V. THE PART IS DERIVED FROM THE WHOLE, THE IMPERFECT FROM THE PERFECT. (continued 4)

FOr as moche Now that thou hast had a faithful representation of future felicity as well as of the true happiness, I shall show thee in what the Perfection of Happiness consists. þan as þou hast seyn. whiche is þe forme of goode þat nys nat perfit. and whiche is þe forme of goode þat is perfit. now trowe I þat it were goode to shewe in what þis perfeccioun of blisfulnesse is 2456 set. Our best plan will be to inquire whether there be in nature such a good as thou hast lately defined, lest we be deceived by the vanity of Imagination and be carried beyond the truth of the matter subjected to our inquiry. and in þis þing I trowe þat we sholden first enquere forto witen yif þat any swiche manere goode as þilke goode þat þou hast diffinissed a lytel her byforne. þat is to seine souereyne goode may be founden in þe nature 2460 of þinges. For þat veyne ymaginacioun of þouȝt ne desceiue vs nat. and putte vs oute of þe soþefastnesse of þilke þinge þat is summyttid to vs. þis is to seyne. but it may nat ben denoyed þat þilke goode ne is. 2464 ¶ and þat it nis ryȝt as a welle of alle goodes. The sovereign good does exist, and is the source of all other good. ¶ For al þing þat is cleped inperfit. is proued inperfit by þe amenusynge of perfeccioun. or of þing þat is perfit. When we say that a thing is imperfect we assert that there is something else of its kind perfect. and her of comeþ it. þat in euery þing general. yif þat. * fol. 21. þat 2468 men seen any þing þat is inperfit *certys in þilke general þer mot ben somme þing þat is perfit. ¶ For yif so be þat perfeccioun is don awey. men may nat þinke nor seye fro whennes þilke þing is þat is cleped inperfit. 2472 Nature takes not her origin from things diminished and imperfect; but, proceeding from an entire and absolute substance, descends into the remotest and most fruitless things. ¶ For þe nature of þinges ne token nat her bygynnyng of þinges amenused and inperfit. but it procediþ of þingus þat ben al hool. and absolut. and descendeþ so doune in to outerest þinges and in to þingus empty and 2476 wiþ oute fruyt. If there be an imperfect and fading felicity there must also be one stable and perfect. but as I haue shewed a litel her byforne. þat yif þer be a blisfulnesse þat be frele and vein and inperfit. þer may no man doute. þat þer nys som blisfulnesse þat is sad stedfast and perfit. b. þis is concludid 2480 quod I fermely and soþefastly. But now consider wherein this felicity resides. That God is the governor of all things is proved by the universal opinion of all men. P. But considere also quod she in wham þis blisfulnesse enhabiteþ. þe commune acordaunce and conceite of þe corages of men proueþ and graunteþ þat god prince of alle þingus is 2484 good. For since nothing may be conceived better than God, then He who has no equal in goodness must be good. ¶ For so as no þing ne may ben þouȝt bettre þan god. it may nat ben douted þan þat [he þat] no þing is bettre. þat he nys good. Reason clearly demonstrates (1) that God is good, and (2) that the sovereign good exists in him. ¶ Certys resoun sheweþ þat god is so goode þat it proueþ by verray force þat perfit 2488 goode is in hym. If it were not so He could not be the Ruler of all things, for there would be some other being excelling him who possesses the supreme good and who must have existed before Him. ¶ For yif god ne is swiche. he ne may nat ben prince of alle þinges. for certis som þing possessyng in hym self perfit goode sholde ben more þan god. and [it] sholde seme þat þilke þing were first 2492 and elder þan god. And we have already shown that the perfect precedes the imperfect; ¶ For we han shewed apertly þat alle þinges þat ben perfit. ben first or þinges þat ben inperfit.

wherefore, that our reasonings may not run on with infinity, we must confess that the Supreme God is full of perfect and consummate good. ¶ And for þi for as moche as [that] my resoun or my proces ne go nat awey wiþoute an ende. we 2496 ouȝt[e] to graunten þat þe souereyne god is ryȝt ful of souereyne perfit goode. And as we have seen that the perfect good is true happiness, it follows that the true felicity resides in the Supreme Divinity. and we han establissed þat þe souereyne goode is verrey blisfulnesse. þan mot it nedes ben [þat verray blysfulnesse is] yset in souereyne god. 2500 B. þis take I wel quod .I. ne þis ne may nat be wiþseid in no manere. But let us see how we can firmly and irrefragably prove that the Supreme God contains in his own nature a plenitude of perfect and consummate good. ¶ But I preie þe quod she see now how þou mayst preuen holily and wiþ-outen corrupcioun þis þat I haue seid. þat þe souereyne god is ryȝt ful of 2504 souereyne goode. [In whych manere quod I.] wenest þou ouȝt quod she þat þis prince of alle þinges haue ytake þilke souereyne good any where þan of hym self. ¶ of whiche souereyne goode men proueþ þat he is ful 2508 ryȝt as þou myȝtest þinken. þat god þat haþ blisfulnesse in hym self. and þat ilke blisfulnesse þat is in hym were diuers in substaunce. If you think that God has received this good from without, then you must believe that the giver of this good is more excellent than God the receiver. ¶ For yif þou wene þat god haue receyued þilke good oute of hym self. þou 2512 mayst wene þat he þat ȝaf þilke good to god. be more goode þan is god. But we have concluded that there is nothing more excellent than God. ¶ But I am byknowen and confesse and þat ryȝt dignely þat god is ryȝt worþi abouen alle þinges. But if this supreme good is in Him by nature, and is nevertheless of a different substance, we cannot conceive, since God is the author of all things, what could have united these two substances differing one from another. ¶ And yif so be þat þis good be in hym by 2516 nature. but þat it is diuers from [hym] by wenyng resoun. syn we speke of god prince of alle þinges feyne who so feyne may. who was he þat [hath] conioigned þise diuers þinges to-gidre. Lastly, a thing which essentially differs from another cannot be the same with that from which it is supposed to differ. and eke at þe last[e] se 2520 wel þat o þing þat is diuers from any þing. þat þilke þing nis nat þat same þing. fro whiche it is vndirstonden to ben diuers. Consequently, what in its nature differs from the chief good cannot be the supreme good. þan folweþ it. þat þilke þing þat by hys nature is dyuers from souereyne good. þat þat 2524 þing nys nat souereyne good. But it would be impious and profane thus to conceive of God, since nothing can excel Him in goodness and worth. but certys þat were a felonous corsednesse to þinken þat of hym. þat no þing nis more worþe. In fact, nothing can exist whose nature is better than its origin. For alwey of alle þinges. þe nature of hem ne may nat ben better þan his bygynnyng. 2528

We may therefore conclude that the Author of all things is really and substantially the supreme Good. ¶ For whiche I may concluden by ryȝt uerray resoun. þat þilke þat is bygynnyng of alle þinges. þilke same þing is good in his substaunce. B. Most rightly said! B. þou hast seid ryȝtfully quod .I. P. But you have owned that true felicity is the sovereign good; then you must also grant that God is that true felicity. P. But we han graunted quod she þat 2532 souereyne good is blysfulnes. þat is soþe quod .I. þan quod she mote we nedes graunten and confessen þat þilke same souereyne goode be god. [* fol. 21 b.] B. Your conclusions follow from your premises. ¶ Certys *quod .I. I ne may nat denye ne wiþstonde þe resouns purposed. 2536 and I see wel þat it folweþ by strengþe of þe premisses. P. Let us see whether we cannot prove this more convincingly by considering it in this view, that there cannot be two sovereign goods which differ in themselves. ¶ Loke nowe quod she yif þis be proued [yit] more fermely þus. ¶ þat þer ne mowen nat ben two souereyne goodes þat ben diuerse amo[n]ges hem 2540 self. For it is plain that of the goods that differ one cannot be what the other is; wherefore neither of them can be perfect where one wants the other. þat on is nat þat þat oþer is. þan [ne] mowen neiþer of hem ben perfit. so as eyþer of hem lakkiþ to oþir. That which is not perfect cannot be the supreme good. but þat þat nis nat perfit men may seen apertly þat it nis nat souereyne. Neither can the chief good be essentially different. þe þinges þan þat ben 2544 souereynely goode ne mowen by no wey ben diuerse. But it has been shown that God and happiness are the chief good, wherefore the sovereign felicity and the Supreme Divinity are one and the same. ¶ But I haue wel conclude þat blisfulnesse and god ben [the] souereyne goode. For whiche it mot nedes be þat souereyne blisfulnesse is souerey[ne] dyuynite. ¶ No 2548 þing quod I nis more soþefast þan þis ne more ferme by resoun. ne a more worþi þing þan god may nat ben concluded. Following then the examples of geometricians who deduce their conse­quences from their propositions, I shall deduce to thee something like a corollary as follows:— P. vpon þise þinges þan quod she. ryȝt as þise geometriens whan þei han shewed her proposiciouns 2552 ben wont to bryngen in þinges þat þei clepen porismes or declaraciouns of forseide þinges. ryȝt so wil I ȝeue þe here as a corolarie or a mede of coroune. Because by the attainment of felicity men become happy, and as felicity is the same as Divinity itself, therefore by the attainment of Divinity men are made happy. For whi. for as moche as by þe getynge of blisfulnesse men ben 2556 maked blysful. and blisfulnesse is diuinite. ¶ þan is it manifest and open þat by þe getyng of diuinite men ben makid blisful. But as by the participation of justice or of wisdom men become just or wise, ryȝt as by þe getynge of iustice . . . and by þe getyng of sapience þei ben maked wise. 2560

so by partaking of Divinity they must necessarily, and by parity of reason, become gods. ¶ Ryȝt so nedes by þe semblable resoun whan þei han getyn diuinite þei ben maked goddys. Every happy man then is a god. But by nature there is only One; but by participation of Divine essence there may be many gods. þan is euery blisful man god. ¶ But certis by nature. þer nys but oon god. but by þe participaciouns of diuinite þere ne letteþ ne 2564 disturbeþ no þing þat þer ne ben many goddes. ¶ þis is quod .I. a faire þing and a precious. ¶ Clepe it as þou wolt. be it corolarie or porisme or mede of coroune or declarynges ¶ Certys quod she no þing nis fairer. 2568 þan is þe þing þat by resoun sholde ben added to þise forseide þinges. what þing quod .I. But as happiness seems to be an assemblage of many things, ought we not to consider whether these several things constitute conjointly the body of happiness, or whether there is not some one of these particular things that may complete the substance or essence of it, and to which all the rest have a relation? ¶ So quod she as it semeþ þat blisfulnesse conteniþ many þinges. it were forto witen wheþir [þat] alle þise þinges maken or 2572 conioignen as a maner body of blysfulnesse by diuersite of parties or [of] membris. Or ellys yif any of alle þilke þingus be swyche þat it acomplise by hym self þe substaunce of blisfulnesse. so þat alle þise oþer þinges 2576 ben referred and brouȝt to blisfulnesse. þat is to seyne as to þe chief of hem. B. Illustrate this matter by proper examples. ¶ I wolde quod I þat þou makedest me clerly to vndirstonde what þou seist. and þat þou recordest me þe forseide þinges. P. As you grant that happiness is a good, you may say the same of all the other goods; for perfect sufficiency is identical with supreme felicity; so is supreme power, likewise high rank, a shining reputation, and perfect pleasure. ¶ Haue I nat 2580 iuged quod she. þat blisfulnesse is goode. ȝis forsoþe quod .I. and þat souereyne goode. ¶ Adde þan quod she þilke goode þat is maked blisfulnes to alle þe forseide þinges. ¶ For þilke same blisfulnesse þat is 2584 demed to ben souereyne suffisaunce. þilke self is souereyne power. souereyne reuerence. souereyne clernesse or noblesse and souereyne delit. What say you, then; are all these things, sufficiency, power, and the rest, to be considered as constituent parts of felicity? or are they to be referred to the sovereign good as their source and principal? what seist þou þan of alle þise þinges. þat is to seyne. suffisance power 2588 and þise oþer þinges. ben þei þan as membris of blisfulnesse. or ben þei referred and brouȝt to souereyne good. ¶ Ryȝt as alle þinges þat ben brouȝt to þe chief of hem.

B. I see what you are aiming at, and I am desirous to hear your arguments. b. I vndirstonde wel quod .I. what þou purposest to 2592 seke. but I desijr[e] to herkene þat þou shewe it me. P. If all these things were members of felicity, they would differ one from another, for it is the property of diverse parts to compose one body. p. Take now þus þe discressioun of þis questioun quod she. yif al þise þinges quod she weren membris to felicite. þan weren þei diuerse þat oon fro þat oþer. 2596 ¶ And swiche is þe nature of parties or of membris. þat dyuerse membris compounen a body. But it has been well shown that all these things are the same and do not differ—therefore they are not parts, for if they were, happiness might be made up of one member—which is absurd and impossible. ¶ Certis quod I it haþ wel ben shewed her byforne. þat alle þise þinges ben alle on þing. þan ben þei none membris quod 2600 she. for ellys it sholde seme þat blisfulnesse were [* fol. 22.] conioigned *al of one membre alone. but þat is a þing þat may nat ben doon. B. This I doubt not, but I desire to hear the sequel. þis þing quod .I. nys nat doutous. but I abide to herkene þe remenaunt of þe 2604 questioun. P. All the things above-mentioned must be tried by Good, as the rule and square. þis is open and clere quod she. þat alle oþer þinges ben referred and brouȝt to goode. Sufficiency, power, &c., are all desired, because they are esteemed a good. ¶ For þerfore is suffisaunce requered. For it is demed to ben good. and forþi is power requered. for men trowen also 2608 þat it be goode. and þis same þing mowe we þinken and coueiten of reuerence and of noblesse and of delit. Good is the cause why all things are desired. þan is souereyne good þe soume and þe cause of alle þat auȝt[e] be desired. For that which contains no good, either in reality or appearance, can never be desired. forwhi þilke þing þat wiþ-holdeþ no 2612 good in it self ne semblaunce of goode it ne may nat wel in no manere be desired ne requered. On the contrary, things not essentially good are desired because they appear to be real goods. and þe contrarie. For þouȝ þat þinges by hir nature ne ben nat goode algates yif men wene þat þei ben goode ȝit ben 2616 þei desired as þouȝ [þat] þei were verrayly goode. Hence, Good is esteemed as the cause and end of all things that we desire. and þerfore is it þat men auȝten to wene by ryȝt þat bounte be souereyne fyn and þe cause of alle þinges þat ben to requeren. That which is the cause of our desiring any thing is itself what we chiefly want. ¶ But certis þilke þat is cause for whiche 2620 men requeren any þing. ¶ it semeþ þat þilke same þing be most desired. If a man desire to ride on account of health—it is not the ride he wants so much as its salutary effects. as þus yif þat a wyȝt wolde ryde for cause of hele. he ne desireþ nat so mychel þe moeuyng to ryden as þe effect of his heele. Since all things are sought after for the sake of Good, they cannot be more desirable than the good itself. Now þan 2624 syn þat alle þinges ben requered for þe grace of good. þei ne ben [nat] desired of alle folk more þan þe same good It has been shown that all the aforesaid things are only pursued for the sake of happiness—hence it is clear that good and happiness are essentially the same. ¶ But we han graunted þat blysfulnesse is þat þing for whiche þat alle þise oþer þinges ben desired. 2628 þan is it þus þat certis only blisfulnesse is requered and desired ¶ By whiche þing it sheweþ clerely þat good and blisfulnesse is al oone and þe same substaunce. B. I see no cause to differ from you. ¶ I se nat quod I wher fore þat men myȝt[en] discorden 2632 in þis. P. It has been proved that God and happiness are identical and inseparable. p. and we han shewed þat god and verrey blysfulnesse is al oon þing B. That is true. ¶ þat is soþe quod .I. Therefore the substance of God is also the same as that of the Supreme Good. þan mowe we conclude sikerly þat þe substaunce of god is set in þilke same good and in noon oþer place. 2636

O Comeþ alle Come hither, all ye that are captives—bound and fettered with the chains of earthly desires;—come to this source of goodness, where you shall find rest and security. to-gidre now ȝe þat ben ycauȝt and ybounde wiþ wicked[e] cheines by þe deceiuable delit of erþely þinges inhabytynge in ȝoure þouȝt. here shal ben þe reste of ȝoure laboures. here is þe hauene 2640 stable in peisible quiete. þis al oone is þe open refut to wreches. [Chaucer’s gloss upon the Text.] Glosa. þis is to seyn. þat ȝe þat ben combred and deceyued wiþ worldly affecciouns comeþ now to þis souereyne good þat is god. þat is refut to hem þat 2644 wolen come to hym. Not the gold of Tagus or of Hermus, nor the gems of India, can clear the mental sight from vain delusions, but rather darken it. Textus. ¶ Alle þe þinges þat þe ryuere Tagus ȝiueþ ȝow wiþ his golden[e] grauels. or ellys alle þe þynges þat þe ryuere hermus. ȝiueþ wiþ his rede brynke. or þat yndus ȝiueþ þat is nexte þe hote 2648 partie of þe worlde. þat medeleþ þe grene stones (smaragde) wiþ þe white (margarits). ne sholde nat cleren þe lokynge of ȝoure þoȝt. but hiden raþer ȝoure blynde corages wiþ inne hire dirkenesse Such sources of our delight are found in the earth’s gloomy caverns,—but the bright light that rules the heavens dispels the darkness of the soul. ¶ Alle þat 2652 likeþ ȝow here and excitiþ and moeueþ ȝoure þouȝtes. þe erþe haþ noryshed it in hys lowe caues. but þe shynyng by þe whiche þe heuene is gouerned and whennes þat it haþ hys strengþe þat chaseþ þe derke 2656 ouerþrowyng of þe soule. He who has seen this light will confess that the beams of the sun are weak and dim. ¶ And who so euer may knowen þilke lyȝt of blisfulnesse. he shal wel seine þat þe white bemes of þe sonne ne ben nat cleer.

P. Then you must own that unity and good are the same (for the substance of those things must be the same, whose effects do not naturally differ). ¶ þan mayst þou graunt[en] it quod she by sembleable resoun þat oon and good ben o same þing. ¶ For of þinges [of] whiche þat þe effect nis nat naturely diuerse 2692 nedys þe substaunce mot ben o same þinge. B. I cannot gainsay it. I ne may nat denye it quod I. P. Do you not perceive that everything which exists is permanent so long as it preserves its unity—but as soon as it loses this, it is dissolved and annihilated? ¶ Hast þou nat knowen wel quod she. þat al þing þat is haþ so longe his dwellyng and his substaunce. as longe is it oone. ¶ but whan it 2696 forletiþ to ben oone it mot nedis dien and corrumpe togidre. B. How so? ¶ In whiche manere quod .I. P. In the animal creation as long as the soul and the body are united and conjoined in one, this being is called an animal or beast, but when the union is dissolved by the separation of these, the animal perishes and is no longer a beast. ¶ Ryȝt as in beestes quod she. whan þe soule and þe body ben conioigned in oon and dwellen to-gidre it is cleped a 2700 beest. and whan hire vnite is destroied by disseueraunce þat oon fram þat oþir. þan sheweþ it wel þat it is a dede þing. and þat it is no lenger no beste. The same may be said of man and all other things; they subsist while unity is preserved, but as soon as that is destroyed the things themselves lose their existence. and þe body of a wyȝt while it dwelleþ in oon forme by coniunccioun 2704 of membris it is wel seyn þat it is a figure of mankynde. and yif þe partyes of þe body ben [so] diuide[d] and disseuered þat oon fro þat oþir þat þei destroien vnite. þe body forletiþ to ben þat it was byforne. 2708 ¶ And who so wolde renne in þe same manere by alle þinges he sholde seen þat wiþ outen doute euery þinge is in his substaunce as longe as it is oon. and whan it forletiþ to ben oon it dieþ and perissiþ. B. I believe we should find this true in every case. boice. 2712 whan I considre quod I many þinges I see noon oþer.

P. Is there anything which acts naturally that forgoes this desire of existence and wishes for death and corruption? ¶ Is þer any þing þanne quod she þat in as moche as it lyueþ naturely. þat forletiþ þe appetit or talent of hys beynge. and desireþ to come to deeþ and to corrupcioun. 2716 B. I do not find any creature endowed with volition, which, of itself and without constraint, renounces or despises life and self-preservation or willingly hastens to destruction. ¶ yif I considere quod I þe beestes þat han any manere nature of willynge or of nillynge I ne fynde no þing. but yif it be constreyned fro wiþ out forþe. þat forletiþ or dispiseþ to lyue and to duren 2720 or þat wole his þankes hasten hym to dien. ¶ For euery beest trauayleþ hym to defende and kepe þe sauuacioun of lijf. and escheweþ deeþ and destruccioun. But with regard to herbs and trees, I am doubtful whether I ought to have the same opinion of them, for they have no sensitive soul, nor any natural volition like animals. b. but certys I doute me of herbes and of trees. þat is 2724 to seyn þat I am in a doute of swiche þinges as herbes or trees þat ne han no felyng soule. ne no naturel wirchynges seruyng to appetite as beestes han wheþer þei han appetite to dwellen and to duren. P. There is no cause for doubt in respect to these. ¶ Certis 2728 quod she ne þer of þar þe nat doute. Herbs and trees first choose a convenient place to grow in, where, agreeably to their respective natures, they are sure to thrive, and are in no danger of perishing; for some grow on plains, some on mountains, &c.; ¶ Now look vpon þise herbes and þise trees. þei waxen firste in swiche place as ben couenable to hem. in whiche place þei ne mowen nat sone dien ne dryen as longe as hire 2732 nature may defenden hem. ¶ For some of hem waxen in feldes and some in mountaignes. and oþir waxen in mareis. [A leaf lost here, and supplied from C.]

[and oothre cleuyn on Roches / and soume waxen plentyuos 2736 in sondes / and if you try to transplant them, they forthwith wither and die. and yif þat any wyht enforce hym to beryn hem in to oother places / they wexen drye // To everything that vegetates, nature gives what is needful for its subsistence, and takes care that they should not perish before their time. For nature yeueth to euery thing þat / þat is conuenient to hym and trauaylith þat they ne dye nat as longe as they 2740 han power to dwellyn and to lyuen // Need I tell you that plants are nourished by their roots (which are so many mouths hid in the earth), and diffuse strength throughout the whole plant, as through their marrow? what woltow seyn of this / þat they drawen alle hyr norysshynges by hyr rootes / ryht as they haddyn hyr Mowthes I.-plounged with in the erthes / and shedyn by hyr maryes (i. medullas) 2744 hyr wode and hyr bark / And further, it is admirably contrived that the pith, the most tender part of plants, is hid in the middle of the trunk, surrounded with hard and solid wood, and with an outer coat of bark to ward off the storms and weather. and what woltow seyn of this þat thilke thing / þat is ryht softe as the marye (i. sapp) is / þat is alwey hidd in the feete al with inne and þat it is defendid fro with owte by the stidefastnesse of 2748 wode // and þat the vttereste bark is put ayenis the destempraunce of the heuene / as a defendowr myhty to suffren harm / Admire, too, the diligence of nature in propagating plants by a multiplicity of seeds, which are as a foundation for a building, not to remain for a time, but as it were for ever. and thus certes maystow wel sen / how gret is the diligence of nature / For alle thinges renouelen and 2752 pupllisen hem with seed .I.-multiplyed / nether nis no man þat ne wot wel þat they ne ben ryht as a foundement and edyfice for to duren / nat only for a tyme / but ryht as forto duren perdurablely by generacyoun // Things inanimate incline to what is most suitable to their beings, and to preserve continuance. and the thinges ek 2756 þat men wenen ne hauen none sowles / ne desire they nat ech of hem by sem[b]lable resoun to kepyn þat that is hirs / þat is to seyn þat is acordynge to hyr nature in conseruacioun of hyr beynge and endurynge // For why should the flame mount upwards by lightness, and the earth tend towards its centre by gravity (weight), unless these motions were agreeable to their respective natures? For wher for elles berith 2760 lythnesse the flaumbes vp / and the weyhte presseth the erthe a-doun // but For as moche as thilke places and thilke moeuynges ben couenable to euerich of hem //

Whatever is agreeable to the nature of a thing preserves it. So what is contrary to its nature destroys it. and forsothe euery thing kepith thilke þat is acordynge 2764 and propre to hym // ryht as thinges þat ben contraryes and enemys corompen hem // Dense bodies, such as stones, resist an easy separation of parts; whereas the particles of liquid or flowing things, such as air and water, are easily separated and soon reunited. and yit the harde thinges as stoones clyuen and holden hyr partyes to gydere ryht faste and harde / and deffenden hem in withstondenge 2768 þat they ne departe nat lyhtly a twyne // and the thinges þat ben softe and fletynge as is water and Eyr they departyn lyhtly // and yeuen place to hem þat brekyn or deuyden hem // but natheles they retornen 2772 sone ayein in to the same thinges fro whennes they ben arraced // Fire avoids and utterly refuses any such division. but fyr [fleetħ] and refuseth alle deuysyoun / I am not now treating of the voluntary motion of a conscious soul, but of the natural intention and instinct. ne I. ne trete nat heere now of weleful moeuynges of the sowle þat is knowynge // but of the naturel entencioun 2776 of thinges // We swallow our meat without thinking of it, and we draw our breath in sleep without perception. As thus ryht as we swolwe the mete þat we resseyuen and ne thinke nat on it / and as we drawen owre breth in slepynge þat we wite it nat whil we slepyt // The love of life in animals is not derived from an intellectual will, but from natural principles implanted in them. For certes in the beestys the loue of hyr lyuynges ne of 2780 hyr beeinges ne comth nat of the wilnynges of the sowle // but of the bygynnyngis of nature // For the will, induced by powerful reasons, sometimes chooses and embraces death, although nature dreads and abhors it. For certes thorw constreynynge causes / wil desireth and embraceth ful ofte tyme / the deth þat nature dredith // that is to seyn 2784 as thus that a man may ben constreynyd so by som cause that his wil desireth and taketh the deth which þat nature hateth and dredeth ful sore // And, on the contrary, we see that concupiscence (by which alone the human race is perpetuated) is often restrained by the will. And som tyme we seeth the contrarye / as thus that the wil of a wight / 2788 destorbeth and constreyneth þat þat nature desireth / and requereth al-wey // that is to sein the werk of generacioun / by the whiche generacioun only / dwelleth and is sustenyd the longe durablete of mortal thinges // Self-love possessed by every creature is not the product of volition, but proceeds from a natural impression or intention of nature. And thus 2792 this charite and this Loue þat euery thing hath to hym self ne comth nat of the moeuynge of the sowle / but of the entencioun of nature // Providence has implanted in all created things an instinct, for the purpose of self-preservation, by which they desire to prolong existence to its utmost limits. For the puruyance of god hat yeuen to thinges þat ben creat of hym / this þat is 2796 a ful gret cause / to lyuen and to duren / for which they desiren naturelly hyr lyf as longe as euer they mowen //

Doubt not, therefore, that everything which exists desires existence and avoids dissolution. For w[h]ych thou maist nat drede by no manere / that alle the thinges / that ben anywhere / that they ne requeren 2800 naturelly / the ferme stablenesse of perdurable dwellynge / and ek the eschuynge of destruccyoun // B. You have made those things perfectly plain and intelligible, which before were obscure and doubtful. B // now confesse I. wel quod I. that I. see wel now certeynly / with owte dowtes / the thinges that whylom semeden 2804 vncerteyn to me / P. That which desires to subsist desires also to retain its unity for if this be taken away it cannot continue to exist. P. // but quod she thilke thyng þat desiretħ to be and to dwellyn perdurablely / he desireth to ben oon // For yif þat that oon weere destroied // certes beinge ne shulde ther non dwellyn to no wiht // B. That is very true! that 2808 is sotħ quod I. // P. All things then desire one thing—unity. Thanne quod she desirin alle thinges oon // B. They do. .I. assente quod .I. // P. Unity then is the same as good. and I haue shewyd quod she that thilke same oon is thilke that is good // B. Yes. B // ye forsothe quod I. // P. Thus all things desire good—and it is one and the same good that all creatures desire. Alle thinges thanne quod she requyren 2812 good // And thilke good thanne [þow] maist descryuen ryht thus // Good is thilke thing þat euery wyht desireth // B. Nothing is more true. For either all things must be reduced to nothing (or have no relation to anything else), and, destitute of a head, float about without control or order; or if there be anything to which all things tend, that must be the supreme good. Ther ne may be thowht quod .I. no moore verray thing / for either alle thinges ben referred and 2816 browht to nowht / and floteryn with owte gouernour despoiled of oon / as of hir propre heued / or elles yif ther be any thinge / to which þat alle thinges tenden and hyen / that thing moste ben the souereyn good of 2820 alle goodes / P. I rejoice greatly, my dear pupil, that you so clearly apprehend this truth, of which but just now you were ignorant. P /. thanne seyde she thus // O my norry quod she I haue gret gladnesse of the // For thow hast fichched in thin herte the myddel sothtfastnesse // that is to seyn the prykke // but this thing hath ben 2824 descouered to the / in that thow seydyst þat thow wystest nat a lytel her by-forn // B. What was that? what was that quod I. //

WHo so that sekith He who seeks truth with deep research and is unwilling to go wrong, should collect his slumbering thoughts, and turn the inner light upon the soul itself. sotħ by a deep thoght And coueyteth nat to ben deseyuyd by no mys-weyes // lat hym rollen and trenden with Inne hym self / the Lyht of his inward syhte // And lat hym gadere ayein enclynynge 2836 in to a compas the longe moeuynges of hys thowhtes / The knowledge that he seeks without he will find treasured up in the recesses of the mind. And lat hym techen his corage that he hath enclosed and hyd / in his tresors / al þat he compaseth or sekith fro with owte // The light of Truth will disperse Error’s dark clouds, and shine forth brighter than the sun. And thanne thilke thing that the 2840 blake cloude of errour whilom hadde y-couered / shal lyhten more clerly thanne phebus hym self ne shyneth // [Chaucer’s gloss.] Glosa // who so wole seken the dep[e] grounde / of soth in his thowht / and wol nat be deceyuyd by false proposiciouns / 2844 that goon amys fro the trouthe // lat hym wel examine / and rolle with inne hym self the nature and the propretes of the thing // and lat hym yit eft sones examine and rollen his thowhtes by good deliberacioun 2848 or that he deme // and lat hym techen his sowle that it hat by naturel pryncyplis kyndeliche y-hyd with in it self alle the trowthe the whiche he ymagynith to ben in thinges with owte // And thanne alle the dyrknesse of 2852 his mysknowynge shal seen more euydently to [þe] syhte of his vndyrstondynge thanne the sonne ne semyth to [þe] syhte with owte forth / For when the body enclosed the soul and cast oblivion o’er its powers it did wholly exterminate the heaven-born light. For certes the body bryngynge the weyhte of foryetynge / ne hath nat chasyd 2856 owt of yowre thowhte al the clernesse of yowre knowyng // The germs of truth were latent within, and were fanned into action by the gentle breath of learning. For certeynly the seed of sooth haldith and clyueth with in yowre corage / and it is a-waked and excited by the wynde and by the blastes of doctryne // Were not truth implanted in the heart, how could man distinguish right from wrong? For where 2860 for elles demen ye of yowre owne wyl the ryhtes whan ye ben axed // but yif so were þat the noryssynges of resoun ne lyuede .I.-plowngyd in the depthe of yowre herte // this [is] to seyn how sholden men demen þe 2864 sooth of any thing þat weere axed / yif ther neere a Roote of sothfastnesse þat weere yplowngyd and hyd in the nature[l] pryncyplis / the whiche sothfastnesse lyued with in the depnesse of the thowght // So, if what Plato taught is true, ‘to learn is no other than to remember what had been before forgotten.’ and yif 2868 so be þat the Muse and the doctryne of plato syngyth sooth // al þat euery whyht lerneth / he ne doth no thing elles thanne but recordeth as men recordyn thinges þat ben foryetyn. 2872

THanne seide B. I am quite of Plato’s opinion, for you have now a second time recalled these things to my remembrance which had been forgotten, first by the contagious union of soul and body, and afterwards by the pressure of my afflictions. I thus // I acorde me gretly to plato / for thow remenbrist and recordist me thise thinges yit] [*Addit. MS. 10,340, fol. 23.] *þe seconde tyme. þat is to seyn. first whan I lost[e] my memorie by þe contagioũs coniunccioun of þe body wiþ 2876 þe soule. and eftsones afterward whan I lost[e] it confounded by þe charge and by þe burden of my sorwe. P. If you will reflect upon the concessions you have already made, you will soon call to mind that truth, of which you lately confessed your ignorance. ¶ And þan sayde she þus. ¶ If þou look[e] quod she firste þe þinges þat þou hast graunted it ne shal nat 2880 ben ryȝt feer þat þou ne shalt remembren þilke þing þat þou seidest þat þou nistest nat. B. What is that? what þing quod I. P. It was, by what power the world is governed. ¶ by whiche gouerment quod she þat þis worlde is gouerned. B. With regard to that, I own I confessed my ignorance, but though I now remotely see what you infer, yet I wish for further explanation from you. Me remembriþ it wel quod I. and I confesse 2884 wel þat I ne wist[e] it nat ¶ But al be it so þat I se now from afer what þou purposest ¶ Algates I desire ȝit to herkene it of þe more pleynely. P. You acknowledged a little while ago that this world was governed by God? ¶ þou ne wendest nat quod she a litel here byforne þat men 2888 sholden doute þat þis worlde is gouerned by god. B. I still cling to this opinion, and will give you my reasons for this belief. ¶ Certys quod I ne ȝitte doute I it nauȝt. ne I nil neuer wene þat it were to doute. as who seiþ. but I wot wel þat god gouerneþ þis worlde. ¶ And I shal 2892 shortly answere þe by what resouns I am brouȝt to þis. The discordant elements of this world would never have assumed their present form unless there had been a wise Intelligence to unite them; and even after such a union, the joining of such opposites would have disunited and ruined the fabric made up of them, had not the same conjoining hand kept them together. ¶ þis worlde quod I of so many dyuerse and contrarious parties ne myȝten neuer han ben assembled in o forme. but yif þere ne were oon þat conioigned so many[e 2896 diuerse] þinges. ¶ And þe same diuersite of hire natures þat so discordeden þat oon fro þat oþer most[e] departen and vnioignen þe þinges þat ben conioigned. yif þere ne were oon þat contened[e] þat he haþ conioigned 2900 and ybounde. The order that reigns throughout nature could not proceed so regularly and uniformly if there were not a Being, unchangeable and stedfast, to order and dispose so great a diversity of changes. ne þe certein ordre of nature ne sholde. nat brynge furþe so ordinee moeuynge. by places. by tymes. by doynges. by spaces. by qualites. yif þere ne were oon þat were ay stedfast dwellynge. 2904 þat ordeyned[e] and disposed[e] þise diuersites of moeuynges. This Being, the creator and ruler of all things, I call God. ¶ and þilke þinge what so euer it be. by whiche þat alle þinges ben maked and ylad. I clepe hym god þat is a worde þat is vsed to alle folke. P. As thy sentiments on these points are so just I have but little more to do—for thou mayest be happy and secure, and revisit thy own country. þan 2908 seide she. syn þou felest þus þise þinges quod she. I trowe þat I haue lytel more to done. þat þou myȝty of wilfulnesse hool and sounde ne se eftsones þi contre.

But let us reflect a little more upon these matters. ¶ But lat vs loken þe þinges þat we han purposed her-byforn. 2912 Did we not agree that Sufficiency is of the nature of true happiness? ¶ Haue I nat noumbred and seid quod she þat suffisaunce is in blisfulnesse. And have we not seen that God is that true felicity, and that He needs no external aid nor instruments? and we han accorded þat god is and þilke same blisfulnesse. ¶ yis forsoþe quod I. and þat to gouerne þis worlde quod she. ne shal he 2916 neuer han nede of none helpe fro wiþoute. For if he should, he would not be self-sufficient. for ellys yif he had[de] nede of any helpe. he ne sholde not haue [no] ful suffisaunce. ȝis þus it mot nedes be quod I. And he directs all things by himself alone? ¶ þan ordeyneþ he by hym self al oon alle þinges quod 2920 she. B. It cannot be gainsaid. þat may nat ben denied quod I. P. I have shown that God is the chief good; God must, therefore, direct and order all things by good, since he governs them by himself, whom we have proved to be the supreme good, and he is that helm and rudder, by which this machine of the world is steadily and securely conducted. ¶ And I haue shewed þat god is þe same good. ¶ It remembreþ me wel quod I. ¶ þan ordeineþ he alle þinges by þilke goode quod she. Syn he whiche we han accorded to 2924 ben good gouerneþ alle þingus by hym self. and he is a keye and a stiere by whiche þat þe edifice of þis worlde is ykept stable and wiþ oute corumpynge B. I entirely agree to this, and partly anticipated your remarks. ¶ I accorde me gretly quod I. and I aperceiuede a litel here byforn 2928 þat þou woldest seyne þus. Al be it so þat it were by a þinne suspecioun. P. I believe it; for your eyes are now more intent upon these great truths relating to true felicity; but what I am going to say is not less open to your view. I trowe it wel quod she. ¶ For as I trowe þou leedest nowe more ententifly þine eyen to loken þe verray goodes ¶ but naþeles þe þinges þat I 2932 shal telle þe ȝit ne sheweþ nat lasse to loken. B. What is that? what is þat quod I. P. As we believe that God governs all things by his goodness, and that all things have a natural tendency towards the good, can it be doubted but that they all voluntarily submit to the will and control of their ruler? ¶ So as men trowen quod she and þat ryȝtfully þat god gouerneþ alle þinges by þe keye of his goodnesse. ¶ And alle þise same þinges as I [haue] 2936 tauȝt þe. hasten hem by naturel entencioun to comen to goode þer may no man douten. þat þei ne ben gouerned uoluntariely. and þat þei ne conuerten [hem] nat of her owen wille to þe wille of hire ordenour. 2940

B. It cannot be otherwise. There would be no safety for those who obey, if the discord of a portion were allowed. as þei þat ben accordyng and enclinynge to her gouernour and her kyng. ¶ It mot nedys be so quod. I. [* Fol. 23 b.] *¶ For þe realme ne sholde not seme blisful ȝif þere were a ȝok of mysdrawynges in diuerse parties ne þe sauynge of 2944 obedient þinges ne sholde nat be. P. Is there anything that follows the dictates of nature that seeks to counteract the will of God? þan is þere no þing quod she þat kepiþ hys nature; þat enforceþ hym to gone aȝeyne god. B. No. ¶ No quod. I. P. If there should be any such, it could not prevail against him, who is supremely happy and consequently omnipotent. ¶ And if þat any þing enforced[e] hym to wiþstonde god. myȝt[e] it auayle at 2948 þe laste aȝeyns hym þat we han graunted to ben al myȝty by þe ryȝt of blisfulnesse. ¶ Certis quod I al outerly it ne myȝt[e] nat auaylen hym. Then there is nothing that either will or can withstand this supreme good? þan is þere no þing quod she þat eyþer wol or may wiþstonde to þis 2952 souereyne good. B. Nothing, certainly. ¶ I trowe nat quod. I P. It is then the supreme good that governs and orders all things powerfully and benignly. ¶ þan is þilke þe souereyne good quod she þat alle þingus gouerneþ strongly and ordeyneþ hem softly. B. I am delighted with your conclusions, but much more with your language; so that fools may be ashamed of their objections to the divine government. þan seide I þus. I delite me quod I nat oonly in þe endes or in þe 2956 sommes of [the] resouns þat þou hast concludid and proued. ¶ But þilke wordes þat þou vsest deliten me moche more. ¶ So at þe last[e] fooles þat somtyme renden greet[e] þinges auȝten ben asshamed of hem 2960 self. [Chaucer’s gloss.] ¶ þat is to seyne þat we fooles þat reprehenden wickedly þe þingus þat touchen goddes gouernaunce we auȝten ben asshamed of oure self. As I þat seide god refuseþ oonly þe werkes of men. and ne entremetiþ nat 2964 of hem. P. You have read the Poets’ fables, how the Giants stormed heaven—how they were repulsed and punished according to their deserts; but may we not compare our reasons together, for by so doing some clear spark of truth may shine forth? p. þou hast wel herd quod she þe fables of þe poetes. how þe geauntes assailden þe heuene wiþ þe goddes. but for soþe þe debonaire force of god disposed[e] hem so as it was worþi. þat is to seyne distroied[e] þe 2968 geauntes. as it was worþi. ¶ But wilt þou þat we ioygnen togedre þilke same resouns. for perauenture of swiche coniunccioun may sterten vp some faire sperkele of soþe B. As you please. ¶ Do quod I as þe list. P. Is God omnipotent? wenest þou quod she 2972 þat god ne is almyȝty. no man is in doute of it. B. No one doubts it. Certys quod I no wyȝt ne defendiþ it if he be in hys mynde.

P. If he is almighty, there are, then, no limits to his power? but he quod she þat is al myȝty þere nis no þing þat he ne may do. B. He can doubtless do all things. þat is soþe quod I. P. May God do evil? May god done yuel 2976 quod she. B. No. nay for soþe quod. I. P. Is evil nothing, since God, who is almighty, cannot do it? ¶ þan is yuel no þing quod she. ¶ Syn þat he ne may not done yuel þat may done alle þinges. B. Dost thou mock me or play with me, leading me with thy arguments into an inextricable labyrinth, and enclosing me in a wonderful circle of Divine Simplicity? scornest þou me quod. I. or ellys pleyest þou or deceiuest þou me. þat hast so wouen me 2980 wiþ þi resouns. þe house of didalus so entrelaced. þat it is vnable to ben vnlaced. þou þat oþer while entrest þere þou issest and oþer while issest þere þou entrest. ne fooldest þou nat to gidre by replicacioun of wordes a 2984 maner wondirful cercle or envirounynge of symplicite deuyne. For thou didst first begin with happiness, and didst say that it was the sovereign good, and that it resided in God; then, that God was that Good and the perfection of happiness; and, hence, thou didst infer that nobody could be happy unless he became likewise a God. ¶ For certys a litel her byforne whan þou bygunne atte blisfulnesse þou seidest þat it is souereyne good. and seidest þat it is set in souereyne god. and þat 2988 god is þe ful[le] blisfulnesse. for whiche þou ȝaf[e] me as a couenable ȝifte. þat is to seyne þat no wyȝt nis blisful. but yif he be good al so þer wiþ Again, thou saidst that the very form of good was the substance whereof God and happiness were composed, and that it was the object and desire of all things in nature. and seidest eke þat þe forme of goode is þe substaunce of god. and 2992 of blisfulnesse. and seidest þat þilke same oone is þilke same goode þat is requered and desired of al þe kynde of þinges. Thou didst prove that God rules the world by his goodness, and that all things willingly obeyed him; and that evil has no existence. and þou proeuedest in disputynge þat god gouerneþ alle [the] þinges of þe worlde by þe gouernementys 2996 of bountee. and seydest þat alle þinges wolen ybeyen to hym. and seidest þat þe nature of yuel nis no þing. These truths you established by forcible and natural arguments, and by no strained and far-fetched reasons. and þise þinges ne shewedest þou nat wiþ no resouns ytake fro wiþoute but by proues in cercles and 3000 homelyche knowen. ¶ þe whiche proeues drawen to hem self hir feiþ and hir accorde eueriche [of] hem of oþer. þan seide she þus. P. I have not deluded you, for by the Divine aid we have accomplished our chief task. I ne scorne þe nat ne pleye ne desseyue þe. but I haue shewed to þe þinge þat is grettest ouer 3004 alle þinges by þe ȝifte of god þat we some tyme prayden

Blisful is Happy is he that hath seen the lucid spring of truth! Happy the man that hath freed himself from terrestrial chains! þat man þat may seen þe clere welle of good. blisful is he þat may vnbynde hym fro þe bonde of heuy erþe. The Thracian poet, consumed with grief for the loss of his wife, sought relief from music. ¶ þe poete of trace [orpheus] þat somtyme hadde ryȝt greet sorowe for þe deeþ of hys wijf. His mournful songs drew the woods along; the rolling rivers ceased to flow; the savage beasts became heedless of their prey; the timid hare was not aghast at the hound. aftir þat 3024 he hadde maked by hys wepely songes þe wodes meueable to rennen. and hadde ymaked þe ryueres to stonden stille. and maked þe hertys and hyndes to ioignen dredles hir sides to cruel lyouns to herkene his songe. 3028 and had[de] maked þat þe hare was nat agast of þe hounde whiche þat was plesed by hys songe. But the songs that did all things tame, could not allay their master’s ardent love. so þat whane þe most[e] ardaunt loue of hys wijf brende þe entrailes of his brest. ne þe songes þat hadde ouer 3032 comen alle þinges ne myȝten nat assuage hir lorde orpheus. He bewailed the cruelty of the gods above, and descended to Pluto’s realm. ¶ He pleyned[e] hym of þe godes þat weren cruel to hym. he wente hym to þe houses of helle There he struck his tuneful strings and sang, exhausting all the harmonious art imparted to him by his mother Calliope. and þere he tempred[e] hys blaundissyng songes by resounyng 3036 of hys strenges. ¶ And spak and song in wepynge alle þat euer he hadde resceyued and laued oute of þe noble welles of hys modir calliope þe goddesse. In songs dictated both by grief and love, he implored the infernal powers to give him back his Eurydice. and he song wiþ as mychel as he myȝt[e] of 3040 wepynge. and wiþ as myche as loue þat doubled[e] his sorwe myȝt[e] ȝeuen hym and teche hym in his seke herte. ¶ And he commoeuede þe helle and requered[e] and souȝte by swete preiere þe lordes of soules in helle 3044 of relesynge. þat is to seyne to ȝelden hym hys wif. Cerberus, Hell’s three-headed porter, stood amazed; ¶ Cerberus þe porter of helle wiþ his þre heuedes was cauȝt and al abaist for þe new[e] songe. the Furies, tormentors of guilty souls, did weep; and þe þre goddesses furijs and vengerisse of felonies þat tourmenten 3048 and agasten þe soules by anoye wexen sorweful and sory and wepen teres for pitee. Ixion, tormented by the revolving wheel, found rest; þan was nat þe heued of Ixione ytourmented by þe ouerþrowing whele. Tantalus, suffering from a long and raging thirst, despised the stream; ¶ And tantalus þat was destroied by þe woodnesse of longe 3052 þrust dispiseþ þe flodes to drynke. and the greedy vulture did cease to eat and tear the growing liver of Tityus. þe fowel þat hyȝt voltor þat etiþ þe stomak or þe giser of ticius is so fulfilled of his songe þat it nil etyn ne tyren no more.

At length Pluto himself relented, crying out, ‘We are overcome! Let us give him back his wife, he hath well won her by his song. ¶ Atte þe laste þe lorde and Iuge of soules was moeued 3056 to misericordes and cried[e] we ben ouer comen quod he. yif[e] we to orpheus his wijf to bere hym compaignye he haþ welle I-bouȝt hir by his faire songe and his ditee. But we will lay this injunction upon him. Till he escape the infernal bounds, he shall not cast a backward look.’ but we wil putten a lawe in þis. and couenaunt 3060 in þe ȝifte. þat is to seyne. þat til he be out of helle yif he loke byhynden hym [þat] hys wijf shal comen aȝeine to vs But, who shall give a lover any law? Love is a greater law than may be given to any earthly man. ¶ but what is he þat may ȝeue a lawe to loueres. loue is a gretter lawe and a strengere to 3064 hym self þan any lawe þat men may ȝeuen. Alas! having left the realms of night, Orpheus cast a look behind and lost his too-much-loved Euridice. ¶ Allas whan Orpheus and his wijf were al most at þe termes of þe nyȝt. þat is to seyne at þe last[e] boundes of helle. Orpheus loked[e] abakwarde on Erudice his wijf and 3068 lost[e] hir and was deed. This fable belongs to all you, whose minds would view the Sovereign Good. ¶ þis fable apperteineþ to ȝow alle who so euer desireþ or sekiþ to lede his þouȝte in to þe souereyne day. þat is to seyne to clerenes[se] of souereyne goode. For he who fixes his thoughts upon earthly things and low, must lose the noble and heaven-imparted Good. ¶ For who so þat euere be so ouer 3072 comen þat he fycche hys eyen in to þe put[te] of helle. þat is to seyne who so setteþ his þouȝtes in erþely þinges. al þat euer he haþ drawen of þe noble good celestial he lesiþ it whan he lokeþ þe helles. þat is to 3076 seyne to lowe þinges of þe erþe.

evil exists and is allowed to pass unpunished. yif þat yuelys mowen ben by any weyes. or ellys yif þat yuelys passen wiþ outen punyssheinge. This, to say the least, is astonishing. þe whiche þinge oonly how worþi it is to ben wondred vpon. þou considerest it weel þi self certeynly. Moreover, while vice flourishes virtue is not only unrewarded, but trampled under foot by base and profligate men, and suffers the punishment due to impiety. but ȝitte to þis 3096 þing þere is an oþer þing y-ioigned more to ben ywondred vpon. ¶ For felonie is emperisse and flowreþ ful of rycchesse. and vertues nis nat al oonly wiþ outen medes. but it is cast vndir and fortroden vndir þe feet of felonous 3100 folk. and it abieþ þe tourmentes in sted of wicked felouns Here is cause for wonderment, since such things are possible under the government of an omniscient and omnipotent God, who wills nothing but what is the best. ¶ Of al[le] whiche þing þer nis no wyȝt þat [may] merueyllen ynouȝ ne compleyne þat swiche þinges ben don in þe regne of god þat alle þinges woot. 3104 and alle þinges may and ne wool nat but only goode þinges. P. It were indeed, not only marvellous, but also horribly monstrous, if, in the well-regulated family of so great a master, the worthless vessels should be honoured and the precious ones be despised:—but it is not so. ¶ þan seide she þus. certys quod she þat were a grete meruayle and an enbaissynge wiþouten ende. and wel more horrible þan alle monstres yif it were as 3108 þou wenest. þat is to sein. þat in þe ryȝt ordeyne house of so mochel a fader and an ordenour of meyne. þat þe vesseles þat ben foule and vyle sholde ben honoured and heried. and þe precious uesseles sholde ben defouled 3112 and vyle. but it nis nat so. For if the conclusions we have come to, be sound and irrefragable, we must confess that under God’s rule the good are always powerful and mighty, and the wicked weak and contemptible; For yif þe þinges þat I haue concluded a litel here byforne ben kept hoole and vnraced. þou shalt wel knowe by þe auctorite of god. of þe whos regne I speke þat certys þe good[e] 3116 folk ben alwey myȝty. and shrewes ben alwey yuel and feble. that vice never passes unpunished, nor virtue goes unrewarded; ne þe vices ben neuere mo wiþ outen peyne; ne þe vertues ne ben nat wiþ outen mede. that happiness attends good men, and misfortune falls to the lot of the wicked. and þat blisfulnesses comen alwey to goode folke. and infortune comeþ 3120 alwey to wicked folke. These and many other truths of like nature shall be proved to thee, and shall put an end to thy complaints, ¶ And þou shalt wel knowe many[e] þinges of þis kynde þat sholle cessen þi pleyntes.

ÞAnne seide I B. Ah! thou promisest me great things indeed!—but without delay, satisfy the expectations you have raised. þus. [owh] I wondre me þat þou by-hetest me so grete þinges. ne I ne doute nat þat þou ne mayst wel performe þat þou by-hetest. but I preie þe 3168 oonly þis. þat þou ne tarie nat to telle me þilke þinges þat þou hast meoued. P. You must first be convinced that the good are always strong and powerful and the wicked destitute of strength. first quod she þou most nedes knowen. þat good[e] folk ben al wey strong[e] and myȝty. and þe shrewes ben feble and desert and naked 3172 of alle strengþes. These assertions do mutually demonstrate each other. and of þise þinges certys eueryche of hem is declared and shewed by oþer. For since good and evil are contrary, if good be powerful evil must be impotent. ¶ For so as good and yuel ben two contraries. yif so be þat goode be stedfast. þan sheweþ þe fieblesse of yuel al openly. And if the frailty of evil is known, the strength and stability of good must also be known to you. and 3176 yif þou knowe clerely þe freelnesse of yuel. þe stedfastnesse of goode is knowen. But to convince you I shall proceed to prove it from both these principles, establishing these truths, by arguments drawn first from one of these topics and then from the other. but for as moche as þe fey of my sentence shal be þe more ferme and haboundaunt. I wil goon by þat oon wey and by þat oþer and I wil conferme 3180 þe þinges þat ben purposed now on þis side and now on þat syde. Two things are necessary to every action—the Will and the Power; if either be wanting, nothing can be effected. ¶ Two þinges þer ben in whiche þe effect of alle þe dedes of man kynde standiþ. þat is to seyn. wil and power. and yif þat oon of þise two fayleþ 3184 þere nis no þing þat may be don. A man can do nothing without the concurrence of his will, and if power faileth the will is of no effect. for yif þat wil lakkeþ þere nys no wyȝt þat vndirtakeþ to done þat he wol not don. and yif power fayleþ þe wille nis but in ydel and stant for nauȝt. Hence, if you see a person desirous of getting what he cannot procure, you are sure he lacks power to obtain it. and þer of comeþ it þat yif þou se a 3188 wyȝt þat wolde geten þat he may nat geten. þou mayst nat douten þat power ne fayleþ hym to hauen þat he wolde. ¶ þis is open and clere quod I. ne it may nat ben denyed in no manere. And if you see another do what he had a mind to do, can you doubt that he had the power to do it? and yif þou se a wyȝt quod 3192 she. þat haþ don þat he wolde don þou nilt nat douten þat he ne haþ had power to done it. B. No, surely. no quod. I. and in þat. þat euery wyȝt may. P. A man, then, is esteemed powerful in respect of what he is able to do, and weak in relation to what he is unable to perform. in þat þat men may holden hym myȝty. as who seiþ in as moche as a man is myȝty 3196 to done a þing. in so moche men halden hym myȝty. and in þat þat he ne may. in þat men demen hym to ben feble. B. That is true. I confesse it wel quod I. P. Do you remember that I proved that the will of man, following different pursuits, seeks happiness only? Remembriþ þe quod she þat I. haue gadred and shewed by forseide resouns 3200 þat al þe entencioun of þe wil of mankynde whiche þat is lad by diuerse studies hastiþ to comen to blisfulnesse. ¶ It remembreþ me wel quod I þat it hath ben shewed.

P. If two beings have the same end in view—and one of them accomplishes his purpose by the use of natural means, while the other not using legitimate means does not attain his end—which of these two is the most powerful? ¶ yif þat þer ben two þinges þat han o same purpos by kynde. and þat one of hem pursueþ and performeþ 3224 þilke same þinge by naturel office. and þat oþer ne may nat done þilk naturel office. but folweþ by oþer manere þan is couenable to nature ¶ Hym þat acomplisiþ hys purpos kyndely. and ȝit he ne acomplisiþ 3228 nat hys owen purpos. wheþer of þise two demest þou for more myȝty. B. Illustrate your meaning more clearly. ¶ yif þat I coniecte quod .I. þat þou wilt seye algates. ȝit I desire to herkene it more pleynely of þe. P. The motion of walking is natural to man? And this motion is the natural office of the feet? Do you grant this? þou nilt nat þan denye quod she þat þe 3232 moeuementȝ of goynge nis in men by kynde. no for soþe quod I. ne þou ne doutest nat quod she þat þilke naturel office of goynge ne be þe office of feet. B. I do. I ne doute it nat quod .I. P. If, then, he who is able to use his feet walks, whilst another lacking this power creeps on his hands—surely he that is able to move naturally upon his feet is more powerful than he who cannot. þan quod she yif þat a wyȝt be myȝty to 3236 moeue and goþ vpon hys feet. and anoþer to whom þilke naturel office of feet lakkeþ. enforceþ hym to gone crepynge vpon hys handes. ¶ whiche of þise two auȝte to ben holden more myȝty by ryȝt. knyt furþe þe remenaunt 3240 quod I. ¶ For no wyȝt ne douteþ þat he þat may gone by naturel office of feet. ne be more myȝty þan he þat ne may nat P. The good and bad seek the supreme good: the good by the natural means of virtue—the wicked by gratifying divers desires of earthly things (which is not the natural way of obtaining it). ¶ but þe souereyne good quod she þat is euenlyche purposed to þe good folk and to 3244 badde. þe good folke seken it by naturel office of uertues. and þe shrewes enforcen hem to geten it by dyuerse couetise of erþely þinges. whiche þat nis no naturel office to geten þilke same souereyne goode. 3248

Do you think otherwise? trowest þou þat it be any oþer wyse. B. The conse­quence is plain, and that follows from what has been granted—that the good are powerful, while the wicked are feeble. nay quod .I. for þe consequence is open and shewynge of þinges þat I haue graunted. ¶ þat nedes goode folk moten ben myȝty. and shrewes feble and vnmyȝty. P. You rightly anticipate me; for it is a good sign, as physicians well know, when Nature exerts herself and resists the malady. ¶ þou rennest aryȝt 3252 byfore me quod she. and þis is þe iugement þat is to seyn. ¶ I iuge of þe ryȝt as þise leches ben wont forto hopen of seke folk whan þei aperceyuen þat nature is redressed and wiþstondeþ to þe maladie. But, as you are so quick of apprehension, I shall continue this mode of reasoning. ¶ But for I 3256 see þe now al redy to þe vndirstandynge I shal shewe þe more þilke and continuel resouns. The weakness of the wicked is conspicuous—they cannot attain the end to which their natural disposition prompts and almost compels them; what would become of them without this natural prompting, so powerful and irresistible? ¶ For loke now how gretly shewiþ þe feblesse and infirmite of wicked folke. þat ne mowen nat come to þat hire naturel 3260 entencioun ledeþ hem. and ȝitte almost þilk naturel entencioun constreineþ hem. ¶ and what were to deme þan of shrewes. yif þilke naturel helpe hadde for-leten hem. ¶ þe whiche naturel helpe of entencioun goþ alwey 3264 byforne hem. and is so grete þat vnneþ it may be ouercomen. Consider how great is the impotence of the wicked. (The greater the things desired, but unaccomplished, the less is the power of him that desires, and is unable to attain his end.) ¶ Considre þan how gret defaute of power and how gret feblesse þere is in grete felonous folk as who seiþ þe gretter þinges þat ben coueited and þe desire 3268 nat accomplissed of þe lasse myȝt is he þat coueiteþ it and may nat acomplisse. ¶ And forþi philosophie seiþ þus by souereyne good. The wicked seek after no trivial things—which they fail to obtain; but they aspire in vain to the sovereign good, which they endeavour day and night to obtain. ¶ Sherewes ne requere nat lyȝt[e] medes ne veyne gaines whiche þei ne may nat 3272 folwen ne holden. but þei faylen of þilke some of þe heyȝte of þinges þat is to seyne souereyne good. ne þise wrecches ne comen nat to þe effect of souereyne good. [* fol. 26.] *þe whiche þei enforcen hem oonly to geten by nyȝtes 3276 and by dayes. The good attain the end of their desires, and therein their power is manifested. ¶ In þe getyn[g] of whiche goode þe strengþe of good folk. is ful wel ysen. For as you deem him a good walker that goes to the end of his journey, so you must esteem him powerful that attains his desires, beyond which there is nothing to desire. For ryȝt so as þou myȝtest demen hym myȝty of goynge þat goþ on hys feet til he myȝt[e] come to þilke place fro þe whiche 3280 place þere ne lay no wey forþer to be gon. Ryȝt so most þou nedes demen hym for ryȝt myȝty þat getiþ and atteiniþ to þe ende of alle þinges þat ben to desire. by-ȝonde þe whiche ende þat þer nis no þing to desire. 3284