination or the senses, but of her own rational conception. ¶ Man is a resonable t[w]o-footid beest. and how so þat þis knowynge [is] vniuersel. ȝit nys þer no wyȝt þat ne woot wel. þat a man is [a thing] ymaginable and sensible ¶ and þis same considereþ wel 4812 resoun. but þat nis nat by ymaginacioun. nor by witte. but it lokiþ it by [a] resonable concepcioun.

ÞE porche þat Fallacious and obscure was the lore of the Stoics, is to sein a gate of þe toune of athenis þer as philosophres hadde hir congregacioun to dispoyten. and þilke porche brouȝt[e] somtyme olde men ful 4828 derke in hire sentences. þat is to sein philosophers þat hyȝten stoiciens. who taught that images of things obvious to the senses were imprinted on the mind by external objects, and that the soul is at first like a mirror or a clean parchment, free from figures and letters. þat wenden þat ymages [and] sensibilites þat is to sein sensible ymaginaciouns. or ellys ymaginacioun of sensible þinges weren inprentid in to soules 4832 fro bodies wiþ oute forþe. ¶ As who seiþ þat þilke stoiciens wenden þat þe soule hadde ben naked of it self. as a mirour or a clene parchemyn. so þat alle fygures mosten [fyrst] comen fro þinges fro wiþ oute in to 4836 soules. and ben inprentid in to soules. Textus. Ryȝt as we ben wont some tyme by a swift poyntel to ficchen lettres emprentid in þe smoþenesse or in þe plainesse of þe table of wex. or in parchemyn þat ne haþ no figure 4840 [ne] note in it. But if the mind is passive in receiving the impressions of outward objects, whence proceeds the knowledge by which the mind comprehends all things? Glosa. But now arguiþ boece aȝeins þat oppinioun and seiþ þus. but yif þe þriuyng soule ne vnplitiþ no þing. þat is to sein ne doþ no þing by hys propre moeuynges. but suffriþ and lieþ subgit to þe 4844 figures and to þe notes of bodyes wiþ oute forþe. and ȝeldeþ ymages ydel and veyne in þe manere of a mirour. whennes þriueþ þan or whennes comeþ þan þilke knowyng in oure soule. þat discerniþ and byholdeþ 4848 alle þinges. Whence its force to conceive individual existences, to separate those things when known, to unite divided things, and to choose and change its path, soaring to the highest and descending to the lowest things—and returning to itself, to confute false things by the true? and whennes is þilke strengþe þat byholdeþ þe syngulere þinges. or whennes is þe strengþe þat dyuydeþ þinges yknowe. and þilke strengþe þat gadereþ to-gidre þe þinges deuided. and þe strengþe þat 4852 cheseþ hys entrechaunged wey for som tyme it heueþ vp þe heued. þat is to sein þat it heueþ vp þe entencioun to ryȝt heye þinges. and som tyme it discendiþ in to ryȝt lowe þinges. and whan it retourniþ in to hym 4856 self. it repreuiþ and destroieþ þe false þinges by þe trewe þinges. This cause is more efficacious and powerful to see and to know things, than that cause which receives the characters impressed like servile matter. ¶ Certys þis strengþe is cause more efficient and mochel more myȝty to seen and to knowe þinges. þan þilke cause þat suffriþ and resceyueþ þe 4860 notes and þe figures inpressed in manere of matere Yet the sense in the living body excites and moves the mental powers; as when the light striking the eyes causes them to see, or as the voice rushing into the ear excites hearing. algates þe passioun þat is to seyn þe suffraunce or þe wit in þe quik[e] body goþ byforne excitynge and moeuyng þe strengþes of þe þouȝte. ryȝt so as whan þat 4864 clerenesse smyteþ þe eyen and moeuiþ hem to seen. or ryȝt so as voys or soune hurtliþ to þe eres and commoeuiþ hem to herkne. Then is the force of thought excited; it calls forth the images within itself, and adds to them the outward forms, blending external images with the counterparts concealed within. þan is þe strengþe of þe þouȝt ymoeuid and excitid and clepeþ furþe þe semblable 4868 moeuynges þe speces þat it halt wiþ inne it self. and addiþ þo speces to þe notes and to þe þinges wiþ out forþe. and medeleþ þe ymages of þinges wiþ out forþe to þe forme[s] yhid wiþ inne hym self. 4872

But what Although there are in objects certain qualities which strike externally upon the senses, and put their instruments in motion; although the passive impression upon the body precedes the action of the mind, [yif] þat in bodies to ben feelid þat is to sein in þe takynge of knowelechinge of bodyly þinges. and al be it so þat þe qualites of bodies þat ben obiect fro wiþ oute forþe moeuen and entalenten þe instrumentes 4876 of þe wittes. and although the former rouses the latter to action, yet if in the perception of bodily things, the soul is not by the impression of external things made to know these things, but by its own power judgeth of these bodily impressions, and al be it so þat þe passioun of þe body þat is to seyn þe witte [or the] suffraunce [goth to-forn the strengthe of the workynge corage / the which passioun or suffraunce] clepiþ furþe þe dede of 4880 þe þouȝt in hym self. and moeueþ and exiteþ in þis mene while þe formes þat resten wiþ in forþe. and yif þat in sensible bodies as I haue seid oure corage nis nat ytauȝt or enprentid by passioun to knowe þise þinges. 4884 but demiþ and knoweþ of hys owen strengþe þe passioun or suffraunce subiect to þe body. how much more shall those pure spiritual beings (as God or angels) discern things by an act of their understanding alone, without the aid of impressions from external objects? Moche more þan þoo þinges þat ben absolut and quit fram alle talentȝ or affecciouns of bodies. as god or hys aungels ne folwen 4888 nat in discernynge þinges obiect from wiþ oute forþe. but þei accomplissen and speden þe dede of hir þouȝt For this reason, then, there are several sorts of knowing distributed among various beings. by þis resoun. ¶ þan þere comen many manere knowynges to dyuerse and differyng substaunces. For sense (or sensation) destitute of all other knowledge is allotted to those creatures that have no motion, as shell-fish. for þe wit 4892 of þe body þe whiche witte is naked and despoyled of alle oþer knowynges. þilke witte comeþ to bestes þat ne mowen nat moeuen hem self here ne þere. as oystres and muscles and oþer swiche shelle fysshe of þe see. 4896 þat cliuen and ben norissed to roches. But imagination is given to such brutes capable of motion, and having in some degree the power of desiring or refusing. but þe ymaginacioun comeþ to remuable bestes þat semen to han talent to fleen or to desiren any þinge. Reason, however, is the attribute of man alone, as Intelligence is that of God. but resoun is al only to þe lynage of mankynde ryȝt as intelligence is oonly þe 4900 deuyne nature. Hence His (i. e. God’s) knowledge exceeds all other, comprehending both what belongs to His own nature, and what is comprehended by all inferior creatures. of whiche it folweþ þat þilke knowyng is more worþe þan [th]is[e] oþer. syn it knoweþ by hys propre nature nat only hys subiect. as who seiþ it ne knoweþ nat al oonly þat apperteiniþ proprely to hys 4904 knowynge. but it knoweþ þe subgitȝ of alle oþer knowynges.

But how shall it be then, if sense and imagination oppose reason, affirming that the general idea of things, which reason thinks it so perfectly sees, is nothing? but how shal it þan be yif þat wit and ymaginacioun stryuen aȝeins resonynge and sein þat of þilke vniuersel þinges. þat resoun weneþ to seen þat it nis 4908 ryȝt nauȝt. For what falls under the cognisance of the senses and imagination cannot be general. for wit and ymaginacioun seyn þat þat. þat is sensible or ymaginable it ne may nat ben vniuersel. þan is eiþer þe iugement of resoun [soth]. ne þat þer nis no þinge sensible. or ellys for þat resoun woot 4912 wel þat many þinges ben subiect to wit and to ymaginacioun. þan is þe consepcioun of resoun veyn and fals whiche þat lookeþ and comprehendiþ. þat þat is sensible and synguler as uniuersele. But if reason should answer to this—that in her idea of what is general she comprehends whatever is sensible and imaginable; but as to the senses and imagination, they cannot attain to the knowledge of what is general, since their knowledge is confined to material figures; and therefore in all real knowledge of things we must give the greatest credit to that faculty which has a more steadfast and perfect judgment of things. and ȝif þat resoun 4916 wolde answeren aȝein to þise two þat is to sein to wit and to ymaginacioun. and sein þat soþely she hir self. þat is to seyn þat resoun lokeþ and comprehendiþ by resoun of vniuersalite. boþe þat þat is sensible and þat 4920 þat is ymaginable. and þat þilke two þat is to seyn wit and ymaginacioun ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhaunsen hem self to knowynge of vniuersalite for þat þe knowyng of hem ne may exceden nor sourmounten 4924 þe bodyly figure[s] ¶ Certys of þe knowyng of þinges men auȝten raþer ȝeue credence to þe more stedfast and to þe more perfit iugement. In a controversy of this kind ought not we, who possess faculties of reason, &c., to side with reason and espouse her cause? In þis manere stryuynge þan we þat han strengþe of resonynge and of ymaginynge 4928 and of wit þat is to seyn by resoun and by ymaginacioun and by wit. [and] we sholde raþer preise þe cause of resoun. as who seiþ þan þe cause of wit or ymaginacioun.

Having lost yesterday it does not as yet enjoy to-morrow; and as for to-day it consists only in the present transitory moment. for certys ȝit ne haþ it nat taken þe tyme of þe morwe. and it haþ lost þat of ȝister-day. and certys in þe lijf of þis day ȝe ne lyuen no more but ryȝt as in þis moeueable and transitorie moment. Whatever, therefore, is subjected to a temporal condition, as Aristotle thought of the world, may be without beginning and without end; and although its duration may extend to an infinity of time, yet it cannot rightly be called eternal: for it doth not comprehend at once the whole extent of its infinite duration, having no knowledge of things future which are not yet arrived. þan þilke þinge þat suffriþ 4996 temporel condicioun. a[l]þoughe þat [it] bygan neuer to be. ne þoughe it neuere cese forto be. as aristotle demde of þe worlde. and al þouȝ þat þe lif of it be strecchid wiþ infinite of tyme. [* fol. 39.] ȝit al*gates nis it no 5000 swiche þing þat men myȝten trowen by ryȝt þat it is eterne. for al þouȝ þat it comprehende and embrace þe space of life infinite. ȝit algates ne [em]braceþ it nat þe space of þe lif alto-gidre. for it ne haþ nat þe futures 5004 þat ne ben nat ȝit. ne it ne haþ no lenger þe preteritȝ þat ben ydon or ypassed. For what is eternal must be always present to itself and master of itself, and have always with it the infinite succession of time. but þilke þing þan þat haþ and comprehendiþ to-gidre alle þe plente of þe lif interminable. to whom þere ne failiþ nat of þe future. 5008 and to whom þer nis nat of þe preterit escapid nor ypassed. þilk[e] same is ywitnessed or yproued by ryȝt to ben eterne. and it byhoueþ by necessite þat þilke þinge be alwey present to hym self and compotent. as 5012 who seiþ alwey present to hym self and so myȝty þat al by ryȝt at hys plesaunce. and þat he haue al present þe infinit of þe moeuable tyme. Therefore some philosophers, who had heard that Plato believed that this world had neither beginning nor end, falsely concluded, that the created universe was coeternal with its Creator. wherfore som men trowen wrongefully þat whan þei heren þat it semid[e] 5016 to plato þat þis worlde ne had[de] neuer bygynnynge of tyme. ne þat it neuere shal haue faylynge. þei wenen in þis manere þat þis worlde ben maked coeterne wiþ his makere. as who seiþ. þei wenen þat þis worlde and 5020 god ben maked to-gidre eterne. and it is a wrongful wenynge. But it is one thing to be conducted through a life of infinite duration, which was Plato’s opinion of the world, and another thing to comprehend at once the whole extent of this duration as present which, it is manifest, can only belong to the Divine mind. for oþer þing is it to ben yladd by lif interminable as plato graunted[e] to þe worlde. and oþer þing is it to embracen to-gidre alle þe presence to þe lif 5024 interminable. þe whiche þing it is clere and manifest þat it is propre to þe deuine þouȝt. Nor ought it to seem to us that God is prior to and more ancient than his creatures by the space of time, but rather by the simple and undivided properties of his nature. ne it ne sholde nat semen to vs þat god is elder þan þinges þat ben ymaked by quantite of tyme. but raþer by þe proprete of hys 5028 symple nature. The infinite progression of temporal things imitates the ever-present condition of an immovable life: for þis ilke infinit[e] moeuyng of temporel þinges folwiþ þis presentarie estat of þe lijf inmoeueable.

and since it cannot copy nor equal it from an immovable and simply present state, it passes into motion and into an infinite measure of past and future time. and so as it ne may nat contrefeten it ne feynen it ne ben euene lyke to it. for þe inmoeueablete. þat is 5032 to seyn þat is in þe eternite of god. ¶ it faileþ and falleþ in to moeuynge fro þe simplicite of [the] presence of god. and disencresiþ to þe infinite quantite of future and of preterit. But since it cannot possess at once the whole extent of its duration, yet, as it never ceases wholly to be, it faintly emulates that whose perfection it can neither attain nor express, by attaching itself to the present fleeting moment, which, because it resembles the durable present time, imparts to those things that partake of it an appearance of existence. and so as it ne may nat han togidre 5036 al þe plente of þe lif. algates ȝitte for as moche as it ne cesiþ neuere forto ben in som manere it semeþ somde[l] to vs þat it folwiþ and resembliþ þilke þing þat it ne may nat attayne to. ne fulfille. and byndeþ it 5040 self to som manere presence of þis litel and swifte moment. þe whiche presence of þis lytele and swifte moment. for þat it bereþ a manere ymage or lykenesse of þe ay dwellynge presence of god. it graunteþ to 5044 swiche manere þinges as it bitidiþ to þat it semeþ hem þat þise þinges han ben and ben But as it cannot stop or abide it pursues its course through infinite time, and by gliding along it continues its duration, the plenitude of which it could not comprehend, by abiding in a permanent state. and for [þat] þe presence of swiche litel moment ne may nat dwelle þer-for [it] rauyssid[e] and took þe infinit[e] wey of tyme. þat 5048 is to seyn by successioun. and by þis manere it is ydon. for þat it sholde continue þe lif in goynge of þe whiche lif it ne myȝt[e] nat embrace þe plente in dwellynge. If we would follow Plato in giving things their right names, let us say that God is eternal and the world perpetual. and for þi yif we willen putte worþi name[s] to þinges 5052 and folwen plato. lat vs seyn þan soþely þat god is eterne. and þat þe worlde is perpetuel. His knowledge, surpassing the progression of time, is ever present, containing the infinite space of past and future times, and embraces in his clear insight all things, as if they were now transacting. þan syn þat euery iugement knoweþ and comprehendiþ by hys owen nature þinges þat ben subiect vnto hym. þere is soþely 5056 al-wey to god an eterne and presentarie estat. and þe science of hym þat ouer-passeþ alle temporel moe[ue]ment dwelliþ in þe symplicite of hys presence and embraceþ and considereþ alle þe infinit spaces of tymes 5060 preteritȝ and futures and lokeþ in þis symple knowynge alle þinges of preterit ryȝt as þei weren ydoon presently ryȝt now Prescience is, then, a foreknowledge, not of what is to come, but of the present and never-failing now (in which God sees all things as if immovably present). ¶ yif þou wolt þan þenke and avisen þe [* fol. 39 b.] prescience by whiche it knoweþ al[le] þinges *þou ne 5064 shalt nat demen it as prescience of þinges to comen.