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Charles Sumner, his complete works, volume 13 (of 20)

Volume 13 — THE EQUAL RIGHTS OF ALL: THE GREAT GUARANTY AND PRESENT NECESSITY, FOR THE SAKE OF SECURITY, AND TO MAINTAIN A REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT. (continued 2)

Reading edition

I begin with Benjamin Franklin, who saw all questions of Government with a surer instinct than any other person in our history. As early as 1736, while still a young man, he wrote an article, which was published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, containing these words:—

“Popular Governments have not been framed without the wisest reasons. It seemed highly fitting that the conduct of magistrates, created by and for the good of the whole, should be made liable to the inspection and animadversion of the whole.”[126]

It is for the good of the whole, and not for an odious oligarchy or an aristocratic class, that our patriot speaks, and in these words is foreshadowed the idea of a republican government. But it was in discussions, after Otis had hurled his flaming bolt, that we find a fuller and more precise definition. Here it is, as adopted, if not written, by Franklin:—

“That every man of the commonalty (excepting infants, insane persons, and criminals) is, of common right, and by the laws of God, a freeman, and entitled to the free enjoyment of liberty.

“That liberty, or freedom, consists in having an actual share in the appointment of those who frame the laws, and who are to be the guardians of every man’s life, property, and peace: for the all of one man is as dear to him as the all of another; and the poor man has an equal right, but more need, to have representatives in the Legislature than the rich one.

“That they who have no voice nor vote in the electing of representatives do not enjoy liberty, but are absolutely enslaved to those who have votes, and to their representatives: for to be enslaved is to have governors whom other men have set over us, and be subject to laws made by the representatives of others, without having had representatives of our own to give consent in our behalf.”[127]

In these emphatic words is a complete vindication of the equal right of representation, as essential to free government,—so much so, that, where this does not exist, Liberty does not exist.

Jefferson followed Franklin in the same vein, but with greater fervor. The author of the Declaration of Independence could not do otherwise. Constantly he testifies to his idea of a Republic. Thus he wrote to Alexander von Humboldt, under date of June 13, 1817, affirming the rights of the majority as “the first principle of Republicanism,” and assuming the principle of Equal Rights:—

“The first principle of Republicanism is, that the lex majoris partis is the fundamental law of every society of individuals of equal rights. To consider the will of the society enounced by the majority of a single vote as sacred as if unanimous is the first of all lessons in importance, yet the last which is thoroughly learnt. This law once disregarded, no other remains but that of force, which ends necessarily in military despotism.”[128]

In another letter, to John Taylor, of Caroline, dated May 28, 1816, he thus defines a Republic:—

“Indeed, it must be acknowledged that the term Republic is of very vague application in every language. Witness the self-styled Republics of Holland, Switzerland, Genoa, Venice, Poland. Were I to assign to this term a precise and definite idea, I would say, purely and simply, it means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally, according to rules established by the majority,—and that every other government is more or less republican in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the citizens.”[129]

Here again, while confessing the unquestionable vagueness of the term according to old examples, he assumes that in a republic all citizens must have a voice. And again, in the same letter, he thus indignantly condemns denial of representation:—

“And also that one half of our brethren who fight and pay taxes are excluded, like Helots, from the rights of representation, as if society were instituted for the soil, and not for the men inhabiting it, or one half of these could dispose of the rights and the will of the other half without their consent.”[130]

Thus did he scout the whole wretched pretension of oligarchy and monopoly by which citizens are deprived of equal rights.

To these may be added his earliest and latest declarations on this important question. The earliest is in his “Notes on Virginia,” written in 1781, where he recognizes “a reciprocation of right” as a presiding principle:—

“When arguing for ourselves, we lay it down as a fundamental, that laws, to be just, must give a reciprocation of right: that without this they are mere arbitrary rules of conduct, founded in force, and not in conscience.”[131]

The latest declaration was in 1826, the year of his death. It is in a paper containing some of his most intimate opinions. Here he bears testimony to “equality among our citizens” as “essential to the maintenance of republican government.”[132] These are among his dying words.

Madison was colder in nature than Jefferson; but they were associates in opinion, as in political life. In the debates on the National Constitution the former condemned the denial of rights on account of color:—

“We have seen the mere distinction of color made, in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man.”[133]

Speaking directly of the right of suffrage, he uses the following language:—

“The right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms.”[134]

Thus declaring himself against “aristocracies,” he naturally recognized the true idea; and here he was perplexed by the question of a property qualification, and the effort to reconcile it with “the right of suffrage,” which he calls “a fundamental article in republican constitutions.”[135] In another place, he says of “confining the right of suffrage to freeholders”: “It violates the vital principle of free government, that those who are to be bound by laws ought to have a voice in making them; and the violation would be more strikingly unjust as the lawmakers become the minority.”[136] Completely recognizing the great American principle, that just government can stand only on “the consent of the governed,” he is brought to this conclusion:—

“Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the mass of citizens should not be without a voice in making the laws which they are to obey, and in choosing the magistrates who are to administer them.”[137]

In one of the most remarkable chapters of the “Federalist,” Madison gives expansion to this idea in his formal definition of a Republic:—

“If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms of government are established, we may define a Republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion, OR A FAVORED CLASS OF IT: otherwise a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for their government the honorable title of Republic.”[138]

Thus, in few significant words, does this authority teach that a Republic is a government derived from “the great body of the people,” and not from “a favored class of it.” Better words could not be found for the American definition.

I repeat these two conditions of republican government according to Madison: First, the government must be derived from the great body of the people; and, secondly, it cannot spring from any favored class.

That the colored race should not be excluded from this definition may be justly inferred from his remark, already quoted, that “where Slavery exists the republican theory becomes still more fallacious,”[139] and also from his correspondence at a later day with Lafayette, whose devotion to the great principle of Equal Rights was blazoned before the world. Writing to the latter, November 25, 1820, he said:—

“The Constitutions and laws of the different States are much at variance in the civic character given to free persons of color: those of most of the States, not excepting such as have abolished Slavery, imposing various disqualifications, which degrade them from the rank and rights of white persons. All these perplexities develop more and more the dreadful fruitfulness of the original sin of the African trade.”[140]

“Various disqualifications which degrade them”; “dreadful fruitfulness”: such are some of the terms in which judgment is recorded. Another letter, also to Lafayette, written as late as February 1, 1830, says:—

“Outlets for the freed blacks are alone wanted for a rapid erasure of the blot [of Slavery] from our Republican character.”[141]

Thus, in his opinion, was the treatment of this unhappy people inconsistent with the “Republican character.”

Hamilton follows with perhaps equal authority. Though approaching political questions from opposite points of view, we find him uniting with Franklin, Jefferson, and Madison. Here is a glimpse of the definition he would supply:—

“As long as offices are open to all men and no constitutional rank is established, it is pure republicanism.”[142]

Not for an oligarchy, but for all, is a Republic created. Then again he testifies for Equal Rights, and against partial distinctions:—

“There can be no truer principle than this, that every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of Government.… We propose a free government. Can it be so, if partial distinctions are maintained?”[143]

Again he says, in positive words:—

“A share in the sovereignty of the State, which is exercised by the citizens at large in voting at elections, is one of the most important rights of the subject, and in a Republic ought to stand foremost in the estimation of the law. It is that right by which we exist a free people.”[144]

He then exhibits the crowning lesson:—

“The principles of the Revolution taught the inhabitants of this country to risk their lives and fortunes in asserting their liberty, or, in other words, their right to a share in the government. That portion of the sovereignty to which each individual is entitled can never be too highly prized. It is that for which we have fought and bled.”[145]

More could not be said in the few words. But it is when Hamilton comes to consider the National Constitution and to expound its provisions, that, while recognizing the anomalous condition of Slavery, and exposing what he calls “the compromising expedient of the Constitution” by which “the slave is divested of two fifths of the man,” he yet declares “the equal level of free inhabitants,” and announces, “that, if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.” Here is this important text,—which has additional authority when it is considered that it was attributed also to Madison, and indeed claimed by him, who thus acknowledged the sentiments as his own:—

“It is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is denied to them in the computation of numbers; AND IT IS ADMITTED, THAT, IF THE LAWS WERE TO RESTORE THE RIGHTS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY, THE NEGROES COULD NO LONGER BE REFUSED AN EQUAL SHARE OF REPRESENTATION WITH THE OTHER INHABITANTS.”[146]

Thus, according to Hamilton, if the slaves are restored to the rights which have been taken away,—in other words, if they become freemen,—they will be on the same equal level, and entitled to the same equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. The two ideas of Equality and a Right to Representation, so early and constantly avowed by the Fathers, are here again recognized as essential conditions of government; and this is the true definition of a Republic.

With these great representative names to illustrate the American idea I might close the catalogue. Surely this is sufficient. But there are others, whose authority cannot be disregarded.

Here is the testimony of that inflexible spirit, who had thought and acted much, Samuel Adams, in a letter to his kinsman, John Adams:—

“That the sovereignty resides in the people is a political doctrine which I have never heard an American politician seriously deny.… We, the people, is the style of the Federal Constitution. They adopted it; and, conformably to it, they delegate the exercise of the powers of government to particular persons, who, after short intervals, resign their powers to the people, and they will reëlect them, or appoint others, as they think fit.”[147]

Here also is the testimony of another Republican, who signed the Declaration of Independence, Roger Sherman, in a letter to John Adams:—

“What especially denominates it a Republic is its dependence on the public or people at large, without any hereditary powers. But it is not of so much importance by what appellation the government is distinguished as to have it well constituted to secure the rights and advance the happiness of the community.”[148]

There also was John Adams himself, who was the least distinct of all the Fathers on this question; but we find in the Preface to his Defence of the American Constitutions a passage full of prophetic meaning:—

“Thirteen governments, thus founded on the natural authority of the people alone, without a pretence of miracle or mystery, and which are destined to spread over the northern part of that whole quarter of the globe, are a great point gained in favor of the rights of mankind.”[149]

Here is a plain assertion that our Thirteen States were founded “on the natural authority of the people alone,” and that they were destined to spread over all North America.

Charles Pinckney, in a speech on the adoption of the Constitution, speaks for South Carolina:—

“The doctrine of representation is the fundamental of a republic.… As to the United Netherlands, it is such a confusion of states and assemblies, that I have always been at loss what species of government to term it. According to my idea of the word, it is not a republic; for I conceive it as indispensable in a republic that all authority should flow from the people.… A republic is where the people at large, either collectively or by representation, form the Legislature.”[150]

Luther Martin, an able representative of Maryland in the Convention, while vindicating a prohibition or tax on the importation of slaves, said:—

“The privilege of importing them was unreasonable; and it was inconsistent with the principles of the Revolution, and dishonorable to the American character, to have such a feature in the Constitution.”[151]

Afterwards, in his address to the Legislature of Maryland, he announced that both in the Committee and in the Convention he was influenced by the argument,—

“that Slavery is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism, and has a tendency to destroy those principles on which it is supported, as it lessens the sense of the Equal Rights of mankind, and habituates us to tyranny and oppression.”[152]

Thus was a “sense of the Equal Rights of mankind” one of the principles on which Republicanism rested.

And here is one more word from Virginia: it is Colonel Mason, who always spoke with so much point:—

“The true idea, in his opinion, was, that every man, having evidence of attachment to and permanent common interest with the society, ought to share in all its rights and privileges.”[153]

Again we have a plain recognition of the Revolutionary idea.

Here, also, is another authority. I quote a Virginia writer on Government,—John Taylor, of Caroline:—

“The end of the guaranty is ‘a republican form of government.’ The meaning of this expression is not so unsettled here as in other countries, because we agree in one descriptive character as essential to the existence of a republican form of government. This is representation. We do not admit a government to be even in its origin republican, unless it is instituted by representation; nor do we allow it to be so, unless its legislation is also founded upon representation.”[154]

I close this array, illustrative of opinion, with the words of Daniel Webster, in harmony with the rest:—

“Now, fellow-citizens, I will venture to state, in a few words, what I take these American political principles in substance to be. They consist, as I think, in the first place, in the establishment of popular governments on the basis of representation.… This representation is to be made as equal as circumstances will allow.”[155]

Then again, on another occasion, he said:—

“This is the true idea of a State. It is an organized government, representing the collected will of the people, as far as they see fit to invest that government with power.”[156]

Thus, at every stage, from the opening, when Otis announced the master principle, “Taxation without representation is Tyranny,” all along to Daniel Webster, we find “Representation” an essential element in the American definition of republican government.

4. From authoritative opinions I pass to public acts, which testify to the true idea of republican government. These are of two classes: first, by the United States, in their collective character; and, secondly, by the States individually.

Looking at the States in their collective character, we find that at the adoption of the National Constitution they refused to recognize any exclusion from the elective franchise on account of race or color. The Fathers knew too well the requirements of a republican government to sanction such exclusion. Recognizing Slavery as a transitory condition, soon to cease, they threw over it a careful oblivion; but they were none the less jealous of the rights of all freemen. The slave did not pay taxes, and, so far as he was a person and not property, he was part of the family of his master, by whom he was represented, so that in his case the commanding principle of the Revolution was not disturbed. But, becoming a freeman, the slave stepped at once within the pale of taxation, and therefore necessarily of representation, since the two are inseparable. And this consideration was the guide to our fathers.

The Continental Congress refused point-blank to insert the word “white” in the Articles of Confederation. The question came up, June 25, 1778, on these words: “The free inhabitants of each of these States (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of FREE CITIZENS in the several States.” The delegates from South Carolina moved, in behalf of their State, to limit this guaranty to “free WHITE inhabitants.” On the question of inserting the word “white,” eleven States voted,—two in favor of the insertion, one was divided, and eight were against it. South Carolina, not disheartened, made another attempt, by moving to add, after the words “the several States,” the further clause, “according to the law of such States respectively for the government of their own FREE WHITE inhabitants,”—thus seeking again to limit the operation of the guaranty. This proposition was voted down by the same decisive majority of eight to three. And thus did our fathers testify to the right of representation without distinction of color. On other occasions, for successive years, they constantly gave the same testimony.

A resolution of Congress in April, 1783, seconded by the report of a Grand Committee, of which Mr. Jefferson was Chairman, in April, 1784, recommended an Amendment of the Articles of Confederation, whereby the war expenses should be apportioned among the several States according to “the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants,”—thus positively embracing colored persons. In the Act for the Temporary Government of the Territory “ceded or to be ceded” to the United States, April 23, 1784, and drawn by Jefferson, the voters are declared to be the “free males of full age,” without distinction of color. In the famous Ordinance for the Government of the Northwestern Territory, drawn by Nathan Dane, of Massachusetts, adopted by the Confederation July 13, 1787, and then reënacted by our Congress after the adoption of the Constitution, the voters are declared to be “free male inhabitants of full age,”—again without distinction of color. Then came successive Acts of Congress for the government of Territories, where the rule in the Ordinance for the Northwestern Territory was followed, and there was no distinction of color. If this rule changed, it was only when the partakers in the Revolution and the authors of the Constitution ceased to exercise influence over public affairs. The testimony of the Fathers was constant, and it is only of this that I speak.

Turning from the States collectively, and looking at them individually, we find the same testimony. By the Constitution of New Hampshire, at the adoption of the National Constitution, the suffrage was vested in “every male inhabitant of each town and parish,” with certain qualifications, but without exclusion on account of color. By the Constitution of Massachusetts the suffrage was vested in “every male inhabitant,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. Rhode Island, at the adoption of the Constitution, was under her original colonial charter, which provided for elections by “the major part of the freemen of the respective towns or places,” without distinction of color. Connecticut was likewise under her original colonial charter, which also provided for elections by “the major part of the freemen of the respective towns, cities, and places,” without distinction of color. By the Constitution of New York the suffrage was vested in “every male inhabitant of full age,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. By the Constitution of New Jersey it was vested in “all inhabitants of this Colony of full age,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. By the Constitution of Pennsylvania it was vested in “every freeman of the full age of twenty-one years,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. By the Declaration of Rights prefixed to the Constitution of Delaware it was announced that “every freeman, having sufficient evidence of a permanent common interest with and attachment to the community, hath a right of suffrage,” without distinction of color; and in the Constitution the suffrage was vested in “the freemen and inhabitants of the respective counties,” with certain specified exceptions, but without distinction of color. By the Constitution of Maryland the suffrage was vested in “all freemen above twenty-one years of age,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color. By the Constitution of North Carolina the suffrage was vested in “all freemen of the age of twenty-one years,” with certain specified qualifications, but without distinction of color; and this rule continued down to 1836, when the Constitution was amended, or rather, let me say, perverted. That eminent citizen, Judge Gaston, of North Carolina, in giving judgment at a later day, said: “It is a matter of universal notoriety, that free persons, without regard to color, claimed and exercised the franchise.”[157] To these States I add Tennessee, which was carved out of North Carolina, and followed her benign example. Her Constitution, adopted in 1796, vested the suffrage in “every freeman of the age of twenty-one years,” with certain qualifications, but without distinction of color; and this rule continued down to the perversion of the Constitution in 1834. Mr. Cave Johnson, of Tennessee, once Postmaster General, is reported to have said that he was originally elected to Congress by the votes of colored persons, and I have heard Mr. John Bell make the same confession with regard to himself.

Virginia was inconsistent and uncandid. By the Declaration of Rights prefixed to her Constitution it was announced that “ALL MEN, having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with and attachment to the community, have the right of suffrage,” without distinction of color; and it is added, that they “cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses without their own consent or that of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not in like manner assented for the public good.” This was entirely worthy of the eminent citizens who adorned that State. But a subsequent provision of the Constitution preserved the right of suffrage “as exercised at present”: thus embodying, without naming, the legislative exclusion of free negroes, mulattoes, and Indians, “although such persons be freeholders.” This discreditable manœuvre becomes more notable in view of an incident in the early history of Virginia, curious and important, and also applicable to all the States during their colonial existence. It was on the enactment of a statute in 1723, “that no free negro, mulatto, or Indian whatsoever shall hereafter have any vote at the election of burgesses, or any other election whatsoever,”[158] when the tyranny here manifest was rebuked with unexpected plainness. The legal authority in England, to whom this colonial statute was submitted for review and approval, reported, in admirable words:—

“I cannot see why one freeman should be used worse than another merely upon account of his complexion.… To vote at elections of officers, either for a county or parish, &c., is incident to every freeman who is possessed of a certain amount of property.”[159]

Georgia was fitful. By her Constitution of 1777, in existence immediately anterior to the National Constitution, suffrage was confined to “male white inhabitants.” But a Constitution adopted May 6, 1789, and another adopted May 30, 1798, accorded suffrage to “citizens and inhabitants,” with certain specified qualifications, but without the word “white.”

It only remains to speak of South Carolina, the persistent marplot of republican institutions, where, by the Constitution, the suffrage was vested in “every free white man, and no other person,” with certain specified qualifications. This was the only State among the original Thirteen, unless Georgia be grouped with South Carolina, which at that time allowed a color discrimination in its Constitution. It was the only State which, after uniting in a National Declaration that “all men are created equal,” openly and audaciously commenced the example of “a white man’s government.” This apostate idea, which has since played such a part as a disturber of the national peace, was then and there born, as the opposite idea was born in Massachusetts, under the inspiring words of James Otis. And the other States, in their Constitutions, followed this patriot voice. They spoke of “persons,” “inhabitants,” “freemen,” or, better still, “men,” without prefix of “white.” Color was not mentioned. But even in South Carolina, which introduced the discreditable tyranny into her Constitution, this exclusion was more apparent than real. In point of fact, even as late as 1790, when the first census was taken, there were in this State only one thousand eight hundred and one free colored citizens. Of course their exclusion was wrong, mean, and unrepublican; but I do not assert that it was such a case as to justify the interference of the nation to reform it, especially where there was no lapse of the State Government. On the other hand, its sufferance cannot be interpreted as a waiver of the principles for which the Revolution was fought. But even in South Carolina there had been a spasm of virtue. In 1757 there was a “flourishing negro school” at Charleston, and in 1709 we find a complaint that “even negroes” had been admitted to vote. Though denounced as an abuse, the precedent is authenticated by a disgusted inhabitant.[160]

Such are the public acts of the States, collectively and individually, at the adoption of the National Constitution, illustrating with rare harmony the American idea of a Republic, and testifying against any exclusion founded on color. Add to these, that the National Constitution, carefully excepting from the basis of Representation “Indians not taxed,” pays open homage to the principle that there can be no taxation without representation; add then that it expressly founds the Government upon “the people,” not only in the preamble, which begins “We the people,” but also in providing that the House of Representatives shall be “chosen by the people of the several States”; add also the crowning fact, that it recognizes no distinction of color, that it treats all with the same impartial justice, that the word “white” does not appear there, and who are we, Sir, who dare foist into this Magna Charta an oligarchical idea which finds no sanction in its republican text?

Here I bring this part of the argument to a close. We have seen the origin of the controversy which led to the Revolution, when Otis, with such solid claim, insisted upon Equal Rights, and then, giving practical effect to the grand demand, sounded the battle-cry, “Taxation without Representation is Tyranny”; we have followed the controversy in its anxious stages, where these principles were constantly asserted and constantly denied, until it broke forth in battle; we have seen these principles adopted as the very frontlet of the Republic, when it assumed its place in the family of nations, and then again when it ordained its Constitution; we have seen them avowed and illustrated in memorable words by the greatest authorities of our history; lastly, we have seen them embodied in public acts of the States collectively and individually; and now, out of this concurring, cumulative, and unimpeachable testimony, constituting a speaking aggregation absolutely without precedent, I offer you the American definition of a Republican form of government. In vain do you cite philosophers or publicists, or the examples of former history. Against these I put the early and constant postulates of the Fathers, the corporate declarations of the Fathers, the avowed opinions of the Fathers, and the public acts of the Fathers, all with one voice proclaiming, first, that all men are equal in rights, and, secondly, that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed; and here is the American idea of a Republic, which must be adopted in the interpretation of the National Constitution. You cannot reject it. As well reject the Decalogue in determining moral duties, or reject the multiplication-table in determining a question of arithmetic.

Counter to this irresistible conclusion there can be only one suggestion having any seeming plausibility, and this is founded on the contemporary recognition of Slavery. On this point, it is enough, if I remind you, first, that our fathers did not recognize Slavery as a permanent part of our system, but treated it as exceptional and transitory, while they concealed it from view by words which might mean something else; secondly, that the slave was always regarded, legally and politically, as part of the family of his master, according to the nomenclature of Blackstone’s Commentaries, much read at the time, where master and servant are grouped with husband and wife, parent and child, and, as in the case of wife and child, the slave is represented by the head of the family, who also paid taxes on his account, so that in his case the cardinal principle of the Revolution, associating representation and taxation together, was not essentially violated; and, thirdly, that by the acts of the Continental Congress, and generally by the State Constitutions, all distinction of color was discarded in determining the elective franchise, and that illustrious expounders of the National Constitution, as if anticipating the very question before us, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, announced in the “Federalist,” IF THE LAWS WERE TO RESTORE THE RIGHTS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY, THE NEGROES COULD NO LONGER BE REFUSED AN EQUAL SHARE OF REPRESENTATION WITH THE OTHER INHABITANTS. Such was the understanding, and such the promise, at the adoption of the Constitution. Such was the declared meaning of our fathers, according to the concurrent contemporary testimony of Hamilton and Madison. Therefore, while confessing sorrowfully the terrible inconsistency in recognizing Slavery, and throwing over their shame the mantle which the son of Noah threw over his father, we must reject every argument or inference on this account against the true idea of a Republic, which is none other than a government where all citizens have an equal voice. As Washington, by divine example, gave to mankind a new idea of political greatness, so did the Fathers, by inspired teaching, give to mankind a new idea of Government. Do you ask again for authority? I offer it in its many forms. It is the early Vocabulary of James Otis, Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and Benjamin Franklin; it is the Dictionary of the Revolution; it is the Lexicon of our National History; it is the Thesaurus of Public Acts. This new idea was the great discovery of our fathers. Rob them of this, and you take their highest title to gratitude. Columbus, venturing into an unknown sea, discovered a New World of Space; but our fathers, venturing likewise, discovered a New World of Public Duty. It is for us, their children, to profit by their discovery.

For determining the meaning of our own Constitution in a momentous requirement without precedent, American authority and example are enough; but I would not have you forget that the conclusion on which I rest is grandly sustained by France. Here I shall be brief.

I cannot begin with a higher name than Montaigne, who, though never defining a Republic, let drop words which, coming from such a master, are invaluable:—

“Popular rule seems to me the most natural and equitable.” “Equality is the first part of equity.”[161]

In the same spirit, Montesquieu, while failing to supply a precise definition, helped to elevate the idea of republican government, when he declared “virtue” its inspiration, and that virtue is the love of equality.[162] A kindred thought is expressed by a publicist of our time, in a remarkable study on Montesquieu, when he says, that “the true principle of democracy is justice.”[163] But justice is equality.

Contemporary with Montesquieu was the Marquis d’Argenson, a minister of Louis the Fifteenth and the friend of Voltaire. In a work written as early as 1739, but not seeing the light till 1764, some time after his death, when it was attributed to Rousseau, this remarkable character gives utterance to words worthy of perpetual memory:—

“It is only necessary to lay aside the most stupid prejudice, to admit that two things are chiefly to be desired for the good of the State: one, that all the citizens shall be equal among themselves; the other, that each shall be the son of his works.”[164]

A government where these two things are assured would be a Republic indeed.

Voltaire, though not professing to define a Republic, taught its dependence upon equality:—

“Civil government is the will of all, executed by one or by many in virtue of laws for which all have voted.” “The republican is undoubtedly the most tolerable of all governments, because it is that which brings men most nearly to natural equality.”[165]

In another place the same illustrious teacher said:—

“The people never desire, and never can desire, anything but Liberty and Equality.”[166]

Advancing in time, the Republic becomes more manifest. Omitting the fervid words of Jean Jacques Rousseau, I adduce Condorcet, whose consecration to truth was sealed by a tragical death:—

“I have ever thought that a Republican Constitution, having Equality for its basis, was the only one in conformity with Nature, with reason, and with justice,—the only one which could preserve the liberty of the citizens and the dignity of the human race.”[167]

Belonging to the ancient system of France, and, like Lafayette, with the rank of Marquis, Condorcet, again like Lafayette, not only accepted the Republic, but declared its true basis.

Another French authority, of eminent experience in diplomacy, who wrote coldly and only according to the requirement of reason, Gérard de Rayneval, asserts the same law of Equality:—

“Political Liberty consists in the right to participate in public affairs. This participation is direct or indirect, and it is more or less extended according to the form of government. It is, then, necessarily unequal. For example, in a Democracy all the citizens participate in the legislative power. If they delegate it, they have only a very indirect part in it; but all can become delegates or representatives, all can arrive at administrative employments, and all have the right to protest against abuses. In aristocratic republics political liberty is exclusively concentrated in the body of Notables; they alone exercise all the power; subjects have only civil liberty.”[168]

Such, in France, is the voice of political science.

It is also the voice of the French Revolution. The one idea which that great event taught with prevailing influence was the Equal Rights of All, explained and defined by the new-born formula, that “all are equal before the Law.” Napoleon recognized the supremacy of this principle, when, in an official address to the Council of State, he said, “France loves Equality above everything”;[169] and he sought to enforce it, when, in an early proclamation, he declared, “Let there be no head which does not bend under the empire of Equality.”[170] Such is human inconsistency, that shortly afterwards his own ambition refused to bend under this empire, which none the less disowned the sceptre he assumed and the nobles he created. But the great truth, though trampled down, survived in the hearts of the French people, to rise again and resume its heritage.

As the Provisional Government of 1848 proclaimed the Republic, it was careful, after proper deliberation, to proclaim at the same time “universal suffrage,” which Lamartine, standing on the steps of the Hôtel de Ville, and speaking in the name of the Government, said was “the first truth and only basis of every National Republic.”[171] This proclamation was itself submitted to the vote of “all the citizens”; and on the terms of this submission another member of the Government, of solid sense and perfect fidelity, thus expresses himself:—

“By these words—all the citizens—the Provisional Government intended to consecrate definitively the fundamental principle of democracy; it intended to proclaim boldly and forever the inalienable, imprescriptible right inherent in each member of society to participate directly in the government of his country; it intended to put in practice really and loyally the great principles hitherto shut up in the domain of the abstract theories of philosophy.”[172]

The same person, M. Garnier-Pagès, who was at once an eminent actor in these scenes and their most authentic historian, thus again dwells on the true idea of a Republic:—

“The Republic, that government of all by all, where each has his place, his duty, and his right; the Republic, that is to say, Liberty itself, the liberty to do every act and to give utterance to every thought not prejudicial to others; the Republic, that fraternal ground where are admitted all parties, the representatives of the past as well as of the future, where all minds, all associations, can have free scope.”[173]

This precise definition is fitly crowned by the remarkable words revealing the soul of De Tocqueville:—

“I should, I think, have loved Liberty at all times, but in the times in which we live I feel inclined to adore it.… There is no legislator sufficiently wise and sufficiently powerful to maintain free institutions, if he does not take Equality for first principle and symbol. All our contemporaries, then, who would create or assure the independence and dignity of their fellow-men, must show themselves the friends of Equality; and the only worthy way of showing themselves such is to be so. Upon this depends the success of their holy enterprise.”[174]

To the authentic testimony of modern France, in harmony with our own country, I add the definition of a very recent foreign publicist, who, after dwelling on Equality as the idol sentiment of a Republic, says:—

“This shows us the nature and the end of republican government. It is a government founded on the general interest and equality.”[175]

Admirable words!—in themselves a definition. And here, before closing this testimony, let me call attention to two authorities, contemporary with our fathers, which stand apart,—one English, and the other German. The first is that of Dr. Richard Price, the friend of John Adams, who very early appreciated the American Revolution, and vindicated it before the world. Here is his idea of good government, compendiously expressed:—

“Legitimate government, as opposed to oppression and tyranny, consists only in the dominion of Equal Laws made with common consent, or of men over themselves; and not in the dominion of communities over communities, or of any men over other men.”[176]

The German was none other than the great thinker, Emanuel Kant, who, in his speculations on Perpetual Peace, says, that to this end every state should be a Republic, which he defines:—

“That form of government where every citizen participates by his representatives in the exercise of the legislative power, and especially in that of deciding on the questions of peace and war.”[177]

The statement of Kant is as simple as Pure Reason, which is the title of his great work. It claims plainly for “every citizen” a share in the government, and is the deliberate conclusion furnished by this eminent philosopher, whose name, rarely quoted in politics, is an unimpeachable authority.

Such is the definition of a republican form of government, as found in the history, declarations, opinions, and public acts of the Fathers of our country, reinforced by the authority of foreign intelligence and the example of France. From this presentation of authorities not to be questioned we pass easily to another stage of the discussion, where the conclusion is the easy and irresistible sequence.

III.

Bringing these lapsed States to the touchstone, we see at once their small title to recognition as republican in form. Authentic figures are not wanting. The census of 1860 discloses the population of the States in question.

States. White Population. Colored Population, Slave and Free, including Indians.

Alabama526,271437,930

Arkansas324,143111,307

Florida77,74762,677

Georgia591,550465,736

Louisiana357,456350,546

Mississippi353,899437,406

North Carolina629,942362,680

South Carolina291,300412,408

Tennessee826,722283,079

Texas420,891183,324

Virginia1,047,299549,019

5,447,2203,656,112

A glance at this table is enough. Taking the sum total of population in the eleven States, we find 5,447,220 whites to 3,656,112 colored persons; and you are now to decide, whether, in the discharge of imperative duties under the National Constitution, and bound to guaranty a republican form of government, you will disfranchise this latter mass, shutting them out from those Equal Rights promised by our fathers, and from all copartnership in the government of their country. They surpass in numbers, by at least a million, the whole population of the Colonies at the time our fathers raised the cry, “Taxation without Representation is Tyranny”; and now you are to decide whether to strip them of representation, while you subject them to grinding taxation by tariff and excise, acting directly and indirectly, dwarfing into insignificance everything attempted by the British Parliament. Our fathers could not bear a Stamp Act in making which they had no voice, and they braved terrible war with the most formidable power of the globe rather than pay a tax of threepence on tea imposed by a Parliament in which they were unrepresented. Are you ready, Sir, in disregard of this great precedent, and in disregard of all promises and examples of past history, to thrust a single citizen out of all representation in the Government, while you consume his substance with taxation, subject him to Stamp Acts, compel him to pay a duty of twenty-five cents a pound on tea, and then follow him with imposts in all the business of life? Clearly, if you do not recognize his title to representation, you must at least by careful legislation relieve him from this intolerable taxation. Some of the millions you thrust out already contribute largely to the public revenue. How, then, can you deny them representation? Their money is not rejected. Why reject their votes? But if you reject their votes, you cannot take their money. As you detect no color in their money, you ought to detect no color in their votes.

In this denial of the right to vote there is a surpassing tyranny, being nothing less than a confiscation of the highest property the citizen can possess. To take his money is robbery; to appropriate his house or land is spoliation; but house and land are less than the right by which the citizen is assured in all other rights. Lord Chief Justice Holt spoke as became one of England’s greatest magistrates, when he said from the bench: “A right that a man has to give his vote at the election of a person to represent him in Parliament, there to concur to the making of laws which are to bind his liberty and property, is a most transcendent thing and of an high nature.”[178] But this “most transcendent thing” is taken from a whole race on an excuse insulting to them as members of the human family.

Unhappily, too many people discern the wrong only when they personally feel its sting. Suppose now the case reversed, and white citizens in South Carolina despoiled of this “most transcendent thing” by the predominance of the colored race, so that “black” instead of “white” marks participation in government. But, if such discrimination is just where the white prevails, it would be equally just where the black prevails, and it would be as constitutional in one case as in the other. Unquestionably a black man’s government is as constitutional as a white man’s government. But the white man could not easily endure the degradation; nor can it be doubted that Congress would promptly insist that it was inconsistent with republican government, and would apply the proper remedy. Failing in this duty, what other discrimination could it arrest? The Anglo-Saxon might exclude the Celt; the Celt might exclude the Anglo-Saxon; both might exclude the German, and the fearful antagonisms of race would have full play. Other battles than the Boyne would be the signal of discord, and other parties than Orangemen would stalk upon the scene.

If, looking at these States together, the case is clear, it becomes clearer when we look at them separately. Begin with Tennessee, which disfranchises 283,079 citizens, being more than a quarter of its whole “people.” Thus violating a distinctive principle of republican government, how can this State be recognized as republican? The question is easier asked than answered. But Tennessee is the least offensive on the list. There is Virginia, which disfranchises 549,019 citizens, being more than a third its whole “people.” There is Alabama, which disfranchises 437,930 citizens, being nearly one half its whole “people.” There is Louisiana, which disfranchises 350,546 citizens, being one half its whole “people.” There is Mississippi, which disfranchises 437,406 citizens, being much more than one half its whole “people.” And there is South Carolina, which disfranchises 412,408 citizens, being nearly three fifths its whole “people.” A republic is a pyramid standing on the broad mass of the people as a base; but here is a pyramid balanced on its apex. To call such a government “republican” is a mockery of sense and decency. A monarch “surrounded by republican institutions,” as at one time was the boast of France, would be less offensive to correct principles, and give more security to Human Rights.

Plainly such a government is not a “democracy,” where all the people assemble and govern in person; nor is it a “republic,” where they assemble and govern by representatives, according to the distinction presented by Madison in the “Federalist.”[179] A representative government is a government by the people, not less than a democracy, provided all the people are represented. Representation is a modern invention of incalculable value to embody the will of the people. A republic, like a democracy, cannot tolerate inequality. Wherever a favored class appears, whether in one or the other, its republican character ceases. It may be an aristocracy or oligarchy, but it is not a democracy or a republic.

It is not difficult to classify our Rebel States. They are aristocracies or oligarchies. Aristocracy, according to etymology, is the government of the best. Oligarchy is the government of the few, being not even aristocracy, but an abuse of aristocracy, as despotism is the abuse of monarchy. Perhaps these States may be characterized in either way; and yet aristocracy, especially in origin, has something respectable, which cannot be attributed to a combination whose single distinctive element is color of the skin.

The eminent French publicist, Bodin, in his definition of aristocracy, says that it exists where a smaller body of citizens governs the greater;[180] and this definition has been adopted by others, especially by Montesquieu. But it is not satisfactory. Hallam, whose judgment is of the highest value, after discussing its merits, proposes the following most suggestive substitute:—

“We might better say, that the distinguishing characteristic of an aristocracy is the enjoyment of privileges which are not communicable to other citizens simply by anything they can themselves do to obtain them.”[181]

These words completely characterize the aristocracy of color; for this aristocracy is plainly in the enjoyment of privileges not communicable to other citizens by anything they can themselves do to obtain them. Are we not reminded that “the Ethiopian cannot change his skin,” neither can we “make one hair white or black,” and “which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature”? Aristotle, the great intelligence of Antiquity, whose illumination has reached everywhere, used congenial language, when, in reply to those who would have magistracy and power distributed unequally, according to some rule of personal superiority, he said, “If this is a correct rule, then complexion, or stature, or some similar advantage, might be made the excuse for superiority in civil rights”; and he illustrates the unreasonableness of such a rule by showing, that, in a company of musicians, the best flute is not given to the most noble, but to the artist who will use it best; thus making merit the only qualification, and discarding color, which is accidental and unchangeable.[182]

The famous French founder of the school of Doctrinaires, Royer-Collard, so remarkable for sententious thought, was in the habit of saying that “the sovereignty of Reason is superior to the sovereignty of the people.” But both declare the equal rights of all. The rule of inequality is plainly unreasonable; and what a mockery is that sovereignty of the people which sanctions any denial of equal rights! In different spirit, the consummate French writer, Louis Blanc, devoted to reform, has declared that “the republic is above universal suffrage,”—meaning that even universal suffrage cannot subvert it. But in each is Equality. Universal suffrage openly proclaims this right; and what is the republic without it?

To show that our Rebel States are aristocracies or oligarchies might suffice. But we must not forget, that, born of Slavery, they have the spirit of that iniquity, so that they are essentially of a low type. Founded on color of the skin, they are, beyond question, the most senseless and disgusting of all history. Would you learn to what they must incline? Listen to the frank words of the Venetian master, the famous Father Paul, while, in a state refined by art and elevated by glory, he counsels the privileged class how to use their powers. “If a noble,” says he, “injure a plebeian, justify him by all possible means; but should that be found quite impossible, punish more in appearance than in reality. If a plebeian insult a noble, punish him with the greatest severity, that the commonalty may know how perilous it is to insult a noble.”[183] Such is the terrible rule announced in a document which taught how to make the power of Venice perpetual. But this same spirit predominates still in the Rebel States. It rages there with more revolting cruelty than Venice ever witnessed. And such is the government now claiming recognition as “republican.”

The pretension is hateful on another ground. It is nothing less than a caste, which is irreligious as well as unrepublican. A caste exists only in defiance of the first principles of Christianity and the first principles of a republic. It is heathenism in religion and tyranny in government. The Brahmins and the Sudras in India, from generation to generation, have been separated, as the two races are still separated in these States. If a Sudra presumed to sit on a Brahmin’s carpet, he was punished with banishment. But our recent Rebels undertake to play the part of Brahmins, and exclude citizens, with better title than themselves, from essential rights, simply on the ground of caste, which, according to its Portuguese origin (casta), is only another term for race.

But the pretension is yet otherwise hostile to good government. Here is a monopoly on a gigantic scale and with an unprecedented field, in a country which sets its face against all monopolies as unequal and immoral. If any monopoly deserves unhesitating judgment, it must be that which absorbs the rights of others and engrosses political power. How vain to condemn the petty monopoly of commerce, while allowing this vast, all-embracing monopoly of Human Rights!

Clearly, most clearly, and beyond all question, such a government is not “republican in form.” Call it oligarchy, call it aristocracy, call it caste, call it monopoly; but never call it a republic.

IV.

Of course such a government can exist only in defiance of the National Constitution, and it is the duty of Congress to interfere against it.

The guaranty is by the United States; therefore Congress must perform it; and, in the discharge of this eminent duty, it must affix the true meaning to the requirement, declaring what is a republican government, and supplying the long-sought definition. Here Congress is sole and final arbiter, binding all other branches of Government. Let a State make office hereditary,—let it shut from the courts all who have not the “blue blood” of ancient ancestry,—let it accord to a favored class controlling power and influence,—let it apply any discrimination on account of race or color, whether against Anglo-Saxons, Celts, or Germans, whether against black or white,—let it do any of these things, all so plainly inconsistent with constitutional requirement, and the legislative power of the nation must recall the State from its aberration, and bring it home to the republican standard.

President Johnson, in his recent annual message, says:—

“In case of the usurpation of the government of a State by one man or an oligarchy, it becomes a duty of the United States to make good the guaranty to that State of a republican form of government.”

The President forgets to mention an aristocracy, and does not add, what is true, that the authority bound to make good the guaranty is the sole judge of the exigency. To this end everything centres in Congress, whose powers are commensurate with the occasion. In aid of the guaranty are those other words providing that Congress “shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States.” Under this ample provision there is a duty to be performed, by any means that seem best. The jurisdiction is complete, and it is in Congress. If any authority were needed for this proposition, it would be found in the words of Chief Justice Taney himself, speaking for the Supreme Court of the United States:—

“The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States provides that the United States shall guaranty to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and, on the application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.

“Under this article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For, as the United States guaranty to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State, before it can determine whether it is republican or not.”[184]

In the exercise of this power two courses are open. One is to impose an irrepealable condition upon the unrepublican States, requiring them, before recognition, to re-form their governments to the satisfaction of Congress. The other, and more direct, is by Act of Congress, in performance of the guaranty, and according to the plenary authority “for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States,” to provide all needful safeguards in the unrepublican States, and especially to place the Equal Rights of All under the guardianship of National Law.

Against the exercise of this power there are but two arguments. First, that the Constitution, by providing that “the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature,” has reserved to each State the power of excluding citizens merely on account of color, even though constituting more than a majority of the population. The other argument is, that, since certain States at the North have disfranchised the few colored persons within their borders, the United States are so far constrained by this example that they cannot protect the millions of freedmen in the Rebel States from disfranchisement, and cannot save the Republic from the peril of crying injustice. I know not which of these two arguments is the least reasonable, or rather, which is the most reprehensible. They are both unreasonable, and both reprehensible. They both do violence to the true principles of the National Constitution, if not to common sense.

It is true, that, according to the text of the Constitution, each State may determine the “qualifications” of electors; but this can have no application to an exigency like the present, where, at the close of a prolonged and desperate rebellion, the United States are obliged to guaranty to certain States a republican form of government. In the performance of this guaranty, the United States will look only at the essential elements of such a government, nor more nor less, without regard to State laws. But I am unwilling to rest the argument here. Even assuming that there has been no lapse of State governments, so as to bring the guaranty into operation,—assuming that we are in a condition of assured peace,—then I utterly deny that the power to determine the “qualifications” of electors can give any power to disfranchise actual citizens. It is “qualifications” only which the States can determine,—meaning by this limited term those requirements of personal condition regarded as essential to the security of the franchise. These “qualifications” cannot be in nature permanent or insurmountable. Color cannot be a “qualification,” any more than size, or quality of hair. A permanent or insurmountable “qualification” is equivalent to deprivation of suffrage; in other words, it is the tyranny of taxation without representation, and this tyranny, I insist, is not intrusted to any State. This is the very ground taken by Mr. Madison, when defending the National Constitution in the Virginia Convention.

“Some States might regulate the elections on the principles of Equality, and others might regulate them otherwise.… Should the people of any State, by any means, be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the General Government.… If the elections be regulated properly by the State Legislatures, the Congressional control will very probably never be exercised. The power appears to me satisfactory, and unlikely to be abused as any part of the Constitution.”[185]

With these decisive words from a chief framer of the National Constitution, backed by the reason of the case, I dismiss this objection to the little consideration it deserves. And I dismiss to the same indifference the other objection, that our hands are tied because certain Northern States have done a wrong and mean thing. Pray, Sir, how can the failure of these States affect the power of Congress in a great exigency under the National Constitution? Duty here is identical with power. No matter if the power has been long dormant, it is none the less vital. It is like the slumbering statute which Cicero describes as a sword in the scabbard, tanquam gladius in vagina. It only remains that it be drawn forth.

This duty is fortified by the Constitutional Amendment, which, after providing for the abolition of Slavery, empowers Congress to “enforce” it by “appropriate legislation,” thus heaping Ossa upon Pelion. Clearly, under these words, Congress may do what in its discretion seems “appropriate” to this end, and there is no power to call its action in question. On this point the authority of the Supreme Court, in the weighty judgment of Chief Justice Marshall, is explicit.

“The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that it may not select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of establishing that exception.…

“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.”[186]

These words of the Chief Justice are reinforced by a kindred declaration from another great authority, Mr. Justice Story, speaking also for the Supreme Court, on an important occasion.

“The Constitution unavoidably deals in general language.… The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence.… Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to the Legislature from time to time to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects.”[187]

Apply these words to the present case, and the conclusion is irresistible. Whatever legislation seems “appropriate” to “enforce” the abolition of Slavery, whatever means seem proper to this end, must be within the powers of Congress under the Constitutional Amendment. You cannot deny this principle without setting aside those most remarkable judgments which stand as landmarks of constitutional history. But who can doubt that the abolition of the whole Black Code, in all its oligarchical pretensions, civil and political, is “appropriate” to “enforce” the abolition of Slavery? Mark the language of the grant. Congress may “enforce” abolition, and nobody can question the “means” it thinks best to employ. Let it not hesitate to adopt the “means” that promise to be most effective. As the occasion is extraordinary, so the “means” employed must be extraordinary.

But the Senate has already by solemn vote affirmed this very jurisdiction. You have, Sir, decreed that blacks shall enjoy the same civil rights as whites,—in other words, that with regard to civil rights there shall be no oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, or monopoly, but that all shall be equal before the law, without distinction of color. And this great decree you have made, as “appropriate legislation” under the Constitutional Amendment, to “enforce” the abolition of Slavery. Surely you have not erred. Beyond all question, the protection of the colored race in civil rights is essential to complete the abolition of Slavery; but the protection of the colored race in political rights is not less essential, and the power is as ample in one case as in the other. In each you legislate for the maintenance of that Liberty so tardily accorded, and the legislation is just as “appropriate” in one case as in the other. Protection in civil rights by Act of Congress will be a great event. It will be great in itself. It will be greater still, because it establishes the power of Congress, without further amendment of the National Constitution, to protect every citizen in all his rights, including of course the elective franchise. There are precedents of Congress, as well as of courts, which are landmarks; and this is one of them.

Therefore, as authority for Congress, you have two sources in the Constitution itself,—first, the guaranty clause, and, secondly, the Constitutional Amendment, each sufficient, the two together a twofold sufficiency. To establish the Equal Rights of All, no further Amendment is needed. The actual text is exuberant. Instead of adding new words, it will be enough, if you give those that exist the natural force belonging to them. Instead of neglecting, use them. Instead of supplementing, interpret them. An illustrious magistrate once retorted upon an advocate, who, dissatisfied with a ruling of the court, threatened to burn his books, “Better read them”; and so would I say now to all who think the Constitution needs amendment, Better read it. Yes, Sir, read it in the principles proclaimed by the Fathers before the Revolution, read it in the declarations of the Fathers when they took their place as a Republic, read it in the avowed opinions of the Fathers, read it in the public acts of the Fathers; and in all this beaming, diffusive light you will discern the true meaning. Then again read it in that other light which, as from another sun, newly risen at midday, streams from the obligation of Congress to “enforce” the abolition of Slavery. And yet again read it in the glowing illumination of the war. In whichever light you read it, you will find always the same irresistible meaning. Even if the text were doubtful, the war makes it clear. The victory which overthrew Slavery carried away all those glosses and constructions by which this wrong was originally fastened upon it. For generations the National Constitution has been interpreted for Slavery. From this time forward it must be interpreted in harmony with the Declaration of Independence, so that Human Rights shall always prevail. The promises of the Fathers must be sacredly fulfilled. This is the commanding rule, superseding all other rules. This is a great victory of the war,—perhaps the greatest. It is nothing less than the emancipation of the Constitution itself.

V.

Mr. President, such is the testimony of history, authority, and Constitution, binding the judgment, and leaving no alternative. Thus far I have done little but bring together the diversified testimony and weave it into one body. It is not I who speak. I am nothing. It is the cause, whose voice I am, that addresses you. But there are yet other things, even at this late hour, craving utterance. And here, after this long review, I am brought back to more general considerations, and end as I began, by showing the necessity of Enfranchisement for the sake of public security and public faith. I plead now for the ballot, as the great guaranty, and the only sufficient guaranty,—being in itself peacemaker, reconciler, schoolmaster, and protector,—to which we are bound by every necessity and every reason; and I speak also for the good of the States lately in rebellion, as well as for the glory and safety of the Republic, that it may be an example to mankind.

Let me be understood. What I ask especially is impartial suffrage, which is, of course, embraced in universal suffrage. What is universal is necessarily impartial. For the present, I simply insist that all shall be equal before the law, so that in the enjoyment of this right there shall be no restriction not equally applicable to all. Any further question in the nature of “qualification” belongs to another stage of the debate. And yet I have no hesitation in saying that universal suffrage is a universal right, subject only to such regulations as the safety of society may require. These may concern (1.) age, (2.) character, (3.) registration, (4.) residence. In ancient Greece there was what is called a Timocracy, where a certain amount of property was required; and this condition has modern example, even among us. But it is entirely out of place now. Nobody doubts that minors may be excluded, and so also persons of infamous life. Registration and residence are both prudential requirements for the safeguard of the ballot-box against the Nomads and Bohemians of politics, and to compel the exercise of this franchise among neighbors and friends, where a person is known. Education also, under certain circumstances, may be a requirement of prudence, particularly valuable in a republic, where so much depends on the intelligence of the people; but it is of doubtful value, especially where patriotic votes are needed to crush treason or counteract fraud. There is something worse than inability to read and write. These temporary restrictions do not in any way interfere with the right of suffrage, for they leave it absolutely accessible to all. Even if impediments, they are easily overcome. At all events, they are not in any sense insurmountable; and this is the essential requirement of republican institutions. No matter under what depression of poverty, in what depth of obscurity, or with what diversity of complexion a man has been born, he is nevertheless a citizen, the peer of every other citizen, and the ballot is his inalienable right.

The ballot is peacemaker; and is it not said, “Blessed are the peacemakers”? High among the Beatitudes let it be placed, for there it belongs. Deny it, and the freedman will be the victim of perpetual warfare. Ceasing to be a slave, he only becomes a sacrifice. Grant it, and he is admitted to those equal rights which allow no sacrifice. Plutarch records that the wise man of Athens charmed the people by saying that Equality causes no War, and this “pleased both the rich and the poor.”[188] In another place the same ancient records the wise man as declaring it “that which would occasion no tumult or faction.”[189] But this is peace. How god-like in transforming power alike on master and slave! The master will recognize the new citizen. The slave will stand with tranquil self-respect in presence of the master. Brute force disappears. Distrust is at an end. The master is no longer tyrant. The freedman is no longer dependant. The ballot comes to him in his depression, and says, “Use me, and be elevated.” It comes to him in his passion, and says, “Use me, and do not fight.” It comes to him in his daily thoughts, filling him with the strength and glory of manhood.

The ballot is reconciler. Next after peace is reconciliation. But reconciliation is more than peace. It is concord. Parties long estranged are brought into harmony. They learn to live together. They learn to work together. They are kind to each other, even if only as the Arab and his horse; and this mutual kindness is mutual advantage. Unquestionably the ballot promises this great boon, because it brings all into natural relations of justice, without which reconciliation is a vain thing. Do you wish to see harmony truly prevail, so that industry, society, government, civilization may all prosper, and the Republic wear a crown of true greatness? Then do not neglect the ballot.

The ballot is schoolmaster. Reading and writing are of inestimable value, but the ballot teaches what these cannot teach. It teaches manhood. Especially is it important to a race whose manhood has been denied. The work of redemption cannot be complete, if the ballot is left in doubt. The freedman already knows his friend by the unerring instinct of the heart. Give him the ballot, and he will be educated into the principles of government. Deny him the ballot, and he will continue alien in knowledge as in rights. His claim is exceptional, as your injustice is exceptional. For generations you have shut him out from all education, making it a crime to teach him to read the Book of Life. Let not the tyranny of the past be apology for further exclusion. Prisoners long immured in a dungeon are sometimes blinded, as they come forth into day; but this is no reason for continued imprisonment. To every freedman the ballot is the light of day.

The ballot is protector. Perhaps, at the present moment, this is its highest function. Slavery has ceased in name; but this is all. The old master still asserts an inhuman power, and now by positive statutes seeks to bind his victim in new chains. Let this conspiracy proceed unchecked, and the freedman will be more unhappy than the early Puritan, who, seeking liberty of conscience, escaped from the “lords bishops” only to fall under the “lords elders.” The master will still be master, under another name,—as, according to Milton,

“New presbyter is but old priest writ large.”

Serfdom or apprenticeship is slavery in another guise. To save the freedman from this tyranny, with all its accumulated outrage, is a solemn duty. For this we are now devising guaranties; but, believe me, the only sufficient guaranty is the ballot. Let the freedman vote, and he will have in himself under the law a constant, ever-present, self-protecting power. The armor of citizenship will be his best security. The ballot will be to him sword and buckler,—sword with which to pierce his enemies, and buckler on which to receive their assault. Its possession will be a terror and a defence. The law, which is the highest reason, boasts that every man’s house is his castle; but the freedman can have no castle without the ballot. When the master knows that he may be voted down, he will know that he must be just, and everything is contained in justice. The ballot is like charity, which never faileth, and without which man is only as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal. The ballot is the one thing needful, wanting which, rights of testimony and all other rights are no better than cobwebs, which the master will break through with impunity. To him who has the ballot all other things shall be given,—protection, opportunity, education, a homestead. The ballot is the Horn of Abundance, out of which overflow rights of every kind, with corn, cotton, rice, and all the fruits of the earth. Or, better still, it is like the hand of the body, without which, man, who is now only a little lower than the angels, must have continued only a little above the brutes. We are fearfully and wonderfully made; but as is the hand in the work of civilization, so is the ballot in the work of government. “Give me the ballot and I will move the world” may be the exclamation of the race despoiled of this right. There is nothing it cannot open with almost fabulous power, like that golden bough which in the hands of the classical adventurer unclosed the regions of another world, while, like that magic rod, it is renewed as in the verse,—

“One plucked away, a second branch you see Shoot forth in gold and glitter through the tree.”[190]

If I crowd these illustrations, it is only that I may bring home that supreme efficacy which cannot be exaggerated. Though simple in character, there is nothing the ballot may not accomplish,—like the homely household lamp in Arabian story, which, at call of its possessor, evoked a spirit that did all things, from the building of a palace to the rocking of a cradle, and filled the air with an invisible presence. As protector it is of immeasurable power,—like a fifteen-inch Columbiad pointed from a Monitor. Ay, Sir, the ballot is the Columbiad of our political life, and every citizen who has it is a full-armed Monitor.

Having pleaded for the freedman, I now plead for the Republic; for to each alike the ballot is a necessity. It is idle to expect any true peace while the freedman is robbed of this transcendent right, and left a prey to a vengeance too ready to wreak upon him the disappointment of defeat. The country, sympathetic with him, will be in perpetual unrest. With him it will suffer; with him alone can it cease to suffer. Only through him can you redress the balance of our political system and assure the safety of patriot citizens. Only through him can you save the national debt from the inevitable repudiation awaiting it, when recent Rebels in conjunction with Northern allies once more bear sway. He is our best guaranty. Use him. He was once your fellow-soldier; he has always been your fellow-man. If he was willing to die for the Republic, he is surely good enough to vote. And now that he is ready to uphold the Republic, it is madness to reject him. Had he voted originally, the Acts of Secession must have failed, treason would have been voted down. You owe this tragical war, and the debt now fastened upon the country, to the denial of this right. Vacant chairs in once happy homes, innumerable graves, saddened hearts, mothers, fathers, wives, sisters, brothers, all mourning lost ones, the poor ground by taxation never known before, all testify against the injustice by which the present freedman was not allowed to vote. Had he voted, there would have been peace. If he votes now, there will be peace. Without this you must have a standing army, which is a sorry substitute for justice. Before you is the plain alternative of the ballot-box or the cartridge-box: choose ye between them.

Reason, too, in every way and with every voice, cries out in unison with necessity. All policies, all expediencies, all economies take up the cry. Nothing so impolitic as wrong; nothing so inexpedient as tyranny; nothing so little economical as the spirit of caste. Justice is the highest policy, the truest expediency, and the most comprehensive economy. In this inspiration act. Do you wish to save the national credit, still imperilled by fatal injustice, and to secure gold as the national currency? Then do not let the question of Equal Rights disturb the country with volcanic throes. You complain that labor is unorganized, and that the cotton crop fails. Do you wish labor to smile and cotton to grow? Then sow the land with Human Rights, and encircle it round about with Justice. The freedman will not, cannot work, while you deny his rights. Cotton will not, cannot grow in such an atmosphere. Absurd to expect it. Using the freedman as you now do, you imitate those barbarous Irish who insisted upon ploughing by the horse’s tail, until an Act of Parliament interfered to require ploughing by harness. The infinite folly must be corrected, if for no higher reason than because it is unprofitable. But it is contrary to Nature, and on this account renders the whole social system insecure. Where Human Rights are set at nought, there can be no tranquillity except that of force, which is despotism. The philosophy of history, speaking by one of its oracles, the great Italian Vico, confirms this lesson, when it says, most sententiously, that “nothing out of its natural state can either easily subsist or last long.” Truer words were never uttered, as statement of philosophy, or warning to injustice enacted into law.

Gratitude, in unison with necessity and reason, takes up the cry, insisting that we shall not fail in duty to benefactors. It is difficult to measure the extent of this obligation, which is vast in proportion to regard for Human Rights and the value set upon the Union. By their strong arms and patriot example the national strength was aggrandized. As Freedom stamped her foot, black armies sprang from the ground. To save the Republic they toiled, digging trenches and making of their bodies breastworks; for the Republic they bled. Toiling and fighting, they became copartners in the government. And shall we now disown the copartnership? Receiving them into our embattled lines, the Republic is estopped against all denial of their Equal Rights. Acts stronger than words created the unimpeachable estoppel. They aided the victories by which the Republic was assured in unity. Is there no assurance for them also?

If that “more perfect union” proclaimed in the National Constitution as a primary object has been obtained at last, it is through them. If the terrible crime of Slavery, for which the Republic suffered in strength and good name, is ended, and the Republic thereby exalted, it is through them. They helped our deliverance. To them, therefore, are we bound as debtor to creditor, as just man to benefactor. By their undoubted service we are under perpetual obligation of doing to them as they did to us. We must deliver them. Here justice commands; but another sentiment, proceeding from the heart, lends persuasive influence. Failing in present duty, the Republic will lose a precious possession, as full of sweetness as of strength.

“Sweet is the breath of vernal shower, The bee’s collected treasures sweet, Sweet music’s melting fall; but sweeter yet The still, small voice of Gratitude.”[191]

Mr. President, already I have taken too much time, and still the great theme, in various and multitudinous relations, continues to open before us. At each step it rises in some new aspect, assuming every shape of interest and of duty,—now with voice of command, and then with voice of persuasion. The national security, the national faith, the good of the freedman, the concerns of business, agriculture, justice, peace, reconciliation, obedience to God,—these are among the forms it takes. In the name of all these I speak to-day, hoping to do something for my country, and especially for that unhappy portion which has been arrayed in arms against us. The people there are my fellow-citizens, and gladly would I hail them, if they would permit, as no longer a “section,” no longer “the South,” but an integral part of the Republic, under a Constitution which, knowing no North and no South, cannot tolerate “sectional” pretension. Gladly, in all sincerity, do I offer my best effort for their welfare. But I see clearly that there is nothing in the compass of mortal power so important to them in every respect, morally, politically, and economically, that there is nothing with such certain promise to them of beneficent result, that there is nothing so sure to make their land smile with industry and fertility, as the decree of Equal Rights I now invoke. Let the judgment go forth to cover them with blessings, sure to descend upon their children in successive generations. They have given us war: we offer them peace. They have raged against us in the name of Slavery: we send them back the benediction of justice for all. They menace hate: we ask them to accept in return all the sacred charities of country, together with oblivion of the past. This is our “Measure for Measure.” This is our retaliation. This is our only revenge.

All omens are with the Republic, destined yet to win its sublimest triumphs. Timid or perverse counsels may postpone the gladsome consummation; but the contest now begun can end only when Slavery is completely transformed by a metamorphosis which shall substitute justice for injustice, riches for poverty, and beauty for deformity. From history we learn not only the past, but the future. By the study of what has been we know what must be, according to unerring law. Call it, if you please, the logic of events, and infer the inevitable conclusion. Or call it, if you please, the Rule of Three, and from the result of certain forces determine the proportionate result of increased forces. There can be no mistake in the answer. And so it is plain that the Equal Rights of All will be established. Amid all seeming vicissitudes the work proceeds. Soon or late the final victory will be won,—I believe soon. Speeches cannot stop it; crafty machinations cannot change it. Against its irresistible movement politicians are as impotent as those old conjurers who imagined that

“By rhymes they could pull down full soon From lofty sky the wandering moon.”[192]

These verses, which shine on the black-letter page of the great lawyer, Sir Edward Coke, aptly describe the incantations of our day to pull down Justice from her lofty sky. It cannot be done. In this conviction I observe what comes to pass without losing faith. I listen with composure to arguments which ought not to be made, and I see with equal composure how individual opinions swing between Congress and the President. It is not to the oscillations of the pendulum that we look for the measure of time, but to the face of the public clock and the striking of the church bell. The indications of that clock and the striking of that bell leave little room for doubt.

In the fearful tragedy drawing to a close there is a destiny, stern and irresistible as that of the Greek drama, which seems to master all that is done, hurrying on the death of Slavery and its whole brood of sin. There is also a Christian Providence which watches this battle for right, caring especially for the poor and downtrodden who have no helper. The freedman, still writhing under cruel oppression, lifts his voice to God the Avenger. It is for us to save ourselves from righteous judgment. Never with impunity can you outrage human nature. Our country, which is guilty still, is paying still the grievous penalty. Therefore by every motive of self-preservation we are summoned to be just. And thus is the cause associated indissolubly with the national life.

But, saving the Republic, we elevate it. Overthrowing an oppressive injustice, we give full scope to the principles of the National Government, and fulfil the “idea of a perfect commonwealth” which has charmed the visions of philosophy and poetry. “I am all that has been, that is, and that shall be, and none among mortals has hitherto lifted my veil”: such was the enigma cut on the pavement of the Temple of the Egyptian Minerva.[193] For ages it remained unanswered; but the answer is at hand. The Republic is all that has been, that is, and that shall be; and it is your duty to lift the veil. To do less were failure; for such was the aspiration and promise of the Fathers, assuming their first vows in the family of nations. To do this will fix the example of American institutions. So long as Slavery endured, it was impossible; so long as the Black Code, wretched counterpart of Slavery, endures in any form, it is impossible. To attain this idea we must proclaim the rule of justice. Slavery thus far has been the very pivot round which the Republic revolved, while all its policy at home and abroad has radiated from this terrible centre. Hereafter the Equal Rights of All will take the place of Slavery, and the Republic will revolve on this glorious centre, whose countless, far-reaching radiations will be the happiness of the people. There is nothing the imagination can picture which will not be ours. Where justice is supreme, nothing can be wanting. There will be room for every business and for every charity. The fields will nod with increase, industry will be quickened to unimagined triumph, and life itself raised to higher service. There will be that repose which comes from harmony, and also that simplicity which comes from one prevailing law, both essential to the idea of Republic. Our country will cease to be a patchwork where different States vary in the rights they accord, and will become a Plural Unit, with one Constitution, one liberty, and one franchise. With all these things the Republic will be the synonym for justice and peace, since these things will be inseparable from its name. In our longings we need not repair to philosophy or poetry. Nor need we go back to the memorable sage who declared that the best government was where every citizen rushed to the defence of the humblest as if he were the state, for all this will be ours. Nor need we go back to the patriot king, in ancient tragedy, who, inspired by the republican idea, called for the vote of the people:—

“For them I made supreme, And on this city, with an equal right For all to vote, its freedom have bestowed.”[194]

Here, at last, among us all this will be assured, and the Republic will be of such renown and virtue that all at home or abroad who bear the American name may exclaim with more than Roman pride, “I am an American citizen!”—and if danger approaches, they may repeat the same cry with more than Roman confidence, knowing well that this title will be a sufficient protection. Then will be renewed the story of the two sticks in the prophecy of Ezekiel: “Behold, I will take the stick of Joseph, which is in the hand of Ephraim, and the tribes of Israel his fellows, and will put them with him, even with the stick of Judah, and make them one stick, and they shall be one in mine hand.”[195]

Sir, it is for you now to determine if all this shall be fulfilled. The whole case is before you in its grandeur and its humanity, infinite as human aspiration, beautiful as the vision of a republic. Turn not away from it. Vindicate the great cause, I entreat you, by the suppression of all oligarchical pretensions, and the establishment of those equal rights without which republican government is a name, and nothing more. Strike at the Black Code, as you have already struck at the Slave Code. There is little to choose between them. Strike at once; strike hard. You have already proclaimed Emancipation; proclaim Enfranchisement also. Nor longer stultify yourselves by setting at nought the practical principle of the Fathers, that all just government stands only on the consent of the governed, and its inseparable corollary, that taxation without representation is tyranny. What was once true is true forever, although we may for a time lose sight of it; and this is the case with those imperishable truths to which you have been, alas! so indifferent. Thus far the work is only half done. See that it is finished. Save the freedman from the outrage which is his daily life. As a slave he was “a tool without a soul.” If you have ceased to treat him according to this ancient definition, it is only because you treat him even as something less. In your cruel arithmetic he is only a “cipher,” without the protection which the slave sometimes found in the self-interest of the master; or rather let me say he is only a “cipher” where rights are concerned, but a numeral counted by millions where taxes are to be paid. Not only is the freedman compelled to pay, he must fight also, and he must obey the laws,—three things he cannot escape. But, according to the primal principle of republican government, he has an indefeasible right to a voice in determining how to be taxed, when to fight, and what laws to obey,—all of which can be secured only through the ballot. Thus again do I bring you to the same conclusion, confronting us at every point and at every stage, as a commandment not to be disobeyed.

Would you secure all the just fruits of this terrible war, and trample out the Rebellion in its pernicious assumptions, as in its arms? You cannot hesitate; and this is the last stage of the argument. The Rebellion began in two assumptions, both proceeding from South Carolina: first, the sovereignty of the States, with the pretended right of secession; and, secondly, the superiority of the white race, with the pretended right of caste, oligarchy, and monopoly, on account of color. The first was often announced in many ways. The second showed itself at the beginning, when South Carolina, conspicuous among the Thirteen States, allowed her Constitution to be degraded by an exclusion on account of color; but it did not receive authoritative statement until a later day, when that false evangelist, Mr. Calhoun, taking issue with the Declaration of Independence, audaciously announced in the Senate that to declare all born free and equal was “the most dangerous of all political errors”; that it had “done more to retard the cause of liberty and civilization, and is doing more at present, than all other causes combined”; and that “we now begin to experience the danger of admitting so great an error to have a place in the Declaration of our Independence.”[196] These two assumptions are kindred in effrontery. All agree that the dogma of State sovereignty must be repelled; but this is less offensive than the other, having the same origin, that the Declaration of Independence is “the most dangerous of all political errors.” To repel such effrontery is not enough; it must be scorned.

The Gospel according to Calhoun is only another statement of the imposture, that this august Republic, founded to sustain the rights of Human Nature, is nothing but “a white man’s government.” The whole assumption is ignoble, utterly unsupported by history, and insulting to the Fathers, while offensively illogical and irreligious. It is illogical, inasmuch as our fathers, when they declared that all men are created equal, gave expression to a truth of political science, which, from the nature of the case, admits no exception. As axiom it is without exception; for it is the essence of an axiom, whether in geometry or morals, to be universal. As abstract truth it is also without exception, according to the requirement of such truth. And, finally, as self-evident truth, so announced in the great Declaration, it is without exception; for only such truth can be self-evident. Thus, whether axiom, abstract truth, or self-evident truth, it is always universal. But the assumption is not only illogical, it is irreligious, inasmuch as it flies in the face of that living truth which appears twice at the Creation: first, when God said, “Let us make man in our image”; and, secondly, in the unity of the race, then divinely appointed, and which appears again in the Gospel, when it said, “God, that made the world, and all things therein, hath made of one blood all nations of men.” According to the best testimony, the present population of the earth—embracing Caucasians, Mongolians, Malays, Africans, and Americans—is about thirteen hundred millions, of whom only three hundred and seventy-five millions are “white,” or little more than one fourth; so that, in claiming exclusive rights for “white,” you degrade nearly three quarters of the human family, made in the “image of God” and declared to be of “one blood,” while you sanction a caste offensive to religion, an oligarchy inconsistent with republican government, and a monopoly which has the Human Family as the subject of its tyrannical usurpation.

Against this assumption I protest with mind, soul, and heart. It is false in religion, false in statesmanship, and false in economy. It is an extravagance, which, if enforced, is foolish tyranny. Show me a creature, with lifted countenance looking to heaven, made in the image of God, and I show you A MAN, who, of whatever country or race, whether browned by equatorial sun or blanched by northern cold, is with you a child of the Heavenly Father, and equal with you in all the rights of Human Nature. You cannot deny these rights without impiety. And so, as God linked the national welfare with national duty, you cannot deny these rights without peril to the Republic. It is not enough that you have given Liberty. By the same title that we claim Liberty do we claim Equality also. One cannot be denied without the other. What is Equality without Liberty? What is Liberty without Equality? One is the complement of the other. The two are necessary to begin and complete the circle of American citizenship. They are the inseparable organs through which the people have their national life. They are the two vital principles of republican government, without which, government, although republican in name, cannot be republican in fact. These two vital principles belong to those divine statutes graven on the soul of Universal Man, even of the slave who forgets them, and of the master who denies them, and, whether forgotten or denied, more enduring than marble or brass, for they share the perpetuity of the human family.

Notes in this chapter

Note 1 · On Government, No. I.: Works, ed. Sparks, Vol. II. p. 279.Note 2 · Some Good Whig Principles: Ibid., pp. 372, 373.Note 3 · Writings, Vol. VII. p. 75.Note 4 · Ibid., Vol. VI. p. 605.Note 5 · Writings, Vol. VI. p. 607.Note 6 · Notes on Virginia, Query XIV.: Ibid., Vol. VIII. p. 385.Note 7 · Thoughts on Lotteries, February, 1826: Ibid., Vol. IX. p. 508.Note 8 · Debates in the Federal Convention, June 6, 1787: Madison Papers, Vol. II. pp. 805, 806.Note 9 · Ibid., August 7, 1787, Vol. III. p. 1253.Note 10 · Ibid., Note to Speech of August 7, 1787, Appendix, No. 4, Vol. III. p. ix.Note 11 · Ibid., p. xii.Note 12 · Ibid., p. xiii.Note 13 · Federalist, No. XXXIX.Note 14 · Letters and other Writings, Vol. I. p. 322.Note 15 · Letters and other Writings, Vol. III. p. 190.Note 16 · Ibid., Vol. IV. p. 60.Note 17 · Remarks in the Federal Convention: Works, Vol. II. pp. 416, 417.Note 18 · Remarks in the Federal Convention: Works, Vol. II. p. 418.Note 19 · Phocion, Letter II.: Ibid., pp. 315, 316.Note 20 · Ibid., p. 316.Note 21 · The Federalist, No. LIV.—J. C. Hamilton, in the Historical Notice prefixed to his edition of the Federalist (Philadelphia, 1864), furnishes Note 22 · Correspondence between John Adams and Samuel Adams on Government, Letter IV., November 20, 1790: Works of John Adams, Vol. VI. p. 421.Note 23 · Correspondence on the Constitution, Letter I., July 20, 1789: Ibid., p. 437.Note 24 · Works, Vol. IV. p. 293.Note 25 · Speech in the South Carolina Convention, May 14, 1788: Elliot’s Debates (2d edit.), Vol. IV. pp. 326, 328.Note 26 · Debates in the Federal Convention, August 21, 1787: Madison Papers, Vol. III. p. 1388.Note 27 · Elliot’s Debates, Vol. I. p. 374.Note 28 · Debates in the Federal Convention, August 7, 1787: Madison Papers, Vol. III. p. 1252.Note 29 · Construction Construed, p. 312.Note 30 · Address at laying the Corner-Stone of the Addition to the Capitol, July 4, 1851: Works, Vol. II. p. 601.Note 31 · Argument in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Case of Luther v. Borden, January 27, 1848: Works, Vol. VI. p. 222.Note 32 · The State v. Manuel, 4 Devereux and Battle, R., 25.Note 33 · Hening, Statutes at Large, Vol. IV. pp. 133, 134.Note 34 · Opinion of Richard West, January 16, 1723, addressed to the Right Honorable the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, on an Act of VNote 35 · Petition of Joseph Boone to the Lords Proprietors of Carolina: Dalcho, Historical Account of the Protestant Episcopal Church in South CaroliNote 36 · Essais, Liv. I. chs. 3, 19.Note 37 · See, ante, p. 149.Note 38 · P. Janet, Histoire de la Philosophie Morale et Politique, Tom. II. p. 371.Note 39 · Considérations sur le Gouvernement de la France, quoted by Henri Martin, Histoire de France, Tom. XV. p. 358. See, also, his Mémoires, Tom. Note 40 · Idées Républicaines, §§ 13, 43: Œuvres (1784), Tom. XXIX. pp. 190, 203.Note 41 · Dictionnaire Philosophique, art. Démocratie: Ibid., Tom. XXXIX. p. 254.Note 42 · Ce que les Citoyens ont Droit d’attendre de leurs Représentants, 10 Avril, 1793: Œuvres, par O’Connor et Arago, (Paris, 1847-49,) Tom. XII. Note 43 · Institutions du Droit de la Nature et des Gens (Paris, 1851), Tom. I. pp. 51, 52, Liv. I. ch. 5, § 4.Note 44 · Buchez et Roux, Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française, Tom. XXXVIII. p. 458.Note 45 · Proclamation, 10 Juillet, 1802, pour l’Anniversaire du 14 Juillet, 1789: Correspondance du Napoléon I., No. 6180, (Paris, 1861, Imprim. ImpéNote 46 · Garnier-Pagès, Histoire de la Révolution de 1848, Tom. V. p. 338.Note 47 · Ibid., p. 348.Note 48 · Garnier-Pagès, Histoire de la Révolution de 1848, Tom. VII. p. 407.Note 49 · De la Démocratie en Amérique (14me édit.), Tom. III. pp. 526, 527, Ch. 7.Note 50 · Block, Dictionnaire de la Politique, art. République.Note 51 · Additional Observations on the Nature and Value of Civil Liberty (London, 1777), Introduction, p. ix.Note 52 · Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations (New York, 1845), p. 751.Note 53 · Ashby v. White et als., Lord Raymond, R., 953.Note 54 · No. XIV.Note 55 · De Republica, Lib. II. c. 6.Note 56 · Literature of Europe, Part II. ch. 4, § 52.Note 57 · Politics, Book III. ch. 7 [12].Note 58 · Sarpi, Opinione come debba governarsi internamente la Republica di Venezia per avere il perpetuo Dominio, p. 13.Note 59 · Luther v. Borden et al.: 7 Howard, R., 42.Note 60 · Elliot’s Debates (2d edit.), Vol. III. p. 367.Note 61 · M’Culloch v. Bank of Maryland: 4 Wheaton, R., pp. 409, 421.Note 62 · Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee: 1 Wheaton, R., 326.Note 63 · Lives, tr. Langhorne: Solon, c. 14.Note 64 · Morals, ed. Goodwin: Of Brotherly Love, c. 12.Note 65 · Virgil, Æneid, tr. Pitt, Book VI., 204, 205 [143, 144].Note 66 · Gray, Ode for Music, st. v.Note 67 · Coke, Institutes, Third Part, p. 44.Note 68 · Plutarch, Of Isis and Osiris, Ch. IX.Note 69 · Euripides, The Suppliants: Tragedies, tr. Wodhull, Vol. II. p. 20.—Milton, in his Answer to Salmasius, has used this text; and in the EnglisNote 70 · Ezekiel, xxxvii. 19.Note 71 · Speech on the Bill to establish a Territorial Government in Oregon, June 27, 1848: Works, Vol. IV. pp. 511, 512.
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