Volume 9 — TAX ON SLAVE-MASTERS.

Speeches in the Senate, on Amendment to the Internal Tax Bill, May 28 and June 6, 1862.

While voting and speaking against a tax on cotton, Mr. Sumner was anxious to tax Slavery, and this he sought to accomplish by a tax on those who pretended to hold slaves.

May 28th, he moved the following amendment:—

“And be it further enacted, That any person who shall claim the service or labor for life of any other person, under the laws of any State, shall pay, on account of such person so claimed, the sum of ten dollars.”

And then said:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—A tax of ten dollars on account of each slave will give $40,000,000. And in putting the tax at ten dollars I follow the precedent of the Constitution, which taxes slaves imported at ten dollars. I do not disguise that on this question I have shared the doubts of others. Of course, no tax would be tolerable which gave any sanction to property in man; and it has been feared that a tax on slaves might be interpreted into such sanction. This fear is not unnatural to persons shocked by the idea of Slavery. It was early avowed by Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, whose sensibility is recorded by Madison in his report of the debates in the Federal Convention.

“He was opposed to a tax on slaves imported, as making the matter worse, because it implied they were property.”[62]

Again, a few days later, when the same clause of the Constitution was under discussion, Mr. Sherman repeated his objection, and the following debate occurred, which seems to exhaust the argument on both sides.

“Mr. Sherman was against this second part, as acknowledging men to be property, by taxing them as such under the character of slaves.

“Colonel Mason. Not to tax will be equivalent to a bounty on the importation of slaves.

“Mr. Gorham thought that Mr. Sherman should consider the duty, not as implying that slaves are property, but as a discouragement to the importation of them.

“Mr. Gouverneur Morris remarked, that, as the clause now stands, it implies that the Legislature may tax freemen imported.

“Mr. Sherman, in answer to Mr. Gorham, observed, that the smallness of the duty showed revenue to be the object, not the discouragement of the importation.

“Mr. Madison thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men. The reason of duties did not hold, as slaves are not, like merchandise, consumed, &c.

“Colonel Mason, in answer to Mr. Gouverneur Morris. The provision, as it stands, was necessary for the case of convicts, in order to prevent the introduction of them.”[63]

After this discussion, the clause as found in the Constitution, laying “a tax or duty on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person,” was adopted, nem. con. Thus it appears that Sherman, Morris, Franklin, and Gerry, to say nothing of Madison, all known for opposition to Slavery, and determination to give it no sanction, concurred in this proposition. They felt that a tax or duty, thus arranged, was not a sanction of Slavery.

The same question is now presented to us. Clearly there can be no such thing as property in man. The whole idea is offensive and odious. There is no revenue, whatever be its amount, to compensate for this recognition. Better be poor, better be pinched in means, better forego much needed supplies, than obtain help through any such sacrifice. But the same considerations which induced our fathers, with all their avowed scruples, to sustain such a tax or duty, may properly influence us.

It is the boast of the Constitution that it knows nobody as a slave. All are “persons.” But at the same time it does not assume to interfere with a well-known State institution by which “persons” are degraded to be property. The condition of the slave is anomalous. He is property by local law; he is a “person” by the Constitution. But nobody questions the existence of Slavery. It is a monstrous fact, beyond reach in the States, except through the War Power, and yet none the less a fact, which taxation will only recognize, and not sanction. It is an intolerable nuisance intrenched in State lines; but we shall not treat it otherwise than as nuisance, when we tax it. In taxing it we do not assume its rightfulness; we only assume its undeniable existence as a fact, and nothing else.

If our tax were an encouragement, it would be clearly immoral. But it is a discouragement. Exemption from taxation is encouragement. Taxation is discouragement just in proportion to its extent, until, in the progress of events, it becomes destructive. Regarding the present question in this light, our course is plain. It is not permissible to encourage Slavery, while every principle of economy and every sentiment of justice and humanity urge its discouragement.

But it is said that the Constitution prohibits a capitation tax, “unless in proportion to the census.” The tax I propose is not a capitation tax, any more than the tax on auctioneers, or lawyers, or jugglers, or peddlers, or slaughterers of cattle is a capitation tax. According to lexicographers, a capitation tax is a poll tax, a tax on each individual. Now this tax makes no pretension to be a poll tax, or a tax on each individual. It is a tax on a person who claims the service or labor of another for life, proportioned to the extent of his claim. In other words, it is a tax on a claim of property; and when I tax this claim, surely I do not recognize its morality, nor do I accord to it any sanction.

If it be said, that at one time I insist the slave shall have all the rights of “persons” under the Constitution, while I now insist that his master shall pay a tax on his claim of property, I reply, that there is no inconsistency, but perfect harmony. By an unquestionable rule of interpretation, applicable to the Constitution, every word must be construed in favor of Liberty, so as most to promote Liberty. According to this rule, every presumption is in favor of Liberty. But, while insisting upon every such presumption, it does not follow that the counter claim shall not be taxed. Indeed, the same principle which inclines in favor of the slave must incline also to tax the claim of his master, so long as this claim exists in fact. Freedom is to be enlarged in every way possible, whether by encouraging the slave or discouraging the master. Therefore do I say fearlessly, that the slave, whenever he appears within the national jurisdiction or before national tribunals, is entitled to all the rights of “persons”; but the master, who asserts this odious property, cannot claim any immunity for it on this account. The indulgence is all for the slave, and not at all for the master. For the slave Congress must do everything in its power; for the master Congress must have nothing but disapprobation and discouragement.

These are reasons that influence me, and I present them now in order to influence those who hesitate to impose this tax, on the old idea of Roger Sherman, that it will be a recognition of property in man. Of course, where Senators have no such scruple, the argument for this tax is unanswerable.

It is easy to levy.

It is profitable.

And so far as it exerts an influence, it must be a discouragement to an offensive wrong, which is the parent of our present troubles, and the occasion of all this taxation. It would be strange, if Slavery, after causing our national calamity, should escape from all its consequences. It would be strange, if Slavery, which has played the tyrant thus far in our history, should now, like the tyrant, be so far indulged as to escape burdens of all kinds. It shall not be by my vote.

Subsequently Mr. Sumner modified his amendment, by accepting a substitute drawn by Mr. Simmons, of Rhode Island, in behalf of the Finance Committee, who suggested, that “the section, as presented by the Senator from Massachusetts, might leave the slave liable to be sold to pay the tax, and that conflicts about as much with the Senator’s notions as he could well have drawn any provision to do so.” Mr. Sumner had no anxiety on this head, and said at once:—

Perhaps the Senator and myself start from different points. I do not think the United States can own a slave. I cannot doubt, that, if a slave should be seized under process of the United States, he would be taken to Freedom, and not to Slavery, for the simple reason that the nation cannot own a slave. Therefore any special provision for this emergency is superfluous. I rest in the conviction, that, when a slave passes into the hands of the United States, he at once becomes free.

Mr. Sumner added, that the proposition he had presented was “in the plainest form and fewest words,” and on this account had merits of its own.

Mr. Collamer hoped Mr. Sumner would accept the substitute, and thought “ten dollars a head on all ages and conditions an unreasonable tax.”

The substitute accepted by Mr. Sumner was as follows.

“Sec.—And be it further enacted, That an annual tax of five dollars shall be paid by every person or persons, corporation, or society, for and on account of the service or labor of every other person between the ages of ten and sixty-five years, whose service or labor, for a term of years or for life, is claimed to be owned by such first mentioned person or persons, corporation, or society, whether in a fiduciary capacity or otherwise, under and by virtue of the laws or customs of any State; and said annual tax shall be levied and collected of the person or persons, corporation, or society, making such claim, and of their goods, chattels, or lands, as is herein before provided; but in no case shall the person or persons whose service or labor is so claimed, or their service or labor, be sold for the purpose of collecting said tax: Provided, That this tax shall not apply to service due to parents.”[64]

Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, took the lead in answer to Mr. Sumner, and in opposition to his amendment. After insisting that slaves are “persons,” and that, if the amendment be adopted, “they will be the only persons taxed under this bill,” he said:—

“If the Senator had made his argument yesterday, when we proposed to tax cotton, a production which goes into manufactures, what he has said would apply with great force. Cotton is a production of slave labor solely.… All his arguments apply to cotton as a subject of taxation; but he convinced a majority of the Senate yesterday that it was not expedient to tax cotton; and now he proposes to tax slaves, and how?… With all our immense resources, we cannot now collect it, except from the loyal people who live in the Border States, who now recognize our flag and are subject to our law. I am not willing to select them as the first to bear a heavy and peculiar taxation. I believe that the true course is to insist upon the tax on cotton.”[65]

The special points of Mr. Sherman’s opposition appear in Mr. Sumner’s reply.

Mr. President,—I will make one remark in reply to the Senator from Ohio. He objects to my proposition as in the nature of a direct tax, or poll tax. How is this? Has not the Senator voted to tax auctioneers, lawyers, jugglers, and slaughterers of cattle, all being classes of persons in the community?

Mr. Sherman. To tax their employments.

Mr. Sumner. And I propose to tax the employment of the slave-master,—that is all. It is the business of the slave-master to make the slave work. This is his high vocation. In other words, his business consists in using the service and labor of another. And to this class of persons he belongs. Is it not plain? Can there be any doubt? Look at it. He is an auctioneer of human rights, a broker of human labor, a juggler of human sufferings and human sympathies,—I might say a slaughterer of human hopes; and, Sir, if the Senator from Ohio can tax auctioneer, broker, juggler, or slaughterer of cattle, I am at a loss to understand why he cannot tax the peculiar form of these vocations all concurring in the slave-master. He is swift to tax the less, but hesitates to tax the greater. He can tax the petty employment, which is not immoral or cruel; but he will not tax the larger multiform employment, in which immorality and cruelty commingle.

But the Senator says it is a capitation or poll tax. Not, Sir, in the sense of the Constitution. On this I stand. It is simply a tax on a productive claim of property, or, to borrow the language of the Senator a moment ago, on an “employment.” It is nothing but that.

The Senator thinks it improper to tax slave-masters, especially when we have cotton for taxation; and he almost chides me, because yesterday I was against the cotton tax, which in his judgment is most proper. Sir, I am at a loss to find the parallel between the two cases implied in supposing that one can be a substitute for the other. They are unlike in every respect. Slaves and cotton belong to the same section of country, precisely as alligators and cotton; and that is all the parallel between them. Cotton is an agricultural product, entering into commerce and manufactures, while the manufactures made from it are important to all classes, but especially the poor. The question of its taxation involves considerations of economy and policy utterly unlike those arising on the motion to tax the claim of the slave-master. It is difficult to see how the two taxes can be confounded. One is a tax on an agricultural product; the other is a tax on an odious claim. The Senator will not say that it is an acceptable claim under the Constitution. Even if there, it is disguised under ambiguous words. Indeed, he knows well that it is offensive and repugnant to the conscience of good people. Shall not such a claim be taxed? Shall such a claim be permitted to go scot-free? Shall we run about the country, seeking class after class to visit with oppressive taxation, and, under the lead of the Senator, excuse this largest and most offensive class of all? I am at a loss to understand on what ground of principle the Senator can proceed, when he proposes this special immunity. If I use strong terms in describing slave-masters, it is because the very language of the bill suggests them, and they are in essential conformity with truth.

I believe I have answered the two objections made by the Senator from Ohio. If he made any other, it has escaped my recollection.

Mr. Sherman followed Mr. Sumner, beginning with these words:—

“I will not reply to that part of the speech of the honorable Senator from Massachusetts in which he denounced slaveholders. My opinions on this subject are well known. I think that slaveholders have certain rights under the Constitution of the United States; and while I never could be one myself, and have as deep a repugnance to any law which authorizes the holding of slaves as any other man, yet, while I am here under oath, I will respect their constitutional rights to the fullest extent. We are bound to legislate for them, and they are entitled to the protection of the Constitution of the United States as fully as if they were here, all of them, to speak for themselves; and especially I do not think it proper or courteous to use such language, applied to a whole class of people, when Senators on this floor are with us, associating with us, who are included by the appellation ‘slaveholder,’ so obnoxious to the Senator from Massachusetts. Certainly I cannot characterize so harshly any one who is a member of the same body with myself.”[66]

He then said that he intended “to put the proposition to tax cotton and the proposition to tax slaves against each other,” and that he would “propose to amend the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts by substituting a modified tax on cotton,”—that “they are connected together, and the Senator cannot disconnect them.” He then spoke of slave-masters again.

“The slaveholders of the Revolution were men of the highest purity, of the greatest patriotism. At that time Slavery was admitted to be an evil. They were men of gentleness, of courtesy, of kindness, good hearts and good heads, nearly all of them; and so are the great body of the slaveholders with whom you are brought in contact in the Border States, men of gentleness and kindness and courtesy.… Many of the most gentlemanly, courteous, kind, and patriotic men that I ever met in the world were slaveholders; and I think, that, taken as a class, the slaveholders of the Border States are men who are deserving of our commiseration, of our kindness, rather than of our reproaches.… I do not choose to select that class of men from among all the population of the Southern States and tax them, and then to apply to them opprobrious epithets.”[67]

Mr. Sumner felt called to speak again in reply, and said:—

The Senator from Ohio says that I propose a tax on “slaves,” and then carefully reminds me that “slaves” are persons, and therefore not, according to the Constitution, to be taxed, except by a capitation tax. Now, Sir, I have to say, in the first place, that the tax which I propose is not to be regarded as a tax on slaves. If applicable to persons, it is to the masters, and not to the slaves. It is a tax on slave-masters, as I have already said,—precisely like the tax on auctioneers, which is sustained by the Senator. It is a tax on a claim of property made by slave-masters. The Senator may call such a claim property or not, as he pleases. It is at least a claim of property, and as such I propose to tax it. Why not? The Senator admits that at other times slaves have been expressly taxed,—actually taxed in name. In the tax of 1815 there was a tax on “land and slaves.” The Senator does not doubt the constitutionality of such tax. Sir, I am content with this authority, which goes beyond anything that I propose, and I am not troubled by any scruple, lest, in imposing a tax on the claim of the slave-master, I recognize property in man. At most, I recognize a profitable claim, and tax it.

The remarks of the Senator were occupied chiefly with two heads,—first, eulogy of slave-masters, and, secondly, vindication of his proposed tax on cotton. I have little to say of the Senator’s eulogy. There are two authorities on that head, which the Senator will pardon me, if I place above him: I mean Mr. Jefferson and Colonel Mason, both of our early Revolutionary days. Mr. Jefferson assures us that the whole commerce between master and slave is one of boisterous passion, tending to barbarism.[68] Colonel Mason exclaimed, in the Convention to frame the Constitution, that every slave-master is born a petty tyrant.[69] And yet, Sir, in the face of this authentic testimony, from persons who knew Slavery and all its influences, the Senator eulogizes slave-masters, and pleads for their exemption from taxation. Eulogy is for the dead. I would not add to the odium justly belonging to a tyrannical class, but I do insist that justice shall be done to their victims; and when the Senator interposes eulogy, I interpose against him the rights which have been violated. So long as men persist in such outrage, so long as they persevere in maintaining an institution which annuls the parental relation, the conjugal relation, the right to instruction, the right to the fruit of one’s own labor, and does all this merely to make men work without wages, so long as men support this unjust and irrational pretence, they must not expect soft words from me. If the Senator from Ohio finds it in his generosity to plead for slave-masters, he must excuse me, if I decline to follow him. He does not know them as well as I do, nor does he know their victims as well as I do.

The Senator dwells much on the importance of a tax on cotton. The subject was fully canvassed yesterday, and the vote of the Senate was against him. He now seeks a re-hearing out of the ordinary course. Would it not be better, if his proposition were postponed to the next stage of the bill, when it will be strictly in order? Meanwhile, in pursuance of my promise to be brief, I content myself with saying, that the desire of the Senate to tax cotton is no reason why they should refuse to tax the claim of the slave-master. The two are not in any way dependent upon each other. Let the Senator from Ohio carry his cotton tax, if the Senate agree with him. But, Sir, I insist, that, whether cotton is taxed or not, the claim of the slave-master shall not be permitted to escape. I do not say the property, but I say the claim. It ought to be taxed, not only for revenue, but also for the discouragement it will fasten upon an odious pretension, which has been to us the fountain of trouble and war.

Mr. Sherman’s motion to strike out the tax on slave-masters and insert the tax on cotton was then lost,—Yeas 15, Nays 22.

Mr. Henderson, of Missouri, then moved to amend the amendment of Mr. Sumner by adding,—

“And provided, further, That the tax herein prescribed shall not be levied or collected in any State where a system of gradual emancipation may have been adopted at the time of the collection.”

May 29th, this was lost,—Yeas 15, Nays 20.

Then, on motion of Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Sumner’s amendment was further modified by substituting a tax of “two” dollars, instead of “five,” on account of each slave. Before the vote was taken, Mr. Sumner assigned the reason for the higher rate.

The Senator from Maine [Mr. Fessenden] said that he had looked simply at the revenue to be obtained by a tax. But, pray, will not a larger revenue be obtained at the rate of five dollars than at the rate of two? There are the slaves,—count them, and tax them. The process is simple, with no chance of evasion. Besides, Sir, I cannot forget, nor can the Senator, that throughout our history we have heard constantly of “incidental protection.” But, if incidental protection is just and expedient, then is incidental discouragement, and the tax I propose may be sustained on this ground. We do not hesitate to tax whiskey and tobacco as luxuries, indulgences, vices. Why should we hesitate to tax the worst luxury, the worst indulgence, the worst vice of all, which is Slavery? Therefore, for a double reason, first, for the sake of revenue, and, secondly, for the sake of discouragement to Slavery, I am for the larger tax.

After further debate, the question was taken on the amendment of Mr. Sumner as modified, and resulted, Yeas 14, Nays 22. So the amendment was lost.

June 5th, at the next stage of the bill, Mr. Sumner moved his amendment in the following form:—

“And be it further enacted, That every person claiming the service or labor of any other person as a slave shall pay a tax of two dollars on account of every person so claimed: but in no case shall any person so claimed be sold for the purpose of collecting the tax.”

The yeas and nays were ordered, and, being taken, resulted, Yeas 19, Nays 16. So the amendment was agreed to.

June 6th, Mr. Anthony, of Rhode Island, who had voted for the tax on slaves, moved a reconsideration, not because he had changed his opinion, but, as he said, at the request of Senators. This was to give an opportunity for another vote.

In the debate which ensued the amendment was assailed by Mr. Doolittle, Mr. Browning, Mr. Cowan, and Mr. Hale. The latter quoted the words,—

and insisted, that, however it might be called, it was a tax on slaves; on which Mr. Wade remarked from his seat, “So much the better.” Mr. Sumner said in reply:—

MR. PRESIDENT,—I presume there is no difference among Senators in desire to follow the Constitution. The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. Hale], on my right, cannot be more desirous to follow it than the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Wilmot], on my left. In that respect they are equal. Nor do I believe that the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Browning], over the way, can claim any particular monopoly of such devotion. In that respect, Sir, we are all equal. Our difference is as to the meaning of the Constitution. But it is a poor argument which finds its chief force in asseverations of devotion to the Constitution. Conscious of my obligation to support it, and of my loyalty, I make no such asseverations.

Nor again, Sir, do I believe that the Senator from New Hampshire can take to himself any monopoly of praise for denying the whole offensive pretension of property in man. Is he more earnest in this denial than many other Senators? Is he more earnest than the Senator from Pennsylvania near me? Is he more earnest than myself? Has he denied it oftener in debate or public speech? To me the pretension is absurd as it is wicked. A man may as well claim property in a star as in his fellow-man. And yet, Sir, with this conviction, I cannot forget that I am here, as a Senator, to legislate with regard to existing institutions, and to see things as they are. I cannot be blind to the fact of Slavery. Slavery exists as a monstrous fact, an enormity, if you please, but still it exists; and as a legislator I am to act on its existence. Am I not right? Can I presume on this occasion to be guided by my inner conviction that there is no property in man, when, looking to the Slave States, I am compelled to see the great, unquestionable fact of pretended property? To my mind, it is more practical to recognize the fact, and to proceed accordingly.

The Senator from Illinois insists that this is a capitation tax, and he reads the text of the Constitution. What is a capitation tax? The precise definition in Webster’s Dictionary—if the Senator will excuse me for going to an authority which is not a law book—is “a tax or imposition upon each head or person, a poll tax.” Such is the tax with regard to which the provision of the Constitution read by the Senator was adopted. This provision is not applicable to any other tax, but simply to this special tax.

Already I have reminded the Senator that he has voted to tax auctioneers, to tax jugglers, to tax the slaughterers of cattle, and to tax lawyers. I might add other classes. I now propose that he should tax claimants of slaves, a class offensive to reason and humanity. That is all. If you look at the census of 1850,—that of 1860 is not yet published,—you will find among the different classes of our population the following: mariners, 70,000,—I will not give the hundreds; merchants, 100,000; planters, 27,000; wheelwrights, 30,000; teachers, 29,000; tailors, 52,000; overseers, 18,000; lawyers, 23,000; farmers, 2,363,000; slaveholders, 347,000.

Now, Sir, would any one say that a tax on the business of the mariner was a capitation tax? Would any one say that a tax on the business of merchants, of whom we have one hundred thousand, was a capitation tax? Would any one say that a tax on the business of the planter was a capitation tax? that a tax on the business of the wheelwright was a capitation tax? that a tax on the business of teachers was a capitation tax? that a tax on the business of tailors was a capitation tax? that a tax on the business of overseers of plantations, who apply the lash, of whom there are eighteen thousand, was a capitation tax? that a tax on lawyers, already voted by the Senator from Illinois, was a capitation tax? that a tax on farmers, if you will, of whom, happily, we have two million three hundred and sixty-three thousand, was a capitation tax? And will any one say that a tax on slave-masters, of whom, unhappily, we have three hundred and forty-seven thousand, is a capitation tax? Senators may imagine it a capitation tax, Senators may call it a capitation tax, but no imagination and no energy of assertion can make it so. It is not a capitation tax. It is a tax on the claim of the slave-master in the bones and muscles, the labor and service of his fellow-man, and, so far as the tax can have any influence, it must discredit and discourage such claim. Therefore, Sir, I say confidently that the tax is in every respect constitutional, and it is also a tax well worthy of adoption, because, at a moment when Slavery stands revealed as the very pest of our land, it will operate to discredit and discourage it.

In no other way can you obtain so much revenue so easily and so beneficently. But if you refuse to impose this tax, you concede a special immunity to a most offensive pretension, and leave those who profit by it to gather their profits without any of that burden so freely imposed upon the honest industry of the country, and upon so many classes of our citizens.

The motion to reconsider was carried,—Yeas 22, Nays 18.

The question then recurred on the amendment, and it was lost,—Yeas 17, Nays 23.

This narrative shows how the effort to tax Slavery finally failed, not on its merits, but from tenderness to slave-masters of the Border States.